CBRN weapons

Thematic Study Clingendael

Strategic Monitor 2017

Sico van der Meer

CBRN weapons
Thematic Study Clingendael Strategic Monitor 2017

Sico van der Meer

February 2017
February 2017

© Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’

© Cover photo: Ministry of Defence

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About the Author

Sico van der Meer is affiliated to the Clingendael Institute as a Research Fellow. His research
focuses in particular on cybersecurity and weapons of mass destruction.

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Contents

Introduction  1

Threat assessment  2

The international CBRN weapons regime  11

Conclusion  17

Appendix: Figures  18
Introduction

The risk that chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons will be
deployed seems low at first glance, in view of the small number of incidents with
these weapons in the past. However, if such an incident does occur, it could have
major consequences. This contribution attempts, on the basis of a number of selected
indicators, to create a threat assessment for the coming five years (2016‑2021).
The concusion is that a small but worrying increasing in threats stemming from CBRN
weapons may be expected. In particular, the tensions between major powers, the
threatened breakdown of the multilateral non-proliferation and disarmament system
and the growing threat of non-state actors play a role in this. In addition, this analysis
considers the extent to which positive or negative developments in international
cooperation can be expected in the coming five years.

1
Threat assessment

Introduction

Due the large-scale death and destruction that Chemical, Biological and Nuclear (CBN)
weapons may produce, these types of weapons have traditionally formed a seperate
category. Radiological weapons (often referred to as ‘dirty bombs’) are not weapons
of mass destruction, but due to their psychological impact, they are often equated
with these; this is why they have been added in the term ‘CBRN’ weapons. The spread
of weapons of mass destruction remains a serious threat, the European Union (EU)
concluded in its recently-published Global Strategy.1 In addition to the Global Strategy,
the relevance of the strategy against the spread of weapons of mass destruction, dating
from 2003, remains unchanged within the EU. 2 In Dutch policy, the threat of CBRN
weapons is also given high priority.3

1 European Union Global Strategy, Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy
for the European Union’s Foreign And Security Policy, June 2016, https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/sites/
globalstrategy/files/eugs_review_web.pdf.
2 Council of the European Union, EU strategy against proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction,
December 2003, http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f= ST%2015708%202003%20INIT
3 International Security Strategy, Letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Dutch House of
Representatives, 21 June 2013, https://www.eerstekamer.nl/behandeling/20130621/brief_regering_
internationale/document3/f=/vjb5n1rn84zh.pdf; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Further information on the
Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) threat’, Letter to the Dutch Senate, 26 September
2016, https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/regering/inhoud/bewindspersonen/bert-koenders/documenten/
kamerstukken/2016/09/27/kamerbrief-met-nadere-informatie-over-de-cbrn-dreiging

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CBRN weapons | Clingendael Strategic Monitor 2017

Table 1 CBRN threat assessment

Trend table CBRN weapons Trend

Base rates Chemical weapon stockpiles

Nuclear weapon stockpiles

Factors Expansion of arsenal

Modernisation of weapons

Escalation potential

Non-state actors’ access to CBRN weapons

Impact on European security interests in 2016 and 2021

Territorial Economic Societal Ecologic Technological

2021
2016 2021 2016 &
2016 2021 2021 2021
2016 2016

Probability of the threat’s occurrence in 2021

Impossible Certain

Actors responsible for the threat

State Hybrid Non-state

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CBRN weapons | Clingendael Strategic Monitor 2017

The base rate

What is to be expected for 2021? At the state level, developments regarding weapons
of mass destruction are fairly stable over the long term (see Table 1). Only a handful of
countries possesses such weapons and the countries suspected of developing these in
recent years can be counted on the fingers of one hand. In statistical terms, the picture
even looks quite good: in the past 10 years, the number of countries with chemical
weapons has fallen slightly (see Figure 1 and in the Appendix Figure A). The destruction
of Schedule 1-chemicals (the type used exclusively for chemical weapons) has risen
from 10 to 60 metric tons since 2004. Two countries in particular have dismantled their
arsenal in the past decade: Libya and Syria. In addition, a number of countries (the US
and Russia) have been working on the destruction of their chemical weapons for almost
20 years.4

Figure 1 Cumulative number of reported and destroyed chemical weapons, Schedule 15

70K

60K

50K
Number of metric tons

40K

30K

20K

10K

0K
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Year

Chemical weapons
Number of metric tons reported Number of metric tons destroyed

4 OPCW, The Chemical Weapons Ban: Facts and Figures, https://www.opcw.org/news-publications/

publications/facts-and-figures/.
5 OPCW, Annual Reports, 2004-2014, https://www.opcw.org/documents-reports/annual-reports/.
Schedule 1 chemicals can be used for chemical weapons and for almost no other purposes. A state
may possess no more than 1 metric ton of these chemical weapons (see: OPCW, Regime for Schedule 1
Chemicals and Facilities Related to such Chemicals, Annex on Implementation and Verification, Part VI,
https://www.opcw.org/chemical-weapons-convention/annexes/verification-annex/part-vi/).

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CBRN weapons | Clingendael Strategic Monitor 2017

However, the decrease in the number of countries with chemical weapons is

accompanied by an increase in the number of countries with nuclear weapons: since
2006 (first nuclear test explosion), North Korea has been included in the number of
states with nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, in absolute terms, the number of nuclear
weapons in the worlds is gradually falling (in particular with regard to the holders of the
largest numbers, the US and Russia: see Figures 2 and 3).6

Figure 2 Absolute numbers of nuclear weapons per country7

15K
nuclear weapons
Number of

10K

5K

0K
Number of readily deployable

15K
nuclear weapons

10K

5K

0K
2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015
Year

Country
United States France North Korea
Russia India Pakistan
China Israel United Kingdom

6 Kile, S.N., and Kristensen, H.M. 2016. ‘Trends in nuclear forces, 2016’, SIPRI, June, https://www.sipri.org/
sites/default/files/FS%201606%20WNF_Embargo_Final%20A.pdf.
7 Military arsenals: Kristensen, H.M. and Norris, R.S. 2013. ‘Global nuclear weapons inventories, 1945-2013’,
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 16 October, http://thebulletin.org/2013/september/global-nuclear-
weapons-inventories-1945-2013; Deployable nuclear weapons: SIPRI, Yearbooks 2004-2015,
http://www.sipriyearbook.org/.

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CBRN weapons | Clingendael Strategic Monitor 2017

Figure 3 Absolute numbers of nuclear weapons per country (without the US

and Russia) 8

1000
nuclear weapons
Number of

500

0
Number of readily deployable

1000
nuclear weapons

500

0
2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015
Year

Country
China India North Korea United Kingdom
France Israel Pakistan

Determining factors

However, these figures do not tell the whole story. There are four factors suggesting
that the threat will have grown by 2021 (see Table 1 again): 1) expansion of the nuclear
arsenal by a number of states; 2) modernisation of weapons by virtually all nuclear
powers; 3) growing tensions between major powers; and 4) the greater role of non-state
actors.

Firstly, Figure 3 shows an increase in the nuclear weapons of China, India, Pakistan and,
of course, North Korea. Although there is no complete certainty, it seems that these
four countries are expanding their nuclear arsenals.9 There is also the Iran question,
which may have been smoothed over for the time being, but which, in view of the large
group of opponents to the agreement in both Iran and the US, could flare up again at
any time. An investigation of Syria by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for
illegal development of nuclear arms has been in progress ever since a mysterious Israeli
bombardment of a suspected illegal nuclear installation in 2007.

8 Ibid.
9 Kile and Kristensen, op. cit.

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CBRN weapons | Clingendael Strategic Monitor 2017

Secondly, almost all states with nuclear weapons are working on modernisation of
their arsenals.10 The US, Russia and the UK are relatively open about their costly
modernisation plans, while for countries such as India and Israel, this currently involves
(supported) rumours.11 Modernisation could mean both improvement of nuclear
weapons themselves and improvement of means of transmission, such as rockets
and submarines.

Thirdly, it is highly probable that the slight downward trend for nuclear arms has come
to an end as a result of growing international tensions. Status quo could be the new
trend in that regard. The main reason for this is the growing Russian-Western tensions,
which do not favour new disarmament steps.12 Diminishing trust and increasing tensions
also give cause for concern for other reasons. History teaches us that growing tensions
between countries with weapons of mass destruction increase the risk of their use.
Although these weapons have a high deployment barrier, unintended escalation can
occur in situations of high tension. For example, tensions can result in misunderstanding
or miscommunication. In these situations, decisions may be taken in the heat of the
moment that would previously have been regarded as unthinkable. Examples of this
include the Cuban crisis in 1962 and the Able Archer exercise of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organisation (NATO) in 1983, which led to great alarm in the Soviet Union.13 The
risk of accidents with these weapons also increases in tense situations; for instance,
incidents with failing warning systems have almost led to the deployment of nuclear
weapons in the past.14 Some nuclear arms states appear to have a relatively low
deployment barrier – in particular, Pakistan – as a result of which escalation of existing
tensions could lead sooner to a nuclear conflict, possibly with global consequences

10 Kristensen, H.M., and Norris, R.S. 2014. ‘Slowing nuclear weapon reductions and endless nuclear weapon
modernizations: A challenge to the NPT’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August, 70(4), 94-107,
http://bos.sagepub.com/content/70/4/94.full.
11 For example: Levy, A. 2015. ‘India Is Building a Top-Secret Nuclear City to Produce Thermonuclear
Weapons, Experts Say’, Foreign Policy, 16 December, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/12/16/india_nuclear_
city_top_secret_china_pakistan_barc/.
12 ‘Russia v America: Going nuclear’, The Economist, 8 October 2016, http://www.economist.com/news/
europe/21708251-angry-over-sanctions-russia-suspends-arms-control-deal-going-nuclear.
13 Hoffman, D.E. 2015. ‘In 1983 ‘war scare,’ Soviet leadership feared nuclear surprise attack by
U.S.’, Washington Post, 24 October, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/
in-1983-war-scare-soviet-leadership-feared-nuclear-surprise-attack-by-us/2015/10/24/15a289b4-7904-
11e5-a958-d889faf561dc_story.html.
14 Lewis, P., et al. 2014. ‘Too Close for Comfort: Cases of Near Nuclear Use and Options for Policy’,
Chatham House Report, https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_
document/20140428TooCloseforComfortNuclearUseLewisWilliamsPelopidasAghlani.pdf; Barrett, A.M.
2016. ‘False alarms, true dangers? Current and future risks of inadvertent US-Russian nuclear war’, RAND
Perspective, No. 191, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE100/PE191/RAND_
PE191.pdf.

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CBRN weapons | Clingendael Strategic Monitor 2017

for the environment and climate.15 At the same time, in statistical terms, countries with
weapons of mass destruction are not involved in conflicts more frequently than other
countries and verbal tensions do not automatically translate into concrete tensions and
escalation potential.

Fourthly, non-state actors also appear to constitute a larger threat in the field of CBRN
weapons. Although it is difficult for them to develop CBRN weapons and deploy these
effectively, the signs that terrorist organisations, in particular, have an interest in such
weapons are cause for concern.16 The combination of the will, available time and
advancing technologies that simplify production of such weapons could lead to their use
by terrorists in the coming 10 years.17 The availability (online) of increasingly accessible
chemical, biological and nuclear knowledge and materials makes such scenarios more
likely than in the past – reference is made to a democratisation of the ‘life sciences’ and
‘do-it-yourself’ chemistry and biology, but that democratisation also entails less positive
security aspects. At present, there are indications that particularly in Syria, (improvised)
chemical weapons have been deployed by both state and non-state actors.18 The Syrian
regime is alleged to have used chlorine gas and Islamic State (IS) mustard gas.19 Since
2013, the United Nations (UN) and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons (OPCW) have been conducting an investigation in Syria into irregularities in
the declaration of chemical weapons in 2013 and potential illegal use of such weapons.

15 Joshi, S. 2013. ‘Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear Nightmare: Deja Vu?’, The Washington Quarterly, 159-172,
https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/TWQ_13Summer_Joshi.
pdf; Meer, S. van der, 2015. ‘De knalroze flamingo: Nucleaire oorlog India en Pakistan’, OneWorld,
29 December, https://www.oneworld.nl/vrede-veiligheid/de-knalroze-flamingo-nucleaire-oorlog-india-en-
pakistan.
16 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Further information on the Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear
(CBRN) threat’, Letter to the Dutch Senate, 26 September 2016, https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/regering/
inhoud/bewindspersonen/bert-koenders/documenten/kamerstukken/2016/09/27/kamerbrief-met-nadere-
informatie-over-de-cbrn-dreiging
17 Caves, J.P. and Carus, W.S. 2014. ‘The Future of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Their Nature and Role in
2030, Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction’ National Defense University Press, Occasional
Paper No. 10, 45-46, http://wmdcenter.ndu.edu/Portals/97/Documents/Publications/Occasional%20
Papers/10_Future%20of%20WMD.pdf; Unal, B. and Aghlani, S. 2016. ‘Use of chemical, biological,
radiological and nuclear weapons by non-state actors. Emerging trends and risk factors’, Lloyd’s & Chatham
House, https://www.lloyds.com/news-and-insight/risk-insight/library/society-and-security/cbrn.
18 Third report of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative
Mechanism, United Nations Security Council, Document S/2016/738, 24 August 2016, http://www.un.org/
ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol= S/2016/738.
19 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Further information on the Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear
(CBRN) threat’, Letter to the Dutch Senate, 26 September 2016, https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/regering/
inhoud/bewindspersonen/bert-koenders/documenten/kamerstukken/2016/09/27/kamerbrief-met-nadere-
informatie-over-de-cbrn-dreiging

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CBRN weapons | Clingendael Strategic Monitor 2017

Biological weapons are more difficult to make than chemical weapons, but incidents in
the recent past (for example, the anthrax letters in the US in 2001) show that possibilities
for terrorists exist here too, certainly now that the technology and knowledge in the field
of bio-sciences are also developing fast. More or less the same applies for radiological
weapons.20

In view of the developments described above, a slight increase in the threat of the
deployment of CBRN weapons by 2021 is expected. For nuclear weapons, the tensions
between major powers appear to represent a greater threat for the time being. In the
field of chemical weapons, major strides have been made in relation to disarmament,
but the interest of non-state actors in chemical weapons gives rise to a slightly rising
trend in the threat. The latter also applies for biological and radiological weapons.
To place matters in perspective, however, it is good to remember that the last time that
CBRN weapons were used on any significant scale in Europe was already a century ago
(during the First World War).

Impact and shocks

The deployment barrier for CBRN weapons remains high, so that the risk of their actual
use can, in itself, be regarded as ‘not probable’. However, the impact of such an incident
could be enormous - a typical case of ‘low probability, high impact’. Roughly speaking,
a CBRN incident can vary from the use of an improvised chemical weapon by terrorists
to an outright nuclear war between major powers. In all cases, there will be major
consequences. In the former primarily causing panic (possibly with social disruption)
in the latter possibly destruction. Intermediate variants and their consequences are
also not inconceivable. For this reason, even the smallest risk that CBRN weapons will
be used is cause for concern, while this risk is currently slowly increasing. The main
threat comes from both state (nuclear) and non-state actors (chemical, biological and
radiological).

The above analysis is based on qualitative and quantitative trends and factors. At the
same time all kinds of uncertainties and sudden events are imaginable which would
require a different assessment. To take this into account, a number of possible events
have been identified and scored by the Clingendael Expert Survey (see Figure B).
The three most relevant shocks with regard to CBRN weapons are terrorists (affiliated to
IS or otherwise) in the EU who obtain CBRN weapons, the US opting for an isolationist
course and a Russian attack on one of the Baltic states. All three scenarios would
increase the risk of the deployment of CBRN weapons.

20 Unal, B. and Aghlani, S., op. cit.; Meulenbelt, S.E., and Nieuwenhuizen, M.S. 2015. ‘Non-State actors’ pursuit
of CBRN weapons: From motivation to potential humanitarian consequences’, International Review of the
Red Cross, 97(899), 831–858, https://www.icrc.org/en/download/file/24548/irc97_17.pdf.

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CBRN weapons | Clingendael Strategic Monitor 2017

If terrorists in the EU obtain CBRN weapons and reveal this and/or even deploy
those weapons, this will primarily have a social impact. Apart from the direct impact
if a CBRN weapon is used, the threat may cause growing fear and uncertainty, and
possibly growing tensions between population groups in European countries. These
fears, uncertainties and tensions could, in turn, have a negative impact on economic
developments and confidence in politics and administration in European countries.

If the US takes a strongly isolationist course under the new president Donald Trump,
this could also have substantial consequences. During his election campaign, Trump
already said that countries such as Japan and South Korea should probably develop
nuclear weapons of their own, rather than hide beneath the ‘nuclear umbrella’ of the
US. Whether the US will maintain that line is very much open to question, but Trump’s
statements alone create distrust of American nuclear guarantees and could lead
countries to develop (infrastructure for) nuclear weapons themselves. 21 Isolationism,
coupled with rejection of multilateral organisations, could itself erode the base of
support for the multilateral non-proliferation and disarmament regime, which for some
countries could be regarded as a carte blanche to develop chemical weapons (again),
for example, and/or to deploy these (for example, the regime in Syria).

A third relevant shock would be a Russian attack on one of the Baltic states, in a ‘hybrid’
form, as in Ukraine, or otherwise. This would mean a direct confrontation with NATO,
with a risk of rapid escalation of the conflict. A scenario in which the escalation rises
to the nuclear level (in various grades) cannot be ruled out and would have major
consequences for the current international system on the level of CBRN weapons. 22

21 Squassoni, S. 2016. ‘East Asia Will Take Trump’s Nuclear Talk Literally and Seriously’, Foreign Policy,
18 November, http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/11/18/east-asia-will-take-trumps-nuclear-talk-literally-and-
seriously/.
22 Shlapak, D.A. and Johnson, M.W. 2016. ‘Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO’s Eastern Flank: Wargaming the
Defense of the Baltics’, RAND Report, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/
RR1200/RR1253/RAND_RR1253.pdf; Thompson, L.B. 2016. ‘Why The Baltic States Are Where Nuclear War
Is Most Likely To Begin’, The National Interest, 20 July, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/why-the-
baltic-states-are-where-nuclear-war-most-likely-17044.

10
The international CBRN
weapons regime

Introduction

The threat assessment gives some cause for concern, but which direction will
international cooperation relating to CBRN weapons take? Is this cooperation also under
pressure? And if so, in which fields? In order to assess this, a number of indicators were
developed and a brief analysis was then made of the main actors and institutions, the
key norms and rules (including development) and the degree of compliance with these.
The expectation for 2021 is that the present international system of cooperation in the
field of CBRN will slowly shift towards a less cooperative system, in which other states
and possibly even non-state actors will come to play an increasingly important role,
in addition to the major powers.

Actors and institutions

With regard to CBRN weapons, the international system has so far been strongly state-
focused. In recent decades, a relatively close-knit system of multilateral treaties and
organisations has developed in order to reduce the risks of the deployment of CBRN
weapons. The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Biological Weapons Convention and
the Chemical Weapons Convention form the basis for this. Surrounding these are various
other agreements and organisations, such as the Disarmament Conference, the Nuclear
Disarmament Treaty (prohibition of nuclear tests) and UN Security Council resolution
1540 (strengthening national export controls). In addition to multilateral initiatives there
are also various bilateral agreements, such as that between the US and Russia on the
reduction of nuclear weapons (e.g. the New-START-treaty).

An important problem is that non-state actors are virtually excluded from the system
(although the nuclear and chemical industries, for example, are involved to a degree
in some parts of the system). The multilateral system prescribes how states should
conduct themselves in this field, but has little control over non-state actors. Some parts
of the system do focus on how states should deal with non-state actors. An example is
UN Security Council resolution 1540, which calls on states to conduct adequate checks
of exports by non-state actors of materials related to weapons of mass destruction.
However, there are no agreements with non-state actors.

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Norms and rules

To date, the international system has certainly had successes concerning non-
proliferation and disarmament: the norms set by the system can be classed as highly
successful (see Table 2). The use of CBRN weapons has become a taboo that is widely
supported all over the world. The wave of disgust that swept the world when chemical
weapons were used in Syria in 2013 says a great deal in that respect. In addition to
the norms, the hard requirements that the multilateral system already imposes on the
member states in relation to CBRN weapons are successful to a degree, although
genuinely independently verified rules are still somewhat scarce. There are only
effective verification mechanisms by independent organisations (the IAEA and the
OPCW respectively) in force in the field of nuclear and chemical non-proliferation and
chemical disarmament. A great deal of other regulation is enforced via more or less
voluntary transparency measures, in which states themselves provide information on
their compliance with the rules (as with the 1540 Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers
Group).

Table 2 Key norms and rules

Norms
States should not use any CBRN weapons.
States should not develop any CBRN weapons.
States must prevent other actors from obtaining
possession of CBRN weapons.
Rules
Verified regulation concerning chemical
weapons only (OPCW).
Verified regulation concerning nuclear and
chemical weapons only (IAEA and OPCW).
Voluntary ‘self-verification’ only, through reports
on own activities (e.g. 1540 Committee, Nuclear
Suppliers Group).

However, the international regime in the field of CBRN also faces a number of
fundamental problems. A cause for concern is that a growing number of cracks appears
to be arising in the multilateral nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime.
As noted in an earlier Clingendael Strategic Monitor, the support for the agreed norms
within this regime is slowly but unmistakeably diminishing. 23 The cornerstone of the
system, the NPT, is under particular pressure. The swelling criticism of the lack of
pledged disarmament steps from the five ‘recognised’ nuclear arms states led in 2015 to
the absence of consensus at the five-yearly NPT Review Conference. A relatively large
group of states is now working towards a potential Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons,
as recommended by a UN Open-Ended Working Group. However, this normative

23 Rood, J. and Dinnissen, R. (Ed.) 2013. Een wereld in onzekerheid (‘A World in Uncertainty’). Clingendael
Strategic Monitor 2013, The Hague, 184-185, https://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/
Strategische%20Monitor%202013.pdf.

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CBRN weapons | Clingendael Strategic Monitor 2017

development threatens to widen the gap between the nuclear arms states (plus their
allies) and the non-nuclear arms states. 24 The world’s nine nuclear arms states and many
of their allies do not support such a prohibition, which is leading to extra tensions within
the multilateral system. 25 This discussion on the possession of nuclear weapons will not
disappear from the international agenda in the coming years and could create (further)
damage to the consensus in existing fora. The completely stalled initiative to realise a
Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free Zone in the Middle East also plays an important role
in the dissatisfaction between NPT member states. 26

Compliance

Member states rarely violate the treaties in this field. The OPCW has never observed a
violation (and this is not due to poor verification techniques), although the organisation
does currently have Syria in its sights as a potential violator of the rules. If the rules are
breached in rare cases, there is immediate trouble: see North Korea, which has not
been stopped since the discovery of an illegal nuclear arms programme and now, more
than ever, forms a regional threat. Assuming that in the past 15 years, three countries
violated the NPT or deliberately skated close to the permitted edges (North Korea, Syria
and Iran), it cannot be ruled out that this will happen again in the near future. Certainly
now that the fierce debate concerning nuclear disarmament has openly exposed the
perceived value of nuclear arms in the owner states, more states may be persuaded to
cross the line.

The failure regarding the entry into force of new international rules has also caused
dissatisfaction, particularly in states that are not major powers or close allies of a major
power. For example, the failure of the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to enter into
force remains problematic. For 20 years now, crucial countries with nuclear programmes
have refused to ratify the treaty, to the frustration of various other states. Negotiations
as part of the Disarmament Conference in Geneva have also been stalled for as long as
20 years, partly with regard to a prohibition of production of fissile material that many
countries want (the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty). Many regard the Biological and
Toxic Weapons Convention, in which there is no verification mechanism, as a paper
tiger and the OPCW in The Hague is under growing pressure from member states to
turn itself into a form of (cheap) night-light organisation, now that further steps in
(so far successful) chemical disarmament seem unlikely. Although such initiatives have

24 Meer, S. van der, 2016. ‘Accelerating global nuclear disarmament. A menu of 16 policy options,’ Clingendael
Policy Brief, February, https://www.clingendael.nl/publication/accelerating-global-nuclear-disarmament-
menu-16-policy-options.
25 Ritchie, N. 2015. ‘Nuclear realities: Worlds apart’, Effective Measures, 5 June, http://unidir.ilpi.org/?p =348.
26 Wan, W. 2015. ‘Why the 2015 NPT Review Conference Fell Apart,’ Centre for Policy Research, United Nations
University, 28 May, http://cpr.unu.edu/why-the-2015-npt-review-conference-fell-apart.html.

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stagnated for 20 years, and there appears to be no breakthrough in the pipeline as

yet, it is primarily the growing dissatisfaction over this among a large group of states
that could change the status quo in this respect. Apart from the stagnation of various
existing initiatives, it is notable that no new bilateral and multilateral initiatives appear
to be able to get off the ground either. Where initiatives such as the New-Start treaty
between the US and Russia and the Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) process have tried
to breathe new life into international control of CBRN risks in the past decade, since
recently that has no longer been the case. On the contrary, existing initiatives threaten
to be abandoned (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty) or have already been
terminated with no clear follow-up (NSS process). In other words, something really is
the matter.

The quadrant chart and shocks

With regard to international cooperation concerning CBRN threats, a slow shift is visible
in the sense that this cooperation is not proceeding as smoothly as before (see Figure 4).
This is because more friction can be seen between states, with the gap between the
major powers and the less powerful states seemingly increasing. At the same time, non-
state actors seem to be emerging in relation to the CBRN threat, but they barely form
part of existing structures in this field. The existing institutions are starting to creak
somewhat, the norms and (to a degree), the rules are still standing, but one or a few
sharp shocks could wobble the existing multilateral system.

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CBRN weapons | Clingendael Strategic Monitor 2017

Figure 4 The international regime: CBRN weapons (2016 – 2021)

State
actors
Great
powers

States

Hybrid:
Non-cooperation

states

Cooperation
No Conflict Conflict
cooperation about norms about rules

Changing Norms Full

norms/rules & rules cooperation

Hybrid:
equilibrium

Non-state
actors

Non-state
actors

A gradual shift can also be seen with regard to actors. Traditionally, the major powers
have more or less had control in the multilateral system concerning CBRN. However,
this position is coming under increasing pressure, as shown by the large group of
smaller and medium-sized UN member states which, despite opposition from the major
powers, have decided to work on a prohibition of use (and, indirectly, therefore, of the
possession) of nuclear weapons. The growing role of non-state actors at the expense
of state actors also cannot be ignored. This concerns both organisations that would
wish to use CBRN weapons and organisations that, through advancing technological
developments, could form sources of proliferation (e.g. the growing number of
companies active in bio-technological applications that can be used for both good
and bad ends).

In the case of the CBRN regime too, expected trends may change as a result of sudden
events. To take this into account, a number of possible events were identified and scored
by means of the Clingendael Expert Survey for the system of international cooperation
(see Figure 7). The wisdom-of-the-crowd suggests various shocks that could have an
impact on international cooperation, such as the disintegration of the EU and a global
financial crisis. Specifically in the CBRN field, the experts mention three potential
shocks: a conflict between China and the US over Taiwan or the South China Sea;

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CBRN weapons | Clingendael Strategic Monitor 2017

North Korea using CBRN weapons against other countries; and a nuclear conflict
between India and Pakistan.

A conflict between China and the US would entail the risk of (unintended) escalation,
even to the nuclear level. It is very doubtful whether the two states would allow
escalation to go that far, but as already mentioned, in tense situations the risk of
misunderstanding and miscommunication that can lead to unforeseen escalation is
always present. Even without a nuclear component, a conflict between two major
powers could change international relations and cooperation in the field of CBRN could
also become a victim of this.

If North Korea were to decide to use CBRN weapons against other countries, this would
put international relations to the test. Because this would almost certainly be suicidal
for the North Korean regime (the norm against such deployment is, for now, still very
powerful), this will probably happen only if the regime is already collapsing and trying to
survive a little longer through violence. In any event, the end of the regime in Pyongyang
will create tensions between major powers: China and the US (and to a lesser extent,
Russia) have completely different visions for the future of the Korean peninsula, one
of the reasons why North Korea has been able to work on CBRN weapons for years, in
a relatively unobstructed fashion. The risk that other states will become sucked into a
conflict on the Korean peninsula (with all the consequences of this) is not inconceivable.

A nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan is not impossible. The relatively low
barrier to deployment of nuclear weapons in that regard has already been referred to
above. The tensions between the two nuclear arms states can regularly be cut with
a knife. If the simmering conflict situation leads to a nuclear war, this will have major
consequences, not only for the countries themselves, but possibly world-wide in terms
of the environment and climate. 27 Because neither country is a member of the NPT,
the impact on international cooperation will be less than if other nuclear arms states
come into conflict. One could even speculate that a nuclear conflict between India and
Pakistan could actually promote further international cooperation, because its horrors
would demonstrate all the more that this can never be allowed to happen again.

27 Robock, A. and Toon, O.B. 2010. ‘Local nuclear war, global suffering’, Scientific American, Vol. 302, 74-81,
http://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/RobockToonSciAmJan2010.pdf.

16
Conclusion

The threat of CBRN weapons appears likely to increase slightly in the coming years.
Rising tensions between nuclear arms states (with the risk of unplanned escalation),
the cracks in the multilateral system and the growing threat of non-state actors all
contribute towards this. Although the number of instances in which CBRN weapons
have been used in the past is small, such an incident could have a major impact.
However, no simple options to reverse the trend in the threat seem to be available at
present. Although a relatively close-knit system of multilateral treaties and organisations
has been developed in recent decades in order to reduce the risks of CBRN weapons,
this system appears to have been functioning less smoothly in the past few years.

17
Appendix: Figures

Figure A Cumulative number of reported and destroyed chemical weapons, Schedule 21

2000

1500
Number of metric tons

1000

500

0
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Year

Chemical weapons
Number of metric tons reported Number of metric tons destroyed

1 OPCW, op. cit. Chemical substances in Schedule 2 can be used as chemical weapons but, on a small scale,
also for other purposes. For this reason, production of small volumes is permitted (see OPCW, Regime for
Schedule 2 Chemicals and Facilities Related to such Chemicals, Annex on Implementation and Verification,
Part VII, https://www.opcw.org/chemical-weapons-convention/annexes/verification-annex/part-vii/).

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CBRN weapons | Clingendael Strategic Monitor 2017

Figure B Potential shocks in CBRN weapons threat assessment (N=10)

A Civil war or large-scale social unrest in

High

France
G B The US pursues a more isolationist
foreign policy and no longer prioritises
A
D B Europe
F C E C European Union disintegrates
D IS uses CBRN weapons or attacks
Impact

a nuclear power station

E Non-state actors gain possession of
nuclear arms
F Nuclear intimidation causes a nuclear
arms race in Europe
G Russia attacks one or more Baltic states
Low

Low Probability High

Figure C Possible systemic shocks related to CBRN weapons (N=10)

A European Union disintegrates

High

B Armed conflict between China and the

US about Taiwan and/or the East/South
China Sea
B
C North Korea uses CBRN weapons
D against its neighbours
C E D Nuclear conflict between Pakistan and
Impact

India
A E Global financial crisis
Low

Low Probability High

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