ANG TIBAY, REPRESENTED BY TORIBIO TEODORO, MANAGER AND PROPIETOR, AND   Not only must there be some evidence

Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the
evidence must be “substantial.” Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means such
NATIONAL WORKERS BROTHERHOOD, PETITIONERS, VS. 
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
 THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND NATIONAL LABOR UNION, INC., RESPONDENTS.  The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
69 Phil. 635 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Due Process in Administrative Bodies contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.
 The administrative body or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own
Facts: independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the
views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.
Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather company which supplies the Philippine  The administrative body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such
Army. Due to alleged shortage of leather, Toribio caused the lay off of a number of his employees. a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons
However, the National Labor Union, Inc. (NLU) questioned the validity of said lay off as it averred for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority
that the said employees laid off were members of NLU while  no members of the rival labor conferred upon it.
union National Workers Brotherhood (NWB) were laid off. NLU claims that NWB is a company
dominated union and Toribio was merely busting NLU.
ICHONG v. HERNANDEZ
The case reached the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) where Toribio and NWB won. Eventually, 101 PHIL 115
NLU went to the Supreme Court invoking its right for a new trial on the ground of newly FACTS:
discovered evidence. The Supreme Court agreed with NLU. The Solicitor General, arguing for the Petitioner, also in behalf of other alien residents’ corporations and partnerships, brought this
CIR, filed a motion for reconsideration. action to obtain a judicial declaration that RA 1180 is unconstitutional. Petitioner contends, among
others, that said act violates the equal protection of laws and that it violates the treaty of the
ISSUE:  Philippines with China. Solicitor General contends that the act was a valid exercise of the police
power and that not a single treaty was infringed by said act.
Whether or not the National Labor Union, Inc. is entitled to a new trial.
ISSUE:
HELD: 
Whether or not RA 1180 violates the equal protection of laws
Yes. The records show that the newly discovered evidence or documents obtained by NLU, which
HELD:
they attached to their petition with the SC, were evidence so inaccessible to them at the time of
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as
the trial that even with the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained
well as hostile discrimination on the oppression of inequality. The real question at hand is whether
them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations. Further, the attached documents
or not the exclusion of the future aliens for the retail trade unreasonable. The equal protection
and exhibits are of such far-reaching importance and effect that their admission would necessarily
clause “is not infringed by a specified class if it applies to all persons within such class and
mean the modification and reversal of the judgment rendered (said newly obtained records
reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and
include books of business/inventory accounts by Ang Tibay which were not previously accessible
those who do not”. Aliens are under no special constitutional protection which forbids a
but already existing).
classification otherwise justified simply because the limitation of the class falls along the lines of
nationality. The difference in status between citizens and aliens constitute a basis for reasonable
The SC also outlined that administrative bodies, like the CIR, although not strictly bound by the
classification in the exercise of police power.
Rules of Court must also make sure that they comply to the requirements of due process. For
administrative bodies, due process can be complied with by observing the following:
 The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to
present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof.
 Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce
evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the
evidence presented.
 While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does
imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its
decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly
attached.
CASE DIGEST : Restituto Ynot Vs IAC
On January 13, 1984, the petitioner transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to
Iloilo when the same was confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for
the violation of E.O. 626-A. A case was filed by the petitioner questioning the constitutionality of
executive order and the recovery of the carabaos. After considering the merits of the case, the
confiscation was sustained and the court declined to rule on the constitutionality issue. The
petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court but it also upheld the ruling
of RTC.
Issue:
Is E.O. 626-A unconstitutional?
Ruling:
The Respondent contends that it is a valid exercise of police power to justify EO 626-A amending
EO 626 in asic rule prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain conditions. The
supreme court said that The reasonable connection between the means employed and the
purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing the Supreme Court do not
see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their
indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in
one province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent
their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill
them there
The Supreme Court found E.O. 626-A unconstitutional. The executive act defined the prohibition,
convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright.
Due process was not properly observed. In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily
confiscated by the police station commander, were returned to the petitioner only after he had
filed a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. The measure struck at
once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying due
process.
CASE DIGEST : PHILCOMSAT VS. ALCUAZ
Facts: The petition before us seeks to annul and set aside an Order 1 issued by respondent
Commissioner Jose Luis Alcuaz of the National Telecommunications Commission
Herein petitioner is engaged in providing for services involving telecommunications. Charging rates
for certain specified lines that were reduced by order of herein respondent Jose
AlcuazCommissioner of the National Telecommunications Commission. The rates were ordered to
be reduced by fifteen percent (15%) due to Executive Order No. 546 which granted the NTC the
power to fix rates. Said order was issued without prior notice and hearing.
Under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5514, petitioner was exempt from the jurisdiction of the then
Public Service Commission, now respondent NTC. However, pursuant to Executive Order No. 196
issued on June 17, 1987, petitioner was placed under the jurisdiction, control and regulation of
respondent NTC
Issue: Whether or Not E.O. 546 is unconstitutional.
Held: In Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. vs. Public Service Commission the Supreme Court said that
although the rule-making power and even the power to fix rates- when such rules and/or rates are
meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the Philippines-may partake of a
legislative character. Respondent Alcuaz no doubt contains all the attributes of a quasi-judicial
adjudication. Foremost is the fact that said order pertains exclusively to petitioner and to no other
The respondent admits that the questioned order was issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial
functions. It, however, insists that notice and hearing are not necessary since the assailed order is
merely incidental to the entire proceedings and, therefore, temporary in nature but the supreme
court said that While respondents may fix a temporary rate pending final determination of the
application of petitioner, such rate-fixing order, temporary though it may be, is not exempt from
the statutory procedural requirements of notice and hearing
The Supreme Court Said that it is clear that with regard to rate-fixing, respondent has no authority
to make such order without first giving petitioner a hearing, whether the order be temporary or
permanent. In the Case at bar the NTC didn’t scheduled hearing nor it did give any notice to the
petitioner.
ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY VS. HON. JUDGE IGNACIO CAPULONG [222 SCRA 644; G.R.
99327; 27 MAY 1993]
Sunday, February 01, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: Leonardo H. Villa, a first year law student of Petitioner University, died of serious physical
injuries at Chinese General Hospital after the initiation rites of Aquila Legis. Bienvenido Marquez
was also hospitalized at the Capitol Medical Center for acute renal failure occasioned by the
serious physical injuries inflicted upon him on the same occasion. Petitioner Dean Cynthia del
Castillo created a Joint Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating Committee which was tasked
to investigate and submit a report within 72 hours on the circumstances surrounding the death of
Lennie Villa. Said notice also required respondent students to submit their written statements
within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt. Although respondent students received a copy of the
written notice, they failed to file a reply. In the meantime, they were placed on preventive
suspension. The Joint Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating Committee, after receiving the
written statements and hearing the testimonies of several witness, found a prima facie case
against respondent students for violation of Rule 3 of the Law School Catalogue entitled
"Discipline." Respondent students were then required to file their written answers to the formal due process prior to their dismissal from Petitioner University.

charge. Petitioner Dean created a Disciplinary Board to hear the charges against respondent

students. The Board found respondent students guilty of violating Rule No. 3 of the Ateneo Law Minimum standards to be satisfied in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions in academic

School Rules on Discipline which prohibits participation in hazing activities. However, in view of the institutions, such as petitioner university herein, thus:

lack of unanimity among the members of the Board on the penalty of dismissal, the Board left the

imposition of the penalty to the University Administration. Accordingly, Fr. Bernas imposed the (1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against

penalty of dismissal on all respondent students. Respondent students filed with RTC Makati a TRO them;

since they are currently enrolled. This was granted. A TRO was also issued enjoining petitioners (2) that they shall have the right to answer the charges against them with the assistance of

from dismissing the respondents. A day after the expiration of the temporary restraining order, counsel, if desired:

Dean del Castillo created a Special Board to investigate the charges of hazing against respondent (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them

students Abas and Mendoza. This was requested to be stricken out by the respondents and argued (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and

that the creation of the Special Board was totally unrelated to the original petition which alleged (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by

lack of due process. This was granted and reinstatement of the students was ordered. the school authorities to hear and decide the case.

Issue: Was there denial of due process against the respondent students. PHIL. PHOSPHATE FERTILIZER CORP. VS. TORRES [231 SCRA 335; G.R. NO.98050; 17 MAR 1994]

Facts: Philphos Movement for Progress, Inc. (PMPI for brevity), filed with the Department of Labor

and Employment a petition for certification election among the supervisory employees of
Held: There was no denial of due process, more particularly procedural due process. Dean of the
petitioner, alleging that as a supervisory union duly registered with the Department of Labor and
Ateneo Law School, notified and required respondent students to submit their written statement
Employment it was seeking to represent the supervisory employees of Philippine Phosphate
on the incident. Instead of filing a reply, respondent students requested through their counsel,
Fertilizer Corporation. Mediator-Arbiter Rodolfo S. Milado issued an order directing the holding of
copies of the charges. The nature and cause of the accusation were adequately spelled out in
a certification election among the supervisory employees of petitioner, excluding therefrom the
petitioners' notices. Present is the twin elements of notice and hearing.
superintendents and the professional and technical employees. However, the PMPI filed an

amended petition with the Mediator-Arbiter wherein it sought to represent not only the
Respondent students argue that petitioners are not in a position to file the instant petition under
supervisory employees of petitioner but also its professional/technical and confidential
Rule 65 considering that they failed to file a motion for reconsideration first before the trial court,
employees. The parties therein agreed to submit their respective position papers and to consider
thereby by passing the latter and the Court of Appeals. It is accepted legal doctrine that an
the amended petition submitted for decision on the basis thereof and related documents.
exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies is when the case involves a question of law, as
Mediator-Arbiter Milado issued an order granting the petition and directing the holding of a
in this case, where the issue is whether or not respondent students have been afforded procedural

certification election among the "supervisory, professional (engineers, analysts, mechanics,
accountants, nurses, midwives, etc.), technical, and confidential employees. PHILPHOS appealed
the order to the Secretary of Labor and Employment who rendered a decision through
Undersecretary Bienvenido Laguesma dismissing the appeal. PHILPHOS moved for reconsideration
but the same was denied; hence, the instant petition alleging denial of due process on the part of
the DOLE to which the mediator-arbiter was under.
Issue: Whether or Not there was denial of due process.
Held: There was no denial of due process. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to
be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of petitioner PHILPHOS
agreed to file its position paper with the Mediator-Arbiter and to consider the case submitted for
decision on the basis of the position papers filed by the parties, there was sufficient compliance
with the requirement of due process, as petitioner was afforded reasonable opportunity to
present its side. Moreover, petitioner could have, if it so desired, insisted on a hearing to confront
and examine the witnesses of the other party. But it did not; instead it opted to submit its position
paper with the Mediator-Arbiter. Besides, petitioner had all the opportunity to ventilate its
arguments in its appeal to the Secretary of Labor.
ANIAG V. COMELEC                        G.R. No. 104961 October 7, 1994
FACTS:
l The COMELEC issued two resolutions in preparation for the synchronized 1992 national and local
elections.
l The first resolution is Resolution No. 2323 otherwise referred to as the "Gun Ban.
l The second resolution Resolution No. 2327 providing for the summary disqualification of candidates
engaged in gunrunning, using and transporting of firearms, organizing special strike forces, and
establishing spot checkpoints.
l Pursuant to the "Gun Ban," Mr. Serapio P. Taccad, Sergeant-at-Arms, House of Representatives, wrote
petitioner who was then a Congressman of the 1st District of Bulacan requesting the return of the
two (2) firearms3 issued to him by the House of Representatives.
l Upon being advised of the request on 13 January 1992 by his staff, petitioner immediately instructed
his driver, Ernesto Arellano, to pick up the firearms from petitioner's house at Valle Verde and
return them to Congress.
l About thirty minutes later, the policemen manning the outpost flagged down the car driven by Arellano
as it approached the checkpoint. They searched the car and found the firearms neatly packed in
their gun cases and placed in a bag in the trunk of the car. Arellano was then apprehended and
detained. He explained that he was ordered by petitioner to get the firearms from the house and
return them to Sergeant-at-Arms Taccad of the House of Representatives.
l The police referred Arellano's case to the Office of the City Prosecutor for an inquest.
l The City Prosecutor ordered the release of Arellano after finding the latter's sworn explanation
meritorious.
l The City Prosecutor invited petitioner to shed light on the circumstances mentioned in Arellano's sworn
explanation. Petitioner not only appeared at the preliminary investigation to confirm Arellano's
statement but also wrote the City Prosecutor urging him to exonerate Arellano. He explained that
Arellano did not violate the firearms ban as he, in fact, was complying with it when apprehended
by returning the firearms to Congress; and, that he was petitioner's driver, not a security officer
nor a bodyguard.
l The Office of the City Prosecutor issued a resolution which, among other matters, recommended that
the case against Arellano be dismissed and that the "unofficial" charge against petitioner be also
dismissed.
l However, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 92-0829 directing the filing of an information against
petitioner and Arellano for violation of Sec. 261, par. (q), of B.P. Blg. 881 otherwise known as the
Omnibus Election Code, in relation to Sec. 32 of R.A. No. 7166;7 and petitioner to show cause why
he should not be disqualified from running for an elective position
l Petitioner’s MR was denied by COMELEC.
l Hence, petitioner questions the constitutionality of Resolution No. 2327 but the SC upheld its validity.
l The other issue of this case is….
ISSUE:
WON the warrantless search is valid
HELD:
NO. It was an invalid warrantless search conducted by the PNP.
In the case at bench, we find that the checkpoint was set up twenty (20) meters from the entrance
to the Batasan Complex to enforce Resolution No. 2327.
There was no evidence to show that the policemen were impelled to do so because of a
confidential report leading them to reasonably believe that certain motorists matching the
description furnished by their informant were engaged in gunrunning, transporting firearms or in
organizing special strike forces. Nor, as adverted to earlier, was there any indication from the
package or behavior of Arellano that could have triggered the suspicion of the policemen. Absent
such justifying circumstances specifically pointing to the culpability of petitioner and Arellano, the
search could not be valid.
It may be argued that the seeming acquiescence of Arellano to the search constitutes an implied Concepcion. Thereafter, the prosecution presented Juvie and had attested the voluntariness of her
waiver of petitioner's right to question the reasonableness of the search of the vehicle and the desistance the same being due to media pressure and that they would rather establish new life
seizure of the firearms. elsewhere. Case was then submitted for decision and Savellano sentenced both accused to
reclusion perpetua. Savellano commented that Alonte waived his right to due process when he did
While Resolution No. 2327 authorized the setting up of checkpoints, it however stressed that not cross examine Juvie when clarificatory questions were raised about the details of the rape and
"guidelines shall be made to ensure that no infringement of civil and political rights results from on the voluntariness of her desistance.
the implementation of this authority," and that "the places and manner of setting up of
checkpoints shall be determined in consultation with the Committee on Firearms Ban and Security
Personnel created under Sec. 5, Resolution No. 2323."  
ISSUE: 
The facts show that PNP installed the checkpoint at about five o'clock in the afternoon of 13
January 1992. The search was made soon thereafter, or thirty minutes later. It was not shown that Whether or not Alonte has been denied criminal due process.
news of impending checkpoints without necessarily giving their locations, and the reason for the
same have been announced in the media to forewarn the citizens. Nor did the informal checkpoint
that afternoon carry signs informing the public of the purpose of its operation. As a result,
motorists passing that place did not have any inkling whatsoever about the reason behind the HELD: 
instant exercise. With the authorities in control to stop and search passing vehicles, the motorists
The Supreme Court ruled that Savellano should inhibit himself from further deciding on the case
did not have any choice but to submit to the PNP's scrutiny. Otherwise, any attempt to turnabout
due to animosity between him and the parties. There is no showing that Alonte waived his right.
albeit innocent would raise suspicion and provide probable cause for the police to arrest the
motorist and to conduct an extensive search of his vehicle. The standard of waiver requires that it “not only must be voluntary, but must be knowing,
intelligent, and done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely
In the case of the petitioner, only his driver was in the car at that time it was stopped for consequences.” Mere silence of the holder of the right should not be so construed as a waiver of
inspection. As conceded by COMELEC, driver Arellano did not know the purpose of the checkpoint. right, and the courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver. Savellano has not
In the face of fourteen (14) armed policemen conducting the operation, driver Arellano being shown impartiality by repeatedly not acting on numerous petitions filed by Alonte. The case is
alone and a mere employee of the petitioner could not have marshaled the strength and the remanded to the lower court for retrial and the decision earlier promulgated is nullified.
courage to protest against the extensive search conducted in the vehicle. In such scenario, the
"implied acquiescence," if there was any, could not be more than a mere passive conformity on AGABON vs NLRC
Arellano's part to the search, and "consent" given under intimidating or coercive circumstances is
no consent within the purview of the constitutional guaranty.
Facts:
Hence, the action then of the policemen unreasonably intruded into petitioner's privacy and the
security of his property, in violation of Sec. 2, Art. III, of the Constitution. Consequently, the
firearms obtained in violation of petitioner's right against warrantless search cannot be admitted
for any purpose in any proceeding. Private respondent Riviera Home Improvements, Inc. is engaged in the business of selling and

installing ornamental and construction materials. It employed petitioners Virgilio Agabon and

Alonte vs. Savellano - GR No. 131652, March 9, 1998 Jenny Agabon as gypsum board and cornice installers on January 2, 1992 until February 23, 1999

when they were dismissed for abandonment of work. Thus, Petitioners then filed a complaint for
Facts:
illegal dismissal and payment of money claims

Petitioners also claim that private respondent did not comply with the twin requirements of notice
Bayani M. Alonte, incumbent Mayor of Biñan, Laguna, was accused of raping Juvie-Lyn
Punongbayan with accomplice Buenaventura Concepcion. It was alleged that Concepcion and hearing. Private respondent, on the other hand, maintained that petitioners were not
befriended Juvie and had later lured her into Alonte’s house. The case was brought before the
Regional Trial Court of Biňan. The counsel and the prosecutor later moved for a change of venue dismissed but had abandoned their work.
due to alleged intimidation. While the change of venue was pending, Juvie executed an affidavit of
desistance. The prosecutor continued on with the case and the change of venue was done
notwithstanding opposition from Alonte. The case was raffled to the Manila Regional Trial Court
under J Savellano. Savellano later found probable cause and had ordered the arrest of Alonte and
 (c) A written notice of termination served on the employee indicating that upon due consideration

Issue: WON petitioners were illegally dismissed. of all the circumstances, grounds have been established to justify his termination.

Held: In case of termination, the foregoing notices shall be served on the employee’s last known

address.

Accordingly, petitioners’ dismissal was for a just cause. They had abandoned their employment Procedurally, (1) if the dismissal is based on a just cause under Article 282, the employer must give

and were already working for another employer. the employee two written notices and a hearing or opportunity to be heard if requested by the

To dismiss an employee, the law requires not only the existence of a just and valid cause but also employee before terminating the employment: a notice specifying the grounds for which dismissal

enjoins the employer to give the employee the opportunity to be heard and to defend himself. is sought a hearing or an opportunity to be heard and after hearing or opportunity to be heard, a

Abandonment is the deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee to resume his notice of the decision to dismiss; and (2) if the dismissal is based on authorized causes under

employment. It is a form of neglect of duty, hence, a just cause for termination of employment by Articles 283 and 284, the employer must give the employee and the Department of Labor and

the employer.  Employment written notices 30 days prior to the effectivity of his separation.

After establishing that the terminations were for a just and valid cause, we now determine if the From the foregoing rules four possible situations may be derived: (1) the dismissal is for a just

procedures for dismissal were observed. cause under Article 282 of the Labor Code, for an authorized cause under Article 283, or for health

The procedure for terminating an employee is found in Book VI, Rule I, Section 2(d) of reasons under Article 284, and due process was observed; (2) the dismissal is without just or

the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code: authorized cause but due process was observed; (3) the dismissal is without just or authorized

Standards of due process: requirements of notice. – In all cases of termination of employment, the cause and there was no due process; and (4) the dismissal is for just or authorized cause but due

following standards of due process shall be substantially observed: process was not observed.

For termination of employment based on just causes as defined in Article 282 of the Code: The present case squarely falls under the fourth situation. The dismissal should be upheld because

1. A written notice served on the employee specifying the ground or grounds for it was established that the petitioners abandoned their jobs to work for another company. Private

termination, and giving to said employee reasonable opportunity within which to respondent, however, did not follow the notice requirements and instead argued that sending

explain his side; notices to the last known addresses would have been useless because they did not reside there

1. A hearing or conference during which the employee concerned, with the anymore. Unfortunately for the private respondent, this is not a valid excuse because the law

assistance of counsel if the employee so desires, is given opportunity to respond mandates the twin notice requirements to the employee’s last known address. Thus, it should be

to the charge, present his evidence or rebut the evidence presented against him; held liable for non-compliance with the procedural requirements of due process.

and Petition denied. CA affirmed with modifications.

Note:
 1. The Supreme Court reviewed and compared the Serrano and Wenphil cases. overbreadth find no application in the present case since these doctrines apply only to free speech

2. In doing so, they came up with a clear cut rule on employment termination and cases; and that RA 9372 regulates conduct, not speech.

payment of separation pay, and if proper, with damages.

3. The said review is not included in the digest.

ISSUE: Whether the vagueness doctrine is an applicable ground to assail a penal statute.
4. Ergo, just read it in the full text.

SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT NETWORK, INC., et al., Petitioners, -versus-

RULING: Yes, but only in an as-applied challenge. A statute or act suffers from the defect of
ANTITERRORISM COUNCIL, et al., Respondents G.R. No. 178552, EN BANC, October 05, 2010, J.
vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must
Carpio-Morales
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution

because it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it,

fair notice of the conduct to avoid.

A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that

men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.

It is repugnant to the Constitution because it violates due process for failure to accord persons,
In this jurisdiction, penal statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated
especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid. Statutes found vague as a
only “as applied” to a particular defendant. This means that in determining the constitutionality of
matter of due process typically are invalidated only 'as applied' to a particular defendant. Thus,
a statute, its provisions which are alleged to have been violated in a case must be examined in the
absent an actual or imminent charge against the petitioner, a vagueness analysis of the assailed
light of the conduct with which the defendant is charged. Absent an actual or imminent charge
statute is legally impermissible. In this case, since the petitioners have not been charged with
against the petitioner, a limited vagueness analysis of the assailed statute is legally impermissible.
violation of the assailed law, the vagueness doctrine is not applicable.
Therefore, in this case, since the petitioners have not been charged with violation of the assailed

FACTS: law, the vagueness doctrine is not applicable.

Petitioners herein challenge the constitutionality of the Human Security Act of 2007. They assailed PEOPLE VS. VERA (1937) | EQUAL PROTECTION  CLAUSE

the said law for being intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad the definition of the crime of
terrorism under the said law in that terms like "widespread and extraordinary fear and panic
among the populace" and "coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand" are
G.R. No. 45685, 65 Phil 56, November 16, 1937
Doctrine: Requites for a valid class legislation: (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must
be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; (4)
must apply equally to all members of the same class.

nebulous, leaving law enforcement agencies with no standard to measure the prohibited acts.

Respondents, through the OSG, countered that the doctrines of void-for-vagueness and

Facts:
 1. Private respondent (Cu-Unjieng) was convicted of a criminal charge by trial court of Ormoc Sugar Company Inc. vs Treasurer of Ormoc City
Manila.
G.R. No. L-23794     February 17, 1968
2. He filed several motions for reconsideration or new trial but was denied. On 1936,
the SC remanded the case to the original court of origin for the execution of
judgment. Facts:
3. While waiting for the new trial, he appealed to Insular Probation Office (IPO) for
probation but was denied. The Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed a municipal tax ordinance imposing on any and all
4. However, Judge Vera, upon another request by petitioner, allowed the petition to be productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company Inc. one (1%) percent per
set for hearing for probation. export sale to the US and other foreign countries.
5. Petitioners then filed a case to Judge Vera for the latter has no power to place the
petitioner under probation because it is in violation of Sec. 11 of the Act 4221 (i.e., In lieu, Ormoc Sugar filed before the CFI of Leyte a complaint against the City of Ormoc, its
the grant to the provincial boards the power to provide a system of probation to Treasurer, Municipal Board and Mayor, alleging said ordinance is violative of the equal
convicted person.) protection clause and the rule of uniformity of taxation, among other things.  Ormoc Sugar
Petitioner’s contentions: Company Inc. was the only sugar central in Ormoc City at the time.
1. Judge Vera has no power to place the petitioner under probation because it is in
violation of Sec. 11 of the Act 4221 because nowhere it states that it is to be made Issue:
applicable to chartered cities like the City of Manila.
2. Assuming if includes cities, it violates equal protection clause for being an invalid WON the ordinance is violative of the constitutional provision on  equal protection?
classification because its applicability is not uniform throughout the country for each
provincial board has its own discretion to provide or not to provide a probation
Ruling:
system, allocate funds for the probation officers based on the discretion of each
provincial boards as regards their own locality, etc.
The taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently
Issue: WON the assailed provision is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection
clause. established sugar central, of the same class as the present company, from the coverage of the
Held: tax. As it is now, even if later a similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because
 YES, the assailed provision is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal the ordinance expressly points only to the company as the entity to be levied upon.
protection clause.
 Class legislation discriminating against some and favoring others in prohibited. But EPC applies only to persons or things identically situated and doesn’t bar a reasonable
classification on a reasonable basis, and nor made arbitrarily or capriciously, is classification of the subject of legislation.
permitted. The classification, however, to be reasonable must be based on
substantial distinctions which make real differences; it must be germane to the A classification is reasonable where: 1) it is based on substantial distinctions which make real
purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must differences; (2) these are germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the classification applies not
apply equally to each member of the class. only to present conditions but also to future conditions which are substantially identical to those
 In the case at bar, however, the resultant inequality may be said to flow from the of the present; (4) the classification applies only to those who belong to the same class.
unwarranted delegation of legislative power. Each provincial board has its own
discretion to provide or not to provide a probation system, allocate funds for the Villegas vs Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho (1978)
probation officers based on the discretion of each provincial boards as regards
their own locality, etc. What if the other province decides not to adopt probation
Facts: The Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance 6537 requiring aliens (except those
system, or it decides not to have salary for the probation officer?
employed in the diplomatic and consular missions of foreign countries, in technical assistance
 it is clear that in section 11 of the Probation Act creates a situation in which
programs of the government and another country, and members of religious orders or
discrimination and inequality are permitted or allowed. Section 11 of Act No. 4221
congregations) to procure the requisite mayor’s permit so as to be employed or engage in trade in
permits of the denial of the equal protection of the law and is on that account bad.
the City of Manila. The permit fee is P50, and the penalty for the violation of the ordinance is 3 to
6 months imprisonment or a fine of P100 to P200, or both.

Issue: Whether the ordinance imposes a regulatory fee or a tax.

Held: The ordinance’s purpose is clearly to raise money under the guise of regulation by exacting
P50 from aliens who have been cleared for employment. The amount is unreasonable and
excessive because it fails to consider difference in situation among aliens required to pay it, i.e.
being casual, permanent, part-time, rank-and-file or executive.
[ The Ordinance was declared invalid as it is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable, being applied
only to aliens who are thus deprived of their rights to life, liberty and property and therefore
violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. Further, the ordinance
does not lay down any criterion or standard to guide the Mayor in the exercise of his discretion,
thus conferring upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted powers.]
Dumlao vs. COMELEC
FACTS: Sec. 4 BP Blg. 52 disqualifies retired elective officials who has received retirement benefits
and is already 65 years old to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired.
Petitioner said it is concocted and designed against him to prevent him from running again.
HELD: No violation of equal protection. It is subject to rational classification. If the groupings are
based on reasonable and real differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated differently
from the others. Here, persons over 65 are classified differently from younger employees to
promote emergence of younger blood. Persons similarly situated are similarly treated. It does not
forbid all legal classification, what is prohibited is a classification which is arbitrary and
unreasonable. That constitutional guarantee is not violated by a reasonable classification is
germane to the purpose of the law and applies to all those belonging to the same class.
PASEI v DRILON DIGEST CASE - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
FACTS:
The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI, for short), a firm "engaged
principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas placement,"
challenges the Constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of the
Department of Labor and Employment, in the character of "GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE
TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD WORKERS,"
through petition for certiorari and prohibition. Specifically, the measure is assailed for
"discrimination against males or females;" that it "does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to
domestic helpers and females with similar skills;" and that it is violative of the right to travel. It is
held likewise to be an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power, police power being legislative, and
not executive, in character.
On May 25, 1988, the Solicitor General, on behalf of the respondents Secretary of Labor and
Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, filed a Comment informing
the Court that on March 8, 1988, the respondent Labor Secretary lifted the deployment ban in the
states of Iraq, Jordan, Qatar, Canada, Hongkong, United States, Italy, Norway, Austria, and
Switzerland. In submitting the validity of the challenged "guidelines," the Solicitor General invokes
the police power of the Philippine State.
No. 1 is unconstitutional it being an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power since police power is
legislative and not executive in nature.
RULING:
NO. The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been defined as the
"state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to
promote the general welfare." As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition of restraint upon liberty
or property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It is not capable of an exact definition but has
been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace.
As a general rule, official acts enjoy a presumed validity. In the absence of clear and convincing
evidence to the contrary, the presumption logically stands. The petitioner has shown no
satisfactory reason why the contested measure should be nullified. There is no question that
Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract workers," but it does not thereby make
an undue discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that "equality before the law" under
the Constitution does not import a perfect Identity of rights among all men and women. It admits
of classifications, provided that (1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are
germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they
apply equally to all members of the same class.
The Court is satisfied that the classification made-the preference for female workers — rests on
substantial distinctions.
The Court took judicial notice of the unhappy plight that has befallen our female labor force
abroad, especially domestic servants, amid exploitative working conditions marked by, in not a few
cases, physical and personal abuse. The sordid tales of maltreatment suffered by migrant Filipina
workers, even rape and various forms of torture, confirmed by testimonies of returning workers,
are compelling motives for urgent Government action. As precisely the caretaker of Constitutional
rights, the Court is called upon to protect victims of exploitation. In fulfilling that duty, the Court
sustains the Government's efforts.
The same, however, cannot be said of our male workers. In the first place, there is no
evidence that, except perhaps for isolated instances, Filipino men abroad have been afflicted with
an Identical predicament. PASEI has proffered no argument that the Government should act
similarly with respect to male workers. The Court, of course, is not impressing some male
chauvinistic notion that men are superior to women. What the Court is saying is that it was largely
a matter of evidence (that women domestic workers are being ill-treated abroad in massive
instances) and not upon some fanciful or arbitrary yardstick that the Government acted in this
case. It is evidence capable indeed of unquestionable demonstration and evidence this Court
accepts. The Court cannot, however, say the same thing as far as men are concerned. There is
simply no evidence to justify such an inference. Suffice it to state, then, that insofar as
classifications are concerned, this Court is content that distinctions are borne by the evidence.
Discrimination, in this case, is justified.
 There is no doubt that such a classification is germane to the purpose behind the
measure. Unquestionably, it is the avowed objective of Department Order No. 1 to "enhance the
protection for Filipino female overseas workers" the SC has no quarrel that in the midst of the
terrible mistreatment Filipina workers have suffered abroad, a ban on deployment will be for their
own good and welfare.
The Order does not also narrowly apply to existing conditions. Rather, it is intended to
apply indefinitely so long as those conditions exist. This is clear from the Order itself ("Pending
review of the administrative and legal measures, in the Philippines and in the host
countries . . ."18), meaning to say that should the authorities arrive at a means impressed with a
greater degree of permanency, the ban shall be lifted.
There is also no merit in the contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes an
invalid exercise of legislative power. It is true that police power is the domain of the legislature,
but it does not mean that such an authority may not be lawfully delegated. As we have mentioned,
the Labor Code itself vests the Department of Labor and Employment with rulemaking powers in
the enforcement whereof.
Himagan vs. People
FACTS: Himagan is a policeman assigned in Camp Catititgan, Davao City. He was charged for the
murder of and attempted murder. Pursuant to Sec 47 of RA 6975, Himagan was placed into
suspension pending the murder case. The law provides that “Upon the filing of a complaint or
information sufficient in form and substance against a member of the PNP for grave felonies
where the penalty imposed by law is six (6) years and one (1) day or more, the court shall
immediately suspend the accused from office until the case is terminated. Such case shall be
subject to continuous trial and shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the
accused. Himagan assailed the suspension averring that  Sec 42 of PD 807 of the Civil Service
Decree, that his suspension should be limited to ninety (90) days. He claims that an imposition of
preventive suspension of over 90 days is contrary to the Civil Service Law and would be a violation
of his constitutional right to equal protection of laws.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 47, RA 6975 violates equal protection guaranteed by the Constitution.
HELD:  No. The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the other classes of
persons charged criminally or administratively insofar as the application of the rule on preventive
suspension is concerned is that policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law which can be
used to harass or intimidate witnesses against them, as succinctly brought out in the legislative
discussions. If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a serious offense is reinstated to his
post while his case is pending, his victim and the witnesses against him are obviously exposed to
constant threat and thus easily cowed to silence by the mere fact that the accused is in uniform
and armed. The imposition of preventive suspension for over 90 days under Sec 47 of RA 6975
does not violate the suspended policeman’s constitutional right to equal protection of the laws.
Almonte vs. Vazquez
Facts:
This is a case wherein respondent Ombudsman, requires petitioners Nerio Rogado and Elisa
Rivera, as chief accountant and record custodian, respectively, of the Economic Intelligence and
Investigation Bureau (EIIB) to produce "all documents relating to Personal Services Funds for the
year 1988" and all evidence such as vouchers from enforcing his orders.
Petitioner Almonte was formerly Commissioner of the EIIB, while Perez is Chief of the EIIB's Budget
and Fiscal Management Division. The subpoena duces tecum was issued by the Ombudsman in
connection with his investigation of an anonymous letter alleging that funds representing savings
from unfilled positions in the EIIB had been illegally disbursed. The letter, purporting to have been
written by an employee of the EIIB and a concerned citizen, was addressed to the Secretary of
Finance, with copies furnished several government offices, including the Office of the
Ombudsman.
May be erased: [The letter reads in pertinent parts: that the EIIB has a syndicate headed by the
Chief of Budget Division who is manipulating funds and also the brain of the so called "ghost
agents" or the "Emergency Intelligence Agents" (EIA); that when the agency had salary differential
last Oct '88 all money for the whole plantilla were released and from that alone, Millions were
saved and converted to ghost agents of EIA; Almost all EIIB agents collects payroll from the big
time smuggler syndicate monthly and brokers every week for them not to be apprehended.]
In his comment on the letter-complaint, petitioner Almonte denied all the allegations written on
the anonymous letter. Petitioners move to quash the subpoena and the subpoena duces tecum
but was denied.
Disclosure of the documents in question is resisted with the claim of privilege of an agency of the
government on the ground that "knowledge of EIIB's documents relative to its Personal Services
Funds and its plantilla . . . will necessarily [lead to] knowledge of its operations, movements,
targets, strategies, and tactics and the whole of its being" and this could "destroy the EIIB."
Issue:
Whether petitioners can be ordered to produce documents relating to personal services and salary
vouchers of EIIB employees on the plea that such documents are classified without violating their
equal protection of laws.
Held:
 YES. At common law a governmental privilege against disclosure is recognized with respect to
state secrets bearing on military, diplomatic and similar matters and in addition, privilege to
withhold the identity of persons who furnish information of violation of laws. In the case at bar,
there is no claim that military or diplomatic secrets will be disclosed by the production of records
pertaining to the personnel of the EIIB. Indeed, EIIB's function is the gathering and evaluation of
intelligence reports and information regarding "illegal activities affecting the national economy,
such as, but not limited to, economic sabotage, smuggling, tax evasion, dollar salting."
Consequently, while in cases which involve state secrets it may be sufficient to determine from the
circumstances of the case that there is reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will
expose military matters without compelling production, no similar excuse can be made for a
privilege resting on other considerations.
The Ombudsman is investigating a complaint that several items in the EIIB were filled by fictitious
persons and that the allotments for these items in 1988 were used for illegal purposes. The
plantilla and other personnel records are relevant to his investigation as the designated
“protectors of the people” of the Constitution.
Nor is there violation of petitioners' right to the equal protection of the laws. Petitioners complain
that "in all forum and tribunals . . . the aggrieved parties . . . can only hale respondents via their
verified complaints or sworn statements with their identities fully disclosed," while in proceedings
before the Office of the Ombudsman anonymous letters suffice to start an investigation. In the first
place, there can be no objection to this procedure because it is provided in the Constitution itself.
In the second place, it is apparent that in permitting the filing of complaints "in any form and in a
manner," the framers of the Constitution took into account the well-known reticence of the
people which keep them from complaining against official wrongdoings. As this Court had occasion
to point out, the Office of the Ombudsman is different from the other investigatory and
prosecutory agencies of the government because those subject to its jurisdiction are public
officials who, through official pressure and influence, can quash, delay or dismiss investigations
held against them. On the other hand complainants are more often than not poor and simple folk
who cannot afford to hire lawyers.
Finally, it is contended that the issuance of the subpoena duces tecum would violate petitioners'
right against self-incrimination. It is enough to state that the documents required to be produced
in this case are public records and those to whom the subpoena duces tecum is directed are
government officials in whose possession or custody the documents are. Moreover, if, as
petitioners claim the disbursement by the EII of funds for personal service has already been
cleared by the COA, there is no reason why they should object to the examination of the
documents by respondent Ombudsman.
Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc.
FACTS:
Antonio Serrano, claims that the 5th paragraph of Section 10, Republic Act (R.A.) No.
8042 violates the OFWs' constitutional rights in that it impairs the terms of their contract, deprives
them of equal protection and denies them due process.
  Section 10, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042 provides:Sec. 10. Money Claims. - x x x In case of
termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or
contract, the workers shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest
of twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment
contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.  x x x x
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Antonio Serrano (serrano for brevity) was a Filipino sea fairer employed as Chief Officer by Gallant
Maritime Services Inc and Marlow Navigation Co., Inc (respondents for brevity) under a 12- month
contract with Basic Monthly Salary of US$1400. However, when he departed on March 19. 1998,
Serrno was constrained to accept a downgraded employment of Second Officer with monthly
salary of US$1,000 with the assurance that he would be made Chief Officer by the end of April
1998. However, respondents failed to keep their promise so Serrano refused to stay as Second
Oficer and was repatriated to the Philippines, having served only 2 months and 7 days fot eh 12
month contract.
Serrano filed a complaint before the Labor arbiter for constructive dismissal and payment of
money claims (total US$26442.73), moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees.
LABOR ARBITER: Serrano was declared illegally dismissed and was awarded monetary benefits,
representing Serrano’s salary for three (3) months of the unexpired portion of  his employment
contract (total USD8,770) at the exchange rate of USD45 and attorney’s fees equivalent to 10% of
total amount awarded. LA’s basis was Serrano’s basic pay (USD1,400), fixed overtime pay
(USD700), vacation leave pay (USD490).
Serrano appealed to the NLRC, arguing that he is entitled to his salaries for the unexpired portion
of his contract pursuant to Tripe Intefrated Services Inc vs. NLRC.
NLRC: NLRC modified the monetary awards and ordered respondents to pay only USD4669 which
is equivalent to 3 months salary (USD1400 x 3); Salary differential of USD45 and 10% attorney’s
fees of USD424.5, reasoning that R.A. No. 8042 "does not provide for the award of overtime pay,
which should be proven to have been actually performed, and for vacation leave pay. Other
findings were affirmed.
Serrano questioned the constitutionality of said provision.
Court of Appeals: The CA affirmed the NLRC’s ruling on the reduction but skirted the constitutional
issue.
Respondents argue that respondent cannot belatedly question the constitutionality of the said law
on appeal.
The Sol Gen (OSG) argues that since the law preceded Serrano’s contract, it (especially the
monetary claims) is deemed incorporated therat sans stipulation. The OSG further contends that
there is a reasonable and valid basis to differentiate OFW from local workers; and therefore the
provision does not violate the equal protection clause nor sec. 18 Art. II of the Constitution.
ISSUES:
1.    Whether or not the issue of Constitutionality was timely raised by Serrano and before the proper
tribunal
2.     Whether or not Section 10 of Rep. Act No. 8402 is constitutional.
3.     Whether or not Serrano is entitled to salaries equivalent of three months of the unexpired
portion or salaries equivalent of the entire nine months and 23 days left of his employment
contract including overtime pay and holiday pay.
RULING:
1.         The Court may exercise its power of judicial review of acts of a co-equal branch, i.e Congress,
when the following conditions are satisfied:
a.         There is an actual controversy
b.     The constitutional question is raised by proper party and at the earliest opportunity
c.         The constitutional question is the very lis mota of the case.
In ruling that the conditions were met, the Court ruled that:
   There is an actual controversy re the Labor and CA’s computation of Serrano’s monetary claims.
   The issue on Constitutionality was timely raised when Serrano raised the same before the Court
of Appeals, such court having been vested with the power of judicial review to declare a law
unconstitutional.
   The constitutional issue is critical to the resolution of the monetary claim of Serrano.
2.         On Violation of Non-Impairment Clause (Sec 10, Art II of the Constitution)
  
The provision does not violate the principle of non-impairment of contract (as the law preceded
the contract and laws operate prospectively.
On Violation of Sec 1, Art III; Sec 18, Art II; and Section 3 of Article XIII of the Constitution
The subject clause VIOLATES the Equal Protection Clause and Right of an individual to due
Process(Sec 1, Art III), recognizing their rights as a protected Sector (Sec 18, Art II; and Section 3
of Article XIII)
Prior to R.A. 8042, all OFWs who were illegally terminated were subjected to a uniform rule of
monetary benefits computation: basic salary times the entire  unexpired portion of their
employment. However, upon the enactment of R.A. 8042, illegally dismissed employees with
unexpired portion of 1 year or more are singled out and subjected to the disadvantageous
monetary award of 3 months of their unexpired portion; as opposed to those illegally terminated
OFWs with unexpired contracts of less than one year who are entitled to their salaries for the
unexpired period; and illegally dismissed local workers with fixed-term employment who are not
subjected to the 3-cap limitation.
Filipino workers are protected and afforded certain rights under the Constitution subject to the
inherent power of Congress to incorporate a system of classification into its legislation.  Serrano of property and money benefits without an existing valid and definitive governmental
There is a valid classification if the classification is
1.) based on substantial distinction,
2.) germane to the purpose of law,
3) it is not limited to existing conditions; and
4) it applies equally to all members of the class.
There are three levels of scrutiny at which the Court reviews the constitutionality of a classification
embodied in a law:
1.) the deferential or rational basis scrutiny in which the challenged classification needs only be
shown to be rationally related to serving a legitimate state interest
2.) the middle-tier or intermediate scrutiny in which the government must show that the
challenged classification serves an important state interest and that the classification is at least
substantially related to serving that interest; and
3.)) strict judicial scrutiny in which a legislative classification which impermissibly interferes with
the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class is
presumed unconstitutional, and the burden is upon the government to prove that the
classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and that it is the least restrictive
means to protect such interest
In American jurisprudence, strict scrutiny is triggered by suspect classifications based on race or
gender but not when the classification is drawn along income categories. However, foreign
decisions, although persuasive, are not per se controlling in the Philippines. Philippine laws are  to
be construed in light of our lawmakers intent and construed to serve our own public interest.
Imbued with the same sense of "obligation to afford protection to labor," the Court in the present
case also employs the standard of strict judicial scrutiny, for it perceives in the subject clause a
suspect classification prejudicial to OFWs.
In the present case, the Court dug deep into the records but found no compelling state interest
that the subject clause may possibly serve.
The Court ruled that the Government has failed to discharge its burden of proving the existence of
a compelling state interest that would justify the perpetuation of the discrimination against OFWs
under the subject clause.
The Court declared the provision unconstitutional clause  VIOLATES  the Equal Protection Clause
and Right of an individual to due Process(Sec 1, Art III), recognizing their rights as a protected
Sector (Sec 18, Art II; and Section 3 of Article XIII).
Note how the Court approaches the issue applying Section 1, Art III and not solely on the
provisions re the Constitution’s state policy on labor.
This is so because Setion 3 of Article XII is not a self-executing provision and it cannot on its own,
be a source of enforceable right. What it does is recognize labor as a protected sector; otherwise,
it will lead to a broad interpretation would suggest a blanket shield in favor of labor.
In declaring the subject clause unconstitutional, the Court reasoned that since the same deprived
purpose, it violated not only Serrano’s right to equal protection but as well as his right to
substantive due process under (Section1, Art. III of the Constitution); thus, entitling Serrano to his
salaries for the entire unexpired period.
3.         Serrano is entitled to his salaries for the entire unexpired period, not including his overtime
and leave pay because there is no evidence that he performed work during those periods.

Salary is understood as the basic wage, exclusive of overtime, leave pay and other bonuses;
whereas overtime pay is compensation for all work "performed" in excess of the regular eight
hours, and holiday pay is compensation for any work "performed" on designated rest days and
holidays.
Quinto vs. COMELEC
FACTS:
Petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition against the COMELEC for issuing a resolution declaring appointive officials who filed
their certificate of candidacy as ipso facto resigned from their positions. In this defense, the
COMELEC avers that it only copied the provision from Sec. 13 of R.A. 9369.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the said COMELEC resolution was valid.
HELD:
NO.
In the Fariñas case, the petitioners challenged Sec. 14 of RA. 9006 repealing Sec. 66 of the
Omnibus Election Code (OEC) for giving undue benefit to elective officials in comparison with
appointive officials. Incidentally, the Court upheld the substantial distinctions between the two
and pronounced that there was no violation of the equal protection clause.
However in the present case, the Court held that the discussion on the equal protection clause was
an obiter dictum since the issue raised therein was against the repealing clause. It didn’t squarely
challenge Sec. 66.
Sec. 13 of RA. 9369 unduly discriminated appointive and elective officials. Applying the 4 requisites
of a valid classification, the proviso does not comply with the second requirement – that it must be
germane to the purpose of the law.
The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a governmental position
to promote one’s candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous or coercive influence of the electorate.
The measure is further aimed at promoting the efficiency, integrity, and discipline of the public
service by eliminating the danger that the discharge of official duty would be motivated by political
considerations rather than the welfare of the public. The restriction is also justified by the
proposition that the entry of civil servants to the electorate arena, while still in office, could result
in neglect or inefficiency in the performance of duty because they would be attending to their
campaign rather than to their office work.
Sec. 13 of RA. 9369 pertains to all civil servants holding appointive posts without distinction as to
whether they occupy high positions in government or not. Certainly, a utility worker in the
government will also be considered as ipso facto resigned once he files his certificate of candidacy
for the election. This scenario is absurd for, indeed, it is unimaginable how he can use his position
in the government to wield influence in the political world.
The provision s directed to the activity any and all public offices, whether they be partisan or non
partisan in character, whether they be in the national, municipal or brgy. level. Congress has not
shown a compelling state interest to restrict the fundamental right involved on such a sweeping
scale.
Biraogo vs. The Philippine Truth Commission
FACTS:
Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC) dated July
30, 2010.
PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary task to
investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees,
their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous administration, and to submit
its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC has all the
powers of an investigative body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate,
arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes between contending parties. All it can do is
gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It may
have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt, much less order their
arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such facts if probable cause
exists as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law.
Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing its
functions. They argued that:
(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress to create a
public office and appropriate funds for its operation.
(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot
legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize
the Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity and efficiency does not include the
power to create an entirely new public office which was hitherto inexistent like the “Truth
Commission.”
(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when it vested the “Truth
Commission” with quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if not superseding, those of the Office of the
Ombudsman created under the 1987 Constitution and the DOJ created under the Administrative
Code of 1987.
(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation and
prosecution officials and personnel of the previous administration as if corruption is their peculiar
species even as it excludes those of the other administrations, past and present, who may be
indictable.
Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of petitioners and argued that:
1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the President’s executive power
and power of control necessarily include the inherent power to conduct investigations to ensure
that laws are faithfully executed and that, in any event, the Constitution, Revised Administrative
Code of 1987, PD No. 141616 (as amended), R.A. No. 9970 and settled jurisprudence, authorize the
President to create or form such bodies.
2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because there is no
appropriation but a mere allocation of funds already appropriated by Congress.
3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the Ombudsman and
the DOJ, because it is a fact-finding body and not a quasi-judicial body and its functions do not
duplicate, supplant or erode the latter’s jurisdiction.
4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because it was validly
created for laudable purposes.
ISSUES:
1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions and question E. O. No. 1;
2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the powers of
Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions;
3. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;
4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.
RULING:
The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or
controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have
the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have
a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct
injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the
earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body to which they
belong as members. To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each
member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that
institution.
Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by
the Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity of
any official action which, to their mind, infringes on their prerogatives as legislators.
With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, any
personal and direct injury attributable to the implementation of E. O. No. 1.
Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.” In private suits,
standing is governed by the “real-parties-in interest” rule. It provides that “every action must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.” Real-party-in interest is “the
party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit.”
Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a “public
right” in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general
public. He has to show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. He has to make out a
sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a “citizen” or
“taxpayer.
The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have “a personal and substantial interest in
the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result.” The Court, however,
finds reason in Biraogo’s assertion that the petition covers matters of transcendental importance
to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional issues in the petition
which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as
precedents
The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. The powers
of the President are not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution. One of the
recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the
power to create ad hoc committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and
determine if laws have been faithfully executed. The purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating
bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to know so that he
can be properly advised and guided in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and
enforcement of the laws of the land.
2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds already
appropriated. There is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to
appropriate funds. There is no need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the operation of
the commission because, whatever funds the Congress has provided for the Office of the President
will be the very source of the funds for the commission. The amount that would be allocated to
the PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations so there is no impropriety in the
funding.
3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective powers. If at all, the
investigative function of the commission will complement those of the two offices. The function of
determining probable cause for the filing of the appropriate complaints before the courts remains
to be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman. PTC’s power to investigate is limited to obtaining facts so
that it can advise and guide the President in the performance of his duties relative to the
execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.
4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its
apparent transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of
Rights) of the 1987 Constitution.
Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both
as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to
treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. The purpose of the equal protection clause
is to secure every person within a state’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary
discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution
through the state’s duly constituted authorities.
There must be equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Equal
protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test
of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial
distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions
only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.
The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly
treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.
Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear
mandate of truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported
cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration only. The intent to single out the
previous administration is plain, patent and manifest.
Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is
not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes
arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating
differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and
selective retribution. Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification.
The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the
authority to investigate all past administrations.
The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other laws must
conform and in accordance with which all private rights determined and all public authority
administered. Laws that do not conform to the Constitution should be stricken down for being
unconstitutional.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
Garcia v. Drilon
FACTS: Petitioner Jesus Garcia (husband) admitted having an affair with a bank manager. His
infidelity emotionally wounded private respondent which spawned several quarrels that left
respondent wounded. Petitioner also unconscionably beat up their daughter, Jo-ann.
The private respondent was determined to separate from petitioner. But she was afraid he would
take away their children and deprive her of financial support. He warned her that if she pursued
legal battle, she would not get a single centavo from him. After she confronted him of his affair, he
forbade her to hold office. This deprived her of access to full information about their businesses.
Hence, no source of income.
Thus, the RTC found reasonable ground to believe there was imminent danger of violence against
respondent and her children and issued a series of Temporary Protection Orders (TPO) pursuant to
RA 9262.
Republic Act No. 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and criminalizes acts of violence
against women and their children (VAWC) perpetrated by women's intimate partners.
Petitioner hence, challenged the constitutionality of RA 9262 on making a gender-based
classification.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 9262 is discriminatory, unjust, and violative of the equal protection
clause.
RULING: No. The equal protection clause in our Constitution does not guarantee an absolute
prohibition against classification. The non-identical treatment of women and men under RA 9262
is justified to put them on equal footing and to give substance to the policy and aim of the state to
ensure the equality of women and men in light of the biological, historical, social, and culturally
endowed differences between men and women.
RA 9262, by affording special and exclusive protection to women and children, who are vulnerable
victims of domestic violence, undoubtedly serves the important governmental objectives of
protecting human rights, insuring gender equality, and empowering women. The gender-based
classification and the special remedies prescribed by said law in favor of women and children are
substantially related, in fact essentially necessary, to achieve such objectives. Hence, said Act
survives the intermediate review or middle-tier judicial scrutiny. The gender-based classification
therein is therefore not violative of the equal protection clause embodied in the 1987
Constitution.
Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc. v. Cabiles
Facts:
Petitioner, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc., is a recruitment and placement agency.
                Respondent Joy Cabiles was hired thus signed a one-year employment contract for a
monthly salary of NT$15,360.00. Joy was deployed to work for Taiwan Wacoal, Co. Ltd. (Wacoal)
on June 26, 1997. She alleged that in her employment contract, she agreed to work as quality
control for one year. In Taiwan, she was asked to work as a cutter.
                Sameer claims that on July 14, 1997, a certain Mr. Huwang from Wacoal informed Joy,
without prior notice, that she was terminated and that “she should immediately report to their
office to get her salary and passport.” She was asked to “prepare for immediate repatriation.” Joy
claims that she was told that from June 26 to July 14, 1997, she only earned a total of NT$9,000.15 as the Solicitor General have failed to show any compelling change in the circumstances that
According to her, Wacoal deducted NT$3,000 to cover her plane ticket to Manila. would warrant us to revisit the precedent.

                On October 15, 1997, Joy filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the NLRC against
petitioner and Wacoal. LA dismissed the complaint. NLRC reversed LA’s decision. CA affirmed the
ruling of the National Labor Relations Commission finding respondent illegally dismissed and
awarding her three months’ worth of salary, the reimbursement of the cost of her repatriation,
and attorney’s fees
                The Court declared, once again, the clause, “or for three (3) months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less” in Section 7 of Republic Act No. 10022 amending Section 10 of
Republic Act No. 8042 is declared unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void.

ISSUE:

                Whether or not Cabiles was entitled to the unexpired portion of her salary due to illegal
dismissal.

 HELD:

                YES. The Court held that the award of the three-month equivalent of respondent’s salary
should be increased to the amount equivalent to the unexpired term of the employment contract.

                In Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Inc., this court
ruled that the clause “or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is
less” is unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause and substantive due process.

                A statute or provision which was declared unconstitutional is not a law. It “confers no
rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has
not been passed at all.”

                The Court said that they are aware that the clause “or for three (3) months for every year
of the unexpired term, whichever is less” was reinstated in Republic Act No. 8042 upon
promulgation of Republic Act No. 10022 in 2010.

Ruling on the constitutional issue

                In the hierarchy of laws, the Constitution is supreme. No branch or office of the
government may exercise its powers in any manner inconsistent with the Constitution, regardless
of the existence of any law that supports such exercise. The Constitution cannot be trumped by
any other law. All laws must be read in light of the Constitution. Any law that is inconsistent with it
is a nullity.

                Thus, when a law or a provision of law is null because it is inconsistent with the
Constitution, the nullity cannot be cured by reincorporation or reenactment of the same or a
similar law or provision. A law or provision of law that was already declared unconstitutional
remains as such unless circumstances have so changed as to warrant a reverse conclusion.

                The Court observed that the reinstated clause, this time as provided in Republic Act. No.
10022, violates the constitutional rights to equal protection and due process.96 Petitioner as well