Peace Morality & Justice in International Politics

Introduction

What is ethics? The place of ethical thought in international affairs.

Leslie H. Gelb and Justine A. Rosenthal, ‘The Rise of Ethics in Foreign Policy: Reaching a
Values Consensus’ Foreign Affairs, May/June 2003

Traditions of international ethics

This week we examine the role played by ethical traditions in international affairs as well as
discuss the differences between different traditions of Ethics. The major traditions
discussed are Deontology (Kantianism), Consequentialism (Utilitarianism). We also discuss
the differences between ethics and Morality and justice.

Singer, Peter, Practical ethics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993. ch1, pp.1-15

Realism and the challenge to think morally

This week we examine the ethics of Realism and assess to what extent if any realism forms
the basis for an adequate international ethics. What are the main principles and concepts of
classical and modern realism? What place is their for ethics in realist thought? Are realists
immoral or amoral or neither? Is realism necessarily hostile to ethics? Who are the main
actors in a realist world? What do realists think about the prospects for peace and justice? Is
it possible to develop moral frameworks in a realist world?

Frances V. Harbour, Thinking about International Ethics, Chapter 3.

Communitarianism and cosmopolitanism

How do cosmopolitan notions of ethics differ from realist positions? What are Kant’s main
ideas? Why are they cosmopolitan? Are they still relevant today? What are the main ideas
behind communitarian approaches to ethics? How do they differ from cosmopolitan and
realist ones? What kind of challenges do issues such as culture and nationalism pose for an
ethics of international politics? What does it mean to be a citizen of the world? Is it possible?
What are the basic claims made by Cosmopolitans? How does Kant understand our moral
duties? Is cosmopolitanism hostile to national identity or must national identity make us the
enemy of humankind? Are cosmopolitan and Communitarian positions necessarily opposed?
Do we have duties towards those who live beyond the borders of our own state who may be
suffering hunger, economic deprivation or lack of civil and political rights? Do compatriots
come first? Is there some ranking of moral obligation or does moral obligation stop at the
boundary of the sovereign state? Is an ‘ethics of coexistence’ the best that can be hoped for.

Utilitarianism can be understood as a version of “cosmopolitanism” about global justice,

where that latter view involves, roughly, both a) a foundational commitment to treating the
claims or interests of all persons equally, and b) a substantive commitment to demanding
principles of distributive justice with global scope. If we are attracted to a broadly
cosmopolitan approach, but are unconvinced by utilitarianism, what other options might we
consider?
One possibility is to attempt to extend one of the family of “liberal egalitarian” theories of
domestic justice to the global level. This move has been most fully executed in the case of
John Rawls’ theory of domestic justice, as developed in his highly influential A Theory of
Justice (1971). We can distinguish two Rawls-inspired arguments for Global Liberal
Egalitarianism. One begins with the idea that nationality or citizenship are morally arbitrary
in the way that race, gender or sexual orientation are arbitrary, and claims that this fact has
radical implications for our understanding of our obligations to persons living overseas.
What are the attractions and problems of such an argument?

Global Liberal Egalitarians such as Beitz and Pogge attempt to apply Rawls’ early theory of
domestic distributive justice to the global order. Rawls himself, however, resisted the
extension. Instead Rawls’ work on global justice draws on his later theory of “political
liberalism”, and attempts to develop an account of the foreign policy of liberal peoples that
both responds appropriately to the special nature of international relations, and respects the
diversity of opinion on “comprehensive doctrines” that we find in global politics. Why did
Rawls take this contrasting approach, and how does he develop it?

Rawls’ claim, against Beitz, Pogge et al., that principles of global justice differ significantly
from principles of domestic justice reflects his general commitment to a relational approach
to questions of justice. On that approach, when constructing our principles of justice we
need to pay careful attention to the special moral nature of the relationships that those
principles are designed to regulate. While Rawls focuses on relations between co-citizens at
the domestic level, and on the relations between “peoples” at the international level, other
theorists highlight instead relations between co-nationals. What role should the concept of
“the nation” play in our thinking about global justice? What moral reasons might support
the apparently anti-cosmopolitan idea that partiality towards co-nationals is appropriate?
Are co-nationals justified in being partial towards each other, and if so – what are the limits
of such partiality?

Michael Walzer, Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad, 1994 Ch 1 ‘A
Minimal Morality’.

Nussbaum, M. ‘Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism’ in Nussbaum, M.Et. Al For Love of

Country, Beacon, 1996.

Brown, C. ‘Ethics of Coexistence: The International Theory of Terry Nardin.’ Review of

International Studies, 14, (1988), 213-222.

World poverty and redistributive justice

To what extent has poverty become an ethical issue in world politics? What kinds of
approaches have been advanced to deal with poverty and, in a more general sense, the
disparities between North and South? Is the problem of global poverty one that we should
be concerned with? How can this problem be dealt with in an international system that is
based on sovereign nation-states?

P.Singer ‘Famine Affluence, Morality’ in International Ethics eds. Charles Beitz et.al.
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985.

P. Singer, ‘One Community’ in One World: The Ethics of Globalisation, Ch 5, Text

Publishing, 2002
Pogge, T. ‘Priorities of Global Justice’, in Metaphilosophy 32 (1/2) January 2001.

Pogge, T ‘The First United Nations Millennium Development Goal: a cause for
celebration?’ Journal of Human Development 5( 3): November 2004

International law and human rights

What is the Geneva Convention? What are human rights? What kind of practices and
institutions have been established to safeguard human rights at an international level?
What values do these rights and practices reflect? How successful have the attempts to
secure them been? Two brief case studies, one on the International Committee of the Red
Cross (as an institutional attempt to secure human rights) and one on the anti-globalisation
movement (as a non-governmental attempt to promote human rights) What are human
rights, what is their philosophical basis? Are they universal or are they actually a specific
cultural product of the West as some non-Western leaders claim? If so does this mean that
human rights claims are the imposition of Western values on non-Western cultures? Human
rights advocates claim that individual human rights trump state sovereignty. Is this the case?
If not, why not? Can human rights claims and the claims of state sovereignty be reconciled?

Jack Donnelly, “Human rights and Asian values: a defence of ‘western’ universalism.’ in
Bauer, J. and Bell, D. (eds) The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights, Cambridge 1999.

Chris Brown ‘Universal Human Rights: A Critique’, in Dunne, T. & Wheeler, N. eds,
Human Rights in Global Politics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 103-127,
1999.

Limiting War: Who fights? When to fight? How to fight?

Conceptions of a just war are far older than modern conceptions of a sovereign state, yet
this form of moral judgment remains a powerful tool for analyzing contemporary
international conflict. A pivotal issue now between rival interpretations of just war --for
example, those by Walzer and Coates--is the extent to which contemporary principles of
just war ought to be state-centric. Another controversy concerns whether attempts at
limiting war are a fundamentally misguided project, given the nature of the contemporary
international system. Both extremes, pacifists who believe that declaring some warfare to
be just promotes war by appearing to sanitize it and adherents to 'war-is-hell' who believe
that moderating warfare prolongs fighting and causes more misery overall than short and
sharp action, reject the middle way constituted by just war. But if no form of military
rescue can be justified, those with the bad luck to be born on the territories of genocidal
states may simply be left by the rest of us to their unfortunate fates. If limiting norms are to
be enforced, however, difficult choices arise among types of limits, such as limits among
targets (combatants vs non-combatants), limits among weapons (nuclear vs biological vs
anti-personnel land-mines), and the limits that can be placed on those who engage in long-
term reconstruction.

(a) The moral reality of war

Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, Chs. 1-3

(b) The theory of aggression

 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, Chs. 4-7

(c) The war convention

Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, Chs. 8-11

(d) Dilemmas of war

Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, Chs. 14-17

(e) The question of responsibility

Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, Chs. 18-19

(f) Terrorism

Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, Chs. 12-13

Walzer, Michael. Just and Unjust Wars, 4th Ed. (2006), pp. ix-xxv and 1-268

Coates, A.J. The Ethics of War (1997), pp. 1-13 and 121-293.

Orend, Brian. Michael Walzer on War and Justice (2000), pp. 1-152.

Shue, Henry. "War," in Oxford Handbook of Practical Ethics (2003), ed. by LaFollette, pp.
734-61.

Greenwood, Christopher. "International Law and the 'War against Terrorism,'"

International Affairs (2002), pp. 301-317.

Jochnick, Chris af, and Roger Normand. “The Legitimization of Violence: A Critical
History of the Laws of War,” 35 Harvard International Law Journal 49 (1994).

Roberts, Adam. "Counter-terrorism, Armed Force and the Laws of War," Survival (2002),
pp. 7-32 ..\..\..\Global Issues\Terrorism\Counter terrorism, armed force and the laws of
war.pdf

Hurka, Thomas. “Proportionality in the Morality of War,” Philosophy & Public Affairs,
33:1 (2005), 34-66.

Jus ad bello: Humanitarian Intervention

The ‘just war’ tradition is a very long one, stretching back to St. Augustine in the 3rd
century AD(d. 410). It was Augustine who argued that it was morally acceptable for
Christians to fight on behalf of the Roman Empire. The refusal of Christians to do this
previously had caused them some problems with the empire as you can imagine! Over the
centuries a tradition of thought evolved, concerned with two aspects of justice and war:
Jus Ad Bellum - Justice Of War, that is, should a particular war be fought in the first place,
for example most scholars would agree that the war against Hitler was a just war. The other
aspect is justice and war is Jus In Bello - Justice In War, that is, even if a war is considered
to be of just cause the issue of how it is fought is important. Over the centuries certain rules
and conventions of justice in war have developed. Humanitarian intervention can be
understood as belonging to this tradition. Many cultures have developed rules about the
conduct of and in war including Islam.

Many people are troubled by the fact that the United Nations Security Council pulled ninety
per cent of an already small peacekeeping force out of Rwanda in April 1994 as a carefully
prepared genocide was beginning to be implemented. Who, if anyone, had any
responsibility to kill and to risk being killed on behalf of Rwandans? Why? Many people
are also troubled by the fact that NATO, without explicit authorization by the Security
Council, bombed Serbia five years later in the name of protecting the rights of the Kosovars.
Was this a legitimate use of force? If not, why? If yes, was NATO an acceptable agent?
Was the kind of bombing conducted an acceptable means?

This class will examine the debate on the legitimacy of intervention for humanitarian
purposes. Finnemore suggests that intervention is a doubly liminal concept, lying at the
boundary of sovereignty and on the boundary of war. Does a reasonable doctrine of state
sovereignty ever permit (or indeed require) military intervention? If so, on what grounds
and by what means? Are foreign military forces a good mechanism for protecting human
rights? If not, is some alternative possible?

Finnemore, Martha. ‘Paradoxes in humanitarian intervention’ in Richard Price, ed., Moral

Limit and Possibility in World Politics (2008), pp. 197-224.

Pattison, James, ‘Legitimacy and Humanitarian Intervention: Who Should Intervene?’

International Journal of Human Rights, 12 (2008), pp. 395-413.

International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. The Responsibility to

Protect (2001).

United Nations, General Assembly. 2005 World Summit Outcome, A/60/L.1 [05-51130*(E)
230905], 20 September 2005, para. 138-40.

Walzer, Michael. "The Politics of Rescue," Dissent (1995), pp. 35-41. ..\The politics of
rescue.pdf

Bellamy, A. “Responsibility to Protect or Trojan Horse? The Crisis in Darfur and

Humanitarian Intervention after Iraq”, Ethics and International Affairs, 19, (2005), pp. 31-
53.

Smith, Michael J. “Humanitarian Intervention: An Overview of the Ethical Issues,” Ethics

& International Affairs, vol. 12 (1998), pp. 63 -79.

Bothe, Michael. “The Protection of the Civilian Population and NATO Bombing on
Yugoslavia,” European Journal of International Law, 12 (2001), pp. 531 ff.

Simma, Bruno. "NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects," European Journal
of International Law (1999), pp. 1-22. ..\..\..\Int'l Law\NATO, the UN and the use of force -
legal aspects.pdf
Mill, J.S ‘A Few Words on Non-Intervention, in Brown, Nardin and Rengger, International
Relations in Political Thought, Cambridge, 2002.

Jean Bethke Elshtain Just war against terror: the burden of American power in a violent
world New York: Basic Books, c2003

Ignatieff M.“The War of Words: a Dialogue on Intervention’ in Ignatieff M., Virtual War,
Chatto & Windus, 2000.

Just war 2 Jus in bello

What rules ought to govern how war is conducted? Is it possible to limit the conduct of war?
Is it ever possible to justify terrorist violence or violence against non-combatants?

Buzan, B. ‘Who may we bomb?’ in Booth and Dunne (eds) Worlds in Collision, Terror and
the Future of Global Order. Palgrave, 2002.

Frost, M, Ethics in International Relations Cambridge, 1996. “The justification of

unconventional violence in international relations”

Bellamy, Alex. Supreme emergencies and the protection of non-compatants in war.’

International Affairs, 2004, 80(5):829-850.

Andrew Valls “Can Terrorism be justified? In Valls, A. (ed) Ethics in International Affairs

S.R. David and Yael Stein, ‘Debate on Israel’s policy of Targeted Killing’ Ethics and
International Affairs, 2003, 17 (1).

War crimes and international tribunals

What is a war crime? Who judges? What is the relationship between individual
responsibility and collective guilt? What institutional structures have been set up to deal
with war crimes in the former Yugoslavia?

Roberts, Adam. “Humanitarian War: Military Intervention and Human Rights,” in

International Affairs 1993 69(3).

David Rodin, et. al, “Symposium: War and Self-Defense” Ethics & International Affairs 18,
1 (2004): 63-98

Allen Buchanan and Robert O. Keohane, “The Preventive Use of Force: A Cosmopolitan
Institutional Proposal” Ethics & International Affairs 18, 1 (2004): 1-22