Society for Comparative Studies in Society and History

The Household and Relations of Production in Southern Peru

Author(s): Jane L. Collins
Source: Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 28, No. 4 (Oct., 1986), pp. 651-671
Published by: Cambridge University Press
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The Household and Relations of
Productionin SouthernPeru
JANE L. COLLINS
State Universityof New Yorkat Binghamton

THE PEASANT HOUSEHOLD AS ANALYTICAL UNIT IN THE ANDEAN

CONTEXT

The household as a unit of analysis has achieved wide currency in social

science circles in recentyears. Researchershave shown thatin manycontexts,
both rural and urban, the household is the locus of importantproductive
processes. It has also been demonstratedto be the context within which many
decisions related to productive strategies are made and where income is
pooled and then allocated. Testimony to the growth of interestin household-
based analyses is provided by the recent appearanceof a numberof edited
volumes (Netting et al. 1984; Smith et al. 1984) and review articles
(Yanagisako 1979; Guyer 1981; Schmink 1984) on the topic.
Researchershave examined the changing size and form of the household
over time and the relationshipof these changes to aspects of the social en-
vironment (Bender 1967; Goody 1972; Hammel and Laslett 1974). Some
have argued that household size and structure is a sensitive indicator of
processes occurringin the world economy, mediatedthroughchanges in labor
markets(Smith et al. 1984; Schmink 1984). The appeal of the household as
an intermediateunit between the individual and larger social institutionshas
also been noted (Wood 1981). As an analytical tool, the concept of the
household has proven useful to scholars of a wide range of theoretical
backgrounds.
Widely adoptedconcepts inevitably draw critics, however, and the house-
hold has had its share. Jane Guyer (1981:98-99) and Roger Sanjek(1982:57-
58) have discussed problems associated with an overzealous applicationof
household models. Most of the critiques have focused on the difficulties of
defining or bounding the household in particularcontexts, although some
have addressedissues of broadertheoreticalconcern. Robert Bach and Lisa
Schraml (1982:329-34) have suggested that studies that take households as

The author wishes to thank Michael Painter, Billie Jean Isbell, David Guillet, William Stein,
RandallMcGuire, CatherineLutz, and the CSSH reviewer for their helpful comments on a draft
of this article. Funding for research was provided by an Inter American FoundationLearning
Fellowship for Social Change.
0010-4175/86/4327-0163 $2.50 ? 1986 Society for ComparativeStudy of Society and History

651

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652 JANE L. COLLINS

their startingpoint tend to fall prey to a functionalistemphasison the mainte-

nance of the unit. Olivia Harris(1981) argues that the coincidence of family
and household in Westernthought presentsthe domestic unit as a domain in
which relationshipsare based on naturallaw, ratherthan historicallyspecific
forces and ideologies.
The concept of the household as a primaryorganizationalform has been
particularlypervasive in studies of social structurein the Andean region of
South America. Nearly every major study of Andean social organizationin
recentyears has assertedor implied that the peasanthousehold is the primary
productiveunit. In general, this literatureviews Andeanhousehold structure
as an adaptationto the demandsof the physical and social environmentof the
highlands, and one that has deep roots in Andean history.2 Andeanists have
contributedprolifically to the literatureon household adaptive strategies.
I would like to suggest that the present emphasis on the household as the
basic unit of analysis in studies of Andean peasanteconomy (and perhapsof
peasanteconomy in general)has been misplaced. Despite the weight of schol-
arly consensus on the issue, there is evidence that such an emphasis distorts
our understandingof the processes at work in the social history of the Andes.
My argumentis two-fold. First, a household-orientedapproachimposes a
Eurocentricanalyticgrid on Andeanreality. Despite the long historyof domi-
nationby the West, social relationshipsin many partsof the Andes have not
yet been assimilatedto the norms of Western society.3 Second, viewing the
household as a basic unit of social structurewith a long Andean tradition
obscures the fact that integrationinto wage and commodity marketsis creat-

I A few examples will suffice:

"In the Andean region . . . households based on nuclear families . . . control productive
resourcesand allocate consumer goods" (Lambert 1977:5).
"The basic economic coalition in peasant society is the household which is based on the
nuclearfamily. This group is the primaryunit of labormobilizationand of production,consump-
tion and management" (Custred 1977:126).
"In the daily life of the individual in Qolla society, the only corporategroup of any signifi-
cance is the household. The household is the landholding unit and the unit which organizes
production,consumptionand exchange of goods and services for its members.Politicalparticipa-
tion at the level of the community is by household. Socializationof childrentakes place almost
exclusively within the confines of the domestic group. And finally, it is the household which
organizes ritualson its own behalf" (Bolton 1977:217).
"The alternativemodel considers the household, not the communityand the hacienda, as the
fundamentalelement of peasant society for a numberof reasons. Firstly, the household is the
basic unit of economic activity. Although many goods are individuallyowned, and rightsto land
and irrigationwater are frequentlybased on membershipin largercorporategroups, the house-
hold is the locus of decision-makingwith regardto production,exchange and consumption. Its
componentmembersengage in economic activities as partof the overall budgetingand allocation
of household resources to meet the needs and goals of the household" (Orlove and Custred
1980:33).
2 See, for example,
EnriqueMayer (1982).
3 In the words of Harris(1981:51), "The image of the household as a separate,privatesphere
is so powerful in contemporarycapitalist organization that we extend it to cover radically
differentstructures,using our own categories of thought to cover other realities."

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 HOUSEHOLD AND RELATIONS OF PRODUCTION IN PERU 653

ing a new emphasis on the independentnuclear-familyhousehold as larger

networksof kin and community are broken down.
The first partof the argumentis concernedwith the fact that a focus on the
household(or any fundamentalunit of social structure)confines our attention
to those relationshipscontained within its boundariesor the relationsthat the
unit as a whole has with other units. There is a tendency to neglect or ignore
productiverelationshipsthat divide, ratherthan unify, family members. Yet
in some parts of the Andes, extrahouseholdrelationshipsare more centralto
social and biological reproductionthan those within the household. The
household, in these contexts, is not a unit that ensures its own maintenance
and reproduction(Wood 1981). It is a subminimal unit, incapable of fully
reproducinglabor power within its boundaries.
The second part of my argument focuses on the process by which the
independenthousehold is being created and reinforcedby peasant participa-
tion in the Andean marketeconomy. The participationof Andean peasantsin
wage and commodity markets weakens networks of nonhousehold rela-
tionships and creates an emphasis on the nuclear family that previously did
not exist and which is not yet fully instituted. Accounts of Andean social
structurehave traditionallyfocused on the surface form of institutionsrather
than on the dialectics of their determination. I argue that by viewing the
household as a basic unit whose boundaries and characteristicsare to be
described, these accounts have missed the complex history of its emergence
on the Andean scene.
This history is complex, because of the incomplete integrationof many
Andean peasants into the cash economy. Their participationin wage and
commodity marketsdoes not provide sufficient income and security, forcing
their continuedreliance on subsistence production.Because cash-earningac-
tivities often mitigate against the maintenance of extrahousehold rela-
tionships, a majorcontradictionis created. Wage laborand cash croppinglead
to the breakdownof the very relationshipsthat organize the subsistence pro-
duction made necessary by the insufficient income they provide.
Obviously, then, the issue of whetherwe should speakof householdsin the
Andeanenvironmentis notjust one of semanticsor definition. The emergence
of the independentnuclear-familyhousehold as a conceptuallyand materially
importantunit and the underminingof broadernetworksof relationshipsare at
the heart of major processes of economic change. The exact nature of the
transitionis shaped, in various contexts, by the natureand degree of integra-
tion into the cash economy.
EleanorLeacock (1979:194) has arguedthat the delineationor strengthen-
ing of the nuclearfamily as an economic unit and the weakeningof other kin
ties is an essential feature of the experience of colonized peoples. The evi-
dence presentedhere suggests that she is correctand furthermorethat in some
parts of the world this transitionis not yet complete. In economies that are

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654 JANE L. COLLINS

marketdominated, but not marketorganized(Taussig 1980:10), peasantsare

caught between the exigencies of two modes of production, and remain de-
pendent on the social relationshipsthat organize productionin each mode.
The proclivityof the Westernresearcherfor "finding" the householdin the
Andes is not simply a conceptual error, but reinforces the creation of the
household as an independent unit. An outsider who views Andean social
structurethrough a Europeangrid sees units that resemble, in their surface
form, the nuclear-familyhousehold in Westernsociety. It is all too simple to
assume that the two units are products of similar historical processes and
embody similar structuralprinciples. To do so not only leads to a misunder-
standingof the social relationshipsthat are involved; it also informs theory
and policy with the notion that the household is important.4When Western
social scientists see "Western" social institutions in other environments,
their findings may unintentionallysupport neocolonial efforts to "modern-
ize" the society. Science not only mirrorsthe society from which it emerges,
but recreates these mirroredimages in other societies to which it turns its
attention.
The particularcase which providesthe point of referencefor this discussion
is that of the Aymara communities of Huancan6Province on the northern
shore of Lake Titicaca in southernPeru. The analysis that follows examines
the networks of nonhousehold productive relations that provide access to
resources for subsistence agricultureand deploy labor for productionin this
sphere. It examines the social relations that pertain in market-orientedac-
tivities. Finally, the processes by which participationin the cash economy
weakens the networkof nonhouseholdproductiverelationsand reinforcesthe
economic position of the nuclear-familyhousehold are discussed.

RELATIONS OF PRODUCTION IN THE ANDEAN COUNTRYSIDE

The account that follows differs from many more traditionalaccounts of

Andeansocial structurein its relianceon concepts of modes of productionand
their articulationto clarify historicalprocesses of economic integration.Such
a perspective presumes that the critical variables to be considered in any
setting are the forces of production(resources, productiveknowledge, tech-
nology, and the technicaldivision of labor)and the social relationsof produc-
tion (relationshipsthatprovide access to resources,deploy laborto productive

4 A recent example can be found in the policies of the Peruvianagrarianreform (1969-75),

whose design was heavily influencedby social scientists. The reformtook householdsheaded by
males to be the basic units of reform enterprisesand peasant communities alike. The Peasant
CommunityStatutesof 1970 forbade reform beneficiaries to maintainrights to land or work in
more than one location, thus ignoring the complex networks throughwhich land and labor for
productiveenterpriseswere obtained. When reform enterprisessuch as the AgriculturalSocial
InterestSociety of San Pedro (Huancan6,Puno) experiencedcrises, networksof extralousehold
relationshipsand land rightsoutside the enterprisereabsorbedthe residentlaborforce andensured
their survival (Condori 1980).

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 HOUSEHOLD AND RELATIONS OF PRODUCTION IN PERU 655

enterprises,and transfersurplusto nonproducers).In the economy of southern

Peru producers may be viewed as participatingin two distinct modes of
production.The forces and relationsof productionin subsistence agriculture
are markedlydifferentfrom those pertainingto cash croppingand wage labor.
It is thus possible to conceptually distinguish between a capitalist mode of
productionand a kin-based noncapitalistmode.5
In referringto a kin-based mode of production, there is no appeal to the
idea of a "naturaleconomy" as yet unintegratedinto internationalspheresof
exchange. After 450 years of colonial and neocolonial domination, the kin-
based mode of productionhas been profoundlyalteredby its articulationwith
capitalist institutions. Tribute and taxation, forced labor, and unfavorable
integrationinto marketsare the majormechanismsby which the surpluslabor
of peasantproducershas been appropriatedby the capitalistinstitutionsof the
colonial and postcolonial period in the Andes (Deere and de Janvry 1981;
Stein 1984).
The process by which traditionalforms of productionare brokendown and
capitalistrelationsof productionare institutedis not necessarilya smooth and
even one, however. According to Pierre-PhilippeRey (1973) and others, in
developing nations this process has been erraticand contradictory,with mar-
kets for labor and peasant-producedcommodities emerging and disappearing
as growth, recession, and crises occur in the largereconomy. In the Andean
countryside, these processes are reflected in what have sometimes been re-
ferredto as peasant diversification strategies. In recent years, it has become
increasingly difficult to apply the terms peasant, proletarian, migrant, or
cash-croppingsmallfarmer to ruraldwellers. A single individualmay occupy
all of these roles in the course of a lifetime. The person identifiedby the social
scientist as a peasant one month may be a rural proletarianthe next, and a
migrantto the cities during the dry season.
Peasantsparticipatein multipleeconomic activities because of the failureof
any single activity to provide an adequate living. They become part-time
wage laborers,notjust because processes of marketpenetrationhave createda
demandfor cash, but in response to stagnationin the agriculturalsector or to
governmentpolicies that lower the prices they receive for crops and thus their
standardsof living. Fluctuationsin the labordemandsof industryor commer-
cial agriculturemay send the same individualsback into food productionor
cash-cropcultivationat anothertime. The insecurityof each of the economic
alternativesmay make it desirableto maintainsome combinationof them as a
risk-mitigationmechanism.
The Aymara cultivatorsof the Lake Titicaca region of southernPeru pro-
vide a graphicexample both of partialintegrationinto a cash economy and of
5
"Kinship can then be understoodas a way of committing social labor to the transformation
of naturethrough appeals to consanguinity and to affinity. Put simply, through kinship social
labor is 'locked up' or 'embedded' in particularrelations between people" (Wolf 1982:90).

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656 JANE L. COLLINS

the unevennessof this process of integration.They grow subsistencecrops in

their high-altitudecommunities while engaging in a range of cash-earning
activities. The two most common of these are seasonal migrationto work in
coffee productionin the easternAndean valleys of Tambopata(Collins 1984)
and migrationto commercialwage-paying agriculturalenterpriseson the Per-
uvian coast. Continuedinvolvement in subsistence agriculturein conjunction
with these activities subsidizes the wages and prices received. The benefits
providedto capitalistenterprisesare those of a labor force "fed and bred in
the domestic sector" (Meillassoux 1981:95).
The central concern of the analysis that follows is not the contradictions
between the forces and relations of productionin situations where capitalist
markets are expanding while precapitalistrelations of production are still
maintained, although this must be understood as the larger context. The
centralpropositionis that in areas where precapitalistrelationsof production
are maintainedor prolonged by the natureof their articulationwith the cap-
italist mode of production, contradictionsalso may be created between the
social relationsof productionthat characterizethe two spheres. In the case of
the Aymara, participationin the capitalisteconomy weakens networksof kin
and community relationships that organize subsistence production, and it
strengthensthe position of the nuclear-familyhousehold. At the same time,
the inadequatereturnprovidedby cash activities demandscontinuedreliance
on subsistence agricultureand requiresthat the largernetworkof kin ties be
maintained. Precapitalistrelations of productionare being destroyed at the
same time that their maintenanceis demanded.6

CAPITALIST AND PRECAPITALIST PRODUCTION AMONG THE

AYMARA

Relations of Production in SubsistenceAgriculture

The researchon which the following descriptionis based was conductedin the
province of Huancane, located on the northeasternshore of Lake Titicaca in
the departmentof Puno in southern Peru between December of 1979 and
December of 1980. The province ranges in altitude from 3,800 meters near
Lake Titicaca to 4,200 meters in regions closer to the easternAndean range.
The primaryactivity of its 108,000 inhabitants,both in termsof the numberof
people involved and the proportionof livelihood provided, is subsistence
agriculture.While the rural areas of Puno produced significant amounts of
food for regional urbancenters early in this century, shifts in marketcondi-
tions have led a majorityof producersto withdrawtheir food crops from the
market(Appleby 1979; Painter1984). The majorcrops cultivatedarepotatoes

6 What Rey (1973:22) calls "conservation/dissolution" and is translatedby Aidan Foster-

Carter(1978:62) as "destruction/maintenance."

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 HOUSEHOLD AND RELATIONS OF PRODUCTION IN PERU 657

TABLE 1
Labor Productivity in Potato Cultivation, Selected Regions
of Peru, 1970-72

Production/i, 000
Labor/Hectare Production/Hectare Days Labor
Location (days) (metric tons) (metric tons)

Huancane 196 1.08 6

LakeTiticacabasin
(mean) 183 1.21 7
Westernslopesof
Andes(mean) 120 2.73 23
Easternslopesof
Andes(mean) 124 2.22 18
Coast(mean) 76 11.46 171

SOURCE:Golte (1980).

and other native tubers, barley, quinoa, and broad beans. Livestock are of
little importancein lakeside communities, but they become more significant
with altitude and are the basis of subsistence in the highest parts of the
province.
More than one hundredfreeholding peasant communities control most of
the land and water resources in Huancane. Prior to the agrarianreform of
1969-75, there were a numberof small herdinghaciendasin the higher parts
of the province, on land that is now controlled by cooperatives established
underthe reform. While the interactionbetween communityand haciendahas
been importanthistorically in terms of competition for access to land and
provision of labor, the postreform cooperatives have been so severely de-
capitalizedand unproductivethat they have had little influence on surround-
ing communities.
A tremendousamounthas been writtenaboutthe parcelizationof landhold-
ings in the Andes, and small landholdings characterizethe productive en-
vironmentof Huancane.Few families cultivate more than 1.5 hectaresin any
given year, and some may bring as little as 0.1 hectare into productionin a
season. The low marketvalue of highlandfood crops limits opportunitiesfor
accumulationon the basis of their production(Painter 1984). Trendstoward
consolidation of landholdings in the province have not been significant in
recent years for this reason.
More importantthan the size of landholdings is the scarcity of labor at
crucial points in the agriculturalcycle. This scarcity results in part from the
low productivity of labor in the highland environment. Table 1 compares
yields of potatoes per hectare in Huancane, and the days of labor requiredto

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658 JANE L. COLLINS

producethem, with those from several other regions of Peru. Far more labor
is requiredto producefar less in Huancanethan on the coast or even in other
highlandregions (Golte 1980). This is a result of ecological factors such as
altitudeand cold nighttimetemperaturesas well as of the low level of devel-
opment of the productiveforces in the southernhighlands.
Access to land. For membersof freeholdingpeasantcommunitiesin Huan-
cane, access to land is governed by (1) the laws and policies thatestablish the
special status of communityproperty,and (2) relationsof kinship that trans-
mit usufructuaryrights to specific plots. In the first instance, the legal rela-
tionship involved is between the peasant community and the state, with the
stategrantingthe communitytitle to the land, while placingcertainlimitations
on its use. The most notable restriction is the inalienabilityof community
land.
Usufructuaryrights to land within the community are inherited. For
Aymaracommunities, inheritancediverges in importantways from Peruvian
law, which requires that household property be divided equally among all
children. Landholdingsin Aymarasociety never become household property
and their transmissionis not governed by relationshipswithin the household.
Men and women retain the propertywith which they enter the household at
marriage.They work the lands together, and, on the basis of common invest-
mentsof labor, they havejoint rightsto the product,but these do not extend to
the land itself. A division of household resources is thus an impossibility.
Transmissionof land rights follows an older patternof parallelinheritance
from fatherto son and motherto daughter,a practicethat has been described
for other areas of the Andes. Billie Jean Isbell (1978:79) notes official re-
sistance to this patternin a Quechua-speakingcommunityof the department
of Ayacucho:
In 1969,thenotarypublicin Cangallo,theprovincecapital,informedmethatChuschi
and three other villages . . . persisted in this peculiar inheritancepattern. He stated
thathe hasbattledsincehis arrivalin 1921to teachthemthatPeruvianconstitutional
law requiresthatall siblingsinheritequally.He refusedto recordwills thatdid not
conformto thelaw. Thenotarywasespeciallydismayedby thepossibilitythatwomen
couldinheritgreaterestatesfromtheirmothersthantheirmalesiblingsif the woman
was richerthan her husband. . . . Villagers simply register a will that complies with
the law, returnto the village, and institutethe traditionalinheritance.
A woman's access to land resources upon marriageis not dependenton
membershipin her natal household but on her position in a line of women
extending back over several generations. The same is true for a man. These
relations of parallel transmissionapparentlyplayed a role in the transferof
names and social statuses in the past (Alb6 and Mamani 1980:293; Isbell
1978:79-80, 110-11; Wolf 1980:121-22; Collins 1981:205, 215-16) as well
as ritualknowledge (Silverblatt 1980:156-58; Belote and Belote 1977:107).
Althoughtheirfunctionshave been attenuated,they have retainedtheirrole in

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 HOUSEHOLD AND RELATIONS OF PRODUCTION IN PERU 659

TABLE 2
Labor Expendedby Peasant Household to Cultivate 1.5 Hectares,
Huancane Province, 1980

Percentage Spent in
Hours/Month/Family Hours/Day/Family Field Labor

September 546 18.2 52

March 645 20.8 60

inheritancein many contemporarycommunities, creating multigenerational

bondsthatare not sharedby male and female householdmembers.The role of
parallelkin ties in transmissionof land rights, and of communitymembership
as a condition for receiving them, reveals the importanceof extrahousehold
relationshipsin providing access to critical productiveresources.
Access to labor. The low productivityof labor in the highlandenvironment
has always resulted in labor shortagesduring periods of labor-intensiveagri-
cultural work. Such periodic shortages have requiredthe development and
maintenanceof patterns of labor exchange. This situation is illustratedby
some simple comparisonsof the supply and demandof laborat criticalpoints
in the agriculturalcycle.
The following data are based on measurementsof laborexpenditurein the
province of Huancane in 19807 (see Table 2). During the month of Sep-
tember, when most planting activities are conducted, a family whose joint
landholdingstotal 1.5 hectares (25 percent in potatoes, 17 percent in broad
beans and other vegetables, 15 percent in grains, and 43 percent in fallow)
would expend 546 hoursof labor. This amountsto 18.2 hoursper day, a little
more than half of which is time spent in the fields, while the remainderis
devoted to supporttasks. During the monthof March, when fallow fields are
being opened for the following year's productioncycle, and harvestactivities
have begun, the total monthly labor requirementis 645 hours, or 20.8 hours
per day. Of this time, 60 percent is spent on work in the fields.
A family's ability to meet these requirementsdiffers markedlyat various
points in the developmental cycle. A family with adolescent children could
meet these labor needs internally, and even young children free a significant
portion of adult labor by performing domestic chores. The period when a
couple has more than one child of full productive age is rather limited,
however, rarely amountingto more than ten years (Collins 1983a:73). More
7 The data
presentedare based on measurementsof a single highlandfamily. It is not claimed
thatthey are representativeof the province. Nevertheless, this family was near the mean in terms
of landholdings,and their allocationof land to variouscrops was representativeof the agricultural
zone, and thus they are illustrativeof problems of labor availability faced in the region.

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660 JANE L. COLLINS

important,alternativeactivities, such as schooling and participationin the

cash economy, also make claims on time, and these are not takeninto account
by the data.
Maintenance of access to appropriateamounts of labor for subsistence
agriculturehas become more difficult with increasing participationin wage
labor and cash cropping, particularlysince these activities require seasonal
migration.Although cash-generatingactivities are confined for the most part
to the dry season, they do overlap to some degree with both planting and
harvest/groundbreaking-the periods of greatest labor intensity in the high-
lands. Even if migrationdid not overlap with these labor-intensiveperiods,
the processing and maintenanceactivities performedduring the dry season
either are neglected or compete for the migrant's time while in the home
community.
Access to labor for agriculturalproduction,therefore,requiresthe mainte-
nanceof a wide rangeof kin-basedsocial ties. These includecompadrazgo,or
ritual kinship; relations between siblings; relations of cooperation between
members of the same community or ayllu8; and the complex obligations
associatedwith affinal kinship. While some accountsof productiveorganiza-
tion in the Andes suggest that it is links between household units that are
crucial in the context of mobilization of labor (Orlove and Custred 1980),
analysis of the relationships outlined above reveals that they differentially
involve household members and may link them to other individualsin ways
that crosscut the household unit.
Affines. Relationsof affinal kinshipare based less upon solidarityand equality
than upon the obligations of those who have received a productivepartnerto
those who have provided them with one. Upon marriagea young man and
woman acquireobligations to provide respect and a varietyof forms of labor
service to the parents and siblings of their partners.These services include
assistance in rituals, constructionof houses, service at funerals, and a more
general commitment to provide labor. These relationshipsbetween a tullqa
(brother-in-law,son-in-law, wife-taker)and his affines, and a yuqch'a (sister-
in-law, daughter-in-law,husband-taker)and hers, are among the most impor-
tant productiverelationshipsin Aymara society.
Evidence for the salience of affinal relationshipsis found in many areas of
the Andes. In the province of Huancan6, bilingual Aymara speakers use a
series of translationtraditionsthroughwhich they renderindigenous catego-

8 The exact definition of the

ayllu in precolonialtimes has not been agreed upon by Andean
scholars. It appearsto refer to a particularkind of kinship unit which was formerly of political
significance. Isbell (1977:91) suggests that the term may refer to a paradigmof social organiza-
tion ratherthan an institution. As used here the term denotes a supracommunityunit recognized
by the state, in which the emphasis on social relationshas given way to an emphasis on the land
occupied by its members.

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 HOUSEHOLD AND RELATIONS OF PRODUCTION IN PERU 66I

ries of affinal kinship into Spanish. In this way they preserveessential produc-
tive relationshipsin the face of pressures to assimilate to a Spanish model
(Collins 1983b). EnriqueMayer (1977:68,79) has noted that in communities
of Chaupiwarangain central Peru, individuals became confused or com-
plained "What for?" when asked to classify relatives according to con-
sanguinealcategories, but "were very precise and made no mistakes when
using affinal categories." In two communitiesof Ayacucho, Ulpiano Quispe
(1969:14) found affinal relationshipsto be of "crucial importance. Each of
them has specified obligations which they fulfill in differentsituationsduring
the year. Failure to comply is severely punished throughsocial pressures."
The responsibilitiesof the tullqa mirrorin many ways those of the yuqch'a,
but they are by definition responsibilitiesthat may not be jointly held by the
consanguinealpair. Individuals may not serve their own families in repay-
ment for relinquishingthem to their partners.When there are inequalities in
wealth between the families of bride and groom, or if one family makes
heavierdemandson their affine than the other9, conflicts within the conjugal
unit may emerge. Not only do affinal relationshipscreateobligationsthatbind
individualsdifferentially to others beyond the household, but they do so in
ways that may cause friction between household members.
Compadrazgo. Relationshipsof ritual kinship, or compadrazgo, imply both
moral and materialresponsibilitiesin Aymarasociety. As the extensive liter-
atureon the practiceindicates, compadrazgoin the Andes is a syncreticblend
between autochthonoussocial relationshipsand the ritual godparenthoodin-
troducedby the Spanish. Unlike the Spanish institution,ties of compadrazgo
can be establishedat birth, at a child's first haircutting,at marriage,or at any
of a range of other events (Foster 1953). Among the Aymara, the terms for
sponsorsof childrenat baptismor subsequentimportantrituals are sutimama
(name mother) and sutitata (name father)-derived from prehispanicrituals
in which names were assigned and reassigned at different points in the life
cycle (see Murra 1956:110-56).
The aim of compadrazgo is to compensate for perceived deficiencies in
one's kinshipnetwork-to create what natureand social definitionhave failed
to supply. Wealth, industry,generosity, and dependabilityare characteristics
sought in ritual kin. If one's godmotherhas a brotherwho is prosperousand
respected, he may be addressedas a compadre, and goods and services may
be offered to him. The same is true of one's godmother's husband. Should
either be a drunkardor a laggard, however, there are no social rules that bind
one to include them in the compadrazgorelationship.
9 William Carternotes the the symbolism of the Aymara malTiageceremony
emphasizes the
inequalitybetween affinal groups ratherthan masking it. "The ceremonies bring two disparate
families together. And ratherthan reducing them to an inane equality, it underlines their dis-
tinctness by rewarding industriousness and frugality with the fruits of prestige" (1977:210).

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662 JANE L. COLLINS

In one instance-the sponsorshipof marriage-relations of compadrazgo

are establishedbetween couples ratherthan individuals. In this case, an older
man and woman assume responsibility for the behavior of a young couple.
The older woman provides instructionand advice to the bride, and the older
man does the same for the groom. This is a relationshipbetween two married
couples, concerned with the reproductionof a propermaritalrelationshipin
the new generation. It is not, properly speaking, a relationship between
households. In all cases but this one, individualsact as primaryritual spon-
sors.
Requests for labor from one's ritual kin carry a sense of moral obligation,
and cannot be refused often withoutjeopardizing the relationship.As in the
case of affinalkinship, the flow of goods and services is not symmetrical.Jim
Belote and Linda Belote (1977:111) reportfor a village in Ecuador:
Inall ritualkinrelationships
amongtheIndians,thesponsormayrequesthelpfromhis
compadres orahijados[godchildren]in thefields,in thehouseor in construction,
etc.
Theahijadoor his parentscannotmakesimilarrequests.
The same structuralasymmetryin compadrazgorelationshipspertainsamong
the Aymara of Huancane.
Siblings. Ties between siblings are both symbolically andproductivelyimpor-
tant in the Andes. Bernd Lambert(1977:3) has noted that in some regions
sibling bonds are emphasizedto a greaterdegree than conjugal relationships.
While he accepts the view thatthe nuclear-familyhouseholdis predominantin
the Andes, he points out that "brothers and sisters continue to be more
significant there than they are for most middle class adults in North Amer-
ica." These sibling relationshipsare not universallysolidary, but are compli-
cated by the fact that siblings are potential competitors for inheritanceof
productive resources. For the Aymara of Huancane, cooperation and ex-
change cannotbe taken for granted,but must be negotiated, and an individual
is unlikely to be equally close to all brothersand sisters. The importanceof
opposite-sex siblings and their children (who are not direct competitors for
resources in a system of parallel descent) is frequently noted in the eth-
nohistoricalliterature(Rostworowski 1983:139;Zuidema 1977:256) and is an
importantfeature of contemporaryAymara kinship. Ties between adult sib-
lings, marriedinto different households, can frequentlybe a source of strain
and division between husbandsand wives.
Broader cooperative ties within the community and the ayllu. A fourth kind of
productiverelationshipimportantin mobilizing labor is that between fellow
community members. While these relationshipsprovide a potential pool of
individuals with whom one can exchange labor, such transactionsare not
socially and morally prescribedas they are in the case of affinal, sibling, or
compadrazgoties. They also differ in that the terms of exchange are overtly
negotiated.Labormay be exchanged for some quantityof laboror for goods,

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 HOUSEHOLD AND RELATIONS OF PRODUCTION IN PERU 663

land, or a combination of all these. These agreements provide access to

resourceswithin the precapitalistmode of production,but they also, underthe
propercircumstances, lend themselves to transformationinto capitalist pro-
ductive relations. As control over land and the means of work comes to be
traded for labor, the potential for the rise of an indigenous class of petty
capitalists presents itself. Under present circumstances in the province of
Huancan6,however, there are few incentives for investmentin agricultureor
expansion of agriculturalproduction, and social differentiationalong these
lines is insignificant.
Withinthe kin-basedmode of production,men and women enter into labor
exchanges as individuals. The frequencywith which their labor is sought and
with which they, in turn, can mobilize others is based on the degree to which
they are considered energetic and skillful, their generosity in providing the
accoutrementsof labor exchange (food and coca), and their reputationsfor
repayingtheir laborobligations. In the provinceof Huancane,these networks
of cooperativerelationshipsmay extend beyond the boundariesof present-day
communities to encompass individuals in other communities of the former
avllu and even to other avllu within the sava-a formerly importantmoiety
division.

Relations of Production in the Cash Economy

Measurementsof consumption conducted in the departmentof Huancan6
reveal that a family of four can produceenough food to meet their nutritional
requirementson 1.5 hectares of land near Lake Titicaca (Collins 1981:194-
99). They face deficits, however, during years of crop failure, and there is
also an importantdifference between meeting minimal nutritionalrequire-
ments and covering the full costs of physical and social reproduction.
The people of Hunacaneparticipatein the cash economy to meet consump-
tion demandsduringthatperiodof the developmentalcycle when dependency
ratios are high, to mitigate the risk of crop failure, and to meet requirements
for cash generatedby increasing consumer demands for store-boughtgoods
that have come to be defined as socially necessary.10They meet these needs
by participatingin several types of activities that link them to the cash econo-
my in different ways.
Cash cropping. One third of all adults in the province of Huancanehave
access to small plots of land in the TambopataValley on which they grow
coffee. They migrateto care for these plots duringNovember and December
and to harvestthe coffee from May throughAugust. Governmentpolicy has
constrainedproductionand marketingdecisions in a numberof ways thathave

10 This
cycle is self-perpetuating,since time spent away from the community in cash-earning
activities is time diverted from the production of domestic goods (baskets. homespun cloth,
candles, and soap) which must thereforebe purchased, increasingthe demand for cash.

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664 JANE L. COLLINS

limited the possibilities for accumulationin the region (Collins 1984). Nev-
ertheless, land is a commodity, and wage labor is used by some producers.
Three types of relations organize coffee production.First, coffee growers
are integratedinto a system of coffee cooperatives,establishedby the govern-
ment in the early 1960s, which are the sole legal purchasersof coffee in the
region. The growers stand in relation to these cooperativesas they would to
any bulk purchaserof a cash crop. Producershave no control over the prices
they ultimately receive or over the marketingdecisions of the cooperative.
Theirlack of controlover transportand the absenceof alternativebuyersplace
them in a particularlydisadvantageousposition.
Second, many of the social relationships that organize the exchange of
labor in the highlands are relied upon in the zone of coffee production.Ties
placed understress by long periods of absence from the highlandsare recre-
ated or given new emphasis in the lowland valleys. A coffee producermay
enlist the labor of siblings, affines, and ritual kin, as well as that of other
persons from the highland community who have migrated.
A third relationshipthat organizes productionin the coffee zone is wage
labor. In 1979, of all landholdingsin the valley 91 percentwere smaller than
five hectares(InstitutoNacional de Planificaci6n 1979:131). Plots this small
can usually be worked with family labor supplementedby labor exchange
during certain periods. Those who hold more than five hectares, however,
rely to some degree on hired workersfor the coffee harvest. Wage labor was
far more common in the valley priorto the establishmentof the coffee cooper-
atives in the early 1960s when members of the highland elite controlled
extensive holdings. Today, while the emergence of class relationshipsbased
on wage labor is occurringon a small scale, the potential for attendantpro-
cesses of land consolidationand capitalaccumulationis limited by the control
the cooperativeexercises over marketfunctions.
Coffee productionyields sufficient revenues to make it the most attractive
supplementto subsistence production(Painter 1984). These amounts are in-
sufficient to support a family throughoutthe year, however. This has pre-
vented producersfrom migrating permanentlyto the valley. Since growers
continue to be subsidized in effect by highland agriculture,cooperatives can
pay producersless for coffee than would otherwise be required.A patternof
petty commodityproductionis perpetuatedin which coffee income is consid-
ered a supplementor surplusand forms only one moreelement in a diversified
subsistence strategy.
Commerce.Petty commerce is an activity which presentsopportunitiesfor
accumulation,and it is this enterprisethat fuels processes of class formation
within the region. Most individualshave limited goals in terms of the amount
of profit they expect commerce to generate-usually a factor of how much
time they can afford to devote to it and still maintainsubsistenceagriculture.
They are linked to bulk purchasersand distributorsin the southernPeruvian

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 HOUSEHOLD AND RELATIONS OF PRODUCTION IN PERU 665

commercial towns of Juliaca, Arequipa, and Cuzco and the national capitals
of Peru and Bolivia. There are, in addition, a handful of individuals who have
parlayed an original small stock of goods into a truck or even a fleet of trucks.
These individuals charge for the transport of the products of others and may
hire assistants, mechanics, and drivers, establishing labor relationships based
on their control of the capital goods needed for transport (Painter 1982).
Wage labor. Wage labor on the coast generates less income than other
options given an equal investment of time (Painter 1984), but it does not
require a five-year waiting period between investment and return, as does
coffee, or the purchase of a stock of goods, as does commerce. It also allows
an individual some flexibility from one year to the next in deciding whether to
migrate, and there is latitude for choice of migratory target based on relative
wage rates. The price paid for labor power on the coast, like the price paid for
coffee in the Tambopata Valley, does not reflect the full cost of reproduction
of labor. Like coffee income, these earnings are viewed by the Aymara as a
supplement and not as a living wage.

Contradictory Pressures on Productive Relationships

Despite the fact that subsistence and cash-producing activities are timed so as
to be complementary, serious contradictory pressures are created by the dual
schedule. Participation in the cash economy narrows the range of social
relationships in which an individual can participate. Related and equally
important pressures create an emphasis on the household which had not pre-
viously existed and concentrate authority in the hands of men in a way that is
not consistent with existing productive arrangements.
Absence from the community and conflicting demands on labor. The trend
toward more restricted sets of relationships is a common one in societies
where seasonal and temporary migration occurs. Stephen Brush (1977a:63)
notes:
The removalof workersalways seems to change the natureof the work regimes, labor
efficiency and intensityof those who remain. . . . Tasks which were once a necessary
partof village life may well become too costly in termsof labordemandand shortages.
Examples of this may be observed in greatly simplified or even abandonedvillage
rituals, in disappearinghandicraftsor in decreasingparticipationin communalevents
such as village labor projects.

People who are absent from the community for several months of every year
find it difficult to repay their reciprocal labor obligations, to participate in the
necessary rituals reaffirming kinship ties, and to fulfill their community labor
obligations. This results in part from the magnitude of the demands on their
time. It is also related to the fact that rituals, festivals, and community work
projects are scheduled whenever possible for slack periods in the agricultural
cycle-precisely the periods of the migrants' absence. The failure to meet
these obligations usually results in a series of complaints, first informal and

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666 JANE L. COLLINS

then more formalin nature.If an individualfails to respondto social pressure,

the ties will eventually become inactive.
The migrantresponds to the loss or weakening of these productive rela-
tionships by increasing the use of purchasedproductive implements, food,
and other items-diminishing the range of goods obtained throughkin and
community-basednetworksof exchange. There is, however, no local market
in labor, and a person whose exchange networks begin to weaken feels the
effect most directly in the difficulty experienced in obtaining this resource.
Productiverelationshipsin the highlandcommunitymay also be weakened
by the need of seasonal migrants to form new relationshipsin the valleys
where coffee is producedand where wage labor is performed.Ritual kin ties
or formalizedrelationshipsof cooperationare frequentlyestablishedin order
to provide supportin the new environment.Parentswho remainin the high-
landsfear thattheirchildrenwill marryin these areas, denying them affines to
supportthem in theirold age. Parentsfrequentlydecline to give their blessing
to such marriagesunless the new partneragrees to take up residence in the
communityand meet the obligations of affinal kinship. The development of
kin networkson the coast or in the eastern Andean valleys provides support
for the migrant in these areas, but it narrows the range of ties that can be
drawn upon for labor in the highlands.
Gender ideologies and the role of the state. In societies where most mi-
grants are men, traditionalarrangementsfor the division of labor may be
underminedwhen males obtain a monopoly over cash income and over new
technologies and resources available in the zones to which they migrate
(Bossen 1975:592-93; Deere 1976). Among the Aymara, males and females
migrate in equal numbersto Tambopata,with more males than females mi-
gratingto the coast. Any disparity in numbersis more than made up by the
greater female role in commercial activity. Thus, monopolization of new
resourcesis not the majorway in which participationin wage marketsunder-
mines the traditionaldivision of labor by sex or the relative prestige of the
sexes for the Aymara.
Nevertheless, migrantswho travel to the coast come in contact with domi-
nant Spanish cultural patternsin which the nuclear-familyhousehold is the
most importantunit of economic cooperationand in which the locus of soli-
darity tends to be the conjugal pair. Migrants also come in contact with a
society thatemphasizes males as heads of households. This contact itself may
cause importantchanges in gender ideologies and the division of labor for
Aymara migrants.
The patriorientationcited in much of the literatureon peasant societies
(Goldschmidtand Kunkel 1971:1069) has been attributedby various authors
to the designation of the male by the state or colonizing power as the titular
head of household and as the person responsiblefor the labor of other mem-
bers (Etienne and Leacock 1980:11; Bossen 1975:598-99; Harris 1981:56-

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 HOUSEHOLD AND RELATIONS OF PRODUCTION IN PERU 667

61). As Harrispoints out, "many aspects of male power over otherhousehold

members may be seen to derive from the nature of the state. ... In most state
formations,household heads are made responsiblefor paying taxes and other
dues to the state and are answerable in law for other household members"
(1981:59). Despite the equal productiveresponsibilitiesof women and men in
Aymarasociety and the equal valuationof their labor, males have been called
upon to serve as mediators between the state and indigenous society. Par-
ticipation in the cash economy, and particularlyin wage labor, reinforces
what these policies have begun. Women find their laborvalued less than that
of their husbands, and both sexes are forced to adapt their behavior to the
norms of a dominantcultural traditionthat defines men as household heads
and women's work as domestic in nature and thus less important.Such a
gender ideology is inconsistentwith the egalitariandivision of laborbetween
men and women in Aymara subsistence agriculture,and is a source of con-
flict, particularlywhen, as Isbell (n.d.) documents, men adopt the new con-
cepts and women do not.
CONCLUSIONS

While households are importantunits of economic functioning, an adult in

Aymarasociety has many statusesthat imply variedtypes of economic behav-
ior. The householdencompasses some but not all of these statuses. Economic
decisions of individualsare not always made with regardto the well-being of
the household, and its members do not always have common interests and
goals. Paralleltransmissionof certain rights, goods and statuses, obligations
to siblings, ties to affines, ritualkinship, and a person's statusas an indepen-
dent producerand communitymemberall createobligationsthat may conflict
with responsibilitiesas members of a household.
If the problems with the use of the household as an analytical unit in the
Andes were only those of definition, they could be resolved by a simple
adjustmentof boundariesor by adding the caveat that extrahouseholdrela-
tions are also important.At a more profound level, however, it is the func-
tionalist and empiricist underpinningsof a focus on the household that are at
issue here-the propensity to look at the way that social units perpetuate
themselves and to focus unduly on their momentarysurface forms. Such an
approachmisses the fact that the household in the Andes has been created
throughspecific historicalprocesses. It is the productof a colonial administra-
tion that viewed the domestic unit of Westernsociety as naturaland universal
and that sought an appropriatelybounded unit of local administration.
The deteriorationof the productive relationshipsjust described might ap-
pear at first glance to be part of a normal process of integrationof these
Andean peasants into the national economy. An approachto social change
that emphasized concepts of modernization might argue that kinship and
ideology in the Andes are simply being adaptedto an increasingparticipation

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668 JANE L. COLLINS

in the cash economy. We have alreadyestablished, however, the dependence

of the Aymara on subsistence agricultureas part of a diversified patternof
economic activities. Cash-earningactivities improve the standardof living,
mitigatethe risk of crop failure, and see families throughthe high consump-
tion years of childrearing.They do not, however, providean adequateliving,
requiringworkersto producepartof theirown subsistence. The integrationof
the Aymarainto wage and commodity marketsreinforcesthe household unit,
while the partialnatureof that integrationcontinues to make it impossible for
the household to stand alone.
It is unlikely that the contradictorypressureson productive relationships
describedfor the Aymaraare unique. Numerouscases of the maintenanceand
even re-creationof labor-intensiveagriculturalor petty-commodityproduc-
tion have been documented in recent years (Roseberry 1983:181, 192-95;
Kahn 1978:134; Stavenhagen 1978:35; Taussig 1978:86-87). It is probable
thatthese types of contradictorypressuresare experiencedby nearly all peas-
ants in moderncontexts, where precapitalistproductionfeeds capitalist mar-
kets and the social relationships born of two modes of productioncoexist
uneasily.
Our methodshave been ill-suited until recentlyto deal with such contradic-
tions at the local level. This articlehas proposedthat local-level processes can
be incorporatedinto an analysis of modes of production by emphasizing
productiverelationships.It has shown that the manifestationof the articula-
tion of modes of productionin many contemporarycontexts is the participa-
tion of ruralpopulationsin diverse economic activities and that broadcontra-
dictions between relations and forces of productioncan form the context for
contradictions between relations of production in the capitalist and pre-
capitalist modes.
These contradictionswould remain invisible in an investigationthat relied
on traditionalempiricistcategories. The household would be seen as allocat-
ing resourcesto diverse economic activities and as "adapting" its structureto
meet the demandsof this allocation. Even if it acknowledgesthat the process
of allocation occurs in response to forces in the larger economy, such an
interpretationis blind to the dialectical relationshipsthat determinethe form
of institutionslike the household as well as to the excruciatingnatureof the
decisions that must be made by peasantproducersunderthese circumstances.
At the level of our analyticalcategories and the level of concreteeconomic
processes, the capitalist economy imposes the household on Aymara
cultivators. Participationin the cash economy limits networksof productive
relationships,leaving units that look more and more like the nuclear-family
householdover time, while for the Aymarasuch a household is a subminimal
unit incapableof providingfor its own maintenanceand reproduction.At the
same time, social scientists referto the householdas the "fundamentalunitof
agrariansociety" in the Andes-thus legitimizing its creation-rather than

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 HOUSEHOLD AND RELATIONS OF PRODUCTION IN PERU 669

recognizing it as a product of the erratic and contradictory articulation of the

capitalist mode of production with precapitalist productive relationships.

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