Defense Against Bioterror: Detection Technologies, Implementation Strategies and Commercial Opportunities

Defense against Bioterror
Detection Technologies, Implementation Strategies

and Commercial Opportunities
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Series B Physics and Biophysics – ol.

Defense against Bioterror
Detection Technologies, Implementation
Strategies and Commercial Opportunities
edited by
Dennis Morrison
Institute of Engineering Research & Applications,
New Mexico Tech, Albuquerque, NM, U.S.A.
Fred Milanovich
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory,
Livermore, CA, U.S.A.
Dmitri Ivnitski
Institute of Engineering Research & Applications,
New Mexico Tech, Albuquerque, NM, U.S.A.
and
Thomas R. Austin
The Boeing Company, U.S.A.
Published in cooperation with NATO Public Diplomacy Division

Proceedings of the NATO Advanced Research Workshop on
Defense against Bioterror: Detection Technologies, Implementation Strategies
and Commercial Opportunities
Madrid, Spain
8 -11 April 2004
A C.I.P. Catalogue record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.
ISBN-10 1-4020-3385-0 (PB)

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ISBN-13 978-1-4020-3384-1 (e-book)
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Table of Contents
PREFACE 9
LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS 13
Strategic Actionable Net-Centric Biological Defense System 17

S. KORNGUTH
Natural Toxins: The Past And The Present 29

E. GRISHIN
Biological Weapons Inspections- The Iraq Experience 47

E. B. MYHRE
Integrated, Secure And Sustainable Disease Surveillance System In

Uzbekistan: Aspects Of Laboratory Research Networks 51
F. T. ADILOVA
A Network-Ready, Broad Spectrum, Environmental Pathogen Detection

System 67
F. P. MILANOVICH, J. DZENITIS, B. J. HINDSON, A. J. MAKAREWICZ,
M. T. MCBRIDE, AND B. W. COLSTON
Concept Design Of Anautonomous Biological Agent Detector System

(Abads) 77
R. BARTON, R. COLLINS, AND R. STARNES
Role Of Prototype System Demonstrations In The Development Of

Detection-Based WMD Defenses 91
L. BRANDT
Validation Testing For Biological Threat Organisms 105

T. L. HADFIELD
Development Of Bioaerosol Alarming Detector 119

A. V. WUIJCKHUIJSE, C. KIENTZ, B. V. BAAR, O. KIEVIT,
R. BUSKER, M. STOWERS , W. KLEEFSMAN AND J. MARIJNISSEN
Biodetection Using Micro-Physiometry Tools Based On Electrokinetic

Phenomena 129
R. PETHIG
5
6
Electro-optical Technique For Detection And Identification Of Biological

Agents 143
VICTOR BUNIN
Detection Of Microbial Cells With Electrooptical Analysis 147

O. V. IGNATOV, O. I. GULIY, V. D. BUNIN,
A. G. VOLOSHIN, D. O’NEIL, AND D. IVNITSKI
Recent Advances In Electrochemical And Photochemical Transduction

Strategies For Immunosensors Based On Electropolymerized Films165
S. COSNIER
Technological Platforms Based On Micro/Nanobiosensors As Early Warning

Systems For Biological Warfare 175
L.M. LECHUGA, J.TAMAYO, A.CALLE, M. CALLEJA
AND C. DOMINQUEZ
Catalytic Beacons For The Detection Of DNA And Telomerase Activity199

Y. XIAO, V. PAVLOV, T. NIAZOV, A. DISHON, M. KOTLER
AND I. WILLNER
Critical Elements Of Biological Sensor Technology For Deployment

In An Environmental Network System 207
D. IVNITSKI, D. MORRISON AND D. J. O'NEIL
Electrochemical Immunosensor For Detection Of Francisella

tularensis 221
P. SKLADAL, Y. SYMERSKA, M. POHANKA, B.SAFAR, AND A. MACEL
Biosensors And Nanotechnological Immunochips For The Detection And

Monitoring Of Chemical And Biological Agents
S. VARFOLOMEYEV, I. KUROCHKIN, A. EREMENKO, E. RAININA
AND I. GACHOK 233
Biosensor For Defence Against Terrorism 245

M. MASCINI AND I. PALCHETTI
Biosensors And Biomimetic Sensors For The Detection Of Drugs, Toxins

And Biological Agents 261
A. P. F. TURNER AND S. PILETSKY
Chemical Multi-Sensor Arrays For Liquids Monolithic Integration Using

Microelectronic Technology 273
A.BRATOV AND C. DOMINGUEZ
7
Immunochemical Approaches For Rapid Detection Of Biologically Active

Compounds 291
B. B. DZANTIEV, A.V ZHERDEV, AND N.A. BYZOVA
Multifunctional Liquid-Crystalline DNA Based Biosensing Units Capable

Of Detecting Biologically Relevant Compounds 303
YU. M. YEVDOKIMOV
Subject Index 335
PREFACE
Instability in warfare arises when offense significantly outstrips defense.

After a half century of vaccine and antibiotic successes in the war against
infectious diseases, the advantage has shifted back to the pathogen.
Infectious diseases are again the leading cause of human mortality
worldwide. To compound matters, the possible intentional spread of disease
is not only possible but also it is reality. For instance, in the past two
decades, the United States alone has had three biological attacks or incidents
against civilians: 1984 salmonella, 1999 West Nile-like Virus, and 2001
anthracis. In addition, several foreign natural epidemics (the recent United
Kingdom foot and mouth virus pandemic and the mad cow disease outbreak)
have shown the potential for both serious economic and political harm.
Indeed, the events of 2001 exposed civilization’s vulnerability to the
covert introduction of harmful biological agents. Bioterroism and biological
warfare employs living agents or toxins that can be disseminated/delivered
by infected individuals, insects, aerosols, and by the contamination of water
and food supplies. Most biological agents can be thousands of times more
lethal per unit than the most lethal chemical warfare agents. Unlike chemical
agents, biological agents attack people stealthily with no observable reaction
until after an incubation period (days to weeks). Current disease surveillance
and response systems rely on post-symptomatic reporting. However, many
infectious agents such as smallpox have a long latency to clinical symptoms,
thereby eluding early detection potentially resulting in widespread,
uncontrolled contagion.
Consequently, the threat of deliberate dissemination of biological
agents is the most complicated and problematic of the weapons of mass
destruction facing mankind today.
9
10
This volume contains papers presented at the NATO Advanced

Research Workshop “Defence against Bioterror: Detection Technologies,
Implementation, Strategies and Commercial Opportunities” held at the Hotel
Wellington, Madrid Spain from 26 May to 29 May 2004. The objective of
the workshop was to contribute to the critical assessment of state-of-the-art
of emerging (“breakthrough”) biosensor technologies that will allow for the
rapid identification of biological threat agents in the environment and human
population; to identify directions for future research, and to promote close
working relationships between scientists from different countries and with
different professional experience. The volume is devoted to a comprehensive
overview of the current state of biological weapons threat; challenges
confronting biodetection technologies and systems; ongoing research and
development; and, future requirements. Following the structure of the NATO
Advanced Research Workshops, the special section starts from the threat
overview and current art, then followed detection platforms, networked
alarm-type biodetector systems, implementation strategies, electro-optical
and electrochemical biosensors.
A strategy and commensurate technology to detect a bioagent
release at the earliest moment is an essential element of a defense against
bioterrorism. The strategy should include: (1) systems of networked
biodetectors that provide wide area monitoring for the early warning of a
bioagent release; (2) a medical surveillance system that provides early
(detection of the presence of disease in the population at large; and, (3) a
concept for integrating these technologies into the public sector. In (1) the
development of networked alarm-type biodetection systems is extremely
important for detecting, tracking and responding to threats. By fielding a
network of alarm-type biodetectors, civilian and military defense officials
can obtain early warning in the event of a biological attack. The networked
alarm-type biodetectors will provide generic discrimination, i.e., pathogenic
vs. non-pathogenic bacteria and may be used as a “trigger” for a more
sophisticated detector/identifier system. A desired performance requirement
of networked alarm-type biodetectors is real-time, pre-exposure detection,
discrimination, and identification of biological threats. The sensing element
should be able to detect the presence of biological agents at below threshold
concentrations in 5-10 min and be sensitive to a broad range of bioagents
(multiplex capable). Obviously the incorporation of all these features within
one biodetector based on current technology is a very complicated task.
Most commercially available biodetectors are inherently bulky, utilize
complex instrumentation, multistep assays and other time consuming
procedures. The solution may be based on application of new emerging
sensor technologies such as array-based biochips, liquid arrays, artificial
olfaction and microfluidic systems, ion-channel switches and
magnetoresistance technology. In (2) a science base that will provide for
11
biomarkers in human body fluids that indicate the presence of disease must
be established. These markers must be able to distinguish pathogen type and
be present at the very onset of disease (presymptomatic). Once established,
detection technologies and application strategies need to be developed to
bring presymptomatic detection to practical application. (3) strategies need
to be developed to bring these advances to the public. Indeed, all levels of
government are seeking to improve their capability for dealing with the
effects and consequences of a biological incident or attack. In particular,
cities recognize that their personnel will play a major part in a bioterrorist
attack. Each small community is faced with the daunting problem of
developing a bio-terrorism response plan with limited resources and limited
local expertise.
Transportation bioterror security presents an extremely complex
problem (alarms, indications, situational awareness, level of response, large
probability of false positive detection, effectiveness/performance, cost,
politics, limited protection). No accurate and rapid “silver bullet” technology
or system in existence can meet this challenge., We recommend the
continued development of sensing technologies and the approach of
employing multiple, layered detection systems with orthogonal technologies.
Biological Warfare Agent (BWA) sensor for defense purposes may also be
designed to offer “dual use” capability in the civil sector, including public
health environmental air and water monitoring as well as drug discovery.
Approach and preparation for biological terrorism can be compared to
existing civilian methods for earthquake protection – very low probability of
occurrence but with very high consequence. Continued collaboration among
NATO members is recommended due to risk of BWA attack against both
existing member countries (USA, UK and others) as well as emerging
member countries (Russia). We would like to acknowledge the NATO
Science Committee for their contributions. Special acknowledgement goes
out to Cynthia Hernandez for providing technical document production and
preparing the camera-ready version of the text.
The editors: Dennis Morrison, Fred P Milanovich, Dmitri Ivnitski, and Tom
R Austin
LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS
Dennis Morrison
Institute of Engineering Research & Applications 901 University Blvd. SE
Albuquerque, NM 87106 USA Phone 505 272 7235
Fax 505 272 7203 morrison@iera.nmt.edu
Fred P. Milanovich
Lawerence Livermore National Labs 7000 East Avenue -174 Livermore, CA
94550 USA
Phone 925 422 6838 Fax 925 422 8020 milanovich1@llnl.gov
Tom R. Austin
The Boeing Company 2201 Seal Beach Blvd MC 110-SC45 Seal Beach, CA
90740 USA
Phone 562 797 3798 Fax 562 797 4778 tom.austin@boeing.com
Shawn H . Park
The Boeing Company 5301 Bolsa Ave MC-H013-B319 Huntington Beach,
CA 92657 USA
Phone: 704 896 1606 Fax: 704 896 6417 shawn.h.park@boeing.com
John C Stammreich
The Boeing Company 2201 Seal Beach Blvd MC-110-SA32 Seal Beach, CA
90740 USA
Phone 562 797 3252 Fax 562 797 4778 john.c.stammreich@boeing.com
Oleg VIgnatov
Institute of Biochemistry & Physiology of Plants & Microorganisms Russian
Academy of Sciences
Entuziastov av.,13 Sartov, 410049 Russia Phone 7 8452 970 383 Fax 7
8452 970 383
oignatov@ibppm.sgu.ru
Dmitri Ivniski
Institute of Engineering Research & Applications, New Mexico Tech
901 University Blvd. SE Albuquerque, NM 87106 USA Phone 505 272
7255
Fax 505 272 7203 ivnitski@nmt.edu
Laura M Lechuga
Biosensor Group Centro nacional de Microelectronica (IMM-CNM-CSIC)
Isaac Newton , 8 28760 Tres Cantos (PTM) Madrid, Spain Phone 34 91 806
0700
Fax 34 91 806 0701 laura@imm.cnm.csic.es
Anthony. Turner
13
14
Cranfield University Silsoe Bedfordshire, MK45 4DT UK Phone 44 0

1525 863005
Fax 44 0 1525 863360 a.p.turner@cranfield.ac.uk
Steven Kornguth
Institute of Advanced Technology 3925 West Braker Lane
Suite 400 Austin, TX 78759 USA Phone 512 232 4486 Fax 512 471 9103
steve_kornguth@iat.utexas.edu
Robert G. Barton
Midwest Research International 425 Volker Blvd. Kansas City, MI 64110
USA
Phone 816 360 5268 Fax 816 531 0315 bbarton@mriresearch.org
Larry D. Brandt
Sandia National Laboratories PO Box 969 MS 9201 Livermore, CA 94551
USA
Phone 925 294 2969 Fax 925 294 1559 lbrandt@sandia.gov
Andrey Bratov
Centro Nacional de Microelectronica Campus UAB. Bellaterra E -08193
Cerdanyola del Valles
Barcelona, Spain Phone 34 93 594 77 00 Fax 34 93 580 14 96
andrey.bratov@cnm.es
Victor D. Bunin
State Research Center of Applied Microbiology Obolensk Moscow region,
142253 Russia
Phone 7 0967 705716 Fax 7 0967 705716 vikbun@inbox.ru
Fatima T. Adilova
Inst. of Cybernetics Academy of Sciences 34, F. Khodjaev str. Tashkent,
700125 Uzbekistan
Phone 99871 162 71 62 Fax 99871 162 73 21 fatima_adilova@ic.uz
James M. Clark
GL Detection Dstl Porton Down Salisbury SP4 OJQ UK Phone 44 1908
613 405
Fax 44 1980 613 987 JMCLARK@mail.dstl.gov.uk
Bob V. Collins
Midwest Research International 425 Volker Blvd. Kansas City, MI 64110
USA
Phone 816 360 5322 Fax 816 531 0315 rvcollins@mriresearch.org
Serge Cosnier
Laboratory of Organic Electrochemistry and Redox Photochemistry UMR
CNRS 5630
Institute of Molecular Chemistry FR CNRS 2607 Batiment Chimie
Université Joseph Fourier Grenoble 1 301 rue de la Chimie,BP 53 38041
Grenoble Cedex 9 France serge.cosnier@ujf-grenoble.fr
Boris B. Dzantiev
15
Institute of Biochemistry RAS Leniskii Prospect 33 Moscow, 110971

Russia
Phone 7 095 954 2804 Fax 7 095 954 2804 dzantiev@inbi.ras.ru
Eugene V. Grishin
Shemyakin-Ovchinnikov Institute of Bioorganic Chemistry Russian
Academy of Sciences Ul. Miklukho-Maklaya, 16/10, 117997 GSP Moscow,
V-437 Russia
Phone 7 095 3305892 Fax 7 095 3350812 grev@ibch.ru
Ted L. Hadfield
Midwest Research International 1470 T reeland Blvd, SE Palm Bay, FL
32909 USA
Phone 321 723 4547 ext. 300 Fax 321 722 2514 thadfield@mriresearch.org
Jay Lewington
Smiths Detection 459 Park Ave Bushey Watford, Herts WD23 2BW UK
Phone 44 0 1923 658206 Fax 44 0 1923 658025
Jay.Lewington@smithsdetection.com
Marco Mascini
Universita di Firenze Sesto Fiorentino Dipartimento di Chimica, Polo
Scientifico
Via della lastruccia 3 Firenze, 50019 Italy Phone 39 055 457 3283
Fax 39 055 457 3384 mascini@unifi.it
Sebastain Meyer-Plath
Smiths Detection 59 Park Ave Bushey Watford, Herts WD23 2BW UK
Phone 44 0 1923 658193 Fax 44 0 1923 221361
sebastian.meyer-plath@smithsdetection.com
Michael Moniz
Circadence Corporation 4888 Pearl East Circle, Ste. 101 Bolder, CO USA
Phone 303 413 8837 Fax 303 449 7099 mike@circadence.com
Louis Montulli
Midwest Research International 613 Rolling Hills Rd Vista, CA 92081
USA
Phone 760 977 9601 Fax 760 598 6488 LT@montulli.org
Petr Skladal
Masaryk University Kotlarska 2 CZ 61137 Brno Czech Republic Phone 420
5 41129402
Fax 420 5 41211214 skladal@chemi.muni.cz
Ronald Pethig
School of Informatics University of Wales, Bangor Dean Street Bangor,
Gwynedd LL57 1UT UK
Phone 44 1248 382 682 Fax 44 1248 361 429 ron@informatics.bangor.ac.uk
Erling B. Myhre
Dept. of Infectious Diseases, University Hospital SE-221 85 Lund Sweden
16
Phone 46 46 17 18 67/17 11 30 Fax 46 56 13 74 14

Erling.Myhre@infek.lu.se
Arjan van Wuijckhuijse
Dr. Ir. A.L. van Wuijckhuijse TNO Prins Maurits Laboratory Detection
Identification and Analytical Chemistry PO Box 45, 2280 AA Rijswijk, THE
NETHERLANDS
Phone +31 15 284 3343 Fax: +31 15 284 3963 www.pml.tno.nl
Sergey D . Varfolomeyev
The M.V.Lomonosov Moscow State University Vorobiovy Gory 1, Bldg. 11
119992 Moscow Russia Phone 7 095 939 3589 Fax 7 (095) 939 5417
sdvarf@enzyme.chem.msu.ru
Itamar Willner
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem Jerusalem 91904 Israel Phone 972 2
658 5272
Fax 972 2 652 7715 willnea@vms.huji.ac.il
Yuri M. Yevdokimov
Head of Laboratory of condensed state of nucleic acids of Engelhardt
Institute of Molecular Biology RAS Engelhardt Institute of Molecular
Biology RAS Vavilov str.
32 Moscow, 119991 Russia Phone 7 095 135 97 20 Fax 7 095 135 14 05
Yevdokim@genome.eimb.relarn.ru
Part 1
CURRENT PROBLEMS OF CHEMICAL

TERRORISM
Chapter 1
PROBLEMS OF CHEMICAL TERRORISM AND
WAYS OF ITS OVERCOMING
Christophor Dishovsky
Department of Military Toxicology, Military Medical Academy, Sofia , Bulgaria
Abstract: The main problem connected with chemical terrorism is that, beside chemical
weapons, terrorists can use different toxic chemicals from the chemical
industry, from agriculture or products of industrial facilities released after the
terrorist act. An attack to a chemical plant can instantly liberate a number of
different chemicals. Studies should be made on incidents occurring in the
facility, during transportation, storage or other processes and these are
important points in the preparation for protection against chemical terrorism.
An important corner-stone of the anti-terrorist organization in any country is
to set a Health & Disaster/Anti Terrorist Acts Management system. Country
antiterrorist protection will be improved by the introduction of a universal
strategy on basic therapeutic trends against chemical terrorism. Chemical
terrorism can be responsible not only for the spread of large amounts of toxic
chemical compounds, but also for chronic and delayed effects of these agents.
Intoxication with small doses of toxic agents is also a possibility used by
terrorists. The variety of characteristics of a chemical agent used by terrorists
needs demands improvement in the detection, personal protection and
decontamination procedures, including that of the medical personnel and
equipment. Antidote treatment, with the exception of the medical units and
organization of national stockpiling which are adequately supplied for, needs
a new and extensive study for new antidotes and for improvement of the
medical treatment on the area of the terrorist act.
C. Dishovsky et al. (eds.), Medical Treatment of Intoxications and Decontamination of Chemical Agents
in the Area of Terrorist Attack, 3–11.
© 2006 Springer. Printed in the Netherlands.
4 Problems of Chemical Terrorism and Ways of Its Overcoming
Keywords: antidotes; Anti Terrorist Management Centers; chemical; chemical industry;

chemical weapons; decontamination; delayed effects; detection; terrorism
1. INTRODUCTION
The main problem connected with chemical terrorism is that, beside

chemical weapons, terrorists can use various toxic chemicals from the
chemical industry, from agriculture or products of industrial facilities released
after the terrorist act. An attack to a chemical plant can instantly liberate a
number of different chemicals. Studies should be made on incidents occurring
in the facility, during transportation, storage or other processes and these are
important points in the preparation for protection against chemical terrorism.
An important corner-stone of the anti-terrorist organization in any country is
to set a Health & Disaster/Anti Terrorist Acts Management system. Country
antiterrorist protection will be improved by the introduction of a universal
strategy on basic therapeutic trends against chemical terrorism. Chemical
terrorism can be responsible not only for the spread of large amounts of toxic
chemical compounds, but also for chronic and delayed effects of these agents.
Intoxication with small doses of toxic agents is also a possibility used by
terrorists. The variety of characteristics of a chemical agent used by terrorists
needs demands improvement in the detection, personal protection and
decontamination procedures, including that of the medical personnel and
equipment. Antidote treatment, with the exception of the medical units and
organization of national stockpiling which are adequately supplied for, needs
a new and extensive study for new antidotes and for improvement of the
medical treatment on the area of the terrorist act.
2. DISCUSSION
The main problem connected with chemical terrorism is that beside

chemical weapons, terrorists can use different toxic chemicals from the
chemical industry, the agriculture or products released from industrial
facilities following a terrorist act. An attack on a chemical plant can
immediately release a number of different kinds of chemicals [6]. Some
differences exist between chemical weapons (CW) and the chemicals released
after destruction of a chemical plant following a terrorist act [4]:
• industrial chemicals are less toxic than CW, but will be present in
much higher quantities for a longer period of time;
• contamination with the hazardous industrial chemicals eventually
covers a bigger area;
Christophor Dishovsky 5
• CW represent a relatively small number of potential agents; on

the contrary - toxic industrial chemicals – tens of thousands;
• for the known CWs, relatively simple detection and identification
equipment and methods have been developed; the potential
variety of industrial chemicals makes the detection process very
difficult;
• decontamination some times may be a long-lasting and expensive
procedure;
• the products of the decontamination can also damage the
environment;
• military protective filters are optimized against CW and BW;
some hazardous industrial chemicals are not very well filtered by
military filters;
The study of the accidents in chemical facilities, during transportation,
storage and others, the research of the chemical products, which are produced
and stored, are important points in the preparation of the defence against
chemical terrorism. An example of such an accident is the explosion at the
Union Carbide pesticide manufacturing plant (Dec. 3, 1984), which scattered
toxic methyl isocyanate (MIC) over the city of Bhopal, India. During the first
few days up to 4000 people died of painful, harrowing deaths [10].
The precise knowledge of the chemicals, produced and stored in the
factories, is a necessary condition for modeling of the accidents. However, it
should be taken into account that in real conditions and especially when the
accidents are accompanied with fire, new toxic compounds may be formed. Such
is the case with the fire, which occurred on July 13, 1993 in the "Alen Mak"
factory in the town of Plovdiv, Bulgaria. During the GC-MS analysis of the air,
soil and various parts of the incident site, over 120 different chemical compounds
were identified, some of which identical to the ones present on the premises
before the fire, while others had obviously formed during the process of
combustion. For a great number of these compounds, toxicological data was not
found in the accessible information banks, such as IRIS of EPA and others [5].
United Nations APELL (Awareness and Preparedness for
Emergencies at the Local Level) [15] chemical accident database (storing
information on about 300 major chemical accidents between 1970 and 1998)
shows that:
- 38% of the accidents occur with hydrocarbons (fuel gases, fuel liquids, oil,
or refined petroleum products);
- 15% - explosive industrial chemicals;
- 8% - chlorine;
- 6% - ammonia;
- 6% - industrial acids and bases;
- 3% - pesticides and chemical intermediates;
- 21% - polychlorinated biphenyls (2 %), unspecified chemicals (5%) and

others.
Hydrocarbon production, storage, transportation and distribution facilities are
at the top of the list of potential targets.
Some of the more common types of chemicals that could be used as
improvised weapons against a community include (data from ATSDR [16]:
- eye, skin and respiratory irritants (acids, ammonia, acrylates, aldehydes, and
isocyanates);
- choking agents (chlorine, hydrogen sulfide, and phosgene);
-flammable chemical industry gases (acetone, alkenes, alkyl halides, amines);
- aromatic hydrocarbons that could be used as water contaminants (benzene,
etc.);
- oxidizers for improvised explosives (oxygen, butadiene, and peroxides);
- aniline, nitrile, and cyanide compounds that could be used as chemical
asphyxiants;
- compressed hydrocarbon fuel gases that could be used as incendiaries or
simple asphyxiants (liquified natural gas, propane, isobutane);
- liquid hydrocarbon fuels that could be used as incendiaries or water
contaminants (gasoline, jet fuel);
- industrial compounds that could be used as blister agents (dimethyl sulfate),
and
- organophosphate pesticides that could be used as low-grade nerve agents.
According to the conclusions reached by some experts, terrorist acts
apply a new strategy in the use of chemical weapons and other chemical
agents, i.e.:
• the use of low doses of toxic chemicals;
• to aim at a delayed and unknown effect of intoxication.
Investigations in Bhopal, 20 years later, showed that thousands of
Bhopal residents suffered from serious long-term side effects such as
blindness, and liver and kidney failure. Estimates of total deaths reach up to
20000. Injuries probably exceeded 100000 [10]. The data from terrorist acts in
Matsumoto city and Tokyo underground in Japan are important for the
understanding that the consequences of a terrorist act bring long lasting
troubles [12, 13]. Some investigations showed that allied troops had been
exposed to sarin during the first Gulf War and that might have caused the
development of the “Gulf war syndrome” in some of the exposed soldiers [7 ].
The main problems caused by OPC are neuro-toxic delayed effects [8]. Shulga
[14] suggested also the presence of delayed neuro-endocrine toxicity after
intoxication with such compounds.
Planning and preparation of anti terrorist measures should be focused
on the following specific points [4]:
• risk assessment for the use of chemical agents as terrorist agents with
particular attention to toxic industrial chemicals and toxins;
• update assessment of the effective toxic levels that should cover both
the known chemical weapons in view of the modern technologies of
their use and toxic compounds and chemicals of industrial origin;
• inventory and assessment of the available means for medical
treatment of chemical intoxications; assessment of the required
amounts and types of antidotes (in view of the broader range of
potentially toxic agents) and their update with development and
introduction of new compounds;
• modernization and optimization of individual protection with
particular focus on respiratory protection and protective clothing;
• creation of new National Pharmaceutical Stockpile, which ensures the
availability of medicines, antidotes, medical supplies and medical
equipment necessary to counter the effects of biological pathogens
and chemical agents;
• creation of effective system of information and supply to the site of
the terrorist act;
• assessment of the available means for indication and control of
chemical contamination and the effectiveness of decontamination. It
should include a broader range of potentially toxic agents and the
available state-of-the-art technologies;
• acquires particular significance for the readiness of all levels of civil
institutions and the army to counteract chemical terrorism. It should
incorporate and implement the latest achievements of computer
simulation and virtual reality technologies;
• intensive education and training of first responders and physicians is
needed for meeting the medical challenges imposed by chemical and
other weapons of terrorism.
A country’s antiterrorist protection system should also incorporate a
general State Strategy against chemical traumatism and terrorism [11]:
• medical chapter;
• universal program for diagnosis and treatment;
• organizational and medical program;
• social and informative chapter;
• social information regarding chemical traumatism;
• knowledge on chemical traumatism and terrorism.
Investigations of Wetter et al. [17] showed that hospital emergency
departments generally are not prepared to treat victims of chemical or
biological terrorism. Some countries have introduced a Health &
Disaster/Anti Terrorist Acts Management system, which includes:
• Health & Disaster Anti Terrorist Management Centers. They can be a
structure of already existing facilities – for example - of the Civil
Defense. Some countries created new independent structures. Such
centers could act independently, their task being to manage the
situation after disasters or terrorist acts.
• Facilities for indication of toxic chemicals;
• Stationary centers for indication of toxic chemicals that work online

and are connected to the Health & Disaster Anti Terrorist
Management Centers.
• Mobile facilities for indication of toxic chemicals for investigating a
potential area of a terrorist act.
• Regional Medical Centers. They can be Primary or Secondary –
depending on the size and type of organization. These can be district
hospitals with developed emergency units.
• Poison information centers. Regional Medical Centers can play this
role.
• Mobile Medical units with Clinic for First aid treatment; Laboratory
& Diagnostic units; operating theater; hospital, specifications for
treatment of patients affected by chemical agents (indication,
decontamination).
• Satellite communications;
• Independent energy supply;
• Mobile decontamination facilities;
• Training Centers (Center) for Mass Casualties Events.
This system will have a dual function. It will enhance not only
emergency preparedness, antiterrorist activity but also the public health
system. Such a view is suggested by Marmagas et al.[10] about possible
connection between preparedness against biological terrorism, public health
infrastructure, chronic disease and environmental health tracking network.
With a view to improve the level of security of the population from
incidents and disasters, a Scientific Coordination Council was created in
Bulgaria as an adjunct to the Permanent State Commission for Protection of the
Population from Disasters and Incidents [5]. Attached to the Council are several
expert committees which organize and conduct research and analysis, give
expertise and make risk assessments for nuclear security, radiation, chemical and
biological defense, emergency, seismic danger, meteorological and hydrologic
problems and physical steadiness, suggest measures for securing and protecting
objects which may add to the dangerous conditions. One of the first tasks of the
Expert Committee for Chemical Defense was to identify the dangerous chemical
conditions on the territory of Bulgaria. At present over 3400 chemical substances
are produced in Bulgaria, among which mineral fetilizers, plastics, drugs, and
others. The basic criteria for the assessment concern the quantity of reserve of
industrially dangerous chemical compounds and compounds which form during
fires or through the reactions of these compounds. The classification is also
concerned with the existence of storage facilities, product conductors,
transportation communications, and others, where risky situations, including
terrorist actions, may be expected. The criteria for the above mentioned
analysis may be defined as follows [5]:
• research of the object as a potential danger;
• analysis of the possible terrorist act;
• analysis of the available system for defense, security and

protection;
• development of a project for improvement of a new system for defense,
security and protection;
• organizing of the defense, security and protection of some chosen objects,
and consideration and use of the experience;
• coordination of the efforts of the various departments, ministries and
others in solving the problems of defense, security and protection of
the potentially dangerous objects.
The country’s antiterrorist preparedness will be improved with the
introduction of a universal doctrine (strategy) suggested from Monov [11],
with the basic therapeutic trends against chemical terrorism which includes
mainly:
• antidotes;
• detoxication;
• reanimation-substitution and correction;
• immunobiological activity;
• antiviral and antibacterial activity;
• organoprotective activity.
A great number of severely injured people, after using
organophosphorus compounds (OPC) like sarin for example, will need skilled
medical help, enough antidotes, preparedness for decontamination and
medical equipment such as breathing apparatuses or supplied air-line
respirators. Some ideas exist how to solve these problems. In the Military
Medical Academy, Sofia, a special antidote, which can be used after fires and
a buddy aid antidote – for severe cases of intoxication were created. It can be
introduced also as the first and buddy aid antidote. This antidote was prepared
in ampoule form bearing the name NEMICOL 5T [9]. It is a multi component
preparation which was tested with animals. The investigations show that this
antidote very quickly recovers the breathing, the arterial pressure and the EKG
in the intoxicated animals. The anticonvulsant activity was very strong and
was demonstrated also with EEG experiments. Neuromuscular transmission
blocked after OPC intoxication recovered 1-3 minutes after introduction of the
Nemicol 5T. All investigated parameters stayed very stable.
Cowan et al. [1, 2] suggest the Multi-Threat Medical Countermeasure
(MTMC) hypothesis – investigations for developing a single countermeasure
drug with efficacy against different pathologies caused by multiple classes of
chemical agents. Serine protease inhibitors can prolong the survival of animals
intoxicated with the nerve agent soman and can also protect against vesication
caused by the blister agent sulfur mustard. Poly (ADP-ribose) polymerase
(PARP) inhibitors can reduce both soman-induced neuronal degeneration and
sulfur-mustard-induced epidermal necrosis. Accordingly, the drugs with anti-
inflammatory action against either nerve or blister agent might also
display multi-threat efficacy for the inflammatory pathogenesis of both classes

of chemical warfare agent [1,2].
3. CONCLUSION
Nowadays, terrorists have changed their tactics. Beside chemical

weapons, they may use different toxic chemicals produced by the industry, the
agriculture or failures in the industrial facilities during transportation, storage,
fires and the like. They may take advantage also of the application of low
doses of toxic chemicals which can provoke delayed and unknown effects of
the intoxication.
Thorough studies of the chemical products, investigations of the
incidents in chemical factories, storehouses and transportation dealing with
chemical products are important points in the protection plan against chemical
terrorism.
A country’s antiterrorist preparedness should include also a State
strategy against chemical traumatism and terrorism. The elaboration of
Organization of Health & Disaster/Anti Terrorist Acts Management system is
an important part of this preparedness.
The scientific research in the field of toxicology gains new
dimensions and priorities. The introduction of a universal strategy for the
basic therapeutic trends against chemical terrorism is necessary.
REFERENCES
1. Cowan F. M., Broomfield C.A., Lenz D. E., Smith W. J., Putative role of proteolysis and
inflammatory response in the toxicity of nerve and blister chemical warfare agents:
implications for multi-threat medical countermeasures. J. Applied Toxicology, 2003, 23, 3,
177-86.
2. Cowan B. S., Broomfield C. a., Stojiljkovic M. P., Smith W. J., A Review of Multi-Threat
Mrdical Countermeasures against Chemical Warfare and Terrorism, Military Medicine,
2004, 169, 11, 850-55.
3. Dishovsky C., “The problems of Chemical Terrorism.” In Technology for Combating
WMD Terrorism, Peter J. Stopa, Zvonko Orahovec, ed’s, NATO Science Series, Kluwer
Academic Publishers, 2004.
4. Dishovsky C., “The problems of Chemical and Biological Terrorism.” In Medical Aspects
of Chemical and Biological Terrorism – Biological Terrorism and Tramautism, Alexander
Monov and Christophor Dishovsky, eds, Publishing House of the Union of Scientists in
Bulgaria, 2004.
5. Dishovsky C., Belokonsky I., Panchev N., The problems of defence in chemical industry-
results of special investigation. Proceedings of the CB Medical Treatment Symposium
Industry I; 1998 October 25-31; Zagreb-Dubrovnik, Croatia, MOD of Croatia, 1999, 69-
73.
6. Eifried G., Terrorism against chemical plants:hazards and risks. Proceedings of the CB
Medical Treatment Symposium Industry I; 1998 October 25-31; Zagreb-Dubrovnik,
Croatia, MOD of Croatia, 1999, 84-88.
7. Haley, R.W., and Kurt, T.R., Self-reported exposure to neurotoxic chemical combinations
in the Gulf War, J. Am. Med. Assos., 1997, 277,231-37.
8. Haley, R., W., Billecke, S., S., and La Du, B., N., Association of low PON1 type Q (type
A) arylesterase activity with neurological symptom complexes in Gulf War veterans,
Toxicol. Appl. Pharmacol., 1999, 157, 227-33.
9. Kotev G., DSc Work , Military Medical Academy, Sofia, 1973. ( in Bulgarian ).
10. Marmagas S.W., Kind L. R.,Public Health’s Response to a changed World: September 11,
Biological Terrorism, and the Development of an Environmental Health Tracking
Network. Amer. J. of Public Health, 2003, 93, 8, 1226-30.
11. Monov Alexander, “Biological Traumatism and Terrorism – unified Medical and
Organizational Doctrine”. .” In Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Terrorism –
Biological Terrorism and Tramautism, Alexander Monov and Christophor Dishovsky, eds,
Publishing House of the Union of Scientists in Bulgaria, 2004.
12. Morita, H., Yanagisawa, N., Nakajima, T., et al., Sarin poisoning in Matsumoto, Japan,
Lancet, 1995, 346, 290-93.
13. Ohbu, S., Yamashina, A., Takasu, N., et al., Sarin poisoning on Tokyo subway. South.
Med. J., 1997, 90, 587-93.
14. Shulga V., “Delayed neuro-endocrine toxicity indused by organophosphorus compounds-
natural consequence of poisonous substances application for terrorist purpose”, In Medical
Aspects of Chemical and Biological Terrorism –Chemical Terrorism and Tramautism,
Alexander Monov and Christophor Dishovsky, eds, Publishing House of the Union of
Scientists in Bulgaria, 2005 ( in press).
15. United Nations APELL (Awareness and Preparedness for Emergencies at the Local Level)
http://www.uneptie.org/pc/apell/.
16. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Agency for Toxic Substances and
Disease Registry (ATSDR) http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/about.html.
17. Wetter D.C., Daniell W. E., Treser C. D., Hospital preparedness for victims of chemical or
biological terrorism. Amer. J. of Public Health, 2001, 91, 5, 710-1
1 A SUMMARY OF THE DISCUSSIONS
Paul Tempest
Director of Windsor Energy Group and Vice President of the British
Institute of Energy Economics
An emerging energy demand/supply imbalance

The IEA expect global energy demand to rise by 66% by 2030 with
90% of the increment supplied by fossil fuels, mainly oil.
The Gulf oil producers, holding two thirds of total global proven oil
reserves, would have to account for most of this increment and for the
replacement of depleting production elsewhere.
Such a doubling or even tripling of Gulf oil production capacity would
require a massive infusion of external capital and new technology. This
looks in present circumstances to be highly unlikely, given the degree of
political turbulence in the area, the reluctance of the capital and financial
markets to take on such risks and the determination of several governments
to protect their own national companies to the point of failing to provide
adequate incentives for the international oil companies to participate fully.
“The end of cheap oil”

Competition for Gulf oil exports is therefore likely to be intense with
South-East Asia taking the bulk and an increasing share. US expectations
that US oil imports will double to 24 mbd by 2030 will further distort the
market and can only be achieved at the cost of denying supply to the
developing world.
Oil prices have remained broadly within the US$22-28 OPEC band for
the last four years and are now moving beyond the upper limit. Yet industry
3
H. McPherson et al. (eds.), Emerging Threats to Energy Security and Stability, 3–8.
4
estimates of the global clearing price for oil is mainly within the US$ 16-18
range, implying that the difference is an anxiety premium caused mainly by
political turbulence in the Middle East.
Dangerous impacts on the global economy - a non-

sustainable energy prospect
Periods of high oil prices have always had adverse impacts on global
economic growth, just as low oil prices have always acted as a stimulus.
Already, continuing high oil prices are seen to be hindering growth for later
this year. Whereas the rest of OECD (Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development) industrialised countries are partly shielded
by the weakening of the US $, the impact on the US economy, which is
already slowing, and on most developing countries could be severe.
One quarter of the world population has no access to electricity and
many more rely on wood, residues and dung for cooking and heating. Even
on assumptions of the persistence of the average GNP growth over the last
25 years, the number of people without access to electricity is 2030 is
unlikely to be below the current level. The steeper the economic
rollercoaster caused by oil price spikes, the less chance there will be to
reach the IEA target of 75 million new connections per year and the greater
the likelihood that global energy poverty will increase rather than decrease.
Changes in oil market leadership

Russia (9.0 mbd this year) has overtaken Saudi Arabia and the USA
(each about 7.8 mbd this year) as the leader in oil production. Iraq is widely
thought to be capable of producing 4-5 mbd by 2010 and possibly 15-20
mbd by 2030. Many of the discussions pivoted around the issue of political
stability in Russia and Saudi Arabia.
Most contributors considered the IEA assumption of a rapid rise in
Saudi production to 19 mbd to be highly unlikely, and indeed, an industry
report which is soon to be published predicts the contrary: imminent
collapse. Yet the consensus view, although vigorously challenged, was that
Saudi Arabia would remain the indispensable provider of surge capacity
until 2010 at least.
5
China (5.7 mbd) has outstripped Japan as the second largest oil
consumer. Chinese oil imports are predicted to rise from 2mbd in 2003 to 6
mbd in 2010 and 15-20 mbd by 2030.
Iraq approaching “boil-over”

Despite considerable and mainly unsung progress in restoring Iraq’s
economic infrastructure over the past six months, the projected transition to
Iraqi control at mid-04 looks precarious unless the proposals are endorsed
by the 60% Shi’a majority (see Special Session C).
The possibility of a break-up of Iraq, whether sooner or later, becomes
clearer. In the light of this eventuality, a serious contingency plan is
needed.
“While there are now no known national threats to the

boundaries of the USA or Europe, there is no boundary to the
global threat of Al-Qaida and other international terrorist
organisations. Our defence forces are largely equipped for Cold
War needs, not for the rapid-response needs we now face.”
Technology transfer stifled

The International Oil Companies provide a rapid and efficient transfer
of petroleum technology and effective management where they are
permitted to operate. Many oil and gas-producing countries overprotect
their national companies to the point of denying IOC access on commercial
terms.
The Caucasus impasse

Rivalries between the USA, Russia and the EU overshadow efforts by
the Caucasus States to develop export capacity for their oil and gas.
Political meddling and attempts from outside to control the economy of the
region explain the numerous development delays.
6
North African surprises

Rapid development of North African oil and gas resources following
political détente may alleviate the competitive weakness of Europe in
securing adequate imported oil and gas. Sanctions on Libya have been easy
to impose, most difficult to dismantle. US policy is still based on a “wait-
and-see” step-by-step policy as Libya demonstrates compliance.
UK energy policy
There is little sign of contingency planning as the UK returns to net gas
import dependence (2005-6) and oil import dependence (2010) and coal
imports (currently 50% of consumption) continue to rise. Nuclear capacity
will also have run down sharply by 2010. UK Government expectations
that wind-power will be able to provide 10% of UK electricity may be
exaggerated.
Threats to ships
Shipping of crude oil and products, which are equivalent to 57% of
global oil production, is vital to the global economy, vulnerable to terrorists
and the problems are poorly understood. Some 90,000 ships move 2,000mn
tons pa.
The fleet of LNG carriers is likely to triple within 10-15 years and are
getting larger – in the next generation of carrier, they will be 150,000 tons
each. A vapour cloud from a damaged LNG vessel will, on ignition, have
the impact of detonating a hydrogen bomb.
The main hazards are:
Ship-seizure by pirates who then transfer and sell the cargo, disguise
the ship and ransom the crew. SAS simulations indicate that fewer than 8
minutes would be needed for regaining control of a captured vessel
between touching the ship’s side and taking over the bridge.
x Ramming – this mostly occurs close to shore and often causes
massive spills and pollution.
x Infiltration of Ship by terrorist cell working among crew.
7
x Actions by environmental groups (e.g. the seizure of The Brent

Spar by Greenpeace)
The four most dangerous choke-points for the oil trade are Hormuz
(15.5mbd), Malacca Straits (10.5 mbd), Bab al-Mandab (3.3 mbd) and the
Suez (0.8 mbd). Collision in congested waterways is not uncommon: in 2
months recently the IMO reported 8 collisions in the Malacca Straits which,
along with Indonesia, heads the IMO list of 445 piracy attacks in 2003.
This session examined detailed studies of the impact of a blockage of
the Malacca Straits, which might be closed from 3 weeks to 3 months
adding 3-5 days to voyage time between the Gulf and Japan.
Remedies discussed included security alert systems, electric fences
around the decks, enhanced naval protection, stricter vetting of crews and
port operatives. There is little enthusiasm for ships to carry weapons and
grenades.
Threats to ports
x Ship used as a bomb in a port city/area (e.g. Boston or Tokyo Bay)
x Inadequate Energy-Related facilities at Ports.
x Threats posed by lack of thorough inspection at international ports
(2% shipping freight is checked)
Threats to pipelines: an Iraqi case study

This session relied on up-to-the-minute reports by security forces and a
leading private security company in Iraq.
Iraq’s main 669KM oil artery, the North/South pipeline is more or less
out of action in the North on account of sabotage. The bulk of Iraqi oil
exports now run southwards through the area under British protection:
Internal resistance is driven by a complex variety of political and
personal motives. There is a general resentment of foreign occupation and
an awareness of the risks of power shifts through the period of transition.
From outside, resistance is reinforced by radicals pouring into Iraq,
many with al-Qaida support.
Urban unrest re lack of electricity, water, security etc is rising.
8
Tribal unrest on tribal boundaries is endemic.

Threats to security are becoming more diverse and complex. Without
any control or customs inspection on the Iraqi borders, al-Qaida has almost
100% freedom of movement.
Remedies include establishing tight control of the borders, introducing
more trunk-road checks, extension of the “cash-for-arms” scheme and the
building up of a network of new medical centres and hospitals, all of which
provide a stream of valuable local intelligence.
The security of the pipelines has been largely handed over to contracted
Iraqi companies who complain that the State must be active in supervising
overall responsibility, which is currently lacking.
Conclusion
The two discernible Middle East flashpoints in the year ahead are Iraq
and Saudi Arabia. There are high hopes of normalisation of relations with
Iran and Libya. Palestine remains a pan-Arab rallying cry. Oil market
leadership is entering a process of change. In the longer-term, acute
competition for Gulf oil and gas exports looks extremely likely and will
present the lead-consumer governments with new and difficult challenges.
STRATEGIC ACTIONABLE NET-CENTRIC
BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE SYSTEM
S. Kornguth
Director, Countermeasures to Biological and Chemical Threats Institute for Advanced
Technology, University of Texas at Austin, USA
Abstract: Technologies required for strategic actionable net-centric biological defense

systems consist of : 1) multiplexed multi-array sensors for threat agents and
for signatures of the host response to infection; 2) novel vaccines and
restricted access antivirals/bacterials to reduce emergence of drug resistant
strains pre- and post-event; 3) telemedicine capabilities to deliver post-event
care to 20,000 victims of a biological strike; and 4) communication systems
with intelligent software for resource allocation and redundant pathways that
survive catastrophic attack. The integrated system must detect all threat agents
with minimal false positive/negative events, a seamless integrated broad-band
communications capability that enables conversion of data to actionable
information, and novel pre- and post-event treatments. The development of
multiplexed multi-array sensors, appropriate vaccines and antibiotics, and
integrated communication capabilities are critical to sustaining normal health,
commerce, and international activities.
1. INTRODUCTION
The overarching objectives in developing effective countermeasures to

biological threats are to protect the Defense community and citizenry from
such threats, and to develop agile responses to unanticipated events
considering that successful terrorists do the unexpected. The need for
protection against and responses to biological threats has been strikingly
demonstrated by the use of anthrax contaminated letters that were sent
through the U.S. mail in October 2001. That attack resulted in human illness,
the loss of life, and discontinuity of government operations because of
contamination of federal office buildings in Washington, DC. A recent report
prepared by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and
supported by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) of the
17
D. Morrison et al. (eds.), Defense against Bioterror: Detection Technologies, Implementation

Strategies and Commercial Opportunities, 17–27.
18 STRATEGIC NET-CENTRIC BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE SYSTEM
Department of Defense (DoD) came to the conclusion that the U.S. is at

present not well prepared for a similar attack using anthrax1. The major
problems include a lack of: 1) a clear chain of command, and 2) tools to
provide the public with information that permits appropriate responses.
The incidence of Congo-Crimean hemorrhagic fever in Afghanistan, an
area where coalition forces are being deployed, increases this need. The
potential threat posed by emergent disease (e.g., Severe Acute Respiratory
Syndrome [SARS] and West Nile Fever virus) or from a major release of a
contagious biological agent such as smallpox, has been a growing concern at
all levels of the international community. This article outlines and discusses
a new strategy that is needed if we are to be fully capable of sensing,
preventing, and managing biological threats.
2. NEW PARADIGM
The current paradigm addresses biological and chemical terrorist threats

in a vertical (stove-piped) response. In the arena of developing sensors for
the detection of biological agents, the paradigm has been to develop separate
detectors for each agent or to develop a platform for detecting 12-24 threat
agents using a single probe for each agent. There is a lack of an interactive
networked communication system that is capable of managing a devastating
emergent disease. To establish a highly networked system that is rapid
enough to permit effective protection, it is necessary to evolve from the
stove-piped, compartmentalized model currently in use to an integrated,
fused, probabilistic, and frequently updated information model. Multiplexed
multi-array sensor systems, capable of recognizing all bacterial or viral
genomic materials related to pathogenicity or of recognizing antigenic
domains that are specific indicators of pathogens are one component of a
network needed for rapid detection and identification of biological threats.
With respect to therapeutics, modern technologies for vaccine and antibiotic
production provide decided advantages over older methods. The traditional
vaccines require extensive development times before they become available
for human use and undesired side effects commonly result from vaccines
produced by these protocols. The cost associated with developing and testing
vaccines, using traditional technology, approximates 50-100 million dollars
per vaccine. The dissemination of antibiotics and antivirals through the
world markets has resulted in the appearance of pathogenic bacteria and
viruses that are resistant to these drugs. One approach to reduce the
development of antibiotic resistance is to restrict the distribution of newly
developed antibiotics. Such an approach presents ethical and social
dilemmas. The consideration of options available for reduction of drug
STRATEGIC NET-CENTRIC BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE SYSTEM 19
resistance, prior to a threat event, may permit development of a rational

policy. A major problem facing our nations in the event of a biological attack
or emergent disease is the large numbers of patients that can be anticipated
to require medical treatment. Although improvements in emergency medical
care and hospital equipment have been achieved during the past two decades,
the ability of any community to manage an outbreak of infectious disease
affecting >10,000 people is lacking. Rapid progress has been achieved
whereby medical care can be provided to patients at sites that are distant
from primary caregivers using telecommunication systems (e.g., the Armed
Services in theater, large scale HMO providers such as Kaiser Permanente,
or the correctional institutions in the U.S.). The funds needed to acquire
telecommunication equipment for such distributed medical care delivery are
estimated to be less than 100 million dollars for the entire U.S. At the present
time such a distributed care system is not readily available.
The new paradigm couples a network centric integrated sensor alert
system that can detect all threat agents simultaneously, with a seamlessly
integrated communication software capability that converts large scale data
to actionable information. For this to be effective, the sensor system must
yield minimal false positive and false negative results. The new paradigm
incorporates large-scale databases on normative values of threat agents in
many regions of the world so that significant changes in real time can be
detected. The paradigm also includes the development and implementation
of novel pre- and post-event treatment capabilities.
Attention must be paid to the ability of high level decision makers and
operators to recognize that a new state of threat has emerged, based upon
output of the sensors, data fusion system, and iconographic display.
Ambiguity of data, lack of an autonomous processing system, and high stress
on the operator (e.g., sleep deprivation, lack of training) may all compromise
the utility of a highly networked system of systems. What is needed for this
new paradigm to succeed? The needs include multiplexed multi-array
sensors for biological agents that infect people, livestock, and edible crops.
The agents of concern include many on the Militarily Critical Technologies
List prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense. We need
multiplexed multi-array sensor systems with high specificity and selectivity
for the rapid detection of host responses to infection. We need a new
generation of effective therapeutics, including vaccines, antibiotics, and
antivirals. A network centric intelligent communication system that can
provide accurate comprehensible information to decision makers (from
command officers to unit operators) is required. To minimize morbidity and
mortality and optimize containment of disease, a biosurveillance system
based on archival health databases, statistical models, and data mining
strategies that can provide an early alert to a disease outbreak is required.
In many cases the operator may be required to understand the meaning of

acquired data in very short time periods (seconds to minutes) if the response
is anticipated to change the outcome of an engagement. The Tactical
Decision Making Under Stress (TADMUS) program is one example of such
a situation. In the biological threat arena, the detection and identification of
toxins require rapid analysis and operator comprehension. The large increase
in numbers of sensors (for high explosives [HX], biological and chemical
agents, meteorological conditions) together with the rapid changes in op
tempo required to manage emergence of clinical disease would suggest a
need for the development of systems capable of autonomous generation of
an alert when threat conditions arise.
3. CURRENT STATE OF TECHNOLOGY NEEDED

FOR THE NEW PARADIGM
In the sensors area, the genomes of most biological threat agents have
been sequenced and the signatures of toxins described. Novel multiplexed
multi-array sensor-platform systems utilize the genomic datasets to detect
the appearance of threat levels of these agents. In the therapeutics area,
researchers are working towards identifying critical antigenic epitopes of
these agents. New therapeutics can emerge that have an antigen binding
capacity significantly greater than antigen-cell receptor binding, resulting in
the potential for agent neutralization. Technologies have been developed
over the past decade for the development of new drugs and DNA based
vaccines. Restricted access antivirals/antibacterials will need to be developed
to reduce the emergence of drug resistant strains pre- and post-event.
A significant development in our program at The University of Texas at
Austin (UT-Austin)2 has been the novel design and production of an
antibody that binds the anthrax PA antigen 1000 times stronger (Kd<10-11)
than any antibody to date. The antibodies were produced using phage display
technology for selection of the antibodies. In tests with experimental rodents
in a controlled facility, administering the Bacillus anthracis PA antigen to
the animals resulted in 100 percent fatalities, whereas the co-administration
of the newly developed antibody against the PA antigen resulted in 100
percent survival2. Research is also being conducted to determine unique
nucleic acid sequences in the genome of pathogenic bacteria and viruses that
contribute to the pathogenic properties of the organisms. This information is
being used to develop multiplexed assay systems that can detect selected
agents simultaneously. By quickly screening for multiple pathogenicity
island sequences or pathogenic factors, end-users will have the capability to
detect the first signs of emergent disease without requiring screening for
each particular organism. In the communications area, researchers are

developing ‘belief maintenance’ software to provide decision makers some
estimate of the validity of incoming data. An estimate of information
credibility is critical to effective decision-making in crisis situations when
one must rely on an 80 percent solution (i.e., 80 percent of needed
information is available). Waiting for a 100 percent solution could have a
catastrophic impact on response effectiveness.
In the area of telecommunications, researchers are developing the means
to provide effective medical triage to victims in a contaminated hot zone.
The hot zone in this case refers to a region experiencing an outbreak of a
highly contagious disease that causes death in a significant percentage of
infected individuals. Advanced telecommunications technology can permit
physicians and other medical experts at remote locations to provide medical
information and support care delivery to personnel in the hot zone. Prior
training of these personnel (from physicians to local citizens) is required. An
extensive use of local persons will be necessary if it is deemed inadvisable to
introduce health care workers and communications experts into the hot zone;
the external support teams are required to provide ‘back-fill’ support to the
overburdened local community.
Biosurveillance systems are being developed to serve as an early warning
of emergent disease. A variety of databases are being developed that are
health related. Examples of these databases include school absenteeism,
over-the counter drug sales, hospital emergency clinic visits, and archival
records on the incidence of diseases in different geographic regions, CONUS
and OCONUS. Each database must be statistically characterized regarding
parameters such as variance, confidence intervals, seasonality, etcetera, and
be integrated into validated predictive models. Once the reference databases
are in place and suitably modeled, statistically significant departures from
baseline values can be detected and transmitted in real time to decision
makers through intelligent communication systems.
3.1 Technology Gaps
A number of critical technology gaps exist that must be addressed if we

are to recognize, prevent, and minimize the effect of biological agents. These
gaps include: deficiencies in the availability of multiplexed multi-array agent
sensors and platforms; critical reagents; capability for large-scale production
of effective vaccines, antibiotics and antivirals; ability to treat a large
number (10,000) of infected people 24/7 for several weeks in a biological
hot zone; archival biosurveillance databases and intelligent and secure
communications networks. With the new capabilities and devices anticipated
during the next decade, approaches that address these gaps include the use of
autonomous (e.g., cell phone-based) microelectronic detectors for the

transmission of data on agent exposure, development of novel antibodies,
antibiotics and antivirals to manage disease outbreaks, and establishment of
global surveillance systems for emergent diseases (e.g., SARS, West Nile
Fever, Congo-Crimean Hemorrhagic Fever).
3.2 Research Areas
Because of the broad scope of needs for technology to prevent and

minimize biological threats, a number of research areas have been identified
as critical. These include: the scientific validation that a biological incident
has occurred (requisite tools/capabilities include situation awareness
systems, sensors and signatures); the availability of medical countermeasures
(vaccines, pharmaceuticals, and medical transport); and a highly effective
communications network for the secure transmission of data and the
conversion of such data to comprehensible information so that decision
makers can take appropriate actions.
3.3 Sensors Research
For effective sensors, a variety of materials are being developed that

include effective high-affinity binders of biological threat agents. The high
affinity binders include antibodies, cDNA gene probes, polynucleotide
aptamers, and combinatorial chemicals. Using phage display methods,
antibody fragments can be selected that have a high affinity for agents such
as anthrax toxin and brucella. Another binding system that has been
examined uses polynucleotide aptamers about 31 nucleotides long that have
good binding affinity to ricin toxin. These sensor materials require
opto/electronic transduction platforms. Sensor platform research currently is
being focused on micro-electro-mechanical systems (MEMS) devices,
microelectronics technology, microfluidics (laboratory-on-a-chip),
DNA/protein microarrays, and transduction devices. Efforts are also being
directed toward the development of multiplexed multi-array systems that
detect approximately 100 biological threat agents of concern. For military
application, it is essential that sensor systems can detect and identify agents
present in samples rapidly, using platforms that are small and have low
power requirements.
3.4 Therapeutics Research
With current approaches, the development-to-market of new vaccines,

antibiotics, and antivirals is in the order of 5-10 years. A paradigm shift to
newer culture and DNA-based technology is needed if we are to have an

effective response to a major biological or chemical event. Current estimates
regarding the time required for developing and fielding new vaccines and
antibiotics/antivirals to specific threat agents, using new technology and
expedited approval, is in the order of three years.
3.5 Communications Research
While current computer/informatics research includes the development of

telecommunications assets, a critical need in the communications area is the
development of seamless integrated communication networks. These
network centric systems enable the conversion of data to actionable
information. Research is being conducted to provide intelligent agent
software designs for such communication systems. This will enable an
enhanced accuracy in critical decision-making and resource allocations. The
integrated system must have redundant pathways that can survive a
catastrophic attack. The communication system must be capable of
integrating data on an emerging threat in a timely manner, and provide
useful information for public safety coordination and perimeter management.
3.6 Telemedicine Needs
Telemedicine capabilities can aid in the delivery of post-event care to

10,000-20,000 victims of a biological strike in a densely populated area for
24 hours a day, seven days a week, for several months. In the event of
smallpox attack in which 10,000 people develop clinical symptoms of
infection within 7-10 days following exposure, local hospitals and medical
response capabilities would be overwhelmed if current treatment protocols
were used. Telemedicine allows physicians at a remote location from the hot
zone to provide medical support via telemedicine capabilities (visual, audio)
to aid local physicians in treating patients. A treatment level of 50 patients
per day per physician would require 200 physicians to provide telemedicine
care for 10,000 patients. Each physician would require telemedicine devices;
hence 200 telemedicine devices would be required at the remote location,
and a similar number in the hot zone. A national telemedicine system could
include the establishment of approximately eight telemedicine response
centers nationally, interconnected via satellite to telepresence and
telemedicine/robotic systems. The remote care capability reduces the
likelihood of the dissemination of disease to physicians and communities in
which the physicians reside. A telemedicine system would also retain health
care delivery in communities providing health care back-fill.
3.7 Networked Operations at the Coordinating Level

and Lower Echelons of Command
A decision making component is required for coordinating the delivery of

actionable information. Figure 1 illustrates such a flow chart. In threat
situations, data developed from sensor arrays, surveillance systems, and
therapeutics inventories can be electronically encrypted and transmitted via
intelligent communication networks to decision makers for appropriate
actions. The decision makers include individuals, government authority,
medical care experts (doctors, hospitals, the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention [CDC], etc.), and the military.
3.8 Network Centric Response to Threat Data Fusion

and Human
1. Perception/Comprehension
2. Primary issue of concern
3. Full situation awareness is contingent on at least four elements including:
4. Large scale acquisition of data (i.e., SIGINT, MASINT, HUMINT,
sensors)
5. High fidelity communication of data sets to autonomous processing
centers
6. Data fusion involving weighting of data and marked reduction in data
volume to yield information that provides users a common operational
picture
7. Rapid comprehension of time dependent information by operators
facilitated by new iconographic displays, training, measures of vigilance
Figure 1.
3.9 Proposed Goal of the Autonomous Data Processing
The end goal is achievement of a rapid appropriate action in response to

detection of threat (within minutes of threat identification). In order to meet
this time constraint in a real world scenario, it is probable that the man-in-
the-loop may have a denial capability rather than an approval function.
3.10 A Strategy to achieve this Goal
The tools required for autonomous weighting of data and subsequent

reduction of data elements for particular missions remain to be developed
and agreed upon. The technologies required for data acquisition,
communication, and autonomous processing fundamentally differ from that
required for comprehension by an operator. The three technologies are
systems that must be developed prior to deployment and will have known
probabilities of accuracy and reliability. The fourth element involves the
training and state of vigilance/alertness of the operator as well as the
development of software (e.g., icons, data mining, and compression) used to
display threat conditions. The point of the fourth element is to permit an
operator to have rapid comprehension of the state of threat in a rapidly
changing environment. Because there is a time factor involved in the
comprehension of threat conditions by an operator, and in the translation of
the information into action, the fourth element must include temporal
qualities. Since the time dependence (seconds to minutes) of an intense
threat situation will differ from that involved in a peacekeeping or supply

distribution situation (many minutes to hours on the average), the
autonomous weighting factors and data reduction factors can be expected to
vary widely. This variability complicates programming of autonomous
systems.
3.11 Basic Principles of Human Decision Making Under

Stress
Command teams on the modern information-age medical delivery front

face an increasing variety of cognitive stressors: information ambiguity,
information overload, fatigue, and fear of contagion and quarantine. There is
a requirement for a useful, predictive model of the effect of these stressors
on individual and collective cognition within the medical delivery team. A
model to quantify stress experienced by the caregiver and to identify
countermeasures and mitigators of stress, develop organizational strategies
for optimum performance under stress is needed. Psychological assessments
that can predict individual and team cognitive functioning and physiological
markers that can determine quantitatively and objectively the effect of stress
experienced on an operators vigilance have been identified (Table 1). The
identification of specific physiological markers that are predictive of stress-
induced changes in complex cognitive functioning will aid in the
construction of autonomous weighting systems.
Table 1. Stressors and Measures

Stressors
Measurement Information Information Fatigue Social Isolation Danger
Technologies Ambiguity Overload
Cognition +++ +++ ++ ++ ++
Behavioral + + + + ++
Markers
Emotional +++ +++ +++ ++ +++
Assessment †
Observer/Control +++ +++ +++ ++ ++
ler Ratings
Auditory/Visual +++ +++ +++ + ++

Evoked Potential
(P300, P600)
Respiration / ++ ++ + +++ +++
Ventilation Rate
Cardiac q-t +++ +++ ++ +++ +++
Interbeat Interval
+ Degree of reactivity to measurement
† (e.g., Voice Stress Analysis)
4. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The research reported in this document was performed in connection with

Contract number DAAD13-02-C-0079 with the U.S. Edgewood Chemical
Biological Command.
REFERENCES
1. Lessons from the Anthrax Attacks: Implications for U.S. Bioterrorism
Preparedness. CSIS Funded by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency of the
Department of Defense. David Heyman investigator. March 2004.
2. Maynard, J.A., Maassen, C.B.M., Leppla, S.H., Brasky, K., Patterson, J.L., Iverson,
B.L., and Georgiou, G., "Protection against Anthrax Toxin by Recombinant
Antibody Fragments Correlates with Antigen Affinity," Nature Biotechnology, vol.
20, pp. 597-601, June 2002.
Chapter 2
TOXIC CHEMICALS AND RADIOACTIVE

SUBSTANCES AS REASON OF OCCURRENCE
OF ACUTE POISONING IN UKRAINE
Sergey Ryzhenko
Dnepropetrovsk Region Sanitary-Epidemiological Station.
39a. Philisofskaja St., Dnepropetrovsk 49000, Ukraine
The chemical terrorism is a new threat to mankind safety, vastly

exceeding in scale the results of the most modern firearms and representing
one of the cheapest forms of terrorism. The first information about "terrorism"
dates from 431-404 years B.C., when ammonium smoke was used in the
course of the Peloponness wars. In 1899 as a result of the International Peace
Conference Agreement in Hague the use of artillery projectiles equipped with
poisoning gas was prohibited. However it is in the XX century during World
War I - in 1915 that the first large-scale use of poisonous material occurred on
the battle site near the city of Ypres, Belgium. During World War I were
applied more than 100 000 tons of toxic chemicals, as a result of which
perished 90 000 soldiers and more than a million were affected.
In 1925 in Geneva a protocol was signed, which forbade the use of
bacteriological and chemical weapons, however this was not sufficient for the
countries to stop further production, use and accumulation of chemical
weapons.
In 1972 several countries signed in Geneva a Convention on biological
and toxin weapons and undertook the obligation to continue the negotiations
for an agreement to forbid chemical weapons also. In 1992 the participants of
the Geneva negotiations agreed on a text of the Convention on prohibiting the
development, production, accumulation and use of chemical weapons and on
their destruction. In 1993 the Convention on chemical weapons was open for
signing.
During the ceremony for the Convention signing in January in Paris,
130 countries supported the agreement and international disarmament with
their signatures. In February of the same year in Hague was founded a
Starting-up commission with the task to prepare the coming into effect of the
Convention. In spite of these efforts, in 1995 in Japan the “Aum Sinrike” sect
made the terrorist act in Tokyo underground by using the chemical weapon
sarin. Beside the 5000 affected, 12 persons perished.
13
14 Toxic Chemicals and Radioactive Substances
Only in 1997 the Convention on chemical weapons took effect for 87

member-countries – initiators of the Convention. According to the Convention
to perform the requirements was created the Organization for Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons (OPCW) with headquarters in Hague.
The Convention on Chemical Weapons is an international agreement,
which forbids the use of chemical weapons and aims at liquidating the
chemical weapons for ever and all over the world. The Convention provides
the basis for supervision by the Organization for Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons and for destruction of the available spare chemical weapons, as well
as objects, which are used for production of chemical weapons, and for
checking industrial objects for prevention not to allow the production of new
chemical weapons. The Organization for Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
also assists the international cooperation and exchange by research
information so that people and governments use chemical investigations for
peace purposes.
Modern highly toxic chemicals and biological agents could fall into
terrorist hands through various channels:
- appropriation of military storehouses and arsenal, where chemical weapons
are kept;
- appropriation of enterprises equipped with facilities for chemical protection;
- supplies from production, storage and trade companies;
- illegal production in underground laboratories.
- for the last 10-20 years there has been a qualitative growth in production of
synthetic preparations for treatment of the various diseases, possessing a
broad spectrum of pharmacological influence. Some psycho-pharmacological
drugs can be used by terrorists for solving their own problems.
The sanitary and epidemiological service in Dnepropetrovsk area has
functions, which have been entrusted by the legislation of Ukraine thus
contributing to the preventive safeguarding of the people from poisoning by
toxic chemicals applicable in industry and agriculture. For the industrial areas
of Dnepropetrovsk the problem for protection from industrial wastes from
enterprises is traditionally actual. At present over 8,2 billion tons of industrial
wastes to miscellaneous degrees of toxicity are stored in this area. The wastes
from the chemical production occupy more than 6,2 km2. On the territory of
the enterprise there continue to be accumulated wastes from the galvanic
technology of 1st and 2nd degree of danger. The big worries remain the
petroleum production waste, whose amount sharply increased in connection to
the stormy development of the town public transport.
A requirement was introduced in this respect to undertake expert
sanitary-hygienic measures for the treatment of wastes in accordance to
article 24 of Law on Wastes of Ukraine, № 187-98-VR from 05.03.98 and
articles 25 and 33 of Law of Ukraine "On the provision of sanitary and
epidemic welfare for the population". Annually the sanitary and
epidemiological service conducts over 500 expert operations. Till
Sergey Ryzhenko 15
01.01.2005 the sanitary-hygienic expert operations connected with wastes

covered over 90% of the enterprises.
For the expert operations with wastes we used the official report form
III for toxic wastes, issued by order of the Ministry of statistics of Ukraine on
23.07.93 under № 162. According to this form subject to accounting are all
types of toxic wastes, including production unfit for recycled use and
containing dangerous elements.
In order to elaborate a state system for registration of wastes, with
Resolution 1360 from 31.08.98 the Council of Ministers of Ukraine approved
the order for registration of sites where wastes are produced, recycled and
used. With order № 41 from 17.02.99 the Ministry for environmental
protection of Ukraine approved a form for register cards.
At present such register cards should be agreed on by the organs of
state control of the district. The evaluation of the register cards is made on the
basis of a sanitary-hygienic expertise of the wastes treatment. Special
attention is paid to specified as being of high degree of danger wastes and
their chemical composition in the register cards.
When making an expert evaluation, specialists at the sanitary and
epidemiological service should take into account two types of waste storage
sites: temporary and for a longer period of time. Temporary storage sites at the
territory of the enterprise are given permission only by way of exception. Longer
storage sites concern such installations as midding slime and slag collectors,
mouldboards etc. Supervision of the sanitary and epidemiological service in
this case is directed mainly to technical equipment requirements of the storage
site and conducting selective laboratory monitoring of the atmospheric air,
ground and water composition in the area of the wastes storage.
Annually the district uses hundreds of the tons of different pesticides
(more than 100 different names) in agriculture. According to the Ukrainian
sanitary regulation for transport and preservation of chemical preparations for
plant protection, this activity can be performed only by transport vehicles and
storehouses, which possess sanitary passports for ecological safety, issued by
the State sanitary and epidemiological service and the Inspection for
ecological safety. To work with pesticides are allowed only persons that have
passed physical examination and have the corresponding education together
with the special permit.
The rather thoughtless use of chemical compounds for plant
protection in the second half of the XX century has brought about the
accumulation in the storehouses of some facilities of about 1000 tons of
preparations that are unfit for use, forbidden or unidentified. The sanitary and
epidemiological service jointly with the Ecological inspection and the District
station for plant protection are conducting an inventory of the storage sites of
these toxic wastes. Inventory data with indications for the place of the storage,
the names of the preparations and their quantity is kept in a computer
database.
Funds have been assigned in the regional and local budgets for
improving the storing of these toxic material, according to information from
the sanitary-and-epidemiological service and the ecological inspection. So in

2004, about 150 tons of unfit and unidentified pesticides were recycled and
stored according to regulations. The same is planned for 2005, but these
actions do not solve the problem as a whole.
Unfortunately, the district is unable for the moment to use or destroy
this dangerous toxic material. The optimum solution for this issue would be
the storage or destruction by such entities that have the respective licenses for
performing this kind of work.
The district will benefit the most from a method for destruction of
this toxic material called "Mobile plasma complex for recycling of unfit and
unidentified pesticides", which has been designed by the "Colorit" Institute of
Dnepropetrovsk. However the mentioned method still has to be ecologically
and sanitary-epidemiologically evaluated by experts.
A system of laboratory monitoring has been organized in the district
which controls indications for pesticides and other chemical substances in
objects of the environment, raw material supplies and food products.
The status of the atmospheric air and the water basins especially the
water collectors and recreation sites is systematically checked for contents of
toxic material.
Food products are systematically checked for safety indicators,
including pesticides contents and chemical compounds. For this procedure
highly sensitive GC and HPLC methods are used.
But a number of problems exist.
Currently to our regret, the laboratories of the state sanitary and
epidemiological service lack modern indication instruments and express
methods equipment, allowing a quick determination of the presence of toxic
material.
With the development of chemical industry the moment has come to
equip the laboratories of the sanitary and epidemiological services with
modern instrumentarium and methods, capable quickly to establish small
(insignificant) quantities of the different groups of poisoning material in the
air, the water and the food products.
An issue with equal significance for the Dnepropetrovsk district is the
provision of radiological safety for the population.
The sanitary and epidemiological service of the Dnepropetrovsk
district also provides supervision for the observance of radiological safety
rates during operation of ionizing radiation sources in public health, industry
and other industrial branches. It carries out studies on food products, drinking
water, construction material, gamma-survey of the territory.
Under special supervision is the 30 km zone of the Zaporozhsk NPS
(nuclear power station).
Annually the radiological subdivisions of the sanitary and
epidemiological service of Dnepropetrovsk district are conducting
measurements for over 1000 different tests and for more than 2000
Sergey Ryzhenko 17
measurements of the power of the external gamma radiation dose on different

objects and in open air.
Measurements of the dose load of about 500 individuals chosen
amonprofessionals and random population, living in the 30 km zone are
executed annually. Our specialists execute works on determining the
affiliation of suspicious objects to the ionizing radiation source, on
estimating the degree of danger, as well as organization of actions for its
neutralization.
Radiological damages connected with loss, finding and appropriation
of radioactive sources are not something unusual for the district. In 1999 such
events have gained mass character in the Dnepropetrovsk district. As a rule
such sources are used in different branches of production in radio-isotope
instruments for the technological control of different processes. The sources
"are packed" in special leaden blocks, which provide the required level of
protection from the harmful effect of the ionizing radiation for the person.
Considering the potential danger of the irradiation, the specialists of the
sanitary and epidemio-logical service request higher caution from the workers
providing the safety of these instruments.
However from 1999 till our days, a series of ravishment of ionizing
radiation sources occurred on the territory of the district, and in the first place
in the town of Krivoi Rog. From 1994 to 1998 only three such incidents were
registered in the district, while in 1999 - five, three of which were connected
to ravishment. It should be noted that all the stolen sources were of
radionuclides caesium - 137.
The results of the analysis made by the sanitary and epidemiological
service of the city of Krivoi Rog, revealed that the main reason that provoked
the cases of ravishment was the formal attitude of the responsible persons
towards their duties, for which they were punished in accordance with the
sanitary legislation.
Fallen in the hands of criminals, which as a rule have a very remote
notion on the danger of ionizing radiation, radioactive sources become a
serious threat for the life and health of the terrorists themselves, as well as of
casual persons. And the attempt to extract the ampoule with the radioactive
source from its protection block is equal to expose oneself to radiation.
Besides, in the event of destruction of the ampoule containing radioactive
material, radioactive contamination of a large territory can occur. Such an
incident happened already in Taromskoe suburb of Dnepropetrovsk.
Unpleasant”findings” often occur. Thus, in August 1999 during
sorting scraps of the ferrous metal production of the ZAO "Ygprom" factory
in the city of Krivoi Rog, a suspicious object was discovered labelled
"Danger.Radioactivity". Further the object was identified as being a radio-
isotope instrument for monitoring the degree of freezing of air-planes.
During the last years ionizing radiation radionuclide sources were
repeatedly withdrawn from illegal circulation in Dnepropetrovsk,
Pavlograde, Dnepropetrovsk district, a small towns Carichanka and

Megevaia.
In 2000 the law-enforcement organs arrested an inhabitant of small
towns Carichanka when he was trying to sell a defensive block with a
radionuclide source. After that, his house was inspected thoroughly and three
similar blocks were discovered hidden at different places.
In September 2001 a citizen of Kiev was arrested in a suburb of
Dnepropetrovsk, who was also trying to sell a defensive block with ionizing
radiation source previously stolen in Doneck district.
After a year practically the same situation was repeated in Pavlograde
city. There a Russian citizen tried to sell on the territory of Ukraine a
radioactive source bought on the black market. In the course of the
investigations it was discovered that the radioactive source was stolen from
one of the enterprises in the Chelyabinsk district.
In all operations of the law-enforcement organs against illegal
handling of the ionizing radiation sources, active participation took the
specialists of the Dnepropetrovsk sanitary and epidemiological station.
Anxious to avoid possible income of nuclear waste with the scrap
metal, the large metallurgical enterprises began introducing different systems
for input radiation supervision. The most efficient from a number of operating
systems is the automated "Cordon" in Krivoi rog metallurgical factory. Due to
its installation, for a period from 2001 till now, it was not permitted for the
smelting to be polluted by more than a group of ten radiation polluted batches.
Amongst the radioactive waste most varied objects were discovered among
which different nodes and spare parts polluted with caesium-37 from
Chernobil, as well as natural radionuclide radium -226. There can be found
radionuclide instruments also.
For the last 5 years under our participation 22 radiological incidents
were liquidated.
According to our counts we took part in five successful joint
operations against illegal possession of ionizing radiation sources with the
law-enforcement organs.
An orderly system for interaction of the authorities on all levels
including lifeguards, ecological, sanitary and epidemiological service,
specialized from the radiological protection organizations was created in the
Dnepropetrovsk district in order to counteract with a well-timed reaction to
any information about suspicious for radiation objects. As a result of the
coordinated activities of all interested services, now it takes less than one day
from the incoming of the information on suspicious radiation object till its
neutralization.
The facts about finding powder of unknown origin in postal envelopes
shocked the world. In 2003-2004 on the basis of laboratory analysis for
extremely dangerous infections, the regional sanitary and epidemiological
station specialists investigated more than 44 mailings, containing unknown
powdery material. Fortunately, according to the laboratory analysis, results in
all the cases were negative.
Sergey Ryzhenko 19
In the majority of the countries, the necessary equipment and potential

have been provided for to counteract the main affections from chemical
incidents. These measures include not only the setting up of specialized
organizations and institutions such as public health establishments or
emergency committees and commissions, but also creation of reliable
information sites and systems.
More efforts for the protection of the population from all types of
terrorism are needed based on the already available systems and initiatives.
1 AN OVERVIEW
Sir David Gore-Booth KCMG KCVO

Workshop Co-Director
Chairman, Windsor Energy Group, Former Ambassador to Saudi Arabia,
Middle East Director, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, UK
The principal event of 2003 was the US/UK invasion of Iraq. I was the
only person in 2003 here at the Windsor Energy Group who said that there
would not be an invasion (mainly because I could not understand the
rationale for it and did not want to be thought to support it even by default).
I still believe it was a mistake to invade and, although not sorry to see
the back of Saddam, I believe this misadventure will cause more problems
than it solves: it has had no beneficial affect on the oil market (on the
contrary the price remains very high – not least since US reserves are at
their lowest level for 29 years).
The invasion of Iraq has had no beneficial effect on the Middle East Peace
Process. The effect, in my view, has been quite the opposite: Sharon seems
more sceptical than ever about the road map and is under no real pressure
from the US Similarly, the war has had no clear beneficial effect on “good
governance” in the Middle East: even Thomas Friedman now accepts it
will take Israeli withdrawal from the Occupied Territories to “strip the
worst Arab leaders of an excuse not to reform”. In terms of the War on
Terror, the invasion of Iraq has turned the country from a peripheral into a
central front and it has diverted attention from the War on Terror’s main
target, Osama Bin Laden. If anyone should have been discovered in a rat
hole it was him! And through all this Afghanistan remains a worry.
On a different note, increased security has become an obsession in the
US, even at the cost of civil rights. We see concrete evidence of this
11
12
manifested in new political phenomena in the US such as the Patriot Act

legislation and the construction of prison complex in Guantanamo Bay.
International organisations such as the UN, NATO and the WTO are in
a state of confusion while the EU remains under real strain over the
drawing up of the new constitution, its stability pact and the steady
appreciation in value of the Euro. Corporate governance is in difficulty
whether in Russia (Yukos), Italy (Parmalat) or UK (Shell) and the problem
is ongoing in the US.
There are, however, some reasons to be cheerful. Both India and
Pakistan have little relevance to central energy issues, a successful
rapprochement will increase both country's demands for energy. The region
will become a large energy-consumer alongside China, whose economic
growth is already boosting demand, still leading in consumption. Libya and
Iran’s entry back into the Global community is due as much to painstaking
European diplomacy as it is to knee-jerk US unilateralism.
In all, I foresee another very stressful year ahead with the approach of
the US election prompting more government by gut and gimmick than by
good sense.
NATURAL TOXINS: THE PAST AND THE
PRESENT
E. Grishin
Deputy Director of Shemyakin-Ovchinnikov Institute of Bioorganic Chemistry, Russian
Academy of Sciences, ul. Miklukho-Maklaya, 16/10, Moscow 117997, Russia
Abstract: Different bacteria, viruses and toxins constitute a potential menace for people.
The number of toxins that could be applied for a bioterrorist attack with real
public health risk, though, is relatively limited. However, these natural toxins
could cause difficult troubles. The objective of this paper is focused on the
toxins of various origins that might be used as a biological weapon. To be used
in such a way the toxin should be highly lethal and easily produced in large
quantities. Our current knowledge on natural toxins is conducive to select the
toxin list threatening public health. At present this list includes a few bacterial
and plant toxins, as well as a set of toxins produced by algae and molds. Novel
methods of toxin detection should be able to monitor the presence of many
toxins at the same time.
1. INTRODUCTION
Natural toxins vary widely in animal, plant and microbial organisms.

Over the past decade we can witness the remarkable progress in our
knowledge about chemical nature of toxin molecules and their biological
action. In fact the natural toxins represent an immense number of various
compounds that causes injury, illness or death of a living organism.
Unfortunately today we are a witness to bioterrorism. Bioterrorism is the
intentional use of biological agents to cause illness of people. Some of the
natural toxins can be used as potential biological weapons. The basic
knowledge and biological weapon expertise are very needed to select a set of
natural toxins that could be utilized for bioterrorism. Civilian population
should be informed about the potential biological weapons of bioterrorism.
The number of toxins that could be applied for a bioterrorist attack with real
public health risk is relatively limited. However, these natural toxins could
29

30 NATURAL TOXINS: THE PAST AND THE PRESENT
cause difficult troubles. Regular national or international meetings are

devoted to toxin research. The balance between openness and biosecurity is
still under discussion. The use of biological weapony has been known for
centuries, culminating in special research programs run by several countries.
The objective of this paper is focused on the toxins of various origins that
might be used as biological weapons. Our current knowledge on natural
toxins is conducive to select the toxin list threatening public health. At
present this list includes a few bacterial and plant toxins, as well as a set of
toxins produced by algae and molds, and some animal toxins. To be included
in this list the toxin should fit some criterions. There are at least four such
criterions: availability and simplicity of manufacture, simplicity of
application, efficacy of action (toxicity) and reasonable stability.
2. BIOLOGICAL ACTIVITY OF NATURAL TOXINS
Poisonous organisms have been known for centuries. Many scientists

have been involved in the investigation of toxic molecules from these
organisms. Their attention has been directed on identification, isolation,
structure determination, biological and toxicological studies of toxic
molecules which constitute a great many of natural toxins. Natural toxins can
generally be divided into several broad groups according to their origin or
their chemical nature or their biological activity. When the potential
weapons for bioterrorism are reviewed for needed characteristics the
biological activity/toxicity attracts special attention. A number of selected
toxins and their toxicity are presented in Table 1. Natural toxins listed in the
Table 1 possess a wide range of toxic activity with LD50 value for 10-5
mkg/kg up to 200 mkg/kg.
Potential agent for bioterror should be highly lethal and easily produced
in large quantities. Only botulinum toxin and ricin meet these requirements.
Some other natural toxins as saxitoxins, microcystins and mycotoxins could
be included in the list of potential biological agents for bioterror.
NATURAL TOXINS: THE PAST AND THE PRESENT 31
Table 1. Toxicity of some natural toxins.
Name LD50 Mr LD50

(mkg/kg) (mol/kg)
-5 -16
Botulinus 1.1x10 150 000 0,6x10
-5 -16
Tetanus 2.8x10 140 000 2.0x10
-11
Abrin (ricin) 2.7 65 000 4.3x10
-11
Palytoxin 0.15 3 300 4.5x10
-11
Taipoxin 2.0 42 000 4.8x10
-9
Cobrotoxin 75 7 819 9.6x10
9
Scorpion toxin 9.0 7 249 1.2x10-
-9
Batrachotoxin 2.0 538 3.7x10
-9
Tetrodotoxin 8.0 319 25x10
-8
Curare 200 696 29x10
-4
Potassium 1000 65 1.5x10
cyanide
3. BOTULINUS
Botulinum toxin (BTX) is the most potent biological toxin yet known [1].
BTX is a protein complex consisting of 150 kDa di-chainal toxins referred as
botulinum neurotoxins associated with non-toxic companion proteins. It is
produced by Clostridium botulinium, C. baratii, and C. butyricum,
anaerobic, spore forming gram-positive bacteria, which are the causative
agents of botulism. Respiratory failure secondary to paralysis of the
respiratory muscles during botulism development can lead to death. BTX
acts preferentially on peripheral cholinergic nerve endings to block
acetylcholine release. Due to the severity and potency of this neurotoxin, its
importance as a biological weapon is of major concern to public health
officials [2].
The ability of BTX to produce its effects is largely dependent on its
ability to penetrate cellular and intracellular membranes. Thus, toxin that is
ingested or inhaled can bind to epithelial cells and be transported to the
general circulation. BTX is structurally organized into three domains
endowed with distinct functions (Fig.1): high affinity binding to neurons,
membrane translocation and specific cleavage of proteins controlling
exocytosis of neurotransmitter [3, 4]. Toxin that reaches peripheral nerve
endings binds to specific receptors on the cell surface, which may comprise
gangliosides. The binding mediated by the toxins heavy chain is followed by

endocytotic internalization of neurotoxin/receptor complex. Thus, it
penetrates the plasma membrane and the endosome membrane upon
acidification of vesicles, when the light chain of the neurotoxin is
translocated into the cytosol. Here, the light chain (Zn2+-endopeptidase)
cleaves one or two among three synaptic proteins (VAMP-synaptobrevin,
SNAP 25, and syntaxin) (Fig.2). All three protein targets of BTX play a
major role in the fusion of synaptic vesicles at the release sites.
Subsequently, their cleavage is followed by blockage of neurotransmitter
exocytosis.
Figure 1. Schematic structure of Botulinum toxin.
Type A BTX is the most widely used in human drug trials [5]. It has
become the treatment of choice for blepharospasm, hemifacial spasm,
cervical and laryngeal dystonia. It may also be used in the treatment of
patients with oromandibular dystonia and limb dystonia, and has been used
successfully in the treatment of spasticity and cerebral paralysis. The toxin
also alleviates pain and may be used in therapeutic trials for prediction of the
response to surgical elongation.
Figure 2. Cleavage of synaptic proteins (VAMP, SNAP 25 and syntaxin) by the light chain of
Botulinum toxin.
4. RICIN
Ricin is a naturally occurring toxin derived from the beans of ubiquitous

worldwide castor oil plant Ricinus communis [6, 7]. Taking into account the
volume of annual castor beans processing in the world and fairly easily
production of the toxin from the waste mash with an output reaching 5%
ricin by weight, the toxin should be considered as being potentially widely
available. The ready availability of ricin, coupled to its extreme potency, has
identified this protein toxin as a potential biological warfare agent.
Therapeutically, its cytotoxicity has encouraged the use of ricin in “magic
bullets” to specifically target and destroy cancer cells, and the unusual
intracellular trafficking properties of ricin potentially permit its development
as a vaccine vector.
The most hazardous routes of ricin exposure are with inhalation and
injection. It is quite stable and extremely toxic. The lethal dose by inhalation
(breathing in solid or liquid particles) and injection (into muscle or vein) has
been estimated, approximately 5-10 mkg/kg, that is 350-700 mkg for a 70 kg
adult. Ricin intoxication can manifest as gastrointestinal hemorrhage after
ingestion, severe muscle necrosis after intramuscular injection, and acute
pulmonary disease after inhalation. Death had ensued within hours of
deliberate subcutaneous injection.
Figure 3. Schematic structure of ricin
Ricin is a heterodimeric protein made up of two hemagglutinins and two

toxins being able to fatally disrupt protein synthesis by attacking the
ribosome [8-10]. The X-ray structure of ricin has been elucidated. The toxins
consist of two polypeptide chains (A and B chains), which are joined by a
disulfide bridge (Fig. 3). The A chain is a specific N-glycosidase with a
prominent active site cleft. The B chain is a two domain lectin.
To enter the cytosol and reach its target, the toxin must cross an internal
membrane and avoid complete degradation without compromising its
activity in any way [11, 12]. Cell entry by ricin involves a series of steps: 1)
binding, via the ricin B chain, to cell surface glycolipids or glycoproteins
having beta-1,4-linked galactose residues; 2) uptake into the cell by
endocytosis; 3) entry of the toxin into early endosomes; 4) transfer, by
vesicular transport,of ricin from early endosomes to the trans-Golgi network;
5) retrograde vesicular transport through the Golgi complex to reach the
endoplasmic reticulum; 6) entry of the A chain in the cytosol, 7) interaction
of A chain with the ribosome to catalyse the depurination reaction (Fig. 4). It
has been reported that even a single molecule of ricin reaching the cytosol
can cause the cell death. Combining our understanding of the ricin structure
with ways to cripple its unwanted properties will also be crucial in the
development of a long awaited protective vaccine against this toxin.
Figure 4. Some stages of ricin action: binding to cell membrane, endocytosis, transport to
Goldgi apparatus and the ER, translocation of A subunit to the cytosol.
5. SAXITOXINS
Paralytic shellfish poisoning is caused by a group of toxins produced by

both marine and freshwater algae. Marine dinoflagellates Alexandrium
catenella, A. minutum, A. ostenfeldii, A. tamarense, Gymnodinium catenatum
and Pyrodinium bahamense produce saxitoxins. In freshwater, blue-green
algae, namely Anabaena circinalis, also manufacture the toxins. At the time
of algal blooms (red tides), shellfish accumulate saxitoxins leading to
paralytic shellfish poisoning (PSP) which, in extreme cases, causes death due
to respiratory paralysis. People walking near the surfline during red tide
events often complain of sore throats and difficulty breathing. This is as a
result of inhaling a toxin-laden aerosol generated by the pounding surf. A
debate continues about whether bacteria produce saxitoxin, or influence
dinoflagellate production of the toxins [13]. There are about 20 derivatives
of saxitoxin responsible for paralytic shellfish poisonings. Saxitoxin was
named after the butter clam Saxidomonus giganteus, from which it was first
isolated in 1957 [14]. The chemical structure of saxitoxin was determined in
1975 [15]. The toxin is a tricyclic molecule containing two guanidino groups
(Fig 5). The polar nature of saxitoxin allows it to readily dissolve in water
and lower alcohols being insoluble in organic solvents. Chemically,
saxitoxin is very stable although it can be inactivated by treatment with
strong alkali. It can be kept in dilute acidic solutions for years without loss of
its activity. Saxitoxin itself is highly toxic. It is toxic by ingestion and by
inhalation, with inhalation leading to rapid respiratory collapse and death.
Figure 5; Chemical structure of saxitotin (STX) and five saxitoxin derivatives.
Saxitoxin exerts it’s toxic effect by interfering with the transmission of

signals through the nervous system. The toxin binds specifically to the
voltage-gated sodium ion channels and prevents their normal function. This
blocks the creation of a proper action potential and the nerve cell no longer
has the means to transmit a signal. Saxitoxin blocks the sodium channel
selectively without any effect on other types of ion channels. The toxin binds
to a site on the external surface of the sodium channel. Owing to the potent
and specific sodium channel blocking action, saxitoxin has become a useful
tool in neuroscience research in various studies of ion channels [16].
6. BLUE GREEN ALGAE TOXINS

(CYANOBACTERIA TOXINS)
Cyanobacterial toxins or cyanotoxins are produced by fresh- and sea-

water photosynthetic prokaryotes (blue-green algae) of cosmopolitan
occurrence [17-19]. When environmental conditions are suitable for their
growth, cyanobacteria may proliferate and form toxic blooms in the upper,
sunlit layers. The occurrence of cyanobacteria and their toxins in water
bodies used for the production of drinking water poses a technical challenge
for water utility managers. The cyanotoxins differ from the intermediates
and cofactor compounds that are essential for cell structural synthesis and
energy transduction. They present acute and chronic hazards to human and
animal health and are responsible for or implicated in animal poisoning,
human gastroenteritis, dermal contact irritations and primary liver cancer in
humans. These low molecular weight toxins (microcystins, nodularins,
saxitoxins, anatoxin-a, anatoxin-a(S), cylindrospermopsin) are structurally

diverse and their effects range from liver damage, including liver cancer to
skin irritation and neurotoxicity. There are indications of the accumulation of
cyanobacterial toxins in fish, and crop plants and they are also associated
with the deaths of human dialysis patients.
6.1 Microcystins
Microcystins are a family of more than 50 structurally similar

monocyclic heptapeptide hepatotoxins produced by species of freshwater
cyanobacteria, primarily Microcystis aeruginosa. They are characterized by
some invariant amino acids, including one of unusual structure, which is
essential for expression of toxicity (Fig. 6) [20]. Microcystins are chemically
stable, but suffer biodegradation in reservoir waters.
Figure 6: Chemical structure of Microcystins
The most common member of the family is microcystin. It has an LD50 in

mice and rats of 36-122 mkg/kg by various routes, including aerosol
inhalation [21]. Acute liver hemorrhage and death occur with high doses of
microcystin, which is also a potent tumor promoter. Although human
illnesses attributed to microcystins include gastroenteritis and allergic
reactions, the primary target of the toxin is the liver, where disruption of the
cytoskeleton, consequent on inhibition of protein phosphatases, causes
massive hepatic hemorrhage. Uptake of microcystins into the liver occurs via
a carrier-mediated transport system, and several inhibitors of uptake can
antagonise the toxic effects of microcystins. Microcystins are very
strong protein phosphatase inhibitors, which are needed for regulation
of structural proteins of the cell [22, 23]. They covalently bind the
serine/threonine protein phosphatases 1 and 2A (PP1 and PP2A), thereby
influencing regulation of cellular protein phosphorylation.
6.2 Anatoxins
Anatoxins are a group of low molecular weight neurotoxic alkaloids

produced by different species of fresh-water cyanobacteria (Anabaena flos-
aquae, Anabaena planktonia, Oscillatoria, Aphanizomenon), in isolation or
in combination with hepatotoxins [24]. Not all strains of the causative
species are toxic and there are no systemic indications to the presence or
absence of anatoxin in a particular strain. Three common anatoxins have
been described: anatoxin-a and homoanatoxin-a are secondary amines and
anatoxin-a(S) is a phosphate ester of a cyclic N-hydroxyguanine structure
(Fig. 7)
Anatoxin-a and homoanatoxin-a are neurotoxic alkaloids, the main effect
of which is production of a sustained postsynaptic depolarizing
neuromuscular blockade causing respiratory arrest [25]. The toxin binds
strongly to the nicotinic acetylcholine receptor [26]. It mimics acetylcholine
action and is thus able to open the ion channel. However, the toxin cannot be
deactivated by acetylcholineesterase which force the ion channel to be open.
Anatoxin-a and homoanatoxin-a are potent neurotoxins causing rapid death
in mammals (LD50 in mice of approx. 250 mkg/kg) [27]
Figure7: Chemical structures of anatoxins.
Anatoxin-a(S), the second type of anatoxins, is the only natural

organophosphate known. It is more water-soluble than synthetic
organophosphates. Anatoxin-a(S) is more potent towards mice (LD50 in mice
is approximately of 50 mkg/kg) [28]. It binds to acetylcholineesterase and
acts as its inhibitor [29], thereby causing toxicity through the exhaustion of
muscle cells. However the toxin is unable to cross the blood-brain barrier to
influence brain cholinesterase activity. In addition to respiratory difficulty,
anatoxin-a(S) unlike anatoxin-a, induces hypersalivation in mammals as well

as other symptoms more typical of neurotoxicity such as diarrhea, tremors
and nasal mucus discharge.
7. MYCOTOXINS
Mycotoxins are low molecular weight secondary metabolites of mould or

fungi [30-32]. These compounds are non-volatile and may be sequestered in
spores or secreted into the growth substrate. Numerous but not all fungi
species produce mycotoxins with variation of toxin production depending on
the substrate. There are over 200 recognized mycotoxins, however, the study
of mycotoxins and their health effects on humans are still in the progress.
Many mycotoxins are harmful to humans and animals when inhaled,
ingested or brought into contact with human skin [33]. Diseases in animals
and human beings resulting from the consumption of mycotoxins are called
“mycotoxicoses”. The mechanism of micotoxicity involves interference with
various aspects of cell metabolism, producing neurotoxic, carcinogenic or
teratogenic effects. The toxins vary in specificity and potency for their target
cells, cell structures or cell processes by species and strain that produces
them. They are nearly all cytotoxic, disrupting various cellular structures
such as membranes, and interfering with vital cellular processes such as
protein, RNA and DNA synthesis [34]. Most mycotoxins possess
immunosuppressant properties that vary according to the compound. The
toxicity of certain fungal metabolites such as aflatoxin, ranks them among
the most potently toxic, immunosuppressive and carcinogenic substances
known [35].
7.1 Aflatoxin
Aflatoxins are a group of closely related mycotoxins that are widely

distributed in nature. Aflatoxin is one of the most potent carcinogens known
to man and has been linked to a wide variety of human health problems [36].
Aflatoxins B1, B2, G1, and G2 are produced in grains in both field and storage
by Aspergillus flavus and A. parasiticus which are common in most soils and
are usually involved in decay of plant materials. Aflatoxin persists under
extreme environmental conditions and is even relatively heat stable at
temperatures above the boiling point of water. Roasting and some microbial
treatments may sharply reduce but not eliminate the aflatoxin content.
The toxins pose a significant public health concern as diseases resulting
from ingestion of aflatoxins, include acute liver disease to cancer
development. Mutagenesis by aflatoxins is caused by the reaction of these
electrophilic chemicals with one of the purine or pyrimidine bases in DNA

resulting in irreversible changes in normal cells [37, 38].
Figure 8. Chemical structure of Aflatoxin B1
Aflatoxin B1 (Fig. 8) is the most potent carcinogen known for the liver. It
is a specifically metabolized into epoxide form by the action of the mixed
function mono-oxygenase enzyme systems (cytochrome P450-dependent) in
the tissues (in particular, the liver) of the affected animal [37]. This epoxide
is highly reactive and can form derivatives with several cellular
macromolecules, including DNA, RNA and protein.
7.2 Ochratoxin
Ochratoxin is primarily produced by Aspergillus ochraceus, Penicillium

viridictum, which have been found in some samples of food and feed grains
[30, 39].
Figure 9: Chemical structure of Ochratoxin A.

Ochratoxin is damaging to the kidneys and liver and is also a suspected

carcinogen. Ochratoxin is absorbed from the small intestine and, in plasma,
binds to serum albumin. The prolonged half-life of the toxin results from its
absorption by proximal tubules and enterohepatic circulation. [40]. The
chemical structure is composed of an isocumarin part linked to l-
phenylalanine (Fig. 9). Ochratoxin inhibition of phenylalanine hydroxylase
and other enzymes that use phenylalanine as a substrate is based on this
structural homology. The inhibition is competitive to phenylalanine resulting
in protein synthesis inhibition, and is reversed by an excess of this amino
acid. The effect of ochratoxin A on protein synthesis is followed by an
inhibition of RNA synthesis, which might affect proteins with a high
turnover. Recently, ochratoxin was also found to enhance lipid peroxidation
both in vitro and in vivo. This inhibition might have an important effect on
cell or mitochondrial membranes and be responsible for the effects on
mitochondria that have been shown by several authors [24].
7.3 Trichothecenes, T-2 Toxin
Fusarium tricinctum and some strains of F. graminearurm, F. equiseti, F.

sporotrichioides, F. poae, and F. lateritium commonly found in grains,
produce T-2 toxin and other toxic trichothecenes [30, 41]. Feed
contaminated with these toxins must be handled carefully because these
toxins can cause severe skin irritation and bleeding from lungs. Upon
ingestion, trichothecenes cause a modulation effect on cell-mediated
immunity and alterations in gastrointestinal propulsion, and can produce
tremors, incoordination, depression, and headaches [42]. Very little
information is available relating to their toxicokinetics and toxicodynamics
in humans. As with most other mycotoxins, the only control is to avoid
contaminated feeds.
Figure 10. Chemical structure of T-2 toxin

T-2 toxin (12,13-epoxytrichothecene) is one of the more deadly toxins

(Fig. 10). If ingested in sufficient quantity, T-2 toxin can severely damage
the entire digestive tract and cause rapid death due to internal haemorrhage.
T-2 toxin has been implicated in the human diseases alimentary toxic aleukia
and pulmonary hemosiderosis. The toxin mainly affects mitotic cells of the
gastrointestinal tract and the lymphoid system and promotes a transient and
reversible aberration in a single enzymatic reaction to cell death. Regardless
of the end point measured, the toxic response involves the interactions of
virtually all-subcellular processes: membrane transport and permeability,
chemical metabolism, DNA function, and energy production/expenditure. T-
2 toxin rapidly crosses the cell membrane of cells and binds to the
intracellular targets. It affects the polyribosome structure and thus inhibits
protein synthesis being irreversible inhibitor.
8. BIOTOXIN DETECTOR
Development of fast and sensitive methods for the detection of natural

toxins is of great importance because of the threat of bioterrorist attacks. In
addition, biotoxin assays are used in food and medical industry and
environmental monitoring. At the present time, laboratory methods for the
detection of biotoxins involve animal tests, microbiological methods, PCR-
based DNA assay, and immunological methods (direct and competitive
immunofluorescence methods or ELISA). Immunoassays are the most
sensitive, convenient, and least time-consuming and may be used as a
method of choice for rapid detection of biotoxins in field conditions.
However, these methods do not allow one to carry out simultaneous test for
the presence of several toxins. In contrast, microchip based methods allow
parallel analysis of different biotoxins.
An array biosensor for the simultaneous detection of several toxins has
been developed by Ligler et al. [43-44]. In this sensor, biotinylated capture
antibodies were immobilized in columns on avidin-coated waveguides on the
surface of glass slide. Electronic microchips with capture antibodies were
proposed to detect fluorescein-labeled staphylococcal and cholera toxins
(direct immunoassay) [45]. Another example of biochips for the assay of
pathogenic organisms and their toxins is the technology that uses surface-
enhanced Raman scattering microscopy (SERS) for the detection of the
antibody-antigen complexes [46]. Despite good sensitivity and low detection
time that are achieved with the mentioned above systems, these biochips are
produced by rather sophisticated technologies and/or complex instruments
are needed for the detection of signals.
Microchips on the basis of three-dimensional hydrogels have been

developed by Mirzabekov et. al. [47]. Gel microchips with immobilized
antibodies were already used for quantitative assay of tumor-associated
markers with the sensitivity as low as 0.2 ng/ml.
9. CONCLUSION
Some natural toxins can be used as agents for bioterrorism, and their
potential for future use is a major concern. Although the list of potential
agents is rather short some natural toxins should be under special attention.
Sensitive methods of toxin detection have to be developed.
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Chapter 3
BIOMONITORING OF EXPOSURE
TO CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS
Noort, D., Van Der Schans, M.J., and Benschop, H.P.

Division of Chemical & Biological Protection, TNO Prins Maurits Laboratory, P.O. Box 45,
2280 AA Rijswijk,The Netherlands
Abstract: An overview is presented of the major methods that are presently available for
biomonitoring of exposure to chemical warfare agents, i.e., nerve agents and
sulfur mustard. These methods can be applied for a variety of purposes such
as diagnosis and dosimetry of exposure of casualties, verification of
nonadherence to the Chemical Weapon Convention, health surveillance,
assessment of low level exposures (Gulf War Syndrome) and last but not least
for forensic purposes in case of terrorist attacks with these agents.
This paper will focus on methods that are based on the analysis of long-lived
protein adducts of CW agents which are detectable weeks or even months
after exposure. Examples of real exposure incidents will be described.
Keyword: biomonitoring; diagnosis; DNA adducts; immunoassay; mass spectrometry;

protein adducts, retrospective detectioin; sulfure mustard
1. INTRODUCTION
Methods to analyze chemical warfare agents (CWA) and their

decomposition products in environmental samples were developed over
the last decades (1). In contrast herewith, methods for such analyses in
biological samples have only recently become available (2). Retrospective
detection of exposure to CWA can be useful for various applications. It
can be envisaged that rapid diagnostic methods can play a pivotal role
in case of a terrorist attack with CWA. In the same context, confirmation of
non-exposure of worried citizens is of utmost importance. Also, such
methods can be used for forensic analyses in case of suspected terrorist
activities (“chemical fingerprints”). It is self-evident that these methods
will also be highly valuable from a military point of view, e.g., to establish
firmly to which chemicals casualties have been exposed to, which is a
starting point for adequate medical treatment, or for health surveillance of
workers in destruction facilities of chemical warfare agents. This
21
22 Biomonitoring of Exposure to Chemical Warfare Agents
presentation will focus on a number of specific methods currently available

for verification of exposure to the most common CWA, i.e., nerve agents and
mustard agents.
There are basically four methods to diagnose an exposure to a nerve agent:
1. cholinesterase inhibition measurements
2. analysis of hydrolysis products, e.g., alkyl methylphosphonic acids
3. analysis of generated phosphofluoridates after treatment of blood with
fluoride ions (“fluoride reactivation”)
4. mass spectrometric analysis of phosphylated peptides after enzymatic
digestion of modified cholinesterase.
For mustards, there are three distinct methods to assess an exposure:
1. mass spectrometric analysis of low molecular weight urinary
metabolites
2. analysis of DNA adducts by means of mass spectrometric or
immunochemical methods.
3. mass spectrometric analysis of protein adducts, e.g., to hemoglobin
and albumin.
Presently available methods to diagnose and biomonitor exposure to

anticholinesterases, e.g., nerve agents, rely mostly on measurement of residual
enzyme activity of acetylcholinesterase (AChE) and butyrylcholinesterase
(BuChE) in blood. More specific methods involve analysis of the intact
poison or its degradation products in blood and/or urine. These approaches
have serious drawbacks. Measurement of cholinesterase inhibition in blood
does not identify the anticholinesterase and does not provide reliable evidence
for exposure at inhibition levels less than 20 %. The intact poison and its
degradation products can only be measured shortly after exposure. Moreover,
the degradation products of pesticides may enter the body as such upon
ingestion of food products containing these products.
In the case of sulfur mustard, analysis of low molecular weight
urinary metabolites suffers from the same drawback as in the case of
anticholinesterases, i.e., these products are rapidly excreted and provide
therefore limited retrospectivity. Similarly, the in vivo lifetime of DNA
adducts of sulfur mustard are less than those of protein adducts due to repair
of DNA damage.
This paper will focus on methods that are based on the analysis of
long-lived protein adducts, i.e., on methods 3 and 4 for nerve agents and on
method 3 for mustards.
D. Noort et al. 23
2. NERVE AGENTS
Analysis of phosphofluoridates generated from phosphylated BuChE

In principle, organophosphate-inhibited BuChE in human plasma is a
persistent and abundant source for biomonitoring of exposure to
organophosphate anticholinesterases. Polhuijs et al. (3) developed a procedure
for analysis of phosphylated BuChE in plasma or serum samples, which is
based on reactivation of the phosphylated enzyme with fluoride ions: this
converts the organophosphate moiety completely into the corresponding
phosphofluoridate, which is subsequently isolated and quantitated. As in the
case of analysis of hydrolysis products this approach identifies the
organophosphate except for its leaving group. Moreover, the extent of the
organophosphate poisoning can be determined in this way. Furthermore,
based on the minimal concentrations of phosphofluoridate that can be
analyzed in blood, it can be calculated that inhibition levels ≥ 0.1% of
inactivated BuChE (i.e., trace level exposure) should be quantifiable.
Evidently, by analyzing the inhibited enzyme instead of the uninhibited
enzyme, inhibitor levels can be measured that are several orders of magnitude
lower than those based on residual AChE activity. The method is limited by
spontaneous reactivation and ageing (i.e., loss of the alkyl moiety from the
alkoxy moiety of the phosphyl group) of the phosphylated enzyme and by the
natural life span of the enzyme. Application of this method to serum samples
of the victims from the Tokyo subway attack and of the Matsumoto incident
yielded sarin concentrations in the range of 0.2-4.1 ng/ml serum. Evidently,
these victims had been exposed to an organophosphate with the structure
iPrO(CH3)P(O)X, presumably with X = F (sarin).
Depending on the structure of the nerve agent, a retrospectivity of 2-8
weeks was observed upon analysis of blood samples from rhesus monkeys
which had been challenged with a sign-free dose of the nerve agent (4).
Mass spectrometric analysis of phosphylated peptides after enzymatic di-

gestion of modified cholinesterase.
Recently, Noort et al developed a procedure that is based on
straightforward isolation of adducted BuChE from plasma by means of
affinity chromatography with a procainamide column, followed by pepsin
digestion and LC/electrospray tandem MS analysis of a specific
nonapeptide containing the phosphonylated active site serine-198 residue
(5). This method surpasses the limitations of the fluoride-reactivation
method, since it can also deal with dealkylated (“aged”) phosphonylated
BuChE. The method allowed the positive analysis of several serum
samples of Japanese victims of the terrorist attack in the Tokyo subway in
1995. Furthermore, the method could be applied for detection of ChE
modifications induced by, e.g., diethyl paraoxon and pyridostigmine
bromide, illustrating the broad scope of this approach. This new approach
will also allow biomonitoring/retrospective detection of exposure to several

organophosphate pesticides and carbamates in one individual.
3. SULFUR MUSTARD
Mass spectrometric analysis of protein adducts

Sulfur mustard is a strong alkylating agent that reacts readily with
nucleophiles under physiological conditions. The reaction products of sulfur
mustard with these nucleophiles are all potential biological markers of human
poisoning. Metabolites derived from an initial reaction with water and
glutathione are excreted in urine (2). Adducts to DNA which may be present
in various tissues and blood can conveniently be detected by using an
immunochemical assay (6). This section will deal with ad-ducts to
hemoglobin and albumin, since it is expected that they are persistent and will
allow retrospective detection.
Upon incubation of human blood with sulfur mustard, it appears that
20-25% of the dose was covalently bound to hemoglobin. The most abundant
adduct was the histidine adduct. In addition, the adducts to cysteine, gluta-mic
and aspartic acid and to the N-terminal valine residues were detected (7). As a
biological marker of poisoning, N-alkylated N-terminal valine has the
advantage that it can be selectively cleaved from haemoglobin by a modified
Edman procedure using pentafluorophenyl isothiocyanate as reagent. Analysis
of the resultant pentafluorophenyl thiohydantoin, using negative ion GC-MS-
MS after further derivatisation with heptafluorobutyric anhydride, provided a
very sensitive method for the detection of the N-alkylated valine. In vitro
exposure of human blood to ≥ 0.1 µM sulfur mustard and in vivo exposure of
guinea pigs could be detected employing this method. Moreover, the adduct
could be detected in samples from victims of accidental exposure to sulfur
mustard and CW casualties (8). Recently, a standard operating procedure
(SOP) for determination of the sulfur mustard adduct to the N-terminal valine
in hemoglobin was developed (9). By using this SOP, it was found that the N-
terminal valine adduct in globin of hairless guinea pigs and marmosets
subsequent to i.v. administration of sulfur mustard (0.5 LD50) is persistent for
at least 56 and 94 days, respectively.
Recently, sulfur mustard has been shown to alkylate a cysteine residue
in human serum albumin (10). The site of alkylation was identified in a tryptic
digest of albumin from blood exposed to [14C]sulfur mustard. A sensitive
method for its analysis was developed based on Pronase digestion of alkylated
albumin to the tripeptide S-[2-[(hydroxyethyl)thio]ethyl-Cys-Pro-Phe, and
detection using micro-LC-MS-MS. In vitro exposure of human blood to ≥ 10
nM sulfur mustard could be detected employing this method. The analytical
procedure was successfully applied to albumin samples from Iranian
casualties of the Iraq-Iran war.
D. Noort et al. 25
4. CONCLUSIONS
• Adducts with macromolecules such as proteins offer long lived biological

markers of exposure, possibly up to several months.
• Gas or liquid chromatography combined with tandem mass spectro-metry
are the methods of choice for unequivocal identification at trace levels.
• Further improvements in retrospectivity and detection limits will hinge
on future enhancements of sensitivity and resolution of electro-spray mass
spectrometry instruments and of several hybrid configurations.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This presentation covers work that was funded by the US Army Medical
Research and materiel Command, by the Bundesministrerium der
Verteidigung, InSan I 3, Germany, and by the Directorate of Military Medical
Service of the Ministry of Defence, The Netherlands.
REFERENCES
1. Chemical Weapons Convention Chemicals Analysis. Mesilaakso, M. (ed.), John Wiley,

New York, 2005 (to be published)
2. Noort, D, Benschop, H.P., and Black, R.M. (2002). Biomonitoring of exposure to
chemical warfare agents: a review. Toxicol. Appl. Pharmacol., 184, 116-126.
3. Polhuijs, M., Langenberg, J.P., and Benschop, H.P. (1997). New method for retrospective
detection of exposure to organophosphorus anticholinesterases: application to alleged sarin
vicitims of Japanese terrorists. Toxicol. Appl. Pharmacol., 146, 156-161.
4. Van der Schans, M.J., Polhuijs, M., Van Dijk, C., Degenhardt, C.E.A.M., Pleijsier, K.,
Langenberg, J.P., and Benschop, H.P. (2004). Retrospective detection of exposure to nerve
agents: analysis of phosphofluoridates originating from fluoride-induced reactivation of
phosphylated BuChE. Arch. Toxicol., 78, 508-524.
5. Fidder, A., Hulst, A.G., De Ruiter, R., Van Der Schans, M.J., Benschop, H.P., and
Langenberg, J.P., (2002). Retrospective detection of exposure to organophosphorus anti-
cholinesterases: mass spectrometric analysis of phosphylated human butyrylcholinesterase.
Chem. Res. Toxicol., 15, 582-590.
6. Van der Schans, G.P., Scheffer, A.G., Mars-Groenendijk, R.H., Fidder, A., Benschop,
H.P., and Baan, R.A. (1994). Immunochemical detection of adducts of sulfur mustard to
DNA of calf thymus and human white blood cells. Chem. Res. Toxicol., 7, 408-413.
7. Noort, D., Hulst, A.G., Trap, H.C., De Jong, L.P.A., and Benschop, H.P. (1997).
Synthesis and mass spectrometric identification of the major amino acid adducts formed
between sulphur mustard and haemoglobin in human blood. Arch. Toxicol., 71, 171-178.
8. Benschop, H.P., Van der Schans, G.P., Noort, D., Fidder, A., Mars-Groenendijk, R.H., and
De Jong, L.P.A. (1997). Verification of exposure to sulfur mustard in two casualties of the
Iran-Iraq conflict. J. Anal. Toxicol., 21, 249-251
9. Noort, D., Fidder, A., Benschop, H.P., De Jong, L.P.A., and Smith, J.R., (2004).
Procedure for monitoring exposure to sulfur mustard based on modified Edman
degradation of globin. J Anal. Toxicol., 28, 311-315.
10. Noort, D., Fidder, A., Hulst, A.G., Wooffitt, A.R., Ash, D., and Barr, J.R. (2004).
Retrospective detection of exposure to sulfur mustard: improvements on an assay for
liquid chromatography-tandem mass spectrometry analysis of albumin-sulfur mustard
adducts. J. Anal. Toxicol., 28, 333-338.
2 A POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE
Lord Howell of Guildford

Conservative Foreign Affairs spokesman, House of Lords and former
Secretary of State for Energy, UK
There can be little doubt that we are entering an age of vastly increased
political risk when it comes to the world energy situation, and that this
coincides with emerging global patterns for both energy supply and
demand.
Of course the optimists hope that globalisation will bring a new
intensity of international cooperation and partnership in energy-related
projects, while the pessimists fear armed clashes, violent struggles for
control of energy resources and risks at every turn. The realists will foresee
a bit of both.
I would like to put these new patterns in some sort of perspective, but
before doing so allow me a few observations on the local British scene,
which is in some respects a microcosm of the problems and challenges that
are faced on a grander scale.
The position in the UK is that after a decade of relatively problem-free
energy flows there are now major dangers ahead on both the supply side
and on the generation and distribution sides.
For the UK the situation is about to change radically. We will shortly
become again, after many years, a net importer of both oil and natural gas,
the latter being supplied by new contracts with Norway, Russia, Algeria
and possibly Iran. This takes these aspects of energy supply right back into
the heart of international politics in the most sensitive areas on earth.
Recently the BBC ran a fictional programme describing how a raid by
Chechen terrorists on a Russian gas transmission facility had the knock-on
effect of blacking out London, via the closing down of numerous gas-fired
13
14
electricity-generating stations. The detail may have been fanciful, but the
underlying thought – that energy flows are now more interwoven and
interlinked than ever before – is correct, and even the politicians, who are
notoriously ignorant about the complexities and long-term nature of energy
projects, felt moved to ask some anxious questions in Parliament.
Meanwhile, here at home in the UK, we have to make crucial new
decisions on nuclear power. It is no longer a question of ‘keeping our
options open’ on nuclear power generation. Decisions have to be made
immediately for a decade’s time.
Investment in offshore windfarms cannot conceivably fill the gap
which will be left by any nuclear closures, quite aside from the fact that
they are about to run into environmental objections almost as fierce as
those surrounding the treatment of nuclear waste.
Finally, we now have to move towards a new generation of techniques
for conservation and low energy consumption. There is much work to be
done.
Global Demand
There is a staggering contrast here between what the more hopeful and
idealistic policy-makers and advisors say about the next 25 years and what
the hard facts suggest.
This is what you hear the more hopeful policy-makers saying about the
next ten to twenty years.
Reliance on fossil fuels will reduce, carbon emissions will drop
dramatically; demand for alternatives will expand, such as current from
wind power, tidal power and solar power, although not from nuclear power.
There will be massive conservation as a low energy future develops.
Vehicles will use much less gasoline, or dispense with gasoline altogether.
Households will adopt small-scale energy sources, oil or gas-fired home
boilers will generate their own electricity and feed it back into local grids.
The reality, however, looks quite different.
The IEA brainstorming paper of February 2003 tells us that world
energy demand will grow – by about two thirds between now and 2030.
Fossil fuels, far from phasing out, will meet 90 percent of these additional
needs. World oil consumption will rise from 77 mb/d to 122 mb/d. Nuclear
power will decline (in OECD countries to a minimum with the possible
15
exception of France). US imports will continue to rise for both oil and LNG
(note that in 1980 US net crude oil imports of 28 percent were deemed ‘far
too high’ – now the figure is 68 percent!).
By a clear margin, the biggest driver of demand expansion will be the
developing countries. China will lead as energy-thirsty nation. By 2121
China’s share of global GDP, says the World Bank, will have more than
doubled, from 3.7 percent to 8 percent. By then the Chinese, who already
consume more oil daily than Japan, could be importing 10 mb/d against the
current level of 2 mb/d plus.
Of the IEA-estimated increase in demand, one third will come from
OECD countries and two-thirds will come from the developing world.
Rose-tinted supply estimates

Now let’s turn to supply patterns – and once again, the cheerful
optimists peddle one picture, while reality dictates another.
Here’s the optimists’ rose-tinted picture: The Middle East region will
emerge possibly de-nuclearized and de-terrorised and its stability will
return. Iraq will see output soar as high as 10 mb/d. Saudi Arabia will
follow the path of gradual reform but will remain stable; the Ayatollahs in
Tehran will realise the folly of economic isolation and join in new patterns
of global responsibility; oil and gas will flow in abundance out of Russia
with the oil coming especially from the Caspian Sea basin via pipelines
through Georgia and Turkey westwards while the oil will flow eastwards to
China and possibly Japan.
A big expansion in LNG is also foreseen, so that it becomes, in effect, a
globally-traded commodity like oil while its price tracks oil closely. The
optimists also plan for cleaner coal technologies with successful carbon
capture and of course a big growth in renewable energy, hopefully on or
ahead of the EU target for renewables of 10% for 2010.
All this will require colossal and sustained investment in energy project
infrastructures – that is maintenance and development of oil and gas
production, new pipeline networks, modern refinery technologies, new
terminals and distribution systems and new storage facilities where
appropriate.
16
A Risky Reality
That is the optimist’s view. Now let us see how this Panglossian picture
collides with reality.
First, the political risks in the post Cold War e-enabled world are
getting larger and starker all the time. The Inforation Technology
revolution has empowered systems and networks for handling and trading
energy supplies beyond the dreams of thirty years ago. But it has also
empowered those with a destructive agenda on the same global scale.
Second, on a geographical plane, Iraq may or may not settle down in
due course (on the whole I am an optimist on this) but the timescale may be
much longer than first hoped and the vulnerability of Iraqi oil continues to
be demonstrated. Saudi Arabia could well drift into turbulence as the
delicate balance between religious extremists and moderate reformers
within is upset by upheaval without (especially in Iraq). Russia is stable
now but the roots of political settlement do not run deep (and anyway one
believes Russian statistics with caution). In Iran the hardline Ayatollahs are
far from defeated and the future there looks very unsettled as well.
Meanwhile Nigeria and Venezuela have already demonstrated their
political unreliability; Algeria has been under attack and looks worryingly
unreliable. Key transit countries like Georgia have also been through
paroxysms and their difficulties may not yet be over. Turkey may be
prospering and its chances for opening negotiations on EU entry may be
improving but there are risks there too as the recent hold-up of shipping in
the Bosphorus reminds us. North Sea oil output is now starting to decline
sharply.
As for nuclear power, it was once seen as the great alternative of the
future. It now remains riddled with political difficulties both with regard to
location and to the handling of nuclear waste. Moreover, over the whole
scene hangs the growing terrorist risk – poised (unless frustrated) to inflict
deadly damage on increasingly integrated and complex energy systems.
Overall, a conservative estimate is that by 2020 half the world’s oil and
gas will come from politically unreliable sources.
Furthermore, there are the more ‘normal’ investment risks that come on
top of these ubiquitous political uncertainties. The capital requirements for
underpinning a secure energy future are enormous even at the calmest of
17
times. Certain very specific conditions are required for capital to be raised
at all. They include stable Governments and governance, sustained political
commitment by the authorities concerned – which may have to stretch over
the full lifetime of the project – as well as clear and predictable regulations,
minimised corruption, respect for the rules of law, property and contract
and freedom to repatriate profits.
As energy projects become more interlinked and stretch across national
borders it becomes necessary in addition to ensure that the same rules apply
both sides of every border and fence.
Above all, energy investment demands long life and secure contracts
between suppliers and customers. Otherwise, who would want to invest
their money? Yet markets see things differently. They want maximum
flexibility to chop and change and go for the best price. The differences are
exemplified here in the Russia/EU energy dialogue. Russia wants to invest
$35bn annually in its oil industry. Who is going to stump up that kind of
money without very long-term contracts with Western European markets?
Even to recite this list of requirements shows how far most of the
energy world is from meeting them, or will be able to meet them in the
foreseeable future.
It must never happen

Finally, I want to make a general comment about broad global stability,
which is the fundamental condition for a safe and secure energy future.
We hear a good deal about the USA being ‘the only superpower’ and
being the new hegemonic empire-builder. This is a very fashionable view
in European circles.
I believe it is both dangerous and wrong. It is dangerous because it
leads straight not just to frenetic anti-Americanism but to the promotion of
Europe as a counter-weight ‘empire’ which is a sure recipe for great power
conflict, clashes of interest, rocketing defence-spending and divided
counsels in coping with terrorism and fanaticism.
It is wrong because the USA is not an imperial power, even if it suits its
enemies to depict it as one. Its interest is the interest of all free states,
which is live and let live, and it so happens that pluralism, if not some
specific democratic model, is the best guarantee that societies will remain
free and open participants in the global system. Our combined Western
18
world energies should be devoted to enabling every society, from the Asian
giants like China and India, to the Arab sheikhdoms, to the smallest Balkan
or East European state to move, at their own pace, in that direction. That is
not imperialism, it is survivalism.
I prefer to see the USA as an ‘umbrella’ state, a larger member of a
network in which the individual national interests of all, large and small,
are inextricably linked. The same can perhaps be said, or ought to be said,
of the European Union institutions which provide collective cover for, but
not interference in, the security and trade-prosperity of its numerous
member states.
For Europe and America to divide and become rival blocs would, in my
view, provide a new playground for terror and disruption. It would
guarantee that the threats to secure energy supplies, which are already
substantial, would become many times more so. I hope it never happens.
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS INSPECTIONS- THE
IRAQ EXPERIENCE
E. B. Myhre
Professor, Lund University, Department of Infectious Diseases University Hospital Medical
Centre, Lund SE-22185, Sweden
Abstract: Prior to the 1990 Iraq-Kuwait conflict it was well known that Iraq had
developed weapons of mass destruction but the extent of its programs were
unclear. After the Iraqi defeat in the ensuing Gulf war 1991 the UN Security
Council authorized the creation of UN Special Commission for Iraq
(UNSCOM) with the purpose of ridding Iraq permanently of weapons of mass
destruction. Several conclusions can be drawn from more than ten years of
biological weapons inspections in Iraq. Firstly, UNSCOM managed to get a
rather clear picture of the past weapons programs. Secondly, it was not
possible for Iraq to restart a substantial program with UNSCOM being present
in the country. Thirdly, a full and final and complete account of the weapons
program could not be established despite the use of the best intellectual and
technical capabilities available at the time.
1. DEVELOPMENT OF BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
Development and production of biological weapons of mass destruction

is an illegitimate activity. In the era of globalization such weapons could end
up in the hands of terrorist groups. The dissemination of weapon technology
through migration of scientists is another concern. Insight into and control of
state-sponsored weapons programs is highly relevant with regards to
prevention of international terrorism.
Prior to the 1990 Iraq-Kuwait conflict it was well known that Iraq had
developed weapons of mass destruction but the extent of its programs were
47

48 BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS INSPECTIONS- THE IRAQ EXPERIENCE
unclear. After the Iraqi defeat in the ensuing Gulf war 1991 the UN Security
Council authorized the creation of UN Special Commission for Iraq
(UNSCOM) with the purpose of ridding Iraq permanently of weapons of
mass destruction. It was expected to be a quick and easy task. Iraq was
supposed to produce a full final declaration of their weapons programs, to
hand over remaining weapons and to destroy them under supervision.
Instead of full open cooperation Iraq engaged in a policy of concealment and
deception. Friendly walk-through inspections were soon transformed into
unannounced intrusive on-site visits. Instead of being provided with
requested information international UNSCOM experts had to collect the
information themselves. This resulted in an atmosphere of mutual distrust.
Soon these inspections became high profile activities, closely watched by the
mass media and wrongly portrayed as the hunt for weapons of mass
destruction. The objectives were to fully understand the Iraqi weapons
programs, to map all its components and to ensure that the weapons program
was not restarted. In 1999 UNSCOM was transformed in into a new
organisation, the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspections Commission
for Iraq (UNMOVIC). Facing the same restraints and an unchanged Iraqi
attitude UNMOVIC would not be more successful than UNSCOM in
providing a full final and complete account of the Iraq’s programs of
weapons of mass destruction. Shortly before the Second Gulf War in 2003
UNMOVIC withdrew its staff from Iraq and the inspection work came to an
end.
Initially Iraq vehemently denied the existence of any offensive biological
weapons program. But 1995 became a turning point with the defection to
Jordan of Kamal Hussein, Saddam Hussein’s son-in-law. Kamal Hussein had
first class insight into the weapons programs and UNSCOM was
immediately notified about the existence of an inconspicuous farm house
outside Baghdad. When UNSCOM searched the farm house cases of
documents were found revealing among other things an offensive biological
research program and a secret production facility. This facility had been
visited by UNSCOM expert teams several times but samples collected had
failed to detect any biological agents. The Iraqis had successfully sanitized
the facility. Yet the location, the construction of the buildings as well as the
equipment found there had always roused suspicion.
UNSCOM on-site inspections were highly sophisticated information
gathering operations. The work was carefully planed and organized by the
permanent staff at UNSCOM headquarter in New York City but provision
was made for local initiatives for quick responses. Operational plans were
often kept secret even from some UNSCOM staff members in order to
prevent unwanted dissemination of information. Sites were visited without
prior notice yet UNSCOM teams were always accompanied by Iraqi
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS INSPECTIONS- THE IRAQ EXPERIENCE 49
minders. With access to their own helicopters UNSCOM staff members

could quickly reach any part of Iraq. Vast amounts of data were accumulated
in a highly systematic way. Detailed information had been collected on
institutions of interest, their technical equipment and their human resources.
The capability of various sites to engage in research and production of
biological weapons was critically evaluated.
Iraqi minders were always present during site visits including interview
sessions with the Iraqi scientists, administrators and laboratory workers. At
times the minders could be disruptive and the situation could become ugly.
Iraqi government officials normally videotaped entire inspections, a
procedure which was very stressful both to the inspectors and the Iraqi who
were working at the site. The minders were apparently instructed to assess
the area of competence of each new UNSCOM inspector. Occasionally the
minders tried to hinder inspections by simply outnumber the UNSCOM
team. UNSCOM own linguists were extremely useful on site as their
presence made studies of various Arabic documents possible.Dual-use
equipment provided a special analytical problem. Such equipment were
tagged and only allowed to be moved after prior notice.
There were many constraints, some of which were of critical importance.
Access to all locations, for example, was one. Presidential palaces, mosques,
private homes and facilities used by various security organizations were all
off limits. Another constraint was the issue of timing. Inspections were never
carried out during the night. The Iraqis could move and hide equipment
during the night if they wanted. There was evidence of such activities.
UNSCOM withdrew twice from Iraq as the US retaliated with cruise
missile strikes for Iraq’s failure to cooperate with UNSCOM. A revisit to a
site after an attack was suggested that the Iraqi had known exactly which
sites were to be attacked. The Iraqis allowed their staff to take home items of
special importance. Items too heavy to be transported to private homes were
stored in a caravan some hundred meters away from the buildings as the
Iraqis knew from past experience that this was the safest place.
Unparalleled experience in conducting weapons inspections was gained
from 10 years of work in Iraq. Even with access to the best intellectual
capabilities and technical equipment UNSCOM/UNMOVIC could not
confirm nor deny that Iraq had retained weapons of mass destruction and had
restarted its offensive weapons programmes. Both the intelligence and the
scientific community were equally divided on these issues. Different
governments made different conclusions based on how they interpreted
available data. There were worries that Iraq would restart their program once
the sanctions were lifted and UNSCOM gone. We knew that the Iraqi
Government kept the weapons groups intact for years. The Iraqi scientists
who had been involved in the past program showed no regret. An ongoing
50 BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS INSPECTIONS- THE IRAQ EXPERIENCE
compartmentalized activity possibly under the auspices of security agencies

was also suspected as were transmigration of scientists and movements of
equipment to other countries.
As soon as the hostilities had ended the Iraqi Survey Group stared to
search for proscribed weapons and illegitimate weapons activities. In
October 2003, the Iraqi Survey Group presented to the Congress in an
interim report that no weapons of mass destruction had been found so far.
What was the actual situation in Iraq at the onset of the last Gulf War 2003?
Many questions remain unanswered. Did Iraq still possess weapons of mass
destruction? Had Iraq restarted its biological weapons program? The answer
today is that we still do not know and we might never know.
2. CONCLUSION
Several conclusions can been draw from more ten years of biological
weapons inspections in Iraq. Firstly, UNSCOM managed to get a rather
clear picture of the past weapons programs. Secondly, it was not possible for
Iraq to restart a substantial program with UNSCOM being present in the
country. Thirdly, a full and final and complete account of the weapons
program could not be established despite the use of the best intellectual and
technical capabilities available at the time.
Chapter 4
NON-RULED MARKET ECONOMY AS A

SOURCE OF CHEMICAL TERRORISM.
AUTOMOTIVE FUEL: QUALITY AND
ENVIRONMENTAL SAFETY
William Zadorsky
Ukrainian State Chemical-Technology University
8. Gagarin Ave., Dnepropetrovsk 49005 Ukrain
Abstract: The problems of the market economy influencing the state of environment in
Ukraine are illustrated by the example of the Pri-dneprovie region. New
examples resul, when ecologically dangerous enterprises and technologies are
created in flagrant contradiction with the conception of sustainable
development in order to please the requirements of the market in the region.
Ecologically dangerous projects are realized, which on the basis of their
effects can be named chemical terrorism without overstatement. Special
attention was paid to the use in Ukraine of the "special" fuel on the base of
wastes of coke factories of Ukraine, containing a carcinogen and benzenel in
quantities, which exceed by orders of magnitude the doses accepted in other
Europian countries and the rest of the world. Possibilities to decline the
harmful influence of such fuel on the population of Ukraine in the market
conditions are shown.
Keywords: chemical terrorism; cleaner production; fuel; liquid waste; market economy;
rocket utilization; sustainable development
1. DISCUSSION
At long last, it was announced that, "based on the major ideas and
principles declared at the Rio de Janeiro Conference of 1992, Ukraine deems
desirable a shift to sustainable development that would ensure a balanced
solution to social and economic tasks and to problems of leaving the
environment and the potential of natural resources in good order for the
current and future generations."
27
28 Non-ruled Market Economy as a Source of Chemical Terrorism
As is well known, the concept of sustainable development includes

three aspects, namely environmental, economic and social. Underestimating
any of these facets will lead to a distortion in this equilateral triangle and to a
deviation from the overall strategy of sustainability. This strategy can only be
implemented when the three tasks are fulfilled simultaneously. The systems
approach reveals strong interactions between the three factors of sustainable
development. The sustainability will therefore be determined mainly by those
parameters that affect at least two of the three factors.
The National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine suggested that an
economic-environmental-social model be devised and employed for the
purposes of the country’s sustainable development. This is a very complex
and time-consuming approach that may not be usable at this time of industrial
restructuring, privatization and other involved processes occurring in a
collapsed national economy. An alternative tactics is put forward, which is
applicable at both national and regional level. Instead of mathematical
modeling and optimization, it uses systems approach and decision theory
techniques.
The environmental pollution in Ukraine has reached critical levels.
Vehicles, power plants, steel mills and nonferrous metallurgy works are the
major air polluters. Pesticides are responsible for much of the harm done to
human health.
Water pollution continues on a large scale. The Dnieper region is the
worst affected among its counterparts in Ukraine. Here, the situation is
disastrous because of a combination of energy-intensive industries, thermal
power generation, and intensive agriculture, further aggravated by Chernobyl.
There is an urgent need to find feasible ways that would stop the
ensuing depopulation in Ukraine, such ways to ensure survival that would
work before the sustainable development concept has been implemented. In
these times of a deep economic crisis, the economic and environment-related
issues must be attacked simultaneously, in line with one strategy for a cleaner
economy. This would be a change from a policy of anthropogenic impact
assessment to that of at-source abatement of pollution.
Such a program must be specific, realistic and not contradicting the
idea of sustainability. It might be a program of cleaner industrial and
agricultural production incorporating a systems principle of ascension from
cleaner local units, mills, factories, and areas to a cleaner Ukraine to cleaner
multinational regions.
What makes our approach rather different from the mainstream
international cleaner production (CP) movement is the desire to abolish the
dominating "black-box" techniques. Instead of regarding a production facility
as no more than a given set of benign inputs and polluting outputs, we insist
that one should seek the best ways to affect a prospective cleaner object
within the "black box".
William Zadorsky 29
As the major principle of cleaner economy, the systems approach is

taken that deals with perfecting any nature-technology system at the various
hierarchic levels, from environmental pollution sources to consumers, and
takes into account the interactions and mutual effects of all important
components. This type of analysis will reveal relationships between the ways
to improve processes and the challenges of risk management and nature
conservation. The main task is therefore to harmonize the nature-technology
relation and, ideally, to engineer high-performance systems featuring desired
environmental characteristics at each hierarchic level, so that the favorable
environmental background is not impaired and, where possible, even restored.
Following are the basic assumptions underlying the cleaner economy concept
for Ukraine:
• At this time of a deep economic crisis, the economic and
environmental challenges must be met simultaneously, in keeping with one
strategy of cleaner economy.
• A move towards a cleaner economy must focus not on consumption,
but rather on perfecting those entities that are actual or potential polluters.
• The success of a cleaner economy policy will be largely determined
by the availability of professionals well trained in the theory and practice of
"economy clean-up" and environmental management.
• No cleaner economy will be possible without creating a civilized
environmental market.
These strategic principles determine some tactical measures for pursuing
them. Such measures are applicable to any industry and include:
• no waste due to improved selectivity,
• neutralizing wastes directly at the origin, rather than at the exit,
• flexible technologies,
• recycling materials and energy,
• conservation of resources,
• waste treatment, etc.
These tactics must be combined with certain design and process engineering
techniques, such as
• providing a considerable excess of the least hazardous agent,
• minimizing dwell times,
• recirculation of materials and energy via closed loops,
• concurrent reactions and product separation,
• introduction of heterogeneous systems,
• adaptive processes and apparatuses,
• increasing throughputs,
• multifunctional environmental facilities, etc.
For a cleaner economy to be affordable an environmental market
must be established and market mechanisms set to motion between all its
interacting operators. Integration is necessary that would link researchers
and developers of environmentally high technologies to designers of
equipment to manufacturers to users. Professionals must be trained and
further educated in the fields of industrial ecology and environmental

management. Qualified consulting and assessing bodies are needed that would
be capable of certifying environmental products, properly performing
scientific, engineering and legal assessment, and winning public trust at the
environmental market. Legislation is necessary that would give incentives to
managers and entrepreneurs promoting cleaner production, ensure benefits to
companies upgrading their production facilities to make them more
environment-friendly, and stimulate development of an environmental market
focused on high technologies, equipment, labor and services and having all
proper attributes like competition, arbitration courts, commercial practices etc.
The latter paragraph is closely related to the idea of restructuring in
the area of material production to be based on
• developing a socially oriented market economy that would guarantee
a proper life standard for the population,
• cleaner production, minimizing environmental loads, material
conservation, adoption of new types of activity grounded on environmentally
safe technologies,
• making a more balanced economy by shifting from production of
means of production to consumer goods, and
• environmental impact assessment and auditing for all economic
projects.
The macroeconomic transformations rely on changes in the structure
of production and consumption, mainly in industry. This necessitates:
• a more pronounced social orientation of industry to increase the
relative importance of light and food-processing industries,
• an effective combination of industry branches keeping abreast of
international requirements and meeting domestic needs,
• setting limits to raw material and semi-finished product industries,
• stepwise reduction of exports from primary and other material- and
energy-intensive industries,
• increasing outputs of high-added-value products to facilitate effective
utilization of domestic resources, and
• restructuring the production environment via introduction of recent
scientific accomplishments, conservation of energy and other resources,
implementation of waste-free and environment-friendly technologies,
application of optimized power sources, waste treatment and utilization.
These points are common to the Draft Concept and to the cleaner
production concept.
How could all that be funded? It would be ridiculous to suggest
that comprehensive actions towards a cleaner economy might be
supported by the miserable national budget. There is even less reason to
believe that any down-to-earth effort to upgrade some specific facility and
implement advanced technologies and state-of-the-art equipment might be
funded from it. Furthermore, we can hardly rely on the assistance from the
William Zadorsky 31
West, and nobody here believes in assistance not backed by economic

interest.
What is to be done to make cleaner production profitable, as is the
case in the West? One source might be those fines that are imposed on
violators of environmental laws in Ukraine. However, no mechanisms of
channeling this money to environmental investments are available so far.
All over the world, the environmental market is replacing punitive
methods of environmental management and those environment protection
agencies that are not capable of coordinating and managing cleaner economy
projects.
Worldwide, the taxation and payments for resources and emissions are
devised in such a manner as to make it more profitable for the manufacturer to
resolve the environmental issues in-plant, rather than to shift them off to the
consumer area. A combination of sanctions with economic incentives for a
cleaner production will make the latter not a recipient from, but rather a donor
to the government budget.Yet even domination of a cleaner economy policy
will not soon guarantee survival of the population under a deep economic
crisis like the current one. The anthropogenic damage already caused to nature
may prove too heavy and not lending itself to repair within the life span of one
or even more generations.
An analysis of the man-production-environment system reveals that
for survival of human beings the CP concept must be complemented by two
more lines of action, namely
• adaptation of human body to life in adverse conditions, and
• utilization of life support systems.
The former approach implies development and implementation of
biomedical and unconventional methods for prevention of ailments,
adaptation and rehabilitation based on recent scientific findings and combined
efforts of scientists, engineers, educators and managers under a degrading
environment in Ukraine. These are the major lines to be pursued:
• setting up a tailored system of environmental education and training
for the population in environmentally damaged areas, relying on the existing
environmental education network and the media,
• research and development of adaptation promoters, immunogens and
detoxicants, mostly of natural origin, processes and equipment for their
manufacture and application practices,
• launching industrial production of adaptation promoters, immunogens
and detoxicants, mainly from Ukraine’s domestic starting materials, and
• research and development of existing and new non-medicinal methods
of health building and adaptation to anthropogenic loads, including ways to
reduce immune reactivity of and risks to people subjected to adverse working
environments, residing in heavily polluted areas or dealing with ionizing
radiation and other negative factors at work.
The latter concept implies providing local life support systems for
unfriendly environments. By now, Ukrainian scientists and engineers have
developed a variety of processes for potable water treatment by adsorption,
electrochemical oxidation, electrocoagulation, electro-coprecipitation,
electrodialysis, electrofloatation, floatation, membrane techniques etc. Each
family must get small units for water purification, air cleaning and removal of
hazardous substances from the food as soon as possible, for it may take
decades to introduce cleaner production on a national scale. Here, we should
follow the example of Western business people who bring with them to
Ukraine devices enabling a safe existence in this unfriendly environment.
More specifically, environment professionals in Dnepropetrovsk have
offered a number of local CP projects. One of them is concerned with
treatment of ash of the local steam power plant. According to Canadian
experts, 32 elements may be recovered from the ash in addition to the residual
coal, making the business of ash treatment highly profitable.
There have been projects to produce building materials from the fly
ash collected directly at precipitation filters. Moreover, this material attracted
international entrepreneurs who wanted to export it to Spain, most probably
for purposes of extraction of some rare earth metals. It is regrettable that no
local business people took interest in the idea, especially when in
Dnepropetrovsk area there are defense industry giants like Yuzhnyi
Engineering Plant and Chemppri with their expertise in high technologies,
including recovery of valuable metals and fabrication of appropriate sorbents
and equipment.
The steam power plant should become another site for an exciting
project enabling a 2-fold reduction in the degree of flue gas cleaning while
cutting the electric power consumption by a factor of 2 to 3. The new process
that applies pulsed voltage to the precipitation filters has been successfully
introduced at several other plants in Ukraine.
These and other projects were included in the draft program of cleaner
production for the Dnieper region. Each item in the program is backed with
engineering and economic analyses. For many of the projects, international
partners and prospective investors are sought that may gain profit by cleaning
our environment.
Coal is one of the major fuels in Ukraine where its environmental
impact is much higher than that of nuclear energy, provided that there are no
accidents. Yet there is no alternative to coal, for natural gas can only cover the
most urgent household and industrial needs, not to mention the country's
indebtedness for its imports. The question of environment-friendly
combustion of coal is therefore highly topical.
It is of special importance to the Lower Dnieper region where
Pridneprovsk, Zaporizhia and Krivoi Rog steam power plants, Europe's
biggest, are operated alongside with hundreds of smaller plants,
cogeneration units and boilers. To abate pollution, one has to find its
William Zadorsky 33
causes. With this in mind, a digest of recent materials found on the Internet is
given in this issue. It has following sections:
The environmental pollution in transition economy countries has
reached critical levels. Vehicles, power plants, steel mills and nonferrous
metallurgy works are the major air polluters. Pesticides are responsible for
much of the harm done to human health. Water pollution continues on a large
scale. Very often the situation is disastrous because this country has a
combination of energy-intensive industries, thermal power generation, and
intensive agriculture, further aggravated by Chernobyl.
There is an urgent need to find feasible ways that would stop the
ensuing depopulation in a lot of FSU countries, such ways to ensure survival
that would work before the sustainable development concept has been
implemented. In these times of a deep economic crisis, the economic and
environment-related issues must be attacked simultaneously, in line with one
strategy for a cleaner economy.
This would be a change from a policy of anthropogenic impact
assessment to that of at-source abatement of pollution. Such a program must
be specific, realistic and not contradicting the idea of sustainability. It might
be a program of cleaner industrial and agricultural production incorporating a
systems principle of ascension from cleaner local units, mills, factories, and
areas to a cleaner country to cleaner multinational regions.
What makes this approach rather different from the mainstream
international cleaner production (CP) movement is the desire to abolish the
dominating “black-box” techniques. Instead of regarding a production facility
as no more than a given set of benign inputs and polluting outputs, we insist
that one should seek the best ways to affect a prospective cleaner object
within the “black box”.
As the major principle of cleaner economy, the systems approach is
taken that deals with perfecting any nature-technology system at the various
hierarchic levels, from environmental pollution sources to consumers, and
takes into account the interactions and mutual effects of all important
components. This type of analysis will reveal relationships between the ways
to improve processes and the challenges of risk management and nature
conservation. The main task is therefore to harmonize the nature-technology
relation and, ideally, to engineer high-performance systems featuring desired
environmental characteristics at each hierarchic level, so that the favorable
environmental background is not impaired and, where possible, even restored.
Following are the basic assumptions underlying the cleaner economy
concept for transition economy countries:
• At this time of a deep economic crisis, the economic and
environmental challenges must be met simultaneously, in keeping with one
strategy of cleaner economy.
• A move towards a cleaner economy must focus not on consumption,
but rather on perfecting those entities that are actual or potential polluters.
• The success of a cleaner economy policy will be largely determined

by the availability of professionals well trained in the theory and practice of
“economy clean-up” and environmental management.
• No cleaner economy will be possible without creating a civilized
environmental market.
The idea of restructuring in the area of material production to be based on:
• developing a socially oriented market economy that would guarantee
a proper life standard for the population,
• cleaner production, minimizing environmental loads, material
conservation, adoption of new types of activity grounded on environmentally
safe technologies,
• making a more balanced economy by shifting from production of
means of production to consumer goods, and
• environmental impact assessment and auditing for all economic
projects.
The macroeconomic transformations rely on changes in the structure
of production and consumption, mainly in industry. This necessitates:
• a more pronounced social orientation of industry to increase the
relative importance of light and food-processing industries,
• an effective combination of industry branches keeping abreast of
international requirements and meeting domestic needs,
• setting limits to raw material and semi-finished product industries,
• stepwise reduction of exports from primary and other material- and
energy-intensive industries,
• increasing outputs of high-added-value products to facilitate effective
utilization of domestic resources, and
• restructuring the production environment via introduction of recent
scientific accomplishments, conservation of energy and other resources,
implementation of waste-free and environment-friendly technologies,
application of optimized power sources, waste treatment and utilization.
These points are common to the Sustainable Development Concept
and to the cleaner production concept. How could all that be funded? It would
be ridiculous to suggest that comprehensive actions towards a cleaner
economy might be supported by the miserable national budget. There is even
less reason to believe that any down-to-earth effort to upgrade some specific
facility and implement advanced technologies and state-of-the-art equipment
might be funded from it. Furthermore, we can hardly rely on the assistance
from the West, and nobody here believes in assistance not backed by
economic interest.
What is to be done to make cleaner production profitable, as is the
case in the West? One source might be those fines that are imposed on
violators of environmental laws in transition economy countries. However, no
mechanisms of channeling this money to environmental investments are
available so far.
William Zadorsky 35
All over the world, the environmental market is replacing punitive

methods of environmental management and those environment protection
agencies that are not capable of coordinating and managing cleaner economy
projects.
Worldwide, the taxation and payments for resources and emissions are
devised in such a manner as to make it more profitable for the manufacturer to
resolve the environmental issues in-plant, rather than to shift them off to the
consumer area. A combination of sanctions with economic incentives for a
cleaner production will make the latter not a recipient from, but rather a donor
to the government budget.
Yet even domination of a cleaner economy policy will not soon
guarantee survival of the population under a deep economic crisis like the
current one. The anthropogenic damage already caused to nature may prove
too heavy and not lending itself to repair within the life span of one or even
more generations.
An analysis of the man-production-environment system reveals that
for survival of human beings the CP concept must be complemented by two
more lines of action, namely adaptation of human body to life in adverse
conditions, and utilization of life support systems.
The former approach implies development and implementation of
biomedical and nonconventional methods for prevention of ailments,
adaptation and rehabilitation based on recent scientific findings and combined
efforts of scientists, engineers, educators and managers under a degrading
environment in Ukraine. These are the major lines to be pursued:
• setting up a tailored system of environmental education and training
for the population in environmentally damaged areas, relying on the existing
environmental education network and the media,
• research and development of adaptation promoters, immunogens and
detoxicants, mostly of natural origin, processes and equipment for their
manufacture and application practices,
• launching industrial production of adaptation promoters, immunogens
and detoxicants, mainly from domestic starting materials, and
• research and development of existing and new non-medicinal methods
of health building and adaptation to anthropogenic loads, including ways to
reduce immune reactivity of and risks to people subjected to adverse working
environments, residing in heavily polluted areas or dealing with ionizing
radiation and other negative factors at work.
The regional program of adaptation and rehabilitation of the
population is developed for the first time in the Ukraine as for near Dniepr
river region, and in a kind of the concept is offered for any of a technogenous
intense region. Feature of the program in integration of efforts on joint activity
in spheres of a science, engineering, training and management with the
purpose of decision of problems of preventive maintenance, adaptation and
rehabilitation of the population in conditions of worsened ecological
conditions in the Ukraine.
Main directions of realization of the program:
• fulfillment of scientific researches on creation of adaptogenous,

immunogenous (predominary a natural origin), techniques of their application,
technologies and equipment for their manufacture;
• fulfillment of scientific researches on ordering known and creation of
new nonmedicine methods healthbuilding and adaptation of the person to
technogenous effects;
• creation of industrial manufacture of adaptogenous, immunogenous
predominary based on Ukrainian raw sources;
• development and realization of the educational ecological programs
for all categories of the population.
Main sections of the program:
1. Organization of a system ecological education and training of the
population and realization of direct work in ecologically intense regions with
use of a network of ecological training and mass media,
2. System engineering of diagnostic, adaptation, the increasing of the
healthlevel and rehabilitation of the persons, received infringements of a
health as a result of technogenous effects.
3. Fulfillment of scientific researches on ordering known and creation of new
non-medicine methods of healthbuilding and adaptation of the person to
technogenous effects, in particular, development of ways of immunity
increase and reduction of the factors of risk at the persons, subjected to effect
of harmful industrial factors, 4. Fulfillment of scientific researches on creation
adaptogenous, immunogenous and other medicines for resistance against
acting of harmful substances (predominary a natural origin), techniques of
their application, technologies and equipment for manufacture. Survey of
natural raw sources of adaptogenous, immuno-genous and development of
industrial technologies and creation of its manufactures.
6. Development and introduction of new food products on the basis use
natural byoaddings with adaptogenous and immunogenous properties,
ensuring preventive maintenance of diseases ecological ethyology.
7. Development and organization of manufacture of an ecological
engineering and surviving means.
With arrival in Ukraine market economy it is possible to mark that
many ecological problems both at the regional level, and at level of our
country, were intensifyed. We have not while systematized analytical data
about the change of concentrations of harmful matters in the water, air, soil,
but of indirect indexes put a number on one's guard.
But every year the population of Ukraine diminishes approximately
on half-million persons, more anxious data about child’s death rate and
morbidity. In Dnepropetrovsk to the end reasons are not found out of
epidemic growth in the last years of quantity of pulmonary diseases. It is
possible to consider as results of biotesting periodically intensifyed tendency
to disappearance of populyatsii of sparrows in the center of city, Lately the
complete disappearance is noticed practically in the town of cockroaches.
But, speak, they are led even in the nuclear reactor...
William Zadorsky 37
1.1. Processes of the Restructuring, Privatization, Military

Conversion in the countries with transitional economy with
account of market conditions.
During Restructuring, Privatization, Military Conversion there is
inconsistencies between requests of maintenance of sustainable development
and problem of deriving of maximum profits. In the countries with transitional
economy unfortunately there is slacking of state and municipal management
and while there is not market mechanisms of managing of SMEs activity.
Recently new program on Market Mechanisms and Incentives for Environ-
mental Management (URL: http://es.epa.gov/ncer/rfa/02marketmech.html) as
part of U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and of its Science to
Achieve Results (STAR) is announced. They are seeking applications for
research leading to improved theoretical and/or empirical analyses of the
feasibility and effectiveness of market mechanisms and economic incentives
(MM&I) as substitutes for, or complements to, traditional environmental
management programs. The terms 'market mechanisms' and 'incentives' refer
to approaches that rely on economic incentives, market forces, or financial
mechanisms to encourage regulated entities to reduce emissions, discharges
and waste generation, or generally improve environmental performance. EPA
is interested in supporting research on practical applications of MM&I
approaches related to its mission, i.e., addressing environmental quality and
human health.
1.2. Chemical Terrorism on local, national, and

international levels (Source: A FOA Briefing Book on
Chemical Weapons)
There have always been fears that terrorists might be tempted to

acquire and use weapons of mass destruction. The world received a shocking
reminder of the potential impact of terrorist use of chemical weapons when
the Aum-Shinrikyo sect used the nerve gas Sarin to attack civilian targets in
Japan during 1994 and 1995. It is fortunate that, to-date, few other incidents
of this nature have occurred. In the wake of the horrific terrorist attacks in
New York on September 11th, 2001, fears of terrorist use of chemical and
biological weapons were rekindled, and fueled by public release of
information suggesting that the terrorists had considered using crop dusting
aircraft in their plans.
There is much that local, national, and international authorities can,
and should, be doing to counter the threat of chemical terrorism. For an
overview of specific subject of the protection against chemical weapons, it is
necessary to pay attention on:
• Decontamination
• Detection
• Protective Equipment
• Collective protection
Protection against Chemical Weapons. There are four main
cornerstones in the protection against chemical weapons, all of which are
largely dependent upon each other to provide optimum effect. These four are:
• physical protection: body protection, respiratory protection, collective
protection,
• medical protection: pretreatment, therapy,
• detection: alarm, monitoring, verification, identification, all-clear,
• decontamination: individual decontamination, equipment
decontamination.
An overview of chemicals defined as chemical weapons. Main
Groups:
• Nerve Agents
• Mustard Agents
• Hydrogen Cyanide
• Arsines
• Psychotomimetic Agents
• Toxins
• Potential CW Agents
Today, only a few of these are considered of interest owing to a
number of demands that must be placed on a substance if it is to be of use as a
CW agent.
• A presumptive agent must not only be highly toxic but also "suitably
highly toxic" so that it is not too difficult to handle.
• The substance must be capable of being stored for long periods in
containers without degradation and without corroding the packaging material.
• It must be relatively resistant to atmospheric water and oxygen so that
it does not lose effect when dispersed.
• It must also withstand the heat developed when dispersed.
CW agents can be classified in many different ways. There are, for
example, volatile substances, which mainly contaminate the air, or persistent
substances, which are involatile and therefore mainly cover surfaces.
All decontamination is based on one or more of the following
principles:
• to destroy CW agents by chemically modifying them (destruction),
• to physically remove CW agents by absorption, washing or
evaporation,
• to physically screen-off the CW agent so that it causes no damage.
Most CW agents can be destroyed by means of suitable chemicals.
Some chemicals are effective against practically all types of substances.
However, such chemicals may be unsuitable for use in certain conditions
William Zadorsky 39
since they corrode, etch or erode the surface. Sodium hydroxide dissolved in
organic solvent breaks down most substances but should not be used in
decontaminating skin other than in extreme emergencies when alternative
means are not available.
CW agents can be washed and rinsed away, dried up, sucked up by
absorbent substances, or removed by heat treatment. Water, with or without
additives of detergents, soda, soap, etc., can be used, as well as organic
solvents such as fuel, paraffin and carburettor spirit. Emulsified solvents in
water can be used to dissolve and wash-off CW agents from various
contaminated surfaces.
Unfortunately, all these methods can not used in the case of global
chemical terrirism of some modern “market” technologies are used in
Ukraine. I would like to name only some of them on the example of our
Pridneprovie Region:
1. During last several years one by one there are already 4
manufactures of the lead accumulators " Ista " adjoining
directly to two inhabited files of city. I shall remind, that the
building of new ecologically dangerous manufactures is
forbidden in the technogenic overloaded city Dnepropetrovsk
approximately 20 years ago.
2. Recently in the center of city Dnepropetrovsk it was
utilization a lot of rockets “SS-20” (Program of USA –
Ukraine) and we had the pollution in the air a lot of very
dangerous and toxic geptil.
3. Using of the most cheap and therefore dirty and dangerous
sorts of coal and liquid fuel (mazut) by our Pridneprovie
Heat Electric Station,
4. And at last it is the using of the “special” Automotive fuel
on the base of liquid wastes of coke factories of Ukraine,
containing a carcinogen and drug benzol in quantities that are
exceeding in other countries of Europe and world in tens
times.
1.3. Automotive fuel on the base of liquid wastes of coke

factories of Ukraine as the chemical terrorism factor.
Recently Cleaner Production Center organized an Environmental
Symposium on Transportation and Environment. In recent years, the
number of cars in Dnepropetrovsk increased dramatically, predominantly
owing to import of used cars, and exceeded 250,000 in 2000. Since the
city has no by-pass highways, tens of thousands of cars pass its center daily.
They run on cheap fuels containing massive admixtures of aromatic
compounds like benzene, toluene and xylene. The fuels produced by coke-
and-byproduct plants in Zaporozhe and Dneprodzerzhinsk contain 16
times as much benzene as does US gasoline (1 to 2 %). In Kharkov, 100 gas-

filling stations sell gasoline of unacceptable quality.
The Security Service of Ukraine in Kharkov blocked an attempt of
two local gasoline stations to sell adulterated gasoline. The hazardous fuel
included the authentic A-76 grade heavily mixed with benzene, toluene and
xylene to imitate high-octane grades A-93 and A-95.
A good news, too. It is regrettable, however, that in Dnepropetrovsk
very many, if not all, cars have to use fuels adulterated with these and other
hazardous compounds. The practices of admixing them to gasoline have been
carried on in this area for several years, in spite of numerous protests by
concerned environmentalists in the media. This badly aggravates the
environmental situation, already disastrous in the entire region.
Xylene, benzene, styrene and toluene total to 40 to 60 per cent in most
of the fuels, as reported by Dnepropetrovsk Sanitary Monitoring Station.
The highway police, the air quality monitoring services or the
meteorological stations do not measure the levels of these compounds.
Although no reports on the amounts of the above aromatics in the exhaust
gases are available, experts assert that complete combustion of these
compounds in an engine is impossible. The combustion products therefore
pollute the air to a degree that makes the common CO and CO2 pleasant air
fresheners. No catalytic converter will help. Rather, it will be poisoned
prematurely.
Several measures may help remedy the situation with fuels:
(a) to introduce new governmental specifications for the fuels to limit the
aromatic contents,
(b) to impose restrictions on sales of adulterated fuels based on more stringent
control of fuel quality,
(c) to carry out certification of bodies having a right to sell automotive fuel,
(d) to put heavy environmental taxes on low quality fuel to be paid by both the
producer and the distributor,
(e) to get involved the governmental standardization bodies and consumer
societies, and
(f) to use state-of-the-art additives enabling a more complete fuel combustion
and therefore improved environmental performance of vehicles.
Only the latter option is workable at present, because the country is lacking
oil. Following are some additives already in use in Ukraine.
General-Purpose Fuel Modifiers T-4 and T-6 developed by A.
Ozeryanskii in Kiev, Ukraine. Non-toxic agents that reduce pollutant
discharges 1.5 to 3-fold and offer 8 to 15 % savings in fuel, depending on
engine wear and fuel type, up to 30 % reduction in carbon monoxide, and 50
% less smoke, while increasing the engine power by 10 to 28 %. They
are very simple in use, so that a 1.2-ml ampoule is just emptied into a fuel
William Zadorsky 41
can. One liter of T-4 is enough to modify 18,500 l gasoline or 5,600 l diesel
fuel. Its cost is 2 to 3 % of the fuel cost.
Oil Modifier MP-8 of the same inventor reduces oil losses by a factor
of 1.6, extends oil service life 2- to 3-fold and cuts pollutant discharges by at
least 30 %, while enhancing engine power by up to 10 %. Also, this non-toxic
additive reduces wear and varnish formation on engine parts and improves
detergency and sealing. Its cost is about 40 % that of domestic motor oil.
Some other developments may also prove useful for making
combustion engines cleaner.
Clean Air Valve developed by Ted Switen, USA. Tests on carburetor
engines in Ukraine showed 2- to 4-fold reductions in the exhaust levels and
fuel economy improvement by 1 %. At its prospective price of about $50, the
device will pay back after a 15,000 to 20,000 km run. A modification intended
for diesel engines will be run in in 1998.
Ukrainian Catalytic Converter developed in Kiev. Being similar to its
Western counterparts in performance, the device will be less expensive.
Ukraine committed itself to the European Union that all its vehicles would be
equipped with catalytic converters by 2003.
Binary Fuel Device developed and produced on a full scale in Ukraine.
Reduces hazardous exhausts by a factor of 2 to 3 through the use of a low-
octane gasoline plus propane-butene. The breakeven is predicted at 20,000
km.
Yet another approach is to influence the combustion process itself by
ionization, pulsed electromagnetic fields, glow discharge etc. The Institute of
Energy at Dnepropetrovsk State University developed a plasma-activated
sparking plug, currently in preparation for a full-scale production.
Prof. V.N. Nabivach (Ukrainian State University of Chemical
Engineering, Dnepropetrovsk). The levels of polycyclic aromatic compounds
(PACs) in exhaust gases deserve special attention, for they often exceed
maximum permissible concentrations 2 to 2.5-fold. A carcinogenic constituent
like benzopyrene is million times as hazardous as CO and 50,000 times as
harmful as NOx, an important difference being that its action is prolonged.
The contribution of automotive engine exhausts to overall urban air pollution
in Ukraine is approaching 30 %, a trend towards the 50 % in the West. In the
absence of standards that would limit aromatics in automotive fuels, the coke
and byproduct plants like those in Dneprodzerzhinsk, Zaporozhe and
Avdeevka are free to produce fuels containing 50 to 70 % PACs, compared to
"only" 30 to 40 % in the products of oil processing companies. PACs are
fairly stable and tend to be adsorbed on building walls, trees etc., thus posing
a permanent threat to public health. Another headache is dioxin, an extremely
hazardous pollutant discovered in automotive exhaust gases in 1980s.
A.G. Khandryga (Manager, Industrial Product Certification Dept.,
Dnepropetrovsk Center for Standardization and Metrology). We do certify
the fuel that is imported whenever its quality is acceptable. What happens
next, when it is unloaded into storage tanks and further on, is beyond our
control. Only the Agency for Consumer Protection can request a certificate of
quality directly at a gas-filling station. It may then see tens of certificates
issued at different places. The law does not prohibit a distributor to apply to a
certification center other than the local one. Furthermore, one check-up
revealed that about 80 % of the certificates were forged.
Prof. L.M. Pritykin (State Academy of Civil Engineering and
Architecture of Dnieper Region). A rapid method to determine quality of
gasoline is needed. The existing instruments generally measure octane
number. This is not sufficient, for even with an acceptable octane number the
exhaust gases may be highly toxic and the engine life short. Our effort was
focused on a simple device for checking on gasoline grade. Our method uses 1
to 2 drops of fuel and takes 1 or 2 seconds to determine whether the gasoline
really is of the labeled grade. The hand-held instrument does not need utility
power and can be used in the field. It is fabricated in Ukraine and priced at
$150 to $200. When the seller's grade does not correspond to the instrument
reading, one should refer to more specific techniques for determination of the
fuel fractional composition, octane number, chemical group composition etc.
It is highly desirable to set up a center for fuel check-up on an absolutely
independent basis. Such a center should be unbiased, self-standing and open
to everybody. It might be run by the city executive committee but never by the
commercial companies dealing in fuel.
V.M. Golushko (Deputy Manager, Agency for Customer Protection).
We have a right to check the quality of petroleum products since late 1997.
We have inspected about 30 gas-filling stations and in 80 % of cases had to
block the sales because of lacking certificates or poor quality. The problem of
mixing various grades does exist but lends itself to control. Another potential
trouble is the location of gas-filling stations that are often situated near the
Dnieper River. No precautions against leaks are made.
As Prof. V.M. Nabivach, Dr. V.A. Gerasimenko informed about
problem of automotive fuel: quality and environmental safety, motor vehicle
pollution is ever increasing, a great many hazardous compounds being
discharged near the ground not only on highways but also in housing areas. Of
all the ingredients of automotive fuel, aromatic hydrocarbons are the most
toxic, benzene being the worst for its carcinogenic properties. Toluene and
xylene have narcotic action. Fuel composition is a major factor that
determines which compounds are present in the exhaust gases. Over 500
organic compounds have been reported in exhaust gases, including the initial
ingredients and also polycyclic aromatics, of which 3,4-benzopyrene is the
nastiest. The level of this carcinogen in exhaust gases increases with increased
initial concentration of aromatics in the fuel. Other data suggest that lowering
William Zadorsky 43
emissions of benzopyrene and fuel soot, its carrier, is the quickest way to a
healthier urban atmosphere.
The gasolines used in industrialized countries display high octane
numbers while having no more than 43 % aromatics and up to 2 % benzene.
As regards Ukrainian products, the respective values may be at 62 % and 4.6
% for gasolines produced by oil refineries and as high as 77 % and 26 % for
products of coke plants.
In order to achieve dramatic reductions in hazardous emissions to air
in urban areas, it is therefore recommended that the domestic standards for
gasoline limit benzene to 2 % and total aromatics to 45 %.
As informed Dr. A.I. Korableva from Institute for Environmental
Management and Ecology under the National Academy of Sciences of
Ukraine in the report "Environmental impact of automobile transport by
example of Dnepropetrovsk", Dnepropetrovsk with its annual discharge of air
pollutants of 177,000 t (as of 1996) is among the worst affected cities in
Ukraine. In these, the automobile transport was found to be responsible for at
least 30 % of the total emissions which are 15 times the maximum permissible
level. Aside from the dust, chemical, photochemical and noise pollution, there
is the aspect of street washout of automobile-related pollutants into the River
Dnieper. The measured annual receipts of lead, particulates and petroleum
derivatives via rainwater and thaw water to the river are 0.45, 80,000+ and
1.8+ t respectively. The actual levels of petroleum derivatives in storm water
sometimes were 206 times the maximum permissible concentration (MPC) for
the fishery basins. At 34 km downstream from the city, the estimated levels of
petroleum derivatives and particulates are 61 and 10.8 times the respective
MPCs. The airborne lead is mainly accumulated in the soil of housing areas.
And, at last, Prof. E.A. Derkachev, Dr. L.B. Ogir, Dr. A.A.
Shevchenko, A.P. Shtepa, V.V. Sotnikov, V.I. Sviridov, G.P. Isaeva from
Dnepropetrovsk State Medical Academy it their report "Hygienic assessment
of automobile transport impact on the environmental situation and public
health in Dnepropetrovsk" informed, that:
1. Soil, being one of the most stable elements of the environment, may serve
as an indicator of long-time pollution with specific agents like heavy metals.
2. The distribution of lead in the soil in Dnepropetrovsk suggests that the
pollutant is mostly supplied by automobile transport via exhaust gases.
3. Lead pollution level is predictive of a number of diseases in the affected
population.
4. Reliable correlations were found between lead concentrations in the soil
and the incidence rates in the population of Dnepropetrovsk. In the adults, the
pollution levels were associated with complications in pregnancy and
delivery, diseases of urogenital, nervous and bone-and-muscular system,
blood problems and tumors. In the children, the blood, blood forming organs,
respiratory system and the muscles and bones were most frequently affected.
5. Comprehensive measures for abatement of automobile-related pollution in

Dnepropetrovsk are needed.
The Symposium adopted the following resolution that deems it
necessary:
1) to introduce new governmental specifications for automotive fuels with a
view to limiting the aromatic contents in harmony with international
standards, to effect more stringent control of fuel quality and to impose
restrictions on sales of adulterated fuels;
2) to implement state-of-the-art computerized systems for assessment and
prediction of transportation effects on environment;
3) to carry out certification of bodies having a right to sell automotive fuels
and to put a heavy environmental tax on low quality fuel to be paid by both
the producer and the distributor;
4) to use state-of-the-art additives enabling a more nearly complete fuel
combustion and therefore improved environmental performance of vehicles;
5) to highlight that accidents involving hazardous freights, particularly
massive at railroads, are a challenge. According to the incomplete data
available, hundreds of these occur at NIS railroads, so that one-time
discharges of hazardous substances pose considerable threats to people and
environment. The environmental monitoring of transportation is not up to the
mark, advanced air purification and water treatment processes are not
employed on a sufficient level, the waste management is inadequate, and the
work on cleaner transportation has just started;
6) to consider as particularly urgent the problem of prevention and elimination
of consequences of accidents in transportation of hazardous freights in the
territory of Ukraine, and to develop proper techniques and facilities for the
relevant transportation bodies;
7) to use the experience in environmental information monitoring gained by
the Laboratory for Environment Protection at the Pridneprovskaya Railroad
and to have the Ecotrans information retrieval system cover the entire railroad
network of Ukraine;
8) to start R&D on waste management for the transportation companies;
9) to implement ideas and practices of constructive ecology, like closed-
circuit water systems, on a broader scale;
10) to deem it necessary to gear Dnepropetrovsk Center for Standardization
and the Consumer society to attack on the overall problem;
11) in view of the positive feedback from environmentalists in the region, to
launch regular publication of Constructive Ecology and Business journal in
1999 and further on. To appeal to management of major industrial and
transportation companies for support; and
12) to inform Dnepropetrovsk City Council, the Ministry of Transportation
and the Ukrainian Railroad Company about the Symposium output and
resolutions.
Besides I would like to inform you about the current situation with
automotive fuels in Russia, mainly in Moscow, and in Kazakhstan
William Zadorsky 45
(Almaty) from the viewpoints of engine operation, fuel production,

commercial trends and government regulation. International experience in
these fields is also covered. Considering the quality of fuels available in
Russia (and Ukraine), ways to achieve a more nearly complete combustion are
to be preferred to reliance on catalytic converters. A number of additives are
covered, including the following ones produced in Russia:
Molilat: Lubricity additive containing molybdenum disulfide for improved
resistance to wear, pitting and fretting. Reduces noise, increases maximum
speed and engine life and cuts fuel consumption.
Molilat-2M: Metal-depositing additive for recovering compression in the
cylinders and pressure in the lubrication system of worn engines. Improves
power performance, saves fuel and oil, reduces noise and smoking of the
exhaust. Guaranteed compatibility with all mineral oils.
Udav: Lubricity additive applicable for new and old engines alike and
compatible with any mineral lubricant. Contains ultrafine diamond powder for
special friction. Reduces noise, wear and smoking while improving power and
extending engine life.
Aspekt-Modifikator-U: Single-use agent which produces a thin porous
film capable of retaining lubricant on the surface of engine and transmission
components. Reduces noise, wear, varnish formation and fuel consumption
and improves detergency.
Aspekt-Modifikator: Versatile fuel additive that neutralizes water,
prevents corrosion and ice formation in the fuel system while improving
engine environmental performance.
RiMet: Lubricity additive for motor and transmission oils. Contains ultrafine
particles of a special alloy. Reduces wear and smoking, cuts fuel and oil
consumption and improves compression.
Turbo-Oktan 115: A small-pack version of Feterol for increasing the octane
number directly in the fuel tank. The agent eliminates detonation, enhances
power and extends engine life while its excess of oxygen improves
combustion and thus reduces pollution.
Forum: Wear-preventive additive containing polytetrafluoroethylene particles
0.4 micrometers in diameter. Dramatically reduces noise and oil loss.
As for Ukraine, it has Renoks, an antidetonation modifier developed
by Prof. Yu. Merezhko of the Ukrainian State University of Chemical
Engineering in Dnepropetrovsk. It offers a 1.5 to 2-fold reduction in pollutant
emissions and an 8 % cut in fuel consumption at the cost of 1.0 to 1.5 % of
fuel price. Also available are Remol-2 and Remol-2A produced by Remol in
Odessa. These oil additives can be recommended for both carburetor and
diesel engines after 40,000 km run to recover and stabilize compression, save
up to 8 % fuel, protect engine components and reduce hazardous substances in
exhaust gases.
The multipurpose fuel modifiers T-4 and T-6 produced by ADIOZ
company of Kiev were covered in the previous issue.
Mazut fuel emulsification. The Dnepropetrovsk national
university for a number of years deals with the complex problems of
power system connected to economy of fuel and protection of an environment.

In this sense the direction connected to use water-fuel emulsion is perspective.
Within the framework of this direction emulsification systems for liquid fuel
are developed in view of individual conditions of the customer. The systems
developed by their emulsification fuel are successfully maintained on some
enterprises of Ukraine.
The known data are put in a basis of development on an
intensification of process of burning and reduction of toxic emissions at
burning in furnace (the chamber of combustion) water-fuel emulsion. The
comparative data on burning waterless and emulsified fuel show, that
emulsified fuel burns down much faster waterless, thus burning water-black
oil emulsion in furnaces provides economy of 10-15 % of black oil in
comparison with burning of clean fuel. Besides one of the factors determining
efficiency of use water – fuel – emulsion (WFE) in котельно-топочных
processes, the opportunity on their basis is to solve a number of environmental
problems. WFE burning reduces a pollution emissions of NОх in gas
(approximately on 50 %), approximately in 3-4 times reduces emission of
carbon black adjournment, reduces emissions of benzapirene in 2-3 times, etc.
The greatest economic benefit and simultaneous decrease of gas
emissions provides addition in fuel of 10-15 % of water, and the greatest
ecological effect regarding recycling the waters polluted with organic
products is realized at a level of a water phase up to 50 %. The physical
features of burning distinguishing WFE as new fuel in comparison with
known, are defined substantially by imperfection existing sprayer devices.
The last practically are not capable to provide dispersion of liquid fuel on a
level of dispersiveness of less than 100 microns. At the same time the drops of
emulsion with such size, created by sprayer devices contains some thousand
micro- drops of water. To this in a high-temperature zone of furnace chambers
the drop of emulsion blows up and occurs secondary dispersion fuel. This
effect is especially important at burning coal pitch and heavy extra-heavy oils
used in metallurgy. As a result of such microexplosions in furnace there are
centers of turbulent pulsations and the number of elementary drops of fuel due
to what the torch increases in volume increases and in regular more intervals
fills the furnace chamber that results in alignment of a temperature field of
furnace with reduction of local maximal temperatures and increase in average
temperature in furnace; to increase of luminosity of a torch due to increase in
a surface of radiation; to essential reduction underburning of the fuel; allows
to lower quantity of blown air and to reduce connected with it heat loss.
Simultaneously in a torch occur the catalytic reactions conducting to reduction
of harmful gas emissions. The opportunity of reduction of quantity of blown
air at burning water-fuel emulsions is rather important, as according to skilled
given efficiencies of the boiler unit at reduction of factor of surplus of air on
0,1 increases for 1 %.
And at last I would like to inform you about our proposals at
Systems approach to cleaner transportation using. The transportation-
William Zadorsky 47
highway complex is a major air polluter, with the motor vehicles accounting
for about 70 %, the rolling stock 25 %, the aircraft 2 %, the road-building
machines 1.4 % and the vessels 1 % of the total transportation-related
pollution. The morbidity in urban areas was found to correlate with the size
and intensity of operation of the vehicle fleet. In rural areas, carcinogens
originating from vehicle exhaust gases tend to accumulate in plants grown
near highways.
The general issue of cleaner transport may be approached using the
approximation of a closed system including man, nature and transport in
which various feedbacks and feedforwards exist between all subsystems.
Following specific environmental problems may further be recognized that
relate to: running gear, engines,fuels,cargo carriage,cargo reloading, passenger
compartments, infrastructure, and accidents.
The systems approach applied here enables treatment of hierarchic levels for
each specific type of transport.
A quantitative characteristic of environmental safety and an algorithm
of environmental safeguarding is suggested that may help find and select the
best engineering solutions.
The algorithm includes the following steps:
1. Processing the initial information to determine the appropriate
hierarchic levels and especially those that control the
pollution.
2. Selecting methods to influence the system.
A major aspect of environmental safeguarding is the abolishment of
«bulk» neutralization of pollutants in a mixed fluid flow. It must be replaced
by local action taken, wherever possible, on a component-by-component basis
as close to the origin as may be, and preferably inside the source. This is just
the opposite of currently prevailing systems where the entire spectrum of
pollutants are collected and neutralized and/or recycled. Moreover, the local
treatment performed close to the source is less expensive, if one takes into
account all relevant costs. Since vehicles mostly rely on combustion for their
energy, the safeguarding methods will include:
- minimizing residence time and providing an excess of one of the reagents,
resulting in reduced formation of side products,
- recuperation or looping of the matter and energy flows enabling a more
nearly ideal combustion and reduced rates of side processes,
- heterogenization to suppress formation of side products by the removal of
the target product from the reaction zone at the instant of its formation, and
adaptive processes and hardware for more reliable operation due to improved
flexibility, helping reduce discharges during idle running and acceleration.
3. Engineering and economic analysis of the available
safeguarding approaches and methods.
4. Selecting the economically and environmentally optimal
safeguarding alternative.
5. Making request for proposal to design the safeguarding system

adopted.
6. Preparing a business plan to carry out the safeguarding project.
Any comprehensive project to process wastes and side products
should not be developed before the completion of the safeguarding designing
for the transportation system.
The most effective direction for ecologization of the fuel burning
process is the use of water- fuel emulsions with the soluble in water catalytic
non- corroding additions and ultrasonic mixing by the sharp superheated
steam. At development of our suggestions we came from that fact, that
exhaust gases of combustion engines contain a generous amount of the
organic and inorganic compounds, distributed between the gas phase and
phase, being microparticles, 90% from which have sizes less than 1 mk.
These particles are adsorbed on its surface of hundred chemicals, including
mutagennie and carcinogenic matters. Mass of these particles is very small,
and therefore its are inhalable dust. A gas phase contains, including
benzapiren and oxides of nitrogen, which are predecessors of acid rain.
These exhausts cause at man the allergic reactions and can lead to different
pulmonary and cardiovascular diseases, including the cancer.
Decreasing of the oxides of nitrogen and microparticles emissions,
traditionally includes the use of catalytic converters. These methods are
very difficult and require the large capital investments, that limits their
commercial applicability. Addition of water to the fuel, multiplies mass of
the air-fuel mixture, entered in time unit, resulting in the improved dispersion
and mixing.The improvement of interfusion causes more high speed of freed
of heat and growth of pressure, that results in formation of more high
maximal pressure in the combustion chamber of engine. Water also lowers a
spades temperature of burning fuels, that in same queue conduces to the
diminished formation of oxides of nitrogen.
Reduction of the formation of oxides of nitrogen proportionally to
maintenance of water in fuel and relies on many factors. Addition of 8-25%
water allows to decrease of CO emission to 40-70%, soot - to 40-60%, heavy
hydrocarbons (including benzapiren) – to 70%.
Unlike the known approaches we develop the use of water- fuel
emulsions with the soluble in water catalytic non- corroding additions and
ultrasonic mixing by the sharp superheated steam for reduction of the oxides
of nitrogen and soot emission in the combustion engines. Our know how is
also the use of the electro-activated water for emulgation. The first results
testify the technical and economic expedience of the chosen direction.
Subject Index
A Chemical detectors, 210

Chemical warfare agents, 245
Acetylcholinesterase, 245, 249 Choline esterase, 237
Acetylthiocholine sensor, 247, 248 Choline oxidase, 237
Advanced Concept Technology Communications and Information
Demonstration, 92 Technology, 52
Aerosol Time-of-Flight Mass Crimean–Congo hemorrhagic fever, 51,
Spectrometry, 119, 127 53
Aflatoxin, 39, 40, 253, 269 Cyanobacterial toxin, 36, 44
Amperometric biosensors, 236
Anatoxin, 38, 44 D
Antibodies, 232, 262, 298
AnzenBio, 89 Dielectrophoresis, 130, 131, 142
ATOFMS system, 121, 122, 127 DNA hybridization, 166, 190
Autonomous Pathogen Detection System, DNA LCD, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313,
67, 104 317, 318, 319, 320, 325, 327, 329,
Azospirillum brasilense, 149, 157, 160 332, 333
DNA-probe, 120
B DNAzymes, 200
Domestic Demonstration and Application
Bacillus anthracis, 20, 120, 125, 143 Programs, 91, 93
Bacillus subtilis, 121, 123, 125, 126, 127, Drug, 44, 108
139
BESOI wafers, 276, 279 E
Bioaerosol, 70, 121, 128
Biological Aerosol Sentry and Electronic nose, 271
Information System, 91, 94 Electro-Optical Analyzer, 145, 216
Biological warfare agents, 119, 208, 262 Electropolymerized films, 165, 172
Biosurveillance system, 21 EO spectral analysis, 152, 154
Biotinylated polypyrrole films, 170 Epidemiology and Surveillance, 52
BioWatch defense system, 91 Escherichia coli, 132, 142, 147, 149, 160,
Botulinum toxin, 31, 32, 33, 209 163
Brucellosis, 54 E-SMART® program, 216
Euglena gracilis, 141
C
F
CD-Spectrometer, 332
Cell Physiometry tools, 129 Francisella tularensis, 143, 221, 222,
Chem.-Bio Emergency Management 223, 228, 229, 231, 232
Information System, 97
336 SUBJECT INDEX
G multichannel electrochemical biosensor,

225
GMP standards, 107 multichannel optical detector, 218
Gram-positive bacteria, 133 Multiple Displacement Amplification, 89
Mycobacterium tuberculosis, 291, 292,
H 299
mycotoxin, 45
hand-held electrochemical biosensor, 213
herpes, 51, 53 N
human chorionic gonadotropin, 214
human luteinizing hormone, 214 Nanobiosensors, 175
Nanomechanical biosensors, 175, 189,
I 191
Nanotechnology, 142, 196
Immunochromatographic test-system, Natural toxins, 29, 30
298 Networked biosensors, 219
Infectious diseases, 9 Newcastle disease, 53
Integrated, 51, 52, 186, 196, 262
ISFET chip, 277, 278 O
J Optoelectronics biosensors, 175
K P
kolibacteriosis, 51, 53 parovavirus, 51, 53

Pelikan system, 264
L Pesticides, 235
phage transfection, 154
laboratory-on-a-chip, 22 phosphoorganic chemical weapons, 292
Laser, 119, 120, 128, 216, 217, 218 phosphoorganic insecticides, 292
Laser-Based Point Detector, 216, 217 photopatterning, 166
Legionella pneumophila, 291, 292, 299, plague, 51, 52, 53, 208, 209
300 polyelectrolytes, 241, 291, 292, 293, 295,
Liquid crystalline dispersions, 306, 333 296, 297, 301
polymerase chain reaction, 73, 83, 100,
M 120, 219, 222, 231, 232
Potentiometric biosensor, 236
M. lysodeikticus, 133 PROACT program, 91, 97, 98, 102
Mach-Zehnder interferometer, 175, 176, Promega’s MagneSil® technology, 88
183, 185, 186, 195
MALDI-TOF-MS, 120 Q
microarray technology, 207, 212
microbead-based assays, 72 Quality assurance, 116
Microcantilever biosensors, 175, 177 Quality control, 107
microelectronics technology, 22, 175, Quality Policy Certification, 105
176, 188
Militarily Critical Technologies List, 19 R
Molecularly Imprinted Polymers, 267,
271 Ricin, 33, 34, 43, 208
MS spectra, 125 rotavirus, 51, 53
SUBJECT INDEX 337
S thermocycler, 74
tick-borne encephalitis, 51
salivary peroxidase, 214 Total Internal Reflection, 179
salmonella, 9, 54 Toxins, 44, 208, 209, 269
salmonellosis, 51, 53 triazine herbicides, 292
Sample collection, 78 tryptophan, 124, 125
Saxitoxin, 35, 36 Tularemia, 104
Screen-printed electrode, 247
Secure and Sustainable Disease, 51, 52 U
self assembled monolayers, 274
sensor array, 273, 274, 275, 276, 279, Universal Mobile Telecommunications
280, 286, 288 System, 178
sequential injection analysis, 71 UNMOVIC, 48, 49
silicon cantilevers, 191 UNSCOM, 47, 48, 49, 50
SpinCon® technology, 80 UV-LIF, 217, 218
Staphylococcus aureus, 295
Surface Plasmon Resonance Sensor, 175, V
176, 195
Surveillance System, 51, 52 Validation testing, 106, 108, 109
viruses, 18, 20, 29, 54, 72, 87, 99, 120,
T 148, 176, 208, 215, 233, 241, 292, 294
TaqMan assay, 74 W
Telomerase, 203
testing requirements, 106 West Nile Fever, 18, 22, 55

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Defense against Bioterror

Detection Technologies, Implementation Strategies

A. Chemistry and Biology (Springer Science and Business Media)

Series B Physics and Biophysics – ol.

Published in cooperation with NATO Public Diplomacy Division

ISBN-10 1-4020-3385-0 (PB)

Printed on acid-free paper

All Rights Reserved

Printed in the Netherlands.

Strategic Actionable Net-Centric Biological Defense System 17

Natural Toxins: The Past And The Present 29

Biological Weapons Inspections- The Iraq Experience 47

Integrated, Secure And Sustainable Disease Surveillance System In

A Network-Ready, Broad Spectrum, Environmental Pathogen Detection

Concept Design Of Anautonomous Biological Agent Detector System

Role Of Prototype System Demonstrations In The Development Of

Validation Testing For Biological Threat Organisms 105

Development Of Bioaerosol Alarming Detector 119

Biodetection Using Micro-Physiometry Tools Based On Electrokinetic

Electro-optical Technique For Detection And Identification Of Biological

Detection Of Microbial Cells With Electrooptical Analysis 147

Recent Advances In Electrochemical And Photochemical Transduction

Technological Platforms Based On Micro/Nanobiosensors As Early Warning

Catalytic Beacons For The Detection Of DNA And Telomerase Activity199

Critical Elements Of Biological Sensor Technology For Deployment

Electrochemical Immunosensor For Detection Of Francisella

Biosensors And Nanotechnological Immunochips For The Detection And

Biosensor For Defence Against Terrorism 245

Biosensors And Biomimetic Sensors For The Detection Of Drugs, Toxins

Chemical Multi-Sensor Arrays For Liquids Monolithic Integration Using

Immunochemical Approaches For Rapid Detection Of Biologically Active

Multifunctional Liquid-Crystalline DNA Based Biosensing Units Capable

Instability in warfare arises when offense significantly outstrips defense.

This volume contains papers presented at the NATO Advanced

Cranfield University Silsoe Bedfordshire, MK45 4DT UK Phone 44 0

Institute of Biochemistry RAS Leniskii Prospect 33 Moscow, 110971

Phone 46 46 17 18 67/17 11 30 Fax 46 56 13 74 14

CURRENT PROBLEMS OF CHEMICAL

Department of Military Toxicology, Military Medical Academy, Sofia , Bulgaria

Keywords: antidotes; Anti Terrorist Management Centers; chemical; chemical industry;

The main problem connected with chemical terrorism is that, beside

The main problem connected with chemical terrorism is that beside

• CW represent a relatively small number of potential agents; on

- 21% - polychlorinated biphenyls (2 %), unspecified chemicals (5%) and

• Stationary centers for indication of toxic chemicals that work online

• analysis of the available system for defense, security and

display multi-threat efficacy for the inflammatory pathogenesis of both classes

Nowadays, terrorists have changed their tactics. Beside chemical

An emerging energy demand/supply imbalance

“The end of cheap oil”

Dangerous impacts on the global economy - a non-

Changes in oil market leadership

Iraq approaching “boil-over”

“While there are now no known national threats to the

Technology transfer stifled

The Caucasus impasse

North African surprises

x Actions by environmental groups (e.g. the seizure of The Brent

Threats to pipelines: an Iraqi case study

Tribal unrest on tribal boundaries is endemic.

Abstract: Technologies required for strategic actionable net-centric biological defense

The overarching objectives in developing effective countermeasures to

D. Morrison et al. (eds.), Defense against Bioterror: Detection Technologies, Implementation