3. Leonardo de Castro vs. Mayor Yap, et.
Non-registrable properties – With respect to land banking program
al.
FACTS:
On April of 1976, the DENR approved the National reservation survey
of Boracay which identified several lots as being occupied by named
persons.
On November of 1978, Pres. Marcos issued PP 1801 declaring Boracay
Island as tourist zones and marine reserves under the administration of
the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA), then later on approves PTA
Circ. 3-82 to implement the said proclamation.
Yap, together with other respondents filed a petition for declaratory
relief with the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan claiming that the said proclamation
prevented them from filing an application for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes.
Moreover, they contend that they or through their
predecessor-ininterest has been in an open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession of the subject land since time immemorial and
they were paying their realty tax.
 Further, the said proclamation did not place Boracay beyond
the commerce of men, classified as a tourist zone, therefore,
susceptible of private ownership. Invoking Sec 48(b) of CA 141
otherwise known as the Public Land Act, they have the right to
have the lots registered under their names.
The republic, through OSG, opposed the petition of the
respondents’claiming that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of
public domain. Invoking Sec 3(a) or PD 705 or the revised forestry
code, as amended, it is not susceptible of private ownership.
The OSG maintained that the right of the respondent to judicial
confirmation of title was governed by PD 705 and CA 141. Since the
Island has not been classified as alienable and disposable, whatever
possession they have cannot ripen into ownership.
RTC: It upheld respondents’ right to have their occupied lands titled in
their name.
CA: Affirmed the decision of the lower court. OSG moved for
reconsideration, but, it was also denied. They appealed to the SC
ISSUE:
Whether private claimants have a right to secure titles over their
occupied portions in Boracay.
RULING:
PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified
lands of the public domain as public forest. Appying this law, all
unclassified lands, including that of the Boracay Island is considered as
Public forest. Nonetheless, PD No. 705 respects titles already existing
prior to its effectivity.
The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into
agricultural, forest or timber, such classification modified by the 1973
Constitution. The 1987 Constitution reverted to the 1935 Constitution
classification with one addition: national parks. Of these, only
agricultural lands may be alienated. Prior to Proclamation No. 1064 of
May 22, 2006, Boracay Island had never been expressly and
administratively classified under any of these grand divisions. Boracay
was an unclassified land of the public domain.
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In
keeping with the presumption of State ownership, the Court has time
and again emphasized that there must be a positive act of the
government, such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order;
an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.
In the present case, there was neither a proclamation, EO,
Administrative action, report statute nor a certificate presented in
court. Proc. No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed to
classify Boracay Island as alienable and disposable land. If President
Marcos intended to classify the island as alienable and disposable or
forest, or both, he would have identified the specific limits of each, as
President Arroyo did in Proclamation No. 1064. This was not done in
Proclamation No. 1801.
LEGAL PRINCIPLE:
Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an
unclassified land of the public domain prior to Proclamation No. 1064.
Such unclassified lands are considered public forest under PD No. 705.
G.
of Bedrock, the following properties may not be registered under the
Torrens System with any Register of Deeds:
A. inalienable lands of the public domain
B. those prohibited under the Constitution (such as national parks,
mineral lands, forest or timber lands and agricultural lands not
classified as alienable and disposable)
i. Amunategui vs. Directory of Forestry
FACTS:
The parcel of land sought to be registered is known as Lot No. 885 of
the Cadastral Survey of Pilar, Capiz, and has an area of 645,703 square
meters.
Roque Borre, petitioner in G.R. No, L-30035, and Melquiades Borre, filed
the application for registration. In due time, the heirs of Jose
Amunategui, petitioners in G.R. No. L-27873 filed an opposition to the
application of Roque and Melquiades Borre. At the same time, they
prayed that the title to a portion of Lot No. 885 of Pilar Cadastre
containing 527,747 square meters be confirmed and registered in the
names of said Heirs of Jose Amunategui.
The Director of Forestry, through the Provincial Fiscal of Capiz, also
filed an opposition to the application for registration of title claiming
that the land was mangrove swamp which was still classified as forest
land and part of the public domain.
Another oppositor, Emeterio Bereber filed his opposition insofar as a
portion of Lot No. 885 containing 117,956 square meters was
concerned and prayed that title to said portion be confirmed and
registered in his name.
During the progress of the trial, applicant-petitioner Roque Borre sold
whatever rights and interests he may have on Lot No. 885 to Angel
Alpasan. The latter also filed an opposition, claiming that he is entitled
to have said lot registered in his name.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Capiz adjudicated 117,956
square meters to Emeterio Bereber and the rest of the land containing
527,747 square meters was adjudicated in the proportion of 5/6 share
to Angel Alpasan and 1/6 share to Melquiades Borre.
It was found that one of the applicants or oppositors had shown that
during the required period of thirty (30) years prescribed by Republic
Act 1942 in order for him to have shown a registerable title for the
entire period of thirty (30) years before filing of the application.
The Heirs of Jose Amunategui maintain that Lot No. 885 cannot be
classified as forest land because it is not thickly forested but is a
"mangrove swamp." Although conceding that a "mangrove swamp" is
included in the classification of forest land in accordance with Section
1820 of the Revised Administrative Code.
ISSUE:
Whether Lot No. 885 is public forest land, not capable of registration
in the names of the private applicants.
RULING:
Yes. A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does
not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may
have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest
land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin
cultivators or other farmers. “Forest lands” do not have to be on
mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by
mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea
water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is
descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be
descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the
land classified as “forest” is released in an official proclamation to
that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural
lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title
do not apply. Possession of forest lands, no matter how long, cannot
ripen into private ownership. It bears emphasizing that a positive act
of Government is needed to declassify land which is classified as forest
and to convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or
other purposes.
The fact that no trees enumerated in Section 1821 of the Revised
Administrative Code are found in Lot No. 885 does not divest such
land of its being classified as forest land, much less as land of the
public domain. The appellate court found that in 1912, the land must
have been a virgin forest as stated by Emeterio Bereber’s witness
Deogracias Gavacao, and that as late as 1926, it must have been a
thickly forested area as testified by Jaime Bertolde. The opposition of
the Director of Forestry was strengthened by the appellate court’s
finding that timber licenses had to be issued to certain licensees and
even Jose Amunategui himself took the trouble to ask for a license to
cut timber within the area. It was only sometime in 1950 that the
property was converted into fishpond but only after a previous
warning from the District Forester that the same could not be done
because it was classified as “public forest.”
ii. Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Lastimado
FACTS:
Private respondent, Isabel Lastimado, filed on September 11, 1967, in
the Court of First Instance of Bataan, Branch I, a Petition for the
reopening of cadastral proceedings over a portion of Lot No. 626 of
the Mariveles Cadastre.
On October 14, 1967, the trial Court rendered a Decision granting the
Petition and adjudicating the land in favor of private respondent.
The trial Court issued an order for the issuance of a decree of
registration in favor of private respondent. Eventually, Original
Certificate of Title No. N-144 was also issued in her favor. Private
respondent thereafter subdivided the land into ten lots, and the
corresponding titles.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Review pursuant to Sec. 38, Act No. 496,
on the ground of fraud alleging that during the period of alleged
adverse possession by private respondent, said parcel of land was part
of the U.S. Military Reservation in Bataan. This was formally turned
over to the Republic of the Philippines only on December 22, 1965, and
that the same is inside the public forest of Mariveles, Bataan and,
therefore, not subject to disposition or acquisition under the Public
Land Law.
The Court (Judge Tito V. Tizon, presiding) issued an Order dismissing
the Petition for Review mainly on the ground that the Solicitor General
had failed to file opposition to the original Petition for reopening of the
cadastral proceedings and was, therefore, estopped from questioning
the decree of registration ordered issued therein.
The CA dismissed herein petitioner's petition for review.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner was estopped from filing a suit due to the
inaction and or neglect of its officials.
RULING:
The Government is not estopped from questioning the decision. The
State cannot be bound by the mistakes of its agents or officials.
Since the subject property was inside the military reservation, it
cannot be the object of cadastral proceedings; and since it also
forms part of the public forest, then any possession thereof,
however how long can never convert it to private property. If the
allegation of petitioner that the land in question was inside the military
reservation at the time it was claimed is true, then, it cannot be the
object of any cadastral nor can it be the object of reopening under
Republic Act No. 931.
Similarly, if the land in question, indeed forms part of the public
forest, then, possession thereof, however long, cannot convert it into
private property as it is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau
of Forestry and beyond the power and jurisdiction of the Cadastral
Court to register under the Torrens System.
iii. Laurel v. Garcia
FACTS:
The subject Roppongi property is one of the four properties in Japan
acquired by the Philippine government under the Reparations
Agreement entered into with Japan on 9 May 1956, the other lots
being the Nampeidai Property (site of Philippine Embassy Chancery),
the Kobe Commercial Property (Commercial lot used as warehouse and
parking lot of consulate staff), and the Kobe Residential Property (a
vacant residential lot). The properties and the capital goods and
services procured from the Japanese government for national
development projects are part of the indemnification to the Filipino
people for their losses in life and property and their suffering during
World War II.
The Roppongi property was acquired from the Japanese government
through Reparations Contract. The Roponggi property consists of the
land and building "for the Chancery of the Philippine Embassy." As
intended, it became the site of the Philippine Embassy until the latter
was transferred to Nampeidai on 22 July 1976 when the Roppongi
building needed major repairs. Due to the failure of our government to
provide necessary funds, the Roppongi property has remained
undeveloped since that time.
During the incumbency of President Aquino, a proposal was made by
former Philippine Ambassador to Japan, Carlos J. Valdez, to lease the
subject property to Kajima Corporation, a Japanese firm, in exchange
of the construction of 2 buildings in Roppongi, 1 building in Nampeidai,
and the renovation of the Philippine Chancery in Nampeidai.
 The President issued EO 296 entitling non-Filipino citizens or
entities to avail of reparations' capital goods and services in
the event of sale, lease or disposition. Amidst opposition by
various sectors, the Executive branch of the government has
been pushing, with great vigor, its decision to sell the
reparations properties starting with the Roppongi lot.
ISSUE:
Whether the Roppongi property and others of its kind can be alienated
by the Philippine government.
RULING:
No. The nature of the Roppongi lot as property for public service is
expressly spelled out. It is dictated by the terms of the Reparations
Agreement and the corresponding contract of procurement which bind
both the Philippine government and the Japanese government.
There can be no doubt that it is of public dominion and is outside the
commerce of man. And the property continues to be part of the public
domain, not available for private appropriation or ownership until there
is a formal declaration on the part of the government to withdraw it
from being such.
It is not for the President to convey valuable real property of the
government on his or her own sole will. Any such conveyances must
be authorized and approved by a law enacted by the Congress. It
requires executive and legislative concurrence.
LEGAL PRINCIPLE:
There is only one kind of public land that can be registered called
PATRIMONIAL LAND. The rest cannot be registered except agricultural
lands. Public dominion property intended for public service cannot be
alienated unless the property is first transformed into private
property of the state otherwise known as patrimonial property of the
state. The transformation of public dominion property to state
patrimonial property involves, to my mind, a policy decision.
iv. Mineral Resources
All mineral resources are owned by the State. Their exploration,
development and utilization (EDU) must always be subject to the full
control and supervision of the State. More specifically, given the
inadequacy of Filipino capital and technology in large-scale EDU
activities, the State may secure the help of foreign companies in all
relevant matters -- especially financial and technical assistance --
provided that, at all times, the State maintains its right of full control.
The foreign assistor or contractor assumes all financial, technical and
entrepreneurial risks in the EDU activities; hence, it may be given
reasonable management, operational, marketing, audit and other
prerogatives to protect its investments and to enable the business to
succeed.
1. La Bugal-B
Bugal-B’’laan Association vs. Ramos
FACTS:
The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAA
is a exception to the rule that participation in the nation’s natural
resources is reserved exclusively to Filipinos. Provision must be
construed strictly against their enjoyment by non-Filipinos.
RA 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act) took effect on April 9, 1995.
Before the effectivity of RA 7942, or on March 30, 1995, the President
signed a Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) with
WMCP, a corporation organized under Philippine laws, covering close to
100,000 hectares of land in South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del
Sur and North Cotabato. On August 15, 1995, the Environment
Secretary Victor Ramos issued DENR Administrative Order 95-23, which
was later repealed by DENR Administrative Order 96-40, adopted on
December 20, 1996.
Petitioners prayed that RA 7942, its implementing rules, and the FTAA
between the government and WMCP be declared unconstitutional on
ground that they allow fully foreign owned corporations like WMCP to
exploit, explore and develop Philippine mineral resources in
contravention of Article XII Section 2 paragraphs 2 and 4 of the
Charter.
In January 2001, WMC – a publicly listed Australian mining and
exploration company – sold its whole stake in WMCP to Sagittarius
Mines, 60% of which is owned by Filipinos while 40% of which is owned
by Indophil Resources, an Australian company. DENR approved the
transfer and registration of the FTAA in Sagittarius‘ name but Lepanto
Consolidated assailed the same. The latter case is still pending before
the Court of Appeals.
EO 279, issued by former President Aquino on July 25, 1987,
authorizes the DENR to accept, consider and evaluate proposals from
foreign owned corporations or foreign investors for contracts or
agreements involving wither technical or financial assistance for large
scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals which upon
appropriate recommendation of the (DENR) Secretary, the President
may execute with the foreign proponent. WMCP likewise contended
that the annulment of the FTAA would violate a treaty between the
Philippines and Australia which provides for the protection of
Australian investments.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Philippine Mining Act is unconstitutional for
allowing fully foreign-owned corporations to exploit the Philippine
mineral resources. 2. Whether or not the FTAA between the
government and WMCP is a ―service contract that permits fully
foreign owned companies to exploit the Philippine mineral resources.
RULING:
First Issue: RA 7942 is Unconstitutional
RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 is unconstitutional for
permitting fully foreign owned corporations to exploit the Philippine
natural resources.
Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution retained the Regalian
Doctrine which states that ―All lands of the public domain, waters,
minerals, coal, petroleum, and other minerals, coal, petroleum, and
other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or
timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned
by the State.
The same section also states that, ―the exploration and development
and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and
supervision of the State.
Conspicuously absent in Section 2 is the provision in the 1935 and
1973 Constitution authorizing the State to grant licenses, concessions,
or leases for the exploration, exploitation, development, or utilization
of natural resources. By such omission, the utilization of inalienable
lands of the public domain through license, concession or lease is no
longer allowed under the 1987 Constitution.
Under the concession system, the concessionaire makes a direct
equity investment for the purpose of exploiting a particular natural
resource within a given area. The concession amounts to complete
control by the concessionaire over the country‘s natural resource, for
it is given exclusive and plenary rights to exploit a particular resource
at the point of extraction.
The 1987 Constitution, moreover, has deleted the
phrase ―management or other forms of assistance in the 1973
Charter. The present Constitution now allows only ―technical and
financial assistance. The management and the operation of the mining
activities by foreign contractors, the primary feature of the service
contracts was precisely the evil the drafters of the 1987 Constitution
sought to avoid.
The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAAs
is an exception to the rule that participation in the nation‘s natural
resources is reserved exclusively to Filipinos. Accordingly, such
provision must be construed strictly against their enjoyment by
non-Filipinos. Therefore, RA 7942 is invalid insofar as the said act
authorizes service contracts. Although the statute employs the
phrase ―financial and technical agreements in accordance with the
1987 Constitution, its pertinent provisions actually treat these
agreements as service contracts that grant beneficial ownership to
foreign contractors contrary to the fundamental law.
The underlying assumption in the provisions of the law is that the
foreign contractor manages the mineral resources just like the foreign
contractor in a service contract. By allowing foreign contractors to
manage or operate all the aspects of the mining operation, RA 7942
has, in effect, conveyed beneficial ownership over the nation‘s mineral
resources to these contractors, leaving the State with nothing but
bare title thereto.
The same provisions, whether by design or inadvertence, permit a
circumvention of the constitutionally ordained 60-40% capitalization
requirement for corporations or associations engaged in the
exploitation, development and utilization of Philippine natural
resources.
When parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and connected as
conditions, considerations, inducements or compensations for each
other as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a
whole, then if some parts are unconstitutional, all provisions that are
thus dependent, conditional or connected, must fail with them.
Under Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Charter, foreign owned
corporations are limited only to merely technical or financial assistance
to the State for large scale exploration, development and utilization of
minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils.
Second Issue: RP Government-WMCP FTAA is a Service Contract
The FTAA between he WMCP and the Philippine government is likewise
unconstitutional since the agreement itself is a service contract.
Section 1.3 of the FTAA grants WMCP a fully foreign owned
corporation, the exclusive right to explore, exploit, utilize and dispose
of all minerals and by-products that may be produced from the
contract area. Section 1.2 of the same agreement provides that EMCP
shall provide all financing, technology, management, and personnel
necessary for the Mining Operations.
These contractual stipulations and related provisions in the FTAA
taken together, grant WMCP beneficial ownership over natural
resources that properly belong to the State and are intended for the
benefit of its citizens. These stipulations are abhorrent to the 1987
Constitution. They are precisely the vices that the fundamental law
seeks to avoid, the evils that it aims to suppress. Consequently, the
contract from which they spring must be struck down.
LEGAL PRINCIPLE:
By virtue of Sections 10.2 (e) and 3.3. of the WMCP FTAA, the foreign
FTAA contractor is given the power to hold inalienable mineral land of
up to 5,000 hectares, with the assistance of the State's power of
eminent domain, free of charge, for a period of up to 50 years in
contravention of Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution