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4 Natural Rights and Human Rights While the idea of moral rights can be extended beyond the human tac, historically its the moral rights possesed by human beings that have preoccupied philosophers. OF those rights, the most Celebrated and significant, particularly for political philosophers have been natural rghts and human rights, Those wo sorts of right are closely related. Uistorically the idea of human rights descended, from that of nat ference between them; they regard “natural” and “human’ as merely different labels forthe same kind of right. Others are less happy with that simple conflation and, while acknowledging the historcal link between the (Wo sorts of right, want to fre human Fights from some ofthe features traditionally wssocated with natural fights In examining these rights, I will treat them 3s distinguishable fven though they possess some common Features Natura rights In the history of political thought, natural rights have been conceived in two diflerent ways. One corresponds to what Dworkin ‘eseribes as rights in the strong sense. Io this tradition, natural fights were conceived as rights of the most fundamental moral importance. They represented the basic entitlements ofall human ‘beings and the first obligation of governments was to ensure thatthe natural right ofits citizens were respected I was this conception of hatural rights that was espoused by the Levellers, John Locke and ‘Thomas Paine and which inspired the delarations of rights that appeared during the American and French evolutions. It was also from this conception of natural rights that the modern idea of ‘human rights evolved, “The other tradition conceived natural rights as rights in Dworkin’s weak sense, In effect it reduced natural righ to mere n ural Rights and Human Rights ” ‘The most celebrated statement of this conception of rights was given by Thomas Hobbes in his portrait of the ‘of mature, but it was not unigue to him. Earlier in the nth century Selden had developed a theory of man's orginal tion of unfettered liberty, and that theory and its associated ‘of natural rights were taken up and developed by other ker such as Dudley Digges, Henry Hammond and Jeremy 18). Spinoza's understanding of natu Tall reer to this as the Hobbesian conception of natural nights I shall concentrate on Hobbes in describing it. The other ion, which historically ultimately proved more important, T ‘describe as the Lockean conception of natural rights, since oske is probably is best known and most influential exponent, 1 all begin by describing the Hobbesian conception. Hobbes thought of natural rights @& those rights individuals ud enjoy inthe state of natute. By a ‘sate of nature’ Hobbes and er political thinkers writing during the sixteenth and seventeenth mluries understood the condition that humanity would be in if ‘were no government and no organised politcal community fof those who appealed to the idea ofa state of nature thought it as an_ actual historical condition that had preceded the ation of human society and the establishment of goverament. ers, such as Hobbes, were more inclined to regard it as an gnary condition which had aot necessarily occurred in human gory, but which was sill a “true fiction’ in that it described. the mn that mankind really would be in if the ‘atfees’ of ent and political society were removed jobbes held that, in such a state of nature, everyone would the same right of mature. That right was ‘he liberty each m hath, to use his own power, as he will himself, for the tion of his own nature; that isto say, of his own Wife; and equcnly, of doing anything, which in his own judgement, and he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto" (1957, 3). However, as Hobbes himself indicates here, this natural ight [preservation was merely ‘bert’ it was not 2 claim-right duties upon others. Thus each individual's natural right of | preservation did not impose correlative duties upon everyone ‘otto endanger his fe. On the contrary, since each individual 4 threat to every other individual, the tight of mature entitled 1” Rights cach to attack and destroy anyone else. The state of nature was therefore a state of war in which mutual threat meant thatthe right ‘of nature gave everyone “aright to everything; evento one another's body” (ibid, p. 85). Hobbes’ natural rights were not therefore a body of mutually compatible claim-rights, respect for which would ensure social harmony and tranquility. Rather they were @ set of clashing liberty-ights which contributed to rather than solved the problem of conflict and disorder amongst mankind. Human beings {ould achieve the peaceful condition that they all wanted only by ‘contracting to divest themselves of thei ‘right to all things’ and by placing themselves under a common authority. Thus, for Hobbes, the creation of political society required men to renounce thei ‘natural rights (vith certain limited exceptions!) and to subject themselves toa ruler whose authority was unlimited Inthe Hobbesian tradition, then, ‘natural rights were understood as Hobfeldian libery-righs They played an important part in explaining the origin or (1 put it non-histrically) the rationale of political society. But, since they were given up eter wholly or for ‘the most part, with the formation of politcal society they ceased to be of any of of much significance in that society. They prescribed ‘either what governments should do nor what they should not do. ‘All ofthis was in marked contrast tothe Lockesn tradition in which ‘natural rights were used not only to explain the origin of political authority but also to define its duties and to limit its extent” "The Lockean tradition of natural rights derived in a much more iret way than the Hobbesian from the centuries-old idea of natural lave and itis best understood by way of its origin in that idea.” PNatural law’ described a body of rules, governing human conduct, hich were conccived as part of 2 natural order of things. It was often understood as a law deriving from God and itis most God was the creator of the lniverse and of everything in it. His creation was not a mere chaos ‘of phenomena but an ordered whole in which everything occupied 2 certain postion and was ordained to act in a certain way. Man was ‘a much a part ofthat created order of things as any other existent and he was equally intended by God to conduct hs life according (0 1 particular pattern. Thus man, no less than the planets and the stars, the winds andthe seas the lion and the eagle, was ordained by God to conduct his life according to God's ordinance. That part of His law which God had laid down for man was described as natural ral Righis and Huma Rights 8 However, unlike plants and non-human animals, man was to God's law’ in a special way. Through his possession of he was able to be Tully conscious of the God-ordained ral laws to whic he should conform. Through his possession of wl he was able 1o will to follow those laws, which z1s0 meant he was capable of defying them. The rest of the material ‘reation followed the design God had ordained for them in an “unknowing and unchoosing way. Unlike man, therefor, they were incapable of ether good or evil. Natural law was not the only law to hich man was subject. There were other injunctions, relating ularly 19 man's Salvation, which man could not know merely through the use of his natural faculties and to which he had acces ly because they had been ‘revealed’ to him by God in the ipures. However natural law provided the basic rules that man ‘needed 10 structure his relations with his fellow human beings rng his earthly lie ‘Given this view of things, use ofthe tem ‘natralin natural law (quite readily intligible These were laws laid down by God for 1 beings in general, just as “positve™ or ‘cui laws were laid by tilts for the governance of particular bodies of citizens. y were "matural’ because they were not “artificial laws; that i, were not man-made. They were 35 much part of a given natural of things a8 what would nowadays be called scientific aw of ture’, Thus any particular individual was typically subject to two ws — the laws of nature and the laws of the particular state 10 ne belonged. Nor were these two bodies of law unrelated. The laid down by human rulers should be guided by, and should ate upon, the laws of nature laid down by God. A putative made law that flouted natural law was, for that reason, not ly law at all, The laws of nature therefore dictated the basic kent of man-made law and also set limits to what rulers could rely require of ther subjects The link between natural law and the Locksan conception of I ight is very simple, Laws bestow rights and impose duties 10 the qualifications that we have considered in ealier rs). Natural law bestows natural rights and imposes natural Locke, for example, gave asthe fundamental law of nature “no-one ought to harm another in hs Life, Health, Liberty, oF 16) He then festated that law in terms ofthe the duties it imposed: each individual had a 16 Rights natural sight to is if, ery and property, and each individual Md a ator ty ot to harm heli hey or propery of ethers, ‘As ith the Hobbesan tran its common to ed Veo this taitom investigating natural ight by picturing ae ihe natural condition ~the se of nature. Hover nual re theorist Lockean radon unerstod tc moral conden of tan nthe usta atre git dierent fom Hobbes For Locke the tusie moral rls that man needed to conduct is We wee provided bythe lw of ate and that tam was ally aval oc Mie nthe te of tate, The se of mare was helt & oad ‘acuum nor a moral chtos it was characterised by 9 sructre of moral rights and duis whch was saplied by God's natural lI ‘rer olive peace and harmony ae to ey ince natural gs men hid ony to abide by that nara law. The, for Locke. uke Hobbes, man's natral condition was not inisially one of onic on the contary, morally it was 4 condion of peace and turnoy Cont ad isa te ae of a Secatme men GBF s Sommnon boy of la te ele a aoe fee eed yo aeeoaersad se ooraen eee peat ‘Ge bad provided for themlt vas ot so much (bi shoreomion of ihe nate Of ature asthe alings of faen mankind that made he sate of nature aneatsfctory an tha induced me to end by ‘Stablohingpolita authon'y However te establishment of potal authority didnot mean the

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