CASE 1

G.R. Nos. 221103 October 16, 2018

REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES, Petitioner v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, Respondents

Constitutional Law; Constituting quorum; Rule 6(a) of the 2015 HRET Rules requires the
presence of at least one Justice and four members of the Tribunal to constitute a quorum. This
means that even when all the Justices are present, at least two members of the House of
Representatives need to be present to constitute a quorum. Without this rule, it would be possible
for five members of the House of Representatives to convene and have a quorum even when no
Justice is present. This would render ineffective the rationale contemplated by the framers of
1935 and 1987 Constitution. The rule does not make Justices indispensable members to
constitute a quorum but rather ensure that representatives from both the Judicial and Legislative
departments are present to constitute a quorum. Members from both the Judicial and Legislative
departments become indispensable to constitute a quorum.
CARPIO, J.:
FACTS: In November 2015, the HRET published the 2015 Revised Rules of House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (2015 HRET Rules).
Petitioner alleges that she has two pending cases before the HRET and the application of
the 2015 HRET Rules to all pending cases could prejudice her cases before the HRET.
It is the contention of the petitioner that Rule 6 of the HRET Rules which requires the
presence of at least one Justice in order to constitute a quorum is unconstitutional for it grants
more powers to the Justices individually than the legislators because even when all six legislators
are present, they cannot constitute themselves as a body and cannot act as an Executive
Committee without the presence of any of the Justices thereby making the latter an indispensable
members thereof. Petitioner alleges that the rule violates the equal protection clause of the
Constitution by conferring the privilege of being indispensable members upon the Justices.
On February 2, 2016, HRET filed its comment maintaining that it has the power to
promulgate its own rules that would govern the proceedings before it. It points out that under
Rule 6 of the 2015 HRET Rules, a quorum requires the presence of at least one Justice-member
and four members of the Tribunal for the purpose of maintaining judicial equilibrium in deciding
election contests and because the duty to decide election cases is a judicial function.
ISSUE: Whether or not the provision of 2015 HRET Rules specifically Rule 6 (a)
requiring the presence of at least one Justice in order to constitute a quorum is constitutional.
HELD: AFFIRMATIVE. The Court elucidated the composition of HRET which is expressly
provided on Section 17, Article VI of the 1987“…Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of
nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the
Chief Justice, and all the remaining six shall be Members of the House of Representatives….”
Thus, it is clear that the HRET is a collegial body with members from two separate departments
of the government: the Judicial and the Legislative departments. Rule 6 of the 2015 HRET Rules
does not grant additional powers to the Justices but rather maintains the balance of power
between the members from the Judicial and Legislative departments as envisioned by the 1935
and 1987 Constitutions. The presence of the three Justices or even at least one is meant to tone
down the political nature of the cases involved and do away with the impression that party
interests play a part in the decision making process. In the case at bar, while it is true that in
constituting a quorum, legislators cannot act without Justices, it does not in any manner make an
indispensable privilege upon Justices nor it violates the equal protection clause for there is a
valid classification to ensure the presence from both Judicial and Legislative branches to
constitute a quorum. Thus, Rule 6 (a) requiring the presence of at least one Justice in order to
constitute a quorum is constitutional.
CASE 2

G.R. Nos. 176549 October 10, 2018

DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, QUEZON CITY & PABLO MENDOZA,
Petitioner v. ROMEO C. CARRIEDO, Respondents

Constitutional Law; Right of retention; Both the Constitution and Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law (CARL) underscore the underlying principle of agrarian reform program, that is, to
endeavor a more equitable and just distribution of agricultural lands taking into account, among
others, equity considerations.
JARDELEZA, J.:
FACTS: In June 1990, Romeo C. Carriedo unilaterally sold his landholdings to People’s
Livelihood Foundation (PLFI) his agricultural landholdings with approximately 58.3723
hectares.
It now becomes a dispute whether Carriedos’s previous sale of his landholdings to PLFI can
be treated as the exercise of his retention rights, such that he cannot lawfully claim the subject
landholding as his retained area anymore.
On January 20, 2016, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision adjudging Item No. 4 of
AO 05-06 as ultra vires for providing terms which appear to expand or modify some provisions
of the CARL.
Item No. 4 of AO 05-06 as applied to this case, petitioner DAR submits that the subject
landholding cannot be considered as the retained area of Carriedo anymore because he has
already exercised his right of retention when he previously sold his landholdings without DAR
clearance. Therefore, Carriedo’s act of disposing his landholdings is tantamount to the exercise
of his retention right under the law. It further contends that the ruling of CA sets back the CARL
by upsetting its established substantive and procedural components and disregarded the long-
standing procedure where the DAR treats a sale (without its clearance) as valid based on the
doctrine of estoppel, and that the sold portion is treated as the landowner’s retained area.
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) being a government agency legally mandated to
implement the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) and the primary agency vested
with the expertise on technicalities of the CARL assails the validity of DAR Administrative
Order No. 5 Series of 2006 (AO 05-06).

ISSUE: Whether or not the DAR Administrative Order No. 5 Series of 2006 (AO 05-06)
is valid.
HELD: AFFIRMATIVE. It is mandated by Constitution specifically under Section 4, Article
XIII thereof, there must be a just distribution of all agricultural lands subject to such priorities
and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe. CARL, giving life to the said
Constitutional provision provided in its Declaration of Principles and Policies that a more
equitable distribution and ownership of land with due regard to the rights of landowners to just
compensation shall be undertaken. The Court elucidated that in order to ensure the effective
implementation of the CARL, previous sales of landholding (without DAR clearance) should be
treated as the exercise of retention rights of the landowner, as embodied in Item No.4 of AO 05-
06, hence, the objective is equitable. It is held that equity in this policy of AO 05-06 is apparent
and easily discernible. By selling his landholdings, it is reasonable presumed that the landowner
already received an amount (as purchase price) commensurate to the just compensation
conformable with the constitutional and statutory requirement. In the case at bar, equity dictates
that he cannot claim anymore, either in the guise of his retention area or otherwise, that which he
already received in the previous sale of his land.

CASE 3

G.R. Nos. 202678 October 12, 2018

ERNESTINA A. PAGDANGANAN, RODERICK APACIBLE PAGDANGANAN, MARIA
ROSARIO LOTA represented by her Attorney-inFact, ERNESTINA A.
PAGDANGANAN, and SANDA APACIBLE PAGDANGANAN, as the heirs and
substitutes of deceased ISAURO J. PAGDANGANAN, ALFONSO ORTIGAS
OLONDRIZ, and CITIBANK N.A. HONGKONG, Petitioners v. THE COURT OF
APPEALS and MA. SUSANA A.S. MADRIGAL, MA. ROSA A.S. MADRIGAL,
MATHILDA S. OLONDRIZ, VICENTE A.S. MADRIGAL. ROSEMARIE OPIS-
MALASIG, MARIA TERESA S. UBANO, EDUARDO E. DELA CRUZ and GUILLER B.
ASIDO , Respondents

Constitutional Law; Speedy disposition of cases: The Constitution specifies specific time periods
when court may resolve cases. The Court of Appeals is given a 12-month period to resolve any
case that has already been submitted for decision. Any case pending 12 months after submission
for decision may be considered as delay. The parties may file the necessary action, such as
petition for mandamus, to protect their constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases.
LEONEN, J.:
FACTS: Solid Guaranty, Inc. is a domestic corporation engaged in the insurance business. In
November 23, 2007, Solid Guaranty, through its minority stockholder, Pagdanganan, filed a
complaint before RTC Manila due to the alleged conflicting claims between respondents
Madrigals and Citibank over the shares of stock previously held by the late Antonio P. Madrigal.
On November 26, 2007, while the case was pending, Special Stockholders’ Meeting was
called to elect new members of Board of Directors. Petitioners Solid Guaranty and Pagdanganan
seeks to amend the complaint and to nullify the stockholders’ meeting and election of the
directors and officers. An Urgent Motion for Permission to Take Custody of Stock Transfer
Book and Other Corporate Records of Solid Guaranty was filed by Corporate Secretary Urbano
before the RTC. Six months later, another motion was filed by Urbano.
On June 2008, RTC granted Urbano’s second motion, considering that the shares of stock to
be transferred were not subject of the interpleader suit. Urbano then called for the holding of a
Special Stockholders’ Meeting. On the contrary, petitioners Solid Guaranty and Pagdanganan
filed a motion with RTC to prevent the holding of the meeting. The RTC authorized the holding
of the meeting so the Special Annual Stockholders’ Meeting was held and new members of the
Board of Directors were elected. Subsequently, petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus, with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction with the Court of
Appeals alleging that RTC committed a grave abuse of discretion in allowing the holding of June
30, 2008 meeting despite the pendency of interpleader suit. Motion for Leave to File
Supplemental Petition was likewise filed by petitioners.
On August 2008, comments to the petition were filed by both parties. In October 2008, CA
received Motion to Admit Second Supplemental Petition filed by petitioners and granted the
same. CA directed the submission of comments on the petition. All the parties submitted their
respective memoranda by the 27th of October 2008. Moreover, a Motion for Leave to File Third
Supplemental Petition was filed on December on the same year.
On October 22, 2009, CA acknowledged that the case could have already been submitted for
a decision but was deferred because of the subsequent filing of the Second and Third
Supplemental Petitions. However, filing of comments on the Third Supplemental Petition were
directed. Thus, a Comment dated November 12, 2009 was filed.
On October 6, 2010, CA issued a resolution expunging from the record the Second and
Third Supplemental Petitions. The case is submitted for decision. On October 9, 2010,
petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the October 6, 2010 Resolution.
On March 24, 2011, petitioner Pagdanganan passed away; thus, counsel moved for the
substitution of parties.
On January 2012, petitioners filed a Motion for Mediation with the Court of Appeals. On
March 1, 2012, they likewise filed a Motion for Reconsideration. While the Motions were
pending with the Court of Appeals, or on August 2, 2012, petitioners filed Petition for
Mandamus against respondents. They alleged that CA committed inordinate delay in resolving
their Petition filed on July 11, 2008. They claimed that the Court of Appeals, “continued inaction
on the case is clearly a neglect of its judicial duties.” CA denied the Motion for Mediation as it
was unilaterally made. Motion for Reconsideration of its October 6, 2010 Resolution was
likewise denied.
On February 8, 2013, CA dismissed the petition for the questioned orders of the RTC were
not rendered in grave abuse of discretion.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed inordinate delay in resolving the
petition.

HELD: NEGATIVE. The Court of Appeals did not delay in resolving the petition. All persons
have the constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases which is expressly enshrined under
Section 15 of the Constitution. In the case at bar, it was only December 14, 2012 that the Court
of Appeals declared with finality that the petition was submitted for decision. CA finally
resolved the Petition on February 8, 2008 or less than 2 months from its final pronouncement
submitting the case for decision. The Court of Appeals has resolved the petition in a timely
manner within the period provided by law, thus, petitioners’ invocation of the right to speedy
disposition of cases is misplaced.
It was, thus, inaccurate for petitioners to accuse the Court of Appeals of delay in resolving
their petition filed in 2008 without taking into account the numerous pleadings they had filed
while the petition was pending. The case is dismissed.