STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
KDG SAN BEDA MENDIOLA 1I 2020
JUANICO NOTES
MODULE 1: LEGISLATIVE POWER
DAVID VS. ARROYOoooooo
F: On the 20th anniversary of EDSA Revolution I, Pres.
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued PP 1017 and GO No. 5
implementing it. One week after it was lifted.
CONTENTS OF P.P. 1017:
1. Command the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
to maintain law and order throughout the
Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of
lawless violence as well as any act of
insurrection or rebellion;
2. To enforce obedience to all the laws and to all
decrees, order and regulations promulgated by
me personally (PGMA) or upon my direction;
3. Do hereby declare a State of National
Emergency.
FACTUAL BASIS (at least 5)
1. members of the Magdalo Group indicted in the
Oakwood mutiny, escaped their detention cell in
Fort Bonifacio and made a public statement
calling upon the people to protest
2. authorities got hold of a document entitled
"Oplan Hackle I  " which detailed plans for
bombings and attacks during the PMA Alumni
Homecoming in Baguio which was followed by a
bomb detonated at the PMA parade ground the
next day.
3. announcement through DZRH that the
"Magdalo’s D-Day would be on February 24,
2006, the 20th Anniversary of Edsa I”
4. Lt. San Juan was recaptured, found in his
possession were records of the meetings
between Magdalo Group and NPA
5. NPA spokesman "Ka Roger" declared: "The
Communist Party and revolutionary movement
and the entire people look forward to the
possibility in the coming year of accomplishing
its immediate task of bringing down the Arroyo
regime; of rendering it to weaken and unable to
rule that it will not take much longer to end it."
6. bombing of telecommunication towers and cell
sites in Bulacan and Bataan
7. raid of an army outpost in Benguet resulting in
the death of three (3) soldiers.
(SC: Sufficient basis)
EVENTS THAT FOLLOWED PROCLAMATION:
1. President announced the cancellation of all
programs and activities related to the 20th
anniversary celebration of Edsa People Power I;
2. revoked permits to hold rallies issued earlier by
the local governments.
3. Presidential Chief of Staff Michael Defensor
announced that "warrantless arrests and take-
over of facilities, including media, can already be
implemented."
4. Protesters were violently dispersed.
5. PNP raided the Daily Tribune, Malaya and
Abante  offices in Manila, confiscated news
stories by reporters, documents, pictures, and
mock-ups of the Saturday issue. Policemen
were stationed inside the editorial and business
offices and outside the building.
- Defensor -  meant to show a strong
presence to tell media outlets not to connive
or do anything that would help the rebels
otherwise it would take over any
organization that would not
follow "standards” set by the government
which is if they would contribute to instability
or not subscribe to what is in the GO or PD
CONTENTIONS OF PETITIONERS
(1) it encroaches on the emergency powers of
Congress as it arrogate unto President Arroyo the
power to enact laws and decrees and that it
amounts to an exercise by the President of
emergency powers without congressional approval."
(2) it is a subterfuge to avoid the constitutional
requirements for the imposition of martial law; and 
(3) violates the freedom of the press, of speech and of
assembly through "censorship" or "prior restraint,
void for overbreadth and produces chilling effect
(4) "emergency" refers only to tsunami, typhoon,
hurricane and similar occurrences, hence, there is
"absolutely no emergency" that warrants the
issuance of PP 1017. 
(5) No factual basis
CONTENTION OF RESPONDENT
1. moot
2. no legal standing
3. not necessary for petitioners to implead
President Arroyo as respondent; 
4. PP 1017 has constitutional and legal basis
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5. PP 1017 does not violate the people’s right to
free expression and redress of grievances.
REQUISITES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
1.  actual case or controversy;  sustained a direct injury as a result of that action, and it
2. Legal standing
3. constitutional question must be raised at the
earliest opportunity
4.   constitutional question must be the lis mota of
the case
ACTUAL CASE - a conflict of legal right, an opposite
legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution. It is
"definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of
parties having adverse legal interest;"
A MOOT AND ACADEMIC case is one that ceases to
present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening
events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no
practical use or value.
SC: NOT MOOT. During the eight (8) days
that PP 1017 was operative, the police
officers, according to petitioners, committed
illegal acts in implementing it. 
EXCEPTIONS TO MOOTNESS   
1. there is a grave violation of the Constitution
2. the exceptional character of the situation and the
paramount public interest is involved
3. when constitutional issue raised requires
formulation of controlling principles to guide the
bench, the bar, and the public
4. the case is capable of repetition yet evading
review.
SC: All the foregoing exceptions are present
LEGAL STANDING - right of appearance in a court of
justice on a given question."
Private Suits - "real-parties-in interest" rule who is "the
party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails
of the suit."
Public Suits - plaintiff who asserts a "public right" in
assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a
representative of the general public.
"direct injury" test - must show that he has
is not sufficient that he has a general interest common to
all members of the public; a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will
sustain direct injury as a result."
EXCEPTION OF LOCUS STANDI - being a mere
procedural technicality, the requirement of locus
standi may be waived by the Court in the exercise of its
discretion where the "transcendental importance" of
the cases due to the "far-reaching implications" of the
petition.
REQUIREMENTS:
(1) taxpayers - claim of illegal disbursement of
public funds or that the tax measure is
unconstitutional;
(2) voters - obvious interest in the validity of the
election law in question;
(3) concerned citizens - issues raised are of
transcendental importance which must be settled
early; and
(5) legislators - claim that the official action
complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as
legislators. 
SC: Those arrested and searched (direct
injury), the Congressmen who alleged
usurpation of legislative powers (legislators),
and the organizations invoking right to
assembly (citizens) have locus standi. But not
IBP and Sen. Legarda, still, the judicial
question is of paramount importance to the
Filipino people calling for the application of the
"transcendental importance" doctrine, a
relaxation of the standing requirements.
IMPROPER TO IMPLEAD PRESIDENT - President,
during tenure or actual incumbency, may not be sued
in any  civil or criminal case.
- It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the
President, the Head of State, if he can be
dragged into court litigations while serving as
such.
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- it is important that he be freed from any form of
harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable
him to fully attend to the performance of his
official duties and functions.
This does not mean that the President is not accountable
to anyone but he may be removed from office only in the
mode provided by law and that is by impeachment.
OVERBREADTH DOCTRINE
-overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool for testing "on
their faces" statutes in free speech cases, PP 1017 is
not primarily directed to speech or even speech-
related conduct
-overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the
validity of a law that "reflects legitimate state interest
-overbreadth are entertained in cases involving statutes
which seek to regulate only "speech" PP 1017
pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free speech,
which is manifestly subject to state regulation. 
VOID-FOR-VAGUENESS
- a law is facially invalid if men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application."
- free speech cases
FACIAL CHALLENGE
-"manifestly strong medicine," to be used "sparingly and
only as a last resort," and is "generally disfavored;"
-Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims that a statute is
unconstitutional as applied to him or her then the
courts carve away the unconstitutional aspects of the
on a case to case basis. In overbreadth challenges
are permitted to raise the rights of third parties; and
the court invalidates the entire statute "on its face,"
not merely "as applied for".
- Reason – chilling effect
-the task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its
deficiencies, and requiring correction of these
deficiencies is rarely if ever an appropriate task for
the judiciary. The combination of the relative
remoteness of the controversy, the impact on the
legislative process of the relief sought, and above
all the speculative and amorphous nature of the
required line-by-line analysis of detailed
statutes,...ordinarily results in a kind of case that
is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional
questions, whichever way they might be decided.
-facial challenge on the ground of overbreadth is the most
difficult since the challenger must establish that there
can be no instance when the assailed law may be
valid.
THEORIES ON POWER OF THE PRESIDENT IN
TIMES OF EMERGENCY
a. John Locke - DOCTRINE OF PREROGATIVE. In
times of danger to the nation, positive law enacted by
the legislature might be inadequate or even a fatal
obstacle to the promptness of action to avert
catastrophe. The Crown retained a prerogative
"power to act according to discretion for the public
good, without the proscription of the law and
sometimes even against it." the people have no other
remedy in case of abuse but to appeal to Heaven."
b. Jean-Jacques Rousseau - The inflexibility of the
laws may bring about, at a time of crisis, the ruin of
the State. It is wrong therefore to wish to make
political institutions as strong as to render it
impossible to suspend their operation. Even Sparta
allowed its law to lapse.
The method is to nominate a supreme lawyer to
uphold the general will of the people.
c. John Stuart Mill – TEMPORARY DICTATORSHIP
d. Nicollo Machiavelli – LIMITED GOVERNMENT
-regularized system of standby emergency powers to
be invoked with suitable checks and controls in time
of national danger with effective constitutional
restraints.
e. Frederick M. Watkins – CONSTITUTIONAL
DICTATORSHIP:
a. period must be relatively short
b. Dictatorship should always be strictly
legitimate in character
c. Final authority to determine the need for
dictatorship must never rest with the
dictator himself
d. objective of such an emergency
dictatorship should be "strict political
conservatism." 
f. Carl J. Friedrich – ditto Watkins
g. Clinton L. Rossiter – Expanded constitutional
dictatorship requirements
h. Charles H. McIlwain – CONCEPT OF
CONSTITUTIONALISM. Emphasis is placed
upon procedural limitations, and political
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responsibility. Historical and proper test of 2. Administrative Orders. — relate to a particular

constitutionalism was the existence of adequate aspect of governmental operations in pursuance of
processes for keeping government responsible. his duties as administrative head
3. Proclamations. — fixing a date or declaring a status
EMERGENCY POWERS UNDER OUR CONSTITUTION or condition of public moment or interest, upon the
existence of which the operation of a specific law or
regulation is made to depend
The problem of allotting discretionary power to the Chief
4. Memorandum Orders. — matters of administrative
Executive, while insuring that such powers will be
detail which only concern a particular officer or
exercised with a sense of political responsibility and
office of the Government
under effective limitations and checks has been coped
5. Memorandum Circulars. — internal administration
with this problem. None has the monopoly of power in
6. General or Special Orders. — as Commander-in-
times of emergency. Each branch is given a role to
Chief
serve as limitation or check upon the other. 

LEGISLATIVE POWER
Calling-out Power

Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the

Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief
Legislature. Section 1, Article VI categorically states
of all AFP and whenever it becomes necessary, he may
that "the legislative power shall be vested in the
call out such armed forces to prevent or
Congress which shall consist of a Senate and a
House of Representatives." To be sure, neither
SC: In declaring a state of national emergency, Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of
President Arroyo did not only rely on Section 18, emergency can justify President Arroyo’s exercise of
but also Section 17, Article XII, the State’s legislative power by issuing decrees.
extraordinary power to take over privately-owned
public utility and business affected with public
“all laws” – military may be called to enforce only those
interest.
laws pertinent to its duty to suppress lawless violence
NOT MARTIAL LAW - It is plain therein that what the
Power to Take Over
President invoked was her calling-out power.

Section 17. Article XII. In times of national emergency,

As such, it cannot be used to justify acts that only under
when the public interest so requires, the State may,
a valid declaration of Martial Law can be done
during the emergency and under reasonable terms
specifically, (a) arrests and seizures without warrants; (b)
prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the
ban on public assemblies; (c) take-over of news media
operation of any privately-owned public utility or
and agencies and press censorship; and (d) issuance of
business affected with public interest.
Presidential Decrees,

AUTHORITY TO DECLARE AND AUTHORITY TO

"Take Care" Power
EXERCISE
SEC. 17. The President shall have control of all the
To the first, Section 18, Article VII grants the President
executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall
such power. But to the second, manifold constitutional
ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
issues arise. 
The operative clause “to enforce obedience to all the
Section 23, Article VI of the Constitution reads: 
laws and  to all  decrees, orders and regulations
promulgated by me personally or upon my direction”
shows that it was lifted from Former President Marcos’ SEC. 23. (2) In times of war or other national
Proclamation No. 1081 declaring martial law.   emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the
President, for a limited period and subject to such
restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers
ORDINANCE POWER UNDER THE ADMIN. CODE
necessary and proper to carry out a declared national
policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the
1.  E.O. — rules of a general or permanent character Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next
in implementation of constitutional or statutory adjournment thereof.
powers
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CONSTRUCTION: 2ND paragraph refers not only to war
but also to "other national emergency." If the intention
of the Framers was to withhold from the President the
authority to declare a "state of national emergency" and
grant it to Congress then the Framers could have
provided so. Clearly, they did not intend that Congress
should first authorize the President before he can
declare a "state of national emergency." President
Arroyo could validly declare it even in the absence
of a Congressional enactment. But the exercise of
emergency powers, such as the taking over of privately
owned public utility or business affected with public
interest, is a different matter. This requires a delegation
from Congress.  c. "AS APPLIED CHALLENGE"
Courts have often said that constitutional provisions
in pari materia  are to be construed together. Different
clauses, sections, and provisions of a constitution which
relate to the same subject matter will be construed
together and considered in the light of each other.
Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency
powers. This is evident in the tenor of Section 23 (2),
Article VI authorizing it to delegate such powers to the
President. During grave emergencies, it may not be
possible or practicable for Congress to meet and
exercise its powers, the Framers deemed it wise to grant
emergency powers to the President, subject to certain
conditions, thus:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period
only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such
restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised
to carry out a national policy  declared by
Congress.
Thus, when Section 17 states that the "the State may,
during the emergency and under reasonable terms
prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the
operation of any privately owned public utility or
business affected with public interest," it refers to
Congress, not the President.
EMERGENCY - as a generic term, is classifiable to: a)
economic, b) natural disaster, and c) national
security.
Constitutional Commission:
MR. VILLEGAS. Strikes, riots, no; those would not be
covered by the term "national emergency."
MR. BENGZON. Unless they are of such proportions
While the President alone can declare a state of national
emergency, however, without legislation, he has no
power to take over. The President cannot decide
whether exceptional circumstances exist warranting the
take over nor determine when such exceptional
circumstances have ceased.
Warrantless arrests and searches and seizures,
revocation of permits without notice or hearing, prior
restraint, although pristine clear, other than declaration
of invalidity, this Court cannot impose any civil, criminal
or administrative sanctions on the individual police
officers concerned in this case.
Settled is the rule that courts are not at liberty to declare
statutes invalid although they may be abused and
misabused and may afford an opportunity for abuse in
the manner of application. The validity of a statute or
ordinance is to be determined from its contents, not
from its effects.
May this Court adjudge a law or ordinance
unconstitutional on the ground that its implementor
committed illegal acts? NO. If this were so, judging
from the blunders committed by policemen the Revised
Penal Code would have been declared unconstitutional a
long time ago. 
ACTS OF TERRORISM
G.O. No. 5: "necessary and appropriate actions and
measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and
lawless violence." 
"acts of terrorism" is still an amorphous and vague
concept. Congress has yet to enact a law defining and
punishing acts of terrorism. In fact, this "definitional
predicament" or the "absence of an agreed definition"
confronts the international community as well due to the
conflicting categorizations that cannot be reconciled in
any way because of opposing political interest is also
problem. GO No. 5 is unconstitutional insofar as
President Arroyo alone has the discretion to determine
what acts constitute terrorism. Her judgment on this
aspect is absolute, without restrictions.
SUMMATION: UNCONSTITUTIONAL INSOFAR AS IT
GRANTED THE PRESIDENT POWER TO ISSUE
DECREES, EXERCISE EMERGENCY POWERS
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WITHOUT DELEGATION FROM CONGRESS, AND
SOLE AUTHORITY TO DEFINE TERRORISM.
What was the question imposed by the Supreme
Court about this case? How does the Constitution of a
free people combine the degree of liberty, without which,
law becomes tyranny, with the degree of law, without
which, liberty becomes license?
SANIDAD V. PEOPLE oooooo
F: Pres. Marcos issued PD 991 calling a referendum-
plebiscite in Barangays, posing the question of whether
they approve the Martial Law and whether they approve
the amendments. The amendments proposed was the
establishment of an Interim Batasang Pambansa (due to
popular backlash against the calling of the National
Assembly)
CONTENTIONS:
1. Even with legislative powers powers under
Martial Law, the incumbent President cannot act
as a constituent assembly to propose
amendments to the Constitution;
2. the submission of the proposed amendments in
such a short period of time for deliberation
renders the plebiscite a nullity;
3. allowing 15-.year olds to vote would amount to an
amendment of the Constitution, which confines
the right of suffrage to those citizens of the
Philippines 18 years of age and above.
AMENDING PROCESS - In times of normalcy, the
amending process may be initiated by the proposals of
the (1) regular National Assembly upon a vote of three-
fourths of all its members; or (2) by a Constitutional
Convention called by a vote of two-thirds of all the
Members of the National Assembly. However the calling
of a Constitutional Convention may be submitted to the
electorate in an election voted upon by a majority vote of
all the members of the National Assembly. In times of
transition, amendments may be proposed by a majority
vote of all the Members of the National Assembly upon
special call by the interim Prime Minister,.  convened and only the Presidency and the Supreme
Incumbent President is vested with that prerogative of
discretion as to when he shall initially convene the
interim National Assembly. However due to
CONCENTRATION OF POWERS IN THE PRESIDENT
- The presidential exercise of legislative powers in time
of martial law is now a conceded valid act.
The Constitutional Convention, while giving to the
President the discretion when to call the interim National
Assembly to session, and knowing that it may not be
convened soon, would create a vacuum in the exercise
of legislative powers. Otherwise, with no one to exercise
the lawmaking powers, there would be paralyzation of
the entire governmental machinery. The separation of
executive and legislature ordained in the Constitution
presents a distinct obstruction to efficient crisis
government. The steady increase in executive power is
not too much a cause for as the steady increase in the
magnitude and complexity of the problems the President
has been called upon by the Filipino people to solve in
their behalf, which involve rebellion, subversion,
secession, recession, inflation, and economic crisis-a
crisis greater than war. In short, while conventional
constitutional law just confines the President's power as
Commander-in-Chief to the direction of the operation of
the national forces, yet the facts of our political, social,
and economic disturbances had convincingly shown that
in meeting the same, indefinite power should be
attributed to tile President to take emergency measures 
PEOPLE IS SOVEREIGN - In the Philippines, a
republican and unitary state, sovereignty "resides in the
people and all government authority emanates from
them. The referendum-plebiscite is a resounding call to
the people to exercise their sovereign power as
constitutional legislator. The proposed amendments, as
earlier discussed, proceed not from the thinking of a
single man. Rather, they are the collated thoughts of the
sovereign will.
SINCE THE PRESIDENT, UNDER THE 1973
CONSTITUTION, MAY EXERCISE LEGISLATIVE
POWER, HE MAY LIKEWISE THEREFORE,
PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION.
If the President has been legitimately discharging the
legislative functions of the interim Assembly, there is
no reason why he cannot validly discharge the
function of that Assembly to propose amendments to
the Constitution, which is but adjunct, although
peculiar, to its gross legislative power. This, of
course, is not to say that the President has
converted his office into a constituent assembly of
that nature normally constituted by the legislature.
Rather, with the interim National Assembly not
Court in operation, the urges of absolute necessity
render it imperative upon the President to act as
agent for and in behalf of the people to propose
amendments to the Constitution. Parenthetically by its
very constitution, the Supreme Court possesses no
capacity to propose amendments without
constitutional infractions. For the President to shy
away from that actuality and decline to undertake
the amending process would leave the governmental
machinery at a stalemate or create in the powers of
the State a destructive vacuum, thereby impeding
the objective of a crisis government "to end the
crisis and restore normal times." In these parlous
times, that Presidential initiative to reduce into
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concrete forms the constant voices of the people
reigns supreme. After all, constituent assemblies or
constitutional conventions, like the President now, are
mere agents of the people.
Proposals to Amend and/or to Revise the
Constitution does not need the Approval of the
President. In sensu strictiore, when the legislative
arm of the state undertakes the proposals of
amendment to a Constitution, that body is not in
the usual function of lawmaking. It is not legislating
when engaged in the amending process. Rather, it is
exercising a peculiar power bestowed upon it by the
fundamental charter itself. While ordinarily it is the
business of the legislating body to legislate for the nation
by virtue of constitutional conferment amending of the
Constitution is not legislative in character. In political
science a distinction is made between constitutional
content of an organic character and that of a legislative
character'. The distinction, however, is one of policy, not
of law. Such being the case, approval of the President
of any proposed amendment is a misnomer. The
prerogative of the President to approve or disapprove
applies only to the ordinary cases of legislation. The
President has nothing to do with proposition or adoption
of amendments to the Constitution.
DISMISSED FOR LACK OF VOTE
CHAVEZ VS. JBC o o
oo F: Upon the unexpected departure of Chief
Justice Corona, former Sol. Gen. Chavez, was nominated
as his potential successor, which triggered these petitions
for prohibition & injunction.
HISTORY
Appointing members of the Judiciary has been the
exclusive prerogative of the executive and legislative.
Like their progenitor of American origins, both the Malolos
Constitution1 and the 1935 Constitution vested the power
same in the President, subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments. With the fusion of
executive and legislative power under the 1973
Constitution, the appointment was no longer subject to
the scrutiny of another body. To rid the appointments
from political pressure and partisanship, the
Constitutional Commission saw the need to create a
separate independent body to recommend nominees to
the President and called it the Judicial and Bar Council.
The House and the Senate would send alternate
representatives. In 1994, an 8th member was added as
two 2 representatives from Congress—one from the
House and one from the Senate, with each having one-
half (1/2) of a vote. JBC En Banc decided to allow them
one full vote each. At present, respondents Senator &
Congressman simultaneously sit in the JBC.
SECTION 8, ARTICLE VIII OF THE CONSTITUTION
(1)  JBC is created under the supervision of the SC
composed of the CJ, DOJ sec., and a representative of
the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of
the IBP, a professor of law, a retired SC Member, and
a representative of the private sector.
(2) The regular members - four years; representative of
the Integrated Bar - four years; professor of law - three
years, the retired Justice - two years; and the
representative of the private sector for one year.
(3) principal function - recommending appointees to the
Judiciary.
CONTENTIONS:
a. The provision is clear, definite and needs no
interpretation in that the JBC shall have only one
representative from Congress.
b. The framers clearly envisioned on a JBC
composed of only seven (7) members. Had the framers
intended otherwise, they could have easily said so as
they did in the other provisions.
c. The composition providing for 3 ex-officio
members is purposely designed for a balanced
representation of the three branches of the government.
d. One of the two (2) members from Congress has
no right (not even ½ right) to sit in the said body
e. The JBC cannot conduct valid proceedings as its
composition is illegal and unconstitutional.
RESPONDENTS:
 “a representative of Congress.” - Under the
Constitution, two houses are permanent and
mandatory components of “Congress,” such that the
absence of either divests the term of its substantive
meaning as expressed under the Constitution. The
House of Representatives, without the Senate and
vice-versa, is not Congress. Bicameralism, as the
system of choice by the Framers, requires that both
houses exercise their respective powers.
 when the JBC was established, the Framers
originally envisioned a unicameral legislative body,
the phrase, however, was not modified to jive with
the change to bicameralism. Ambiguity having
resulted from a plain case of inadvertence, we must
look beyond the letter.
 It does not render the JBC’s purpose nugatory. 2
members from Congress does not necessarily
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amplify political partisanship in the JBC. In fact, it will
provide balance as against the other (6) who are
presidential appointees.
locus standi
i. Taxpayer - right to demand that the taxes paid to
the government are spent for lawful purposes. The JBC
derives financial support from taxes, petitioner possesses
as taxpayer both right and legal standing to demand that
the JBC’s proceedings are not tainted with illegality.
ii. personal stake - not only official nominees for
the post of Chief Justice can come to the Court and
question the JBC composition. The JBC’s duty is not at
all limited to the nominations for the highest magistrate in
the land. A vast number of aspirants to judicial posts all
over the country may be affected by the Court’s ruling.
iii. Citizen - the legality of the very process of
nominations to the positions in the Judiciary is the
nucleus of the controversy. The Court considers this a
constitutional issue. A citizen has a right to bring this
question to the Court, clothed with legal standing and at
the same time, armed with issues of transcendental
importance to society. The claim that the composition of
the JBC is illegal and unconstitutional is an object of
concern for all citizens who have the right to seek judicial
intervention for rectification of legal blunders.
1. transcendental importance determinants:
(1) the character of the funds or other assets involved in
the case;
(2) clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory
prohibition by the public respondent and
(3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and
specific interest
Belated filing of the petition. The current composition has
been in practice since 1994, petitioner’s silence for
eighteen (18) years does not comply with the “earliest
possible opportunity” requirement. – SC although this
question has been boggling the minds of several, there
was no opportunity to question it.
CONSTRUCTION
The provision is clear. The use of the singular letter “a”
preceding “representative of Congress” is unequivocal
and leaves no room for any other construction. It is
indicative of what the framers had in mind, that is,
Congress may designate only one (1) representative to
the JBC
STATCON PRINCIPLE:
Where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free
from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and
applied without attempted interpretation.32 It is a well-
settled principle of constitutional construction that the
language employed in the Constitution must be given
their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are
employed. Verba legis non est recedendum―from the
words of a statute there should be no departure.
noscitur a sociis - where a particular word or phrase is
ambiguous or susceptible of various meanings, its correct
construction may be made clear and specific by
considering the company of words in which it is founded
or with which it is associated. This is because a word or
phrase in a statute is always used in association with
other words or phrases, and its meaning may, thus, be
modified or restricted by the latter.
The word “Congress” used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) is
used in its generic sense. No particular allusion is made
on whether the Senate or the House is being referred to,
but that, in either case, only a singular representative
may be allowed to sit in the JBC.
The language of the subject provision is plain and
unambiguous, there is no need to resort extrinsic aids
such as records of the Constitutional Commission.
Nevertheless, even if the Court should proceed, records
show that it was intended that the JBC be composed of
seven (7) members only. The seven-member composition
serves a practical purpose, that is, to provide a solution
should there be a stalemate in voting therefore a single
vote may not be divided into half (1/2), between any of
the sitting members. This unsanctioned practice would
render the purpose illusory, defeating the mechanism
which the Constitution itself created.
JBC consultant, retired Justice Ynares-Santiago:
composition reflects the desire “to have a representation
for the major elements of the community.” The ex-officio
members represent the three branches of government
while the regular members are various stakeholders in
the judiciary. The unmistakable tenor treats each ex-
officio member as representing one co-equal branch of
government having equal say.
BICAMERALISM
No parallelism can be drawn between the representative
of Congress in the JBC and the exercise by Congress of
its legislative and constituent powers. Congress, in
relation to the executive and judicial branches of
government, is treated as a coequal branch in the JBC.
On the other hand, the exercise of legislative and
constituent powers requires the Senate and House of
 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
KDG SAN BEDA MENDIOLA 1I 2020
Representatives to coordinate. No such dichotomy need
be made when Congress interacts with the other two co-
equal branches of government. It is more in keeping with
the co-equal nature to assign the same weight to
considerations any of its representatives may have. One
branch should not have any more quantitative influence
as the other
“Congress” as a bicameral body refers to its primary
function in government—to legislate. In the exercise of
such powers, the Constitution employs precise language
in laying down the roles which a particular house plays.
An inter-play between the two houses is necessary in the
realization of these powers causing a vivid dichotomy that
the Court cannot simply discount. Verily, each house is
constitutionally granted with powers and functions
peculiar to its nature and with keen consideration to 1) its
relationship with the other chamber; and 2) in
consonance with the principle of checks and balances,
to the other branches. In the case of JBC
representation, no liaison between the two houses exists,
No mechanism is required. A fortiori, a pretext of
“oversight” cannot prevail over the more pragmatic
scheme which the Constitution laid with firmness, that is,
that the JBC has a seat for a single representative of
Congress, as one of the co-equal branches of
government.
Framers intended to create a JBC to eliminate politics in
the appointment of members of the Judiciary. Therefore,
to allow the Legislature to have more quantitative
influence in whether with one full vote or one-half (1/2) a
vote each, would negate the principle of equality.
Notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the
current composition of the JBC, all its prior official actions
are nonetheless valid.
DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL
EXTENT AND LIMITATION ON LEGISLATIVE POWER
IN RE: CUNANAN
N
NO AUTHORITY TO ADJUST BAR PASSING RATE
F: Bar Flunkers Act of 1953 reducing the passing rate
from 75% to 70%
REASON: Handicap which students during the years
immediately after the Japanese occupation such as
insufficiency of materials and inadequacy of preparation
experienced.
AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST
The public interest demands of legal profession
adequate preparation and efficiency, precisely more
so as legal problem evolved by the times become
more difficult. An adequate legal preparation is one of
the vital requisites for the practice of law that should
be developed constantly and maintained firmly. To the
legal profession is entrusted the protection of
property, life, honor and civil liberties. To approve
those inadequately prepared individuals to dedicate
themselves to such a delicate mission is to create a
serious social danger. Moreover, the statement that
there was an insufficiency of legal reading materials is
grossly exaggerated. There were abundant materials.
The Official Gazette had been published continuously.
Books and magazines published abroad have entered
without restriction since 1945. Many law books have
been printed locally during those periods. A new set of
Philippine Reports began to be published since 1946,
AUTHORITY
By the disputed law, Congress has exceeded its
legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement the
rules on admission to the Bar. Such additional or
amendatory rules are, as they ought to be, intended to
regulate acts subsequent to its promulgation and should
tend to improve and elevate the practice of law, and this
Tribunal shall consider these rules as minimum norms
towards that end in the admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers to the Bar,
inasmuch as a good bar assists immensely in the daily
performance of judicial functions and is essential to a
worthy administration of justice. It is therefore the
primary and inherent prerogative of the Supreme Court
to render the ultimate decision on who may be admitted
and may continue in the practice of law according to
existing rules.
ANG NARS PARTYLIST v. EXEC. SEC
C
JOINT RESOLUTION CANNOT AMMEND LAW
F: PH Nursing Act of 2002 provided that the salary grade
of Nurses in Public Health Institutions cannot be lower
than Grade 15. In 2008, Congress issued a Joint
Resolution authorizing the President to modify the
compensation and position classification system.
Implementing it, Pres. Arroyo issued EO 811 providing
that the salary grade of Nurses be from 10 to 11.
PURPOSE OF THREE READING RULE:
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KDG SAN BEDA MENDIOLA 1I 2020
1. to inform the members of Congress of what they
must vote on
2. to give the members of Congress notice that a
measure is progressing through the legislative
process, allowing them and others interested in the
measure to prepare their positions on the matter.
SENATE RULES OF PROCEDURE - TYPES OF
LEGISLATION
1. Bills (S.) - General measures, which if passed upon,
may become laws. When passed by both chambers in
identical form and signed by the resident or repassed by
Congress over a presidential veto, they become laws.
2. Joint Resolution - Requires the approval of both
houses and the signature of the President. It has the
force and effect of a law if approved. There is no real
difference between a bill and a joint resolution. The latter
generally is used when dealing with a single item or
issue, such as a continuing or emergency appropriations
bill. Joint resolutions are also used for proposing
amendments to the Constitution.
3. Concurrent Resolutions (S. Ct. Res.) - It is used for
matters affecting the operations of both houses and must
be passed in the same form by both of them. However,
they are not referred to the President and do not have
the force of law. Concurrent resolutions are used to fix
the time of adjournment of a Congress and to express
the "sense of Congress" on an issue.
4. Simple Resolutions (P. S. Res.) - deals with matters
entirely within the prerogative of one house of Congress,
such as adopting or receiving its own rules. A simple
resolution is not considered by the other chamber and is
not sent to the President for his signature. It has no
effect and force of a law. Simple resolutions are used
occasionally to express the opinion of a single house on
a current issue. Oftentimes, it is also used to call for a
congressional action on an issue affecting national
interest.
ONLY A BILL CAN BECOME A LAW
When a bill is proposed, the public is immediately
informed that there is a proposal being considered
which, if it becomes a law, can bind them. It is imperative
for the public to know when a bill is being considered so
that they can send their comments, proposals, or
objections to the bill. If a joint resolution is proposed
instead of a bill, the public will not be alerted that there is
a proposed legislation, and a law can pass stealthily
without notice to the public.
Sections 24 and 25, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution,
on legislative appropriations, likewise refer only to bills.
In addition, Section 27(1), Article VI speaks of the veto
power of the President over every bill which must be
presented to him for approval and applies expressly only
to bills, not to joint resolutions. If a joint resolution is
given the effect of, and treated as, a law, Congress will
be taking away the veto power of the President since the
Constitution only provides for the President's veto power
over a bill. In short, Congress can enact a joint resolution
into a law that is not subject to the President's veto
power, a situation that clearly violates the Constitution.
Indeed, under both the U.S. Senate and U.S. House of
Representatives, there is no difference between a bill
and a joint resolution. This practice, however, cannot be
applied in this jurisdiction. Our Constitution is clear that
only a bill can become a law. Granting that our
Constitutions have borrowed from the U.S. the basic
system of government, our Constitutions have never
adopted wholesale or verbatim the U.S. Constitution.
expressio unius est exclusio alterius - the express
mention of one person, thing, or consequence implies
the exclusion of all others.
Expressum facit cessare tacitum - what is expressed
puts an end to that which is implied
Applying in this jurisdiction by interpretation express
provisions in the U.S. Constitution, that do not appear in
our Constitutions sets an extremely dangerous
precedent.
That the term "joint resolutions" was removed when the
Constitutional Convention decided to adopt a unicameral
legislative system and the subcommittee modified the
proposed provisions by deleting joint resolutions
because there are no joint resolutions under a
unicameral legislature is a "clerical error." No one,
however, has pointed out this "clerical error" until now,
after 84 long years from the adoption of the 1935
Constitution.
Assuming for the sake of argument that the framers
committed this "clerical error," this should have been
corrected by the framers of the 1973 and 1987
Constitutions. They did not because, very obviously,
there was no "clerical error" at all. While a part of the
1935 Constitution was patterned after the Jones Law,
the final version did not adopt "joint resolutions."
The Court cannot expand the Constitution by inserting a
term that is not expressly found in the Constitution.
Deletions in preliminary drafts of the Constitutional
Convention are, at best, negative guides, which cannot
prevail over the positive provisions of the finally adopted
Constitution
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BILL JR
3 readings on
APPROVAL separate days
BELGICA v. OCHOA unless certified depending on the
. Printed copies in rules of procedure
final form must be that Senate /
distributed 3 days House may, at
CONGRESS CANNOT PARTICIPATE IN THE their sole
before passage
BUDGET EXECUTION; CANNOT DELEGATE discretion, adopt.
Must be
LEGISLATION POWERS TO INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS presented to
Pres.
PDAF: (Priority Development Assistant Fund-Estrada) No amendment
AQUINO ADMIN.: Express lump–sum amounts on 3rd reading
be changed at
allocated for individual legislators and the VP: Fixed in the any time by the
PROCEDURE
Constitution Senate or the
SEPARATION OF POWERS - constitutional House
demarcation of the three fundamental powers of and the Senate Committee on Finance for favorable
government. The Constitution has blocked out with deft endorsement to the DBM or the implementing agency,
strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the
executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of Fund Release - request for release of funds shall be
the government.” The principle stem from the notion that supported by the documents prescribed and favorably
the powers of government must be divided to avoid endorsed by House Committee on Appropriations and
concentration of these powers in any one branch; to the Senate Committee on Finance;
avoid any single branch from lording its power over the
other. Lack of independence would result in the inability Fund Realignment - realignment shall be submitted to
of one branch to check the arbitrary or self– interest the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate
assertions of another. Committee on Finance and some department secretaries
are authorized to realign funds subject to concurrence of
HOW VIOLATED: the legislator concerned.

(a) interference with and/or Clearly, these are not related to functions of

(b) assumption of another department’s functions
The enforcement of the national budget is indisputably a
function both constitutionally assigned and properly
entrusted to the Executive.
congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to
intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to
the sphere of budget execution.
(ON DELEGATION TO PRESIDENT)

Upon approval and passage of the GAA, Congress’ law–
making role necessarily comes to an end and from there
the Executive’s role of implementing the national budget
begins.
Program Menu Feature - allows legislators to identify
PDAF projects that falls under a general program listed
in the said menu
Priority List - standard from which the legislator may
make his choice. It further authorizes legislators to
identify projects outside his district as long as the
representative of the district concerned concurs in
writing.
Modification of the project identification – must be
submitted to the House Committee on Appropriations
“completeness test.” - complete when it sets forth
therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or
implemented by the delegate.
“sufficient standard test.” - law lays down a sufficient
standard when it provides adequate guidelines or
limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the
delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from
running riot.
Present Case – “and for such other purposes as may be
directed by the Pres” INSUFFICIENT STANDARD
ABAKADA v. PURISIMA
.
CONGRESS CANNOT APPROVE/DENY ADMIN. IRR
THROUGH OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE.
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KDG SAN BEDA MENDIOLA 1I 2020
F: Congress passed the Attrition Act to optimize
revenue-generating capability and collection of BIR and
BOC through incentives and sanctions to be facilitated
by the Revenue Performance Evaluation Board
consisting of DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC tasked to
promulgate IRR to be approved by a Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee – seven Members from the Senate
and seven Members from the House, appointed by
Senate Pres. And Speaker with 2 members from
minority.
OBJECTIVE OF POST-ENACTMENT MEASURES:
i. monitor bureaucratic compliance with program
objectives
ii. determine whether agencies are properly
administered
iii. eliminate executive waste and dishonesty
iv. prevent executive usurpation of legislative authority
v. assess executive conformity with the congressional
perception of public interest.
The power of oversight is intrinsic in the grant of
legislative power itself and integral to the checks and
balances inherent in a democratic system of
government. Congress has invoked its oversight power
with increased frequency to check the perceived
"exponential accumulation of power" by the executive
branch.
CATEGORIES OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT
FUNCTIONS
a. Scrutiny - lesser intensity and continuity of attention to
administrative operations. Its primary purpose is to
determine economy and efficiency of the operation of
government activities. Congress may request information
and report from the other branches. It can give
recommendations or pass resolutions for consideration
of the agency involved.
b. Congressional investigation - more intense digging of
facts. The power of Congress to conduct investigation is
recognized by the 1987 Constitution.
c. Legislative supervision - most encompassing form.
"Supervision" connotes a continuing and informed
awareness regarding executive operations and allows
Congress to scrutinize the exercise of delegated law-
making authority, and permits Congress to retain part of
that delegated authority.
Congress exercises supervision over the executive
agencies through its veto power requiring the President
or agency to present regulations to Congress, which
retains a "right" to approve or disapprove.
CONSITUTIONALITY - congressional oversight is not
unconstitutional per se, meaning, it neither necessarily
constitutes an encroachment on the executive power to
implement laws nor undermines the constitutional
separation of powers. Rather, it is integral to the checks
and balances inherent in a democratic system of
government. It may in fact even enhance the separation
of powers as it prevents the over-accumulation of power
in the executive branch.
LIMITATIONS ON CONGRESS:
1. It may not vest itself, any of its committees or its
members with either executive or judicial power.
2. When it exercises its legislative power, it must
follow the "single, finely wrought and
exhaustively considered, procedures" under the
Constitution
OVERSIGHT POWERS OF OUR CONGRESS
(1) SCRUTINY - based primarily on Congress’
power of appropriation and the budget hearings
conducted in connection with it, its power to ask
heads of departments to appear before and be
heard by either of its Houses on any matter
pertaining to their departments and its power of
confirmation
(2) INVESTIGATION - monitoring of the
implementation of laws pursuant to the power to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.
Any action or step beyond that will undermine the
separation of powers guaranteed by the Constitution.
Legislative vetoes fall in this class.
LEGISLATIVE VETO – in the form of a JCOC is an
inward-turning delegation designed to attach a
congressional leash to an agency to which Congress
has by law initially delegated broad powers. It radically
changes the design or structure of the Constitution’s
diagram of power as it entrusts to Congress a direct role
in enforcing, applying or implementing its own laws.
ADMINISTRATIVE RULES
Congress has two options when enacting legislation to
define national policy. It can itself formulate the details or
it can assign to the executive. In the latter case, the law
must be complete in all its essential terms and conditions
when it leaves the hands of the legislature that what is
left for the executive branch is to fill up details
(supplementary rule-making) or ascertain facts
necessary to bring the law into actual operation
(contingent rule-making).
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KDG SAN BEDA MENDIOLA 1I 2020
Administrative regulations have the force of law and are
entitled to respect. They partake of the nature of a
statute and are just as binding as if they have been
written in the statute itself. Congress, in the guise of
assuming the role of an overseer, may not pass upon
their legality by subjecting them to its stamp of approval
without disturbing the calculated balance of powers
established by the Constitution. In exercising discretion
to approve or disapprove the IRR based on whether or
not they conformed with RA 9335, Congress arrogated
judicial power unto itself, a power exclusively vested in
this Court by the Constitution.
(Partially granted, provisions regarding JCOC
unconstitutional but constitutionality of the Attrition Act is
upheld.)
DATU ABAS KIDA v. SENATE
. repeal. It cannot declare in advance the intent of
CONGRESS CANNOT PASS IRREPEALABLE LAWS
SUPERMAJORITY VOTING REQUIREMENT
Section 1. Consistent with the provisions of the
Constitution, this Organic Act may be reamended or
revised by the Congress of the Philippines upon a vote
of two-thirds (2/3) of the Members of the House of
Representatives and of the Senate voting separately.
This has to be struck down for giving RA No. 9054 the
character of an irrepealable law by requiring more than
what the Constitution demands.
The Constitution provides that a "majority of each House
shall constitute a quorum to do business." In other
words, as long as majority of the members of the House
of Representatives or the Senate are present, these
bodies have the quorum needed to conduct business
and hold session.  Within a quorum, a vote of majority is
generally sufficient to enact laws or approve acts.
In contrast, RA No. 9054 requires a vote of no less than
(2/3) of the House and of the Senate, voting separately,
in order to effectively amend RA No. 9054. Clearly, this
is higher than what the Constitution requires for the
passage of bills, and served to restrain the plenary
powers of Congress to amend, revise or repeal the
laws it had passed.  i. Sponsorship
BASIS (City of Davao v. GSIS)
It would be noxious anathema to democratic
principles for a legislative body to have the ability to bind
the actions of future legislative body, considering that
both assemblies are regarded with equal footing,
exercising as they do the same plenary
powers. Perpetual infallibility is not one of the attributes
desired in a legislative body, and a legislature which
attempts to forestall future amendments or repeals of its
enactments labors under delusions of omniscience.
A state legislature has a plenary law-making power over
all subjects, whether pertaining to persons or things,
within its territorial jurisdiction, either to introduce new
laws or repeal the old, unless prohibited expressly or by
implication by the federal constitution or limited or
restrained by its own. It cannot bind itself or its
successors by enacting irrepealable laws. Every
legislative body may modify or abolish the acts
passed by itself or its predecessors. This power of
repeal may be exercised at the same session at which
the original act was passed; and even while a bill is in its
progress and before it becomes a law. This legislature
cannot bind a future legislature to a particular mode of
subsequent legislatures or the effect of subsequent
legislation upon existing statutes.
Thus, while a supermajority is not a total ban against a
repeal, it is a limitation in excess of what the Constitution
requires on the passage of bills and is constitutionally
obnoxious because it significantly constricts the future
legislators' room for action and flexibility.
MODULE 2: STATUTES AND ENACTMENT
HOW DOES A BILL BECOME A LAW?
I. Bill is filed with the Secretary-General of HR
II. First Reading
- Reading of Title/Author(s)
- Referral to appropriate committee(s). The
Committee then studies and recommends. If action is
favorable, a report is submitted through Committee
on Rules. If unfavorable, bill is laid on the table
(author/s informed).
• The Committee on Rules includes the bill in
calendar of business.
III. Second Reading
ii. Period of debates
iii. Period of amendments
iv. Voting: If favorable, calendar for third reading.
If unfavorable, transmit to archives.
IV. Third Reading
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KDG SAN BEDA MENDIOLA 1I 2020
i. Distribution of bill on final form.
ii. Roll call vote. If approved, transmittal for action
to the other house. If disapproved, transmit to
archives.
iii. In case of conflicting provisions, the Bicameral
Conference Committee is constituted to
reconcile differences.
- Ratification of Conference Committee
Report, bill is printed in engrossed form.
V. Enrolment of bill – Signed by the presiding officers
VI. Presidential Action
i. Approval; the act shall take effect after 15
days following the publication in the Official
Gazette or in at least two (2) national
newspaper of general circulation.
ii. Inaction; if no action on the bill within thirty
(30) days, the bill lapses into a law.
iii. Vetoed; the bill is returned to originating
house with explanation, either veto is
accepted or override of veto by 2/3 votes
from both houses.
TITLE OF BILLS
LIDASAN v. COMELEC
.
F: Congress passed “An Act Creating the Municipality of
Dianaton, in the Province of Lanao del Sur” which
consists of 21 barrios, 9 from Lanao, and 12 from
Cotabato.
LIMITATIONS UPON LEGISLATIVE POWER:
1. Congress is to refrain from conglomeration,
under one statute, of heterogeneous subjects.
2. The title of the bill is to be couched in a
language sufficient to notify the legislators and
the public and those concerned of the import of
the single subject thereof.
ONE SUBJECT-ONE TITLE RULE
The Constitution does not require Congress to employ in
the title of an enactment, language of such precision as
to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the
minute details therein. It suffices if the title should serve
the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform
the legislators, the persons interested in the subject
of the bill, and the public, of the nature, scope and
consequences of the proposed law and its operation to
lead them to inquire into the body of the bill, study and
discuss the same, take appropriate action thereon, and,
thus, prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislators.
THE TEST OF THE SUFFICIENCY - whether or not it is
misleading; and (which technical accuracy is not
essential, and the subject need not be stated in express
terms where it is clearly inferable from the details set
forth) whether a title is so uncertain that the average
person reading it would not be informed of the purpose
of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or
which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating
one subject where another or different one is really
embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or
indication of the real subject or scope of the act
In determining sufficiency of particular title its substance
rather than its form should be considered, and the
purpose of the constitutional requirement, of giving
notice to all persons interested, should be kept in mind
by the court. Compliance is imperative, given the fact
that the Constitution does not exact of Congress the
obligation to read during its deliberations the entire text
of the bill. In fact, in the case of House Bill 1247, which
became Republic Act 4790, only its title was read from
its introduction to its final approval in the House of
Representatives.
IN THE CASE AT BAR: The title in this case projects
the impression that solely the province of Lanao del Sur
is affected by the creation of Dianaton. Not the slightest
intimation is there that communities in the adjacent
province of Cotabato are incorporated in this new Lanao
del Sur town. The phrase “in the Province of Lanao del
Sur,” makes the title misleading, deceptive.
For, the known fact is that the legislation has a two-
pronged purpose combined in one statute: (1) it creates
the municipality of Dianaton; and (2) it also dismembers
two municipalities in Cotabato.
Such title did not inform the members of Congress as to
the full impact of the law; it did not apprise the people in
the Cotabato that part of their territory is being taken
away and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del
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Sur; it kept the public in the dark as to what towns and
provinces were actually affected by the bill.
Transfer of a sizeable portion of territory from one
province to another of necessity involves reduction of
area, population and income of the first and the
corresponding increase of those of the other. This is as
important as the creation of a municipality. And yet, the
title did not reflect this fact. The lumping together of
barrios in adjacent but separate provinces under one
statute is neither a natural nor logical consequence of
the creation of the new municipality of Dianaton. A
change of boundaries of the two provinces may be made
without necessarily creating a new municipality and vice
versa.
GIRON v.
COMELEC . combing through various laws, they found other election
“An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest,
Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair Election
Practices.”
Objectives: to guarantee or ensure equal opportunity for
public service and assure free, orderly, honest, peaceful
and credible elections.
The title and the objectives of Rep. Act No. 9006 are
comprehensive enough to include the repeal of the
Omnibus Election Code within its contemplation. To
require that the said repeal be expressed in the title is to
insist that the title be a complete index of its content.
The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code to the other provisions which deal with the
lifting of the ban on the use of media for election
propaganda, does not violate the “one subject-one title”
rule. An act having a single general subject in the title,
may contain any number of provisions, no matter how
diverse, so long as they are not inconsistent with or
foreign to the general subject.
Pursuant to the committee deliberations, Congress did
not limit the law to the lifting of the political ad ban. After
practices that they considered inequitable. Some
included the appreciation of the votes cast in case of a
late substitution of candidates and the ipso facto
resignation of certain elective officials upon the filing of
their certificates of candidacy. Thus, to “level the playing
field,” Congress fashioned a law that would address
what they determined were unfair election practices;
hence, the birth of the Fair Election Act.

Section 12 and Section 14 are indeed germane to the

PROVISIONS:
subject expressed in the title worded broadly enough to
include the measures embodied in the assailed sections.
- lifting of the political ad ban
- the treatment of the votes cast for substituted
DISMISSED.
candidates after the official ballots have been
printed
FORMALITIES
- repeal of the Omnibus Election Code on the
resignation of elective officials immediately after
they file their COC for an office other than that TOLENTINO VS. SEC. OF FINANCE
which they are currently holding in a permanent o
capacity.
F: Petitioners assailed RA 7716 widening the tax base
(FARINAS) To determine whether there has been of VAT System by amending the NRIC.
compliance with the one-subject—one-title” rule, it must
not be so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the
CONTENTIONS:
1. Although the house bill originated from the House, it
power of legislation. There must be reasonable and not a
was not passed by Senate which simply consolidated it
technical construction. It is sufficient if the title be with the Senate version in the Conference Committee
comprehensive enough reasonably to include the
general object which a statute seeks to effect, without 2. It did not comply with the 3-reading rule, having
expressing each and every end and means necessary or done the 2nd and 3rd reading on the same day.
convenient for the accomplishing of that object. Mere
details need not be set forth. The title need not be an
abstract or index of the Act.
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3. Conference committee included provisions not
found in either bill which only has the power to
reconcile conflicting provisions.
3-READING-RULE
No bill passed by either House shall become a law
unless it has passed three readings on separate days,
and printed copies thereof in its final form have been
distributed to its Members three days before its
passage, except when the President certifies to the
necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public
calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill,
no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote
thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the
yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
EXCEPTION
If the President certifies the bill as urgent, then it can
dispense with the requirement of giving copies of the
bill, three (3) days before the third reading.
URGENCY OF PRESIDENT’S CERTIFICATION
According to the President, there was a growing
budget deficit at the time, and therefore is a need to
enact a remedy measure so here comes the
expanded value added tax.
EFFECT OF CERTIFICATION
As a general rule, the first, second, and third readings
must be done on three (3) separate days, but once
the President certifies the bill as urgent the first,
second, and third readings can be done on the same
day.
CONSTRUCTION
the "unless" clause must be read in relation to the
"except" clause, because the two are really coordinate
clauses of the same sentence. To construe the
"except" clause as simply dispensing with the second
requirement in the "unless" clause (i.e., printing and
distribution three days before final approval) would not
only violate the rules of grammar. It would also negate
the very premise of the "except" clause: the necessity
of securing the immediate enactment of a bill which is
certified in order to meet a public calamity or
emergency. For if it is only the printing that is
dispensed with by presidential certification, the time
saved would be so negligible as to be of any use in
insuring immediate enactment.
ORIGIN OF THE BILL
To begin with, it is not the law — but the revenue bill
— which is required by the Constitution to "originate
exclusively" in the House of Representatives. It is
important to emphasize this, because a bill originating
in the House may undergo such extensive changes in
the Senate that the result may be a rewriting of the
whole. To insist that a revenue statute — and not only
the bill which initiated the legislative process
culminating in the enactment of the law — must
substantially be the same as the House bill would be
to deny the Senate's power not only to "concur with
amendments" but also to "propose amendments."
Nor is the power to amend limited to adding a
provision or two in a revenue bill emanating from the
House. 
It would be to violate the coequality of legislative
power of the two houses of Congress and in fact
make the House superior to the Senate. Nor does the
Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a
substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill
from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a
body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill
There is really no difference between the Senate
preserving the House bill then writing its own version
(which, it would seem, petitioners admit is an
amendment by substitution), and, on the other hand,
separately presenting a bill of its own on the same
subject matter. In either case the result are two bills
on the same subject.
Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the
initiative for filing must come from the House on the
theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the
members of the House can be expected to be more
sensitive to the local needs and problems. On the
other hand, the senators, who are elected at large,
are expected to approach the same problems from
the national perspective. Both views are thereby
made to bear on the enactment of such laws.
BILLS TO EXCLUSIVELY ORIGINATE FROM THE
HOUSE
(1) Revenue bills
(2) tariff bills
(3) bills authorizing an increase of the public debt
(4) private bills
(5) bills of local application
CONFERENCE COMMITTEE - To be sure, nothing in
the Rules limits a conference committee to a
consideration of conflicting provisions. 3-reading rule
applies only to bills introduced for the first time not to
the conference committee report.
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KDG SAN BEDA MENDIOLA 1I 2020
PHILJA v.
PRADO . FACTS: R.A. No. 7354 as
implemented by the Philippine Postal Corporation through
its Circular, withdrawing the franking privilege from the
courts, and the Land Registration Commission and its
Registers of Deeds, and other government offices was
assailed by the petitioners who are members of the lower
courts who feel that their official functions as judges will
be prejudiced.
CONTENTIONS:
(1) VIOLATES one subject-one title rule
(2) did not pass the required readings in both Houses
and printed copies of the bill in its final form were
not distributed among the members before its
passage; and
(3) discriminatory
PURPOSE OF ONE SUBJECT-ONE TITLE RULE:
(1) to prevent hodge-podge or “log-rolling” legislation;
(2) to prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature
(3) to fairly apprise the people, in order that they may
have opportunity of being heard thereon
CONFERENCE COMMITTEE
That the paragraph appeared only in the Conference
Committee Report, notwithstanding that Sec. 35 was
never a subject of any disagreement is unacceptable.
While it is true that a conference committee is the
mechanism for compromising differences between the
Senate and the House, it is not limited but instead has
an authoritarian power. The Conference Committee
Report was returned to and duly approved by both
houses then the bill was enrolled with its certification as
having been duly passed by both Houses. It was then
presented to and approved by President.
Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court
may not inquire beyond the certification of the approval
of a bill. The enrolled bill is conclusive upon the Judiciary
(except in matters that have to be entered in the journals
like the yeas and nays on the final reading of the bill.)8
The journals are themselves also binding on the
Supreme Court. To inquire into the veracity of the
journals is to interfere with the legitimate powers and
functions of the Legislature.
APPROVAL OF BILLS
BOLINAO ELECTRONICS v. VALENCIA …
F: In the GAA, 300,000 was appropriated for the
operation of the Philippine Broadcasting Service,
provided that no portion shall be used for the
operation of television stations in Luzon or any part of
the Philippines where there are television stations.
THE PRESIDENT VETOED THIS ITEMS FOR THE
REASON THAT if approved will render inoperative the
television stations currently operated by the Philippine
Broadcasting Service in Manila.
RESTRICTIONS ON VETO
Under the Constitution, the President has the power
to veto any particular item or Items of an appropriation
bill.
It may be observed from the wordings of the
Appropriations Act that the amount appropriated for
the operation of the Philippine Broadcasting Service
was made subject to the condition that the same shall
not be used or expended for operation of television
stations in Luzon, where there are already existing
commercial television stations. This gives rise to the
question of whether the President may legally veto a
condition attached to an appropriation or item in the
appropriation bill.
The executive's veto power does not carry with it the
power to strike out conditions or restrictions. If the
veto is unconstitutional, it follows that the same
produced no effect whatsoever,4 and the restriction
imposed by the appropriation bill, therefore, remains.
Any expenditure made by the intervenor PBS, for the
purpose of installing or operating a television station
in Manila, where there are already television stations
in operation, would be in violation of the express
condition for the release of the appropriation and,
consequently, null and void.
EVIDENCE OF ENACTMENT OF BILLS
MABANAG v. LOPEZ VITO …
ENROLLED BILL
“Sec. 313, old Code of Civil Procedure - Official
documents may be proved as follows:
(2) the proceedings of any legislative body –
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KDG SAN BEDA MENDIOLA 1I 2020
1 - journals of either house
2 - by published statutes or resolutions
3 - copies certified by the clerk or secretary.
In the case of Acts of the Philippine Commission or the
Philippine Legislature, when there is an existence of a
copy signed by the presiding officers and secretaries of
said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof the Acts and of
the due enactment thereof."
REASONS FOR CONCLUSIVENESS
- respect due to a coequal and independent
department of the government, and it would be
an inquisition into the conduct of the members of
the legislature
- also one of convenience, because courts could
not rely on the published session laws, but would
be required to look beyond these to the journals
of the legislature. Otherwise, after relying on the
prima facie evidence of the enrolled bills,
authenticated, it might be ascertained from the
journals that an act theretofore enforced had
never become a law.
In the event of a material discrepancy between the
journal and the enrolled copy, the former is to be taken
as the standard of veracity and the act is to be rejected.
It is argued that if the authenticated roll is conclusive
upon the Courts, then less than a quorum of each House
may impose laws upon the State in defiance of the
inhibition of the Constitution. It must be admitted that the
consequence stated would be possible. BUT It is not fit
that the Judiciary should claim for itself a purity beyond
all others, it is no more the function of the Judiciary in the
one case than in the other to try to keep the Legislature
to its duty.
Even if both the journals and an authenticated copy of
the Act had been presented, the disposal of the issue by
the Court on the basis of the journals does not imply
rejection of the enrollment theory, for, as already stated,
the due enactment of a law may be proved in either of
the two ways. No discrepancy appears to have been
noted between the two documents.
ARROYO v. DE VENECIA … new members may be assumed to have an open mind
F: Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the law on sin
taxes for not following the Rules of Senate, therefore,
unconstitutional. They urge the Court not to feel bound
by the certifications that they have been duly enacted.
Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing by the
Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate
and the certification by the secretaries of both Houses
that it was duly passed are conclusive of its due
enactment.
In one case we “went behind” an enrolled bill and
consulted the Journal to determine whether certain
provisions of a statute had been approved by the
Senate. But, where there is no evidence to the contrary,
this Court will respect the certification of the presiding
officers that a bill has been duly passed.
Wigmore: The truth is that many have been carried
away with the righteous desire to check at any cost the
misdoings of Legislatures. They have set such store by
the Judiciary for this purpose that they have almost
made them a second and higher Legislature. But they
aim in the wrong direction. Instead of trusting a faithful
Judiciary to check an inefficient Legislature, they should
turn to improve the Legislature. The sensible solution is
not to patch and mend casual errors by asking the
Judiciary to violate legal principle and to do
impossibilities with the Constitution; but to represent
ourselves with competent, careful, and honest
legislators, the work of whose hands on the statute-roll
may come to reflect credit upon the name of popular
government.
The enrolled bill doctrine, rests on the following
considerations:
. . . As the President has no authority to approve a bill
not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody
of the Secretary of State, and having the official
attestations carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by
the legislative and executive departments of the
government, charged, respectively, with the duty of
enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by
Congress. The respect due to coequal and independent
departments requires the judicial department to act upon
that assurance, and to accept, as having passed
Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated;
leaving the court to determine, when the question
properly arises, whether the Act, so authenticated, is in
conformity with the Constitution
Indeed, petitioners have advanced no argument to
warrant a departure from the rule, except to say that,
with a change in the membership of the Court, the three
on the question of the enrolled bill rule.
Moreover, the due enactment of the law in question is
confirmed by the Journal of the House which shows that
the conference committee report was approved on that
day.
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KDG SAN BEDA MENDIOLA 1I 2020
JOURNAL KEEPING
Constitution. Art. VI, §16(4) provides: Each House shall
keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time
publish the same, excepting such parts as may, in its
judgment, affect national security; and the yeas and nays
on any question shall, at the request of one-fifth of the
Members present, be entered in the Journal. Each
House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings.
REASON OF CONCLUSIVENESS OF JOURNALS -
The imperatives of public policy for regarding the
Journals as public memorials of the most permanent
character is because all are required to conform to them;
they should be permanent, that rights acquired today
upon the faith of what has been declared to be law shall
not be destroyed tomorrow, or at some remote period of
time, by facts resting only in the memory of individuals.
ASTORGA v. VILLEGAS … bill had been duly enacted? In such a case the entries in
F: The Senate President in public and in a letter to the
President, relayed that his signature on the bill is invalid
and of no effect, on account that the passed version of
the law is the wrong one, not embodying the agreed
amendments but the prior, discarded ones. President
withdrew his signature.
ENROLLMENT – AUTHENTICATION
Congress devised its own system of authenticating bills
duly approved by both Houses, namely, by the
signatures of their respective presiding officers and
secretaries on the printed copy of the approved bill. This
procedure is merely a mode of authentication, to signify
to the Chief Executive that the bill being presented to
him has been duly approved by Congress and is ready
for his approval or rejection. The function of an
attestation is therefore not of approval, because a bill is
considered approved after it has passed both Houses.
EFFECT OF ABSENCE
If the signatures are mandatory such that their absence
would render the statute invalid would be in effect giving
the presiding officers the power of veto. It may be noted
that the enrolled bill theory is based mainly on “the
respect due to co-equal and independent departments,”
which requires the judicial department “to accept, as
having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the
manner stated.”
This is neutralized in this case by the fact that the
Senate President declared his signature on the bill to be
invalid and issued a subsequent clarification that the
invalidation of his signature meant that the bill he had
signed had never been approved by the Senate.
Obviously this declaration should be accorded even
greater respect than the attestation it invalidated, which it
did for a reason that is undisputed in fact and
indisputable in logic.
As far as Congress itself is concerned, there is nothing
sacrosanct in the certification made by the presiding
officers. It is merely a mode of authentication. The
lawmaking process in Congress ends when the bill is
approved by both Houses, and the certification does not
add to the validity of the bill or cure any defect already
present upon its passage. In other words it is the
approval by Congress and not the signatures of the
presiding officers that is essential.
Absent such attestation as a result of the disclaimer, and
consequently there being no enrolled bill to speak of,
what evidence is there to determine whether or not the
the journal should be consulted.
The journal of the proceedings of each House of
Congress is no ordinary record. The Constitution
requires it. While it is true that the journal is not
authenticated and is subject to the risks of misprinting
and other errors, the point is irrelevant in this case. This
Court is merely asked to inquire whether the text of
House Bill No. 9266 signed by the Chief Executive was
the same text passed by both Houses of Congress.
Under the specific facts and circumstances of this case,
this Court can do this and resort to the Senate journal for
the purpose. The journal discloses that substantial and
lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and
approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the
printed text sent to the President and signed by him. Not
being so, there is no law to speak of.
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FRANCISCO V. HRo o oo
F: In an HR resolution to investigate disbursements and
expenditures of CJ Davide, Erap filed an impeachment
case against him. 4 months later it was dismissed for
lack of substance. A few weeks later, the 2 nd
impeachment case was filed.

Section 16. –  If filed by member/citizen, it is deemed

initiated on the day the Committee on Justice finds that it
is sufficient in substance. If filed by 1/3 of the members,
impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated at the
time of the filing of such verified complaint or resolution
of impeachment with the Secretary General.

Section 17 – Within a period of one (1) year from the

date impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated, no
impeachment proceedings, as such, can be initiated
against the same official.

Verba legis [non est recedendum] - the words used in

the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning
except where technical terms are employed. It is to be
assumed that the words in which constitutional
provisions are couched express the objective sought to
be attained. They are to be given their ordinary meaning
except where technical terms are employed in which
case the significance thus attached to them prevails. As
the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document, it
being essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should
ever be present in the people's consciousness, its
language as much as possible should be understood in
the sense they have in common use.

Where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima - The

words of the Constitution should be interpreted in
accordance with the intent of its framers. A foolproof
yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention
underlying the provision under consideration. Thus, it
has been held that the Court in construing a Constitution
should bear in mind the object sought to be
accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any,
sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision
will be examined in the light of the history of the times,
and the condition and circumstances under which the
Constitution was framed. The object is to ascertain the
reason which induced the framers of the Constitution to
enact the particular provision and the purpose sought to
be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole
 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
KDG SAN BEDA MENDIOLA 1I 2020

as to make the words consonant to that reason and

calculated to effect that purpose.

Ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be

interpreted as a whole. The members of the
Constitutional Convention could not have dedicated a
provision of our Constitution merely for the benefit of one
person without considering that it could also affect
others. When they adopted [provisions of the
Constitution], they permitted, if not willed, that said
provision should function to the full extent of its
substance and its terms, not by itself alone, but in
conjunction with all other provisions of that great
document.

Extraneous Materials Can Only be used if the Above-

Mentioned Rules Fail
If, however, the plain meaning of the word is not found to
be clear, resort to other aids is available. While it is
permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and
proceedings of the constitutional convention in order to
arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting
Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other
guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary the
terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear.
Debates in the constitutional convention "are of value as
showing the views of the individual members, and as
indicating the reasons for their votes, but they give us no
light as to the views of the large majority who did not
talk, much less of the mass of our fellow citizens whose
votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of
fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the
constitution from what appears upon its face." The
proper interpretation therefore depends more on how it
was understood by the people adopting it than in the
framers's understanding thereof. [Civil Liberties Union v.
Executive Secretary]

DEEMED INITIATED
Initiation of impeachment proceedings starts with the
filing of the complaint, and the vote of one-third of the
House in a resolution of impeachment does not
initiate the impeachment proceedings which was already
initiated by the filing of a verified complaint under Section
3, paragraph (2), Article XI of the Constitution."145