Cold Start (military

doctrine)

Cold Start is a military doctrine that was

developed by the Indian Armed Forces for
use in a possible war with Pakistan.[1] It
involves the various branches of India's
military conducting offensive operations
as part of unified battlegroups. The
doctrine is intended to allow India's
conventional forces to perform holding
attacks to prevent a nuclear retaliation
from Pakistan in case of a conflict.[2][3]

Origins
India's defence strategy from 1974 was, in
the words of former Defence Minister
George Fernandes, "a non-aggressive, non-
provocative defense policy",[4] centred on
"holding corps" to halt hostile advances. In
response to the terrorist attack on the
Indian Parliament in 2001, India initiated a
full mobilisation. Taking almost a month,
the slow mobilisation demonstrated the
weakness of India's policy. The long
mobilisation time resulted in sufficient
international pressure to prevent India
from conducting a retaliatory strike.

Sundarji Doctrine (1981–2004)

The Sundarji Doctrine was made up of

seven defensive "holding corps" of the
Indian Army and deployed near the
Pakistani border. Possessing limited
offensive power, the holding corps' primary
responsibility was to check a Pakistani
advance.[5] India's offensive potency was
derived from the "strike corps", which were
made up of a mechanised infantry and
extensive artillery support. "Unlike the
holding corps that was deployed close to
the border", argues Walter Ladwig of the
University of Oxford, "the strike corps was
based in central India, a significant
distance from the international border. In a
war, after the holding corps halted a
Pakistani attack, the strike corps would
counterattack, penetrating deep into
Pakistani territory to destroy the Pakistan
Army's own strike corps through 'deep
sledgehammer blows' in a high-intensity
battle of attrition".[5]

However, the limitation of the Sundarji

doctrine was exposed on 13 December
2001, when five masked men attacked the
Indian Parliament. Twelve people,
including the five gunmen, were killed and
22 were injured. India suspected Kashmir-
based militant groups were behind the
attack because just two months earlier, a
similar assault had been carried out by the
Jaish-e-Mohammad on the Kashmir State
Assembly. India received credible evidence
that militant groups Lashkar-e-Taiba and
Jaish-e-Mohammad were behind the
attack, prompting India to initiate
Operation Parakram, the largest activation
of its forces since the 1971 Bangladesh
Liberation War.[6]

It took the Indian strike corps three weeks

to get to the international border. During
that time, Pakistan was able to counter-
mobilise and allow for intervening powers,
the United States in particular, to become
intermediaries to the conflict. Urging India
to restrain, the American Ambassador to
India, Robert Blackwill, demanded for India
to wait until President Pervez Musharraf
delivered a speech that would address the
crisis. Musharraf's speech was quick to
denounce terrorism generally, specifically
militant groups operating in Kashmir, and
promised a crackdown. "As a result of
Musharraf's declaration, by the time the
[Indian] strike corps reached the border
region, India's political justification for
military action had been significantly
reduced," Walter C. Ladwig maintained.[7]

Indian military strategists came to the

conclusion that the Sundarji Doctrine was
flawed. It was too inflexible to respond to
terrorist attacks or other indirect
challenges for three reasons:

The strike corps was too big and too far

away from the international border,
making it difficult to deploy in a timely
fashion.
The long duration needed to mobilise
the strike corps prevented strategic
 surprise, allowing Pakistan plenty of
time to counter-mobilise.
The holding corps' lack of offensive
power along the international border
prevented it from engaging in significant
offensives.[8]

Doctrine development

Arjun MBT conducting driving test on sand berms.

The development of the doctrine

represented a significant change in Indian
defence planning. Exercises aimed at
reducing mobilisation time and improved
network-centric warfare capabilities have
contributed to the development of the
doctrine. Despite its advances, the
doctrine remains in the experimental
stage.[2]

The doctrine, known as Cold Start,

deviated from the defence posture that
India’s military had employed since
independence in 1947. "The goal of this
limited war doctrine is to establish the
capacity to launch a retaliatory
conventional strike against Pakistan that
would inflict significant harm on the
Pakistan Army before the international
community could intercede, and at the
same time, pursue narrow enough aims to
deny Islamabad a justification to escalate
the clash to the nuclear level".[9]

Drawing on the experience of the 1967 Six-

Day War as well as the Indo-Pakistani War
of 1971, Indian defence planners
envisioned a new doctrine that would
involve limited, rapid armoured thrusts,
with infantry and necessary air support.[1]

As per Cold Start promulgation, offensive

operations could begin within 48 hours
after orders had been issued. Such a
limited response time would enable Indian
forces to surprise their Pakistani
counterparts. Operations would involve
armoured spearheads, launched from
forward positions in Punjab and
Rajasthan.

The plan emphasises speed and

overwhelming firepower: armored
formations and accompanying infantry
would advance into eastern Pakistan, with
limited goals in terms of distance and in
terms of duration. The plan reportedly has
a significant air support component. From
the Indian perspective, the plan has the
added virtue of accentuating Pakistani
discomfiture and angst, which theoretically
has some deterrent value.

India's stance
India denies the Cold Start strategy.
Quoting the Indian Army chief: "There is
nothing called 'Cold Start'. As part of our
overall strategy we have a number of
contingencies and options, depending on
what the aggressor does. In the recent
years, we have been improving our
systems with respect to mobilization, but
our basic military posture is defensive".[10]

In January 2011, while speaking to the

media in the run-up to Army Day, Army
chief General VK Singh came closer than
any other government official in describing
the widely speculated Indian war doctrine,
popularly referred to as Cold Start: "There
is nothing like Cold Start. But we have a
'proactive strategy' which takes steps in a
proactive manner so that we can achieve
what our doctrines and strategies".[11]

Former Indian defence minister Jaswant

Singh has denied the existence of the
doctrine: "There is no Cold Start doctrine.
No such thing. It was an off-the-cuff
remark from a former chief of staff. I have
been defense minister of the country. I
should know".[12]
Despite such assertions, in recent years,
the Indian Army has conducted a series of
major combat exercises, including the
recent 'Brahmashira' exercise by the 2
'Kharga' Strike Corps in Rajasthan , to
practice "swift multiple offensives deep
into enemy territory" under its "Pro-Active
Conventional War Strategy".[13]

On January 6, 2017, Army Chief General

Rawat acknowledged the existence of this
doctrine.[14][15][16][17]

Pakistan's response
The Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff
Committee of the Pakistani military
declared 2010 the "Year of Training" and
conducted a large-scale joint-military
exercise, Azm-e-Nau–III, which focused on
offensive defence against Cold Start. The
military also tested the Nasr,[18] a nuclear-
capable missile from the family of Hatf-IX
missiles with a purported range of 60 km,
a high accuracy and a shoot-and-scoot
delivery system. The Institute for Defence
Studies and Analyses stated that the
development of the Nasr indicates that
Pakistan views Cold Start with concern
and that the missile was meant to deter
India's implementation of the doctrine. It
added that the net result would be "further
nuclear impact(s) on India's territory".[19]
Validation
In May 2011, India launched Operation
Vijayee Bhava ("Be Victorious"), a defence
exercise involving 50,000 troops[20] in
Bikaner and Suratgarh near the border with
Pakistan to boost the synergy between the
various branches of the armed forces.[21]

The main objective of the operation was to

cut down the mobilisation time of the
military, which took 27 days to mobilise
during Operation Parakram. The Indian
Army confirmed that the exercise was
successful by reducing mobilisation time
drastically to 48 hours.[22]
In July 2011, India tested the Prahaar, a
new solid-fuel tactical ballistic missile with
a range of 150 km[23] designed to provide
invading Indian Army battle groups with
lethal fire support.[24]

Later that year, the Indian Army conducted

its largest war games in the last two
decades, Operation Sudarshan Shakti,
under the Southern Command
Headquarters, to revalidate its Cold Start
doctrine.[25] The desert exercise was
based on the Integrated Theatre Battle
concept, with various defence wings and
military elements being required to
participating in a single cohesive format
during war.[26]

The focus of Sudarshan Shakti was to

practice synergy and integration between
ground and air forces. Nearly 60,000
troops and 500 armoured vehicles,
including T-72, T-90 and Arjun main battle
tanks, carried out simulated assaults on
their objectives, with support from artillery
and the Indian Air Force.[27]

The Indian military has also tested newly

inducted radars, unmanned aerial vehicles,
surveillance systems, precision guided
bombs, missiles, space-based assets and
real-time data-sharing between
elements.[26]

Criticism
The Cold Start doctrine has invited
criticism from Pakistani media and former
generals.[28] They claim that although the
doctrine was designed to punish Pakistan
in a limited manner without triggering
nuclear retaliation, the Indian Army cannot
be sure if Pakistan's leadership will
actually refrain from such a response.[29]

Criticism of the doctrine by Timothy J.

Roemer, US Ambassador to India from
2009 to 2011, was revealed in a leaked
cable.[30] Roemer gave a detailed
explanation of the doctrine as well as
several facts that he believed raised
questions about the actual application of
doctrine. He raised questions about India's
willingness to pursue the option, including
the decision not to implement the doctrine
after the deadly 2008 Mumbai attacks.[29]
Some of the claims that he made were
that India would likely encounter "mixed
results",[29] that Cold Start is "a mixture of
myth and reality"[30] and that "the value of
the doctrine to the GOI (Government of
India) may lie more in the plan’s existence
than in any real world application".[30]
Walter Ladwig has suggested that a host
of factors, including the terrain, the
favorable deployment of Pakistani forces,
and a lack of strategic surprise in the most
likely conflict scenarios, would mitigate
whatever mobilization advantages India
may be gaining by its experimentation with
Cold Start. [31]

2008 Mumbai terrorist

attacks
By intelligence intercepts and analysis
carried out during the 2008 Mumbai
attacks, Indian planners had assessed that
the ongoing attack was likely a deliberate
attempt by the ISI-sponsored terrorist
organisation Lashkar-e-Taiba to provoke
an Indian military strike on Pakistan, the
objective being to entice other Islamist
Pakistani militant groups that were
engaged in armed conflict with the
Pakistani state to redirect their attacks
away from the Pakistani state and instead
unify against an external threat, India.[32]
Consequently, to defeat the strategic goals
of the Pakistani planners of the Mumbai
massacre, India decided to hold off
launching a punitive military strike on
Pakistan.[33] That assessment was later
verified by interrogations and court
testimony of one of the planners of the
massacre, David Headley (half-Pakistani,
half-American), while he was in custody of
US and Indian authorities.[34]

Impact
In a manner similar to the way that the US
Strategic Defense Initiative impacted the
economy of the Soviet Union during the
Cold War,[35] the threat of the Cold Start
doctrine and the increase in the Indian
defence budget from $24 billion to $40
billion between 2007 and 2009 both
apparently prompted the Pakistan
government to increase its defence budget
sharply to 32% of their federal
government's net revenue receipts, further
increasing the strain on that country's
already-tenuous economy.[36] In 2009,
financial constraints on budget and the
effects on national economy made the
Pakistani government officials to begin
working on the database program that it
called "Threat Matrix", which was revealed
in 2013 during a press conference.

References
1. "India's New 'Cold Start' War Doctrine
Strategically Reviewed" . South Asia
Analysis Group. 4 May 2004. Archived
from the original on 2 October 2011.
2. Walter C. Ladwig III "A Cold Start for
Hot Wars? The Indian Army's New
Limited War Doctrine" . International
Security. Winter 2007–2008.
3. "The Calculus of 'Cold Start' " . India
Together. May 2004.
4. Ladwig, Walter (Winter 2007–2008). "A
Cold Start for Hot Wars?: The Indian
Army's New Limited War Doctrine"
(PDF). International Security. 32 (3):
158–190, 159.
doi:10.1162/isec.2008.32.3.158 .
Retrieved 16 January 2013.
5. Ladwig, Walter (Winter 2007–2008). "A
Cold Start for Hot Wars?: The Indian
 Army's New Limited War Doctrine"
(PDF). International Security. 32 (3):
158–190, 160.
doi:10.1162/isec.2008.32.3.158 .
Retrieved 16 January 2013.
6. Ladwig, Walter (Winter 2007–2008). "A
Cold Start for Hot Wars?: The Indian
Army's New Limited War Doctrine"
(PDF). International Security. 32 (3):
158–190, 161.
doi:10.1162/isec.2008.32.3.158 .
Retrieved 16 January 2013.
7. Ladwig, Walter (Winter 2007–2008). "A
Cold Start for Hot Wars?: The Indian
Army's New Limited War Doctrine"
 (PDF). International Security. 32 (3):
158–190, 162.
doi:10.1162/isec.2008.32.3.158 .
Retrieved 16 January 2013.
8. Ladwig, Walter (Winter 2007–2008). "A
Cold Start for Hot Wars?: The Indian
Army's New Limited War Doctrine"
(PDF). International Security. 32 (3):
158–190, 163.
doi:10.1162/isec.2008.32.3.158 .
Retrieved 16 January 2013.
9. Ladwig, Walter (Winter 2007–2008). "A
Cold Start for Hot Wars?: The Indian
Army's New Limited War Doctrine"
(PDF). International Security. 32 (3):
 158–190, 164.
doi:10.1162/isec.2008.32.3.158 .
Retrieved 16 January 2013.
10. "No Cold Start Doctrine, India Tells
US" . The Indian Express. 9 September
2010.
11. " 'Army Able To Launch Faster
Response Against Pakistan' " .
Business Standard. 13 January 2012.
12. "Race to the End" . Foreign Policy. 5
September 2012.
13. "Army chief General Suhag says India
needs to be ready for short wars" .
Times of India. 2 September 2015.
14. S; January 4, eep Unnithan; January
16, 2017 ISSUE DATE:; January 7,
2017UPDATED:; Ist, 2017 01:07. " 'We
will cross again' " . India Today.
Retrieved 18 January 2019.
15. Diplomat, Ankit Panda, The. "A Slip of
the Tongue on India's Once-Hyped
'Cold Start' Doctrine?" . The Diplomat.
Retrieved 18 January 2019.
16. "What is India's "Cold Start" military
doctrine?" . 31 January 2017.
Retrieved 18 January 2019 – via The
Economist.
17. "Why General Rawat alerted the world
to Cold Start" . Rediff. Retrieved
 18 January 2019.
18. "NASR: A Disadvantage for Pakistan" .
IDSA. 19 August 2011.
19. "Making Sense of 'Nasr' " . Institute for
Defence Studies and Analyses. 24
April 2011.
20. "Exercise 'Vijayee Bhava' to Transform
Army into More Agile Force" . ANI. 12
May 2011.
21. "Exercise 'Vijayee Bhava' to Boost
Synergy Between Armed Forces" . ANI.
9 May 2011.
22. "Army Mobilisation Time: 48 Hours" .
DNA. 16 May 2011.
23. "India Conducts First Test Launch of
Short-Range Ballistic Missile
'Prahaar' " . IANS. 21 July 2011.
24. "Army's 'Cold Start' Doctrine Gets
Teeth" . Business Standard. 22 July
2011.
25. "Indian Army Exercise Sudershan
Shakti: Revalidation of Cold Start War
Doctrine" . South Asia Analysis Group.
10 December 2011. Archived from the
original on 4 January 2012.
26. "Exercise Sudarshan Shakti: Army
Tests New Weapons" . Mid Day. 1
December 2011.
27. Dutta, Sujan (7 December 2011). "In
Fog of Desert, Mission to Reshape
Army" . The Telegraph (Calcutta).
Calcutta, India.
28. "India Toying with Dangerous Cold
Start War Doctrine" . Eurasia Review.
29 October 2011.
29. "India 'Unlikely' To Deploy Cold Start
Against Pakistan" . The Guardian.
London. 30 November 2010.
30. "WikiLeaks: India's Cold Start mix of
myth, reality" . IBNLive. Retrieved
16 February 2016.
31. Walter C. Ladwig III "Indian Military
Modernization and Conventional
 Deterrence in South Asia" (PDF).
Journal of Strategic Studies. 2015.
32. Greg Miller, Emily Wax (20 October
2010). "Indian report accuses
Pakistan's intelligence service of
significant role in Mumbai siege" .
Washington Post. Retrieved
2 December 2012.
33. "The New Delhi Bombing: Is There a
Pakistani Link?" . Time.com. 7
September 2011. Retrieved
2 December 2012.
34. United States District Court, Northern
District of Illinois, Eastern Division, No.
09 CR 830-3, Plea Agreement, United
 States of America vs. David Coleman
Headley,. 18 March 2010. pp. 1–2.
35. "The Collapse of the Soviet Union and
Ronald Reagan" . World Association of
International Studies.
36. "Pakistan's Defence Budget: Cloaked in
Secrecy" . Newsline. 27 July 2011.

Sources
A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian
Army’s New Limited War Doctrine by
Walter C. Ladwig III
Indian Military Modernization and
Conventional Deterrence in South Asia
by Walter C. Ladwig III
 How India’s Cold Start is making the
world a safer place
CSD: Clear and Present Danger by
Muhammad Ali Baig

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