Telecommunications Policy 41 (2017) 242–252

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Telecommunications Policy
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/telpol

Political economy of telecommunication infrastructure: An MARK

investigation of the National Broadband Network early rollout and
pork barrel politics in Australia
⁎
Tooran Alizadeh , Reza Farid
Griffith University, 170 Kessels Rd, Nathan 4111, QLD, Australia

A R T I C L E I N F O ABSTRACT

Keywords: It has been argued that infrastructure unevenness rigidifies into more lasting structures of socio-
Political economy economic and political privilege and advantage. This paper focuses on telecommunication
Infrastructure infrastructure as the backbone of the fast-growing digital economy, and raises important
Telecommunication questions about the early National Broadband Network (NBN) rollout in Australia. The paper
Australia
asks whether there was any case of pork barrelling in the selection of early release sites that
Pork barrel
National Broadband Network
enjoyed a regional competitive advantage against other localities that had to wait several years to
receive the infrastructure. The answer to this question then leads to a second question about the
degree to which voting in the early NBN release sites has swung following the infrastructure
rollout. In order to answer these questions the paper examines the voting patterns in the earlier
NBN release sites versus all electorates in the Federal elections in 2007–2013 using the data
available via Australian Electoral Commission. Findings show trends of politically targeted
funding, followed by vote swing in the very next election.

1. Introduction

Infrastructure has long been a topic of investigation for numerous urban studies (Graham & Marvin, 2001; Kaika &
Swyngedouw, 2000; Swyngedouw, 1997). The investigation, for the last two decades, mostly included a strong focus on
infrastructure protection closely linked to the conventional treatments around technical and engineering aspects of infrastructure
provision and maintenance (Gheorghe, Masera, & Weijnen, 2006). It has been only over the last few years that a surge of interest in
the socio-economic and political character of infrastructure formations has been witnessed (Dodson, 2009; Neuman & Smith,
2010). It has been argued that the infrastructure unevenness rigidifies into more lasting structures of privilege and advantage
(Bröcker, Korzhenevych, & Schürmann, 2010; Dodson, Gleeson, Evans, & Sipe, 2007).
More recently, the literature has shown growing interest in broadband technology as the key telecommunication infrastructure,
and also as the backbone of the fast-growing knowledge economy (Eskelinena, Frankb, & Hirvonena, 2008; Ford & Koutsky, 2005;
Grubesic & Mack, 2015). In the US, consequences of uneven distribution of the new infrastructure have been studied with focus on
‘islands of inequity’ that are simultaneously victimized by the deregulated telecommunications market, and by local governments not
promoting an equitable distribution of broadband services (Grubesic & Murray, 2004; , 2006, 2012). In Australia, referring to the
ongoing investment on the National Broadband Network (NBN), it has been argued that the early NBN rollout gives the release sites
a regional competitive advantage against other localities that have to wait up to several years to receive the telecommunication

⁎
Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: t.alizadeh@griffith.edu.au (T. Alizadeh), r.farid@griffith.edu.au (R. Farid).

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.telpol.2017.02.002
Received 7 October 2016; Received in revised form 2 February 2017; Accepted 3 February 2017
Available online 07 February 2017
0308-5961/ © 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
T. Alizadeh, R. Farid Telecommunications Policy 41 (2017) 242–252

infrastructure (Alizadeh, 2013, 2015a).

This paper, however, takes the discussions on the provision of telecommunication infrastructure in Australia to a new level, and
raises important questions about the political economy of infrastructure provision. The paper asks firstly whether there was any case
of pork barrelling in the early NBN rollout; and secondly if the (targeted) infrastructure funding swung votes at all.
In order to answer the above questions, the paper starts with an investigation of political economy of infrastructure investment
both internationally, and in Australia. It then focuses on telecommunication infrastructure with a review of the ups and downs of the
National Broadband Network (NBN) since its announcement in April 2009. An analysis of the distribution of the early NBN rollout
across Australian Federal electorates is then followed to examine if there was any pork barrelling politics involved in the
infrastructure investment, and if the targeted funding swung votes.
Such an examination has its limitations—while the early NBN rollout gave the local communities a competitive advantage, the
new telecommunication infrastructure was only a fraction of total federal government investment. In other words, the NBN rollout
was only one possible way that the government could direct resources towards particular electorates. Decisions over the location of
universities, hospitals, military bases, and government offices can all be implemented in a partisan manner. This suggests that this
study at best will be able to identify some correlation between the telecommunication infrastructure investment distribution, and
voting behaviour. This cannot be assumed as a causal relationship because of the complexity of all of the factors which influence
voting decisions.

2. Political economy of infrastructure investment: pork barrel politics

The surge of interest in infrastructure, over the last few years, has involved a shift from conventional treatments organised
around technical and engineering discussions to more recent approaches that emphasize the socio-economic and political character
of infrastructure formations (Alizadeh, Sipe, & Dodson, 2014; Dodson, 2009; Kaika & Swyngedouw, 2000; Lorrain, 2001). Much of
this new interest in infrastructure stems from the recognition that modern cities are comprised of multiple, inter-connected and/or
overlapping networks of physical and digital infrastructure conveying not only people, water, waste and energy, but also information
(Furlong, 2011; Graham & Marvin, 2001; Guy, Marvin, Medd, & Moss, 2010; Rutherford, 2011). The utmost level of integration of
modern life with infrastructure has resulted in increased governments’ investment; and also made infrastructure a desirable target of
pork barrel politics.
Pork barrel politics - the practice of targeting public funds to particular regions or local districts based on political considerations
- has long been investigated (Evans, 2004; Leigh, 2008). One set of studies has focused on the relationship between electoral systems
and pork barrel politics. A key question is whether politicians allocate resources primarily towards swing seats or safe seats. While
Cox and McCubbins (1986) posited a model in which politicians are risk-averse, and therefore channel resources more generously
towards their core supporters, Dixit and Londregan (1996) argued that in certain circumstances, politicians prefer to spend money
on swing voters. Another important question is whether and if yes, how much pork barrelling matters at the ballot box. While some
studies have observed little or no relationship between local expenditure and vote share (Feldman & Jondrow, 1984; Stein &
Bickers, 1994), others have found that more spending influences people's voting behaviour (Alvarez & Saving, 1997b; Levitt &
Snyder, 1997).
There is a well-established body of international literature around political economy of infrastructure investment (Cadota,
Röller, & Stephan, 2006; Gramlich, 1994), covering a wide range of traditional infrastructure projects (transport, energy, etc.).
There, however, remain ongoing debates around the impact of government investment in different types of infrastructure projects on
economic activity and employment at the national level (Crain & Oakley, 1995; Edelberg, Eichenbaum, & Fisher, 2002). The
literature argues that the main political factor considered in infrastructure allocation is a measurement of the electoral productivity
of funds invested in each region (Castells & Solé-Ollé, 2005).

2.1. International perspective

The politics of infrastructure provision, has been widely studied across the US (Alvarez & Saving, 1997a; Crain & Oakley, 1995;
Feldman & Jondrow, 1984); with evidence suggesting that political conditions such as legislative stability and voter volatility are
systematically related to infrastructure differences across states (Alvarez & Saving, 1997b; Evans, 2004).
Similar patterns are observed across Europe, and research has shown historic trends of pork barrelling in a number of countries
including Italy (Golden & Picci, 2008), Spain (Castells & Solé-Ollé, 2005) and France (Cadota et al., 2006). Results mainly suggest
that efficiency criteria played only a limited role in the geographical distribution of infrastructure spending. Nevertheless, electoral
concerns appeared to be, indeed, significant determinants of the cross-regional allocation of infrastructure investments.
Empirical evidence from South and Central America also show a culture of ‘political opportunism’ and ‘local pork barrel politics’
in infrastructure investment at different levels (Costa-I-Font, Rodriguez-Oreggia, & Lunapla, 2003; Schady, 2000). Drazen and
Eslava, (2005, 2006, 2010) in a series of studies presented a model of the political budget cycle – across Colombian municipalities –
in which targeted infrastructure investments were devised to influence voters, especially in swing regions.
The data coming out of the fastest growing economies in the world, China and India, seem to also be telling similar stories of pork
barrel politics (Khemani, 2010; Luo, Zhang, Huang, & Rozelle, 2010). For example, Khemani (2010) examined the variation pattern
of public spending in infrastructure across India over time, and argued that the pattern was due to infrastructure projects being used
at the margin for political gain.
More specifically, there is a growing body of international literature focusing on the political economy of telecommunication

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infrastructure. Here, the literature is bifurcated and far from conclusive. One line in the literature focuses on the role of government
and the subsidies offered to the rollout of advanced telecommunication infrastructure. However, the findings are mixed. In some
studies (Kenny & Kenny, 2011) the economic cases made, and therefore governments’ intention for the huge subsidiaries, are
questioned; while others (Gruber, Hätönen, & Koutroumpis, 2014) find that the benefits outweigh the investment costs.
There are also questions raised in the literature and popular media about the role played by the big corporations – such as
Google- in the rollout of advanced telecommunication infrastructure – such as Google Fiber (McNeill, 2015; Paroutis, Bennett, &
Heracleous, 2014; Townsend, 2013). A particular focus has been on how firms have tried to influence city governments, while
engaging in providing services to the local governments (Halegoua, 2014; Kitchin, 2015; Söderström, Paasche, & Klauser, 2014;
Wiig, 2015). Having said this, the fast pace of change has made it difficult for academia to keep up. Further investigation is required
to understand the complexity of the political economy of telecommunication provision in different parts of the world.

2.2. Australian perspective

Research in parliamentary democracies has traditionally been less concerned about the issue of pork barrelling than in the US
(Leigh & Neill, 2011). There is still a relative shortage of pork barrel studies in Australia, as a parliamentary democracy, in which
political parties typically exert more control over their legislators. Previous Australian studies of pork barrelling, however, have
identified solid evidences of the phenomenon specially around infrastructure spending. Earlier studies of pork barrelling in
Australia, focusing on federal programs for the unemployed (Andrews, Fry, & Jakee, 2005), and sports grants program (Denemark,
2000; Gaunt, 1999) concluded that the spending was skewed towards marginal electorates.
In order to understand the extent and effects of pork barrelling in infrastructure funding in Australia, Leigh (2008) analysed four
discretionary programs funded by the Australian Federal Government during the 2001–2004 election cycle. Results showed that
electorates held by the governing Liberal National Coalition (aka Coalition) received a disproportionately larger share of
discretionary funding. Among government seats, funding did not appear to have been directed towards those that were more
marginal. More discretionary funding was associated with a larger swing towards the government in the 2004 election. More
recently, in 2013 Clemens, Crespin, and Finocchiaro (2013) replicated Leigh (2008) analysis of pork barrelling in Australian politics
using geographic techniques. Their findings highlighted the importance of political geography and have important implications for
studies of legislative politics and elections.
In 2014, Denemark (2014) used data from Australia's Regional Partnerships Program (RPP), to explore the logic of
parliamentary pork barrel politics. Results showed the governing Coalition's distribution of the funds was consistent with three
electoral priorities — to reward its own MPs and show voters that the government “can deliver”; to provide vote-winning assets in the
governing Coalition's most marginal seats, and to try to re-establish its credibility at the local level in regional seats that had proven
vulnerable to inroads made by independent candidates. Denemark's study (2014) is especially important as it covered the position of
independent candidates and minor parties in its investigation of pork barrel politics in Australia.
In the last few years, there has been a shift in the Australian politics which witnessed an increase in the power of independents
and minor parties (Rodrigues & Brenton, 2010). Currently, minor parties and independents hold the power in the Senate following
the 2013 Federal election. However, when it comes to the House of Representatives, their numbers are limited and the two party
power system is still the dominant political discourse.
More specifically, there is a dearth of research when it comes to investigating political economy of telecommunication
infrastructure in the Australian context. Previous studies (Ergas, 2008; Given, 2004) discussed the monopolist nature of
telecommunication market, and the issues involved in the power dynamics between states and federal government in the
deployment of earlier types of telecommunication infrastructure. Nevertheless, the introduction of the National Broadband Network
(NBN) changed the game dramatically across the nation; and was followed by an influx of commentary in the mainstream and social
media.
The political agenda behind the order of the NBN early rollout was amongst the topics widely discussed in the popular media
(Corner, 2011; Tsang, 2015). However, there is little scholarly research (Alizadeh, 2015b) to test the widely-held perception about
the politics of NBN. The rest of the paper will contribute to this gap.

3. Methodology

In response to the gaps existing in the literature, this paper focuses on the political economy of telecommunication infrastructure
provision in Australia; and raises important questions about the order of the National Broadband Network (NBN) rollout. It
questions whether there was any case of pork barrelling politics in the early NBN rollout and if yes, did it swing votes in the
subsequent election? Considering that the NBN started as the largest single infrastructure project in the history of the nation, these
are questions worthy of investigation.
In order to answer the proposed questions, the paper offers a review of the ups and downs of the NBN, since introduction. It then
examines the distribution of the NBN across the political spectrum, with a focus on the early rollout sites across three states of New
South Wales, Victoria and Queensland. These three states are the most populated ones across the nation, and are home to three
quarter of Australia's population (ABS, 2014). About half of the NBN early release sites were located in these three states, which
make them sufficient to investigate any possible political agenda behind the selection of the order of the rollout.
The required data to analyse the relationship between voting behaviour and the early NBN rollout was obtained from the
independent Australian Electoral Commission (AEC)’s Virtual Tally Room (http://results.aec.gov.au/). The data downloaded from

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the AEC was for the 2007, 2010 and 2013 Australian Federal elections for the House of Representatives and was organised on a two
party preferred basis (The two parties being the Australian Labor Party (ALP), and the Liberal National Coalition (Coalition). The
data was downloaded at the electorate (electoral division) level, as the main political competition happens at this level - the winning
party at each electorate secures a seat in the parliament.
Analysis involved identifying the seat classification for each electorate in Victoria, New South Wales and Queensland for the
aforementioned three Federal elections. The AEC classifies seats as marginal, fairly safe or safe. Following the AEC's guidelines, a
seat was classified as ‘marginal’ where the winning candidate received less than 56% of the two candidate preferred vote, considered
‘fairly safe’ between 56% and 60% and classified ‘safe’ when more than 60% (Australian Electoral Commission 2014). Applying this
classification, a breakdown of seats held by the ALP versus the Coalition is tallied and shown in a range of graphs (Figs. 2–7) to
portray patterns of voting in the NBN release sites versus all electorates in 2007–2013 Federal elections.
We ran correlation tests to see if they are any statistically significant correlation between the voting percentages and any of the
two major parties (the ALP and the Coalition). In this case, a correlation coefficient value of +1 suggests a perfect positive linear
correlation, meaning an absolute tendency to vote for the ALP; a correlation coefficient value of −1 suggests a perfect negative linear
correlation, meaning an absolute tendency not to vote for the ALP (or to vote for the Coalition, given the nature of two party
preference system); and finally a correlation coefficient value of 0.00 suggests there is no linear correlation, meaning no statistically
significant tendency was identified to vote for any of the two major parties. This analysis helps to understand if the selection of the
early NBN rollout order was skewed by the voting behaviour in the 2007 and 2010 Federal elections for any potential political gain. It
also shows if the targeted investment swung votes in the post-NBN Federal election in 2013.
It is important to acknowledge that this study is aware of the unique role that the three independent MPs played, following the
hung parliament in the 2010 Federal election. Their support of the ALP was based on negotiations including the deal made to
expedite the NBN rollout, at least in the electorate of one of the three independent MPs. However, because of the limited number of
independents, the rest of the early NBN release site selection is analysed based on its distribution across the two major party seats.

4. Telecommunication in Australia: The NBN rollout

Telecommunication infrastructure has growingly been of interest to many national governments as a critical infrastructure with
direct implications on national security (Moteff & Parfomak, 2004), social equity (Faulhaber & Hogendorn, 2000; McMahon &
Salant, 2001), and economic development (Alizadeh, Sipe, & Dodson, 2011; Willson, Marshall, & McCann, 2009). This is in part
are based on a fast growing international body of literature (Crandall & Jackson, 2001; Gillett, Lehr, Osorio, & Sirbu, 2006;
Greenstein & McDevitt, 2011) which discusses the positive economic impacts of high-speed broadband in addition to its social
benefits related to education, healthcare, and civic engagement.
In response to the increasing concerns about the quality of Australia's broadband and telecommunication infrastructure (Barr,
2008; Given, 2008; Middleton & Chang, 2008), the Australian Federal Labor Government, in 2009, approved the construction of
Australia's National Broadband Network (NBN) (NBN Co Ltd, 2010b). In line with the international debates, there was a great
emphasis on the significant role of the NBN to facilitate equity across Australia's communities in regard to access to government
services through e-government, e-health, and e-education particularly in regional and rural areas, and for people who are
geographically isolated (Parliment of Australia, 2011).
The NBN was to provide terrestrial fibre network coverage for 93 per cent of Australian premises by the end of 2020, with the
remaining seven per cent served by fixed wireless and satellite coverage (NBN Co Ltd, 2010a). Following the approval for the
construction of the NBN, the Federal Labor Government announced the formation of the National Broadband Network Company
(NBN Co.), in April 2009, responsible for the design, construction and operation of the NBN.
The NBN rollout began with the announcement that the island of Tasmania was the launch state (NBN Co Ltd, 2010a). The
rollout of the NBN on mainland Australia started one year later in March 2010 when the NBN Co. announced the first five release
sites as part of live trials of the network design and construction (NBN Co Ltd, 2010c). The second stage of the mainland rollout,
announced in July 2010, included fourteen new locations and five sites adjacent to the existing first release sites (NBN Co Ltd,
2011b).
Early NBN rollout was mostly based on a series of operational modules that each covers approximately 3000 premises (NBN Co
Ltd, 2012a). There were some speculations about the political agenda behind the earlier release site selection (King, 2011). However,
the NBN Co. and the then Federal Labor Government on different occasions presented a range of engineering and logistic criteria
including the availability of existing core infrastructure to connect the access network to, and also access to the transit network and
fibre access nodes (DBCDE, 2011; NBN Co Ltd, 2012a). It was also argued that the earlier release sites were selected because they
represented the diversity of situations that the NBN Co. will encounter across Australia in the volume rollout, and allowed the
company to test and document different design and construction techniques (NBN Co Ltd, 2010c).
Nevertheless, it is hard to deny that telecommunication infrastructure, namely the NBN, has been an issue of interest that has
influenced Australia's political environment. Perhaps the high point of this influence was when three independent MPs cited the
NBN as one of the key reasons motivating their support for the Australian Labor Party (ALP) over the National Liberal Coalition (aka
Coalition) following a hung parliament in the 2010 Federal election. Tony Windsor, one of the three influential independent MPs,
speaking on the need for NBN for regional Australia, showed his support for the ALP's plan by saying “Do it once, do it right, and do
it with fibre”. He consequently secured priority access to the early NBN under ALP government for his own electorate.
Following the ALP's success to secure the government for the second term, a twelve month national rollout schedule plan was
announced by the NBN Co. in October 2011, listing the final 60 early rollout locations where the construction would begin prior to

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Fig. 1. Distribution of the Early NBN Rollout across Australia.

September 2012 (NBN Co Ltd, 2011a). Fig. 1 shows the location of 60 early rollout release sites across the nation. Later on, in March
2012 the NBN Co. announced the first stage of the large-scale rollout to connect 3.5 million premises in 1500 communities in every
state and territory to the fibre optic component of the network (NBN Co Ltd, 2012b). It was envisioned that the localities included in
the first stage of the large-scale rollout would be connected to the fibre-optic component before mid-2015.
Since the NBN was announced in April 2009, the NBN has attracted a great deal of media coverage which was described as
“overwhelmingly negative” (Arnold et al., 2014; Saarinen, 2014). The negative media coverage questioned the model, costs and
technology (Ross, 2012a, 2012b), and consequently public opinion polls reflected a growing level of dissatisfaction with the national
project. Public dissatisfaction provided Liberal National Coalition with a chance to influence the NBN, following the results of the
Federal election in 2013 and winning the power back.
In 2013, the elected Coalition Federal Government decided to reassess the scale of the national fibre project, and initiated a
number of reviews into the original NBN plan and its delivery model, cost and timeline (Department of Communications, 2013; NBN
Panel of Experts, 2014; Senate Select Committee on the National Broadband Network, 2014). The first stage of the large-scale NBN
rollout was also put on hold; and connection dates were scrapped for almost two-thirds of premises previously scheduled to connect
to the NBN in the first stage of the large-scale rollout. As of October 2013, only 300,000 premises were still guaranteed to be
connected directly to the fibre network (Duke, 2013; Turner, 2013). The announcements made by the LNP Federal Government
confirmed that a mixed technology network will be adopted (Turnbull, 2014), which means the roll-out speed could be significantly
different for the rest of the country.
This decision to continue the NBN using a mixed technology intensifies the socio-economic and political implications of the
earlier NBN rollout, as those early release sites could potentially be the only ones across the nation that enjoyed fibre to premise
NBN. Previous studies (Dias, Arnold, Gibbs, Nansen, & Wilken, 2014; Hayes, 2012; Tucker, 2015) have discussed some of the
socio-economic and technical ramifications of the Coalition's NBN. Dias et al. (2014) for example, argues that following the
introduction of mixed technology network provision of universal high-speed capacity is now transformed into a patchwork of final
speeds across the nation, undermining the potential of the NBN to deliver social and economic equity.
While this paper – with a narrow focus on the early rollout - cannot offer a comprehensive resolution on the political economy of
telecommunication infrastructure provision across the nation; it proffers the more modest objective of throwing new light on the
political economy of infrastructure planning in the digital age; and expanding the methodological possibility to investigate this line of
inquiry.

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Fig. 2. Australian 2007 Federal Election Seat Classification Percentage in all Electorates across Victoria, New South Wales and Queensland.

5. The NBN rollout and voting

5.1. Before the NBN: 2007 Federal election voting behaviours

In the 2007 Australian Federal election, the ALP was the clear winner across Victoria, New South Wales and Queensland (Fig. 2).
In fact statistical analysis shows a very strong positive linear correlation towards the ALP across all the three states (correlation
coefficient value of 0.97). In Victoria and Queensland, the ALP secured just over 62% of the seats; and the results in New South
Wales were not far away with a 57% win for the ALP. However, there were some differences in the voting behaviours across the three
states. Queensland, for example, showed a distinguished pattern in which the ALP victory was secured through a majority marginal
seat: Over 40% of the ALP held seats in Queensland were marginal in comparison to just over 10% marginally held ALP seats in
Victoria and New South Wales.

5.2. During the early rollout: 2010 Federal election voting behaviours

The 2010 Australian Federal election was very different from the 2007 one. Unlike the 2007 election which had the ALP as the
clear winner, the 2010 election ended up with a hung parliament. In fact statistical analysis – unlike the 2007 election – does not
show a strong linear correlation towards any of the two major parties across all the three states (correlation coefficient value of
−0.15). The 2010 election happened just one year after the introduction of the NBN, and the establishment of the NBN Co. which
had initiated the trial phase of the rollout in the very first release sites. However, many would argue that the voting behaviour
changed because of a number of reasons other than the NBN including the intense internal power conflicts within the ALP (Johnson,
2011).
Compared to the 2007, the overall voting behaviour patterns for the 2010 Australian Federal election in the states of Victoria,
New South Wales and Queensland were quite different (Fig. 3). ALP won the majority of the seats in Victoria and New South Wales
in the 2010 election. Victoria was the only state that did not show much of a change on the Coalition votes, and indeed experienced a
positive swing towards the ALP as the number of safe seats held by the ALP increased (from just under 30% in the 2007 to just over
40% in the 2010 election). The overall distribution of seats between the two parties slightly shifted in New South Wales. Yet, the shift
was not big enough for the Coalition to win the 2010 election. The number of safely held Coalition seats in New South Wales
increased (from about 16% in 2007 to over 29% in 2010), while the ALP managed to hold on to over 64% of the seats. It could be
argued that the ALP's win in New South Wales was somehow fragile in comparison to the 2007 election, as the percentage of safe
seats held by the ALP had decreased (from 36.73% in 2007 to 20.83% in 2010), and the marginally held ALP seats had doubled in
number (from 10.20% in 2007 to 20.83% in 2010).
Queensland, however, showed the biggest swing in the 2010 election, as the Coalition was the clear winner securing over 73%
percent of the seats. The shift in voting across Queensland was so strong that the ALP did not secure any safe seats at all (in
comparison to 13.79% safe seats secured in 2007), and lost more than half of its marginal seats to the Coalition – ALP's marginal
seats in 2010 were 20% in comparison to 41.38% in the 2007 election. The strong negative swing for the ALP in Queensland has been
explained by reference to the unpopularity of the then Labor State Government (Tiffen, 2011). Moreover, the internal ALP conflicts

Fig. 3. Australian 2010 Federal Election Seat Classification Percentage in all Electorates across Victoria, New South Wales and Queensland.

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Fig. 4. Australian 2007 Federal Election Seat Classification Percentage in the Early NBN Rollout Electorates across Victoria, New South Wales and Queensland.

at the Federal level had resulted in the replacement of a Queensland-based Prime Minister (Kevin Rudd) which almost certainly had
negative impacts on the ALP votes in Queensland (Green, 2013).

5.3. Who received the NBN?

Discussions on the provision of the NBN commenced following the 2007 election. The selection of the NBN early release sites
therefore could be said to be guided by voting behaviour in the 2007 Australian Federal election. Moreover, at the time of the 2010
election, 19 NBN release sites were introduced, with the full list of 60 sites announced in October 2011. Hence, the voting behaviour
in the 2010 election could still have also guided the selection of the NBN early release sites.
An observation of the voting behaviour within the electoral divisions that were later selected for the early NBN release reveals
those electorates that voted for the ALP were the key beneficiaries (Fig. 4). Such an observation is supported by statistical analysis, as
a very strong positive linear correlation towards the ALP held seats in the 2007 election (correlation coefficient value of 0.96) is
noted in the early NBN rollout selection. It is important to note that the ALP had a convincing win in the 2007 Federal election, and
yet the tendency to vote for the ALP among those electorates missing the early NBN rollout was weaker (correlation efficient value of
0.77), than those selected to receive the NBN.
There were also interesting sub-patterns observed across the early NBN rollout sites in the three states. Fig. 4 shows that the
biased towards the ALP held seats were stronger in Victoria and Queensland (in both states about 80% of the NBN release sites were
selected from the ALP held seats in the 2007 election), versus New South Wales (in which 65% of the NBN release sites were selected
from the ALP held seats in the 2007 election). More interestingly, based on the 2007 election results, all Queensland based marginal
seats held by the then Coalition missed out on the NBN while Queensland based marginal seats held by the ALP were the clear
winners (63%).
Fig. 5 shows voting behaviour in the 2010 election, within the electoral divisions selected for the early NBN rollout. The 2010
election results look quite different from the 2007 election, they are mixed across the three states, and a correlation test shows
weaker tendency (correlation coefficient value of 0.43) to vote for the ALP in the early NBN rollout sites. Interestingly, a correlation
test focused on all other electorates (those not selected for the early NBN rollout) shows a negative linear correlation for the ALP
(correlation coefficient value of −0.61). In other words, the early NBN was offered to a selection of the electorates which maintained
a relatively positive tendency towards voting for the ALP, during an election that the rest of the country had a swing against the ALP.
The above statistical analysis suggests that the early NBN rollout sites were perhaps selected based on political consideration. It is
yet interesting to look at the trends in each of the three states. As pointed out earlier (see Fig. 3), in the 2010 Federal election, the
ALP experienced the biggest negative swing across all electorates in Queensland. Queensland was also the only state in which the
Coalition held seats (with 68%) had a bigger share of the NBN early rollout, based on the 2010 election results. It is however,
important to realize that over two third of the Coalition held seats (46% out of 68%) selected for the early NBN rollout were marginal.
One could then argue this selection was politically motivated in order to swing the marginal seats back for the benefits of the ALP.
The NBN release site selection in New South Wales and Victoria favoured those electoral divisions that voted for the ALP in the
2010 election; with a strong presence of (over 77%) of the ALP held safe seats in Victoria. A correlation test also shows a positive
linear correlation (with a correlation coefficient value of 0.47) for the ALP held safe seats across the three states. This suggests that
the ALP safe seats in the 2010 election were more likely to be receiving the NBN in comparison to the Coalition safe seats.

Fig. 5. Australian 2010 Federal Election Seat Classification Percentage in the Early NBN Rollout Electorates across Victoria, New South Wales and Queensland.

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Fig. 6. Australian 2013 Federal Election Seat Classification Percentage in All Electorates across Victoria, New South Wales and Queensland.

Fig. 7. Australian 2013 Federal Election Seat Classification Percentage in the Early NBN Rollout Electorates across Victoria, New South Wales and Queensland.

5.4. Did the early NBN rollout swing votes?

5.4.1. After the early rollout: 2013 Federal election voting behaviours
The 2013 Federal election happened when the early rollout was well under-way and the plans for the first stage of the large-scale
rollout across all Australian states and territories were also announced. The Australian Labor Party (ALP) however, lost the election
which changed the fate of the NBN. This time, similar to the previous elections, a number of factors such as the ongoing frustrating
internal power conflicts within the ALP and a campaign against the Carbon Pricing influenced people's preference. However, the
NBN was also widely discussed prior to the 2013 election and was one of the deciding factors. In fact, the heated discussions between
the representatives of the then Labor government versus of the then Coalition opposition were widely covered in the media (Lateline,
2013; LeMay, 2013; Levy, 2013). Such discussions were mostly about three main issues: the cost of providing fibre to the premises
NBN, the speed at which the infrastructure was being rolled out, and the determination of an adequate level of connection speed for
Australian cities and regions.
A comparison of the voting behaviour in the NBN recipient electorates versus all electoral divisions in the 2013 election is
interesting (see Figs. 6 and 7). In fact statistical analysis shows a weak negative linear correlation in the NBN release sites
(correlation coefficient value of −0.03), which suggests a weak tendency towards the Coalition was observed in the voting behaviour
of those who received the early NBN. It is however important to realize that such tendency to vote for the Coalition (against the ALP)
was far stronger in the rest of the country. A correlation coefficient value of −0.92 suggests that those who did not receive the early
NBN, had a very strong swing in votes towards the Coalition.
Looking at the voting pattern in each state helps to understand these statistical differences in the NBN sites versus all electorates.
For example, the ALP secured about 62% of seats across all electorates in Victoria in the 2010 election; this number was reduced to
54% in the 2013 election which shows a loss of 8% of all seats. The ALP, however, did far better in the NBN recipient divisions as the
results in the 2013 and 2010 elections were very similar (85% win in 2010, and 84% win in 2013).
In other words, while the ALP experienced an overall heavy negative swing across the nation, which resulted in losing the
election, the ALP's loss in the NBN release sites were highly mitigated. This different trend could be related to the provision of the
hefty infrastructure which distinguished the NBN release sites from the rest of the nation. This cannot, however, be assumed as a
causal relationship, due to the complex nature of factors influencing voting behaviour.

6. Conclusion

This paper acknowledges the utmost level of integration of modern life with infrastructure which has resulted in governments’
investment in different infrastructure projects all around the world. It then focuses on telecommunication infrastructure as the
backbone of the fast-growing digital economy, and scrutinizes the political economy of the provision of the high-speed broadband in
Australia. The paper asks whether there was any case of pork barrelling in the selection of the early NBN release sites. The answer to
this question then leads to a second question about the degree to which the voting in the early NBN release sites swung following the
infrastructure rollout. In order to answer these questions the paper examines the voting patterns in the earlier NBN release sites
versus all electorates in three states of New South Wales, Victoria and Queensland, using the data available via Australian Electoral
Commission. The analysis is offered in two parts focusing on the 2007 and 2010 Federal elections (as pre-early rollout elections), and
the 2013 Federal election (as the post- early rollout election).
An analysis of the voting behaviour in the 2007 and the 2010 Federal elections shows a pattern in which the ALP held seats were
the key beneficiaries of the early NBN rollout. Moreover, the results suggests that the Coalition held safe seats were the least likely to

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receive the infrastructure. Diverse sub-patterns across the three states of New South Wales, Queensland, and Victoria have been
discussed in details. However, the overall findings remain that the selection process for the early NBN rollout was skewed up for
potential political gains.
The paper then moves to the second question on whether the targeted infrastructure provision worked and swung votes for the
ALP in the following 2013 Federal election. The analysis of the voting in the NBN early rollout areas versus the rest of the country
shows a clear difference. While the ALP experienced an overall heavy negative swing across the nation and lost the election, the
negative shift was highly mitigated in the NBN early release sites. This difference could be related to the provision of the hefty
infrastructure which distinguished the NBN release sites from the rest of the nation. Nevertheless, it is important to remember the
limits of this study; because the NBN was only one of the many factors that could impact voting behaviour.
This study does not claim to offer a solid resolution on the political economy of the NBN provision in Australia. However, its
findings suggest an interesting correlation between the provision of the telecommunication infrastructure and voting patterns which
is worthy of further investigation. The paper's findings need to be considered in light of previous studies arguing that the
infrastructure unevenness rigidifies into more lasting structures of privilege and advantage (Bröcker et al., 2010; Dodson et al.,
2007). More specifically, previous research has already pointed out some of the shortcomings of the socio-economic patterns of the
early NBN rollout (Alizadeh, 2013, 2015a).
It might be unrealistic to expect such a major telecommunication infrastructure project be fully de-politicized. Nevertheless, from
infrastructure planning perspective, this calls for current and future broadband rollout plans to be integrated in broader public policy
debates around social equity and spatial justice. It is only through open policy debates that the full potentials of telecommunication
infrastructure to build equitable and sustainable cities and regions will be utilized.
This latest decision to continue the NBN using a mixed technology intensifies the socio-economic and political implications of the
national broadband project which has now transformed into a patchwork of final speeds and different quality of service across the
country. So, we conclude with a call for future studies to further examine the distribution of the ongoing NBN rollout, now using a
mixed technology, across the Australian political spectrum. Such an investigation is necessary to unravel the complexity of political
economy of infrastructure provision in the digital age. It needs to account for the growing role of the independents and minor parties
in the Australian politics, and scrutinize the socio-spatial implications of the different levels of access proposed across Australian
cities and regions.

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