BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS VS MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY

FACTS:
Meralco's electric power is generated by its hydro-electric plant located at Botocan Falls, Laguna and is transmitted
to the City of Manila by means of electric transmission wires, running from the province of Laguna to the said City.
Meralco has constructed 40 of these steel towers within Quezon City, on land belonging to it.
City Assessor of Quezon City declared the aforesaid steel towers for real property tax under Tax declaration Nos.
31992 and 15549. After denying respondent's petition to cancel these declarations, an appeal was taken by
respondent to the Board of Assessment Appeals of Quezon City,
Court of Tax Appeals (CTA for short) which rendered a decision on December 29, 1958, ordering the cancellation of
the said tax declarations and the petitioner City Treasurer of Quezon City to refund to the respondent the sum of
P11,651.86.

CTA held that: (1) the steel towers come within the term "poles" which are declared exempt from taxes under part II
paragraph 9 of respondent's franchise; (2) the steel towers are personal properties and are not subject to real
property tax; and (3) the City Treasurer of Quezon City is held responsible for the refund of the amount paid. These
are assigned as errors by the petitioner in the brief.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE STEEL TOWERS ARE IMMOVABLE PROPERTY?

RULING:

Article 415 of the Civil Code does, by stating the following are immovable property:

(1) Land, buildings, roads, and constructions of all kinds adhered to the soil;
xxx     xxx     xxx
(3) Everything attached to an immovable in a fixed manner, in such a way that it cannot be separated
therefrom without breaking the material or deterioration of the object;
xxx     xxx     xxx
(5) Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an
industry or works which may be carried in a building or on a piece of land, and which tends directly to meet
the needs of the said industry or works;
The steel towers or supports in question, do not come within the objects mentioned in paragraph 1, because
they do not constitute buildings or constructions adhered to the soil. They are not construction analogous to
buildings nor adhering to the soil. As per description, given by the lower court, they are removable and
merely attached to a square metal frame by means of bolts, which when unscrewed could easily be
dismantled and moved from place to place. They can not be included under paragraph 3, as they are not
attached to an immovable in a fixed manner, and they can be separated without breaking the material or
causing deterioration upon the object to which they are attached. Each of these steel towers or supports
consists of steel bars or metal strips, joined together by means of bolts, which can be disassembled by
unscrewing the bolts and reassembled by screwing the same. These steel towers or supports do not also
fall under paragraph 5, for they are not machineries, receptacles, instruments or implements, and even if
they were, they are not intended for industry or works on the land. Petitioner is not engaged in an industry or
works in the land in which the steel supports or towers are constructed.

DAVAO SAW MILL CO., INC VS CASTILLO

FACTS:

The Davao Saw Mill Co., Inc., is the holder of a lumber concession from the Government of the Philippine Islands. It
has operated a sawmill in the sitio of Maa, barrio of Tigatu, municipality of Davao, Province of Davao. However, the
land upon which the business was conducted belonged to another person. On the land the sawmill company erected
a building which housed the machinery used by it. Some of the implements thus used were clearly personal property,
the conflict concerning machines which were placed and mounted on foundations of cement. In the contract of lease
between the sawmill company and the owner of the land there appeared the following provision:

That on the expiration of the period agreed upon, all the improvements and buildings introduced and erected by the
party of the second part shall pass to the exclusive ownership of the party of
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE MACHINERIES ARE IMMOVABLE PROPERTY?
RULING: YES, THE MACHINERIES ARE IMMOVABLE PROPERTY.

the improvements and buildings shall likewise pass to the ownership of the party of the first part as though
the time agreed upon had expired: Provided, however, That the machineries and accessories are not
 included in the improvements which will pass to the party of the first part on the expiration or abandonment
of the land leased.

, it should further be explained that the Davao Saw Mill Co., Inc., has on a number of occasions treated the
machinery as personal property by executing chattel mortgages in favor of third persons.
FELS ENERGY, INC. V OFFICE OF THE PROVINCIAL ASSESSOR OF BATANGAS
FACTS:
NPC entered into a lease contract with Polar Energy, Inc. over diesel engine power barges moored at Batangas. The
contract, denominated as an Energy Conversion Agreement,
Polar Energy, Inc. assigned its rights under the Agreement to FELS. Thereafter, FELS received an assessment of
real property taxes on the power barges. The assessed tax, which likewise covered those due for 1994, amounted
to P56,184,088.40 per annum. FELS referred the matter to NPC, reminding it of its obligation under the Agreement to
pay all real estate taxes. It then gave NPC the full power and authority to represent it in any conference regarding the
real property assessment of the Provincial Assessor.

NPC sought reconsideration of the Provincial Assessor’s decision to assess real property taxes on the power barges.
However, the motion was denied. The Local Board of Assessment Appeals (LBAA) ruled that the power plant
facilities, while they may be classified as movable or personal property, are nevertheless considered real property for
taxation purposes because they are installed at a specific location with a character of permanency.

FELS appealed the LBAA’s ruling to the Central Board of Assessment Appeals (CBAA). The CBAA rendered a
Decision finding the power barges exempt from real property tax.

It was later reversed by the cbaa upon reconsideration and affirmed by the CA

ISSUE
Whether power barges, which are floating and movable, are personal properties and therefore, not subject to real
property tax.

RULING
No. Article 415 (9) of the New Civil Code provides that "[d]ocks and structures which, though floating, are intended by
their nature and object to remain at a fixed place on a river, lake, or coast" are considered immovable property. Thus,
power barges are categorized as immovable property by destination, being in the nature of machinery and other
implements intended by the owner for an industry or work which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land
and which tend directly to meet the needs of said industry or work.

LEUNG YEE, VS FRANK L. STRONG MACHINERY COMPANY – (YELLOW PAPER)

Facts:
"Compania Agricola Filipina" purchased rice-cleaning machinery company from Strong Machinery. As a
security for the purchased price, a chattel mortgage on the machines and and the building was executed. The
registered mortgage was foreclosed and purchased by “Strong Machinery Co.”
Leung Yee, a creditor of “Agicola” purchased the same building at sheriff’s sale and with his prior knowledge
on the sale in favor of “Strong Machinery”. The sale in favor of Leung Yee was recorded in the registry.

Issue: WHETHER OR NOT THE BUILDINGS WHICH ARE SUBJECT TO CHATTEL MORTGAGE IS AN
IMMOVABLE PROPERTY?

RULING:
YES, the building is an immovable property. The mere fact that the properties decided to deal as a personal property
for purposes of Chattel mortgage law does not change its character as a real property

SERGS PRODUCTS, INC., VS PCI LEASING AND FINANCE, INC.

FACTS:

PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. (PCI Leasing for short) filed with the RTC-QC a complaint for [a] sum of money
(Annex E), with an application for a writ of replevin docketed as Civil Case No. Q-98-33500. chanrobles virtual law
library

respondent judge issued a writ of replevin (Annex B) directing its sheriff to seize and deliver the machineries and
equipment to PCI Leasing after 5 days and upon the payment of the necessary expenses. chanrobles virtual law
library
sheriff proceeded to petitioners factory, seized one machinery with [the] word that he [would] return for the other
machineries. 
petitioners asserted that the properties sought to be seized [were] immovable as defined in Article 415 of the Civil
Code,

They further stated that PCI Leasing [was] estopped from treating these machineries as personal because the
contracts in which the alleged agreement [were] embodied [were] totally sham and farcical. chanrobles virtual law
library

ISSUE: Whether or not the machineries purchased and imported by SERGS became real property by virtue of
immobilization
RULING :

Article 415 of the Civil Code enumerates immovable or real property as follows: chanrobles virtual law library

ART. 415. The following are immovable property:

x x x....................................x x x....................................x x x chanrobles virtual law library

(5) Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or
works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land, and which tend directly to meet the needs of the
said industry or works;

x x x....................................x x x....................................x x x chanrobles virtual law library

In the present case, the machines that were the subjects of the Writ of Seizure were placed by petitioners in the
factory built on their own land. Indisputably, they were essential and principal elements of their chocolate-making
industry. Hence, although each of them was movable or personal property on its own, all of them have become
immobilized by destination because they are essential and principal elements in the industry.16 In that sense,
petitioners are correct in arguing that the said machines are real, not personal, property pursuant to Article 415 (5) of
the Civil Code.[17 chanrobles virtual law library

Be that as it may, we disagree with the submission of the petitioners that the said machines are not proper subjects
of the Writ of Seizure. chanrobles virtual law library

The Court has held that contracting parties may validly stipulate that a real property be considered as
personal.18 After agreeing to such stipulation, they are consequently estopped from claiming otherwise. Under the
principle of estoppel, a party to a contract is ordinarily precluded from denying the truth of any material fact found
therein. chanrobles virtual law library

SIBAL VS VALDEZ ( YELLOW PAPER)

FACTS: THE sheriff attached the sugarcane that was growing on the lots of the plaintiff. The said lots incidentally had
already been previously attached by another judgment creditor of the plaintiff. Within onne year period of redemption,
plaintiff wanted to redeem the lots from one creditor. The redemption of sugarcane was refused by the defendant
who contended that the sugarcane was a personal property, and therefore could not be subject of legal redemption
sought to be enforced.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT SUGARCANE BE REGARDED AS MOVABLE PROPERTY?
RULING:
YES, sugarcane is regarded as movable property . Although, under article 415 of the civil code, sugarcane is
considered as “ growing fruits” and therefore ordinarily a real property. However, the same must be regarded as
PERSONAL PROPERTY for purposes of chattel mortgage law and for the attachment.
The existence of a right on the growing crop is a mobilization by anticipation, a gathering as it were in advance,
rendering the CROP MOVABLE.

OWNERSHIP
HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN VS REP OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:

The property subject of the application for registration is a parcel of land situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang Cavite,
more particularly identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, with an area of 71,324-square meters. On February 20, 1998,
applicant Mario Malabanan, who had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, filed an application for land
registration covering the property in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Tagaytay City, Cavite, claiming that the
property formed part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that he and his predecessors-in-
interest had been in open, continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse possession and occupation of the land for
more than 30 years, thereby entitling him to the judicial confirmation of his title.1

To prove that the property was an alienable and disposable land of the public domain, Malabanan presented during
trial a certification dated June 11, 2001 issued by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
(CENRO) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR),

because Malabanan failed to establish by sufficient evidence possession and occupation of the property on his part
and on the part of his predecessors-in interest since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

Issues:
Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their names under Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of
the Property Registration Decree or both?

RULING:

We deny the motions for reconsideration.

Land, which is an immovable property,10 may be classified as either of public dominion or of private

ownership.11 Land is considered of public dominion if it either: (a) is intended for public use; or (b) belongs to the
State, without being for public use, and is intended for some public service or for the development of the national
wealth.12 Land belonging to the State that is not of such character, or although of such character but no longer
intended for public use or for public service forms part of the patrimonial property of the State.13 Land that is other
than part of the patrimonial property of the State, provinces, cities and municipalities is of private ownership if it
belongs to a private individual.

Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine (Jura Regalia), all lands of the public domain belong to the State.

All lands not appearing to be clearly under private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Also, public lands
remain part of the inalienable land of the public domain unless the State is shown to have reclassified or alienated
them to private persons.17

Classifications of public lands

according to alienability

Whether or not land of the public domain is alienable and disposable primarily rests on the classification of public
lands made under the Constitution.
agricultural, forest or timber, and mineral, but added national parks

Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, only agricultural lands of the public domain may be alienated; all
other natural resources may not be.

Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall into two categories, to wit: (a) patrimonial lands of the State, or those
classified as lands of private ownership under Article 425 of the Civil Code,23 without limitation; and (b) lands of the
public domain, or the public lands as provided by the Constitution, but with the limitation that the lands must only be
agricultural. Consequently, lands classified as forest or timber, mineral, or national parks are not susceptible of
alienation or disposition unless they are reclassified as agricultural.24 
the exclusive prerogative to classify public lands under existing laws is vested in the Executive Department, not in the
courts
a declaration of such conversion must be made in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or by a Presidential
proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law to that effect.

until Congress or the President declares that the State no longer intends the land to be used for public service or for
the development of national wealth, the Regalian Doctrine is applicable.
Public Land Act (CA No. 141) provides the manner by which alienable and disposable lands of the public domain,
i.e., agricultural lands, can be disposed of, to wit:

Section 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed of only as follows, and not otherwise:

(1) For homestead settlement;

(2) By sale;

(3) By lease; and

(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;

(a) By judicial legalization; or

(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).

The core of the controversy herein lies in the proper interpretation of Section 11(4), in relation to Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act, which expressly requires possession by a Filipino citizen of the land since June 12, 1945, or earlier,
viz:

, the requirement that the land should have been classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land at the time
of the application for registration is necessary only to dispute the presumption that the land is inalienable.

The declaration that land is alienable and disposable also serves to determine the point at which prescription may run
against the State. The imperfect or incomplete title being confirmed under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is title
that is acquired by reason of the applicant’s possession and occupation of the alienable and disposable agricultural
land of the public domain. Where all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government are complied with
through actual physical, open, continuous, exclusive and public possession of an alienable and disposable land of
the public domain, the possessor is deemed to have acquired by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a
grant by the Government, because it is not necessary that a certificate of title be issued in order that such a grant be
sanctioned by the courts.31

On the other hand, if a public land is classified as no longer intended for public use or for the development of national
wealth by declaration of Congress or the President, thereby converting such land into patrimonial or private land of
the State, the applicable provision concerning disposition and registration is no longer Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act but the Civil Code, in conjunction with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.35 As such,
prescription can now run against the State.

the petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that they and their predecessors-in-interest had been
in possession of the land since June 12, 1945. Without satisfying the requisite character and period of possession -
possession and occupation that is open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious since June 12, 1945, or earlier - the
land cannot be considered ipso jure converted to private property even upon the subsequent declaration of it as
alienable and disposable. Prescription never began to run against the State, such that the land has remained
ineligible for registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.

DOMALSIN VS SPOUSES JUANITO VALENCIANO

FACTS:

Frisco B. Domalsin claims to be the lawful owner and possessor of said parcel of land since 1979 up to the present.
He declared it for taxation purposes in 1983 as (per) Tax Declaration No. 9540 issued on September 12, 1983 by the
Municipal Assessor of Tuba Benguet. He allegedly introduced improvements consisting of levelling, excavation,
riprapping of the earth and a private road to the river, fruitbearing trees and other agricultural plants of economic
value. He was in continuous, adverse possession and in the concept of an owner for the past nineteen (19) years.

petitioners Spouses Juanito Valenciano and Amalia Valenciano (Sps. Valenciano, for brevity) allegedly entered the
premises to construct a building made of cement and strong materials, without the authority and consent of
respondent, by means of force and strategy, and without a building permit from the Department of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH, for brevity).
including its first residents, William and Gloria Banuca
Sps. Valenciano are just starting the construction because the permission was only given now by Gloria Banuca
petitioner filed before the MCTC of Tuba, Benguet, a complaint for Forcible Entry
petitioner’s admission that he was temporarily not operating any business in the area, and respondents’ admission
regarding the issuance of Tax Declarations on the property in dispute in petitioner’s name.
Petitioner testified that he is a lawyer-businessman formerly engaged in trucking business, hauling sand and gravel,
and operated under the name Salamander Enterprises.14 

After agreeing on the consideration, the former executed a Deed of Waiver and Quitclaim15 over the land in his favor.

Based on the Deed of Waiver and Quitclaim executed by Castillo Binay-an, petitioner was able to apply for, and was
issued, a tax declaration over the land covering one hectare

petitioner has been regularly paying real property taxes over the land.

Petitioner disclosed that in 1983, William Banuca applied for, and was accepted, as foreman.21 Due to the nature of
his job, Banuca was permitted to stay in the second house beside the private road.22 Banuca now lives permanently
in said house after petitioner gave it to him.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY A PUBLIC DOMINION?
RULING: YES

it is clear that neither the petitioner nor the respondents can own nor possess the subject property the same being
part of the public dominion. Property of public dominion is defined by Article 420 of the Civil Code as follows:

ART. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:

(1) Those intended for public use such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State,
banks, shores, roadsteads, and other of similar character.

(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth.

Properties of public dominion are owned by the general public.34 Public use is "use that is not confined to privileged
individuals, but is open to the indefinite public."35 As the land in controversy is a portion of Kennon Road which is for
the use of the people, there can be no dispute that same is part of public dominion. This being the case, the parties
cannot appropriate the land for themselves. Thus, they cannot claim any right of possession over it.

CEBU OXYGEN VS BERCILLES

FACTS:
The parcel of land sought to be registered was originally a portion of M. Borces Street, Mabolo, Cebu City.
as an abandoned road, the same not being included in the City Development Plan. 1 Subsequently, on December
19, 1968, the City Council of Cebu passed Resolution No. 2755, authorizing the Acting City Mayor to sell the land
through a public bidding.
Acting City Mayor, executed a deed of absolute sale to the herein petitioner for a total consideration of P10,800.00
to have its title to the land registered. 4

On June 26, 1974, the Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Cebu filed a motion to dismiss the application on the ground that
the property sought to be registered being a public road intended for public use is considered part of the public
domain and therefore outside the commerce of man,
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE SUBJECT LOT IS A PUBLIC DOMINION?
RULING: NO.
Article 422 of the Civil Code expressly provides that "Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public
use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State."cralaw virtua1aw library
Accordingly, withdrawal of the property in question from public use and its subsequent sale to the petitioner is valid.
Hence, the petitioner has a registerable title over the lot in question.
CHAVEZ VS PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY
FACTS:
the government, through the Commissioner of Public Highways, signed a contract with the Construction and
Development Corporation of the Philippines ("CDCP" for brevity) to reclaim certain foreshore and offshore areas of
Manila Bay.
President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1084 creating PEA. PD No. 1084 tasked PEA "to
reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas," and "to develop, improve, acquire, x x x lease and sell any
and all kinds of lands."
President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517, granting and transferring to PEA "the parcels of land
so reclaimed under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP) containing a total area of
one million nine hundred fifteen thousand eight hundred ninety four (1,915,894) square meters."
reclaimed islands known as the "Freedom Islands"
On April 25, 1995, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement ("JVA" for brevity) with AMARI, a private corporation,
to develop the Freedom Islands. The JVA also required the reclamation of an additional 250 hectares of submerged
areas surrounding these islands to complete the configuration in the Master Development Plan of the Southern
Reclamation Project-MCCRRP.

On November 29, 1996, then Senate President Ernesto Maceda delivered a privilege speech in the Senate and
denounced the JVA as the "grandmother of all scams." As a result, the Senate Committee on Government
Corporations and Public Enterprises, and the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations,
conducted a joint investigation. The Senate Committees reported the results of their investigation in Senate
Committee Report No. 560 dated September 16, 1997.7 Among the conclusions of their report are: (1) the reclaimed
lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of the public domain which the government has not
classified as alienable lands and therefore PEA cannot alienate these lands; (2) the certificates of title covering the
Freedom Islands are thus void, and (3) the JVA itself is illegal.

President Fidel V. Ramos issued Presidential Administrative Order No. 365 creating a Legal Task Force to conduct a
study on the legality of the JVA in view of Senate Committee Report No. 560.
Antonio M. Zulueta filed before the Court a Petition for Prohibition with Application for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction docketed as G.R. No. 132994 seeking to nullify the JVA
Frank I. Chavez ("Petitioner" for brevity) as a taxpayer, contends the government stands to lose billions of pesos in
the sale by PEA of the reclaimed lands to AMARI
Petitioner assails the sale to AMARI of lands of the public domain as a blatant violation of Section 3, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution prohibiting the sale of alienable lands of the public domain to private corporations
Issue
WON THE reclaimed lands and submerged areas of Manila Bay are public domain or private ownership ?
WON THE reclaimed lands and submerged areas of Manila Bay are alienable and disposable?
RULING:

The Regalian Doctrine. The ownership of lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged areas is rooted in the
Regalian doctrine which holds that the State owns all lands and waters of the public domain.

owner of all lands and waters of the public domain. The Regalian doctrine is the foundation of the time-honored
principle of land ownership that "all lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by
grant, belong to the public domain."43 Article 339 of the Civil Code of 1889, which is now Article 420 of the Civil Code
of 1950, incorporated the Regalian doctrine.

Property of public dominion referred not only to property devoted to public use, but also to property not so used but
employed to develop the national wealth. This class of property constituted property of public dominion although
employed for some economic or commercial activity to increase the national wealth.

Article 341 of the Civil Code of 1889 governed the re-classification of property of public dominion into private
property, to wit:

"Art. 341. Property of public dominion, when no longer devoted to public use or to the defense of the
territory, shall become a part of the private property of the State."
This provision, however, was not self-executing. The legislature, or the executive department pursuant to law, must
declare the property no longer needed for public use or territorial defense before the government could lease or
alienate the property to private parties.45

There is no express authority under either PD No. 1085 or EO No. 525 for PEA to sell its reclaimed lands. PD No.
1085 merely transferred "ownership and administration" of lands reclaimed from Manila Bay to PEA, while EO No.
525 declared that lands reclaimed by PEA "shall belong to or be owned by PEA." EO No. 525 expressly states that
PEA should dispose of its reclaimed lands "in accordance with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1084," the
charter of PEA.

The Regalian doctrine is deeply implanted in our legal system. Foreshore and submerged areas form part of the
public domain and are inalienable. Lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged areas also form part of the public
domain and are also inalienable, unless converted pursuant to law into alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain. Historically, lands reclaimed by the government are sui generis, not available for sale to private parties
unlike other alienable public lands. Reclaimed lands retain their inherent potential as areas for public use or public
service.

Clearly, the Amended JVA violates glaringly Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Under Article
1409112 of the Civil Code, contracts whose "object or purpose is contrary to law," or whose "object is outside the
commerce of men," are "inexistent and void from the beginning." The Court must perform its duty to defend and
uphold the Constitution, and therefore declares the Amended JVA null and void ab initio.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, JOSEFINA L. MORATO,

The Facts

Morato filed a Free Patent Application No. III-3-8186-B on a parcel of land with an area of 1,265 square meters
situated at Pinagtalleran, Calauag, Quezon. On January 16, 1974, the patent was approved and the Register of
Deeds of Quezon at Lucena City
specifically mandate that the land shall not be alienated nor encumbered within five years from the date of the
issuance of the patent (
it was established that the subject land is a portion of the Calauag Bay, five (5) to six (6) feet deep under water during
high tide and two (2) feet deep at low tide, and not suitable to vegetation

, a portion of the land was mortgaged by respondent Morato to respondents Nenita Co and Antonio Quilatan for
P10,000.00 (pp. 2, 25, Folder of Exhibits). The spouses Quilatan constructed a house on the land. Another portion of
the land was leased to Perfecto Advincula on February 2, 1976 at P100.00 a month, where a warehouse was
constructed.

ISSUE:
whether the land in question, is really part of the foreshore lands.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

From the evidence adduced by both parties, it has been proved that the area of the portion of the land, subject matter
of the lease contract (Exh. "B") executed by and between Perfecto Advincula and Josefina L. Morato is only 10 x 12
square meters, where the total area of the land granted to Morato is 1,265 square meters. It is clear from this that the
portion of the land leased by Advincula does not significantly affect Morato's ownership and possession. Above all,
the circumstances under which the lease was executed do not reflect a voluntary and blatant intent to violate the
conditions provided for in the patent issued in her favor. On the contrary, Morato was compelled to enter into that
contract of lease
Respondents failed to justify their position that the mortgage should not be considered an encumbrance
The prohibition against the encumbrance — lease and mortgage included — of a homestead which, by analogy
applies to a free patent

Respondent Morato cannot use the doctrine of the indefeasibility of her Torrens title to bar the state from questioning
its transfer or encumbrance. The certificate of title issued to her clearly stipulated that its award was "subject to the
conditions provided for in Sections 118, 119, 121, 122 and 124 of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141." Because she
violated Section 118, the reversion of the property to the public domain necessarily follows, pursuant to Section 124.

Second Issue: Foreshore Land

Revert to the Public Domain

whether the land in question, is really part of the foreshore lands.

A foreshore land, on the other hand has been defined as follows:

. . . that part of (the land) which is between high

and low water and left dry by the flux and reflux of the tides . . . .
The strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and that is alternatively wet and dry according to the
flow of the tide.

When the sea moved towards the estate and the tide invaded it, the invaded property became foreshore land and
passed to the realm of the public domain. In fact, the Court in Government vs. Cabangis 30 annulled the registration of
land subject of cadastral proceedings when the parcel subsequently became foreshore land. 31 In another case, the
Court voided the registration decree of a trial court and held that said court had no jurisdiction to award foreshore
land to any private person or entity. 32 The subject land in this case, being foreshore land, should therefore be
returned to the public domain.

DACANAY, petitioner,
vs.
MAYOR MACARIO ASISTIO, JR., etal

FACTS:

On January 5, 1979, MMC Ordinance No. 79-02 was enacted by the Metropolitan Manila Commission, designating
certain city and municipal streets, roads and open spaces as sites for flea markets. Pursuant, thereto, the Caloocan
City mayor opened up seven (7) flea markets in that city. One of those streets was the "Heroes del '96" where the
petitioner lives. Upon application of vendo

city mayor and city engineer, issued them licenses to conduct vending activities on said street.

Antonio Martinez, as OIC city mayor of Caloocan City, caused the demolition of the market stalls on Heroes del '96,
V. Gozon and Gonzales streets. To stop Mayor Martinez' efforts to clear the city streets, Rodolfo Teope, Mila
Pastrana and other stallowners filed an action for prohibition

The trial court found that Heroes del '96, Gozon and Gonzales streets are of public dominion, hence, outside the
commerce of man:The Heroes del '96 street, V. Gozon street and Gonzales street, being of public dominion must,
therefore, be outside of the commerce of man

the Court opines that defendants have the right to demolish the subject stalls of the plaintiffs, more so when Section
185, par. 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337,

ISSUE: WON public streets or thoroughfares ARE PUBLIC DOMINION AND can be leased or licensed to market
stallholders by virtue of a city ordinance or resolution of the Metro Manila Commission?

There is no doubt that the disputed areas from which the private respondents' market stalls are sought to be evicted
are public streets, as found by the trial court in Civil Case No. C-12921. A public street is property for public use
hence outside the commerce of man (Arts. 420, 424, Civil Code). Being outside the commerce of man, it may not be
the subject of lease or other contract

As the stallholders pay fees to the City Government for the right to occupy portions of the public street, the City
Government, contrary to law, has been leasing portions of the streets to them. Such leases or licenses are null and
void for being contrary to law. The right of the public to use the city streets may not be bargained away through
contract. The interests of a few should not prevail over the good of the greater number in the community whose
health, peace, safety, good order and general welfare, the respondent city officials are under legal obligation to
protect.

The Executive Order issued by Acting Mayor Robles authorizing the use of Heroes del '96 Street as a vending area
for stallholders who were granted licenses by the city government contravenes the general law that reserves city
streets and roads for public use. Mayor Robles' Executive Order may not infringe upon the vested right of the public
to use city streets for the purpose they were intended to serve: i.e., as arteries of travel for vehicles and pedestrians
SALVADOR H. LAUREL, petitioner,vs. RAMON GARCIA
FACTS:

subject property in this case is one of the four (4) properties in Japan acquired by the Philippine government under
the Reparations Agreement.

The properties and the capital goods and services procured from the Japanese government for national development
projects are part of the indemnification to the Filipino people for their losses in life and property and their suffering
during World War II.

The Roppongi property was acquired from the Japanese government

The Roppongi property consists of the land and building "for the Chancery of the Philippine Embassy"
it became the site of the Philippine Embassy until the latter was transferred to Nampeidai o
A proposal was presented to President Corazon C. Aquino by former Philippine Ambassador to Japan, Carlos J.
Valdez, to make the property the subject of a lease agreement with a Japanese firm - Kajima Corporation — which
shall construct two (2) buildings in Roppongi and one (1) building in Nampeidai and renovate the present Philippine
Chancery in Nampeidai. The consideration of the construction would be the lease to the foreign corporation of one
(1) of the buildings to be constructed in Roppongi and the two (2) buildings in Nampeidai. The other building in
Roppongi shall then be used as the Philippine Embassy Chancery. At the end of the lease period, all the three leased
buildings shall be occupied and used by the Philippine government. No change of ownership or title shall occur.
The Philippine government retains the title all throughout the lease period and thereafter.
President Aquino created a committee to study the disposition/utilization of Philippine government properties in
Tokyo and Kobe, Japan
the President issued Executive Order No. 296 entitling non-Filipino citizens or entities to avail of separations' capital
goods and services in the event of sale, lease or disposition.
the Executive branch of the government has been pushing, with great vigor, its decision to sell the reparations
properties starting with the Roppongi lot.
ISSUE:

(1) Can the Roppongi property and others of its kind be alienated by the Philippine Government?; and

(2) Does the Chief Executive, her officers and agents, have the authority and jurisdiction, to sell the Roppongi
property?

RULING :

The applicable provisions of the Civil Code are:

ART. 419. Property is either of public dominion or of private ownership.

ART. 420. The following things are property of public dominion

(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges
constructed by the State, banks shores roadsteads, and others of similar character;

(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public
service or for the development of the national wealth.

ART. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character stated in the preceding
article, is patrimonial property.

The Roppongi property is correctly classified under paragraph 2 of Article 420 of the Civil Code as property belonging
to the State and intended for some public service.

Has the intention of the government regarding the use of the property been changed because the lot has been Idle
for some years? Has it become patrimonial?
The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for actual Embassy service does not automatically
convert it to patrimonial property. Any such conversion happens only if the property is withdrawn from public use
(Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene Co. v. Bercilles, 66 SCRA 481 [1975]). A property continues to be part of the public
domain, not available for private appropriation or ownership until there is a formal declaration on the part of the
government to withdraw it from being such
Abandonment cannot be inferred from the non-use alone specially if the non-use was attributable not to the
government's own deliberate and indubitable will but to a lack of financial support to repair and improve the property

Abandonment must be a certain and positive act based on correct legal premises.

A mere transfer of the Philippine Embassy to Nampeidai in 1976 is not relinquishment of the Roppongi property's
original purpose.

THE PROVINCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE VS CITY OF ZAMBOANGA

FACTS:
 Facts:
Prior to its incorporation as a chartered city, the Municipality of Zamboanga used to be the provincial capital of the
then Zamboanga Province. On October 12, 1936, Commonwealth Act 39 was approved converting the Municipality
of Zamboanga into Zamboanga City. Sec. 50 of the Act also provided that “Buildings and properties which the
province shall abandon upon the transfer of the capital to another place will be acquired and paid for by the City of
Zamboanga at a price to be fixed by the Auditor General.”

Such properties include lots of capitol site, schools, hospitals, leprosarium, high school playgrounds, burleighs, and
hydro-electric sites.
On June 6, 1952, Republic Act 711 was approved dividing the province of Zamboanga into two (2): Zamboanga del
Norte and Zamboanga del Sur. As to how the assets and obligations of the old province were to be divided between
the two new ones, Sec. 6 of that law provided “Upon the approval of this Act, the funds, assets and other properties
and the obligations of the province of Zamboanga shall be divided equitably between the Province of Zamboanga del
Norte and the Province of Zamboanga del Sur by the President of the Philippines, upon the recommendation of the
Auditor General.”

However, on June 17, 1961, Republic Act 3039 was approved amending Sec. 50 of Commonwealth Act 39 by
providing that, “All buildings, properties and assets belonging to the former province of Zamboanga and located
within the City of Zamboanga are hereby transferred, free of charge, in favor of the said City of Zamboanga.”

This constrained Zamboanga del Norte to file on March 5, 1962, a complaint against defendants-appellants
Zamboanga City; that, among others, Republic Act 3039 be declared unconstitutional for depriving Zamboanga del
Norte of property without due process and just compensation.

Lower court declared RA 3039 unconstitutional as it deprives Zamboanga del Norte of its private properties.

Hence the appeal.

Issue:
Whether RA 3039 is unconstitutional on the grounds that it deprives Zamboanga del Norte of its private properties.

Held:
No. RA 3039 is valid. The properties petitioned by Zamboanga del Norte is a public property.

The validity of the law ultimately depends on the nature of the 50 lots and buildings thereon in question. For, the
matter involved here is the extent of legislative control over the properties of a municipal corporation, of which a
province is one. The principle itself is simple: If the property is owned by the municipality (meaning municipal
corporation) in its public and governmental capacity, the property is public and Congress has absolute control over it.
But if the property is owned in its private or proprietary capacity, then it is patrimonial and Congress has no absolute
control. The municipality cannot be deprived of it without due process and payment of just compensation.

The capacity in which the property is held is, however, dependent on the use to which it is intended and devoted.
Now, which of two norms, i.e., that of the Civil Code or that obtaining under the law of Municipal Corporations, must
be used in classifying the properties in question?

Civil Code
The Civil provide: ART. 423. The property of provinces, cities, and municipalities is divided into property for public
use and patrimonial property; ART. 424. Property for public use, in the provinces, cities, and municipalities, consists
of the provincial roads, city streets, municipal streets, the squares, fountains, public waters, promenades, and public
works for public service paid for by said provinces, cities, or municipalities. All other property possessed by any of
them is patrimonial and shall be governed by this Code, without prejudice to the provisions of special laws.

Applying the above cited norm, all the properties in question, except the two (2) lots used as High School
playgrounds, could be considered as patrimonial properties of the former Zamboanga province. Even the capital site,
the hospital and leprosarium sites, and the school sites will be considered patrimonial for they are not for public use.
They would fall under the phrase “public works for public service” for it has been held that under the ejusdem generis
rule, such public works must be for free and indiscriminate use by anyone, just like the preceding enumerated
properties in the first paragraph of Art 424. The playgrounds, however, would fit into this category.

Law of Municipal Corporations

On the other hand, applying the norm obtaining under the principles constituting the law of Municipal Corporations, all
those of the 50 properties in question which are devoted to public service are deemed public; the rest remain
patrimonial. Under this norm, to be considered public, it is enough that the property be held and, devoted for
governmental purposes like local administration, public education, public health, etc.

 Final Ruling
The controversy here is more along the domains of the Law of Municipal Corporations — State vs. Province — than
along that of Civil Law. If municipal property held and devoted to public service is in the same category as ordinary
private property, then that would mean they can be levied upon and attached; they can even be acquired thru
adverse possession — all these to the detriment of the local community. It is wrong to consider those properties as
ordinary private property.

Lastly, the classification of properties other than those for public use in the municipalities as patrimonial under Art.
424 of the Civil Code — is “… without prejudice to the provisions of special laws.” For purpose of this article, the
principles, obtaining under the Law of Municipal Corporations can be considered as “special laws”. Hence, the
classification of municipal property devoted for distinctly governmental purposes as public should prevail over the
Civil Code classification in this particular case.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside and another judgment is hereby entered as follows:.
(1) Defendant Zamboanga City is hereby ordered to return to plaintiff Zamboanga del Norte in lump sum the amount
of P43,030.11 which the former took back from the latter out of the sum of P57,373.46 previously paid to the latter;
and
(2) Defendants are hereby ordered to effect payments in favor of plaintiff of whatever balance remains of plaintiff’s
54.39% share in the 26 patrimonial properties, after deducting therefrom the sum of P57,373.46, on the basis of
Resolution No. 7 dated March 26, 1949 of the Appraisal Committee formed by the Auditor General, by way of
quarterly payments from the allotments of defendant City, in the manner originally adopted by the Secretary of
Finance and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. No costs. So ordered.