UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2017-08348 Doc No.

C06515975 Date: 04/11/2018

Jon H. Huntsnren, Jr.

CHAIRMAN

@Atlantic Council Brent Scowcroft

INTERNATIONAL ADVISORY
BOARD CHAIRMAN

Frederick Kernpe
PRESIDENT E CEO

MEMORANDUM

To: Secretary of State

RELEASEIN FULL
Secretary of Defense
From: Ambassador Frederic C. Hof
Subject: The National Security Importance of Iraq
Date: February 6, 2017

The Objective

The objective of the United States is an independent, stable, and prosperous Iraq: one at peace with its
neighbors, one reflecting legitimate and effective governance, and one strongly inclined to cooperate
closely with the United States in the Middle East and beyond.

This objective cannot be achieved unilaterally. It will require a sustained American leadership effort in
'artnership with allies and friends — including Iraqis — willing to carry significant parts of the burden.
I

Achieving the objective is of the utmost importance to our own national security. An Iraq lacking in
legitimate and effective governance will be a place where ISIL (IS, ISIS, Daesh, Islamic State) and even
more lethal successors will regenerate, fill vacuums, grow, and conduct transnational acts of terrorism
from secure Iraqi bases. An Iraq mired in disunity, instability, and corruption will be a place where Iran
and its local proxies will be dominant at times and places largely of their own choosing.

The single most importont thing President Trump can do immediately is to state publicly, and assure Iraqi
leaders privately, that the U,S. is totally committed for the long-term to helping Iraq become an
independent, stoble, and prosperous country; that this commitment far tronscends the forthcoming
military defeat of ISIL

What ISILand iran have in common is a consistent message to their supporters and hostages: that the
American presence in Iraq is transitory and superficial; that the Americans will be gone at their first
opportunity. Neutralizing this message is job one, even before the defeat of ISIL becomes an
retreat'ould
accomplished fact. Indeed, this presidential rebuke to the ISIL-Iran message of 'America in
reflect a fundamental national security truth: a precipitous U,S, withdrawal from Iraq would cede
the ground to enemies and adversaries of the United States.

For the past year the Atlantic Council's Rafik Hariri Center, which direct, has facilitated a Task Force on
I

the Future of Iraq chaired by Ambassador Ryan Crocker. He brought together the world's leading Iraq
scholars, experts, and former policy practitioners to conduct a rigorous inquiry into what it would take
to achieve the objective stated above. The Task Force traveled to Baghdad, Erbil, Sulaimaniya, Najaf,
Amma n, Berlin, and twice convened in Washington, DC to hear the perspectives of Iraqi political leaders,

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Atlantlccouncil.org

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civil society actors, and religious figures. It likewise listened carefully to policy makers representing
several countries engaged in the war against ISIL.

The project director, Nussaibah Younis, is now preparing a formal report of findings and
recommendations. That report will be released publicly and will be made available to your staffs. This
memorandum seeks to boil it down to its essentials for efficient reading. Getting Iraq right is essential to
the security of our citizens.

The Interests

1. Countering violent extremism. U.S. policy in Iraq prioritizes the defeat of ISIL. But progress in the
battle against extremism cannot be measured solely in terms of the number of ISIL fighters
killed and the scale of territory retaken from the group, In our interviews, one senior Iraqi
government official told us that the message he was hearing from the United States was:
"Forget about reforms, focus on ISIS." If such messages are being conveyed, even inadvertently,
they are counter-productive. Governance reforms are key to killing ISIL and keepingit dead. It is
in the interests of the United States to promote that message and outcome relentlessly.
2. Preventing regional instability. Iraq has become a destabilizing force in the Middle East, and its
continued volatility has had a significant impact on surrounding countries. The presence of
ungoverned spaces in Iraq offers strategic depth to criminal, insurgent, and extremist networks
in neighboring countries. Militant groups in Syria, including ISIL, benefit from supply routes
through Iraq. And the export of Iraqi Shia fighters into Syria, organized by the Iranian
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), further exacerbates the conflict in Syria,
3. Ensuring the free flow of oil. Iraq is currently the fourth largest oil producer in the world,
pumping some 4 million barrels a day: an all-time high for the country, And iraq has the
potential to expand its oil production capacity significantly. It is in the interests of the United
States that oil flow freely onto globalmarkets and that oil prices remain relatively stable, This is
best achieved by supporting the Iraqi government in its efforts to recapture the support of
Iraq'i'itizens,
and to improve its ability to govern and to secure its territory effectively.

The Strategy

The previous administration returned American combat forces to Iraq reluctantly, in the wake of a
shocking eruption out of Syria, through Mosul, and to points south. The precipitous American
ISIL

withdrawal from Iraq in 2011 encouraged Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Maliki to do his worst in terms of
sectarianism and rule by cronies, alienating much of Iraq's Sunni Arab community and gutting the
leadership of the Iraqi Army. Just as Bashar al-Assad made large parts of Syria safe for ISIL, Maliki paved
the way for al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) to rise from near-death and transform itself irito a self-proclaimed
caliphate, Maliki's departure from the premiership cleared the way for American military intervention,

sweep through much of Iraq also enabled Iranian military intervention. Working through mainly
ISIL's

Shia militias (Popular Mobilization Units — PMU), officers of the IRGC have taken part in the ground
counter-offensive against ISII., Some of the PMUs have engaged in atrocities against Iraqi Arab Sunnis,
branding them as supporters of ISIL. The problem posed by Iran is twofold: as part of its aggressive

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penetration of the Arab world it hopes to dominate Iraq politically; and as a force for political
sectarianism it brings to Iraq the same sociological poison that resurrected AQI in the first place.

It isunderstandable that Iran would wish to dominate a weak and divided Iraq, Memories of the Iran-
Iraq War are still fresh. Iraq's majority Shia community is seen by the Islamic Republic as a recruiting
base. Having the decisive say on Iraqi oil production potential would be good for Iran. Nearly of the
things that motivate Iranian behavior in iraq run counter to American interests,

the American objective in Iraq is an independent, stable, and prosperous country, then the strategy
If

for achieving the objective must address the following elements:

~ Making it clear to all concerned — especially the leaders of the Iraqi government and military—
that the American commitment to achieving its objective will be sustained over the long-term,
Iran's message to the same audience is that the United States will be gone forever once ISIL is

~
patrol.'ut
vanquished. It will not be easy for us to convince Iraqi leaders that we are in for 'the long
we should spare no effort to make the case.
Completing the military defeat of ISIL both in Iraq and Syria, while also recognizing that there is
no purely military cure for what ails Iraq in the long run. 180,000 American military personnel
could not compel legitimacy and competence in Iraqi governance. The defeat of ISIL could, if not
followed-up properly, be merely a waystation to Iraq's complete undoing and the rise of new
terrorist threats. We will have wasted resources and opportunities if we declare victory and
come home, Worse, we will have set the stage for new threats to American national security.
~ Pivoting quickly from beating ISIL to helping Iraq make progress on the governance front, ISIL,
Iran, and other lslamist threats to our national. security are, first and foremost, vacuum fillers.
The vacuums they fill — whether in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, or Yemen — are created by illegitimate
governance: political systems that have no standing in the eyes of the ruled, The challenge for
the United States and its partners is not one of 'nation-building that is a job for Iraqis, But a
pivot to governance would have several important aspects:
o Continue the training of Iraqi security forces. Maintain an appropriate contingent of
-
American forces in Iraq beyond the liberation of Mosul, Pursue a long-term mission to
advise, train, and equip iraqi security forces. Focus on strengthening the ability of!raqi
intelligence services to penetrate extremist networks, Strengthen the professionalism of
security forces to enhance community cooperation. Help diversify the personnel of
security forces so that they avoid exacerbating ethnic and sectarian tensions,
o Place good governance at the heart of the national advisory and assistance mission,
Corruption is crippling the Iraqi state. The. highest ticket corrupt practices are those tied
to ministerial procurements. Technical assistance should focus on transparency, Online
publication of funds allocated to projects and procedures for contractor selection is
essential. Online bid submission and tight regulation of subcontracting can also mitigate
the diversion and disappearance of funds. Devolving project funding to provinces and
even lower echelons of government can improve accountability and promote
empowered local governance, In this connection, devolving security management to
locally recruited police can defuse tensions between localities and Baghdad. These
governance elements are foundational to state stability, and promoting them should be
the cornerstone of the post-ISIL American strategy in Iraq,

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o Provide good offices to help resolve disputes between the Iraqi government and the
Kurdish Regional Government (KRG}, Ultimately neither the United States nor its
partners will dictate whether or not an independent Kurdistan eventually separates
itself from iraq. But efforts can be made to defuse tensions over disputed territories,
revenue sharing, and other issues that roil relations between Baghdad and Erbil. Again:
it all goes back to American national security interests. Governance vacuums in disputed
areas can be filled by elements focused on transnational terror agendas.
o Work closely with the Iraqi government on economic reform. International Monetary
Fund (IMF} conditionality is important, but insufficient. American technical assistance
can usefully focus on regulatory reforms that simplify the legal steps to starting and
running a business and bar officials from extorting start-ups, The Commerce
Department's Commercial Law Development Program has done good work, but
implementation of its recommendations must be pressed. The United States, its
partners, and international financial institutions should prioritize funding for small and
'medium enterprises. Although it is imperative that the Iraqi government continues to
prioritize investment in the oil and gas sector and works to maximize the efficiency of
the institutions that deal with foreign companies working in that sector, promoting
private sector growth is key to reorienting the Iraqi economy from its near-exclusive
dependence on oil, and to mitigating the volatility of commodity markets on the
country's finances.
o Avoid, if at all possible, direct confrontation — verbal and operational — with Iran in Iraq.
If we sustain — as we should — a significant military presence in Iraq, there will be force
protection issues in which pro-Iranian elements will figure prominently, We should
neither look for trouble nor provoke it. Our effort in Iraq should be seen by Iraqis of all
political persuasions for what it is: a long-term project to help achieve the kind of
legitimate and effective governance that respects the dignity of citizens and delivers
services that people can see and use. We can (and should} compete with Iran in Iraq on
the basis of positive deliverables, not ideological debates and insults, At the same time,
we should, if necessary, make sure that Iran understands that we will protect American
citizens — uniformed and not — in Iraq, and that any attempt by anyone to do harm to
Americans will be met by a strong and even disproportionate response.

Maximizing the Prospects for Success

The goal is an Iraq governed in such a way as to eliminate from its territory threats to the safety and
security of Americans. This is not mission-impossible, This is not a repeat of 2003; invasion and
occupation are not on the menu. Iraq is indeed replete with challenges, and engagement looks
expensive and cumbersome, But if we invest in this relationship with strategic patience, and measure
progress in years rather than in months, the future could be very promising, Iraq has a level of freedom
of expression almost unparalleled in the Middle East, a burgeoning and vibrant civil society, a wealth of
diversity and ambition in its youth, vast potential oil wealth, and the ability to become a positive force
for stability in the region.

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Iraq not, in short, a completely bad news story. Its potential as an engine for regional and global
is

economic growth is enormous. Its potential as a stabilizing force in the Arabian Gulf region and beyond
isunlimited. Its potential as a pa'rtner of the United States regionally and beyond is striking, All of these
factors make strong, continued American engagement desirable. The national security threat posed to
/
Americans if Iraq goes badly makes sustained engagement mandatory. What can we do to increase our
chances of success?

~ Make sure we understand what Iraqis are thinking, what they want, and what they are prepared
to support. We approached our Task Force work with intense curiosity, open minds, and closed
mouths. After listening carefully, we concluded that there is a strong Iraqi appetite for a
sustained American advisory presence aimed at helping Iraq achieve the kind of legitimacy in
governance that can stabilize the place and begin to realize the massive economic potential that
resides in a combination of impressive human capital and abundant natural resources, We can
and should devise a strategy consistent with our objective: ideally this memorandum has spelled
out the headlines, But implementation cannot be a 'made in America'ndertaking. Iraqis will
have to do the heavy lifting, so we owe it to ourselves to try as best we can to get inside their
heads.
~ Make sure we have solid White House buy-in for a long-term commitment to Iraq for the sake of
American national security. Your Departments will be essential to devising strategy, offering
options, and overseeing implementation. But inevitably there will be bumps and even detours in
the road as a multi-year effort unfolds, Having th'e President and his Assistant for National
Security Affairs fully on board with the objective and the overall strategy is absolutely essential.
Without their commitment an effort featuring strategic patience cannot succeed.
Make sure the Congress is fully briefed on the objective and the accompanying strategy. It goes
without saying that the power of the purse makes Congressional support for a long-term effort
essential. Members of Congress welcome two-way consultations and some will have very useful
advice to offer. The previous administration had serious shortcomings in this area. It will not be
difficult to improve executive-legislative communication on a matter bearing very heavily on
American national security.
~ Make sure that the American public understands (a) the national security imperative for a long-
term role in iraq and (b) the essential differences between the mission envisioned now and the
one set forth in 2003. There is profound popular skepticism over the prospect of doing anything
of a long-term nature anywhere in the Middle East, The skepticism is understandable. It can be
overcome only by highlighting the security stakes and illustrating a sensible way forward.
~ Make sure we have partners sharing the burden and contributing to the outcome we seek.
There is an opportunity to leverage the multi-national counter-ISIL coalition to develop an
ongoing stabilization partnership between Iraq and action-oriented elements of the
international community. We should build on the strength of European engagement to share
costs, divide responsibility, and better tackle sensitive areas where the United States may not be
seen by Iraqi leaders as the ideal interlocutor and service provider,

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Conclusion

As our Task Force was concluding its work another Atlantic Council project — the Middle East Strategy
Task Force — issued its report. This was an 18-month undertaking led by Steve Hadley and Madeleine
Albright. One passage from that report - which featured extensive interactions with governments and
peoples across the Middle East — is particularly pertinent to the challenge posed by Iraq:

There is nothing in or about the Middle East that condemns it to failure, or that other regions
have not overcome. The thesis of intractable ancient conflicts rooted in religion and ethnicity is
as faulty in the Middle East asit was in Europe. On the contrary, there is much about the region
—
starting with its people — thatinspires hope, But hopeis no mare a strategy than cynicism,

We have offered here the elements of a strategy for Iraq that aims in the end to keep Americans safe
from terrorism. require of the United States and its allies an effort long on strategic patience and
It will

costly in terms of investment. yet those costs will only increase exponentially if we declare victory once
ISIL is vanquished and come horne, leaving Iraq and its people to the tender mercies of an aggressive

and sectarian Iran and to Islamist extremists who will bide their time until reemergence is feasible. The
fact that American forces have returned to Iraq after prematurely departing in 2011 should make the
point. There will be no education derived from the second kick of a mule.

Our full Task Force report will address the issues raised here in more depth. But the bottom line will be
the same: our national security dictates that we do our best to help bring about an Iraq that is
independent, stable, and prosperous: one at peace with its neighbors; one reflecting legitimate and
effective governance; and one strongly inclined to cooperate closely with the United States in the
Middle East and beyond.

Postscript

The Executive Order "Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States" was not
received well in Iraq. Protecting Americans is, of course, job one. But a strategy to do so rooted in
partnership simply must take into account (in advance of final decisions) the pride, dignity, and
viewpoints of partners: actual and prospective. Waivers for Iraqis who have served as interpreters for
our military are a welcome adjustment. Still, the initial impact of the Executive Order on the iraqi
government, the KRG government, and the Iraqi people makes the recommended presidential
statement about total American commitment to Iraqi independence, stability, and prosperity all the
more essential.

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