1.) The seizure of the drugs was invalid as the “stop and frisk” rule was invalidly invoked.

Well-
settled jurisprudence provides that indeed that in a “stop and frisk,” probable cause is not
required but it cannot also be validated on the basis of a suspicion or a hunch. The law enforcers
must have a genuine reason to believe that a criminal activity is underway. Thus, reliance on one
suspicious activity alone, or none at all cannot produce a reasonable search.

2.) Component one (1) of the Comprehensive National Security Strategy (CNSS) is
unconstitutional. Under Article 7 Sec. 18 of the Philippine Constitution only the President is
authorized to exercise the calling out of powers and the only one who has full discretion to call
the military when in his judgment it is necessary to do so in order to avoid or suppress lawless
violence, invasion, or rebellion. While component two (2) of the CNSS, is constitutional as in the
case of Lagman v. Medialdea, the president’s power to declare martial law is not subject to any
condition except the two (2) requirements of actual invasion or rebellion and that public safety
requires it. Thus, such does not require the recommendation of the Defense Secretary and the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).

3.a.) X is incorrect in claiming that W should not be dispensing the functions of a Congressman
since he is deemed ipso facto resigned upon his filing of a Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for
governor of Albay since Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) providing for the ipso
facto resignation of an elective official upon his filing of his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) has
already been repealed by Section 14 of R.A. 9006.

3.b.) If W is instead an incumbent Undersecretary of the Department of National Defense, who is

an appointed official, he is considered as ipso facto resigned as Defense Undersecretary upon the
filing of his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) because as it was stated in the case of Farinas v.
The Executive Secretary dated December 10, 2003, only Sec. 67 which pertains to elective
officials of the OEC has been repealed and Sec. 66 of which has been retained. Sec. 66 of the
OEC states that appointive officials are considered as ipso facto resigned from office upon filing
of their COC.

4.a) Under the 1987 Philippine Constitution, a natural-born citizen is someone who is a citizen of
the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine
citizenship while a naturalized citizen are foreigners that have been adopted into the political
body a nation by clothing such person with the privileges of a citizen.

4.b) Under the law X is not qualified to run for Congress as it is stated also under the law that a
member of the House of Representatives should be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines as
one of the requirements.

4.c) X’s proclamation did not divest anything because according to the law, only the Provincial
Board of Canvassers (PBOC) can proclaim the winner. In this case, the proclamation of X by the
Provincial Election Supervisor (PES) can be said to be void ab initio, without any legal effect.
The House Of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) did not acquire jurisdiction over X’s
qualification as his proclamation has been deemed as void ab initio.

5.a) H’s filing of his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) is insufficient to renounce foreign
citizenship as in a case decided by the Supreme Court, a dual citizen by naturalization is required
to take an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to personally renounce his
foreign citizenship in order to be qualified as a candidate for public office.

5.b) Even if H is a dual citizen because of his parents being Filipino citizens and being born in
California, USA, filing of a Certificate of Candidacy (COC) is still insufficient to renounce his
foreign citizenship as it is well-settled in jurisprudence that dual citizens cannot run for elective
public office in the Philippines unless he personally swears renunciation of all foreign citizenship
at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy.

6.a) Under the Contiguous zone, the Philippines has the right to exercise control necessary to
prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations within
its territory or territorial sea and punish infringement of these laws and regulations committed
within its territorial sea.

6.b.) Within its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), the Philippines has sovereign rights to explore,
exploit, conserve and manage natural resources whether living or non-living, of waters lying
over to the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil, and regarding other activities for economic
exploration and exploitation of the zone, such as the production of energy from the water,
currents and winds. Also under the UNCLOS, within its EEZ the Philippines has jurisdiction to
the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures, marine research,
protection and preservation of the marine environment.

6.c.) With regards to its Continental shelf, the UNCLOS states that the Philippines have
exclusive rights to resources located within its continental shelf.

7.a.) There are three (3) requirements to be a bona fide member of the House of Representatives.
Namely: Valid proclamation, Taking of the oath before the speaker in an open session, and the
assumption of office. As it can be seen in this case, Mr. C was validly proclaimed and he took
the oath before the speaker in an open session but the last requisite is missing; his assumption of
office. In short, Mr. C is still not a bona fide member of the House of Representatives.

7.b.) As stated unequivocally in the Philippine Constitution and the case of Amores v. House Of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), a nominee of the youth sector must at least be
twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election and a
candidate who is more than the age of 30 on the day of the election is not qualified to be a youth
sector nominee. The ruling then will be that Mr. C is disqualified as he was already above the
age limit on the day of the election.
8.) Red Crescent can indeed file a suit against PhilHealth to collect a debt as according to Article
16 of the Philippine Constitution, the state cannot be sued without its consent. But one of the
powers and functions of PhilHealth is to sue and to be sued in court as stated in RA 7875 as
amended by RA 10606.

BONUS:

Bishop D was just engaging in his religious vocation and there is no provision in the
Philippine Constitution that prohibits such. Thus, the President is incorrect in raising the doctrine
of “Separation of Church and the State.” The main context of the doctrine of “Separation of
Church and the State is to avoid a government which is ruled by the Church.

SUBMITTED BY:

PEREZ, JOSE IGNATIUS D.

2020110051