– Vision for the market model of

integrated European electricity markets–

Contents

 Research project
 Background:
 Electricity markets
 Energy policy of the EU
 Development patterns of electricity markets
 Market models
 Wholesale electricity markets
 Retail electricity markets
 Scanning for the future
 Forming the vision
 Description of the vision
 Conclusions
Vision for European Electricity Markets in 2030 –
research project
- Carried out between April 2010 and April 2011 at
Lappeenranta University of Technology
- Commissioned by the Finnish Energy Industries
(ET), the Finnish Electricity Research Pool, Suomen ElFi
Oy, the Finnish Forest Industries Federation, the
Federation of Finnish Technology Industries and Nord
Pool Spot AS
- The objective of the research project was to establish a
vision of the future electricity market model in Europe
- Efficient, responds to the climate challenge and
guarantees the security supply of electricity in
sustainable and economic way
- In this research project
- In the literary research, the international electricity
market models were studied
- Different interest group meetings, workshops and
surveys were organized to establish the prospects
of electricity markets
Electricity markets Generation

− Electricity markets comprise supply and

demand of electricity
− Supply comprises Transmission
generation, selling, transmission and
distribution
− Transmission and distribution are
regulated monopoly functions
− Generation and selling are under
competition
− The fundamental goals of the electricity
market deregulation have been uniform: Distribution
reducing governments’ role in the sector;
introducing competition where feasible; and Customer
increasing the demand side’s participation
− In general, competition is considered to
increase efficiency, reduce costs and
improve quality
Electricity markets

− Special features of electricity markets:

− Generation and consumption must be balanced all the time
− Storing of electricity economically in large quantities is not yet possible
− Transmission networks define market model
− Transmission networks enbale the transmission of electricity from
lower price area to higher price area
− If electricity can be transmitted almost always like desired, it can be
said, that ”the electric power networks provides a market place for
electricity”
− If transmission connections are repeatedly congested and prevent
the flow of power in desired direction in the market area, the need to
find tools to control the system congestions starts to dictate the
design of the market model
 Pricing principle
− Marginal pricing directs the merit order of Price

generation so that the production with the

lowest marginal cost is the first to be
Supply
brought on line while the production with
the highest marginal cost is the last
A
 Determines the price of electricity
(marginal price) Consumer surplus
Equilibrium price
 It is the intersection of demand Generator surplus

and supply curves B

− The price is same for all generators Demand

and consumers
Volume
– Another alternative is the pay-as-bid principle
– Each generator is paid according to its bid price
– Price of all consumption is the weighted average of generation bids
– Increases uncertainty, because generators are not able to predict the bids of other
generators or how the merit order is determined
– Generators add a certain risk margins to their bids and start to guess the highest bid
 European Union’s energy policy
− The common internal markets for all kinds of commodities have for
long been the target of European Union; also for electricity
− ”The second legislative energy package” 2003 set, for example, the
guidelines for the gradual liberalisation of electricity markets
− ”The third legislative energy package” specified, for example, the
instructions to creating common European internal electricity markets
− Regional electricity markets  common European electricity
market
− The bottleneck incomes should primarily be used to
guarantee the actual availability of the shared capacity or be
allocated to network investments (or lower transmission
network tariffs)
− The corner stone’s of the EU’s energy policy are:
− security of supply, competitiveness and sustainability
− 20-20-20 target affect the electricity generaion and use in future
− 20 % decrease of greenhouse emissions
Source: EU 2011
− 20 % increase of energy efficiency
− 20 % increase of the use of renewables by year 2020
Electricity generation and use

− Electricity generation and use will change in future

Sources: Finnish Energy Industries 2010, IEA World Energy Outlook 2009, Eurelectric Power Choices 2009
Development patterns of electricity markets
Flow-based network
calculation
Complexity of Splitting the market into NODAL PRICING
market structure smaller price areas
Network
congestion
challenge HYBRID MODEL
Network
investment
plans
Network ZONAL PRICING
investment
challenge
Market
integration
accelerates
Generation
challenge
Regional
market Are network investment plans
National carried out in practice?
markets
Closed
market

Time

ZONAL PRICING
Development patterns
Development patterns of electricity markets since the deregulation of markets
1. National competitive electricity markets (zonal pricing)
2. To promote competition, expand market area to regional
3. Regional markets face the generation challenge when demand-supply situation tightens
4. Expand of market area to increase the number of players and enable the sharing of resources
across a larger geographic area
5. If the transmission capacity is not sufficient between the integrated market areas, the benefits of
the larger market area are not realized
6. To increase transmission network capacity, the network investment plans are done
7. The critical inversion point is, if the transmission network plan are carried out?
8. If the investments are done, the zonal pricing model can be still used
9. If transmission congestion gets worse and new investments are not made, the market area need
to be split smaller price areas
- Smaller price areas are sometimes enough to handle the network congestion problem
- If the internal congestion is common, re-dispatching is required and opportunities of gaming
may emerge
10. One solution is to optimize dispatching within the area based on supply offers and demand bids at
each node of the network. Using the nodal calculation to derive optimal dispatching order, but not
to set prices at the nodes characterizes as some kind of hybrid model.
11. The next step is the nodal pricing, in which the use of the electricity system is optimized by
calculating the locational marginal prices at each node of the network. The nodal prices take into
account the costs of electric energy, transmission congestion and losses
 Market models
− Electricity market model covers the operation principles of the electricity wholesale
market
− Two basic models: zonal and nodal pricing
− Zonal pricing model: electricity price is calculated for price areas and
transmission capacities are taken into account separately
− Nodal pricing model: electricity price is calculated for each node of the
grid, based on the load flow calculation. The price of the node contains
energy, losses and congestion cost

Zonal pricing Nodal pricing

Calc. of the transm. system use Node price= energy,

Electricity price calculation congestion fee and losses

Single or few
Risk management: Price for each Risk management:
changes in the price node of the network congestion
area price(s) of electricity between the nodes
network

Ex post market Ex ante market

surveillance surveillance
Wholesale electricity markets

− In this connection, the following zonal and nodal markets are introduced
− Zonal pricing:
− The Nordic countries
− Central West Europe
− Nodal pricing:
− The US: PJM and Texas
− Australia
− New Zealand
− Russia
 The Nordic countries and CWE

− In this connection, the Nordic countries refers Finland, Sweden, Norway and Denmark
− Central West Europe refers France, the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany (CWE
area)
− EU legislation guides the development of the regional markets and common market
model
− Both regions uses the zonal pricing model;
 In the Nordic countries market splitting mechanism (one power exchange; one
system price and when cross-border transmissions capacity is congested splitting
to price areas)
 In the CWE area market coupling mechanism (couple exchanges; first calculating
area prices and if transmission capacity allows unifying the price areas)
− Betweeen the Nordic countries and CWE area there are market based trading
− Primary forms of generation in the Nordic countries: hydro, nuclear, coal, gas and wind
Electricity consumption is about 400 TWh in year and average system price 53 €/MWh
(2010)
− Primary forms of generation in the CWE area: coal, nuclear, renewables and oil
− Electricity consumption is about 1267 TWh in year and average spot price 50-70 €/MWh
 PJM RTO
− PJM area in the US covers the states of Pennsylvania, New
Jersey and Maryland and partly e.g. Delaware, Ohio, Virginia
and Illinois
− Electricity consumption in whole PJM area is about 710 TWh
in year and average spot price 40 €/MWh (2009)
− Primary forms of generation are coal and gas
− The market operator is RTO (Regional Transmission System
Operator), which takes care of transmission networks and
electricity price calculation
− Market model is nodal pricing so electricity price is calculated
for over 7000 nodes of the grid both day-ahead and real-time
markets
− Market surveillance is tight; the generators’ bids are surveilled
almost in real time and various price and offer caps have been
set Source: FERC Electric Power Markets 2011
− The hedging of price difference between nodes is done with
FTR (Financial Transmission Right) products
− Market participants have to participate to the obligatory
capacity markets, which guarantee the sufficient generation
investments
Texas Ercot

− The electricity markets of Texas Ercot covers almost a whole state of Texas
in the US
− Electricity consumption is about 312 TWh in year and average spot price
about 30 €/MWh (2009)
− Primary forms of generation are coal and gas
− Markets are undergoing a significance change from a zonal to a nodal
market
− 4000 nodes
− Higher price caps than in PJM; separated capacity markets do not exist
 Australia
− East Australian electricity markets (NEM) covers
New South Wales, Tasmania, South
Australia, Victoria, Queensland and Australian
Capital Territory
− States have common wholesale electricity markets
 E.g. privatization questions are decided in each
state separately
− Electricity consumption is about 210 TWh in year
and average spot price is 35-50 €/MWh (2010)
− Primary forms of generation are coal, gas and hydro
− Nodal pricing, but there are only 5 nodes, so the
calculation algorithm is much more simple than in
PJM
− Mandatory pool, only generators participate
 The market operator estimates the
consumption
− No separate real-time markets, but generators are
allowed to change once their bids before delivery
(”in good faith” )
− Hedging both bilateral financial contracts and in
exchange with financial products
Lähde: AER 2009
New Zealand

− Primary forms of generation are hydro, gas, coal, geothermal and wind
− Electricity consumption is 37 TWh in year and average spot price 35 €/MWh (2008)
− Similar nodal pricing mechanism like in PJM area, 250 nodes
− Obligatory pool, only generators participate
 Market operator estimates consumption
− Only few future products for hedging
− No FTR products for hedging price difference between nodes
 Vertical integration between generators and retailers is allowed and used as a
hedge
Russia

− Restructuring markets in 1990’s and 2003 when vertical integrated monopolies were
separated to different companies
− Electricity consumption 1023 TWh in year and primary forms of generation are thermal, hydro
and nuclear
− Market model is nodal pricing and there are almost 8000 nodes;
 System operator chooses the generators for next day based on production
notifications, demand forecasts and grid conditions
 ATS (Administrator of Trade System) receive the generation plans and offers from
demand side, and calculates the prices and amounts of electricity
− Hedging products are forwards and futures (bilateral and exchange)
− FTR products may be added later on
− Capacity markets are founded to cover the generators’ fixed costs and to encourage new
capacity investments. The generators make capacity bids and buyers are obligated to
purchase capacity corresponding to their the peak consumption from markets
− State has long capacity agreements with new nuclear and hydro power plants
− New thermal power plants have their own capacity agreement mechanism
Retail markets

− Retail markets of electricity are national markets also in those regions where the
wholesale trade of electricity crosses the national borders
− In the Nordic countries, there are plans to create common retail markets too
− Target to reduce regulator and technical barriers so that retailers can be active in
several countries
− The contractual arrangements between DSOs, suppliers and customers,
defining the billing regime, specification of future common Nordic business
processes and creating a harmonised Nordic balance settlement
− The framework for the common Nordic retail market should be in place in
2015. However, for example creating the necessary data systems may take
longer
− In Victoria state in Australia, there are one of the most active electricity retail markets
in the world (customers’ retailers switching rate)
− Reasons for active markets, e.g. saving possibilities, extra bonus (like free
magazine subscription) or dissatisfaction with their previous supplier
Retail markets – price elastic demand

− In the countries discussed in this report, the retail customers’ consumption

is not very elastic with respect to wholesale prices
− The tariff structures typically applied to retail customers do not
encourage wholesale-market-based elasticity
− In many countries, there are tariff schemes (or pilot schemes) that direct
energy use from typical peak hours to other times of the day
− The expansion of smart meters enables more real-time pricing
Research work, 1
− To compile the vision, the prospects of the electricity markets were scanned in different
interest group meetings and workshops
− Scenario work
− Objective: to recognise and identify factors that direct the development of the
electricity markets, and to assess their significance in the market model applied in
the market (scenarios in Appendix)
− A group of experts in the electricity markets
− GDSS (Group Decision Support System) -workshop
− The key target was to identify tools and actions to promote competition in the
electricity market and to assess the effects of these actions and the time required
− For a selected group of Finnish electricity market specialists with in-depth
knowledge about Nordic and European electricity markets
− The ideas generated in the GDSS-innovation provided a starting point for an
international Delphi survey
Reasearch work, 2

− Delphi survey
− In the Delphi method, the objectives are to forecast the future development, to
determine the desirable development trends and to find out how the future
development can be influenced
− Respondents of the survey presented European electricity market professionals
− The Delphi survey was conducted in two rounds,
− The main result of the first round was the outlook of the essential elements
influencing competition and future development of the European electricity
market
− The goal of the second round was to find possibilities to influence certain
factors that play a role in establishing a competitive environment in the
electricity markets
− Response rate on the 1st round was 51.7 % and on the 2nd round 86.7 %
Delphi survey

− Results of the 1st round

− On historical viewpoint, the one of the most critical issues was that
“lengthy permitting procedures related to building of transmission lines
result in significant delays in putting the investments plans into practice”
− Also, it was considered important that “transmission capacity is
allocated in a market-based method”
− The importance of both claims was also seen to increase in future
Easier permitting procedures
Transmission capacity allocated market based both in day-
ahead and intraday markets
− Close co-operation of power exchanges, harmonized algorithms for day-
ahead calculation and harmonized intraday principles were seen very
significant to the functioning of competition
− It was also seen that these issues are likely to come true
Delphi survey

− Results of the 2nd round

− The results of the first round were exploited on the second round, and for
example, asked how to promote new transmission network investments
− The suggested methods included, for example: regulatory co-operation
and legislation, separation of transmission ownership and
operation, terminating the bottleneck revenues, merchant lines, stronger
role of ACER, easier permitting procedures, and TSOs’ obligation to pay
for the congestion
− Also questions about smaller price areas, need of capacity
markets, common retail market and energy storing
− Small price areas were generally viewed as a problem for the
competition
− The respondents viewed that the energy-only markets would be
likely to guarantee adequate revenues to electricity generators
− Storing electricity economically in large quantities might be the wild
card in the electricity markets
Delphi survey
− Results of the questions, if there are single power exchange in 2030 and if the separate capacity markets are needed

6. Do you think that there will be a common power exchange 7. Do you think that separate capacity markets are needed in
for physical dayahead electricity trading in Europe in 2030? Europe to guarantee adequate revenues to the electricity
100 % generators?
90 % 100 %
80 % 90 %
70 % 80 %
60 % 70 %
50 % 60 %
40 % 50 %
40 %
30 %
30 %
20 %
20 %
10 % 10 %
0% 0%
Yes No Yes No

− Results of the question, if TSO’s have necessary incentives to build new crossborder lines
1. Do you agree with the claim that the transmission
companies have no necessary incentives to build new
crossborder lines because they would then lose their
congestion revenues?
100 %
90 %
80 %
70 %
60 %
50 %
40 %
30 %
20 %
10 %
0%
Yes No
Free competition – regulated competition
− The goals of the electricity market deregulation are generic: to reduce the
government involvement in the electricity supply sector, to introduce competition in
electricity generation and selling, and to increase the demand side participation
− In the free competition school of thought, the main principle is that the electricity
markets are like other commodity markets; common electricity price for whole
market
− In the regulated competition school of thought ,electricity price is calculated for
each node of the grid  small market areas need of market surveillance to
mitigate the market power abuse
− The specific requirements for free competition to work are the existence of sufficient
amount of transmission capacity and the elasticity of demand with respect to price
− The demand side is expected to signal its willingness to pay for electricity in the
day-ahead markets, thus playing an essential role in the price formation
− Under regulated competition, the demand side participation can be rather weak; the
demand may be taken as forecasted
− Regulated competition is often the only solution if the transmission networks do
not enable free competition
− Regulation itself is also not without problems since it easily hinders the dynamic
development of the markets
Forming the vision

− The Vision for European Electricity Market in 2030 is constructed following the logics of
free competition school of thought
− Workable competition as a key to efficient operation of the electricity markets that
would benefit both the supply side and the demand side
− Obtaining sufficient transmission capacity and activating the demand side are
extremely challenging goals in future electricity markets
− Giving up these goals would contradict with the initial objectives of the electricity
market deregulation and the heavy-handed regulation
− Vision enables achieving the EU’s goal of internal market in electricity
− Vision also honors the objective that there are
− No structural entry barriers for renewable generation
− Supporting the energy-efficient
− Low-carbon future of the electricity supply sector
− Vision views electricity networks as enablers
− Transmission constraints do not hamper the operation of the markets
− Distribution networks play a key role in ensuring that there are no technical or
structural barriers that would hinder the cross-border operation of the electricity
retailers
 Vision for European Electricity Markets in 2030
- Large price areas and no structural bottlenecks in the
transmission networks within the price areas
 Uniform marginal pricing
-Demand side plays a key role in limiting the price setting
power of the generators
-Antitrust policy efficiently applied in assessing mergers and
acquisitions to prevent market concentration
-No price caps in the day-head market of electricity
-Price spikes are possible
-Hedging against the price volatility of electric energy
-Trading of financial instruments (e.g. futures, forwards,
options, CfDs, FTRs) at exchange and bilaterally
-‘Energy only’ market provides adequate revenues to
generators
-No separate capacity markets needed
-No structural entry barriers for market-based investments and
operation of renewable generation
-No technical or structural barriers to the cross-border
operation of the retailers
Alternative scenario
-Heavily congested transmission networks and the existence of inter-
and intra-regional bottlenecks in the transmission networks
 Locational marginal pricing
-Continuous monitoring of locational market power. Pivotal suppliers’
offers to the market are limited through regulation
 Demand side participation in price formation is not obligatory
Regulation of the suppliers’ offers reduce price spikes
 Revenue adequacy is not guaranteed through the market of
electric energy
 Capacity markets provide the ‘missing money’ to the
generators
-Hedging against locational price differences with financial
transmission rights (FTRs)
-FTR auctions organized by the Independent System Operator (ISO)
-Feasibility tests to ensure that FTRs do not exceed physical
transmission capacities
-Locational price signals may constitute an entry barrier to renewable
generation (but RES support mechanisms may enable entering and
staying in the market)
-The retail markets are mainly locational because of the locational
price risks that the retailers face in the wholesale markets
Limitations of the vision and the alternative
scenario
− Both the vision and an alternative scenario assume the primary market
mechanism to be the price formation of electricity in the day-ahead market
applying marginal pricing
− Should an event or phenomena occur that would destroy this market
mechanism, the markets would end up in a completely unknown situation
− For example, the enormous penetration of intermittent generation would
prevent the formation of the day-ahead prices because of the limited day-
ahead supply forecasts
− In other words: a lot of supply capacity would be missing from the day-
ahead price formation, and the intersection of the supply and demand
curves could not necessarily be determined
− The lack of day-ahead market prices, in turn, would enforce notable
changes in the structure of the markets because many of the operations
in today’s markets
− Also storing electricity economically in large quantities may affect markets
Vision – Transmission networks

− Common European wholesale and retail electricity markets

− An adequate transmission network in the electricity market
area enables the equalization of the electricity price
− The planning and implementation of transmission network
investments play a key role in this process
− All TSOs are obliged to carry out investments, and the costs of
those investments that benefit the entire market are allocated
to the TSOs in proportion to their benefits
− The regulatory models by which the operation of national TSOs
is monitored are compatible with each other and the models
guide to eliminate transmission bottlenecks
− The efficient allocation and use of the existing transmission
network capacity is ensured by implicit mechanisms both in the
day-ahead and intraday trade
Vision - Pricing

− In wholesale electricity markets, the price is formed freely without

any price caps or price floors
− The main pricing principle is the marginal pricing, which defines the
merit order of generation from the lowest to the highest marginal
cost of generation
− In Europe, there is a single power exchange or a few power
exchanges operating in close cooperation with each other, and
applying a ”single price coupling” mechanism in price calculation in
the day ahead market
− The operation principles of the intraday market are harmonised
− The relevant market information is available to all market
participants, and credible communication of information is provided
Vision - Generation

− The price of electric energy provides a sufficient signal for new

investments in generation, and no separate capacity markets or
charges are required
− The market entry and exit of generation are market based
− Permitting procedures for new generation are harmonised in
Europe
− Intermittent generation participates in the markets in a market-
based manner
− There is a clear-cut global system for limiting CO2 emissions
− The electric power network provides opportunities rather than
restricts the placement of new generation
− There is enough balancing and reserve power capacity in the
market area, and free price formation provides sufficient incentives
also to remain in the market
 Vision - Retail markets
− A common large wholesale market area also promotes the
development of common retail markets
− There is a harmonised retail market model in the EU, which includes for
instance the customer interface processes, the principle of the data
transfer and sharing mechanism and other operating principles. This
enables supranational retail markets with a large number of suppliers.
− The price signals in the wholesale market are transmitted to the retail
market, and the retail prices are not subsidised
− There is a wide selection of retail products, and also the supplier can be
chosen freely
− The distribution networks enable competition in the retail market
− All the electricity end-users are involved in demand elasticity
− Participation to the markets is fostered by providing consumers with
relevant information regarding to the opportunities and sufficient level of
consumer protection
− Energy storages are widely adopted for instance in the form of EV
batteries
− Some of the households have own small-scale generation, and excess
power is sold in the market
Implementation of vision

− Essential for implementation of the vision

− Sufficient transmission networks
− Price elastic demand
Free competition

− If these targets are given up, it may lead towards

alternative scenario
− Regulated competition hinders the dynamic
development of the markets
− Regulation systems usually drift into a spiral of
complexity
How to promote implementation of the vision?

− Transmission networks
− Implementation of TYNDP, taking into account the needs of the European
electricity markets
− Incentives for TSOs to reduce bottlenecks and invest in new intra- and inter-
regional transmission capacity
− Easier permitting procedures for new transmission investments
− Renewables
− Sufficient transmission networks allow the entry of renewable energy generation
− RES support mechanisms do not disturb the markets
− Power exchange
− Single price coupling
− EU-wide shared order book and capacity management module in intraday
trading
− Demand side participation
− Smart grid possibilities
− Storing of electricity
− Trust in market
Conclusions

− Vision for European electricity markets in 2030 is done in April 2010 - April
2011 at Lappeenranta University of Technology
− During the research project different scenarios about future electricity
markets have been created and several surveys for Finnish and European
electricity market experts have been done
− The final result is the vision which enables free competition, EU’s targets
about common European electricity markets, entry of renewable generation,
energy efficiency and reduction of CO2 emissions in electricity generation
− In the vision, the transmission networks are seen as enablers
− Essential for implementation of the vision are the sufficient transmission
networks and active demand side
− Giving up these goals would contradict with the initial objectives of the
electricity market deregulation and the heavy-handed regulation
− It may hamper the dynamic development of the electricity markets
Appendix 1 Presentation of scenarios
Open and public price formation

4.
1.
• There are plenty of bottlenecks in the European transmission networks
• There is a strong transmission network in the whole of Europe
• A European ISO is responsible for the operation of the transmission
• An European ISO is responsible for the operation of the transmission
networks
network
• Nodal pricing is applied, the ISO is responsible for price calculation The
nodal price reflects the cost of the use of the power system (energy +
• The transmission network operation is monitored by an EU regulator
losses + congestion fee)
• A marketplace fee is charged for the use of transmission networks
• Hedging against price differences is carried out through financial
• The price of electric energy is formed in a European power exchange
products (Financial Transmission Rights, FTRs)
• The electricity market provides sufficient incentives for new
investments, and no separate capacity market is needed
• Offers made by generators are monitored at the plant level (production
costs, running plans)
• There is plenty of distributed generation in the market, and the
market has to be able to adapt to the variation related to DG
• Incentives for investments are basically generated in the capacity
•Demand elasticity plays a significant role in the market
market
• Wholesale prices are balanced for the retail markets
• There are common retail markets in Europe
• Retail markets operate at a national level
• The customers are equipped with smart meters
• The consumers are equipped with smart meters
• Pricing of electricity is hourly based
• Balanced reference price is used as the reference in demand elasticity

The market adapts to the The network adapts to the

limits set by the network needs of the market

3.
2.
• In the area of Europe, the electricity markets are split into self-sufficient,
• There is a strong transmission network covering the whole of Europe
separate networks with both generation and consumption of electricity
• The EU regulator supervises the network entry
• In the separate networks, the price of electricity varies, being a local
• Trade in electric energy is bilateral and the prices are market based
competitive factor
• Electric energy can be purchased anywhere in Europe
• The crisis in transmission networks and the development of power
• Transit fees are charged for the use of transmission networks
storages and small-scale generation has led to the emergence of separate
• There are large European energy companies and numerous local
networks
market participants
• Behind the crisis, there are large damages caused by major storms and
• Distributed generation is mainly traded at a local level
terror attacks
• Retail markets are national markets
• There are transmission connections between separate networks only as
• The consumers have smart meters
back-up connections
• Pricing of electricity for consumers is power based
• Electricity trade is bilateral
• Consumers are compensated for participating in the power balance
• Large-scale industries have generation of their own in the vicinity of
management
consumption
• Retail markets are regional markets
• There is demand flexibility within each region, as well as small-scale
generation and storage potential

Fragmented price formation

Appendix 2 Results of scenario survey

− Can the scenario be realised by year 2030?

100 %

80 %

60 %

40 %

20 %

0%
1 2 3 4

Can the scenario be realised by year 2030?