G.R. No. 185604               June 13, 2013 and on the W. by Lot No. 2.
and on the W. by Lot No. 2. Beginning at a point marked "1" on plan, being
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
EDWARD M. CAMACHO, Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before this Court is a petition1 for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, seeking the reversal of the
Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 87390, which
affirmed the Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Villasis,
Pangasinan, Branch 50 in Land Registration Case No. V -0016.
The facts follow.
On March 6, 2003, respondent Edward M. Camacho filed a
petition4 denominated as "Re: Petition for Reconstitution of the Original Title
of O.C.T. No. (not legible) and Issuance of Owner's Duplicate Copy" before
the RTC.
In support thereof, respondent alleged that the Original Certificate of
Title5 (OCT) sought to be reconstituted and whose number is no longer
legible due to wear and tear, is covered by Decree No. 444263, Case No.
3732, Record No. 221416 issued in the name of Spouses Nicasio Lapitan and
Ana Doliente (Spouses Lapitan) of Alcala, Pangasinan. Respondent also
alleged that the owner’s duplicate copy of the OCT is in his possession and
that he is the owner of the two parcels of land covered by the
aforementioned OCT by virtue of a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition with
Absolute Sale7 (the Deed) executed on December 26, 2002 by the heirs of
Spouses Lapitan in his favor. Said OCT covers two parcels of land located in
San Juan, Alcala, Pangasinan, (Lot No. 1) and Namulatan,8 Bautista,
Pangasinan (Lot No. 2) with the following technical descriptions:
A parcel of land (Lot No. 1, plan Psu- 53673), situated in the Barrio of San
Juan, Municipality of Alcala. Bounded on the NE. by property of Benito
Ferrer; on the S. by an irrigation ditch and property of Marcelo Monegas;
S. 0 deg. 53’ W., 3830.91 m. from B. L. L. M. No. 1, Alcala; thence S. 87
deg. 22’ W., 44.91 m. to point "2"; thence N. 5 deg. 25’ W., 214.83 m. to
point "3"; thence S. 17 deg. 06’ E., 221.61 m. to the point of beginning;
containing an area of four thousand eight hundred and eighteen square
meters (4,818), more or less. All points referred to are indicated on the plan
and on the ground are marked by old P. L. S. concrete monuments;
bearings true; declination 0 deg. 40’ E.; date of survey, April 19-21, 1926;
and
A parcel of land (Lot No. 2, plan Psu-53673), situated in the Barrio of
Namulatan, Municipality of Bautista. Bounded on the N. by properties of
Hipolito Sarmiento and Ciriaco Dauz; on the E. by Lot No.1; and on the SW.
by property of Nicasio Lapitan vs. Felix Bacolor. Beginning at a point marked
"1" on plan, being S. 2 deg. 40’ W., 3625.25 m. from B. L. L. M. No. 1,
Alcala; thence N. 80 deg. 47’ E., 3.50 m. to point "2"; thence N. 86 deg. 53’
E., 40.64 m. to point "3"; thence S. 5 deg. 25’ E., 214.83 m. to point "4";
thence N. 16 deg. 57’ W., 220.69 m. to the point of beginning; containing
an area of four thousand seven hundred and fortyfour square meters
(4,744), more or less. All points referred to are indicated on the plan and on
the ground are marked by old P. L. S. concrete monuments; bearings true;
declination 0 deg. 40’ E.; date of survey April 19-21, 1926.9
Respondent attached to his petition photocopies of the Deed; the OCT; Tax
Declaration No. 485810; a Certification11 dated January 13, 2003 issued by
the Office of the Register of Deeds of Lingayen, Pangasinan stating that the
file copy of the OCT could not be found and is considered lost and beyond
recovery; and Decree No. 444263.12
Upon a Show-Cause Order13 of the RTC, respondent filed an Amended
Petition14 dated May 21, 2003, alleging that the subject properties bear no
encumbrance; that there are no improvements therein; that there are no
other occupants thereof aside from respondent; and that there are no deeds
or instruments affecting the same that had been presented for registration.
He further alleged that "the land in issue is bounded on the North by the
land covered by Plan Psu-53673; on the North by the properties of Hipolito
Sarmiento and Cipriano Dauz,15 residents of Anulid, Alcala, Pangasinan; on
the West by Lot No. 3; and on the Southwest by the properties of Nicasio
Lapitan vs. Felix Bacolor who are also residents of Anulid, Alcala,
Pangasinan."16 Respodent intimated that he desires to have the office/file
copy of the OCT reconstituted based on the Technical Description provided
by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office and thereafter, to be
issued a second owner’s duplicate copy in lieu of the old one.
On May 30, 2003, the RTC issued an Order17 finding the respondent’s
petition sufficient in form and substance and setting the same for hearing
on September 29, 2003. The said Order is herein faithfully reproduced as
follows:
ORDER
In a verified petition, petitioner Edward Camacho, as vendee of the parcels
of land located in San Juan, Alcala, Pangasinan, and Namulatan, Bautista,
Pangasinan, covered by Decree No. 444263, Case No. 3732, G.L.R.O. No.
22141, formerly issued in the names of spouses Nicasio Lapitan and Ana
Doliente, of Alcala, Pangasinan, under an Original Certificate of Title the
number of which is not legible due to wear and tear, seeks an order
directing the proper authorities and the Registrar of Deeds, Lingayen,
Pangasinan, to reconstitute the office file copy of said Original Certificate of
Title based on the technical description thereof and to issue a second
owner’s duplicate copy of the same in lieu of the old one.
Being sufficient in form and substance, the petition is set for hearing on
September 29, 2003, at 8:30 in the morning, before this Court, on which
date, time and place, all interested persons are enjoined to appear and
show cause why the same should not be granted.
Let this order be published twice in successive issues of the Official Gazette
at the expense of the petitioner.
Likewise, let copies of this Order and of the Amended Petition be posted in
conspicuous places in the Provincial Capitol and the Registry of Deeds, both
in Lingayen, Pangasinan, the Municipal Halls of Alcala and Bautista,
Pangasinan, and the Barangay Halls of San Juan, Alcala, Pangasinan and
Namulatan, Bautista, Pangasinan, and the Office of the Solicitor General,
Manila.
Finally, furnish copies of this Order, by registered mail, at the expense of
the petitioner, to the following:
1. Hipolito Sarmiento;
2. Cipriano Dauz;
3. Nicasio Lapitan; and
4. Felix Bacolor.
all of Brgy. Anulid, Alcala, Pangasinan.
SO ORDERED.18
Thereafter, copies of the said order were posted on seven bulletin boards:
at the Pangasinan Provincial Capitol Building, at the Alcala and Bautista
Municipal Buildings, at the San Juan and Namulatan Barangay Halls, at the
office of the Register of Deeds in Lingayen, Pangasinan and at the
RTC.19 The order was also published twice in the Official Gazette: on August
18, 2003 (Volume 99, Number 33, Page 5206), and on August 25, 2003
(Volume 99, Number 34, Page 5376).20
However, on January 22, 2004, respondent filed his second Amended
Petition21 averring that "the land in issue is bounded on the North by the
land of Ricardo Acosta, a resident of Laoac, Alcala, Pangasinan; on the
South by the property of Greg Viray,22 a resident of Laoac, Alcala,
Pangasinan; on the West by the land of Roque Lanuza, 23 a resident of
Laoac, Alcala, Pangasinan; and on the East by the lot of Juan Cabuan, 24 a
resident of Laoac, Alcala, Pangasinan."25 On March 4, 2004, respondent filed
a Motion26 with Leave of Court to admit his second Amended Petition, which
the RTC granted in its Order27 dated March 4, 2004, directing therein that
the persons mentioned in the second Amended Petition be notified by
registered mail.
During the hearing, the following witnesses were presented: (1)
respondent28 who, among others, presented the original owner’s duplicate
copy of the OCT before the RTC;29 (2) the tenant of the adjoining lot
(Western portion) Roque Lanuza who testified that he tilled the adjoining
lots, that he has personal knowledge that respondent bought said lots from
the heirs of the Spouses Lapitan, and that he was present when the lots
were surveyed;30 (3) adjoining owners Gregorio Viray31 and Ricardo
Acosta32 who testified that they were notified of the proceedings and
interposed no objection to the petition; and (4) Arthur David (Mr. David),
Records Custodian of the Register of Deeds of Lingayen, Pangasinan who
testified that Atty. Rufino Moreno, Jr., Registrar of Deeds had issued the
Certification that the OCT subject of the petition can no longer be found in
the Office of the Register of Deeds.33 In his subsequent testimony, Mr.
David reported to the RTC that the name of Nicasio Lapitan cannot be
located in the Index Cards of titles as some are missing and destroyed.
Upon questioning, Mr. David testified that the number of the OCT sought to
be reconstituted may be referred to in the decree issued in the name of
Nicasio Lapitan which allegedly could be found in the Land Registration
Authority (LRA).34
On May 23, 2005, the LRA rendered a Report35 addressed to the RTC which
pertinently stated, to wit:
(1) The present amended petition seeks the reconstitution of Original
Certificate of Title No. (not legible), allegedly lost or destroyed and
supposedly covering Lot Nos. 1 and 2 of plan Psu-53673, situated in the
Barrio of San Juan, Municipality of Alcala and Barrio of Namulatan,
Municipality of Bautista, respectively, Province of Pangasinan, on the basis
of the owner’s duplicate thereof, a reproduction of which, duly certified by
Atty. Stela Marie Q. Gandia-Asuncion, Clerk of Court VI, was submitted to
this Authority;
(2) Our records show that Decree No. 444263 was issued on July 18, 1931
covering Lot Nos. 1 and 2 of plan Psu-53673, in Cadastral Case No. 3732,
GLRO Record No. 22141 in favor of the Spouses Nicasio Lapitan and Ana
Doliente;
(3) The technical descriptions of Lot Nos. 1 and 2 of plan Psu-53673,
appearing on the reproduction of Original Certificate of Title No. (not
legible) were found correct after examination and due computation and
when plotted in the Municipal Index Sheet No. 451/1027, do not appear to
overlap previously plotted/decreed properties in the area.
The government prosecutor deputized by the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG)36 participated in the trial of the case but did not present controverting
evidence.37
On March 9, 2006, the RTC rendered the assailed Decision, 38 the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court, finding the documentary as well as the parole (sic)
evidence adduced to be adequate and sufficiently persuasive to warrant the
reconstitution of the Original Certificate of Title covered by Decree No.
444263, Cadastral Case No. 3732, GLRO Record No. 22141, and pursuant to
Section 110, PD No. 1529 and Sections 2 (d) and 15 of RA No. 26, hereby
directs the Register of Deeds at Lingayen, Pangasinan, to reconstitute said
original certificate of title on the basis of the decree of registration thereof,
without prejudice to the annotation of any subsisting rights or interests not
duly noted in these proceedings, if any, and the right of the Administrator,
Land Registration Authority, as provided for in Sec. 16, Land Registration
Commission (now NALTDRA) Circular No. 35, dated June 13, 1983, and to
issue a new owner's duplicate copy thereof.
SO ORDERED.39
On April 4, 2006, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG,
filed a Motion for Reconsideration40 which was denied by the RTC in its
Resolution41 dated May 24, 2006 for lack of merit. The RTC opined that
while the number of the OCT is not legible, a close examination of the
entries therein reveals that it is an authentic OCT per the LRA’s findings.
Moreover, the RTC held that respondent complied with Section 2 of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 2642 considering that the reconstitution in this case is based
on the owner’s duplicate copy of the OCT.
Petitioner appealed to the CA.43 By Decision44 dated July 31, 2008, the CA
affirmed the RTC’s findings and ruling, holding that respondent’s petition is
governed by Section 10 of R.A. No. 26 since the reconstitution proceedings
is based on the owner’s duplicate copy of the OCT itself. The CA, invoking
this Court’s ruling in Puzon v. Sta. Lucia Realty and Development,
Inc.,45 concluded that notice to the owners of the adjoining lots is not
required. Moreover, the CA opined that Decree No. 444263 issued on July
18, 1931 covering Lot Nos. 1 and 2 in the name of Spouses Lapitan exists in
the Record Book of the LRA as stated in the LRA’s Report. The CA
ratiocinated that the LRA’s Report on said Decree tallies with the subject
OCT leading to no other conclusion than that these documents cover the
same subject lots. Petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration 46 which the
CA, however, denied in its Resolution47 dated November 20, 2008.
Hence, this petition based on the following grounds, to wit:
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THE TRIAL
COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED THE PETITION FOR RECONSTITUTION EVEN
IF THE ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OFTITLE NUMBER IS NOT LEGIBLE; and
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THE TRIAL
COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED THE PRAYER FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A
SECOND OWNER’S DUPLICATE.48
Petitioner through the OSG avers that respondent does not have any basis
for reconstitution because the OCT per se is of doubtful existence, as
respondent himself does not know its number. According to the OSG, this
fact alone negates the merits of the petition for reconstitution as held by
this Court in Tahanan Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, et
al.49 Moreover, the OSG highlights that the Deed, the tax declaration for the
year 2003, and the Register of Deeds Certification all indicated that the
number of the OCT is not legible. The OSG also stresses that nowhere in
the records did the LRA acknowledge that it has on file the original copy of
Decree No. 444263 from which the alleged OCT was issued and that said
Decree did not at all establish the existence and previous issuance of the
OCT sought to be reconstituted. The OSG notes that the RTC erred, as
found in the dispositive portion of its decision, in basing the reconstitution
of the OCT under Section 2(d) of R.A. No. 26. Finally, the OSG submits that
respondent cannot seek the issuance of the second owner’s duplicate of the
OCT because he himself alleged in his own petition that he is in possession
of the same owner’s duplicate certificate.50
On the other hand, respondent counters that the OSG’s reliance in Tahanan
and Republic of the Phils. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,51 is unavailing.
He argues that in Tahanan, the petitioner therein merely relied on
documents other than the owner’s duplicate copy of the certificate of title,
while in Republic, this Court ruled that reconstitution cannot be based on
statutes which do not confer title over the property. Respondent claims that
in these aforementioned cases, petitioners therein do not have other
sources to support their respective petitions for reconstitution while in this
case the owner’s duplicate copy of the OCT sought to be reconstituted truly
exists albeit its number is not legible. Respondent submits that the
documentary as well as the parol evidence he adduced are adequate to
warrant the reconstitution of the OCT as it is covered by Decree No.
444263. Respondent also submits that since there is a valid title in this case,
there is legal basis for the issuance of the owner’s duplicate copy of the
reconstituted title.52
Notwithstanding the numerous contentions raised by both parties, this Court
finds that the fundamental issue to be resolved in this case is whether the
RTC properly acquired and was invested with jurisdiction in the first place to
hear and decide Land Registration Case No. V-0016 in the light of the strict
and mandatory provisions of R.A. No. 26.
We resolve the sole issue in the negative.
Section 11053 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the
Property Registration Decree, as amended by R.A. No. 6732,54 allows the
reconstitution of lost or destroyed original Torrens title either judicially, in
accordance with the special procedure laid down in R.A. No. 26, or
administratively, in accordance with the provisions of R.A. No. 6732.55
As the case set before this Court is one for judicial reconstitution, we limit
the discussion to the pertinent law, which is R.A. No. 26, and the applicable
jurisprudence.
The nature of the proceeding for reconstitution of a certificate of title under
R.A. No. 26 denotes a restoration of the instrument, which is supposed to
have been lost or destroyed, in its original form and condition. The purpose
of such a proceeding is merely to have the certificate of title reproduced,
after proper proceedings, in the same form it was in when its loss or
destruction occurred. The same R.A. No. 26 specifies the requisites to be
met for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over a petition for
reconstitution of a certificate of title. Failure to comply with any of these
jurisdictional requirements for a petition for reconstitution renders the
proceedings null and void. Thus, in obtaining a new title in lieu of the lost or
destroyed one, R.A. No. 26 laid down procedures which must be strictly
followed in view of the danger that reconstitution could be the source of
anomalous titles or unscrupulously availed of as an easy substitute for
original registration of title proceedings.56
It bears reiterating that respondent’s quest for judicial reconstitution in this
case is anchored on the owner’s duplicate copy of said OCT – a source for
reconstitution of title provided under Section 2 (a) of R.A. No. 26, which
provides in full as follows:
SEC. 2. Original certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such of the
sources hereunder enumerated as may be available, in the following order:
a. The owner’s duplicate of the certificate of title;
b. The co-owner’s, mortgagee’s, or lessee’s duplicate of the certificate of
title;
c. A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by the register
of deeds or by a legal custodian thereof;
d. An authenticated copy of the decree of registration or patent, as the case
may be, pursuant to which the original certificate of title was issued;
e. A document, on file in the registry of deeds, by which the property, the
description of which is given in said document, is mortgaged, leased or
encumbered, or an authenticated copy of said document showing that its
original had been registered; and
f. Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and
proper basis for reconstituting the lost or destroyed certificate of title.
(Emphasis supplied.)
In this aspect, the CA was correct in invoking our ruling in Puzon v. Sta.
Lucia Realty and Development, Inc.,57 that notices to owners of adjoining
lots and actual occupants of the subject property are not mandatory and
jurisdictional in a petition for judicial reconstitution of destroyed certificate
of title when the source for such reconstitution is the owner’s duplicate copy
thereof since the publication, posting and notice requirements for such a
petition are governed by Section 10 in relation to Section 9 of R.A. No. 26.
Section 10 provides:
SEC. 10. Nothing hereinbefore provided shall prevent any registered owner
or person in interest from filing the petition mentioned in section five of this
Act directly with the proper Court of First Instance, based on sources
enumerated in sections 2(a), 2(b), 3(a), 3(b), and/or 4(a) of this Act:
Provided, however, That the court shall cause a notice of the petition,
before hearing and granting the same, to be published in the manner stated
in section nine hereof: And, provided, further, That certificates of title
reconstituted pursuant to this section shall not be subject to the
encumbrance referred to in section seven of this Act. (Emphasis supplied.)
Correlatively, the pertinent provisions of Section 9 on the publication,
posting and the contents of the notice of the Petition for Reconstitution
clearly mandate:
SEC. 9. x x x Thereupon, the court shall cause a notice of the petition to be
published, at the expense of the petitioner, twice in successive issues of the
Official Gazette, and to be posted on the main entrance of the provincial
building and of the municipal building of the municipality or city in which the
land lies, at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing, and after hearing,
shall determine the petition and render such judgment as justice and equity
may require. The notice shall specify, among other things, the number of
the certificate of title, the name of the registered owner, the names of the
interested parties appearing in the reconstituted certificate of title, the
location of the property, and the date on which all persons having an
interest in the property must appear and file such claim as they may have. x
x x (Emphasis supplied.)
In sum, Section 10, in relation to Section 9, requires that 30 days before the
date of hearing, (1) a notice be published in two successive issues of the
Official Gazette at the expense of the petitioner, and that (2) such notice be
posted at the main entrances of the provincial building and of the municipal
hall where the property is located. The notice shall state the following: (1)
the number of the certificate of title, (2) the name of the registered owner,
(3) the names of the interested parties appearing in the reconstituted
certificate of title, (4) the location of the property, and (5) the date on
which all persons having an interest in the property, must appear and file
such claims as they may have.58
Verily, while the CA invoked the appropriate provisions of R.A. No. 26, it
failed, however, to take note that Section 9 thereof mandatorily requires
that the notice shall specify, among other things, the number of the
certificate of title and the names of the interested parties appearing in the
reconstituted certificate of title. In this case, the RTC failed to indicate these
jurisdictional facts in the notice.
First. The Notice of Hearing issued and published does not align with the in
rem character of the reconstitution proceedings and the mandatory nature
of the requirements under R.A. No. 26.59 There is a mortal insufficiency in
the publication when the missing title was merely identified as "OCT No.
(not legible)" which is non-compliant with Section 9 of R.A. No. 26.
Moreover, while the LRA confirmed the issuance of Decree No. 444263 in its
Report, it perplexes this Court that the LRA failed to state that an OCT was
actually issued and mention the number of the OCT sought to be
reconstituted. In Republic of the Phils. v. El Gobierno De Las Islas
Filipinas,60 this Court denied the petition for reconstitution of title despite
the existence of a decree:
We also find insufficient the index of decree showing that Decree No.
365835 was issued for Lot No. 1499, as a basis for reconstitution. We
noticed that the name of the applicant as well as the date of the issuance of
such decree was illegible. While Decree No. 365835 existed in the Record
Book of Cadastral Lots in the Land Registration Authority as stated in the
Report submitted by it, however, the same report did not state the number
of the original certificate of title, which is not sufficient evidence in support
of the petition for reconstitution. The deed of extrajudicial declaration of
heirs with sale executed by Aguinaldo and Restituto Tumulak Perez and
respondent on February 12, 1979 did not also mention the number of the
original certificate of title but only Tax Declaration No. 00393. As we held in
Tahanan Development Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, the absence of any
document, private or official, mentioning the number of the certificate of
title and the date when the certificate of title was issued, does not warrant
the granting of such petition. (Emphasis supplied.)
Second. Respondent and the RTC overlooked that there are two parcels of
land in this case. It is glaring that respondent had to amend his petition for
reconstitution twice in order to state therein the names of the adjoining
owners. Most importantly, the Notice of Hearing issued by the RTC failed to
state the names of interested parties appearing in the OCT sought to be
reconstituted, particularly the adjoining owners to Lot No. 1, namely, Benito
Ferrer and Marcelo Monegas. While it is true that notices need not be sent
to the adjoining owners in this case since this is not required under Sections
9 and 10 of R.A. No. 26 as enunciated in our ruling in Puzon, it is
imperative, however, that the notice should specify the names of said
interested parties so named in the title sought to be reconstituted. No less
than Section 9 of R.A. No. 26 mandates it.
Well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that where the words of a statute are
clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning
and applied without attempted interpretation. Verba legis non est
recedendum. From the words of a statute there should be no departure.61 In
view of these lapses, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction to proceed with
the case since the mandatory manner or mode of obtaining jurisdiction as
prescribed by R.A. No. 26 had not been strictly followed, thereby rendering
the proceedings utterly null and void.62 As such, while petitioner overlooked
these jurisdictional infirmities and failed to incorporate them as additional
issues in its own petition, this Court has sufficient authority to pass upon
and resolve the same since they affect jurisdiction.63
Apropos is our ruling in Castillo v. Republic64 where we held that:
We cannot simply dismiss these defects as "technical." Liberal construction
of the Rules of Court does not apply to land registration cases. Indeed, to
further underscore the mandatory character of these jurisdictional
requirements, the Rules of Court do not apply to land registration cases. In
all cases where the authority of the courts to proceed is conferred by a
statute, and when the manner of obtaining jurisdiction is prescribed by a
statute, the mode of proceeding is mandatory, and must be strictly complied
with, or the proceeding will be utterly void. When the trial court lacks
jurisdiction to take cognizance of a case, it lacks authority over the whole
case and all its aspects. All the proceedings before the trial court, including
its order granting the petition for reconstitution, are void for lack of
jurisdiction.65
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision
dated July 31, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 87390 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petition for reconstitution docketed as LRC
No. V-0016, RTC, Villasis, Pangasinan, Branch 50, is DISMISSED. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 213568, July 05, 2016 - ALICIA P. LOGARTA, Petitioner, v.
CATALINO M. MANGAHIS, Respondent.
G.R. No. 213568, July 05, 2016
ALICIA P. LOGARTA, Petitioner, v. CATALINO M. MANGAHIS, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the
Decision2 dated December 13, 2013 and the Resolution3 dated June 27,
2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 98819, which affirmed
the Order4 dated June 27, 2011 and the Amended Order5 dated December
29, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna, Branch 25 (RTC) in
LRC Case No. B-4122, directing the cancellation of Entry No. 626131, Entry
No. 626132, Entry No. 626133, and Entry No. 626134 on Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. CLO-763.
The Facts
Respondent Catalino M. Mangahis (respondent) is the registered owner of a
parcel of land in Barangay Malitlit, Sta. Rosa, Laguna, with an area of
28,889 square meters, and covered by TCT No. CLO-763 (subject
property).6 He authorized a certain Venancio Zamora (Zamora) to sell the
subject property, who, in turn, delegated his authority to Victor Peña
(Peña).7chanrobleslaw
On January 23, 2001, Peña entered into a Memorandum of Agreement8
(MOA) with Carmona Realty and Development Corporation (Carmona
Realty), represented by petitioner Alicia P. Logarta (petitioner), for the sale
to Carmona Realty of contiguous parcels of land in Malitlit, Sta. Rosa,
Laguna (Malitlit Estate) which included the subject property. The Malitlit
Estate had a total area of 1,194,427 square meters and Carmona Realty
agreed to deposit in escrow the total consideration of P1,476,834,000.00
within thirty (30) days from the execution of the MOA.9 The release of the
escrow deposits was subject to Peña's submission of a number of
documents, among others, the order of conversion from the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) allowing the use of the Malitlit Estate for residential,
industrial, commercial, or a combination of the foregoing uses, the transfer
of the TCTs and the Certificates of Land Ownership (CLOAs) in Carmona
Realty's name, and the release waiver and quitclaim executed by
complainants and/or order of dismissal of pending cases involving any of
the lands constituting the Malitlit Estate.10 The parties also agreed to make
the same effective unless Carmona Realty withdraws from it by reason of
force majeure or fails to make the escrow deposits within the period
specified therein, in which case the MOA shall be considered automatically
null and void.11chanrobleslaw
On March 28, 2003, the MOA was annotated12 on TCT No. CLO-763,
pursuant to the Sworn Statement to Request for Annotation13 executed by
petitioner and the Secretary's Certificate14 issued by Marianito R. Atienza,
Carmona Realty's Corporate Secretary. Thus, Entry Nos. 626131-626134
(the subject entries) were made on TCT No. CLO-
763:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Entry No. 626131. Secretary's Certificate
No. 626132. Letter;
No. 626133. Sworn Statement to Request Annotation of Memorandum of
Agreement. Executed by Alicia P. Logarta on 26 March 2003, ratified before
Notary Public Anthony B. Escobar, as per Doc. No. 499, Page No. 100, Book
No. 1, Series of 2003.
No. 626134. Memorandum of Agreement. Executed by and between Victor
Peña and Carmona Realty and Development Corporation on 23 January
2001, ratified before Notary Public Ma. Loreto U. Navarro, as per Doc. No.
68, Page No. 14, Book No. XVIII, Series of 2001, filed in Env. No. CLO-213.
Date of instrument: March 26, 2003
Date of inscription : March 28, 2003 at 1:05 p.m.
On August 8, 2008, respondent filed a petition15 to cancel the subject
entries on the ground that the MOA was a private document that had no
legal effect because the Notary Public before whom it was acknowledged
was not commissioned as such in the City of Manila for the year 2001. In
the same petition, respondent also sought the revocation of Zamora's
authority to sell the subject property.16chanrobleslaw
In opposition,17 petitioner contended that the MOA was duly notarized in
Makati City where the Notary Public, Atty. Loreto Navarro, was
commissioned.18 She also maintained that Peña had the authority to enter
into the MOA at the time it was executed, considering that respondent
expressed his intention to revoke the same only in the
petition.19chanrobleslaw
During the trial, respondent's brother and authorized20 representative,
Emiliano M. Mangahis, asserted that the subject entries should be cancelled
because the purpose for which they were made is no longer present since
petitioner did nothing to enforce the MOA.21 On the other hand, petitioner
argued that she is not the proper party to the case as she merely acted as
representative of Carmona Realty in the MOA.22chanrobleslaw
The RTC Ruling
In an Order23 dated June 27, 2011, the RTC granted the petition and
ordered the cancellation of the subject entries. It found that the subject
entries are adverse claims which ceased to be effective 30 days after
registration and should, therefore, be cancelled, pursuant to Section 70 of
Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1529,24 otherwise known as the "Property
Registration Decree," which states:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Section 70. Adverse claim. Whoever claims any part or interest in registered
land adverse to the registered owner, arising subsequent to the date of the
original registration, may, if no other provision is made in this Decree for
registering the same, make a statement in writing setting forth fully his
alleged right or interest, and how or under whom acquired, a reference to
the number of the certificate of title of the registered owner, the name of
the registered owner, and a description of the land in which the right or
interest is claimed.
The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall state the adverse
claimant's residence, and a place at which all notices may be served upon
him. This statement shall be entitled to registration as an adverse claim on
the certificate of title. The adverse claim shall be effective for a period of
thirty days from the date of registration. After the lapse of said period, the
annotation of adverse claim may be cancelled upon filing of a verified
petition therefor by the party in interest: Provided, however, that after
cancellation, no second adverse claim based on the same ground shall be
registered by the same claimant.
x x x x (Emphases supplied)
The RTC also remarked that the MOA no longer has any force and effect,
considering that Carmona Realty failed to make the escrow deposits
stipulated therein which rendered the same automatically null and
void.25cralawred It further explained that petitioner has other remedies
which she can pursue if Peña failed to comply with his obligations under the
MOA. In any case, however, the adverse claim cannot be inscribed on TCT
No. CLO-763 forever.26chanrobleslaw
Dissatisfied, petitioner moved for reconsideration,27 arguing that the
subject entries do not constitute an adverse claim but a voluntary dealing
which is governed by Section 54 of PD 1529.28 She also contended that the
RTC erred in declaring that the MOA no longer had any force and effect,
considering that there was no such allegation in respondent's petition and
no evidence to such effect was presented during trial.29chanrobleslaw
In an Amended Order30 dated December 29, 2011, the RTC denied
petitioner's motion for reconsideration and reiterated its directive to cancel
the subject entries. Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the
CA.31chanrobleslaw
The CA Ruling
In a Decision32 dated December 13, 2013, the CA dismissed petitioner's
appeal and affirmed the RTC ruling. It agreed with the trial court that the
subject entries are akin to an annotation of adverse claim which is a
measure designed to protect the interest of a person over a piece of real
property and governed by Section 70 of PD 1529.33 The CA reiterated the
RTC's observation that the MOA no longer had any force and effect, absent
any showing that Carmona Realty had made the escrow deposits stipulated
therein or that there was a mutual agreement between the parties to
extend its effectivity.34chanrobleslaw
Petitioner moved for reconsideration,35 which was, however, denied by the
CA in its Resolution36 dated June 27, 2014; hence, the present petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA and the
RTC erred in ordering the cancellation of the subject entries.
The Court's Ruling
The Court finds the petition meritorious.
An adverse claim is a type of involuntary dealing37 designed to protect the
interest of a person over a piece of real property by apprising third persons
that there is a controversy over the ownership of the land.38 It seeks to
preserve and protect the right of the adverse claimant during the pendency
of the controversy,39 where registration of such interest or right is not
otherwise provided for by the Property Registration Decree.40 An adverse
claim serves as a notice to third persons that any transaction regarding the
disputed land is subject to the outcome of the dispute.41 Section 70 of PD
1529 states:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Section 70. Adverse claim. Whoever claims any part or interest in registered
land adverse to the registered owner, arising subsequent to the date of the
original registration, may, if no other provision is made in this Decree for
registering the same, make a statement in writing setting forth fully his
alleged right or interest, and how or under whom acquired, a reference to
the number of the certificate of title of the registered owner, the name of
the registered owner, and a description of the land in which the right or
interest is claimed.
The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall state the adverse
claimant's residence, and a place at which all notices may be served upon
him. This statement shall be entitled to registration as an adverse claim on
the certificate of title. The adverse claim shall be effective for a period of
thirty days from the date of registration. After the lapse of said period, the
annotation of adverse claim may be cancelled upon filing of a verified
petition therefor by the party in interest: Provided, however, that after
cancellation, no second adverse claim based on the same ground shall be
registered by the same claimant.
Before the lapse of thirty days aforesaid, any party in interest may file a
petition in the Court of First Instance where the land is situated for the
cancellation of the adverse claim, and the court shall grant a speedy hearing
upon the question of the validity of such adverse claim, and shall render
judgment as may be just and equitable. If the adverse claim is adjudged to
be invalid, the registration thereof shall be ordered cancelled. If, in any
case, the court, after notice and hearing, shall find that the 4 adverse claim
thus registered was frivolous, it may fine the claimant in an amount not less
than one thousand pesos nor more than five thousand pesos, in his
discretion. Before the lapse of thirty days, the claimant may withdraw his
adverse claim by filing with the Register of Deeds a sworn petition to that
effect. (Emphases supplied)
Thus, before a notice of adverse claim is registered, it must be shown that
there is no other provision in law for the registration of the claimant's
alleged right in the property.42 In Register of Deeds of Quezon City v.
Nicandro,43 the Court held that where the basis of the adverse claim was a
perfected contract of sale which is specifically governed by Section 57 of the
Land Registration Act, or Act No. 496, the filing of an adverse claim was
held ineffective for the purpose of protecting the vendee's right.44 Similarly,
in L.P. Leviste & Company, Inc. v. Noblejas,45 the Court emphasized that if
the basis of the adverse claim is a perfected contract of sale, the proper
procedure is to register the vendee's right as prescribed by Sections 5146
and 5247 of PD 1529, and not under Section 70 which is ineffective for the
purpose of protecting the vendee's right since it does not have the effect of
a conveyance.48chanrobleslaw
In the case at hand, a cursory perusal of the MOA49 shows that it is
essentially a conditional sale where Carmona Realty's payment is subject to
the submission of certain documents by Peña, respondent's authorized
representative. Its relevant provisions state:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WITNESSETH, That:
xxxx
WHEREAS, the FIRST PARTY represents, that subject to the payment of an
agreed compensation to the CLOA holders/ARB[s], the Land Bank, and the
National Irrigation Authority, FIRST PARTY is willing and able to have all
titles, rights, interests and claims, transferred, ceded, conveyed, assigned or
waived in favor of the SECOND PARTY who has accepted the offer to sell
and has agreed to acquire and purchase the property, subject to the terms
and conditions set forth under this Agreement.
xxxx
III
ESCROW DEPOSIT OF PURCHASE PRICE
3.1 Within thirty (30) days from the execution of this Memorandum of
Agreement, the SECOND PARTY or its assignee or nominee shall deposit in
escrow with a bank or financial institution which is mutually acceptable to
the Parties, the total amount of x x x. Said amount shall be subject to
release by the escrow agent/bank and/or withdrawal in favor of the Parties
specified in Section II above, upon presentation of the documents specified
herein below, and as set forth in the Escrow instructions given by both
parties to the Escrow agent/bank.
3.2. To the FIRST PARTY:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryAll releases of the amounts under escrow in
favor of the FIRST PARTY of the full amount of x x x, shall be subject to the
submission by the FIRST PARTY of the following documents:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary1) Order of Conversion x x x
xxxx
IV
TRANSFER OF TITLE TO THE SECOND PARTY
4.1. The SECOND PARTY shall be entitled to have the subject CLOAs-TCTs
cancelled and in lieu of the same, new TCTs shall be issued in the name of
the SECOND PARTY or its assignee free from any liens or encumbrances as
provided herein,
xxxx
VI
EFFECTIVITY OF THIS AGREEMENT
This Agreement shall take effect upon execution hereof and shall continue
in force unless the SECOND PARTY withdraws from this Agreement by
reason of force majeure or it fails to make the escrow deposits within the
period as specified herein, in which event, this Agreement shall be
considered automatically null and void, unless extended by mutual
agreement of the parties.50chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
It is settled that in a deed of conditional sale, ownership is transferred after
the full payment of the installments of the purchase price or the fulfillment
of the condition and the execution of a definite or absolute deed of sale.51
Verily, the efficacy or obligatory force of the vendor's obligation to transfer
title in a conditional sale is subordinated to the happening of a future and
uncertain event, such that if the suspensive condition does not take place,
the parties would stand as if the conditional obligation had never existed.52
Given the foregoing, the MOA is essentially a dealing affecting less than the
ownership of the subject property that is governed by Section 54 of PD
1529, to wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Section 54. Dealings less than ownership, how registered. No new certificate
shall be entered or issued pursuant to any instrument which does not divest
the ownership or title from the owner or from the transferee of the
registered owners. All interests in registered land less than ownership shall
be registered by filing with the Register of Deeds the instrument which
creates or transfers or claims such interests and by a brief memorandum
thereof made by the Register of Deeds upon the certificate of title, and
signed by him. A similar memorandum shall also be made on the owner's
duplicate. The cancellation or extinguishment of such interests shall be
registered in the same manner. (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, being a conditional sale, the MOA is a voluntary instrument
which, as a rule, must be registered as such and not as an adverse claim. In
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office v. New Dagupan Metro Gas
Corporation,53 the Court explained that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Apart from the foregoing, the more important consideration was the
improper resort to an adverse claim. In L.P. Leviste & Co. v. Noblejas, this
Court emphasized that the availability of the special remedy of an adverse
claim is subject to the absence of any other statutory provision for the
registration of the claimant's alleged right or interest in the property. That if
the claimant's interest is based on a perfected contract of sale or any
voluntary instrument executed by the registered owner of the land, the
procedure that should be followed is that prescribed under Section 51 in
relation to Section 52 of P.D. No. 1529. Specifically, the owner's duplicate
certificate must be presented to the Register of Deeds for the inscription of
the corresponding memorandum thereon and in the entry day book. It is
only when the owner refuses or fails to surrender the duplicate certificate
for annotation that a statement setting forth an adverse claim may be filed
with the Register of Deeds. Otherwise, the adverse claim filed will not have
the effect of a conveyance of any right or interest on the disputed property
that could prejudice the rights that have been subsequently acquired by
third persons.
What transpired in Gabin is similar to that in Leviste. In Gabin, the basis of
the claim on the property is a deed of absolute sale. In Leviste, what is
involved is a contract to sell. Both are voluntary instruments that should
have been registered in accordance with Sections 51 and 52 of P.D. No.
1529 as there was no showing of an inability to present the owner's
duplicate of title.
It is patent that the contrary appears in this case. Indeed, New Dagupan's
claim over the subject property is based on a conditional sale, which is
likewise a voluntary instrument. However, New Dagupan's use of the
adverse claim to protect its rights is far from being incongruent in view of
the undisputed fact that Peralta failed to surrender the owner's duplicate of
TCT No. 52135 despite demands.54 (Emphases supplied; citations omitted.)
Thus, the prevailing rule is that voluntary instruments such as contracts of
sale, contracts to sell, and conditional sales are registered by presenting the
owner's duplicate copy of the title for annotation, pursuant to Sections 51 to
53 of PD 1529.55 The reason for requiring the production of the owner's
duplicate certificate in the registration of a voluntary instrument is that,
being a willful act of the registered owner, it is to be presumed that he is
interested in registering the instrument and would willingly surrender,
present or produce his duplicate certificate of title to the Register of Deeds
in order to accomplish such registration.56 The exception to this rule is
when the registered owner refuses or fails to surrender his duplicate copy of
the title, in which case the claimant may file with the Register of Deeds a
statement setting forth his adverse claim.57chanrobleslaw
In the case at hand, there was no showing that respondent refused or failed
to present the owner's duplicate of TCT No. CLO-763, which would have
prompted Carmona Realty to cause the annotation of the MOA as an
adverse claim instead of a voluntary dealing. On this score, therefore, the
RTC and the CA erred in ordering the cancellation of the subject entries on
the strength of Section 70 of PD 1529 which authorizes regional trial courts
to cancel adverse claims after the lapse of thirty (30) days from registration.
Being a voluntary dealing affecting less than the ownership of the subject
property, Section 54 of PD 1529 - which states that the cancellation of
annotations involving interests less than ownership is within the power of
the Register of Deeds - should have been applied. Accordingly, the RTC and
the CA should have dismissed the petition for cancellation of the subject
entries for being the wrong remedy.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated December 13,
2013 and the Resolution dated June 27, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 98819, which affirmed the Order dated June 27, 2011 and the
Amended Order dated December 29, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court of
Biñan, Laguna, Branch 25 in LRC Case No. B-4122 are hereby SET ASIDE.
The Petition to cancel Entry No. 626131, Entry No. 626132, Entry No.
626133, and Entry No. 626134 on Transfer Certificate of Title No. CLO-763
filed by respondent Catalino M. Mangahis is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 142687 July 20, 2006
SPOUSES FRANCISCO and BERNARDINA RODRIGUEZ, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES CHRISTOPHER and MA. ANGELICA
BARRAMEDA, and SPOUSES ANTONIO and MARIDEL CALINGO,
respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals dated
September 7, 1999 in CA-G.R. CV No. 48772 and its resolution dated March
31, 2000. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati in Civil Case No. 92-3524.
The facts show that herein respondent Spouses Antonio and Maridel Calingo
(respondents Calingo) were the registered owners of a house and lot
located at No. 7903 Redwood Street, Marcelo Green Village, Parañaque,
Metro Manila. The property was mortgaged to the Development Bank of the
Philippines, which mortgage was later absorbed by the Home Mutual
Development Fund (HMDF) or Pag-ibig.
On April 27, 1992, respondents Calingo and respondent Spouses
Christopher and Ma. Angelica Barrameda (respondents Barrameda) entered
into a contract of sale with assumption of mortgage where the former sold
to the latter the property in question and the latter assumed to pay the
outstanding loan balance to the Development Bank of the Philippines.1
Respondents Barrameda issued two checks in the amounts of P150,000.00
and P528,539.76, for which respondents Calingo issued a receipt dated April
24, 1992.2
In a letter dated April 23, 1992, respondent Antonio S. Calingo informed
HMDF/Pag-ibig about the sale of the property with assumption of mortgage.
Said letter, however, together with an affidavit by respondents Calingo, was
served upon HMDF/Pag-ibig on October 2, 1992.3
On May 29, 1992, respondents Barrameda filed with the Register of Deeds
of Parañaque an affidavit of adverse claim on the property. The adverse
claim was inscribed at the back of the certificate of title as Entry No. 3439.4
On June 1, 1992, respondent Ma. Angelica Paez-Barrameda wrote HMDF,
Mortgage and Loans Division informing the office that they have purchased
the subject property from the Calingo spouses and that they filed a notice of
adverse claim with the Register of Deeds of Parañaque. They also sought
assistance from said office as regards the procedure for the full settlement
of the loan arrearages and the transfer of the property in their names.5
Respondents Barrameda moved into the property on June 2, 1992.
On July 13, 1992, a notice of levy with attachment on real property by
virtue of a writ of execution was annotated at the back of the certificate of
title of the property in question. The writ of execution was issued by Judge
Salvador Abad Santos, Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 65 in
connection with Civil Case No. 88-2159 involving a claim by herein
petitioners, Spouses Francisco and Bernardina Rodriguez, against
respondents Calingo. Judge Abad Santos issued the writ in favor of
petitioners Rodriguez.6
On July 21, 1992, petitioners’ counsel, Atty. Nelson A. Loyola, sent a letter
to respondents Barrameda inquiring about the basis of their occupation of
the property in question.
On August 21, 1992, respondents Barrameda remitted to respondents
Calingo the amount of P364,992.07 to complete the payment of the agreed
purchase price. Respondents Calingo acknowledged receipt of said amount
and waived all their rights to the property in favor of the Barrameda
spouses. They also guaranteed that the property was clear and free from
any liens and encumbrances, except the real estate mortgage assumed by
respondents Barrameda.7
On October 7, 1992, respondents Barrameda executed a joint affidavit
stating that they are the owners of the property in question by virtue of a
deed of sale with assumption of mortgage; that they registered an affidavit
of adverse claim with the Register of Deeds of Parañaque; that the Sheriff
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 65, Makati, Sheriff Manuel C. Dolor,
levied said property despite their adverse claim; and that they have
acquired the property long before the levy was made, and therefore, said
levy was illegal. They served a copy of the affidavit on petitioners’ counsel,
Atty. Loyola, who made a reply thereto on October 15, 1992.
In his letter to Christopher Barrameda dated October 15, 1992, Atty. Loyola
pointed out that the alleged deed of sale with assumption of mortgage was
not registered with the Register of Deeds and that the records of the HMDF
show that the property is owned by the Calingo spouses. He urged the
Barrameda spouses to confer with the petitioners to amicably settle the
controversy.8
On November 9, 1992, respondents Barrameda found a Notice of Sheriff’s
Sale posted on their front gate, announcing the auction sale of their house
and lot on December 3, 1992 at 10:00 in the morning.9
On November 20, 1992, pursuant to Rule 39, Section 17 of the Revised
Rules of Court, respondents Barrameda served a Notice of Third Party Claim
upon Sheriff Manuel C. Dolor, accompanied by their affidavit of title.
On December 2, 1992, respondents Barrameda filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Makati a petition for quieting of title with prayer for preliminary
injunction. The petition prayed, among others, that the execution sale of
the property be enjoined, the notice of levy and attachment inscribed on the
certificate of title be cancelled, and that respondents Barrameda be declared
the lawful and sole owners of the property in question.10
The trial court ruled in favor of herein petitioners and dismissed
respondents Barrameda’s petition for quieting of title. It ruled that the
annotation of respondents Barrameda’s adverse claim at the back of the
certificate of title was insufficient to establish their claim over the property.
It said that respondents Barrameda, as buyers of the property, should have
registered the title in their names. Furthermore, respondents Barrameda’s
adverse claim had lost its efficacy after the lapse of thirty days in
accordance with the provisions of the Land Registration Act. The trial court
also found that there was collusion between respondents Barrameda and
respondents Calingo to transfer the property to defraud third parties who
may have a claim against the Calingos.11
The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the decision of the trial court.
Citing the ruling in Sajonas v. Court of Appeals,12 the appellate court held
that respondents Barrameda’s adverse claim inscribed on the certificate of
title was still effective at the time the property was levied on execution. It
said:
Therefore, the disputed inscription of adverse claim on TCT No.
83612/57286 was still in effect on July 13, 1992 when the Rodriguezes
caused the annotation of the notice of levy on execution thereto.
Consequently, they are charged with knowledge that the property sought to
be levied upon on execution was encumbered by an interest the same as or
better than that of the registered owner thereof. Such notice of levy cannot
prevail over the existing adverse claim inscribed on the certificate of title in
favor of the Barramedas. xxx
The court held, therefore, that the notice of levy could not prevail over
respondents Barrameda’s adverse claim.
Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the appellate court’s ruling, but
the motion was denied.
Hence, this petition. Petitioners essentially argue that the remedy of a
petition for quieting of title was not available to respondents Barrameda as
they did not have a valid title to the property in question; that the affidavit
of adverse claim inscribed by respondents Barrameda at the back of the
certificate of title was not sufficient to establish their claim to the property;
and there was collusion between respondents Barrameda and respondents
Calingo.
The principal issue that needs to be resolved in this case is whether
respondents Barrameda’s adverse claim on the property should prevail over
the levy on execution issued by another court in satisfaction of a judgment
against respondents Calingo.
We hold that it cannot.
Respondents Barrameda anchor their claim on the property on the deed of
sale with assumption of mortgage executed by them and respondents
Calingo on April 27, 1992. The Property Registration Decree13 requires that
such document be registered with the Register of Deeds in order to be
binding on third persons. The law provides:
Sec. 51. Conveyance and other dealings by registered owner. An owner of
registered land may convey, mortgage, lease, charge or otherwise deal with
the same in accordance with existing laws. He may use such forms of
deeds, mortgages, leases or other voluntary instruments as are sufficient in
law. But no deed, mortgage, lease, or other voluntary instrument, except a
will purporting to convey or affect registered land shall take effect as a
conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate only as a contract between
the parties and as evidence of authority to the Register of Deeds to make
registration.
The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect the land
insofar as third persons are concerned, and in all cases under this Decree,
the registration shall be made in the office of the Register of Deeds for the
province or city where the land lies. (emphasis supplied)
It is admitted in this case that the deed of sale with assumption of
mortgage was not registered, but instead, respondents Barrameda filed an
affidavit of adverse claim with the Register of Deeds. The question now is
whether the adverse claim is sufficient to bind third parties such as herein
petitioners.
In L.P. Leviste and Company, Inc. v. Noblejas,14 we explained when an
inscription of an adverse claim is sufficient to affect third parties, thus:
The basis of respondent Villanueva’s adverse claim was an agreement to
sell executed in her favor by Garcia Realty. An agreement to sell is a
voluntary instrument as it is a wilful act of the registered owner. As such
voluntary instrument, Section 50 of Act No. 496 [now Presidential Decree
No. 1529] expressly provides that the act of registration shall be the
operative act to convey and affect the land. And Section 55 of the same Act
requires the presentation of the owner’s duplicate certificate of title for the
registration of any deed or voluntary instrument. As the agreement to sell
involves an interest less than an estate in fee simple, the same should have
been registered by filing it with the Register of Deeds who, in turn, makes a
brief memorandum thereof upon the original and owner’s duplicate
certificate of title. The reason for requiring the production of the owner’s
duplicate certificate in the registration of a voluntary instrument is that,
being a wilful act of the registered owner, it is to be presumed that he is
interested in registering the instrument and would willingly surrender,
present or produce his duplicate certificate of title to the Register of Deeds
in order to accomplish such registration. However, where the owner refuses
to surrender the duplicate certificate for the annotation of the voluntary
instrument, the grantee may file with the Register of Deeds a statement
setting forth his adverse claim, as provided for in Section 110 of Act No.
496. In such a case, the annotation of the instrument upon the entry book
is sufficient to affect the real estate to which it relates, although Section 72
of Act No. 496 imposes upon the Register of Deeds the duty to require the
production by the [r]egistered owner of his duplicate certificate for the
inscription of the adverse claim. The annotation of an adverse claim is a
measure designed to protect the interest of a person over a piece of real
property where the registration of such interest or right is not otherwise
provided for by the Land Registration Act, and serves as a notice and
warning to third parties dealing with said property that someone is claiming
an interest on the same or a better right than the registered owner thereof.
(emphases supplied)
In the case at bar, the reason given for the non-registration of the deed of
sale with assumption of mortgage was that the owner’s duplicate copy of
the certificate of title was in the possession of HMDF. It was not shown,
however, that either respondents Barrameda or respondents Calingo
exerted any effort to retrieve the owner’s duplicate copy from the HMDF for
the purpose of registering the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage. In
fact, the parties did not even seek to obtain the consent of, much less
inform, the HMDF of the sale of the property. This, despite the provision in
the contract of mortgage prohibiting the mortgagor (respondents Calingo)
from selling or disposing the property without the written consent of the
mortgagee.15 Respondents Calingo, as party to the contract of mortgage,
are charged with the knowledge of such provision and are bound to comply
therewith. Apparently, there was haste in disposing the property that
respondents Calingo informed HMDF of the sale only on October 2, 1992
when they served a copy of their letter to said office regarding the transfer Regional Trial Court, Makati in Civil Case No. 92-3524 is REINSTATED. No
of the property to respondents Barrameda. There was no reason for the cost.
parties’ failure to seek the approval of the HMDF to the sale as it appears
from the letter of respondent Angelica Paez-Barrameda to HMDF that they SO ORDERED.
were ready to pay in full the balance of the loan plus interest. What is more
suspect is that the judgment against respondents Calingo ordering them to
pay the petitioners the sum of P1,159,355.90 was rendered on January 28,
1992, before the sale of the property on April 27, 1992. We also find it
unsettling that respondents Barrameda, without any reservation or inquiry,
readily remitted to respondents Calingo the full payment for the property on
August 21, 1992 despite knowledge of the levy on execution over the
property in July of the same year. Any prudent buyer of real property,
before parting with his money, is expected to first ensure that the title to
the property he is about to purchase is clear and free from any liabilities
and that the sellers have the proper authority to deal on the property.

Again, we stress that the annotation of an adverse claim is a measure

designed to protect the interest of a person over a piece of property where
the registration of such interest or right is not otherwise provided for by the
law on registration of real property. Section 70 of Presidential Decree No.
1529 is clear:

Sec. 70. Adverse claim. Whoever claims any part or interest in registered
land adverse to the registered owner, arising subsequent to the date of the
original registration, may, if no other provision is made in this Decree for
registering the same, make a statement in writing setting forth his alleged
right or interest, and how or under whom acquired, a reference to the
number of the certificate of title of the registered owner, the name of the
registered owner, and a description of the land in which the right or interest
is claimed. xxx

The deed of sale with assumption of mortgage executed by respondents

Calingo and Barrameda is a registrable instrument. In order to bind third
parties, it must be registered with the Office of the Register of Deeds. It
was not shown in this case that there was justifiable reason why the deed
could not be registered. Hence, the remedy of adverse claim cannot
substitute for registration.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision and

resolution of the Court of Appeals are SET ASIDE and the decision of the

G.R. No. 220940
JOY VANESSA M. SEBASTIAN, Petitioner
vs
SPOUSES NELSON C. CRUZ AND CRISTINA P. CRUZ and THE
REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR THE PROVINCE OF PANGASINAN,
Respondents
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Resolutions dated
March 13, 20152 and October 9, 20153 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. SP No. 136564 dismissing the petition for annulment of judgment filed
by petitioner Joy Vanessa M. Sebastian (Sebastian) before it.
The Facts
The instant case stemmed from a petition4 for annulment of judgment filed
by Sebastian before the CA, praying for the annulment of the Decision5
dated March 27, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan,
Branch 69 (RTC) in LRC Case No. 421. Petitioner alleged that respondent
Nelson C. Cruz (Nelson), married to Cristina P. Cruz (Cristina; collectively,
Spouses Cruz), is the registered owner of a 40,835-square meter parcel of
land located in Brgy. Bogtong-Bolo, Mangatarem, Pangasinan and covered
by Katibayan ng Orihinal na Titulo Big. (OCT No.) P-415666 (subject land).
Sometime in November 2009, Nelson, through his father and attomey-
infact, Lamberto P. Cruz (Lamberto), then sold the subject lot in favor of
Sebastian, as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale7 executed by the
parties. Upon Sebastian's payment of the purchase price, Lamberto then
surrendered to her the possession of the subject land, OCT No. P-41566,
and his General Power of Attomey8 together with a copy of Tax Declaration
No. 9041 and Property Index No. 013-26-019-0322.9 Sebastian then paid
the corresponding capital gains tax, among others, to cause the transfer of
title to her name.10 However, upon her presentment of the aforesaid
documents to the Register of Deeds of the Province of Pangasinan (RD-
Pangasinan), the latter directed her to secure a Special Power of Attorney
executed by Spouses Cruz authorizing Lamberto to sell the subject land to
her. Accordingly, Sebastian requested the execution of such document to
Lamberto, who promised to do so, but failed to comply. Thus, Sebastian
was constrained to cause the annotation of an adverse claim in OCT No. P-
41566 on August 2, 2011 in order to protect her rights over the subject
land.11
According to Sebastian, it was only on July 14, 2014 upon her inquiry with
RD-Pangasinan about the status of the aforesaid title when she discovered
that: (a) Nelson executed an Affidavit of Loss dated September 23, 2013
attesting to the loss of owner's duplicate copy of OCT No. P- 41566, which
he registered with the RD-Pangasinan; (b) the Spouses Cruz filed before the
R TC a petition for the issuance of a second owner's copy of OCT No. P-
41566, docketed as LRC Case No. 421; and (c) on March 27, 2014, the RTC
promulgated a Decision granting Spouses Cruz's petition and, consequently,
ordered the issuance of a new owner's duplicate copy of OCT No. P-41566
in their names.12 In view of the foregoing incidents, Sebastian filed the
aforesaid petition for annulment of judgment before the CA on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction. Essentially, she contended that the RTC had no
jurisdiction to take cognizance of LRC Case No. 421 as the duplicate copy of
OCT No. P-41566 - which was declared to have no further force in effect -
was never lost, and in fact, is in her possession all along.13
The CA Ruling
In a Resolution14 dated March 13, 2015, the CA did not give due course to
Sebastian's petition and, consequently, dismissed the same outright.15 It
held that the compliance by Spouses Cruz with the jurisdictional
requirements of publication and notice of hearing clothed the RTC with
jurisdiction to take cognizance over the action in rem, and constituted a
constructive notice to the whole world of its pendency. As such, personal
notice to Sebastian of the action was no longer necessary.16
Aggrieved, petitioner moved for reconsideration,17 which was, however,
denied in a Resolution18 dated October 9, 2015; hence, this petition.19
The Issue Before the Court
The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly
denied due course to Sebastian's petition for annulment of judgment,
resulting in its outright dismissal.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Under Section 2, Rule 4 7 of the Rules of Court, the only grounds for
annulment of judgment are extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Lack of
jurisdiction as a ground for annulment of judgment refers to either lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defending party or over the subject
matter of the claim. In case of absence, or lack, of jurisdiction, a court
should not take cognizance of the case. Thus, the prevailing rule is that
where there is want of jurisdiction over a subject matter, the judgment is
rendered null and void. A void judgment is in legal effect no judgment, by
which no rights are divested, from which no right can be obtained, which
neither binds nor bars any one, and under which all acts performed and all
claims flowing out are void. It is not a decision in contemplation of law and,
hence, it can never become executory. It also follows that such a void
judgment cannot constitute a bar to another case by reason of res
judicata.20
As will be explained hereunder, the CA erred in denying due course to
Sebastian's petition for annulment of judgment and, resultantly, in
dismissing the same outright.
The governing law for judicial reconstitution of title is Republic Act No. (RA)
26,21 Section 15 of which provides when reconstitution of a title should be
allowed:
Section 15. If the court, after hearing, finds that the documents presented,
as supported by parole evidence or otherwise, are sufficient and proper to
warrant the reconstitution of the lost or destroyed certificate of title, and
that petitioner is the registered owner of the property or has an interest
therein, that the said certificate of title was in force at the time it was lost or
destroyed, and that the description, area and boundaries of the property are
substantially the same as those contained in the lost or destroyed certificate
of title, an order of reconstitution shall be issued. The clerk of court shall
forward to the register of deeds a certified copy of said order and all the
documents which, pursuant to said order, are to be used as the basis of the
reconstitution. If the court finds that there is no sufficient evidence or basis
to justify the reconstitution, the petition shall be dismissed, but such
dismissal shall not preclude the right of the party or parties entitled thereto
to file an application for confirmation of his or their title under the provisions
of the Land Registration Act. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
From the foregoing, it appears that the following requisites must be
complied with for an order for reconstitution to be issued: (a) that the
certificate of title had been lost or destroyed; (b) that the documents
presented by petitioner are sufficient and proper to warrant reconstitution of
the lost or destroyed certificate of title; (c) that the petitioner is the
registered owner of the property or had an interest therein; (d) that the
certificate of title was in force at the time it was lost and destroyed; and (e)
that the description, area and boundaries of the property are substantially
the same as those contained in the lost or destroyed certificate of title.
Verily, the reconstitution of a certificate of title denotes restoration in the
original form and condition of a lost or destroyed instrument attesting the
title of a person to a piece of land. The purpose of the reconstitution of title
is to have, after observing the procedures prescribed by law, the title
reproduced in exactly the same way it has been when the loss or
destruction occurred. RA 26 presupposes that the property whose title is
sought to be reconstituted has already been brought under the provisions of
the Torrens System.22
Indubitably, the fact of loss or destruction of the owner's duplicate
certificate of title is crucial in clothing the RTC with jurisdiction over the
judicial reconstitution proceedings. In Spouses Paulino v. CA,23 the Court
reiterated the rule that when the owner's duplicate certificate of title was
not actually lost or destroyed, but is in fact in the possession of another
person, the reconstituted title is void because the court that rendered the
order of reconstitution had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
case, viz.:
As early as the case of Strait Times, Inc. v. CA, the Court has held that
when the owner's duplicate certificate of title has not been lost, but is, in
fact, in the possession of another person, then the reconstituted certificate
is void, because the court that rendered the decision had no jurisdiction.
Reconstitution can be validly made only in case of loss of the original
certificate. This rule was reiterated in the cases of Villamayor v. Arante,
Rexlon Realty Group, Inc. v. [CA], Eastworld Motor Industries Corporation v.
Skunac Corporation, Rodriguez v. Lim, Villanueva v. Viloria, and Camitan v.
Fidelity Investment Corporation. Thus, with evidence that the original copy
of the TCT was not lost during the conflagration that hit the Quezon City
Hall and that the owner's duplicate copy of the title was actually in the
possession of another, the RTC decision was null and void for lack of
jurisdiction.1âwphi1
xxxx
the same was surrendered to her by Lamberto, Nelson's father and
attorney-in-fact, and was in her possession all along.25 Should such
allegation be proven following the conduct of further proceedings, then
there would be no other conclusion than that the RTC had no jurisdiction
over the subject matter of LRC Case No. 421. As a consequence, the
Decision dated March 27, 2014 of the RTC in the said case would then be
annulled on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
Thus, the Court finds prima facie merit in Sebastian's petition for annulment
of judgment before the CA. As such, the latter erred in denying it due
course and in dismissing the same outright. In this light, the Court finds it
more prudent to remand the case to the CA for further proceedings to first
resolve the above-discussed jurisdictional issue, with a directive to: (a)
grant due course to the petition; and (b) cause the service of summons on
Spouses Cruz and the RD-Pangasinan, in accordance with Section 5, Rule
4726 of the Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated March 13,
2015 and October 9, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG. R. SP No.
136564 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the instant case
is REMANDED to the CA for further proceedings.

In reconstitution proceedings, the Court has repeatedly ruled that before SO ORDERED.
jurisdiction over the case can be validly acquired, it is a condition sine qua
non that the certificate of title has not been issued to another person. If a
certificate of title has not been lost but is in fact in the possession of
another person, the reconstituted title is void and the court rendering the
decision has not acquired jurisdiction over the petition for issuance of new
title. The courts simply have no jurisdiction over petitions by (such) third
parties for reconstitution of allegedly lost or destroyed titles over lands that
are already covered by duly issued subsisting titles in the names of their
duly registered owners. The existence of a prior title ipso facto nullifies the
reconstitution proceedings. The proper recourse is to assail directly in a
proceeding before the regional trial court the validity of the Torrens title
already issued to the other person.24 (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)

In this case, Sebastian's petition for annulment of judgment before the CA

clearly alleged that, contrary to the claim of Spouses Cruz in LRC Case No.
421, the owner's duplicate copy of OCT No. P-41566 was not really lost, as