Thomas McCarthy The MIT Press Cambridge, Massachuseus, and London, EnglandCopyrgh © 1978 by The Macha sae of Technology Alteighs reserve No prof hit ook maybe reprodced nay form or by {ny mens electronic or mechani incdng photocoping, earn by ny information strage and tetra sate, witho ert a ng {rom he publisher “This book was sein VIP Basherile by Woodland Graphic, printed and ound by Hay Lishograph Corporation nthe Unie Sate of Aeris Library of Congres Catling in Pubcon Da McCarthy. Thomas A "The rial theory of ingen Habermas Biography: p Herma, Jorgen. 2. Ceicim (Phsophy 3. Theory (Philosophy) 4. Soc evoltin. 5 Communkation-Socl spec B Sater hear Uta BSISEHS2INS2 ves 75-4540 ISBN 0262-18158-2 hard) ISBN 0-262.078° (pape For my parentsContents Toe Preface ix “Toward a Methodology of Critical Theory 126 3.1 Empirical Philosophy ‘of History with a Practical Intent 126 3.2 Understanding and Social Inquity 137 Acknowledgments xv Chapter 1 ‘On Theory and Practice in our lfc Civilization 1 3.3 Language, Hermeneutics, 1LI"The Scientization of Polites 1 and the Critque of Ideology 162 1.2 Labor and Interaction: et ‘The Critique of Instrumental Reason 16 8.4 Psychoanalysis and So y 1.3 Positiviem and Philosophy 40 43.5 On the Scope and Limits of Functionalist Theory 218, 3.6 Toward a Reconstruction of Historical Materialism 282 hapter 2 Knowledge and Human Interests 53 2A Preliminary Sketch 58 2.2 The Technical Inerest of the Empirical-Analytic Sciences 60 4.2 On the Logic of Theoretical Discourse: Truth 291 2.8 The Practical Interest 4.3 On the Logic of Practical Discourse: Morality 310 ‘ofthe Hisiorical- Hermeneutic Sciences 68, Chapter 4 Foundations: A Theory of Communication 272 4.1 The Idea of a Universal Pragmatics 272 44 Communication and Socialization $33, 2.4 The Emancipatory Interest of Critical Theory 75 2.5 The Idea of Philosophy and Its Relation to Social Theory 91 Chapter 5 Legitimation Problems in Advanced Capitalism 358 Notes 387 A Bibliography of Works by Habermas, with Translations and Reviews 442 Index 465Preface ‘A book of this length on a contemporary thinker calls fr some exp nation, especially when its subjects stil eatively young and his work hhasoaly recently begun tobe dscosed inthe Englshspeakig word “Jingen Habermas ithe dominant figure on the intellect scene in “Germany today, a8 he hasbeen forthe past decade, There is scarcely an area ofthe humanities or seca cences that hats ot Fel the inf fence of his thought: he is master, in breadth and depth alike, of 3 wide range of specialize literatures. But his contributions o philoso: phy and psychology. politcal scence and sociology, the history of ideas and soil theory are distinguished not ony by ther scope but by the unity of perspective that informs them, This unity derives fom a vision of mankind, our hisory and our prospects, tha is rooted in the tradition of German thought from Kant to Marg, 2 vision that ‘draws is power as much from the moral-polcl intention that anc mates i as From the systematie form in which it article ‘With the tranlation in recent years of a growing number of bis hooks and aries, Habermas's influence has gradually spread to the English-speaking world. He is now widely recognized ae 3 mijor figure in the postwar renewal of German philewophy and sodal theory. But his recepsion by Anglo-American thinkers has by no ‘means been painles Iehas been hindered by the usial problems of cultural distance atending the penetration of any work that i deeply rooted inthe German tradition. If our appreciation of Kant is consid ‘erably developed, that of Hegel i decidedly lee so; and Fete and Schelling ae sil relegated to the nether world that we reserve for peculiarly German spirits. If Weber and Freud now havea frm place in our pantheon, Dikhey and Gadamer are sil largely unkown, Moreover, the tradition of Western Marxism Habermas seeks to ‘renew has remained comparatively underdeveloped here: 3 number fof important works by Lukics, Korich, Horkheimer, Adorno, and Mary himself were oaly recently translated, Then there are probes“Feta Serva i clledas'a witness. Thus i cem to me that iis the Uaditon of eritcism which constitutes what i new in aience, and swat characteristic of saence:™ positions of positivism re- lieson a conception ofthe subject of knowledge a activ, biologically snd cultarally conditioned, and situted in a process of historia de- ‘lopment from which the crea tradition constitutive of science merges. On the one hand, something like transcendental functions fre assigned to this subject only inthe seting ofthe frame of refer fence constituted by out horizon of expectations is meaning or si tificance conferred on or experience ad action. Sense experiences fot the primary experience of a manifes immediacy proposed by ‘empiricism; itis preformed by physiology, previons experience, tad on, by what fas been learned and what i anticipated. In ths sense, facts are no given” ut “onsttuted” On the other hand, the sub- {ect of scientific knowledge is note pure transcendental eg of Kan Tris the community of investigators, sharing a hase physiological makeup and communicatively interacting within intitatonal and cl tural frameworks that undergo historical evolution. Scientific inguiry is inimately connected with socal life processes: iis the systematic ‘continuation of the learting processes through which the species Comes to terms with is environment, One might sty of Popper, den, teh Habermas says of Pence: that he approaches a conception of quas-transcendenta” conditions of kaowledge that are formed un der empirical conditions.“The logic of inquiry situated ait were Between formal and tra scendettal logit goes beyond the realm of the formal condone of the tality of propositions, ut fal short ofthe cognitively constr tive dterminatons of transcendental consciousness such Like luanscendentl loge, the logi of inquiry extends to the structure of the consittion of Knowledge. But at process of ing. his logical structure materializes under empirical conditions. The loge ical analy of giy, therefore, concerned not withthe atibutes (fa transendental consciousness ss such bu wth those of abject that stains the process of inquiry aea whole ce with the cmmaauriy ‘of investigators, who endeavor to perform tee common tsk come ‘Thisis, of course, decidedly not Popper's understanding of where hisreflections have taken him. In contas tothe position suggested by Habermas, Popper formulates his theory of knowledge a an "epi temology without a knowing subject.” He vegatds attempts (such as those of Thomas Kuhn for example) to thematize the stractore of n= teraction in the scentife community as scilogy of knowlege and excludes them from the loge ofngury as sch. The grounds for this apparent reversal include a correspondence theory of truth: 8 qs Platonic conception of theories, probleme, arguments, and the lke as Inhabitants of 3 “third works and a decisions fudation of ert ‘al rationalism ill "The correspondence theory of ruth permits PPopper to maintain the independence of facts and to argue for an ob> Jectvistic conception of theories 28 striving to approximate an adequate conception of an independent reality. This effectively Shorteizeuts the ranscencental tin implied by his own thei that facts are constituted only within frames of reference oF horizons of ‘expectaions. Given the independence af fics, Papper ean aval pur sung the consequences of his view that asi observational statements are established by convention. Conventions, of couse, reslt from Some form of agreement If they are not atbitary, dee must exist rules for attaining such agreement, forms of argument that are ape propriate to supporting oF challenging it standards snd values that ‘might be appealed tin such argument nd soon In short the notion lof conventions, no les than that of constitutive Frames of reference, seems to call fora systematic analysis of communication structures within the community of investigators. The surprising, and icons feng, retention af an objectivistie notion of fact sat the rox of Pop pers failure to complete his transcendent Rear an RIT Tt ako contributes w his decsionitic foundation of critical ational. Since justification isidentiied with deduction and ration ality is imited tothe cent method of conjecture and refutation (by ‘comparison with the facts), i, according to Popper, not penile to {sly rationally ground the ertcal attitude itself, We are faced ith a choice between competing traditions, competing medels for Knowledge and action, andthe choice of the critical atte is jst thata choice that cin be neither deductvely justified nor sien ‘ifcally corroborated: hence tis the prerational or, more bluntly, the inrational foundation of rationality. If Popper consistently pursued his insights that scientific discourse includes the cial disssion of alternative techniques of inquiry, competing theories, various dei- ‘tions of base predicates, in short, of different frames of reference snd ther elements that "kis only in the course ofthe eli Sion that observation i called in ay a witness and that even this wit ress depends on standards and rules, then he could not init rational ‘ty to ial and erro inthe sense of confrontation with the facts. I Sciences to serve asthe paradigm of rationality, hen ll ofthe forms ‘oF argumentation involved in this presto critical discussion ate ‘ional. Bu the rational motivation ofthe acceptance of standards and roles, the eitcism and support of tind and outlooks, canna pro ‘ceed by way of deduction and flifiaton. Thisisanerely one emer Jn a more comprchemsive rationality. In point of fat, despite is cexplict renunciation ofa rational justification forthe critical tiude, Popper's methovllogical writings are replete with good reasons for adopting it, reavons based on an understanding of the proces of in ‘quiry asa whole in relation to asiestructures of human lie thats 10 the learn process on which the reproduction of human ie de pends) ‘Of course Popper cannot simply revert to empiricist models of ex: petience, observation, and theory. He introduces 2 conception of the {ied world that~although itis “natural product of the human ai ‘mal, comparable toa spider's web"—nevertheles retains its objectivity and autonomy visas the subjects who produce it A fl discussion ‘oF this conception would require x rather detailed ook at the theory fof meaning and language behind it These questions willbe taken up In discussing the theory of communicative competence. The reslts of ‘that discussion should make clear that Popper's third word an n= {enable reification of language, tradition, and cule, In any even,ry a se the “objectivity and autonomy of the thd world” enable him to ‘minimize the importance of reflection onthe subject of knowlege for his theory of “objective knowledge.” But Popper’ casfiation of theories of Knowledge into subjectvatic and object als o on sider that mode of thematsing the subject suggested above. Under subjective approaches, he includes the tradienalthematization of the knowing subject yan isolated, individual consciousness, ay wel as psychological and sociological sidies of cognition.” The idea that there could be a nonprychologcal, nonsociological treatment of the subjective conditions of hnowledge, in which the subject is regarded rot a6 a pure ego oF conscousnes but as che community of inves tigators, is not systematically pursued, although his own metiodelogy «al refections point precisely in that direction Te does not help matters that contemporary methodologiss who ‘conspicuously orient their inguiies im this direction —aost promi ely ‘Thomas Kuhn and his supporters—themselves lack a adequate conception of the status of their inquiries, Thus they too easly open themselves wo charges of substituting the history and sociology of science forthe lie and methodology of scence and of denying the seemingly undeniable progress of sence in favor of an inreducible relatiiy of theoretical frameworks Under the presse of such crtiam, however, Kuhn has made it increasingly clear that fhe teyards the “shift of professional commitments involved in paradigm change as guided in part bya deep-seated commitment ‘ales "constcutive of since” Probably the most deeply eld values conse predictions: they should be accurate: quantiaive predictions are prcferrate to ul- ie ones. There area, however, ase used joing vole theories: they must, fat and foremost permit pel Tormulaion and solution: where poste they shoud simples sl cemssent and plausible, compatible, that, wth other theories ea remy deployed ‘Asa rest ofthis consiutive commitment, Kuba goes onto say, the evelopment of scence isa uniciretional process, Imagine an evolutionary tee representing the development of the tern sient species ror thelr comtnon angie sa. pris. the natural philosophy and the craft A line drawn up that Wee, never doubling back from the trunk tothe tip of some beach woul trace suceson of theories related by dese Considering ay tro oo such theories, chosen from points not oo near thei origin, it would be easy design a li ofcrteria that would enable an uneompited server to ditingulsh the earlier fom the more recent theory time Sfter time. Among the most seul would be: accuracy of prediction, iculary of quantatve prediction: the balance beween esoteric End everyday subject mater. snd the numberof different problems solved Less useful for this purpose, though also important determi ‘ants of scenic, woul be such values a spy. scope, and compatiblity with other species Thos lis are not yet the care ured, butt have no dou that they can be completed If they can, ‘hen scenic development i ike bologcal, untrertionl sh revernble proces Later seni theorer arc bcter than ear ones {or solving pucesin the often quite different environments to which they are applied. Thats nota feasts pension, and dapays he sense in which Tam a convinced leer in siete progres Of course itis not only these anshisoricl, constcuive values that are shared by members of scientific community. The constellation of {group commitments, or “dieiplinary matrix.” which shared by the members of a particular community of investigators, also includes parscular symbolic generalzations, particular model, particular val. tes, particular exemplars of succes centific practice, ad 500, ‘Although these commitments are not conse of sence as such, {hey are deine ofthe particular tradition of normal scence prac ‘iced by that community. Shifts inthe constellation ofthese commit ments consiate paradigm change. The argumentation that produces them involves, among other things, an appeal to precisely thove vies that are constiutive of science. (Such appeals do not, Kuhn pois ‘out, automatically Tea to.a new consensns, for shared vales ean be diferently interpreted and applied, and there can be disagreements to sthich of set of values are most important in a particular cise) Te shoul be clear that Kuhn's theory of science isnot so totally at ‘adds with Popper's posion as some have thought. For one thing, Popper's “cial atte” has many points in common with Kuhn's “constitutive commitment to predictive and pzlesaving capability, and Kuhns paradigms or disdplinary matrices serve many of the Same functions as do Popper's rames of reference or horizons of ex: ection On the other hand, i the critics af Popper sketched above are valid, Kuhn's conception ofthe theory of scence fa sep in the right direction. Atte ver} least, t opens up dimension in which ne might begin to make sense ofthe “conventions,” "frames of refer cence," "dispositions," “tradions” and the lke to which Poppe cam“Theory and Pate stanly refers in expicating the logic of ing ened a systematic role inhi “epistemology without a knowing sub- ject" The invenigation of the structure of communication in thes temic community cannot simply be relegated to the sociology of nowlalge, Although commitments, valves, rules, conventions, at- titudes, frames, and wo forth clearly do arse and develop under em pial conditions they are just as clear conditions of possibility of ‘iene knowledge, Hsin this dimension combining the empirical fnd the trancendenal—that the logic of inguiry moves. Having taken uso the pint where “the conception of new ad transformed transcendental philosophy” (Habermas) becomes necessary, Popper fd Kuh fain diferent ways to pursue systematically the questions Central to its elucidation Popper largely because of his eemingly inconsistent) recourse tothe independence of facts and an abstract ‘opposition between the “objective spproae” to an autonomous third rol and the “subjective approach’ to the subject of knowledge, Ku largely because of his faire to develop a clear idea of the dif ferences berween empirical psyehology and sociology of knowlede tnd the “quasiaranscendenta logic of inquiry. Habermas theory of Cognitive interests an attempt to formulate dhe relevant questions “ind to provide some guideposts on the way to ther resolution Chapter 2 Knowledge and Human Interests 2.1.4 PRELIMINARY SKETCH. (OF Haberma’s works Knowledge and Human Interest is perhaps the ‘most intinsicaly difficult for Anglo-American readers to com- prehend. Most ofthe authors discussed, a well athe structure of the argument as 2 whole, are deeply rooted in the tradition of German philosophy and social theory. Moreover the book represents Haber- mass ist attempt to present his postion systematically; with Few ex ‘xpsions the major theses he advances have been subsequently refor- ‘mulated or revised. Even this characterization a a Rrst systematic Statement i misleading! the book is, ae Habermas points ost inthe preface, « historical prolegomenon, an atempt to understand the solution of epistemology which has left the philosophy of sence initsplace,"*to make one's way over abandoned stages of reflection.” “Thus it must be read a an effort to open-or rather to reopen — certain aventcs of reflection that were blocked by the ascendancy of positive during the ks hundred years The “abandoned stages cf reflection” to which Habermas reersare historically cated in the movement of German thought from Kant 0 ‘Mare His concer swith tha alteration ofthe relation betwen “eps temological self-reflection” and “empircakanalyic cence” discussed inehapter 1 In Kans eritcal philosophy, science was comprehended as one category of posible knowledge; theoretical reason was loated ina comprehensive framework tht encompassed practical reason reflective judgment, and cial rection itself, But this construction was unable to withstand Hegel’ cisque ofthe unacknowledged pre “ippostons of tranecendenta philosophy The intention of rx phi losophy’ tha informs Kantsctique isilusory transcendental rele tion snot an absolute beyinning but depends om something prior and sven In particular the knowing subject cannot be construed svn ab- Solute origina self-contained unity outside of or above the movement‘of history. Rather cic consciousness itself the outcome of sll formative processes (Bidungyprce) of both the species and the indie ‘ial, Acordingly ‘phenomenological reflection” most reconstruct its own genesis from sense certainty, through soccesive stages of the appearance of consciousness, to the sage of citque; is reason "reflecting on the differen forms that it has taken in the course of ‘own history. iaermas agrees that the knowing subject mist be comprehended inits historical development bu he takes ise with the way in which Hegel himself develops this insight, namely as 4 philosophy of Ab- solute Spirit in which epistemology isnot radicalized but abolished 1 shall have more to say ofthis: For now iis necessary to woe only that Hege’s philosophy of identity led not toa cil comprehension ‘of empirial scence as one category of posible knowledge butt ts The connection of hypotheses 1 experience i established through controlled abxeri1- tion typically an experiment. We generate inital conditions and mea sure the rest of operations carried out under thee condiins. realy, thea, baie atements do not provide immediate evidence wth no admistare of subjectivity, They ate “not simple representations of facts in themselves but express the succes of failure of our oper ‘ions The basic operations are measurement operations, which make posable the univocal correlation of operatively determined events and sjstematcally connected signs! “If the framework of em piticalanalyie enquiry were that of a transcendental subject, then imeasuronent would be the syneti activity which genuinely charac: terest Only a theory of measurement, therefore cat elucidate the conditions ofthe objectivity of possible knowledge fr the nomologt fal sciences" All of this shows, Habermas argues, that the behavioral sistem of| inrumental action ultimately determines the structure of empirical- Analytic inuiry. The methodological commitments consinutive of such inquiry anse from structures of humas ie, from imperatives of 4 species that reproduces sel! (in part) through purposiveratonal Action thats intially ted to cumulative learning processes These processes have to be maintained in the form of methodological in ‘quit ifthe se-formaton of the species not tbe endangered. The {erm ena cognitive intrest i meant to convey the bac orientation ‘oF inguiry, the general congnitve strategy, that derives fom this Fu damental condition of the reprodaction of human lie “This view of empiricab-analytc scence (a guided by an “anthropolog ically deep-seated” itereat in securing and expanding contol vet bjectified processes) rites a number of problems, the mest obvious ‘of which ists adequacy as an account of nateral since. I shold be clear from the preceding exposition that Habermas i not making 3 psychological claim about ihe intentions of natal sents or a his torical clan about specific connections between the development of science and the rise of industry His analysis is directed rather tothe meaning of a certain dass of scientific statements and tothe type of validiy chat they can claim, His thesis is that te origins, structure, and application of such statements show them to be sntrinsialyre= lated to possbiles of action of a certain sort: purposive-rational c- tion. Thus counterarguments would have vo come not From the ps ‘chology apd history of sence but from the logic and pilosophy of science. No atempt will e made here to establish the adequacy of Habermas's acount of natural science or to delve a final word in the debate concerning scientific instrumentaie ves that sso alive "ody But few bret remarks might be inorder to sharpen his posi tion a bit and to avert some posible misundersandings. Hans Albert has raised against Habermas the standard objections to insuumentalist views of senie theory, for instance, that theories ‘annot be regard a instruments since the logic f trying ota n= -srument and finding i suitable or unsuitable difers fom the logic of testing a theory and finding it corroborated or fae nsiuments cannot be falsed. But this type of objection mises the mark Habermas's pragmatic interpretation of empirica-analytic scence is rota theories as instruments view. Theories are, according to him systems of statements that can be corrector incorrect, corroborated of {alsiied. This notin question, The quesionirater; What do such statements, f ali disclose about reality? Does their meaning bear an Intrinsic relation to posses of action of a certain sor? Habermas's response—that empiricalanaltic inquiry provides i formation thai technically uteable woul be wily agreed t, i somewhat lest interesting, wreit intended ina realist sense, Isience ‘ould be conceived as presenting or approximating tue picture of the regular order of a natureinstself would follow routinely that this informacion might be put to practical use. The thesis of the technical interes guiding scence fas bite only if understood in a ‘quas-transcendental sense: making claim about the conditions of Posiiliy of objectively valid knowledge of nature and hus about the ‘ery meaning of sdentifc statements But how is one to decide be twcen the reals and transcendental accounts ofthe technical utility of scientific information? Granted that statements about the regular ‘covariance of observable events make poasble prediction and contrat ‘of theve events, why s this not simply consequence rather thin 3 condition of froitulinguiy? ‘One line of argument in support of Habermar’ postion followsfram the discussion of Popper und Kula in chapter 1 Scenic in- sqiry iva human sctivty. The actions in wbich members ofthe sien Sic community engage—obsersation and experimentation, me surement and concept formation, theory construction and testing ind so forth —are subject to certain rules, norms, standards andthe like. Akhough commitment to standards ea shift over ime al vary among different groups at any onetime, certain fundamental com Imitments are constitutive of went ingury a such—for example, commitments tothe testability of hypotheses through eantrolled ob ‘ervation and/or experimentation and tothe predictive accuracy, pat ticalarly quantiaive accuracy, of proposed laws and theories. IF such ‘commitments ate constitutive for scienticinguiy, it cear that the [rognostic and technical virtues of the information it produces are ‘ot merely an acidental consequence. The very nature af the proce {ures for constructing and testing scientific theories ensures tht suc ‘cesful theories will have predictive and technical potential, Further snore the realist secount ofthis potential fen rests on a conception ‘oftruth~trath aa correspondence of statements with realiy-—which becomes increasingly implausible once the idea of immediate vensory ‘evidence is given up in favor of some sort of "theory-ladenmess” of ‘observation statements, We shall have an opportunity to consider Habermas’ concept of trth in chapter 4. For the present tis impor. tantto note only that his theory of interests doesnot imply reduction of scentibe wath to technical utzabiliy, 9 version of the “ifs ‘worke'virue” view. His poion is much loner to Pete's Weal co sensu theory of tr “Another typeof objection tothe idea of technical interest might tie raised from within the Frankfurt schoo self Ie appeats chat this conception limits our Knowledge of nature to information that i technically wiizable and our intercourse with nature to ingtromental mastery of objected procestes. Horkheimer and Adorno, as well as Mareuse, exphily rejected any such Tnitation."* They argued, i fact, thatthe orientation exchsively to the domination of nature wat ‘hase factor inthe deformation of subjective capacities for emancipa tion, As wesw in secon 12, Haberatas reject their impli concep ‘ion of New Science and 3 New Technology arguing tht the logial "structures of scence and technology a we Know them representa ‘objectification of the essential structural elements of the behavioral ‘stem of instrumental action. Realizing this itinimponsetocmvinage hw 8 ang he organize don of human nature does no change and as long therfore as we have to achieve self preseration through soc abor and with he id ff means that subsite for works we ould renounce technaogy tore particularly our technology, in favor ofa qualitatively differen There is mo “more humane” substitute for the achievements of scientiictechnical progress. The real problem is nt technical reason assuch buts expansion “tothe proportions of life form, of the his torical totality’ ofa life workd"* Understood in this way, Habermas ngues, the proper tesponse tothe deformation of the subject that has ‘sulted from the uniersliration of technological rainy ad the logic of domination isnot the replacement of science and technology {through some version ofthe “resurrection of fallen nature” bute tivation of the reflective understanding of wience as one category of ‘knowledge, of technical contol a ae more of action. Technological "tionality most be assigned its legitimate, if Kimited, place within a ‘comprehensive theory of rationality 1c for this task that the theory of cognitive interests s designed ‘But this enough? Ate we not left i dhe end with only one legit mate atinide toward nature: technical mastery? And is this not se ously inadequate a8 an account of the mulfaeted relationships With nature, both “outer nature” and the “inner nature” of ox ov bodies, which are in fact not only possible but necessary for fll realization of our humanity? Habermas does aot exclude the possi: ity of ether atitude toward nature—mimetie, poetic, playful mystica faternal. He docs not even exclude a prior! the posi of some Sort of communicative relation with nature” But his theory does Seem to exclude modes of cognizing nature other than the empirical analytic, Objections to this exclusion might come from several dee tions. On what grounds could all cognitive content be denied to those ‘modes of consciousness described above a attitudes? The history of ‘mankind, a5 well as our own experience in the everyday lifeworld are replete with alternative way of iewing nature. Can all of these be plausibly casifed ether as protowientific oF noncognive (sty, a8 motional, appetite, oF expressive)? To maintain that dhey must ‘would seem to imply a preconception of cognition, atleast with re- Spec to nature, thats highly retrictive and in needa the very lat of some explication and defer.Rosle aad a Tiere Although there is some doubt as to how Habermas would respond to these questions, there is less doubt 2s to what is posion would be isdhvis objections that might be raised from the standpoint of metaphysics The noton that beyond the scientific image of nature it ‘might be powible, and even necesty, to seek a “deeper” metaphysi- calunderstanding appears to be ruled out by Habermas's theory of imterests. Against adiional ontology he employs the "wranscendental turn’ the separation of Being and Time, which underlies ontology. conceals an “objective ilusion,”" the suppression ofthe conaingive role ofthe subject of knowledge. But even if this is granted, there re tains the question whether some ype of alternative approuch to na ture aright be compatible with, and even required by, Habermar's theory of interes T shall resin to thi question inthe conelding section ofthis chapter, 2.3 THE PRACTICAL INTEREST OF THE HISTORICAL-HERMENEUTIC SCIENCES Habermas finds a fundamental indecision in Mares writing, In his ‘material svestgations Marx always took account of both the prod ive activity of societal individuals andthe onganizaon oftheir interve- lations. He treated socal relations as subject to norms that deter mined, with the force of institutions, hw obligations and rewatds were distributed. On the ether hand, in is sheoretcal emarks Mars ‘often seemed to regard the development of the human species 6 transpiing solely in the dimension of social labor, of proceses of production. This tendency wo reduce the “sell-generative at” of the hhuman species to labor, to eliminate in theory. non practice, the structure of symbolic interaction and the role of eulural vadition, was, acording to Habermas, a the 100 of the Flare of elas Marsisn to develop & reflective theory of knowledge, fort sin his very dimension that the eitque of knowledge (aswell sof ideologi- ‘al consciousness) moves According tothe theory of cognitive interes, the specific view pints from which we apprehend realty originate in the interest Structure ofa species that is ed to definite means of social organiza tion, Whereas the technical interes arse from imperatives of «form of life bound io work, the practical interest anchored in an equally Udeep-eated ienperative of sexicultral life: the survival of societal 10 Hor Rene ST viduals linked tothe existence of a reliable intrsubjectiviy of understanding in ordinary language communication. 1m its very stucture hermeneutic understanding i designed to fuarante, within cultural tadidons, the possible acion-oening Situnderstanding of individuals and groupe as well at Tedprocal Understnding between diferent individual and groups. fakes owl the form of uncon The tp Intersubjectivity on which communicative action depends Tans he ‘danger of communication breakdown in bath dimestsons the vertical tone of one's own individual ife history and the collective tadion (o ‘eich one belongs and the hodzontl one of mediating between the Tradions of diferent individuals, qroupa and cultures: When these ‘communication flows break offal the intersubjecity of m Understandings ether rigid or fall apart, condition of survival [Saisurbed, one that an elementary asthe complementary condo ‘ofthe sucess of instramental action: namely the possiblity of uncon. Strained agreement and non-vlent recognition, Because ths fhe presuppotion of practical bulge orto ‘trl scenes Gadosenlen] “practical nis precisely this sphere of unconsrsined agreement and open in tersubjectivity to which Habermas appealed in his enisque of the poskivs. program for a unified sence. The communiation struc: tures presupposed by the community of natural sent cannot themselves be grasped within the framework of empitial-anaytic c- ‘ence. The dimension in which concepts, methods, theories, and 50 forth are discused and agreed upon, in which the framework of| shared meaning, norms, values and so on is rounded, ithe dimen ‘Son of synbolicimteraction thats neither ential with nor reducible torinetrumental action, The rationality of dicourse abot the appro priateness of conventions oF the meaning of concepts is no the £2 Hoality of operations on objected: process: it volves the i terpretation of intentions and meanings. gals, values, and reasons. ‘Thus the objective Fnowledge produced by empirical analytic inquiry {nce posible without knowledge in the form of imersubjeive tanderstanding. The aalablityof an intersubjective val pre-and mmetiscientficlinguage, of # framework of shared meanings and ‘alls, is aken for granted in the natural sciences. The cultural ie Context (Labouwammenhang), of which sdentie communication i fonly one clement, belongs instead to the domain of the cultralThis distinction becween domains of inguty is not an ontological ‘one between different material objects of inquiry. Human beings cn be regarded at part of nature and dealt with in the categories of natural science (a, fo instance, in biology. Furthermore human be: havior ca, within imi, also be treated ae subject to the categories of objected processes (a, for instance, in the stily behavioral sc fences). The distinction i, rather, an epistemological or "wanscea: ‘denial loical” distinction between formal objects of inquiry. It rests fon the different modes of "constituting" the objects of inguiy. on ‘the system of primitive terms which categorize the objet of posible experience «and the method by which action-elated primary experiences are selected, extacied from their own system and uslzed forthe porpore of the discursive examination of chime t validity, and thas transformed into “data"" In the one orientation, we en ‘counter bodies in motion, events and procestes capable of being caus- ally explained in the other, we encounter speaking and acting sub jects tterances, and actions capable of being undestood In Krouledge and Human Ines the “self-reflection of the Gites umucfion” is developed through 4 suggestive if, from a purely "exegetical print of view, often debatableinterpretation of Dike. his more narvowly methodological writings, however, Habermas's ac count ofthe nature and limitations of historica-hermeneutic Know ferlge makes ite diret use of Dlthey. He draws instead on eontem porary phenomenological, hermeneutic, and inguistic approaches. I Shall, therefore, restrict the discussion of Habermas Dilthey in lerpreution to the presentation of few central ideas, putting off tant the next chaptera more complete dicussion of thecal ses associated with interpretive procedures and their claimed ireduaiil- ity to the procedures of empirical analytic gun: Dilthey anchors sill understanding in prior modes of under- standing in everyday life, "Hermeneutic understanding is only Imethodiclly developed form of the dim reflexivity or semirans- pareney with which the life of presientiScally communicating a Socially intersting men takes place in any case”* The “meanings” that are the object of such “ulderstanding” are constituted in two dimensions. On the one hand, they derive from the role of particular ‘clement in an entire developmental history. The signieance that 3 person or thing aequres fora subject (group) sa Fanti of ts place in his thei) leas whole, the unity of which i constiuted through ever changing retrospective imerpretations. In this dimension, the lite history of an individual isthe pattern For dhe hermeneutic relation of the whole to its parts. “This guarantees that every specie sg nificance is integrated into a macaning structure that represents the inalenbly individual (nd not merely singular) unity of world cen- {ered stourd an ego and ofa life history held together by ego iden iy" On the other hand, meanings that are fixed in symbol are never private. They always have intersubjective vality. A symbol cally structured element ofa life history owes is semantic content 38 turk o its place in a linguistic aystem valid for other subject as it ‘docs to its place in a biographical context. Even selfsunderstanding always moves inthe medium of mutual understanding with other sub jects “Tunderstane myself only in the sphere of whats common’ in ‘whic I simultaneously understand the other in his objectvations. For tur two experiences of ile ae articulated in the same language nhc for us hay intersubjectively binding validity." * Thus ego iden: Sy” and. communication in ordinary language, preseretion of ronidentty and reciprocal identification, are complementary com cepts designating the conditions of interaction in dialogue. Dithey, postulates the “community of life unites” (Gemeinsambeit der Leeninkoen), defined by the dialogue relation and reciprocal recognition on the one hand, and egovienty and the process of self-formation in ie history on the ther, as the objective framework fof the exltual sciences Its characteriaed bya double dialectic ofthe whole adits pats The es isthe horizontal level of communication, marked by the relation of the tality of linguistic commaityto the individuals who, hint, identiy with eachother to the same extent that they umieancousy assert their on-leniity against eachother The second is the verial “mension of ne, marked by the relation of the aly of aif his. tory tothe singular experiences snd life relations of which fi cn ruc.” The ground of the intersbjectvity that makes interaction and al understanding between individuals possible is ordinary lan ig. I hermencutes isto be analyzed a a explicit procedure, the eric characerisice of ordinary language that allow forthe com- ‘nication, no mutter how indirealy, of what is ineffably individual sunt be explicate. Dilthy distinguishes three canes of "life ex Presions” (Lebousgrn): linguistic expressions, actions, andeae aod man Tee (nonverbal) experiential expressions (gestures, nervous glances, bushing, intonations and the ike). The three clases of expression are integrated and mutually ieterpret one another. Syinbalie interac ion is as much a form of representation a s linguistic communica tion. The convertibility of the meaning of sentences nto actions and of actions into sentences makes reciprocal interpretations posible: ‘Mutual understanding about linguist symbol i subject toa peri et conta trough he actual cert ote atin Spat n given context, ail hes n(n cae interpreted through nguie te communication there i's desurbanceof consensus, fhe mean Tinguste synbols canbe made der Dvough patcipation In al iterations. Language and action interpre eich ee ep. rocally: chs i developed in Wittgensein's concept of the language fame! Neither in linguistic communication nor in symbolic interaction can the concrete background ofthe indviduate life histories, which de {ermines the spec meanings of particular expressions and actions, be directly expressed. The indival conditions of life in. which communication is sikuated cannot be transposed completely or una. tered into actions that obey general norms of inte the general categories of ordinary language” The third clas of ie expressions helps the imerpreter t close this qup. Experiential expressons-— primarily psychological, expressive phenomena linked to the Te sponses ofthe human hody—function as sgnal for unstated inten ‘dons and thus provide indications of the roe that the subject takes oF pretends to take in any given context of its actions and dialogues The dialectic of general and inva made posible in the intersub- ject of talking al acting ean lo make ste ofthe accompanying, foe of baci movements and correct self by there Ordinary language dors not obey the syntax ofa pore language. Ti becomes complete only when cameshed wi interactions snd cor: Pore forms of expression. The grammar uf language games in the Fema complte ruc fn regulates nt the cm nation of symbols but also the interpretation lngusic symbols through setins and expressions —. |A“pure language," in Habermas’ terminology, could be exhaustively defined by metalinguisic rules of construction, A natural language ‘on the other hand, defies formally rigorous reconstuction because of {ts “tellexvty "sit ncorporates int itl nonverbal forms of expres: sion (actions and experiential expressions) through which itis inter- preted. In this sense, ordinary language i its own metalanguage “This singular integration of language and practice makes com- prehensile the function of understanding in the conduct of fe. A breakdown in communication threatens the “action-orienting sel Understanding” of individuals and groups, as well reciprocal under nding between individuals and groups. The communication fow Can be reestalshed only by successfully interpreting those life ex reson tht cannot be understood and that block the reciprocity of behavioral expectations. “The function of understanding in the conduct of ies analogous to that deste by ce for empiralanaic int. Beth CGegories of lmesigations are embeded in systems of actions: Both Ste scoff by disturbances of routinized intercourse whether with na ture or wth other persons. Boch aim atthe eiminadon of doubt sd the eesablishment of tnproblematic modes of behavior. The fmergence of «problematic uation rests from disappointed ex [pecutions, But in one ease the criterson of disappointment is the fal- fre of feedbackscontaied purponverational action while inthe bother tis the distorbance ofa consensus, that the how agreement of ‘eciprcal expectations between at last two ating sujet cord ingly the intendons ofthe two onentations of inguty dif. The ist tims at replacing rules of behawor that have fled im wealty with tested tecnica ules whereas the second ost interpreting cx pressions of life hat eannoe be ndersond ad that block the mutual [yo tehavioral expectations. “Experiment refines the everyday progae contol of rules of insumertal action to a-methodial Fort of corroboration, whereas hermeneusi isthe scent form of the nterpretve activities of everyday Ie ike the empitical-analytic sciences the hermeneutie sdences are anchored in a specifi system of action, inthis case, the system of in- teractions mediated by ordinary language. This rootednes in a spe ‘fi life structure means that hermeneutic inquiry is governed by a Specific cognitive interest, inthis case, a "practical interest” ia main taining the typeof open itersebjectiity and nonviolent recognition ‘on which communicative action depend Is this intrest that under- Tay the emergence ofthe cultural sciences from categories of profes: sonal knowledge that developed systematized interpretation into ashill. “The cultural disiplines did not develop out ofthe eafts and bother protesions in which technical knowledge required but rather tout ofthe professonalized realms of action that require practical wis ftom" Tn consequence ofthe different interes structure of hermeneutic inquiry, the logic of inguiy in the cultural disciplines i, Habermas tainains, fundamentally diferent from that which obtains inthe ‘empirical analytic sciences In the present context the difference in {question might simply be stated as dae between the roles of the tran scendental Frameworks in the two types of inquiry. Habermas pte 3 follows Enpircalanayic scencesdiclose rea in so far a8 t appears ‘lin the bekuvoral system of tnarumenal aqion- nomelegal Seen oth je dain. ap sah wth eon technical control that. under spedtied conditions is posse verywhere and atall ines. The hetmencitic cence do tot dae fealty under a different wanscendentl ramework Rather they re Aiected toward the rancendental trator of various actual rts ttf, within each of which realty i iterpreted according to aspe- ie grammar of worldviews snd of acon r+ They grasp tterpretr tions of realty with regard to an incersubjecity of aton-oreming Understanding pose Troma given hermencuti sartng point” The pattern of communicative ation doesnot play a transcendental role forthe hermeneutic sdiences inthe same way thatthe framework ‘of instumental action does for the nomological siences. Ahough it is tue thatthe roles of every interpretation are determined by the structure of symbolic iteracion in general it alo true that, once the interpreter i soalized in his mother tongue and has bee ine structed in interpreting as such, "he does not proceed sje to ran Scendental rules, but the ew! ofthe transcendental strictures thet Selves" The hermeneutic inquirer can interpret the meaning of his texts" only in relation tothe structure of the word to which he be- longs. Here the role of uanscendental framework is played by the grammar of ordinary guage, which stables schemata of wold Interpretation Interpretations of interpretations ural proceed at a different level than do interpretations of reality in semantic term, Sentences about sentences are of a different order than sentences hou fs. On the other hand, the rational semantic contents that are the objecs of hermeneutic inquiry are at once symbols and fats “Thus imerpretacon ie simultaneously empirical and conceptual anal- sys It i directed to the clemente of world cossttuted thro inary langage and 3¢ the very “grammatical” res that constite this world, 2.4 THE EMANCIPATORY INTEREST OF CRITICAL THEORY {In dealing withthe technical andl practical interests, Habermas could begin with generally accepted modes af inquiry and goon to present arguments for thei intrinsic connection to “anthropoloically deep ‘ete systems of action, In the case of the emancipatory interest he ‘Stuation is palpably diferenc Iti aid tobe the guiding interest of the “critially oriented sciences” and of philosophy. By the former Habermas understands a typeof social inguiry concerned to go be- yond the preduction of nomological knowledge and to determine when theoretical statements grasp invariant regularities ft soal action as such and when they express tology oze lations of dependence that an in principle be tranformed (lt) ‘aker into account that information about tawhike connections ee off 5 proces of reflection n the consciousness of thse whos the les are Shout Thus the unelected consciousness, which ine ofthe inital ‘Conditions of such laws, can be transformed. OF cour, to ths end 4 ‘vcally mediated knowledge of laws cannot through reflec slone tender law Suef inoperative, bu W ean render inapplicable! Although Marxian critique of ideology and Freudian payehoanalyis are the clasical example of auch rtalyorited inquiry, they ca ‘ot, Habermas argues simply be adopted as paradigms. As presented bay their founders, they were both subject to “acientste msn derstanding.” Thus the construction of an adequate model for critical, ‘cial theory i sill outstanding. Similarly although Kant’s tan scendenial critique of knowledge and Heyes. phenomenological Tellecion of consciousness in its manifeaacons provide he point of departure for Habermas discussion of the theory of knowledge, be regards nether as an adequate conception of philosophy. The de ‘elopment of a mode of philosophical inquiry appropriate to the ‘rnancpatory intrest ia stil oustanding. Consequenly in his die ‘cussion of the third interest, Habermas cannot simply appeal to ree tion on generally accepted mods of inguiry ax fe uid seth the first ‘wo interests. He snot plumbing the foundations of established disciRong and Tero plies but engaging in epistemological reflection a a propacdeutc ta formulating a new conception of social and plesophical inquiry. The idea ofa critical social theory incorporating an emancipatory inerest hes us tothe center of Habermas thought, We shall en- ‘outer iin various forms nd from various points of view in the re mainder of this study. Although the rough outlines of his conception of tical theory are drawn in Knouiedge and Human Inte is further development—even ata very general, programmatic level— hha to await the construction of a general theory of communication In this section my treatment willbe confined tothe historical consid- ‘tations and preliminary formulations Found in that exrier work. In ‘the final section of this chapter, I shall examine more critally a Few ofits basic concepts and assumptions The history of philosophy provides a number of variations on the theme; "the ruth shall make you fre.” In ancient Greece, Socratess ‘pursuit ofthe Delphic injunction to “know thyself is only the most ‘obvious example, The systematic endeavors of Plato and Aristotle ‘were no less informed by an interest in emancipation. The atiude of pure theory, diimerested contemplation, promised purification from the inconstane drives and passions of everyday lie “The releawe of knowledge from interest was not supposed to pity theory from the obfuscations of subjecuvity but inversely to provide ‘the subject with an ecstatic purscalion from the passions. Cathars iso longer atained through mystery cults but established inthe wil ‘oF individuals themselves by means of theory {In modern times, the Enlightenment assigned reason a partisan poi- ‘ion in the war agains cogmatiam, Progress oferta insight meant Drogress toward the autonomy of the individual: dhe disolaion of ogmatic constraints was the condition of the hberation of society from unnecessary, because sll-imposed,sulfering. As Holbach put “To error we owe the oppressive chine which despots and priests ‘everywhere forge for the people. To ervor we owe the slavery 18 ‘thich people languish in alent ll countries To error we owe the Feligows terrors mhich freeze human beings in fear and make them Slaughter eachother Tor the sake of igments of the mind™ Emancipation by enlightenment required the wil be rational. In a bis reply to ube question; Whats Enlightenment, Kant made this is Enlightenment i man’s release from his selincurved ttelage, Tate age man's inability to make use of his understanding with die: ‘Son from another. Sel ncurred itis utlage when fa case es ot In lack of teason but in the lack of resolution and courage tose ‘without direction from another. Soper aude! “Have courage to se our own reason!"™—that the meat of enlightenment ‘Ths the dea of Reason encompassed the wilt be rational, the will te achieve Mindigti, autonomy, and responsibility inthe conduct of lites Although the concept of an interest of reason appears in Kants practical philosophy, the notion that reson shoul ince adie 10 realize reason is, strictly speaking, inconceivable within his tr Scendental ramework. To allo the wil tobe determined by anything fother than respect for the laws of practical reason, to at from desire borinclinaton is for Kant heteronomy ofthe will surrender of one's freedom and rationality. The motive of a free acta rational act, ca ‘lie subjective interest in the abject of the action; emus bea mt ive valid for all rational beings as such. On the other hand, moral eel ing ates wo something ike factual interest inthe realization of ‘moral laws, of a realm of freedom. Ths interest cannot be a sensual tne. Thus Kant cil practical pleasre i morality, that sim ations that are determined by principles of reason, a pre interest” (in con tras to the “pathological” interest in the object ofthe ation). The concept of pure interest ascribes to reason a causality opposed 0 that of the Faculty of desire yee i hot hie ane rh {Tete eatin beng asthat which e ought owl certainly there fe reds power of feaon tonal felng of psn o sata ton inthe fuller of uy and hence thee me be cust of ‘ern to determine te sensi in sesordance with sow pine ples. But iis whalyimposabe to der Leto make a prt con Eevnable how 3 mete thought containing nothing sensuous 0 pro- dice ec of pane or dpe Fora pare Kind oF causality of which, as ofall csaiy, we mot dtermine Anything aon but must consult experience only ‘Thus to account for the experience of morality Kant must introduce the eancept of 4 pre soteret of reason in Mint reason sllharbors an interest in the achievement of autonomy and responsi vi: If pure reason is to be the cause of an effec tha ‘experience pleasure in the fulfillment of duty—then a moment of Factcy i introduce ito reason ill. Thus am answer tothe ques tion, How can pure reason be practical? would require the concept of fan interes that ws neither empirical nor eatiey severed from ex perience. But from Kan viewpoint his inconceivable, ashe com edes in the concasion tothe lines quoted above: But since experience can exemplify the relation of cause wo effect onl jv ubnsting between two objets of experience, while here pure re Som by mere Ideas (whic furnish no object for experience) io be the use ofa etfeet which does ei experience a explanation of how Sind why the universality ofthe maxi a aw (and hence moral) Tiere si completely sponsible for us men Cn the bass of Kans conception of eason, then, while we cam be cer tain thar pure reason can be practical, we are entely incapable of ‘comprehending hme thi is posible Fiche provides «framework in which the intersted employment ‘of pute reason can be comprehended, but only atthe cost of reducing hature tothe post of an absolute ego, He overcomes the Kansan split betwen theoretical and practical reason by making a prindpe of the primacy of practical reson, The fundamental form of dogmatism that is to be overcome by enlightenment the fixation of the imma ‘ure unmndigen) conaciossness on things. A conscousnes that com: prebende tell asa product of the things around it, s a product of hature, is dogmatically enslaved: "The prinaple ofthe dogmatss i belie in things fr their own se, that, indizect belie in thei own self, whieh is dispersed and supported only by objects." Only from the ideals standpoint is poruble to transcend the dogmatism af ‘natural consciousness and achieve mature autonomy (Minit). But to raise ive to thi standpoint the ego mun ave am interest in its ‘own autonomy, a will to emancipate elf from ite dependence on ‘ings. Dogmatim is as mach a moral lacks a theoretical incapacity Correspondingly the intellectual intuition ia which the eo ap prehends isel the el- and wor- posting subject an original et fof freedom motivated by the interest of reason in emancipation. AS Habermas puts it 29 Incheimerestin the independence ofthe ego, reason realizes iteltin the saine measure as the act of reason ae auch produces freedom, Sclereecton at once intuition and emancipation, comprehension and liberation from dogmate dependence. The dogmatm that rex Son una ch aaa an pracy fe comes ‘rtor and unfree existence” On Fichtean premises dogmatsm—as unreflected, natural con stiousness—becomes al-pervasive. It does not frst have to establish itself (as wth Holbach) a prejudice, private or institutionalize itis present wherever there is tnawarenes of os autonomy. In this ting, enlightenment isidealism, the redaction of ature to indetermi- nate material for acting subjects. From the tandpeint of his dealin, Fiche can conceive of reason as inherently practical, sted to the practical tention of a subjet that seek ts omn aitonomy. In this sense, “the highest interest and the ground of all other interest is interest in ourselves” This autonomy i attainable ony through an act of slfreflection in which the subject apprehends sell a the ‘ource of consciousness and of the world, Thus the interest of reawon isconsitive both for knowing and for acting, In Habermas’ terms, TAs an act of freedom interest precedes self-reflection just at it realizes ill in the emancipatory power of self-reflection." Unlike the absolute sel posting of Fchte's ego, Hegel's phenome. nological self-reflection surmounts dogmatien by reflectvely recon: structing the sel-formative proces (Bdangyprozs) of mind (Get (Cait Feflection is not an absolute origin: dependent on some ‘thing prior, which it takes sis object whl simsleaneoualy originating ini Beginning with the natural consciousness of the everyday le ‘world in which we already find ourselves, phenomenological reflection tracesits own genesis through the successive stageso the manifestation, ‘of consciousnes. Ths movement combines reason and interest, since at every stage i overcomes both world sew and form of ie, For reflection destroy, along with a ale view of things. the dogmatic sides of abil form fhe" false conscious, Lng and wiling ate sll oined. The reversal of consovsness mean ihe disoetion ofideteations, the breaking of aon, ad the Alestruction of projections The experience of teflection proceeds by way of a determinate neenor a at Hama Ta ston that guards against empty skepticism. The unmasking of a ‘matic atte contains postive moment that isincorporated ina new reflected atitude |A form of lif that has become an abstraction cannot be negated with ‘ut leaving a trace or overthrow without practical conse ‘The revoluxiontzed situation contains the one that has been sed becatee the sight ofthe new consis precisely inthe experience ‘of revolutionary eleae from the old consciousness Critica consciousness, proceeding by way of determinate negation, aims at comprehending the context of its own genes, the self formative process of which i ise? the outcome. Through a sys tematic repetition ofthe manifestations of consciousness that constc tte the history of mankind, t works itself up tot present standpoint through stages of reflection, At every stage new insight is confirmed ina new atid Phenomenclogal reflection is acordingly 2 mode lf reflection or sel-knowledge in which theoretical and practical ea [At the end of the Phonology of Mind, Hegel asserts that his ei- cal consciousness is abso knowledge In Habermas view this ean ‘only mean shat "from the very beginning Hegel presumes as given knowledge of the Absolute." For phenomenology, as a reflective appropriation of the selfformative process of the human species, ‘would not otherwise confer upon exteal coascousnes the satus of twolute knowledge, would not otherwise eventate in the absolute ‘unity of subject and object. This indicates that Hegel has different tunderstanding of phenomenology: "He presumes that phenome nological experience always Keeps an has Rept within the medium of abwolute movement of the mind.” From thi standpoint, rather than a radicalized critique of knowledge that unifies theoretical and practial reason, phenomenology becomes "metaphysical philosophy ‘of mind and nature” In contrast to Fichi’s absolute self and word-positing ego and Hegels absolute movement of mind, Marx conceives of the self formative process of the human species as conditioned it depends on ‘contingent conditions of nature, Mind ie not the absolute ground of atures its mature thats the ground of mind in dhe vente of a natural Process that gives rise both othe mural human beng ad the a ‘ure that surrounds him. Ia reproducing its life under natural condi: tions the human species regulates its material exchange with nature through processes of social labor. Socal labor, “senstons human at iy." is not only a condition of human existence buts transcendental accomplishment. "The system of objective aetivities creates the factual ‘conditions of the possible reproduction of vocal lie ala th sane tine the transcendental conditions ofthe posible objet ofthe jects experience. Itregulates material exchange wth nature and constitutes a work." The objecs of experience share with nature the property of beinginitself, but they also bear the character of produced objectivity resting from the atvty of man, In opposition {0 idealism, the subject of world constitation i not transcendental consciousness in general but the concrete humaa species reproducing its ie dhrough processes of sca labor. Because of the invariant relationship of the species to ity natural ‘environment-—expressed in structures of fusnan sensuous activity tha are rooted in the boxy organization of man-—the transcendental accomplishment of world constitution transpires within a fixed. Framework. On the other hand, the speci forms in which nature is ‘objetifed change historically in dependence on the system of svi labor. We have acess to ature only through a historvalyalteable stock of categories and rules that reflects the organization of our ta terial activities. Alterations in the system of sxil labor brought about bythe development ofthe forces of pretucion give ie to erations inthe societal categories through which anything like a work ean be given In other words, although the labor process may be considered Independently of every specie soil form, it designates ne fixed Ihuman essence but only a xed mechanism of the evolution of the species. In the lahor process, what changes fs not only the natute worked upon but the nature of the laboring subjects themselves. “His tory isthe true natueal history of man” From this standpoint, Mare ca detach the reconstruction of the selFformative process ofthe human specie fom its idealist pres postions. The stages of the manifestation of consciousness are de- penelent on the historia stages af evelopment of the forces and re- lations of production. Since the system of social labor i the result of the labor of past generations, dhe present subject comprehend tel by knowing itself to have been pretuced a by self through the pro- duction of pas subjects... Also subject stain consciousness ofRowe and a TE ‘tse inthe strit sense ony if becomes aware of itself in its produc tion or labor as the sell-generative act ofthe species in general ane Koes itself 1 have been produced by the "labor of the entire previ- ‘ous course of world history." ‘Human reawon and the partisanship of reason against dogmatism develop historically in the proces ofthe confrontation of laboring subjects with nature In contrat to the subjective form of Fichtes ‘asfication of men (nto dogmatists and deaits) and of their inter fests in things or in themselves, Marx anchors the division of clases Snd interests in historically specie configurations of alienated labor land suppressed freedom, Dogmatisn, i the form of Tae conscious- ress and refed soil relations, cannot be overcome by & Fichtean withdrawal into the autonomous subject. Rooted asi isin material imerest it ust be eritcized practically at the lve of the objective context of delusion, that i, atthe level ofthe sytem of rial labor itself. Doginatism asumes the form of ideology. and reason is acive asthe critique of ideology. The partisanship of reason against dog- ‘matiam has the same objectivity a8 the illusion tha it entices the Jere in a rational organization of society sno les historically de termined, no les embedded in the objective socal context In Habermas’ view, Marrs work contains the principal elements required for an adequate conception of reason and the interest of 2 ‘on in emancipation. But this promis, he argues. was never realized Gonsiere manent sn or in ern of e rodocion bears ety tered, Mar sca arises between the practice of inquiry and the limited philosophical Snderting ofthe ing inh cpl set Mary com prchends the history of the specie under categories of material ai Ky and the critical bolton st sleologes, of Itrumental scion end ‘evolutionary practice, of labor and feet at once. But Mare i texprets what he docs inthe more reacted concep ofthe species selbreficction tough work sone oe (On the one hana, in is material investigations, Mars treats the self formative process of the human species as mediated nat only by the productive actcty of individuals but also by the organization oftheir imeractin, that i, by the istiutonalzed relations of power and the cultural wadiions tht regulate men's interactions among thentselves, Although it isthe development ofthe Fores of production that pro ‘des the impetus for overcoming rigidifed forms of life and con- seiousness, this development dees not taken by isl, lead to that reflexive comprehension of the socal life process from which se Conscious control could rest. Emancipation from relations of socal force, from the power of one clas over anther, requires revelation ary struggle, including the crcl reflective activity through which ideological delusions are dispelled. From this perspective, Ma going beyond Hegel, can regard the reconstruction of the manifests tions of consdounness ax an encoded representation of the sel reproduction of the species. Forms of consciousness arise and are suspended not ideality, through the seltmovement of a abxo Tue mind, but materially, through the development of the forces of production and the struggle of social cases. Critical cone sciousness, inthe form of the critique of ieology, is Rslf involved in the selfformative process it reflectvely appropriates. ‘On the other hand, atthe categoral level, Marx tends to view the selfformative process of the species nidimensionally in terms of progres through prodictive activi, The institutional framework is regarded as an aspect of the productive process ‘The form of knowledge adequate wo this proces 3 “human natural sence.” In ‘oking the model of physics, Marx claims to represent “the economic laws of motion of mevlern society” 36a "natual law.” This shows c= cording to Habermas, that although the ide of the selt-constcation fof mankind through Inhor sufficed to critisize Hegel, i was in adequate to render comprehensible the real significance of the mate- ‘alist appropriation of Hegel