4 Natural Rights and
Human Rights
While the idea of moral rights can be extended beyond the human
tac, historically its the moral rights possesed by human beings
that have preoccupied philosophers. OF those rights, the most
Celebrated and significant, particularly for political philosophers
have been natural rghts and human rights, Those wo sorts of right
are closely related. Uistorically the idea of human rights descended,
from that of nat
ference between them; they regard “natural” and “human’ as
merely different labels forthe same kind of right. Others are less
happy with that simple conflation and, while acknowledging the
historcal link between the (Wo sorts of right, want to fre human
Fights from some ofthe features traditionally wssocated with natural
fights In examining these rights, I will treat them 3s distinguishable
fven though they possess some common Features
Natura rights
In the history of political thought, natural rights have been
conceived in two diflerent ways. One corresponds to what Dworkin
‘eseribes as rights in the strong sense. Io this tradition, natural
fights were conceived as rights of the most fundamental moral
importance. They represented the basic entitlements ofall human
‘beings and the first obligation of governments was to ensure thatthe
natural right ofits citizens were respected I was this conception of
hatural rights that was espoused by the Levellers, John Locke and
‘Thomas Paine and which inspired the delarations of rights that
appeared during the American and French evolutions. It was also
from this conception of natural rights that the modern idea of
‘human rights evolved,
“The other tradition conceived natural rights as rights in
Dworkin’s weak sense, In effect it reduced natural righ to mere
n
ural Rights and Human Rights ”
‘The most celebrated statement of this conception of
rights was given by Thomas Hobbes in his portrait of the
‘of mature, but it was not unigue to him. Earlier in the
nth century Selden had developed a theory of man's orginal
tion of unfettered liberty, and that theory and its associated
‘of natural rights were taken up and developed by other
ker such as Dudley Digges, Henry Hammond and Jeremy
18). Spinoza's understanding of natu
Tall reer to this as the Hobbesian conception of natural nights
I shall concentrate on Hobbes in describing it. The other
ion, which historically ultimately proved more important, T
‘describe as the Lockean conception of natural rights, since
oske is probably is best known and most influential exponent, 1
all begin by describing the Hobbesian conception.
Hobbes thought of natural rights @& those rights individuals
ud enjoy inthe state of natute. By a ‘sate of nature’ Hobbes and
er political thinkers writing during the sixteenth and seventeenth
mluries understood the condition that humanity would be in if
‘were no government and no organised politcal community
fof those who appealed to the idea ofa state of nature thought
it as an_ actual historical condition that had preceded the
ation of human society and the establishment of goverament.
ers, such as Hobbes, were more inclined to regard it as an
gnary condition which had aot necessarily occurred in human
gory, but which was sill a “true fiction’ in that it described. the
mn that mankind really would be in if the ‘atfees’ of
ent and political society were removed
jobbes held that, in such a state of nature, everyone would
the same right of mature. That right was ‘he liberty each
m hath, to use his own power, as he will himself, for the
tion of his own nature; that isto say, of his own Wife; and
equcnly, of doing anything, which in his own judgement, and
he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto" (1957,
3). However, as Hobbes himself indicates here, this natural ight
[preservation was merely ‘bert’ it was not 2 claim-right
duties upon others. Thus each individual's natural right of |
preservation did not impose correlative duties upon everyone
‘otto endanger his fe. On the contrary, since each individual
4 threat to every other individual, the tight of mature entitled1” Rights
cach to attack and destroy anyone else. The state of nature was
therefore a state of war in which mutual threat meant thatthe right
‘of nature gave everyone “aright to everything; evento one another's
body” (ibid, p. 85). Hobbes’ natural rights were not therefore a
body of mutually compatible claim-rights, respect for which would
ensure social harmony and tranquility. Rather they were @ set of
clashing liberty-ights which contributed to rather than solved the
problem of conflict and disorder amongst mankind. Human beings
{ould achieve the peaceful condition that they all wanted only by
‘contracting to divest themselves of thei ‘right to all things’ and by
placing themselves under a common authority. Thus, for Hobbes,
the creation of political society required men to renounce thei
‘natural rights (vith certain limited exceptions!) and to subject
themselves toa ruler whose authority was unlimited
Inthe Hobbesian tradition, then, ‘natural rights were understood
as Hobfeldian libery-righs They played an important part in
explaining the origin or (1 put it non-histrically) the rationale of
political society. But, since they were given up eter wholly or for
‘the most part, with the formation of politcal society they ceased to
be of any of of much significance in that society. They prescribed
‘either what governments should do nor what they should not do.
‘All ofthis was in marked contrast tothe Lockesn tradition in which
‘natural rights were used not only to explain the origin of political
authority but also to define its duties and to limit its extent”
"The Lockean tradition of natural rights derived in a much more
iret way than the Hobbesian from the centuries-old idea of natural
lave and itis best understood by way of its origin in that idea.”
PNatural law’ described a body of rules, governing human conduct,
hich were conccived as part of 2 natural order of things. It was
often understood as a law deriving from God and itis most
God was the creator of the
lniverse and of everything in it. His creation was not a mere chaos
‘of phenomena but an ordered whole in which everything occupied 2
certain postion and was ordained to act in a certain way. Man was
‘a much a part ofthat created order of things as any other existent
and he was equally intended by God to conduct hs life according (0
1 particular pattern. Thus man, no less than the planets and the
stars, the winds andthe seas the lion and the eagle, was ordained by
God to conduct his life according to God's ordinance. That part of
His law which God had laid down for man was described as natural
ral Righis and Huma Rights 8
However, unlike plants and non-human animals, man was
to God's law’ in a special way. Through his possession of
he was able to be Tully conscious of the God-ordained
ral laws to whic he should conform. Through his possession of
wl he was able 1o will to follow those laws, which z1s0 meant
he was capable of defying them. The rest of the material
‘reation followed the design God had ordained for them in an
“unknowing and unchoosing way. Unlike man, therefor, they were
incapable of ether good or evil. Natural law was not the only law to
hich man was subject. There were other injunctions, relating
ularly 19 man's Salvation, which man could not know merely
through the use of his natural faculties and to which he had acces
ly because they had been ‘revealed’ to him by God in the
ipures. However natural law provided the basic rules that man
‘needed 10 structure his relations with his fellow human beings
rng his earthly lie
‘Given this view of things, use ofthe tem ‘natralin natural law
(quite readily intligible These were laws laid down by God for
1 beings in general, just as “positve™ or ‘cui laws were laid
by tilts for the governance of particular bodies of citizens.
y were "matural’ because they were not “artificial laws; that i,
were not man-made. They were 35 much part of a given natural
of things a8 what would nowadays be called scientific aw of
ture’, Thus any particular individual was typically subject to two
ws — the laws of nature and the laws of the particular state 10
ne belonged. Nor were these two bodies of law unrelated. The
laid down by human rulers should be guided by, and should
ate upon, the laws of nature laid down by God. A putative
made law that flouted natural law was, for that reason, not
ly law at all, The laws of nature therefore dictated the basic
kent of man-made law and also set limits to what rulers could
rely require of ther subjects
The link between natural law and the Locksan conception of
I ight is very simple, Laws bestow rights and impose duties
10 the qualifications that we have considered in ealier
rs). Natural law bestows natural rights and imposes natural
Locke, for example, gave asthe fundamental law of nature
“no-one ought to harm another in hs Life, Health, Liberty, oF
16) He then festated that law in terms ofthe
the duties it imposed: each individual had a16 Rights
natural sight to is if, ery and property, and each individual
Md a ator ty ot to harm heli hey or propery of ethers,
‘As ith the Hobbesan tran its common to ed Veo
this taitom investigating natural ight by picturing ae ihe
natural condition ~the se of nature. Hover nual re
theorist Lockean radon unerstod tc moral conden of
tan nthe usta atre git dierent fom Hobbes For Locke
the tusie moral rls that man needed to conduct is We wee
provided bythe lw of ate and that tam was ally aval oc
Mie nthe te of tate, The se of mare was helt & oad
‘acuum nor a moral chtos it was characterised by 9 sructre of
moral rights and duis whch was saplied by God's natural lI
‘rer olive peace and harmony ae to ey ince natural gs
men hid ony to abide by that nara law. The, for Locke. uke
Hobbes, man's natral condition was not inisially one of
onic on the contary, morally it was 4 condion of peace and
turnoy Cont ad isa te ae of a
Secatme men GBF s Sommnon boy of la te ele a aoe
fee eed yo aeeoaersad se ooraen eee peat
‘Ge bad provided for themlt vas ot so much (bi shoreomion of
ihe nate Of ature asthe alings of faen mankind that made he
sate of nature aneatsfctory an tha induced me to end by
‘Stablohingpolita authon'y
However te establishment of potal authority didnot mean the