CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED Tanodbayan, recommending the filing of charges for graft and corrupt practices against
ecommending the filing of charges for graft and corrupt practices against former Minister
SEC. 14, ART. III:
1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.
2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial and public trial,
to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the
attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after
arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused, provided that
he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.
CRIMINAL DUE PROCESS
Q. Explain the requirement of due process in criminal cases.
A. The requirement that no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without “due process of
law” simply that the rules prescribed by Section 14 and all other provisions related to criminal
prosecution are followed.
a) In Mejia v. Pamaran, 160 SCRA 457, the Supreme Court enumerated the ingredients of due
process as applied to criminal proceedings, as follows:
1) The accused has been heard in a court of competent jurisdiction;
2) The accused is proceeded against under the orderly processes of law;
3) The accused has been given notice and the opportunity to be heard; and
4) The judgment rendered was within the authority of a constitutional law.
b) Unreasonable delay in resolving complaint. In Roque v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 129978, May
12, 1999, it was held that the failure of the Office of the Ombudsman to resolve a complaint
that had been pending for six years clearly violates the constitutional command for the
Ombudsman to act promptly on complaints and the right of the petitioner to due process of
law and to speedy trial. In such event, the aggrieved party is entitled to the dismissal of the
complaint. A similar ruling was made in Cervantes v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 108595, May
18, 1999, and in Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, 159 SCRA 70, where it was held that the
unreasonable delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation by the
Tanodbayan violated the due process clause.
i) However, in Santiago v. Garchitorena, 228 SCRA 214, although the offense was
allegedly committed on or before October 17, 1988 and the information was filed
only on May 9, 1991, and an amended information filed on December 8, 1992, the
delay did not constitute a denial of due process, because there was continuing
investigation, snarled only because of the complexity of the issues involved. In
Socrates v. Sandiganbayan, 253 SCRA 559, it was found that the six-year delay in
the termination of the preliminary investigation was caused by petitioner’s own
acts, not by inaction of the prosecution. Accordingly, there was no violation of the
petitioner’s right to due process of law or of his right to speedy disposition of the
case.
TATAD VS. SANDIGANBAYAN [G.R. NOS. L-72335-39, MARCH 21, 1988]
FACTS: Complainant, Antonio de los Reyes, originally filed what he termed "a report" with the Legal
Panel of PSC on October 1974, containing charges of alleged violations of RA No. 3019 against then
Secretary of Public Information Francisco S. Tatad. The "report" was made to "sleep" in the office of the
PSC until December 1979, when the 1974 complaint was resurrected in the form of a formal complaint
filed with the Tanodbayan. The Tanodbayan acted on the complaint in April 1980 by referring the
complaint to the CIS, PSC, for investigation and report. In June 1980, the CIS report was submitted to the
Tatad and Antonio L. Cantero. By October 1982, all affidavits and counter-affidavits were in the case was
already for disposition by the Tanodbayan. However, it was only in July 1985 that a resolution was
approved by the Tanodbayan, recommending the filing of the corresponding criminal informations
against the accused Francisco Tatad. Five (5) criminal informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan in
June 1985, all against petitioner Tatad. Petitioner claims that the Tanodbayan culpably violated the
constitutional mandate of "due process" in unduly prolonging the termination of the preliminary
investigation and in filing the corresponding informations only after more than a decade from the
alleged commission of the purported offenses.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his constitutional right to due process.
RULING: We find the long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan in
the instant case to be violative of the constitutional right of the accused to due process. Substantial
adherence to the requirements of the law governing the conduct of preliminary investigation, including
substantial compliance with the time limitation prescribed by the law for the resolution of the case by
the prosecutor, is part of the procedural due process constitutionally guaranteed by the fundamental
law. Not only under the broad umbrella of the due process clause, but under the constitutional
guarantee of "speedy disposition" of cases as embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of Rights (both in the
1973 and the 1987 Constitutions), the inordinate delay is violative of the petitioner's constitutional
rights. A delay of close to three (3) years cannot be deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the
circumstance obtaining in the case at bar. We are not impressed by the attempt of the Sandiganbayan to
sanitize the long delay by indulging in the speculative assumption that "the delay may be due to a
painstaking and gruelling scrutiny by the Tanodbayan as to whether the evidence presented during the
preliminary investigation merited prosecution of a former high ranking government official." In the first
place, such a statement suggests a double standard of treatment, which must be emphatically rejected.
Secondly, three out of the five charges against the petitioner were for his alleged failure to file his sworn
statement of assets and liabilities required by Republic Act No. 3019, which certainly did not involve
complicated legal and factual issues necessitating such "painstaking and gruelling scrutiny" as would
justify a delay of almost three years in terminating the preliminary investigation. The other two charges
relating to alleged bribery and alleged giving of unwarranted benefits to a relative, while presenting
more substantial legal and factual issues, certainly do not warrant or justify the period of three years,
which it took the Tanodbayan to resolve the case.
It has been suggested that the long delay in terminating the preliminary investigation should not be
deemed fatal, for even the complete absence of a preliminary investigation does not warrant dismissal
of the information. True-but the absence of a preliminary investigation can be corrected by giving the
accused such investigation. But an undue delay in the conduct of a preliminary investigation cannot be
corrected, for until now, man has not yet invented a device for setting back time.
After a careful review of the facts and circumstances of this case, we are constrained to hold that the
inordinate delay in terminating the preliminary investigation and filing the information in the instant
case is violative of the constitutionally guaranteed right of the petitioner to due process and to a speedy
disposition of the cases against him. Accordingly, the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 10499, 10500,
10501, 10502 and 10503 should be dismissed. In view of the foregoing, we find it unnecessary to rule on
the other issues raised by petitioner.
c) Impartial court or tribunal. A critical component of due process of law is a hearing before
an impartial and disinterested tribunal. In order to disqualify a judge on the ground of bias
and prejudice, the movant must prove such bias by clear and convincing evidence. In this
case, the petitioners failed to adduce any extrinsic evidence to prove that the respondent
judge was motivated by malice or bad faith when she issued the assailed rulings [Webb v.
People, G.R. No. 127262, July 24, 1997].
 i) In Imelda Romualdez Marcos v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 126995, October 6,
1998, the Supreme Court, reiterating its ruling in Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan, 268
SCRA 332, declared that the cross-examination of the accused and the witnesses
by the trial court indicated bias, and thus violated due process.
ii) But where the questions propounded by the court are merely for clarification, to
clear up dubious points and elicit relevant evidence, such questioning will not
constitute bias [People v. Castillo, 289 SCRA 213; Cosep v. People, 290 SCRA 378;
People v. Galleno, 291 SCRA 761], Thus, in People v. Herida, G.R. No. 127158,
March 5, 2001, where the trial court intensively questioned the witnesses and the
accused (approximately 43% of the questions asked of the prosecution witnesses
and the accused were propounded by the judge), it was held that the questioning
was necessary. Judges have as much interest as counsel in the orderly and
expeditious presentation of evidence and have the duty to ask questions that
would elicit the facts on the issues involved, clarify ambiguous remarks by
witnesses, and address the points overlooked by counsel. See also People v.
Medenilla, G.R. No. 131638-39, March 26, 2001.
d) Right to a hearing. In Alonte v. Savellano, G.R. No. 131652, March 9, 1998, and in
Concepcion v. Savellano, G.R. No. 131728, March 9, 1998, the Supreme Court held that the
accused were denied due process of law when the trial court convicted them (after having
declared that they had waived their right to present evidence), but it was shown that there
were deviations from the regular course of trial, e.g., petitioners were not directed to present
evidence to prove their defenses nor dates set for that purpose, petitioners were not given an
opportunity to present rebuttal evidence nor dates set for that purpose, and petitioners had
not admitted the offense charged in the information which would have justified any
modification in the order of the trial. In Defensor- Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
123792, March 8, 1999, it was held that the re-opening of a case without giving the accused
the opportunity to introduce controverting evidence is an error and a denial of due process of
law.
ALONTE VS. SAVELLANO [G.R. NO. 131652, MARCH 9, 1998]
FACTS: Juvie-lyn Punongbayan charged Bayani Alonte, the incumbent mayor of Biñan, Laguna, with the
crime of rape. According to Punongbayan, on or about September 12, 1996, Alonte offered her a
drinking water which made her dizzy and weak. Thereafter, Alonte unlawfully and feloniously had carnal
knowledge with her against her will and consent. During the pendency case, however, Juvie-lyn
Punongbayan, assisted by her parents and counsel, executed an affidavit desisting her testimonies
against Alonte. Nonetheless, respondent Judge Savellano found Alonte guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the heinous crime of rape. Accordingly, the accused did not present any countervailing evidence
during the trial. They did not take the witness stand to refute or deny under oath the truth of the
contents of the private complainant's aforementioned affidavit. They left everything to the so-called
"desistance" of the private complainant. In this petition, Alonte avers that respondent Judge committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when respondent Judge rendered a
decision in the case thereby depriving him of his Constitutional right to be presumed innocent.
ISSUE: Whether or not the presumption of innocence stands in favor of Alonte.
RULING: NO. In the trial of criminal cases, the constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of an
accused requires that an accused be given sufficient opportunity to present his defense. So, with the
prosecution as to its evidence. Hence, any deviation from the regular course of trial should always take
into consideration the rights of all the parties to the case, whether in the prosecution or defense. There
can be no short-cut to the legal process, and there can be no excuse for not affording an accused his full
day in court. Due process, rightly occupying the first and foremost place of honor in our Bill of Rights, is
an enshrined and invaluable right that cannot be denied even to the most undeserving. In the case at
bar, the affidavit of desistance of Juvie-Lyn Punongbayan does not contain any statement that disavows
the veracity of her complaint against petitioners but merely seeks to "be allowed to withdraw" her
complaint and to discontinue with the case for varied other reasons. In People vs. Ballabare we have said
that any recantation must be tested in a public trial with sufficient opportunity given to the party
adversely affected by it to crossexamine the recanting witness. A retraction does not necessarily negate
an earlier declaration. Hence, when confronted with a situation where a witness recants his testimony,
courts must not automatically exclude the original testimony solely on the basis of the recantation. They
should determine which testimony should be given credence through a comparison of the original
testimony and the new testimony, applying the general rules of evidence.
INDISPENSABLE ELEMENTS OF CRIMINAL DUE PROCESS. It does seem to the Court that there has been
undue precipitancy in the conduct of the proceedings. Perhaps the problem could have well been
avoided had not the basic procedures been, to the Court's perception taken lightly. And in this
shortcoming, looking at the records of the case, the trial court certainly is not alone to blame.
Section 14, paragraphs (1) and (2), of Article III, of the Constitution provides the fundamentals.
1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.
2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial,
to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance
of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial
may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly
notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.
Jurisprudence acknowledges that due process in criminal proceedings, in particular, require:
a) that the court or tribunal trying the case is properly clothed with judicial power to hear and
determine the matter before it;
b) that jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the person of the accused;
c) that the accused is given an opportunity to be heard; and
d) that judgment is rendered only upon lawful hearing.
The above constitutional and jurisprudential postulates, by now elementary and deeply imbedded in our
own criminal justice system, are mandatory and indispensable. The principles find universal acceptance
and are tersely expressed in the oft-quoted statement that procedural due process cannot possibly be
met without a "law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment
only after trial."
e) In People v. Hubert Webb, G.R. No. 132577, August 17, 1999, the Supreme Court said that
there was no denial of due process where the trial court refused to grant the petition of
Webb to take the deposition of witnesses residing abroad, considering that the testimony of
the witnesses would be merely corroborative, the defense had already presented 57
witnesses and 464 documentary exhibits, and the trial court had already admitted the
exhibits on which the said witnesses would have testified.
f) In Joseph Ejercito Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001, RA 7080
(Plunder Law), as amended by RA 7659, was challenged on the following grounds:
1) it is vague;
2) it dispenses with the “reasonable doubt” standard in criminal prosecutions;
and
3) it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under the
Revised Penal Code;
All of which are purportedly violations of the right of the accused to due process of law and to
be informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation against him. The Court ruled that
 every legislative measure is presumed constitutional, and the petitioner failed to discharge
the burden to overcome the presumption of constitutionality:
1) The law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined parameters which
would enable the accused to determine the nature of the violation. Sec. 2 is
sufficiently explicit in its description of the acts, conduct and conditions
required or forbidden, and prescribes the elements of the crime with
reasonable certainty and particularity.
2) Sec. 4 does not circumvent the immutable obligation of the prosecution to
prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts showing unlawful scheme
or conspiracy. The prosecution has to prove beyond reasonable doubt the
number of acts sufficient to form a combination or a series which would
constitute a pattern involving an amount no less than P50- million.
3) The legislative declaration in RA 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense
implies that it is malum in se. If the acts punished are inherently immoral or
inherently wrong, they are mala in se even if punished under special laws,
particularly because in plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala in se.
g) Plea of guilt to a capital offense. In People v. Sta. Teresa, G.R. No. 130663, March 20, 2001,
the Court enumerated the stringent constitutional standards impelled by the due process
clause whenever the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, viz:
1) The trial court must conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness of the
plea and the full comprehension of the consequences thereof;
2) The prosecution shall be required to present evidence to prove the guilt of
the accused and the precise degree of his culpability; and
3) The accused must be asked if he desires to present evidence on his behalf
and allow him to do so if he so desires.
In People v. Ostia, G.R. No. 131804, February 26, 2003, the Supreme Court said that the
procedure is mandatory, and a judge who fails to observe with fealty the said rule commits
grave abuse of discretion. The Court has cautioned trial judges to proceed with meticulous
care whenever the imposable penalty for the crime charged is death.
h) The State and the offended party are entitled to due process. The State, and more so, the
offended party, is also entitled to due process of law. In Galman v. Pamaran, 138 SCRA 274,
the judgment of acquittal was vacated upon a finding by the Supreme Court that there was
bias and partiality on the part of the judge and the prosecutor. In Merciales v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 124171, March 18, 2002, it was held that the petitioner (mother of the
victim in a rape with homicide case) was denied due process when the public prosecutor, who
was under legal obligation to pursue the action on her behalf, reneged on that obligation and
refused to perform his sworn duty. But, in People v. Verra, G.R. No. 134732, May 29, 2002, it
was held that the People could not claim that it was denied due process, because there was a
public prosecutor who represented it at every stage of the proceedings — from arraignment
to promulgation of the dismissal order — to protect its interest.
GALMAN VS. SANDIGANBAYAN [G.R. NO. 72670, SEPTEMBER 12, 1986]
FACTS: On October 22, 1983, then President Marcos created a Fact- Finding Board to investigate the
assassination of Ninoy Aquino. The minority and majority reports of the Board both agreed that Rolando
Galman was not the assassin but was merely a fall guy of the military which plotted the assassination
itself. The minority report tags 26 persons, headed by General Ver, as respondents to the case. Marcos
rejected the reports of the Board and stuck to his claim that it was Galman who killed Aquino.
Thereafter, Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan acquitted the respondents of the crime charged, declaring
them innocent and totally absolving them of any civil liability. In this petition, Petitioners Saturnina
Galman, wife of the late Rolando Galman, and 29 others filed the present action alleging that respondent
courts committed serious irregularities constituting mistrial and resulting in miscarriage of justice and
gross violation of the constitutional rights of the sovereign people of the Philippines to due process of
law. Allegedly, then President Marcos had ordered the respondent courts to whitewash the criminal
cases against the 26 respondents accused and produce a verdict of acquittal. In his comment, the Deputy
Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera, affirmed the allegations and revealed that Malacañang had planned the
scenario of the trial. Respondents-accused prayed for its denial.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial was a mock trial and that the predetermined judgment of acquittal was
unlawful and void ab initio.
RULING: The fact of the secret Malacañang conference of January 10, 1985 at which the authoritarian
President discussed with the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan and the entire prosecution panel the
matter of the imminent filing of the criminal charges against all the twenty-six accused (as admitted by
respondent Justice Fernandez to have been confirmed by him to the then President's "Coordinator"
Manuel Lazaro on the preceding day) is not denied. It is without precedent. This was illegal under our
penal laws, supra. This illegality vitiated from the very beginning all proceedings in the Sandiganbayan
court headed by the very Presiding Justice who attended. As the Commission noted: "The very acts of
being summoned to Malacañang and their ready acquiescence thereto under the circumstances then
obtaining, are in themselves pressure dramatized and exemplified... Verily, it can be said that any avowal
of independent action or resistance to presidential pressure became illusory from the very moment they
stepped inside Malacanang Palace on January 10, 1985."
No court whose Presiding Justice has received "orders or suggestions" from the very President who by an
amendatory decree (disclosed only at the hearing of oral arguments on November 8, 1984 on a petition
challenging the referral of the Aquino-Galman murder cases to the Tanodbayan and Sandiganbayan
instead of to a court martial, as mandatory required by the known P.D. 1850 at the time providing for
exclusive jurisdiction of courts martial over criminal offenses committed by military men made it possible
to refer the cases to the Sandiganbayan, can be an impartial court, which is the very essence of due
process of law. As the writer then wrote, "jurisdiction over cases should be determined by law, and not
by preselection of the Executive, which could be much too easily transformed into a means of
predetermining the outcome of individual cases. "This criminal collusion as to the handling and
treatment of the cases by public respondents at the secret Malacanang conference (and revealed only
after fifteen months by Justice Manuel Herrera) completely disqualified respondent Sandiganbayan and
voided ab initio its verdict. This renders moot and irrelevant for now the extensive arguments of
respondents accused, particularly Generals Ver and Olivas and those categorized as accessories, that
there has been no evidence or witness suppressed against them, that the erroneous conclusions of
Olivas as police investigator do not make him an accessory of the crimes he investigated and the
appraisal and evaluation of the testimonies of the witnesses presented and suppressed. There will be
time and opportunity to present all these arguments and considerations at the remand and retrial of the
cases herein ordered before a neutral and impartial court.
The Supreme Court cannot permit such a sham trial and verdict and travesty of justice to stand
unrectified. The courts of the land under its aegis are courts of law and justice and equity. They would
have no reason to exist if they were allowed to be used as mere tools of injustice, deception and
duplicity to subvert and suppress the truth, instead of repositories of judicial power whose judges are
sworn and committed to render impartial justice to all alike who seek the enforcement or protection of a
right or the prevention or redress of a wrong, without fear or favour and removed from the pressures of
politics and prejudice. More so, in the case at bar where the people and the world are entitled to know
the truth, and the integrity of our judicial system is at stake. In life, as an accused before the military
tribunal, Ninoy had pleaded in vain that as a civilian he was entitled to due process of law and trial in the
regular civil courts before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor. In death, Ninoy, as the victim
of the "treacherous and vicious assassination" and the relatives and sovereign people as the aggrieved
parties plead once more for due process of law and a retrial before an impartial court with an unbiased
prosecutor. The Court is constrained to declare the sham trial a mock trial the non-trial of the century-
and that the pre-determined judgment of acquittal was unlawful and void ab initio.
Q. May the Supreme Court review decisions of military tribunals?
A. Generally, the Supreme Court has no supervisory authority over military courts. Kuroda v. Jalandoni,
83 Phil. 171; Martelino v. Alejandro, 32 SCRA 106 (March 25, 1970). By the National Security Code, P.D.
1498, June 11, 1978 (74 O.G. 11066), the SC does not review decisions of military commissions but of the
Court of Military Appeals in cases appealed to the latter by military commissions. Therefore, the issue of
denial of the right to present evidence should first be passed upon by military authorities. Buscayno &
Sison v. Military Commissions, 109 SCRA 273 (November 19, 1981). But see dissents of Fernando and
Teehankee and Art VIII, Section 1.
Q. May military commissions or tribunals have jurisdiction to try civilians for offenses allegedly
committed during martial law when civil courts were open and functioning?
A. No. Olaguer v. Military Commission No. 34, 150 SCRA 144 (1987), explicitly reversing Aquino, Jr. v.
Military Commission No. 2, 63 SCRA 264 (1975) and all decided cases affirming the same.
Q. The rule is that jurisdiction over a person is acquired only upon arrest. Does this apply to military
jusrisdiction?
A. No. This is a rule for ordinary courts. See Article of War 2 and Section 8 of Manual for Courts Martial,
AFP. Abadilla v. Ramos, 156 SCRA 92 (December 1, 1987). [The reasoning here is unconvincing.]
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
Q. What is the reason for the presumption of innocence?
A. It is based on the principle of justice. The presumption is not designed to protect the guilty but to
prevent the conviction of one who is innocent, for it is a rule that accusation is not synonymous with
guilt. Proof must survive the test of reason. The conviction must be based on moral certainty, for it is
better to acquit a guilty person rather than to convict an innocent man. (People v. Dramayo, 42 SCRA
60).
PEOPLE VS. DRAMAYO [G.R. NO. L-21325, OCTOBER 29, 1971]
FACTS: In a drinking session, Pableo Dramayo and Paterno Ecubin brought up the idea of killing Estelito
Nogaliza so that he could not testify in the robbery case which Dramayo and Ecubin was a prime suspect
thereof. That same night, Ecubin hit Estelito with a piece of wood on the side of the head while Dramayo
repeatedly stabbed him with a short pointed bolo. The next morning, Dramayo went to the house of the
deceased and informed the latter's widow Corazon that he had just seen the cadaver of Estelito. Upon
interview, the Chief of Police noticed blood stains on the trousers of Dramayo and asked the latter to
explain where he obtained it. Dramayo answered that it was caused by his daughter who has a skin
ailment. It was on this basis that Dramayo and Ecubin were charged of the crime of murder. Upon trial,
the lower court found Dramayo and Ecubin guilty beyond reasonable doubt basing on the testimonies
offered by the prosecution. In this appeal, Accused-Appellants invoke their constitutional right to be
declared presumptively innocent.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Accussed-Appellants constitutional right to be presumed innocent can stand
against judgment of conviction against them.
RULING: NO. The presumption of innocence could not come to appellants’ rescue as it was more than
sufficiently overcome by the proof that was offered by the prosecution.
ACCUSATION IS NOT SYNONYMOUS WITH GUILT. It is to be admitted that the starting point is the
presumption of innocence. So it must be, according to the Constitution. That is a right safeguarded both
appellants. Accusation is not, according to the fundamental law, synonymous with guilt. It is incumbent
on the prosecution to demonstrate that culpability lies. Appellants were not even called upon then to
offer evidence on their behalf. Their freedom is forfeit only if the requisite quantum of proof necessary
for conviction be in existence. Their guilt must be shown beyond reasonable doubt. To such a standard,
this Court has always been committed. There is need, therefore, for the most careful scrutiny of the
testimony of the state, both oral and documentary, independently of whatever defense is offered by the
accused. Only if the judge below and the appellate tribunal could arrive at a conclusion that the crime
had been committed precisely by the person on trial under such an exacting test should the sentence be
one of conviction. It is thus required that every circumstance favoring his innocence be duly taken into
account. The proof against him must survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be
permitted to sway judgment. The conscience must be satisfied that on the defendant could be laid the
responsibility for the offense charged; that not only did he perpetrate the act but that it amounted to a
crime. What is required then is moral certainty.
So it has been held from the 1903 decision of United States v. Reyes. United States v. Lasada, decided in
1910, yields this excerpt:
"By reasonable doubt is not meant that which of possibility may arise, but it is that
doubt engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and an inability, after such
investigation, to let the mind rest easy upon the certainty of guilt. Absolute certainty of guilt
is not demanded by the law to convict of any criminal charge but moral certainty is required,
and this certainty is required as to every proposition of proof requisite to constitute the
offense."
To the same effect is an excerpt from the opinion of the late Justice Tuason in People v. Esquivel. Thus:
"In this connection it may not be out of place to bring to the attention of
prosecuting attorneys the absolute necessity of laying before the court the pertinent facts as
their disposal with methodical and meticulous attention, clarifying contradictions and filling
up gaps and loopholes in their evidence, to the end that the court's mind may not be tortured
by doubts, that the innocent may not suffer and the guilty not escape unpunished. Obvious to
all, this is the prosecution's prime duty to the court, to the accused, and to the state."
It is understandable why the stress should be on the absence of sufficient evidence to establish the guilt
of appellants beyond reasonable doubt, the defense of alibi interposed hardly meriting any further
discussion. It cannot be denied though that the credible and competent evidence of record resulted in
moral certainty being entertained not only by the trial judge but by us as to the culpability of appellants.
The force of the controlling doctrines, on the other hand, required that the other three accused be
acquitted precisely because, unlike in the case of appellants, the requisite quantum of proof to show
guilt beyond reasonable doubt was not present. There is no question as to the other two who testified
for the state being likewise no long subject to any criminal liability. The reference then to opinion of the
late Justice Laurel, stressing the need for adhering to the fundamental postulate that a finding of guilt is
allowable only when no reasonable doubt could be entertained, is unavailing. This is evident from the
very citation in the brief of appellants of the opinion of Justice Laurel in People v. Manoji. Thus: "Upon
the other hand there are certain facts which if taken together are sufficient to raise in the mind of the
court a grave doubt as to the guilt of the defendant-appellant, 'that doubt engendered by an
investigation of the whole proof and an inability after such investigation, to let the mind rest easy upon
the certainty of guilt.' (U.S. v. Lasada [1910], 18 Phil. 90, 96.) The finding of the two gold teeth of the
deceased the suitcase of Maradani, and the testimony of Erajio Ello that he gave the hat ... to Maradani
not only engender serious doubt in our minds as to the guilt of the appellant but also seems to sustain
the theory of the defense and strengthen the suspicion of the trial court, that Maradani and Salupudin
are not foreign to, or entirely ignorant of, the killing of Seijin Ige. In the light of the facts and
circumstances of record, we feel that it is better to acquit a man upon the ground of reasonable doubt,
even though he may in reality be guilty, than to confine in the penitentiary for the rest of his natural life
a person who may be innocent. ..." The facts of the present case certainly do not fit within the above
mold. Reliance on the part of appellants on the above decision is therefore futile.
Q. What is the principal effect of the guarantee of presumption of innocence?
A. Its principal effect is that no person shall be convicted unless the prosecution has proved him guilty
beyond reasonable doubt.
Q. For purposes of disqualification in an election, Section 4 of Batas Blg. 52 says: “the filing of charges for
the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall
be prima facie evidence of such fact (disqualification).” Valid?
A. No. This violates the guarantee of presumption of innocence. The disqualification put the candidates
in the category of convicts without first finally convicting them. Dumlao v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 52245,
January 22, 1980.
DUMLAO VS. COMELEC [G.R. NO. L-52245, JANUARY 22, 1980]
PRESUMPTION OF GUILT UPON THE FILING OF CHARGES VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE. In so far as the petition of Igot and Salapantan are concerned, the
second paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52, quoted in full earlier, and which they
challenged, may be divided in two parts. The first provides: "a judgment of conviction for any of the
aforementioned crimes shall be conclusive evidence of such fact. . . . "
The supremacy of the Constitution stands out as the cardinal principle. We are aware of the presumption
of validity that attached to a challenged statute, of the well-settled principle that "all reasonable doubts
should be resolved in favor of constitutionality," and that Courts will not set aside a statute as
constitutionally defective "except in a clear case." (People vs. Vera, supra). We are constrained to hold
that this in one such clear case.
Explicit is the constitutional provision that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel (Article
IV, section 19, 1973 Constitution). An accusation, according to the fundamental law, is not synonymous
with guilt. The challenged proviso contravenes the constitutional presumption of innocence, as a
candidate is disqualified from running from public office on the ground alone that charges have been
filed against him before a civil or military tribunal. It condemns before one is fully heard. In ultimate
effect, except as to the degree of proof, no distinction is made between a person convicted of acts of
disloyalty and one against whom charges have been filed for such acts, as both of them would be
ineligible to run for public office. A person disqualified to run for public office on the ground that charges
have been filed against him is virtually placed in the same category as a person already convicted of a
crime with the penalty of arresto, which carries with it the accessory penalty of suspension of the right to
hold office during the term of the sentence (Art. 44, Revised Penal Code).
And although the filing of charges is considered as but prima facie evidence, and therefore, may be
rebutted, yet, there is "clear and present danger" that because the proximity of the elections, time
constraints will prevent one charged with acts of disloyalty from offering contrary proof to overcome the
prima facie evidence against him.
Additionally, it is best that evidence pro and con of acts of disloyalty be aired before the Courts rather
than before an administrative body such as the COMELEC. A highly possible conflict of finding between
two government bodies, to the extreme detriment of a person charged, will thereby be avoided.
Furthermore, a legislative administrative determination of guilt should not be allowed to be substituted
for a judicial determination.
Q. Section 40 of the Local Government Code disqualifies from running from office a “(e) Fugitive from
justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad.” If applied to one who has not yet been convicted
of any offense but was merely fleeing from trial, would there be violation of the presumption of
innocence?
A. This was defended against the suggestion that it violates presumption of innocence on the argument
that the disqualification is not a penalty and that Congress is allowed to prescribe reasonable
qualifications for local candidates both by Article V, Section 1 and Article X, Section 3. Marquez, Jr. v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 112889, April 18, 1995. (But the Court remanded the case to the lower court for
determination of the fact of being a “fugitive from justice.”)
MARQUEZ VS. COMELEC [G.R. NO. 112889, APRIL 18, 1995]
Petitioner's position is perspicuous and to the point. The law, he asseverates, needs no further
interpretation and construction. Section 40(e) of Republic Act No. 7160, is rather clear, he submits, and it
disqualifies "fugitive from justice" includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment
but likewise those who, after being charged flee to avoid prosecution. This definition truly finds support
from jurisprudence (Philippine Law Dictionary, Third Edition, p. 399, by F.B. Moreno; Black's Law
Dictionary, Sixth Edition, p. 671; King vs. Noe, 244 S.C. 344, 137 S.E. 2d 102, 103; Hughes vs. PFlanz, 138
Federal Reporter 980; Tobin vs. Casaus, 275 Pacific Reporter, 2d., p. 792), and it may be so conceded as
expressing the general and ordinary connotation of the term.
Private respondent reminds us that the construction placed upon law by the officials in charge of its
enforcement deserves great and considerable weight (Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corp.
vs. CA, 182 SCRA 166, 181). The Court certainly agrees; however, when there clearly is no obscurity and
ambiguity in an enabling law, it must merely be made to apply as it is so written. An administrative rule
or regulation can neither expand nor constrict the law but must remain congruent to it. The Court
believes and thus holds, albeit with some personal reservations of the ponente (expressed during the
Court's en banc deliberations), that Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code of 1991, to the extent that it confines the term "fugitive from justice" to refer only to
a person (the fugitive) "who has been convicted by final judgment." is an inordinate and undue
circumscription of the law.
Unfortunately, the COMELEC did not make any definite finding on whether or not, in fact, private
respondent is a "fugitive from justice" as such term must be interpreted and applied in the light of the
Court's opinion. The omission is understandable since the COMELEC dismissed outrightly the petition for
quo warranto on the basis instead of Rule 73 of the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Oversight
Committee. The Court itself, not being a trier of facts, is thus constrained to remand the case to the
COMELEC for a determination of this unresolved factual matter.
Q. Does preventive suspension pendent lite violate the right to be presumed innocent?
A. No, because preventive suspension is not a penalty. Gonzaga v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 96131,
September 6, 1991.
Q. Does presumption of innocence preclude the State from shifting the burden of proof to the accused?
A. The State having the right to declare what acts are criminal, within certain well defined limitations,
has a right to specify what act or acts shall constitute a crime, as well as what proof shall constitute
prima facie evidence of guilt, and then to put upon the defendant the burden of showing that such act or
acts are innocent and are not committed with any criminal intent or intention. US v. Luling, 34 Phil. 725
(1916).
a) Every circumstance favoring the innocence of the accused must be taken into account. The
proof against him must survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be
permitted to sway judgment [People v. Austria, 195 SCRA 700], Thus, in Dumlao v. Comelec,
95 SCRA 392, the provision of an election statute which disqualified from running for public
office any person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the State “provided that the
filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal
shall be prima facie evidence of such fact”, was declared unconstitutional for being violative
of the presumption of innocence clause. Likewise, in People v. Lomboy, G.R. No. 129691, June
29, 1999, it was held that the acquittal of the accused is inevitable if inculpatory facts and
circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one consistent with the innocence of
the accused and the other consistent with his guilt.
b) The presumption of innocence was held not to have been overcome by prosecution
evidence where the victim had difficulty in identifying the accused not only during the
hospital confrontation but also in open court [People v. Alcantara, 240 SCRA 122]; or where
the prosecution failed to present the alleged poseur-buyer, because without the testimony of
the latter, there is no convincing evidence that the accused was a marijuana peddler and not
merely a victim of instigation [People v. Tapeda, 244 SCRA 339]; or where the testimony of
the prosecution witnesses is marred by inconsistencies [Layug v. Sandiganbayan, 245 SCRA
123].
c) The presumption that official duty was regularly performed cannot, by itself, prevail over
the constitutional presumption of innocence. If the inculpatory facts and circumstances are
capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the
accused, and the other consistent with guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of
moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction [People v. Martos, 211 SCRA 805].
Thus, in People v. Briones, 266 SCRA 254, the fact that SP01 Alilio was presumed to have
regularly performed his official duty was held insufficient to overcome the presumption of
innocence, as it was inconceivable that the accused would still sell shabu to SP01 Alilio when
the accused knew Alilio to be the police officer who earlier arrested his friend, Ormos, for
allegedly selling shabu.
i) But where it is not the sole basis for conviction, the presumption of regularity of
performance of official functions may prevail over the constitutional presumption
of innocence [People v. Acuram, 209 SCRA 281].
d) The constitutional presumption will not apply as long as there is some logical connection
between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed, and the inference of one fact from
proof of another shall not be so unreasonable as to be a purely arbitrary mandate. In such a
case the burden of proof is thus shifted to the possessor of the dangerous drug to explain the
absence of animus possedendi [People v. Burton, 268 SCRA 531, citing Dizon- Pamintuan v.
People, 234 SCRA 63]. This is reiterated in People v. Balluda, G.R. No. 114198, November 19,
1999.
i) In order that this constitutional presumption may be overcome in a prosecution
for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements must be proven:
a) that the transaction or sale took place;
b) that the corpus delicti or the illicit drug was presented as
evidence; and
c) that the buyer and seller are identified.
To comply with the second element, it is imperative that the integrity of the
corpus delicti be preserved, and the chain of custody requirement, as provided in
R.A. 9165, performs this function for it ensures that there are no unnecessary
doubts concerning the identity of the evidence. [People v. De Guzman, G.R. No.
186498, March 26, 2010]
ia) The seizure and custody of the drugs remain valid despite failure to
comply with the chain of custody procedure, if:
1) the non-compliance is attended by justifiable grounds;
and
2) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items
are properply preserved.
However, in the case, not only did the prosecution fail to present any
justifiable ground for non-compliance, but there is a gaping hole in the
chain of custody. The length of time that lapsed from the seizure of the
items until they were given to the investigating officer for marking took
all of 3-1/2 hours, despite the fact that De Guzman’s house was walking
distance from the police station. Moreover, it took more time before
the items were submitted to the PNP Crime Laboratory, without any
explanation on who had custody in the meantime. [People v. De
Guzman, supra.]
e) This constitutional presumption may be overcome by contrary presumptions based on the
experience of human conduct, such as unexplained flight which may lead to an inference of
guilt, or the inability of an accountable officer to produce funds or property entrusted to him
which is considered prima facie evidence of misappropriation.
i) However, in Madarang v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 112314, March 28, 2001, and
in Agullo v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 132926, July 20, 2001, it was held that the
prima facie presumption of accountability does not shatter the presumption of
innocence which the petitioner enjoys, because even if prima facie evidence
arises, certain facts still have to be proved, and the Sandiganbayan must be
satisfied that the petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. And this finding
must rest upon the strength of the prosecution’s own evidence, not on the
weakness, deficiency or absence of evidence for the defense. In Monteverde
v..People, G.R. No. 139610, August 12, 2002, it was held that the presumption that
the possessor of a forged or falsified document is the author of the forgery or
falsification will not prevail over the presumption of innocence.
f) In Ong v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 126858, September 16, 2005, the constitutionality of R.A.
1379 (Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired Property) was challenged because it is vague, violates
the presumption of innocence and the right against self-incrimination,and breaches the
authority of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights. It was held that the law is not vague, because it defines
with sufficient particularity “unlawfully acquired property”, and provides a definition of what
is legitimately acquired property. Neither is the presumption of innocence by Sec. 2 thereof,
which states that property acquired by a public officer during his incumbency in an amount
which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to
his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property shall be prima
facie presumed to have been unlawfully acquired. The Court held that under the principle of
presumption of innocence, it is merely required that the State establish a prima facie case,
after which the burden of proof is shifted to the accused.
Q. When does presumption of innocence end?
A. Moreover, where the conviction by a lower court is still on appeal, it has not yet reached finality and
the accused still enjoys the constitutional presumption of innocence. It must be remembered that the
existence of a presumption indicateing the guilt of the accused does not in itself destroy the
constitutional presumption of innocence unless the inculpating presumption, together with all the
evidence, or the lack of any evidence or explanation, proves the accused’s guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. Until the accused’s guilt is shown in this manner, the presumption of innocence continues. Thus
in Mangubat v. Sandiganbayan, the Court held that respondent Sandiganbayan did not act with grave
abuse of discretion, correctible by certiorari, when it ruled that despite her conviction, the accused still
enjoyed presumption of innocence. Re: Judge Angeles, A.M. No. 06-9-545-RTC, January 31, 2008.
Q. What do you understand by the conscience test for conviction?
A. It means that only when the conscience is satisfied that the crime has been committed by the person
on trial should the sentence be for conviction. If the prosecutions’s evidence miserably fails to pass the
conscience test, then, the accused must be acquitted. (People v. Frago, 51 SCAD 497, G.R. Nos. 104492-
93, May 31, 1994; People v. Abellanosa, et al., 76 SCAD 596, G.R. No. 121195, November 27, 1996).
Q. What is the basis of the conscience test of conviction? Explain.
A. It is based on the right of the accused to be presumed innocent. In the case of People v. Mejia, et al.,
84 SCAD 245, G.R. Nos. 118940-41 and G.R. No. 119407, July 7, 1997, it was said:
“Enshrined in the Bill of Rights is the right of the accused to be presumed innocent
until the contrary is proved. To overcome the presumption, nothing but proof beyond
reasonable doubt must be established by the prosecution. Save in certain circumstances as
where, for instance, the accused admits the commission of the acts alleged to constitute a
crime but interposes justifying circumstances, the burden never shifted to the accused or
diminished by the weakness of his defense. Indeed, unless the prosecution successfully
discharges that burden, the accused need not even offer evidence in his behalf.” (People v.
Garcia, 215 SCRA 349).
“In our jurisdiction, accusation is not synonymous with guilt. The freedom of the
accused is forfeited only in the requisite quantum of proof necessary for conviction be in
existence. This, of course, requires the most careful scrutiny of the evidence for the State,
both oral and documentary, independent of whatever defense is offered by the accused.
Every circumstance favouring the accused’s innocence must be duly taken into account. The
proof aginst the accused must survive the test of reason. Strongest suspicion must not be
permitted to sway judgment. The conscience must be satisfied that on the accused could be
laid the responsibility of the offense charged. (People v. Dramayo, 42 SCRA 59). If the
prosecution fails to discharge the burden, then it is not only the accused’s right to be freed, it
is, even more, the court’s constitutional duty to acquit him. (People v. Pido, 200 SCRA 45;
People v. Cordova, 43 SCAD 135, G.R. Nos. 83373-74, July 5, 1993)
Q. Give the concept of derivative, not positive, identification of an accused and cite an example.
A. Derivative identification is one patterned from the identification of an accused by another person, not
by the witness himself/herself. (People v. Frago, 51 SCAD 497, G.R. Nos. 104492-93, May 31, 1994, citing
People v. Domingo, 165 SCRA 620 [1988]).
Example:
The accused was identified by two (2) sisters on September 28, 1960. The victim
identified him on October 8, 1990. They are neighbours. The possibility that they conferred
with one another is not remote, hence, she got the identification from them.
g) Circumstantial evidence. In People v. Bato, G.R. No. 113804, January 16, 1998, the Supreme
Court held that in order that circumstantial evidence may warrant conviction, the following
requisites must concur:
1) there is more than one circumstance;
2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.
Thus, where the conviction is based on circumstantial evidence gleaned from the sole
testimony of the son of the deceased, the prosecution evidence does not constitute an
unbroken chain leading, beyond reasonable doubt, to the guilt of the accused and, therefore,
cannot overthrow the constitutional presumption of innocence.
h) Equipoise rule. The equipoise rule invoked by the petitioner is applicable only where the
evidence adduced by the parties are evenly balanced, in which case the constitutional
presumption of innocence should tilt the scales in favor of the accused [Corpus v. People, 194
SCRA 73].
i) The right to presumption of innocence can be invoked only by an individual
accused of a criminal offense; a corporate entity has no personality to invoke the
same [Feeder International Line v. Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA 842].
CORPUS VS. PEOPLE [G.R. NO. 74259, FEBRUARY 14, 1991]
EQUIPOISE RULE. The equipoise rule invoked by the petitioner is applicable only where the evidence of
the parties is evenly balanced, in which case the constitutional presumption of innocence should tilt the
scales in favor of the accused. There is no such equipoise here. The evidence of the prosecution is
overwhelming and has not been overcome by the petitioner with his nebulous claims of persecution and
conspiracy. The presumed innocence of the accused must yield to the positive finding that he malversed
the sum of P50,310.87 to the prejudice of the public whose confidence he has breached. His conviction
must be affirmed.
FEEDER INTERNATIONAL LINE VS. CA [G.R. NO. 94262 MAY 31, 1991]
Before we proceed to a discussion of the factual findings of the Court of Appeals, it bears mention that
petitioner, which is a corporate entity, has no personality to invoke the right to be presumed innocent
which right is available only to an individual who is an accused in a criminal case.
NOTE: The equipoise rule provides that where the evidence of the parties in a criminal case is
evenly balanced, the constitutional presumption of innocence should tilt the scales in favour
of the accused. There is no equipoise if the evidence is not evenly balanced. The equipoise
rule cannot be invoked where the evidence of the prosecution is overwhelming. [Malana v.
People, G.R. No. 173612, March 26, 2008]
RIGHT TO BE HEARD BY HIMSELF AND COUNSEL
Q. Discuss the importance of the right to counsel.
A. The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel.
Even the most intelligent person may not have the skill in law, especially the rules of procedure, hence,
the accused may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he may not know how to establish his
innocence. (Borja v. Mendoza, 77 SCRA 422; Abriol v. Homeras, 84 Phil. 525; People v. Holgado, 85 Phil.
752). In People v. Lucero, 61 SCAD 401, G.R. No. 97936, May 29, 1995, it was said that if the Constitution
has any value, it is because it stands up for those who cannot stand for themselves. Thus, it protected
those under custodial investigation with the all-important right to counsel. The right to counsel cannot
be diluted without tampering the scales of justice.
BORJA VS. MENDOZA [G.R. NO. L-45667, JUNE 20, 1977]
FACTS: Petitioner Manuel Borja, accused of slight physical injuries, was convicted and sentenced to
suffer imprisonment for a period of twenty days of arresto menor by respondent Judge Senining, despite
the absence of an arraignment. The judge proceeded with the trial in absentia and promulgated the
assailed decision. An appeal was duly elevated to the Court of First Instance of Cebu presided by
respondent Judge Mendoza. Without any notice to petitioner and without requiring him to submit his
memorandum, a decision on the appealed case was rendered against him.
ISSUE: Whether or not the decision was validly rendered despite the absence of an arraignment.
RULING: NO.
ARRAIGNMENT IS AN INDISPENSABLE REQUIREMENT OF THE RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED TO BE
INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATION AGAINST HIM. An arraignment thus
becomes indispensable as the means "for bringing the accused into court and notifying him of the cause
he is required to meet . . ." Its importance was stressed by Justice Moreland as early as 1916 in the
leading case of United States v. Binayoh. He pointed out that upon the accused being arraigned, "there is
a duty laid by the Code [now the Rules of Court] upon the court to inform [him] of certain rights and to
extend to him, on his demand, certain others. This duty is an affirmative one which the court, on its own
motion, must perform, unless waived." To emphasize its importance, he added: "No such duty, however,
is laid on the court with regard to the rights of the accused which he may be entitled to exercise during
the trial. Those are rights which he must assert himself and the benefits of which he himself must
demand. In other words, in the arraignment the court must act of its own volition, . . . ." In the terse and
apt language of the Solicitor General: "Arraignment is an indispensable requirement in any criminal
prosecution." Procedural due process demands no less.
Nor is it only the due process guarantee that calls for the accused being duly arraigned. As noted, it is at
that stage where in the mode and manner required by the Rules, an accused, for the first time, is granted
the opportunity to know the precise charge that confronts him. It is imperative that he is thus made fully
aware of possible loss of freedom, even of his life, depending on the nature of the crime imputed to him.
At the very least then, he must be fully informed of why the prosecuting arm of the state is mobilized
against him. An arraignment serves that purpose. Thereafter, he is no longer in the dark. It is true, the
complaint or information may not be worded with sufficient clarity. He would be in a much worse
position though if he does not even have such an opportunity to plead to the charge. With his counsel by
his side, he is thus in a position to enter his plea with full knowledge of the consequences. He is not even
required to do so immediately. He may move to quash. What is thus evident is that an arraignment
assures that he be fully acquainted with the nature of the crime imputed to him and the circumstances
under which it is allegedly committed. It is thus a vital aspect of the constitutional rights guaranteed him.
It is not useless formality, much less an idle ceremony.
PEOPLE VS. HOLGADO [G.R. NO. L-2809, MARCH 22, 1950]
FACTS: Appellant Frisco Holgado was charged in the court of First Instance of Romblon with slight illegal
detention because according to the information, being a private person, he did "feloniously and without
justifiable motive, kidnap and detain one Artemia Fabreag in the house of Antero Holgado for about
eight hours. On the day set for trial, he appeared alone without the assistance of a lawyer. He was
subsequently arraigned and pleaded guilty upon the instruction of a certain Mr. Numeriano Ocampo.
Judgement was rendered convicting him of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention.
ISSUE: Whether the accused was afforded of his right to be heard by himself and counsel.
RULING: NO. Under the circumstances, particularly the qualified plea given by the accused who was
unaided by counsel, it was not prudent, to say the least, for the trial court to render such a serious
judgment finding the accused guilty of a capital offense, and imposing upon him such a heavy penalty as
ten years and one day of prision mayor to twenty years, without absolute any evidence to determine and
clarify the true facts of the case.
DUTIES OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE WHENEVER AN ACCUSED APPEARS BEFORE IT WITHOUT COUNSEL.
The proceedings in the trial court are irregular from the beginning. It is expressly provided in our Rules of
Court, Rule 112, section 3, that:
"If the defendant appears without attorney, he must be informed by the court that
it is his right to have attorney before being arraigned, and must be asked if he desires the aid
of attorney. If he desires and is unable to employ attorney, the Court must assign attorney de
oficio to defend him. A reasonable time must be allowed for procuring attorney."
Under this provision, when a defendant appears without attorney, the court has four important duties to
comply with:
1) It must inform the defendant that it is his right to have attorney before being arraigned;
2) After giving him such information the court must ask him if he desires the aid of an attorney;
3) If he desires and is unable to employ attorney, the court must assign attorney de oficio to
defend him; and
4) If the accused desires to procure an attorney of his own the court must grant him a
reasonable time therefore.
One of the great principles of justice guaranteed by our Constitution is that "no person shall be held to
answer for a criminal offense without due process of law", and that all accused "shall enjoy the right to
be heard by himself and counsel." In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be
given an opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not
include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in
the science of the law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and, without counsel, he may be convicted
not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence. And this can
happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason that the right to be
assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it has become a constitutional right and it is so
implemented that under our rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to apprise an accused of
his right to have an attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it
is essential that the court should assign one de oficio for him if he so desires and he is poor or grant him
a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own.
Q. What are the elements of the general right to be heard?
A. It includes:
1) the right to be present at trial;
2) the right to counsel;
3) the right to an impartial judge;
4) the right of confrontation; and
5) the right to compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses.
Q. Why must an accused enjoy the right to counsel?
A. This is a realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the average defendant does not have the
professional skill to protect himself when brought before a tribunal with power to take his life or liberty,
wherein the prosecution is represented by an experienced and learned counsel. Johnson v. Zerbist, 304
US 458 (1938).
Q. What duty is imposed on the judge by the guarantee of the right to counsel?
A. If the defendant appears without counsel he must be informed by the court that he has a right to have
counsel before being arraigned, and must be asked if he desires the aid of counsel. If he desires and is
unable to employ counsel, the court must assign counsel to defend him. This is a right which the
defendant should not be deprived of, and the failure of the court to assign counsel or, after counsel has
been assigned, require him to perform this duty by appearing and defending the accused would be
sufficient cause for the reversal of the case. US v. Gimeno, 1 Phil. 236 (1905).
Q. What are the pre-arraignment duties of the trial judge?
A. Under Section 6 of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, the four-fold duties are:
1) to inform the accused that he has the right to have his own counsel before being
arraigned;
2) after giving such information, to ask accused whether he desires the aid of counsel;
3) if he so desires to procure the services of counsel, the court must grant him reasonable
time to do so; and
4) if he so desires to have counsel but is unable to employ one, the court must assign
counsel de oficio to defend him.” People v. Agbayani, G.R. No. 122770, January 16.
1998, 284 SCRA 315, 333 (citing People v. Holgado, 85 Phil. 752, 756 [1950]).
PEOPLE VS. AGBAYANI [G.R. NO. 122770, JANUARY 16, 1998]
THE FAILURE OF THE RECORDS TO DISCLOSE THAT THE ACCUSED WAS INFORMED OF HIS RIGHT TO
COUNSEL DOES NOT CONSTITUTE VIOLATION OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS. This obviously means
that the appointment had taken place earlier. The trial court's order of 22 December 1994 states that
said de oficio counsel were "duly appointed by the Court with the consent of the accused." Since
appellant has miserably failed to show that he was not informed of his right to counsel, the
presumptions that the law has been obeyed and official duty has been regularly performed by the trial
court stand. In other words, the trial court is presumed to have complied with its four-fold duties under
Section 6 of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, namely:
1) to inform the accused that he has the right to have his own counsel before being
arraigned;
2) after giving such information, to ask accused whether he desires the aid of
counsel;
3) if he so desires to procure the services of counsel, the court must grant him
reasonable time to do so; and
4) if he so desires to have counsel but is unable to employ one, the court must assign
counsel de oficio to defend him.
It is settled that the failure of the record to disclose affirmatively that the trial judge advised the accused
of his right to counsel is not sufficient ground to reverse conviction. The reason being that the trial court
must be presumed to have complied with the procedure prescribed by law for the hearing and trial of
cases, and that such a presumption can only be overcome by an affirmative showing to the contrary.
Thus it has been held that unless the contrary appears in the record, or that it is positively proved that
the trial court failed to inform the accused of his right to counsel, it will be presumed that the accused
was informed by the court of such right.
In U .S. v. Labial, this Court held:
Adhering to the doctrine laid down in that case, the only question to be
determined in this case is whether the failure of the record to disclose affirmatively that the
trial judge advised the accused of their right to have counsel is sufficient ground to reverse
the judgment of conviction and to send the case back for a new trial. Upon this point we are
all agreed that in the absence of an affirmative showing that the court below did in fact fail to
advise the accused of their rights under the provisions of sections 17 of General Orders No.
58, as amended by section 1 of Act No. 440, the mere omission from the record brought here
upon appeal of an entry affirmatively disclosing that he did so, is not reversible error.
In the absence of an affirmative showing to the contrary, the court below must be presumed in matters
of this kind to have complied with the provisions of law prescribing the procedure to be followed in the
trial had before him. While in People v. Miranda this Court explicitly stated: However, said counsel calls
attention to the fact that the record is silent as to whether or not, at the time appellant was arraigned,
the trial court informed him of his right to be assisted by an attorney, under section 3 of Rule 112 of the
Rules of Court.
This precise issue was determined in United States vs. Labial (27 Phil. 87, 88), in the sense that unless the
contrary appears in the records, it will be presumed that the defendant was informed by the court of his
right to counsel. ". . . If we should insist on finding every fact fully recorded before a citizen can be
punished for an offense against the laws, we should destroy public justice, and give unbridled license to
crime. Much must be left to intendment and presumption, for it is often less difficult to do things
correctly than to describe them correctly." (United States vs. Labial, supra.) The same doctrine was
reiterated in People vs. Abuyen (52 Phil. 722) and in United States vs. Custan (28 Phil. 19). We see no
reason to modify it now.
The right to counsel proceeds from the fundamental principle of due process which basically means that
a person must be heard before being condemned. It is more than just the presence of a lawyer in the
courtroom or the mere propounding of standard questions and objections. It means that the accused is
amply accorded legal assistance extended by a counsel who commits himself to the cause of the defense
and acts accordingly. Tersely put, it means an efficient and truly decisive legal assistance, and not simply
a perfunctory representation [People v. Bermas, G.R. No. 120420, April 21, 1999]. In Estrada v. Badoy,
A.M. No. 01-12-01-SC, January 16, 2003, the Supreme Court said that a PAO lawyer is considered an
independent counsel within the contemplation of the Constitution since he is not a special counsel,
public or private prosecutor, counsel of the police, or a municipal attorney whose interest is admittedly
adverse to that of the accused.
Q. Both the transcript of stenographic notes and the order issued by the trial judge failed to disclose
categorically that the court informed the accused of his right to counsel. Is this sufficient ground to
reverse conviction?
A. No. The trial court must be presumed to have complied with the procedure prescribed by law for the
hearing and trial of cases, and such a presumption can only be overcome by an affirmative showing to
the contrary. People v. Agbayani, G.R. No. 122770, January 16, 1998, 284 SCRA 315, 334. However, the
Court admonished all trial courts to have their compliance with their pre-arraignment duties put on
record. Id. at 335-36
a) The right to counsel during the trial is not subject to waiver [Flores v. Ruiz, 90 SCRA 428],
because “even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of law,
particularly in the rules of procedure, and without counsel, he may be convicted not because
he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence” [People v.
Holgado, 86 Phil 752]. Thus, the conviction of the accused in the lower court was set aside
and the case remanded for new trial, as the accused was represented by someone who was
not a member of the Philippine Bar [People v. Santociles, G.R. No. 109149, December 21,
1999], But the failure of the record to disclose affirmatively that the trial court advised the
accused of his right to counsel is not sufficient ground to reverse conviction. The trial court
must be presumed to have complied with the procedure prescribed by law for the hearing
and trial of cases, and such presumption can be overcome only by an affirmative showing to
the contrary [People v. Agbayani, G.R. No. 122770, January 16, 1998].
b) The decision of conviction was set aside where it appeared that there was merely a pro
forma appointment of a counsel de officio who did not exert his best efforts for the
protection of the accused [People v. Magsi, 124 SCRA 64]. Where the accused manifested that
he had lost confidence in his counsel de officio and wanted to retain a counsel de parte, but
the court still appointed the same lawyer as counsel de officio, and proceeded with the trial,
there was deemed a denial of this constitutional guarantee [People v. Malunsing, 63 SCRA
493]. Likewise, in People v. Cuizon, 256 SCRA 325, where the accused, a Cantonese, could not
understand English, Pilipino or any Philippine dialect, it was held that he was denied the right
to counsel because although he was provided with one, he could not understand or
communicate with his counsel concerning his defense.
c) Although the right to counsel is not indispensable to due process of law [Feeder
International Line v. Court of Appeals, supra.], there are instances when the Constitution
and/or the laws provide that the same may not be waived. Thus, the accused cannot waive
the right during the trial, and no valid waiver of the right to remain silent or to counsel can be
made by a person under custodial interrogation without the assistance of counsel. However,
while the right to be represented by counsel during the trial is absolute, the option of the
accused to hire one of his own choice is limited. Such option cannot be used to sanction
reprehensible dilatory tactics, to trifle with the Rules of Court, or to prejudice the equally
important rights of the State and the offended party to speedy and adequate justice [People
v. Serzo, G.R. No. 118435, June 20, 1997].
Q. The accused contends that the judge’s appointment of a counsel de oficio deprives him of his
constitutional right to be defended by counsel of his own choice. Decide.
A. The ‘preference in the choice of counsel’ pertains more aptly and specifically to a person under
investigation rather than one who is the accused in criminal prosecution. Amion v. Judge Chiongson,
A.M. No. RTJ-97-1371, January 22, 1999.
d) An examination of related provisions in the Constitution concerning the right to counsel
will show that the “preference in the choice of cqunsel” pertains more aptly and specifically
 to a person under custodial investigation rather than one who is accused in criminal
prosecution. And even if the application of the concept were to be extended to an accused in
a criminal prosecution, such preferential discretion cannot partake of discretion so absolute
and arbitrary as would make the choice of counsel refer exclusively to the predilection of the
accused. Thus, there is no denial of the right to counsel where the counsel de oficio was
appointed during the absence of the accused’s counsel de parte pursuant to the court’s desire
to finish the case as early as possible under the continuous trial system [Amion v. Judge
Chiongson, A.M. No. RTJ-97-1371, January 22, 1999]. This is reiterated in People v. Rivera,
G.R. No. 139180, July 31, 2001.
AMION VS. JUDGE CHIONGSON [A.M. NO. RTJ-97-1371, JANUARY 22, 1999]
FACTS: At the scheduled hearing of the criminal case against Amion, trial was not held because on the
day before the scheduled hearing, he was informed that his retained counsel, Atty. Depasucat, was ill.
The hearing was reset with a warning that no further postponement would be entertained. On the date
of re-scheduled hearing, Atty. Depasucat again failed to appear. To avoid further delay, the court
appointed Atty. Jacildo of PAO as counsel de oficio who was however, prohibited to represent a party
who has retained the services of a counsel of his own choice. At the next scheduled hearing Atty.
Depasucat still did not show up in court. In view of the fact that the victim's wife, Mrs. Vaflor and
another government witness both reside about 70 to 80 kilometers from Bacolod City, and that the
appearance of Atty. Depasucat remained uncertain, Judge Chiongson, appointed Atty. Lao-Ong from the
Free Legal Aid Office to represent Amion without prejudice to the appearance of Amion's counsel de
parte. Amion filed a complaint charging respondent judge with Ignorance of the Law and Oppression
relative to the former's criminal case. Amion asserts that his right to due process was violated and that
he was deprived of his constitutional and statutory right to be defended by counsel of his own choice.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge's appointment of a counsel de oficio constitutes a violation of
accused-complainant's right to due process and a deprivation of his constitutional right to be defended
by counsel of his own choice.
RULING: The accused's discretion in a criminal prosecution with respect to his choice of counsel is not so
much as to grant him a plenary prerogative which would preclude other equally competent and
independent counsels from representing him.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED TO BE HEARED BY COUNSEL CANNOT BE EXERCISED TO
THE PREJUDICE OF OTHER PARTIES. The claim of accused-complainant that respondent judge's
appointment of a counsel de oficio constitutes a clear violation of his right to due process and a
deprivation of his constitutional right to be defended by counsel of his own choice cannot be
countenanced by this Court.
An examination of related provisions in the Constitution concerning the right to counsel, will show that
the "preference in the choice of counsel" pertains more aptly and specifically to a person under
investigation rather than one who is the accused in a criminal prosecution.
Even if we were to extend the application of the concept of "preference in the choice of counsel" to an
accused in a criminal prosecution, such preferential discretion cannot partake of a discretion so absolute
and arbitrary as would make the choice of counsel refer exclusively to the predilection of the accused.
As held by this Court in the case of People vs. Barasina:
"Withal, the word "preferably" under Section 12(1), Article 3 of the 1987
Constitution does not convey the message that the choice of a lawyer by a person under
investigation is exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and independent attorneys
from handling his defense. If the rule were otherwise, then, the tempo of a custodial
investigation, will be solely in the hands of the accused who can impede, nay, obstruct the
progress of the interrogation by simply selecting a lawyer, who for one reason or another, is
not available to protect his interest. This absurd scenario could not have been contemplated
by the framers of the charter"
Applying this principle enunciated by the Court, we may likewise say that the accused's discretion in a
criminal prosecution with respect to his choice of counsel is not so much as to grant him a plenary
prerogative which would preclude other equally competent and independent counsels from
representing him. Otherwise, the pace of a criminal prosecution will be entirely dictated by the accused
to the detriment of the eventual resolution of the case.
Accused-complainant was not, in any way, deprived of his substantive and constitutional right to due
process as he was duly accorded all the opportunities to be heard and to present evidence to
substantiate his defense but he forfeited this right, for not appearing in court together with his counsel
at the scheduled hearings.
Accused-complainant had more than sufficient time and every available opportunity to present his side
which would have led to the expeditious termination of the case. A party cannot feign denial of due
process when he had the opportunity to present his side.
Moreover, there is no denial of the right to counsel where a counsel de oficio was appointed during the
absence of the accused's counsel de parte pursuant to the court's desire to finish the case as early as
practicable under the continuous trial system.
Thus, it has been held by this Court in the case of Lacambra v. Ramos:
"The Court cannot help but note the series of legal maneuvers resorted to and
repeated importunings of the accused or his counsel, which resulted in the protracted trial of
the case, thus making a mockery of the judicial process, not to mention the injustice caused
by the delay to the victim's family."
Undoubtedly, it was accused-complainant's own strategic machinations which brought upon the need
for the appointment of a counsel de oficio in as much as the criminal case had been dragging on its
lethargic course.
e) The long standing rule is that a client is bound by the mistakes of his lawyer [Andrada v.
People, G.R. No. 135222, March 4, 2005], except when the negligence or incompetence of
counsel is deemed so gross as to have prejudiced the constitutional right of the accused to be
heard. Thus, in U.S. v. Gimenez, 34 Phil. 74, the case was remanded for new trial when
counsel for the accused inadvertently substituted a plea of guilty for an earlier plea of not
guilty, thus resulting in the precipitate conviction of his client. In Aguilar v. Court of Appeals,
320 Phil. 456, the dismissed appeal from a conviction for estafa was reinstated after it was
shown that the failure to file the appellant’s brief on time was due to the sheer
irresponsibility on the part of appellant’s counsel. In De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
103276, April 11, 1996, the case was remanded for reception of evidence after counsel filed a
demurrer to the evidence notwithstanding that his motion for leave of court was denied, thus
precluding the accused to present his evidence. In Reyes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111682,
February 6, 1997, a new trial was ordered after a showing that counsel for the accused
abandoned the accused without explanation. In People v. Bascuguin, G.R. No. 144404,
September 4, 2001, it was held that the counsel de officio’s haste in proceeding with the
arraignment falls short of the standard mandated by the rules of effective and adequate
counselling.
RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATION AGAINST HIM
Q. What are the purposes of the requirement that the accused should be informed of the nature of the
accusation filed against him?
A. The accused must be informed of the nature of the accusation against him in order to prepare his
defense. He should not be made to guess the charge against him.
Q. What is the purpose and scope of the right to be informed?
A. The object of the written accusation is – first, to furnish the accused with such a description of the
charge against him as will enable him to make his defense; and second, to avail himself of his conviction
or acquittal for prosecution against a further prosecution for the same cause; and third, to inform the
court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a
conviction, if one should be had. In order that this requirement may be satisfied, facts must be stated,
not conclusions of law. Every crime is made up of certain acts and intent; these must be set forth in the
complaint with reasonable particularity of time, place, names (plaintiff and defendant), and
circumstances. In short, the complaint must contain a specific allegation of every fact and circumstance
necessary to constitute the crime charged. US v. Karelsen, 3 Phil. 223 (1904).
a) Rationale. In People v. Valdesancho, G.R. No. 137051-52, May 30, 2001, reiterated in
People v. Monteron, G.R. No. 130709, March 06, 2002, the Supreme Court said that the
reasons for this guarantee, as explained in US v. Karlsen, are:
1) to furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as
will enable him to prepare for his defense;
2) to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further
prosecution for the same cause; and
3) to inform the Court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they
are sufficient in law to support a conviction.
i) In People v. Crisologo, 150 SCRA 653, the conviction of the accused who was a
deaf-mute was reversed by the Supreme Court because no one who knew how to
communicate with the accused was utilized by the trial court during the entire
proceedings. Similarly, in People v. Parazo, G.R. No. 121176, July 8, 1999, the
judgment of conviction rendered by the trial court was vacated where there was
no showing that the accused, a deaf- mute, was aided by a competent sign
language expert able to fully understand and interpret the actions and mutterings
of the appellant. See also People v. Ramirez, 69 SCRA 144; People v. Montes, 122
SCRA 409.
ii) Settled is the rule that when a judge is informed or discovers that an accused is
apparently in a condition of insanity or imbecility, it is within his discretion to
investigate the matter. If it be found that by reason of such affliction the accused
could not, with the aid of counsel, make a proper defense, it is the duty of the
court to suspend proceedings and commit the accused to a proper place of
detention until he recovers his faculties. To arraign the accused while he is in a
state of insanity will violate the right of the accused to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him [People v. Alcalde, G.R. Nos. 139225-26,
May 29, 2002].
Q. What must a criminal information contain in order to comply with the constitutional right of the
accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him?
A. According to Sections 6 and 8 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, it must state the following:
1) the name of the accused;
2) the designantion given to the offense by the statute;
3) a statement of the acts or omissions so complained of as constituting the offense;
4) the name of the offended party;
5) the approximate time and date of the commission of the offense; and
6) the place where the offense had been committed. People v. Quitlong, G.R. No. 121562,
July 10, 1998, 292 SCRA 360.
PEOPLE VS. QUITLONG [G.R. NO. 121562, JULY 10, 1998]
Overwhelming, such as it may have been thought of by the trial court, evidence of conspiracy is not
enough for an accused to bear and to respond to all its grave legal consequences; it is equally essential
that such accused has been apprised when the charge is made conformably with prevailing substantive
and procedural requirements. Article III, Section 14, of the 1987 Constitution, in particular, mandates
that no person shall be held answerable for a criminal offense without due process of law and that in all
criminal prosecutions the accused shall first be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him. The right to be informed of any such indictment is likewise explicit in procedural rules. The
practice and object of informing an accused in writing of the charges against him has been explained as
early as the 1904 decision of the Court in U.S. vs. Karelsen; viz:
“First. To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as
will enable him to make his defense; and second, to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal
for protection against a further prosecution for the same cause; and third, to inform the court
of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a
conviction, if one should be had. (United States vs. Cruikshank, 92 U.S., 542). In order that this
requirement may be satisfied, facts must be stated, not conclusions of law. Every crime is
made up of certain acts and intent; these must be set forth in the complaint with reasonable
particularity of time, place, names (plaintiff and defendant), and circumstances. In short, the
complaint must contain a specific allegation of every fact and circumstance necessary to
constitute the crime charged.”
An information, in order to ensure that the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the
nature and cause of his accusation is not violated, must state the name of the accused; the designation
given to the offense by the statute; a statement of the acts or omissions so complained of as constituting
the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time and date of the commission of the
offense; and the place where the offense has been committed. In embodying the essential elements of
the crime charged, the information must set forth the facts and circumstances that have a bearing on the
culpability and liability of the accused so that the accused can properly prepare for and undertake his
defense. One such fact or circumstance in a complaint against two or more accused persons is that of
conspiracy. Quite unlike the omission of an ordinary recital of fact which, if not excepted from or
objected to during trial, may be corrected or supplied by competent proof, an allegation, however, of
conspiracy, or one that would impute criminal liability to an accused for the act of another or others, is
indispensable in order to hold such person, regardless of the nature and extent of his own participation,
equally guilty with the other or others in the commission of the crime. Where conspiracy exists and can
rightly be appreciated, the individual acts done to perpetrate the felony becomes of secondary
importance, the act of one being imputable to all the others. Verily, an accused must know from the
information whether he faces a criminal responsibility not only for his acts but also for the acts of his co-
accused as well.
A conspiracy indictment need not, of course, aver all the components of conspiracy or allege all the
details thereof, like the part that each of the parties therein have performed, the evidence proving the
common design or the facts connecting all the accused with one another in the web of the conspiracy.
Neither is it necessary to describe conspiracy with the same degree of particularity required in describing
a substantive offense. It is enough that the indictment contains a statement of the facts relied upon to
be constitutive of the offense in ordinary and concise language, with as much certainty as the nature of
the case will admit, in a manner that can enable a person of common understanding to know what is
intended, and with such precision that the accused may plead his acquittal or conviction to a subsequent
indictment based on the same facts. It is said, generally, that an indictment may be held sufficient "if it
follows the words of the statute and reasonably informs the accused of the character of the offense he is
charged with conspiring to commit, or, following the language of the statute, contains a sufficient
statement of an overt act to effect the object of the conspiracy, or alleges both the conspiracy and the
contemplated crime in the language of the respective statutes defining them."
b) Requisites. In order that the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him may not be violated, the information must
state the name of the accused, the designation given to the offense by statute, a statement of
the acts or omission so complained of as constituting the offense, the name of the offended
party, the approximate time and date of the commission of the offense and the place where
the offense had been committed. The information must set forth the facts and circumstances
that have a bearing on the culpability and liability of the accused, so that the accused can
prepare for and undertake his defense. One such fact or circumstance in a complaint against
two or more persons is conspiracy. Where no such allegation is made in the information, the
court’s finding of conspiracy violates the constitutional requirement [People v. Quitlong, G.R.
No. 121502, July 10, 1998]. Every element of the offense must be alleged in the complaint or
information, because the accused is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the
facts that constitute the offense charged [People v. Tabion, G.R. No. 132715, October 20,
1999]
i) But it is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise time
when the offense was committed, except when time is a material ingredient of the
offense. The act may be alleged to have been committed at any time as near to
the actual date at which the offense was committed as the information or
complaint will permit [People v. Marcelo, G.R. No. 126714, March 22, 1999], This
rule was reiterated in People v. Alba, G.R. Nos. 131858-59, April 15, 1999 and in
People v. Flores, Jr., G.R. No. 128823-24, December 27, 2002, where it was held
that the exact date the rape was committed is not an element of the crime.
ii) Due process requires that the acts or omissions constitutive of the offense must
be stated in the information to fully apprise the accused of the charge against him
[People v. Garcia, 281 SCRA 463; People v. Bolatete, G.R. No. 127570, February 25,
1999]. The nature and the cause of the accusation must be reasonably stated in
the information [People v. Ambray, G.R. No. 127177, February 25, 1999], Thus, in
People v. Puertollano, G.R. No. 122423, June 17, 1999, where the information (for
rape) failed to allege the victim’s exact age, it was held that the imposition of the
death penalty was not warranted, considering that for the imposition of the death
penalty the special qualifying circumstance of the victim’s age and her relationship
to the offender must be alleged. Likewise, in People v. Bonghanoy, G.R. No.
124097, June 17, 1999, because the information failed to allege the relationship
between the accused and the victim, the death penalty was not imposed. See also
People v. De la Cuesta, G.R. No. 126134, March 2, 1999.
iii) The description not the designation of the offense controls [Soriano v.
Sandiganbayan, 131 SCRA 184; Santos v. People, 181 SCRA 487; Pecho v. People,
262 SCRA 918], The accused can be convicted only of the crime alleged or
necessarily included in the allegations in th,e information [People v. Legaspi, 246
SCRA 206], Thus, in People v. Paglinawan, G.R. No. 123094, January 31, 2000,
where during the trial for murder, it was shown that the mother and the brother
of the victim were also injured during the same incident, it was held that the
accused-appellant could not be convicted of the said injuries because they were
not properly charged in the information.
iv) While the trial court can hold a joint trial of two or more criminal cases and can
render a consolidated decision, it cannot convict the accused of the complex crime
constitutive of the various crimes in the two informations. To do so would violate
the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and the cause of the
accusation against him [People v. De Vera, G.R. Nos. 121462-63, June 9,
1999].
v) The fundamental test to determine the adequacy of the averments in an
information is whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, would
establish the essential elements of the crime. [People v. Robert Balao, G.R. No.
176819, January 26, 2011]
SORIANO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN [G.R. NO. L-65952, JULY 31, 1984]
FACTS: Thomas Tan was accused of qualified theft in a complaint lodged with the City Fiscal of Quezon
City, assigned for investigation to the petitioner who was then an Assistant City Fiscal. In the course of
the investigation the petitioner demanded P4,000.00 from Tan as the price for dismissing the case. Tan
reported the demand to the National Bureau of Investigation which set up an entrapment. The
Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner as guilty for violation of Section 3, paragraph (b) of R.A. 3019 which
penalizes: "Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit,
for himself or for any other person, in connection with any contract or transaction between the
Government and any other party, wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to intervene under
the law."Petitioner contends that the preliminary investigation of a complaint does not constitute a
"contract or transaction" and thus he cannot be convicted for violation of R.A. 3019. And if acquitted, he
cannot be subsequently convicted of direct bribery because that would violate his right to be informed of
the nature of the accusation against him.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not preliminary investigation constitutes a "transaction or contract."
2) Whether or not, if previous conviction for violation of R.A. 3019 were wrong, he can now be
convicted for direct bribery without violating his right to be informed.
RULING:
1) NO. The term 'transaction' as used thereof is not limited in its scope or meaning to a
commercial or business transaction but includes all kinds of transaction, whether commercial,
civil or administrative in nature, pending with the government. This must be so, otherwise,
the Act would have so stated in the "Definition of Terms", Section 2 thereof. But it did not.
The investigation was also not a contract. Neither was it a transaction because this term must
be construed as analogous to the term which precedes it. A transaction, like a contract, is one
which involves some consideration as in credit transactions and this element (consideration)
is absent in the investigation conducted by the petitioner. We agree with the petitioner that it
was error for the Sandiganbayan to have convicted him of violating Sec. 3 (b) of R.A. No. 3019.
2) YES. The petitioner also claims that he cannot be convicted of bribery under the Revised Penal
Code because to do so would be violative of as constitutional right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him. Wrong. A reading of the information which
has been reproduced herein clearly makes out a case of bribery so that the petitioner cannot
claim deprivation of the right to be informed.
THE DESCRIPTION IN THE COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION CONTROLS OVER THE DESIGNATION OF THE
OFFENSE. The principal issue in this petition to review a decision of the Sandiganbayan is whether or not
the preliminary investigation of a criminal complaint conducted by a Fiscal is a "contract or transaction"
so as to bring it within the ambit of Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The petitioner also claims that he cannot be convicted of bribery under the Revised Penal Code because
to do so would be violative of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. Wrong. A reading of the information which has been reproduced herein clearly
makes out a case of bribery so that the petitioner cannot claim deprivation of the right to be informed.
PECHO VS. PEOPLE [G.R. NO. 111399, SEPTEMBER 27, 1996]
FACTS: Petitioner and his co-accused Joe Catre were alleged to have conspired in representing Pecho as
a representative of Everson Commercial Trading of Cotabato City, which turned out to be not-existent.
Pecho was then tried and convicted by the Sandiganbayan for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A No. 3019.
The SC modified the Sandiganbayan decision, holding the petitioner guilty of the complex crime of
attempted estafa through falsification of official and commercial documents. Although the petitioner
could not be convicted of the crime charged, viz., violation of Section 3(e) of R.A No. 3019, as amended
— because the said section penalizes only consummated offenses and the offense charged in this case
was not consummated — he could, nevertheless, be convicted of the complex crime of attempted estafa
through falsification of official and commercial documents, which is necessarily included in the crime
charged. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration as the conviction for estafa after his acquittal from
violation of R.A. 3019 constitutes double jeopardy. As such, he could not be convicted without violating
his right to be informed of the accusation against him.
ISSUE: Whether or not the conviction for estafa after acquittal from the original crime charged violates
his right to be informed of the nature of the accusation against him.
RULING: NO.
AN ACCUSED MAY BE CONVICTED OF AN OFFENSE WHICH IS NECESSARILY INCLUDED IN OR
NECESSARILY INCLUDES THE OFFENSE PROVEN. In short, we held that although the petitioner could not
be convicted of the crime charged, viz., violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended -- because
the said section penalizes only consummated offenses and the offense charged in this case was not
consummated -- he could, nevertheless, be convicted of the complex crime of attempted estafa through
falsification of official and commercial documents, which is necessarily included in the crime charged.
Section 4, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court provides:
"Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. — When there
is variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information, and that proved or
established by the evidence, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes
the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved included in that
which is charged, or of the offense charged included in that which is proved.”
Analyzing this provision, this Court stated in Esquerra vs. People:
"Stated differently, an accused may be convicted of an offense provided it is
included in the charge, or of an offense charged which is included in that proved. Still stated
differently, an accused can be convicted of an offense only when it is both charged and
proved. If it is not charged although proved, or if it is not proved although charged, the
accused cannot be convicted thereof. In other words, variance between the allegation and
proof cannot justify conviction for either the offense charged or the offense proved unless
either is included in the other."
Section of Rule 120 states when an offense includes or is included in the other:
"Sec. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. — An offense charged
necessarily includes that which is proved, when some of the essential elements or ingredients
of the former, as this is alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an
offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved, when the essential ingredients
of the former constitute or form a part of those constituting the latter.”
In view of the aforesaid rules, it follows then that:
a. When the offense proved is less serious than, and is necessarily included in, the offense
charged (as when the offense proved is homicide and the offense charged is murder), in
which case the defendant shall be convicted of the offense proved (U.S. vs. Macalintal, 2 Phil.
448; . . .)
b. When the offense proved is more serious than and includes the offense charged (as when the
offense proved is serious physical injuries and the offense charged is slight physical injuries),
in which case the defendant shall be convicted only of the offense charged (U.S. vs. Guzman,
8 Phil. 21).
As earlier adverted to, the evidence established by the prosecution proves beyond reasonable doubt
that the crime of estafa was only at its attempted stage and that it was sought to be consummated
through the falsification of the following documents: the packing list (Exhibit "A-3") and Invoice (Exhibit
"A-4"), which appear to be prepared by the exporter, Kowa Tsusho Co. Ltd. through one Masayuki
Higuchi, its general manager; Bill of Lading (Exhibit "A-5") which appears to be issued in Yokohama by the
Kisen Kaishe Ltd.; the sworn Import Entry Declaration (Exhibit "A-6") all of which show that the cargoes
imported were "agricultural disc blades and irrigation water pumps; as well as the Import Entry and
Internal Revenue Declaration signed by customs broker Constantino Calica and prepared on the basis of
the foregoing documents. The falsifications consist in making it appear that the importer-consignee
indicated is a legitimate importer or an existing importer which had participated in such importation and
authorized the accused to request the release of the imported articles although, in truth, it is non-
existent and, therefore, had no participation in the importation; and in the untruthful statements that
what were imported were agricultural disc blades and irrigation water pumps when in truth they were
automotive diesel engines.
Q. Accused is charged with two informations containing two set of facts. May the facts in the two
informations be combined to allow a conviction for a complex crime consisting of the allegation in the
two informations?
A. No. Although the trial of the two cases may be joint, there should be two separate verdicts for the two
informations. To combine the two set of facts to form one complex crime would violate his right to be
informed of the accusation against him. People v. Ramirez, G.R. No. 92167-68, July 14, 1995.
c) Void for Vagueness Rule: The accused is also denied the right to be informed of the charge
against him, and to due process as well, where the statute itself is couched in such indefinite
language that it is not possible for men of ordinary intelligence to determine therefrom what
acts or omissions are punished. In such a case, the law is deemed void. See Joseph Ejercito
Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001.
i) In Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, 435 SCRA 371, the petitioner argued that Sec. 5
of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act — which penalizes any relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree of the President who
intervenes in any business or contract with the Government — is void for being
vague. The Supreme Court said that the term “intervene” should be understood in
its ordinary acceptance, which is “to come between”. The challenged provision is
not vague.
NOTE: Void for Vagueness and Strict Scrutiny
The doctrine of strict scrutiny is different from void for vagueness rule. Strict
scrutiny and overbreadth are analytical tools developed for testing “on their face” statutes in
free speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot
be made to do service when what is involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such
statute, the established rule is that ‘one to whom application of a statute is constitutional will
not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as
applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might be
unconstitutional.’ As has been pinted out, ‘vagueness challenges in the First Amendment
context, like overbreadth challenges typically produce facial invalidation, while statutes found
vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated [only] ‘as applied’ to a particular
defendant.’” The rule established in our jurisdiction is, only statutes on free speech, religious
freedom, and other fundamental rights may be facially challenged. Under no case may
ordinary penal statutes be subjected to facial challenge. The rationale is obvious. If a facial
challenge to a penal statute is permitted, the prosecution of crimes may be hampered. No
prosecution would be possible. A strong criticism against employing a facial challenge in tha
case of penal statutes, if the same is allowed, would effectively go against the grain of the
doctrinal requirement of an existing and concrete controversy before judicial power may be
appropriately exercised. A facial challenge against a penal statute is, at best, amorphous and
speculative. It would, essentially, force the court to consider third parties who are not before
it. As I have said in my opposition to the allowance of a facial challenge to attack penal
statutes, such a test will impair the State’s ability to deal with crime. If warranted, there
would be nothing that can hinder an accused from defeating the State’s power to prosecute
on a mere showing that, as applied to third parties, the penal statute is vague or overbroad,
notwithstanding that the law is clear as applied to him. Spouses Romualdez v. COMELEC, G.R.
No. 167011, December 11, 2008.
d) Waiver. Concededly, the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him may not be waived, but the defense may waive the right to enter a plea and let
the court enter a plea of “not guilty” [People v. Bryan Ferdinand Dy, G.R. Nos. 115236-37,
January 29, 2002]. The right cannot be waived for reasons of public policy. Hence, it is
imperative that the complaint or information filed against the accused be complete to meet
its objectives. As such, an indictment must fully state the elements Of the specific offense
alleged to have been committed. For an accused cannot be convicted of an offense, even if
duly proven, unless it is alleged or necessarily included in the complaint or information
[People v. Flores, Jr., G.R. No. 128823-24, December 27, 2002].
i) However, it is altogether a different matter if the accused themselves refuse to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them. The defense
cannot hold hostage the court by such refusal. Thus, in this case, it was held that
there was substantive compliance with this right when the counsel of the accused
received a copy of the Prosecutor’s resolution sustaining the charge for rape and
acts of lasciviousness. The failure to read the information to the accused was a
procedural infirmity that was eventually non-prejudicial to the accused. Not only
did they receive a copy of the information, they likewise participated in the trial,
cross-examined the complainant and her witnesses and presented their own
witnesses to deny the charges against them. The conduct of the defense,
particularly their participation in the trial, clearly indicates that they were fully
aware of the nature and cause of the accusation against them.
ii) Failure to object to the multiple offenses alleged in the criminal information
during the arraignment is deemed a waiver of the right [Abalos v. People, G.R. No.
136994, September 17, 2002], Thus, in Dimayacyac v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
136264, May 18, 2004, the Supreme Court said that the accused may be convicted
of as many offenses charged in the information and proved during the trial, where
he fails to object to such duplicitous information during the arraignment.
iii) An information which lacks certain material allegations (in this case, rape
through force and intimidation) may still sustain a conviction when the accused
fails to object to its sufficiency during the trial, and the deficiency is cured by
competent evidence presented therein [People v. Palarca, G.R. No. 146020, May
29, 2002].
e) Political Offense Doctrine. Under the political offense doctrine, “common crimes,
perpetrated in furtherance of a political offense, are devisted of their character as ‘common’
offenses and assume the political complexion of the main crime of which they are mere
ingredients, and consequently, cannot be punished separately from the principal offense, or
complexed with the same, to justify the imposition of a graver penalty.” [People v.
Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515. 541 (1956)].
i) Thus, when a killing is committed in furtherance of rebellion, the killing is not
homicide or murder. Rather, the killing assumes the political complexion of
rebellion as its mere ingredient and must be prosecuted and punished as rebellion
alone. However, this is not to say that public prosecutors are obliged to
consistently charge respondents with simple rebellion instead of common crimes.
No one disputes the well-entrenched principle in criminal procedure that the
institution of criminal charges, including whom and what to charge, is addressed to
the sound discretion of the public prosecutor.
ii) But when the political offense doctrine is asserted as a defense in the trial court,
it becomes crucial for the court to determine whether the act of killing was done in
furtherance of a political end, and for the political motive of the act to be
conclusively demonstrated. Thus, in Saturnino Ocampo v. Hon. Ephrem Abando,
G.R. No. 176830, February 11, 2014, the Court said that the burden of
demonstrating political motivation must be discharged by the defense; the proof
showing political motivation is adduced during trial where the accused is assured
an opportunity to present evidence. It is not for this Court to determine this
factual matter in the instant petition for certiorari.
RIGHT TO SPEEDY, IMPARTIAL AND PUBLIC TRIAL
Q. What is the concept of a speedy trial?
A. It is one that is free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, the purpose of which is to free
the accused from anxiety and expenses of a court litigation. (Andres v. Cacdac, 113 SCRA 216; People v.
Jardin, 124 SCRA 167; Gonzales v. SB, et al., G.R. No. 94750, July 16, 1991; Hipolito v. CA, et al., 48 SCAD
385, G.R. No. 108478-79, Feb. 21, 1994)
Q. What is the meaning of “speedy trial?”
A. The concept of speedy trial is necessarily relative and determination of whether the right has been
violated must be based on the balancing of various factors. Length of delay is certainly a factor to
consider, but other factors must also be considered such as the reason for the delay, the effort of the
defendant to assert his right, and the prejudice caused by the defendant. Conde v. Rivera, 59 Phil. 650
(1924), is the leading case on the subject of speedy trial. After reciting the pitiful plight of petitioner
Conde, Justice Malcolm concluded:
“We lay down the legal proposition that, where a prosecuting officer, without
good cause, secures postponements of the trial of a defendant against his protest beyond a
reasonable period of time, as in this instance for more than a year, the accused is entitled to
relief by a proceeding in mandamus to compel a dismissal of the information, or if he be
restrained of his liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain freedom.” Id. at 652.
CONDE VS. RIVERA [G.R. NO. 21741, JANUARY 25, 1924]
RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL. Aurelia Conde, formerly a municipal midwife in Lucena, Tayabas, has been
forced to respond to no less the five information for various crimes and misdemeanors, has appeared
with her witnesses and counsel at hearings no less than on eight different occasions only to see the
cause postponed, has twice been required to come to the Supreme Court for protection, and now, after
the passage of more than one year from the time when the first information was filed, seems as far away
from a definite resolution of her troubles as she was when originally charged.
Philippine organic and statutory law expressly guarantee that in all criminal prosecutions the accused
shall enjoy the right to have a speedy trial. Aurelia Conde, like all other accused persons, has a right to a
speedy trial in order that if innocent she may go free, and she has been deprived of that right in defiance
of law. Dismissed from her humble position, and compelled to dance attendance on courts while
investigations and trials are arbitrarily postponed without her consent, is palpably and openly unjust to
her and a detriment to the public. By the use of upon the appropriate information, could have attended
to the formal preliminary examination, and could have prepared the case for a trial free from vexatious,
capricious, and oppressive delays.
Once before, as intimated, the petitioner had to come to us for redress of her grievances. We thought
then we had pointed out the way for the parties. We hope propose to do all in our power to assist this
poor woman to obtain justice. On the one hand has been the petitioner, of humble station, without
resources, but fortunately assisted by a persistent lawyer, while on the other hand has been the
Government of the Philippine Islands which should be the last to set an example of delay and oppression
in the administration of justice. The Court is thus under a moral and legal obligation to see that these
proceedings come to an end and that the accused is discharged from the custody of the law.
We lay down the legal proposition that, where a prosecuting officer, without good cause, secures
postponements of the trial of a defendant against his protest beyond a reasonable period of time, as in
this instance for more than a year, the accused is entitled to relief by a proceeding in mandamus to
compel a dismissal of the information, or if he be restrained of his liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain his
freedom. (16 C.J., 439 et seq.; In the matter of Ford [1911], 160 Cal., 334; U.S. vs. Fox [1880], 3 Montana,
512. See further our previous decision in Conde vs. Judge of First Instance, Fourteenth Judicial District,
and the Provincial Fiscal of Tayabas, No. 21236.
Q. What is the test in determining whether there is a violation of the right to speedy trial?
A. The test for a violation of the right to speedy trial has always been made to begin from the time of the
filing of the information (People v. Orsal, 113 SCRA 262). In Martin v. Ver, 123 SCRA 745, it was said that
the conduct of the parties, the length of delay, the reason for delay, the defendant’s assertion or non-
assertion of the right are some of the tests in determining whether there has been a violation. (See also
Hon. Adelina Calderon-Bargas, et al. v. Hon. Padolina, 45 SCAD 165, G.R. Nos. 103259-61, Oct. 1, 1993)
Q. A speedy trial means a trial conducted according to the law of criminal procedure and the rules and
regulations, free from vexations, capricious and oppressive delays. In Conde v. Rivera and Unson, 45 Phil.
650, 652 (1924), the Court held that “where a prosecuting officer, without good cause, secures
postponements of the trial of a defendant against his protest beyond a reasonable period of time, as in
this instance, for more than a year, the accused is entitled to relief by a proceeding in mandamus to
compel a dismissal of the information, or if he be restrained of his liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain his
freedom.” The concept of speedy trial is necessarily relative. A determination as to whether the right has
been violated involves the weighing of several factors such as the length of delay, the reason for the
delay, the conduct of the prosecution and the accused, and the efforst exerted by the defendant to assert
his rights, as well as the prejudice and damage caused to the accused. When is the right of the accused to
speedy trial violated?
A. In determining the right of an accused to speedy trial, courts should do more than a mathematical
computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case. The right to a
speedy trial is deemed violated only when:
1) the proceedings are attended by vexatious, caprcious, and oppressive delays; or
2) when unjustified postponements are asked for and secured; or
3) when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse
without the party having his case tried.
a) Speedy trial: a trial free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays. But justice and
fairness, not speed, are the objectives. See Acevedo v. Sarmiento, 36 SCRA 247; Martin v. Ver,
123 SCRA 745. Accused is entitled to dismissal, equivalent to acquittal, if trial is unreasonably
delayed.
i) The right to speedy trial is relative, subject to reasonable delays and
postponements arising from illness, medical attention, body operations, etc.
Speedy trial means one that can be had as soon after indictment is filed as the
prosecution can, with reasonable diligence, prepare for trial. While accused
persons do have rights, many of them choose to forget that the aggrieved also
have the same rights [People v. Ginez, 197 SCRA 481]. In determining the right of
the accused to speedy trial, courts should do more than a mathematical
computation of the number of postponements of scheduled hearings, of the case.
What offends the right are unjustified postponements which prolong trial for an
unreasonable length of time. In this case, the hearing was only postponed twice
and for a period of less than two months; thus, there was no violation of the
constitutional right to speedy trial [People v. Tampal, 244 SCRA 202]. The right to
speedy trial is violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious,
capricious and oppressive delays, or when unjustified postponements of the trial
are asked for and secured, or when without cause or justifiable motive, a long
period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried [De la
Rosa v. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 499; Tai Lim v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
131483, October 26, 1999].
ia) The different interests of the defendant which the right to speedy
trial are designed to protect are:
1) to prevent oppressive pre-trial incarceration;
2) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and
3) to limit the possibility that the defense will be
impaired.
But the right to speedy trial cannot be invoked where to sustain the
same would result in a clear denial of due process to the prosecution. In
essence, the right to a speedy trial does not preclude the people’s
equally important right to public justice [Uy v. Hon. Adriano, G.R. No.
159098, October 27, 2006]
ii) A separate trial is consonant with the right of the accused to a speedy trial. In
this case, it has been eight years since the information was filed, and the case has
yet to be tried. The long delay has clearly prejudiced the petitioner who is more
than 73 years old. The inconvenience and expense on the part of the government
resulting from separate trial cannot be given preference over the right to a speedy
trial [Dacanay v. People, 240 SCRA 490]
iii) See Republic Act No. 8493 [The Speedy Trial Act], which provides, among
others, that the arraignment of an accused shall be held within 30 days from filing
of the information, or from the date the accused has appeared before the justice,
judge or court in which the charge is pending, whichever date last occurs.
Thereafter, where a plea of not guilty is entered, the accused shall have at least 15
days to prepare for trial. Trial shall commence within 30 days from arraignment as
fixed by the court. In no case shall the entire trial period exceed 180 days from the
first day of trial, except as otherwise authorized by the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court.
iiia) R. A. 8493 is a means of enforcing the right of the accused to a
speedy trial. The spirit of the law is that the accused must go on record
 in the attitude of demanding a trial or resisting delay. If he does not do
this, he must be held, in law, to have waived the privilege [Uy v. Hon.
Adriano, G.R. No. 159098, October 27, 2006].
iv) The right to a speedy trial, as well as other rights conferred by the Constitution
or statute, may be waived except when otherwise expressly provided by law.
One’s right to speedy disposition of his case must, therefore, be asserted. Due to
the failure of the petitioner to assert this right, he is considered to have waived it.
[Barcelona v. Lim, G.R. No. 189171, June 3, 2014].
PEOPLE VS. TEE [G.R. NOS. 140546-47, JANUARY 20, 2003]
RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL. A speedy trial means a trial conducted according to the law of criminal
procedure and the rules and regulations, free from vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays. In
Conde v. Rivera and Unson, 45 Phil. 650, 652 (1924), the Court held that "where a prosecuting officer,
without good cause, secures postponements of the trial of a defendant against his protest beyond a
reasonable period of time, as in this instance, for more than a year, the accused is entitled to relief by a
proceeding in mandamus to compel a dismissal of the information, or if he be restrained of his liberty, by
habeas corpus to obtain his freedom."
The concept of speedy trial is necessarily relative. A determination as to whether the right has been
violated involves the weighing of several factors such as the length of the delay, the reason for the delay,
the conduct of the prosecution and the accused, and the efforts exerted by the defendant to assert his
right, as well as the prejudice and damage caused to the accused.
The Speedy Trial Act of 1998, provides that the trial period for criminal cases in general shall be one
hundred eighty (180) days. However, in determining the right of an accused to speedy trial, courts should
do more than a mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings
of the case. The right to a speedy trial is deemed violated only when:
1) the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or
2) when unjustified postponements are asked for and secured; or
3) when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse
without the party having his case tried.
Even if the arrest of a person is illegal, supervening events may bar his release or discharge from custody.
What is to be inquired into is the legality of his detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the
application for a writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by
reason of same supervening events such as the instances mentioned in Section 4, Rule 102, be no longer
illegal at the time of the filing of the application. Any such supervening events are the issuance of a
judicial process preventing the discharge of the detained person.
As a general rule, the burden of proving illegal restraint by the respondents rests on the petitioner who
attaches such restraints. Whether the return sets forth process where on its face shows good ground for
the detention of the petitioner, it is incumbent on him to allege and prove new matter that tends to
invalidate the apparent effects of such process.
Moreover, the petitioner, in his motion for reconsideration with the CID, offered to post a bail bond for
his provisional release to enable him to secure the necessary documents to establish the appropriate
grounds for his permanent stay in the Philippines. By offering to post a bail bond, the petitioner thereby
admitted that he was under the custody of the CID and voluntarily accepted the jurisdiction of the CID.
FLORES VS. PEOPLE [G.R. NO. L-25769, DECEMBER 10, 1974]
WHEN PROCEEDINGS ANTERIOR TO THE TRIAL IS DELAYED, THE TRIAL IS LIKEWISE DELAYED. The
constitutional right to a speedy trial, as was noted in a recent decision, Acebedo v. Sarmiento, "means
one free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, . . ." Thus, if the person accused were
innocent, he may within the shortest time possible be spared from anxiety and apprehension arising
from a prosecution, and if culpable, he will not be kept long in suspense as to the fate in store for him,
within a period of course compatible with his opportunity to present any valid defense. As was also
pointed out in Sarmiento:
"The remedy in the event of a non-observance of this right is by habeas corpus if
the accused were restrained of his liberty, or by certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus for the
final dismissal of the case."
The above ruling is a reiteration of the doctrine announced, even before the 1935 Constitution, in Conde
v. Rivera, a 1924 decision. In that case, Justice Malcolm announced categorically that the trial, to comply
with the requirement of the then organic law, the Philippine Autonomy Act, must be "free from
vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays." Further: "We lay down the legal proposition that, where a
prosecuting officer, without good cause, secures postponements of the trial of a defendant against his
protest beyond a reasonable period of time, as in this instance for more than a year, the accused is
entitled to relief by a proceeding in mandamus to compel a dismissal of the information, or if he be
restrained of his liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain his freedom."
In the first Supreme Court decision after the 1935 Constitution took effect, People v. Castañeda, where it
was shown that the criminal case had been dragging on for almost five years and that when the trial did
finally take place, it was tainted by irregularities, this Court set aside the appealed decision of conviction
and acquitted the accused. As was pointed out by the ponente, Justice Laurel:
"The Government should be the last to set an example of delay and oppression in
the administration of justice and it is the moral and legal obligation of this court to see that
the criminal proceedings against the accused come to an end and that they be immediately
discharged from the custody of the law."
It was on the basis of the above judgment that the dismissal of a second information for frustrated
homicide was ordered by this Court, where the evidence disclosed that the first information had been
dismissed after a lapse of one year and seven months from the time the original complaint was filed
during which time on the three occasions the case was set for trial, the private prosecutor twice asked
for postponements and once the trial court itself cancelled the entire calendar for the month it was
supposed to have been heard. The same result followed in Esguerra v. De la Costa, where the first
complaint was filed on August 29, 1936, the accused having been criminally prosecuted for an alleged
abuse of chastity in a justice of the peace court but after over a year and three months, with the lower
court twice dismissing the case, he still had to face trial for the same offense on a new information, thus
compelling him to resort to a mandamus suit to compel the lower court to terminate the case was his
right to a speedy trial was violated, a remedy deemed appropriate by this Court.
There was another occasion where Justice Laurel spoke for this Court on this specific issue. That was in
Mercado v. Santos. Here, for a period of about twenty months, the accused was arrested four times on
the charge of falsifying his deceased wife's will. Twice, the complaints were subsequently withdrawn.
The third time he was prosecuted on the same charge, he was able to obtain a dismissal. Then came on
the part of the provincial fiscal, a motion for reinvestigation. The lower court was in a receptive mood. It
ordered that the case be heard on the merits. The accused moved to dismiss, but he did not succeed. He
tried the Court of Appeals, but he failed again. He elevated the matter to this Court; he prevailed. It was
stressed in Justice Laurel's opinion:
"An accused person is entitled to a trial at the earliest opportunity. . . . He cannot
be oppressed by delaying the commencement of trial for an unreasonable length of time. If
the proceedings pending trial are deferred, the trial itself is necessarily delayed."
The opinion likewise considered as not decisive the fact that the provincial fiscal did not intervene until
an information was filed charging the accused with the crime of falsification the third time. Thus: "The
Constitution does not say that the right to a speedy trial may be availed of only where the prosecution
for crime is commenced and undertaken by the fiscal. It does not exclude from its operation cases
commenced by private individuals. Where once a person is prosecuted criminally, he is entitled to a
speedy trial, irrespective of the nature of the offense or the manner in which it is authorized to be
commenced." The latest decision in point, Acebedo v. Sarmiento, presented an even clearer case. The
information for damage to property was filed on August 3, 1959. There the matter rested until May 19,
1965, when the accused moved to dismiss. The lower court denied the motion in his order of July 10,
1965. Two more years elapsed, the period now covering almost eight years, when the trial was
commenced. When one of the witnesses for the prosecution failed to appear, the provincial fiscal sought
the postponement, but the accused countered with a motion for dismissal. The lower court acceded, and
this Court sustained him, even if thereafter it changed its mind and reinstated the case.
Petitioners can thus invoke the constitutional guarantee that the trial should be speedy. In the absence
of any valid decision, the stage of trial has not been completed. In this case then, as of May 10, 1965,
when they moved to dismiss in the Court of Appeals, petitioners could validly contend that they had not
been accorded their right to be tried as promptly as circumstances permit. It was not the pendency in
the Court of Appeals of their cases that should be deemed material. It is at times unavoidable that
appellate tribunals cannot, even with due diligence, put an end to suits elevated to them. What is
decisive is that with the setting aside of the previous decision in the resolution of August 5, 1959,
petitioners could validly premise their plea for dismissal on this constitutional safeguard. That is the sole
basis for the conclusion reached by us — considering the controlling doctrinenannounced with such
emphasis by this Court time and time again.
Q. What is the remedy for violation of the right to speedy trial?
A. The accused is entitled to dismissal of the case, and, if he is under detention, to release by habeas
corpus. Moreover, dismissal for violation of the right to speedy trial is equivalent to acquittal and is a bar
to another prosecution for the same offense.
Q. May the right to speedy trial be invoked even if it would result in deprivation of the State’s right to due
process? Explain.
A. No. The right to speedy trial cannot be invoked where to sustain the same would result in a clear
denial of due process to the prosecution. It should not operate in depriving the State of its inherent
prerogative to prosecute criminal cases or generally in seeing to it that all those who approach the bar of
justice is afforded fair opportunity to present their side. For it is not only the State; more so, the
offended party who is entitled to due process in criminal cases. In essence, the right to a speedy trial
does not preclude the people’s equally important right to public justice. (Uy v. Hon. Arsenio P. Adriano,
et al., G.R. No. 159098, October 27, 2006).
Q. State the effect if a party to a case fails to timely question the delay in the trial of the case. Explain.
A. One’s failure to timely question the delay in the trial to a case would be an implied acceptance of such
delay and a waiver of the right to question the same. Except when otherwise expressly so provided, the
speedy trial right, like any other right conferred by the Constitution or statute, may be waived when not
positively asserted. A party’s silence may amount to laches. The right to a speedy trial is a privilege of the
accused. If he does not claim it, he should not complain. R.A. No. 8493 (Speedy Trial Act of 1998) is a
means of enforcing Section 14(2), Art. III of the Constitution. The spirit of the law is that the accused
must go on record in the attitude of demanding a trial or resisiting delay. If he does not do this, he must
be held, in law, to have waived the privilege. (Uy v. Hon. Arsenio P. Adriano, et al., G.R. No. 159098,
October 27, 2006).
Q. What are the different interests of a defendant that may be affected by the violation of his right to
speedy trial? Explain.
A. The different interests of a defendant which may be affected by the violation of the right to a speedy
trial were identified. It was held that prejudice should be assessed in the light of the interests of a
defendant which the speedy trial right was designed to protect, namely:
1) to prevent oppressive pre-trial incarceration;
2) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and
3) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired.
Of these, the most serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant to adequately prepare his case
skews the fairness of the entire system. If witnesses die or disappear during delay, the prejudice is
obvious. There is also prejudice if defense witnesses are unable to recall accurately events of the distant
past. Loss of memory, however, is not always reflected in the record because what has been forgotten
can rarely be shown. Even if an accused is not incarcerated prior to trial, he is still disadvantaged by
restraints on his liberty and by living under a cloud of anxiety, suspicion, and often hostility. After all,
arrest is a public act that may seriously interfere with the defendant’s liberty, whether he is free on bail
or not, and that may disrupt his employment, drain his financial resources, curtail his associations,
subject him to public obloquy, and create anxiety in him, his family and friends. (Uy v. Hon. Arsenio P.
Adriano, et al., G.R. No. 159098, October 27, 2006).
b) Impartial trial. The accused is entitled to the “cold neutrality of an impartial judge”. In
People v. Opida, 142 SCRA 295, the judgment of conviction was reversed upon showing that
the trial judge was biased because of the appearance and criminal record of the accused. In
Imelda Romualdez Marcos v. Sandiganbayan, supra., reiterating Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan,
supra., the cross examination of the accused and the witnesses by the court constituted bias
and partiality. But the impartiality of the judge cannot be assailed on the ground that he
propounded clarificatory questions to the accused [People v. Castillo, G.R. No. 120282, April
20, 1998], Indeed, trial judges must be accorded a reasonable leeway in asking questions as
may be essential to elicit relevant facts and to bring out the truth. This is not only the right
but the duty of the judge who feels the need to elicit information to the end that justice will
be served [People v. Vaynaco, G.R. No. 126286, March 22, 1999].
i) In Go v. Court of Appeals, 221 SCRA 397, the Supreme Court said that the “cold
neutrality of an impartial judge”, although required for the benefit of litigants, is
also designed to preserve the integrity of the judiciary and more fundamentally, to
gain and maintain the people’s faith in the institutions they
have erected when they adopted our Constitution.
ii) In People v. Sanchez, G.R. Nos. 121039-45, January 25, 1999, the Supreme
Court, citing People v. Teehankee, Jr., 249 SCRA 54, rejected the appellant’s
contention that he was denied the right to an impartial trial due to prejudicial
publicity. Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of the accused to
a fair trial.
Q. Give an example of a judge who lacks impartiality.
A. The application of the right to criminal prosecution was recently emphasized in Mateo, Jr. v. Villaluz,
50 SCRA 18 (1972). One of the accused in the case had made an extrajudicial statement, which he
subsequently subscribed before the judge, implicating his co-accused. Later, however, the same accused
repudiated his statement claiming that he had made it as a result of a threat by a government agent. The
co-accused then sought the disqualification of the judge claiming that the repudiation of the statement
would not sit well with the judge before whom it had been subscribed. The Court, noting “the imperative
character of the safeguard of due process connoting at the very least, an impartial tribunal,” disqualified
the judge.
MATEO, JR. VS. VILLALUZ [G.R. NOS. L-34756-59, MARCH 31, 1973]
IMPARTIAL JUDGE. It is now beyond dispute that due process cannot be satisfied in the absence of that
degree of objectivity on the part of a judge sufficient to reassure litigants of his being fair and being just.
Thereby there is the legitimate expectation that the decision arrived at would be the application of the
law to the facts as found by a judge who does not play favorites. For him, the parties stand on equal
footing. In the language of Justice Dizon:
"It has been said, in fact, that due process of law requires a hearing before an
impartial and disinterested tribunal, and that every litigant is entitled to nothing less than the
cold neutrality of an impartial judge."
He should, to quote from another decision "at all times manifest depth commitment and concern to the
cause of justice according to legal norms, a cerebral man who deliberately holds in check the tug and pull
of purely personal preferences and prejudices which he shares with the rest of his fellow mortals." A
judge then, to quote from the latest decision in point, Geotina v. Gonzales, penned by Justice Castro,
should strive to be at all times "wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent. Elementary due
process requires a hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal. A judge has both the duty of
rendering a just decision and the duty of doing it in a manner completely free from suspicion as to its
fairness and as to his integrity." Nor is this to imply that prior to Gutierrez, there had been no awareness
of the due process aspect of an impartial tribunal even if not explicitly referred to. As noted by Justice
Street as far back as 1926 in Government v. Abella, a 1926 decision, if the Supreme Court "were of the
opinion that the litigant had not had a fair trial, a new trial could be granted." There was a reiteration of
such a view in a case decided in 1933, Dais v. Torres, with Justice Vickers as ponente, in these words:
"Although a judge may not have been disqualified [according to the Code of Civil
Procedure], nevertheless if it appears to this court that the appellant was not given a fair and
impartial trial because of the trial judge's bias or prejudice, this court will order a new trial, if
it deems it necessary, in the interest of justice."
Conformably to what was so emphatically asserted in Gutierrez as the fundamental requisite of
impartiality for due process to be satisfied, the Rules of Court provision on disqualification when revised
three years later in 1964 contains this additional paragraph:
"A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting
in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above."
Thereby, it is made clear to the occupants of the bench that outside of pecuniary interest, relationship or
previous participation in the matter that calls for adjudication, there may be other causes that could
conceivably erode the trait of objectivity, thus calling for inhibition. That is to betray a sense of realism,
for the factors that lead to preferences or predilections are many and varied. It is well, therefore, that if
any such should make its appearance and prove difficult to resist, the better course for a judge is to
disqualify himself. That way, he avoids being misunderstood. His reputation for probity and objectivity is
preserved. What is even more important, the ideal of an impartial administration of justice is lived up to.
Thus is due process vindicated. There is relevance to what was said by Justice Sanchez in Pimentel v.
Salanga, drawing "attention of all judges to appropriate guidelines in a situation where their capacity to
try and decide a case fairly and judiciously comes to the fore by way of challenge from any one of the
parties. A judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation. But when suggestion is made of
record that he might be induced to act in favor of one party or with bias or prejudice against a litigant
arising out of circumstance reasonably capable of inciting such a state of mind, he should conduct a
careful self-examination. He should exercise his discretion in a way that the people’s faith in the courts
of justice is not impaired. A salutary norm is that he reflects the probability that a losing party might
nurture at the back of his mind the thought that the judge had unmeritoriously tilted the scales of justice
against him. That passion on the part judge may be generated because of serious charges misconduct
against him by a suitor or his counsel, is not altogether remote. He is a man, subject to the frailties of
other men. He should, therefore, exercise great care and caution before making up his mind to act or
withdraw from a suit where that party or counsel is involved. He could in good grace inhibit himself
where that case could be heard by another judge and where no appreciable prejudice would be
occasioned to others involved therein. On the result of his decisions to sit or not to sit may depend to a
great extent the all-important confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary. If after reflection he should
resolve to voluntarily desist from sitting a case where his motives or fairness might be seriously
impugned, his action is to be interpreted as giving meaning and substance to the second paragraph of
Section 1, Rule 137. He serves the cause of the law who forestalls miscarriage of justice."
Q. When is a trial “public?”
A. It is public when attendance is open to all irrespective of relationship to defendants. However, when
the evidence to be presented may be characterized as “offensive to decency or public morals,” the
proceeding may be limited to friends, relatives and counsel. Garcia v. Domingo, L-30104, July 25, 1973.
Q. What is the meaning of public trial?
A. It is one held openly or publicly. It is sufficient that relatives and friends, who want to watch the
proceedings are given the opportunity to witness the same.
Q. What is the purpose of the guarantee of a public trial?
A. The purpose of this guarantee is to serve “as a safeguard against any attempt to employ our courts as
instruments of persecution. The knowledge that every criminal trial is subject to contemporaneous
review in the form of public opinion is an effective restraint on possible abuse of judicial power.” Garcia
v. Domingo, supra.
GARCIA VS. DOMINGO [G.R. NO. L-30104, JULY 25, 1973]
PUBLIC TRIAL. The 1935 Constitution which was in force at the time of the antecedents of this petition,
as set forth at the outset, explicitly enumerated the right to a public trial to which an accused was
entitled. So it is, as likewise made clear, under the present dispensation. As a matter of fact, that was
one constitutional provision that needed only a single, terse summation from the Chairman of the
Committee on the Bill of Rights, Delegate, later Justice, Jose P. Laurel, to gain acceptance. As was
stressed by him:
"Trial should also be public in order to offset any danger of conducting it in an
illegal and unjust manner."
It would have been surprising if its proposed inclusion in the Bill of Rights had provoked any discussion,
much less a debate. It was merely a reiteration of what appeared in the Philippine Autonomy Act of
1916, popularly known as the Jones Law. Earlier, such a right found expression in the Philippine Bill of
1902, likewise an organic act of the then government of this country as an unincorporated territory of
the United States. Historically, as was pointed out by Justice Black, speaking for the United States
Supreme Court in the leading case of In re Oliver:
"This nation's accepted practice of guaranteeing a public trial to an accused has its
roots in [the] English common law heritage."
He then observed that the exact date of its origin is obscure, "but it likely evolved long before the
settlement of [the United States] as an accompaniment of the ancient institution of jury trial." It was
then noted by him that there, "the guarantee to an accused of the right to a public trial first appeared in
a state constitution in 1776." Later it was embodied in the Sixth Amendment of the Federal Constitution
ratified in 1791. He could conclude his historical survey thus:
"Today almost without exception every state by constitution, statute, or judicial
decision, requires that all criminal trials be open to the public."
Such is the venerable, historical lineage of the right to a public trial.
The crucial question of the meaning to be attached this provision remains. The Constitution guarantees
an accused the right to a public trial. What does it signify? Offhand it does seem fairly obvious that here
is an instance where language is to be given a literal application. There is no ambiguity in the words
employed. The trial must be public. It possesses that character when anyone interested in observing the
manner a judge conducts the proceedings in his courtroom may do so. There is to be no ban on such
attendance. His being a stranger to the litigants is of no moment. No relationship to the parties need be
shown. The thought that lies behind this safeguard is the belief that thereby the accused is afforded
further protection, that his trial is likely to be conducted with regularity and not tainted with any
impropriety. It is not amiss to recall that Delegate Laurel in his terse summation of the importance of this
right singled out its being a deterrence to arbitrariness. It is thus understandable why such a right is
deemed embraced in procedural due process. Where a trial takes place, as is quite usual, in the
courtroom and a calendar of what cases are to be heard is posted, no problem arises. It is the usual
course of events that individuals desirous of being present are free to do so. There is the well recognized
exception though that warrants the exclusion of the public where the evidence may be characterized as
"offensive to decency or public morals."
What did occasion difficulty in this suit was that for the convenience of the parties, and of the city court
Judge, it was in the latter's air-conditioned chambers that the trial was held. Did that suffice to vitiate the
proceedings as violative of this right? The answer must be in the negative. There is no showing that the
public was thereby excluded. It is to be admitted that the size of the room allotted the Judge would
reduce the number of those who could be present. Such a fact though is not indicative of any
transgression of this right. Courtrooms are not of uniform dimensions. Some are smaller than others.
Moreover, as admitted by Justice Black in his masterly In re Oliver opinion, it suffices to satisfy the
requirement of a trial being public if the accused could "have his friends, relatives and counsel present,
no matter with what offense he may be charged."
c) Public trial. This is intended to prevent possible abuses which may be committed against
the accused. The rule is not absolute. See Garcia v. Domingo, 52 SCRA 143.
i) An accused has a right to a public trial, but it is a right that belongs to him more
than anyone else, where his life or liberty can be held critically in balance. A public
trial aims to ensure that he is fairly dealt with and would not be unjustly
condemned and that his rights are not compromised in secret conclaves of long
ago. A public trial is not synonymous with a publicized trial; it only implies that the
court doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit in the available seats,
conduct themselves with decorum and observe the trial process [Re: Request for
Live TV Coverage of the Trial of former President Joseph Estrada, A.M. No. 01-4-
03-SC, June 29, 2001]
IN RE: REQUEST FOR LIVE RADIO AND TV COVERAGE OF THE TRIAL IN THE SANDIGANBAYAN OF THE
PLUNDER CASES AGAINST FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH ESTRADA [A.M. NO. 00-1-4-03-SC, SEPTEMBER
13, 2001]
COURT PROCEEDINGS MAY BE FILMED FOR RECORD PURPOSES ONLY, AND NOT FOR PUBLIC
SHOWING. Thus, many important purposes for preserving the record of the trials can be served by
audio-visual recordings without impairing the right of the accused to a fair trial.
Nor is the right of privacy of the accused a bar to the production of such documentary. In Ayer
Productions Pty. Ltd. v. Capulong, this Court set aside a lower court's injunction restraining the filming of
"Four Day Revolution," a documentary film depicting, among other things, the role of then Minister of
National Defense Juan Ponce Enrile in the 1986 EDSA people power. This Court held: "A limited intrusion
into a person's privacy has long been regarded as permissible where that person is a public figure and
the information sought to be elicited from him or to be published about him constitute matters of a
public character."
No one can prevent the making of a movie based on the trial. But, at least, if a documentary record is
made of the proceedings, any movie that may later be produced can be checked for its accuracy against
such documentary and any attempt to distort the truth can thus be averted.
Indeed, a somewhat similar proposal for documentary recording of celebrated cases or causes célèbres
was made way back in 1971 by Paul Freund of the Harvard Law School. As he explained:
In fairness let me refer to an American experience many of my lay friends found
similarly moving. An educational television network filmed a trial in Denver of a Black Panther
leader on charges of resisting arrest, and broadcast the document in full, in four installments,
several months after the case was concluded — concluded incidentally, with a verdict of
acquittal.
No one could witness the trial without a feeling of profound respect for the painstaking way in which the
truth was searched for, for the ways whereby law copes with uncertainties and ambiguities through
presumptions and burden of proof, and the sense of gravity with which judge and jury carried out their
responsibilities.
I agree in general with the exclusion of television from the courtroom, for the familiar good reasons. And
yet the use of television at a trial for documentary purposes, not for the broadcast of live news, and with
the safeguards of completeness and consent, is an educational experiment that I would be prepared to
welcome. Properly safeguarded and with suitable commentary, the depiction of an actual trial is an
agency of enlightenment that could have few equals in its impact on the public understanding.
Understanding of our legal process, so rarely provided by our educational system, is now a desperate
need.
Professor Freund's observation is as valid today as when it was made thirty years ago. It is perceptive for
its recognition of the serious risks posed to the fair administration of justice by live TV and radio
broadcasts, especially when emotions are running high on the issues stirred by a case, while at the same
time acknowledging the necessity of keeping audio-visual recordings of the proceedings of celebrated
cases, for public information and exhibition, after passions have subsided.
WHEREFORE, an audio-visual recording of the trial of former President Estrada before the
Sandiganbayan is hereby ordered to be made, for the account of the Sandiganbayan, under the following
conditions:
a) the trial shall be recorded in its entirety, excepting such portions thereof as the
Sandiganbayan determine should not be held public under Rule 119, §21 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure;
b) cameras shall be installed inconspicuously inside the courtroom and the
movement of TV crews shall be regulated consistent with the dignity and
solemnity of the proceedings;
c) the audio-visual recordings shall be made for documentary purposes only and shall
be made without comment except such annotations of scenes depicted therein as
may be necessary to explain them;
d) the live broadcast of the recordings before the Sandiganbayan shall have rendered
its decision in all the cases against the former President shall be prohibited under
pain of contempt of court and other sanctions in case of violations of the
prohibition;
e) to ensure that the conditions are observed, the audio-visual recording of the
proceedings shall be made under the supervision and control of the
Sandiganbayan or its Division concerned and shall be made pursuant to rules
promulgated by it; and
f) simultaneously with the release of the audio-visual recordings for public
broadcast, the original thereof shall be deposited in the National Museum and the
 Records Management and Archives Office for preservation and exhibition in
accordance with law.
Q. If the trial of the accused is conducted inside the Bilibid Prisons without objections, is this a public trial?
Why?
A. Yes, for as long as the public has not been excluded. (Garcia v. Domingo, 52 SCRA 143; US v. Mercado,
4 Phil. 304; People v. Tampus, 96 SCRA 625).
Q. When is the exclusion of the public valid without violating the right to public trial?
A. The exclusion of the public from the trial is valid without violating the right to public trial when the
evidence to be produced is offensive to decency or public morals. (Rule 119, Sec. 13, Rules of Court).
Q. When does publicity prejudice due process?
A. The rule is that “to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity there must be allegation and proof that
the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity.”
“Petitioners cannot just rely on the subliminal effects of publicity... because these are basically
unbeknown and beyond knowing.” Webb v. De Leon, G.R. No. 121234, August 23, 1995. See also People
v. Teehankee, Jr., G.R. No. 111206-08, October 6, 1995.
RIGHT TO MEET WITNESSES FACE TO FACE (RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION)
Q. What is the concept of the right to confrontation?
A. It is the right of the accused to meet the witnesses against him face to face. It is the right of the
accused to cross –examine the witnesses.
Q. What are the purposes of the right to confrontation?
A. The purposes are:
1) to cross-examine the witness to test their credibility. (Anciro v. People, 46 SCAD 967,
G.R. No. 107819, Dec. 17, 1993); and
2) to enable the court to observe the demeanor of the witnesses. (US v. Javier, 37 Phil.
449).
UNITED STATES VS. JAVIER [G.R. NO. L-12990, JANUARY 21, 1918]
AFFIDAVIT OF A DECEASED PERSON WHO HAS NOT BEEN CROSS-EXAMINED IS INADMISSIBLE IN
EVIDENCE. The foregoing statement of the facts and the law disposes of all but one assignment of error,
namely, that the lower court erred in admitting Exhibit B of the prosecution as evidence. Exhibit B is the
sworn statement of sergeant Presca, now deceased, whose signature was identified, before the justice of
the peace of the municipality of Santo Tomas, Province of Batangas. Appellant's argument is predicated
on the provision of the Philippine Bill of Rights which says, "That in all criminal prosecutions the accused
shall enjoy the right . . . to meet the witnesses face to face," and the provision of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, section 15 (5), which say that "In all criminal prosecutions the defendant shall be entitled: . . .
to be confronted at the trial by and to crossexamine the witnesses against him." With reference to the
clause of the Bill of Rights, which we have quoted, Justice Day said in a case of Philippine origin (Dowdell
vs. U.S. [1911], 221 U.S. 325) that it "intends to secure the accused in the right to be tried, so far as facts
provable by witnesses are concerned, by only such witnesses as meet him face to face at the trial, who
give their testimony in his presence, and give to the accused an opportunity of cross-examination. It was
intended to prevent the conviction of the accused upon depositions or ex parte affidavits, and
particularly to preserve the right of the accused to test the recollection of the witness in the exercise of
the right of cross-examination." In other words, confrontation is essential because cross-examination is
essential. A second reason for the prohibition is that a tribunal may have before it the deportment and
appearance of the witness while testifying. (U.S. vs. Anastasio [1906], 6 Phil., 413.) The Supreme Court of
the Philippine Islands has applied this constitutional provision on behalf of accused persons in a number
of cases. (See for example U.S. vs. Tanjuanco [1902], 1 Phil., 374; U.S. vs. Bello [1908, 12 Phil. 87.) It is for
us now to determine whether the present facts entitle the accused to the protection of the Bill of Rights
or whether the facts fall under some exception thereto.
Q. What is the purpose of the right of confrontation?
A. The right has a two-fold purpose:
1) primarily, to afford the accused an opportunity to test the testimony of the witness by
cross-examination; and
2) secondarily to allow the judge to observe the deportation of the witness.
Right to cross-examine complainant and witnesses. The testimony of a witness who has not submitted
himself to crossexamination is not admissible in evidence. The affidavits of witnesses who are not
presented during the trial — and thus, are not subjected to cross-examination — are inadmissible
because they are hearsay [People v. Quidato, G.R. No. 117401, October 1, 1998; Cariago v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No.143561, June 6, 2001]. Thus, in People v. Monje, G.R. No. 146689, September 27, 2002,
the Supreme Court said that to administer by final judgment the dreaded lethal injection on the basis of
circumstantial evidence consisting mainly of the testimony of a witness who failed and refused to return
to court and submit to cross-examination four times is judicial tyranny of the highest order. But the right
to cross-examine witnesses may be waived.
a) In People v. Lacbanes, G.R. No. 88684, March 20, 1997, it was held that the failure to
present as witness the poseur-buyer in a prosecution for illegal sale of marijuana, is not fatal
to the prosecution’s case, because what is required is merely proof of the consummation of
the sale transaction, and in this case, the entire transaction was witnessed by Pfc. Rosales
who testified on the same. Distinguish this case from People v. Tapeda, 244 SCRA 339, where
the Supreme Court said that the failure of the prosecution to present as witness the poseur-
buyer in a buy-bust operation was fatal to the prosecution’s case, because without the
testimony of the latter there is no convincing evidence that the accused was a marijuana
peddler and not simply the victim of instigation.
Q. Is the right of confrontation absolute? Why?
A. No, because there is an express exception which is the admission of dying declaration. This is because
the dying declaration may be the only evidence of the prosecution. (People v. Gueron, 121 SCRA 115).
Q. What are the principal exceptions to the right of confrontation?
A. (1) the admissibility of “dying declarations;” and
(2) trial in absentia under Section 14(2).
Q. Is the right of confrontation available in preliminary investigation?
A. No. It is a right available during trial which begins only upon arraignment. Dequito v. Arellano, 81 Phil.
128 (1948).
NOTE: “From Section 5 of Rule 112 it is clear that unlike in the preliminary investigagtion
proper, an accused is not entitled as a matter of right to be present during the preliminary
examination nor to cross-examine the witnesses presented against him before his arrest, the
purpose of said examination being merely to determine whether or not there is sufficient
reason to issue a warrant of arrest. The provision commanding the determination of probable
cause prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest, requires no notice to an accused. A
preliminary examination is generally a proceeding ex parte in which the person charged has
no right to participate or to be present.” Marinas v. Siochi, 104 SCRA 423, 437 (L-25707 &
25753-4, May 14, 1981).
Q. Several accused were tried separately. May one be convicted on the basis of the testimony of another
who was not cross-examined? Why?
A. No, because that is violative of his right to cross-examine the witness against him. (Talino v.
Sandiganbayan, 148 SCRA 598).
TALINO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN [G.R. NOS. L-75511-14, MARCH 16, 1987]
IF SEVERAL CO-ACCUSED WERE TRIED SEPARATELY, TESTIMONIES MADE IN ONE CASE CANNOT BE
CONSIDERED IN THE OTHERS UNLESS THEY ARE ACCORDED THEIR RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION. It is
settled that if a separate trial is allowed to one of two or more defendants, his testimony therein
imputing guilt to any of the co-accused is not admissible against the latter who was not able to cross-
examine him. The issue in this case is whether or not such testimony was considered by the respondent
court against the petitioner, who claims that it was in fact the sole basis of his conviction.
The right of confrontation is one of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution to the person
facing criminal prosecution who should know, in fairness, who his accusers are and must be given a
chance to cross-examine them on their charges. No accusation is permitted to be made against his back
or in his absence nor is any derogatory information accepted if it is made anonymously, as in poison pen
letters sent by persons who cannot stand by their libels and must shroud their spite in secrecy. That is
also the reason why ex parte affidavits are not permitted unless the affiant is presented in court and
hearsay is barred save only in the cases allowed by the Rules of Court, like the dying declaration.
Q. Must an informant who led the police to the arrest of the accused be presented for cross examination?
A. No. There is no right of confrontation against informants who are not witnesses.
RIGHT TO COMPULSORY PROCESS TO SECURE THE ATTENDANCE OF WITNESSES AND THE
PRODUCTION OF EVIDENCE
Q. What is the basic purpose of the right of the accused to have compulsory process to secure the
attendance of the witnesses in his behalf?
A. The purpose is to assure a full and unimpeded opportunity for him to meet what in the end could be a
baseless suit or accusation. The due process clause simply requires, too, that before a person may be
deprived of his life, lipberty or property, he must be given the opportunity to be heard.
Q. What processes may be resorted to compel the attendance of a person in court?
A. The different processes that may be resorted to compel attendance of parties in court as well as
witnesses are: subpoena, subpoena duces tecum, warrant of arrest, contempt, perpetuation of
testimony and modes of discovery.
a) A subpoena is a process directed to a person requiring him to attend and to testify at the
hearing or trial of an action or at any investigation conducted under the laws of the
Philippines, or for the taking of his deposition [Caamic v. Galapon, 237 SCRA 390], In this
jurisdiction, there are two kinds of subpoena, to wit: subpoena ad tbstificandum and
subpoena duces tecum. The first is used to compel a person to testify, while the second is
used to compel the production of books, records, things or documents therein specified.
Well- settled is the rule that before a subpoena duces tecum may issue, the court must first
be satisfied that the following requisites are present:
1) the books, documents, or other things requested must appear prima facie
relevant to the issue subject of the controversy (test of relevancy); and
2) such books must be reasonably described by the parties to be readily
identified (test of definiteness) [Roco v. Contreras, G.R. No. 158275, June 28,
2005].
ROCO VS. CONTRERAS [G.R. NO. 158275, JUNE 28, 2005]
A subpoena is a process directed to a person requiring him to attend and to testify at the hearing or trial
of an action or at any investigation conducted under the laws of the Philippines, or for the taking of his
deposition.
In this jurisdiction, there are two (2) kinds of subpoena, to wit: subpoena ad testificandum and subpoena
duces tecum. The first is used to compel a person to testify, while the second is used to compel the
production of books, records, things or documents therein specified. As characterized in H.C. Liebenow
vs. The Philippine Vegetable Oil Company:
The subpoena duces tecum is, in all respects, like the ordinary subpoena ad testificandum with the
exception that it concludes with an injunction that the witness shall bring with him and produce at the
examination the books, documents, or things described in the subpoena.
Well-settled is the rule that before a subpoena duces tecum may issue, the court must first be satisfied
that the following requisites are present:
1) the books, documents or other things requested must appear prima facie relevant to the
issue subject of the controversy (test of relevancy); and
2) such books must be reasonably described by the parties to be readily identified (test of
definiteness).
Again, to quote from H.C. Liebenow:
“In determining whether the production of the documents described in a
subpoena duces tecum should be enforced by the court, it is proper to consider, first,
whether the subpoena calls for the production of specific documents, or rather for specific
proof, and secondly, whether that proof is prima facie sufficiently relevant to justify
enforcing its production. A general inquisitorial examination of all the books, papers, and
documents of an adversary, conducted with a view to ascertain whether something of value
may not show up, will not be enforced.” (Emphasis supplied)
“Further, in Universal Rubber Products, Inc. vs. CA, et al.,[9] we held: Well-settled
is Our jurisprudence that, in order to entitle a party to the issuance of a 'subpoena duces
tecum, it must appear, by clear and unequivocal proof, that the book or document sought to
be produced contains evidence relevant and material to the issue before the court, and that
the precise book, paper or document containing such evidence has been so designated or
described that it may be identified.” (Emphasis supplied)
b) In People v. Chua, G.R. No. 128280, April 4, 2001, the Court reiterated what, in US v.
Ramirez, it declared as the requisites for compelling the attendance of witnesses and the
production of evidence, as follows:
1) the evidence is really material;
2) accused is not guilty of neglect in previously obtaining the production of such
evidence;
3) the evidence will be available at the time desired; and
4) no similar evidence can be obtained.
NOTE: In Webb v. De Leon, G.R. No. 121234, August 23, 1995, the Court ruled that, since a
preliminary investigation can result in arrest and therefore in a deprivation of liberty, the
accused should not be denied access to evidence favourable to him, in this case an earlier
version of an affidavit made by a witness for the prosecution.
TRIAL IN ABSENTIA
Q. What are the purposes of trial in absentia?
A. The basic purpose of trial in absentia is to speed up the disposition of criminal cases considering that if
the accused would not always be present, that would derail the trial of the cases.
Q. What are the requisites of a valid trial in absentia?
A. (1) the accused has already been arraigned;
(2) he has been duly notified of the trial; and
(3) his failure to appear is unjustifiable.” Parada v. Veneracion, A.M. No. RTJ-96-1353, March
11, 1997, 269 SCRA 371, 376 (citing People v. Salas, 143 SCRA 163 [1986]).
Q. What is the scope of the right to be present at trial?
A. It covers only the period from arraignment to promulgation of sentence. US v. Beecham, 23 Phil. 259
(1972). However, this has been modified by Section 14(2) which says that “after arraignment, trial may
proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his
failure to appear is unjustifiable.”
Q. What are the conditions for waiver of the right to be present at the trial?
A. The right may be waived “provided that after arraignment he may be compelled to appear for the
purpose of identification by the witness of the prosecution, or provided he unqualifiedly admits in open
court after his arraignment that he is the person named as the defendant in the case on trial. Reason for
requiring the presence of the accused, despite his waiver, is, if allowed to be absent in all stages of the
proceeding without giving the People’s witnesses the opportunity to identify him in court, he may in his
defense say that he was never identified as the person charged in the information and, therefore, is
entitled to acquittal.” People v. Presiding Judge, G.R. No. L-64731, October 26, 1983; Aquino , Jr. v.
Military Commission No. 2, L-37364. April 24, 1975.
Q. What are the effects of the waiver of the right to appear by the accused?
A. The effects are:
(1) there is a waiver of the right to present evidence;
(2) the prosecution can present evidence if accused fails to appear; and
(3) the court can decide without the accused’s evidence.
Q. Is trial in absentia violative of the accused’s right to due process? Why?
A. No, because it does not mean that the judgment will result in conviction. It is not also violative of the
right to be presumed innocent because the judgment may not necessarily result in conviction. The
judgment will still be based on the evidence presented as the prosecution is still bound to prove the guilt
of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. There is no violation of the right to due process because he
was given the opportunity to be heard. (Jimenez v. Nazareno, L-37933, April 15, 1988).
Q. Does the provision on trial in absentia preclude forfeiture of bail bond under the Rules of Court for one
who jumps bail?
A. No, the new provision “does not lend itself to a latitudinarian construction.” People v. Judge Prieto,
Jr., L-46542, July 21, 1978. (Prieto’s argument was that the time to forfeit bail should be after conviction,
not upon jumping bail.)
The purpose of this rule is to speed up the disposition of criminal cases, trial of which could, in the past,
be indefinitely deferred, and many times completely abandoned, because of the defendant’s escape
[People v. Agbulos, 222 SCRA 196]. Sec. 6, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
authorizes the promulgation of judgment in absentia in view of the failure of the accused to appear
despite notice. This is intended to obviate the situation where the judicial process could be subverted by
the accused jumping bail to frustrate the promulgation of judgment [People v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
140285, September 27, 2006]. Trial in absentia is mandatory upon the court whenever the accused has
been arraigned, notified of date/s of hearing, and his absence is unjustified. See Gimenez v. Nazareno,
160 SCRA 1; People v. Judge Salas, 143 SCRA 163; Aquino v. Military Commission No. 2, 63 SCRA 546.
a) Waiver of appearance or trial in absentia does not mean that the prosecution is thereby
deprived of the right to require the presence of the accused for purposes of identification by
its witnesses which is vital for the conviction of the accused [People v. Macaraeg, 141 SCRA
37]. Even after the accused has waived further appearance during the trial, he can be ordered
arrested by the court for non-appearance upon summons to appear for purposes of
identification [Carredo v. People, 183 SCRA 273].
b) Thus, the presence of the accused is mandatory:
1) during arraignment and plea;
2) during trial, for identification; and
3) during promulgation of sentence, unless for a light offense wherein the
accused may appear by counsel or a representative.
c) An accused who escapes from confinement, or jumps bail, or flees to a foreign country,
loses his standing in court, and unless he surrenders or submits himself to the jurisdiction of
the court, he is deemed to have waived his right to seek relief from the court, including the
right to appeal his conviction [People v. Mapalao, 197 SCRA 79], One who jumps bail can
never offer a justifiable reason for his non-appearance during the trial. Accordingly, after the
trial in absentia, the court can render judgment in the case and promulgation can be made by
simply recording the judgment in the criminal docket with a copy thereof served upon his
counsel, provided that the notice requiring him to be present at the promulgation of
judgment is served through his bondsmen or warden and counsel [People v. Acabal, G.R: No.
103604-05, September 23, 1993].
PEOPLE VS. MAPALAO [G.R. NO. 92415, MAY 14, 1991]
AN ACCUSED WHO IS TRIED IN ABSENTIA WAIVES HIS RIGHT TO PRESENT EVIDENCE AS WELL AS HIS
RIGHTS TO BAIL AND APPEAL. By the same token, an accused who, after the filing of an information, is
at large and has not been apprehended or otherwise has not submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the
court, cannot apply for bail or be granted any other relief by the courts until he submits himself to its
jurisdiction or is arrested.
In Gimenez vs. Nazareno, this Court had occasion to rule on a similar case in this wise — "First of all, it is
not disputed that the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused-private
respondent when he appeared during the arraignment on August 22, 1973 and pleaded not guilty to the
crime charged. In criminal cases, jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired either by his
arrest or voluntary appearance in court. Such voluntary appearance is accomplished by appearing for
arraignment as what accused-private respondent did in this case.
But the question is this — was that jurisdiction lost when the accused escaped from the custody of the
law and failed to appear during the trial? We answer this question in the negative. As We have
consistently ruled in several earlier cases, jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the instance of
parties but continues until the case is terminated.
To capsulize the foregoing discussion, suffice it to say that where the accused appears at the
arraignment and pleads not guilty to the crime charged, jurisdiction is acquired by the court over his
person and this continues until the termination of the case, notwithstanding his escape from the custody
of the law.
Going to the second part of Section 19, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution aforecited a 'trial in absentia'
may be had when the following requisites are present:
(1) that there has been an arraignment;
(2) that the accused has been notified; and
(3) that he fails to appear and his failure to do so is unjustified.
In this case, all the above conditions were attendant calling for a trial in absentia. As the facts show, the
private respondent was arraigned on August 22, 1973 and in the said arraignment he pleaded not guilty.
He was also informed of the scheduled hearings set on September 18 and 19, 1973 and this is evidenced
by his signature on the notice issued by the lower court. It was also proved by a certified copy of the
Police Blotter that private respondent escaped from his detention center. No explanation for his failure
to appear in court in any of the scheduled hearings was given. Even the trial court considered his
absence unjustified.
The lower court in accordance with the aforestated provisions of the 1973 Constitution, correctly
proceeded with the reception of the evidence of the prosecution and the other accused in the absence
of private respondent, but it erred when it suspended the proceedings as to the private respondent and
rendered a decision as to the other accused only.
the accused cannot invoke its jurisdiction to seek relief. Sec. 6, Rule 120 does not take away
substantive rights; it merely provides the manner through which an existing right may be
implemented. Like an appeal, a motion for reconsideration is a statutory grant or privilege. As
a statutory right, the filing of a motion for reconsideration is to be exercised in the manner
provided by law; the party filing such a motion must strictly comply with the requisites laid
down by the Rules. [Reynaldo Jaylo v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 183152, January 21, 2015]
PEOPLE VS. VALERIANO [G.R. NOS. 103604-05, SEPTEMBER 23, 1993]

Upon the termination of a trial in absentia, the court has the duty to rule upon the evidence presented in
court. The court need not wait for the time until the accused who escaped from custody finally decides
to appear in court to present his evidence and cross-examine the witnesses against him. To allow the
delay of proceedings for this purpose is to render ineffective the constitutional provision on trial in
absentia. As it has been aptly explained:
'. . . The Constitutional Convention felt the need for such a provision as there were
quite a number of reported instances where the proceedings against a defendant had to be
stayed indefinitely because of his non-appearance. What the Constitution guarantees him is a
fair trial, not continued enjoyment of his freedom even if his guilt could be proved. With the
categorical statement in the fundamental law that his absence cannot justify a delay provided
that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified, such an abuse could be
remedied. That is the way it should be, for both society and the offended party have a
legitimate interest in seeing to it that crime should not go unpunished.'
A JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION MAY BE PROMULGATED AFTER THE ACCUSED HAS BEEN TRIED IN
ABSENTIA. The trial court further erred in holding that no penalty could be imposed on accused Engracio
Valeriano in Criminal Case No. 4584 because he "is nowhere to be found, hence, not brought to the bar
of justice, he being a fugitive or at large." The court ignored the fact that Engracio jumped bail after he
had been arraigned, just before the retaking of evidence commenced. Paragraph (2), Section 14, Article
III of the Constitution permits trial in absentia after the accused has been arraigned provided he has
been duly notified of the trial and his failure to appear thereat is unjustified. One who jumps bail can
never offer a justifiable reason for his non-appearance during the trial. Accordingly, after the trial in
absentia, the court can render judgment in the case and promulgation may be made by simply recording
the judgment in the criminal docket with a copy thereof served upon his counsel, provided that the
notice requiring him to be present at the promulgation is served through his bondsmen or warden and
counsel.

The contention of the respondent judge that the right of the accused to be presumed innocent will be
violated if a judgment is rendered as to him is untenable. He is still presumed innocent. A judgment of
conviction must still be based upon the evidence presented in court. Such evidence must prove him
guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Also, there can be no violation of due process since the accused was
given the opportunity to be heard.

Nor can it be said that an escapee who has been tried in absentia retains his rights to cross-examine and
to present evidence on his behalf. By his failure to appear during the trial of which he had notice, he
virtually waived these rights. This Court has consistently held that the right of the accused to
confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses is a personal right and may be waived. In the same
vein, his right to present evidence on his behalf, a right given to him for his own benefit and protection,
may be waived by him.

Finally, at this point, We note that Our pronouncement in this case is buttressed by the provisions of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, particularly Section 1(c) of Rule 115 which clearly reflects the
intention of the framers of our Constitution, to wit:

'. . . The absence of the accused without any justifiable cause at the trial on a
particular date of which he had notice shall be considered a waiver of his right to be present
during that trial. When an accused under custody had been notified of the date of the trial
and escapes, he shall be deemed to have waived his right to be present on said date and on
all subsequent trial dates until custody is regained . . .'

Accordingly, it is Our considered opinion, and We so hold, that an escapee who has been duly tried in
absentia waives his right to present evidence on his own behalf and to confront and cross-examine
witnesses who testified against him."

d) Under Sec. 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, an accused who failed to appear at the
promulgation of the judgment of conviction shall lose the remedies available against the
judgment and the court shall order his arrest. The accused on bail who fails to present himself
during promulgation of judgment loses his standing in court. Without any standing in court,