The Tyranny of Dictatorship When The Greek Tyrant Met The Roman Dictator

The Tyranny of Dictatorship: When the Greek Tyrant Met the Roman Dictator
Author(s): Andreas Kalyvas

Source: Political Theory, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Aug., 2007), pp. 412-442
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.
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Andreas Kalyvas
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The articleexamines the inauguralencounterof theGreek theoryof tyranny

and theRoman institution of dictatorship.
Although the twentieth centuryis
creditedforfusingthetyrant and thedictatorintoone figure/concept, I tracethe
originsof thisconceptual synthesisin a much earlierhistoricalperiod, thatof
the laterRoman Republic and the early Principate, and in thewritings
of twoGreek historiansofRome, Dionysius ofHalicarnassus andAppian of
Alexandria. In theirhistories, the traditionalinterestin the relationship
between theking and the tyrantis displaced by a new curiosityabout the
tyrantand thedictator.The two historiansplaced the two figuresalongside
one another and found them to be almost identical,blurringany previous
empirical, analytical, or normative distinctions. In theirGreco-Roman
synthesisdictatorshipis re-describedas 'temporarytyranny by consent' and
the tyrantas a 'permanentdictator.'Dictatorship, a venerated republican
magistracy, theultimateguardian of theRoman constitution,is for the first
timeradicallyreinterpreted and explicitlyquestioned. Itmeets its firstcritics.
Keywords: Dionysius; Appian; tyranny;dictatorship; Athens; Rome;

democracy; republicanism
For most of the twentiethcentury theconcepts of dictatorship and tyranny

were treated as synonyms, two names for one formof autocratic politi
cal rule. "Dictatorship," Fossey JohnCobb Hearmshaw wrote in 1934, "is the
formof government theGreeks have very correctly connoted with the term
The dictator and the tyrant
'tyranny.'1'l were fused together in a single figure,
that of illegality, violence, and arbitrariness, and perceived as a common
threattopolitical freedom,constitutionalism, and the rule of law,2a threat the
Author's Note: I am grateful to Andrew Arato, Melvin Richter, Dmitri Nikoulin, Vassilis
Lambropoulos, and Mary Dietz for their advice and insightful comments on earlier drafts of
this article. I would also like to thankNadia Urbinati, Jason Frank, Gerasimos Karavitis, Ann
Kornhauser, Claudio Lopez-Guerra, JimMiller, and the two anonymous reviewers for their
helpful and constructive suggestions and criticisms.
412

Kalyvas /The Tyranny of Dictatorship 413
ancients had formulated as political enslavement. Accordingly, throughout

the century, this conceptual identification provided normative resources to
thosewho opposed themodern revival of dictatorship. Denunciations of the
many forms of dictatorship, both of theRight and theLeft, which emerged
over the course of the last century as modern manifestations of tyranny
theseresources.3
mobilizedrepeatedly
The equation of dictatorship and tyranny is not, however, unique to the
twentiethcentury. It appeared as well in a preceding historical period in the
shiftingpolitical context of the revolutionary upheavals of Europe and its
overseas colonies and the decline of themonarchical order.4Claude Nicolet
rightlyobserves that"since theeighteenth century,"the termdictatorship "has
served to refer to despotisms or tyrannies-in otherwords, essentially pow
erswhich are far fromhaving been regularly conferred, and instead had been
usurped through force or deceit."5 The conceptual marriage of the dictator
and the tyrantcoincided with the radical transformationofWestern society
and politics in the age of themodern democratic revolutions, legal rational
ization, thegradual inclusion of new groups into the terrainof formalpolitics,
and the successive attempts to institutionallyresuscitateRoman dictatorship
by such figures as Cromwell, the Jacobins, and Napoleon.6
Nicolet's narrative accurately captures themodern blending of the two
terms and correctly relocates itwithin thebroader historical movement and
diffusion of republicanism.7 But his story is incomplete. It disregards a still
earlier moment inWestern political historywhen thedictator began to look
dangerously like a tyrant. In the turbulent transitional period between the
Roman republic and thePrincipate, Sulla and Caesar, and their struggle for
supreme power gravely tested the institutionof dictatorship.8The 'abuse' of
this emergency institution, its exercise outside the limits delineated by the
established legal framework, its appropriation for the advancement of per
sonal ambitions, and even itsuse against the republic itself,prompted a pro
found reconsideration of its nature, function, and value.
Two Greek historians of the early and high Imperial periods, Dionysius
of Halicarnassus (60 BC-after 7 BC) and Appian of Alexandria (95-165
AC) undertook such a radical reassessment.9 While most of the annalists
and 'republican historians' cherished thememory of the republic and its
institutions,among which dictatorship was held in the highest esteem, the
writings of the two Greek narrators followed a differentpath.10Their his
tories suggest a fresh reconsideration of this emergency magistracy, which
they carried out by utilizing concepts and methods borrowed from the
classical Greek tradition.'1 In theirGreco-Roman synthesis dictatorship is
re-described as 'temporarytyrannyby consent' and the tyrantas a 'permanent

414 PoliticalTheory
dictator.' This historical and conceptual revisionism inaugurated a compar

ative study of theRoman institutionof dictatorship and Greek theories of
tyrannywith some crucial implications.
Dionysius and Appian's Greek histories of Rome include a critical
re-examination of dictatorship insofar as they interrogate its very capacity
to preserve the constitutional order. 2Was the abuse of Roman dictatorship
accidental, the effectofmoral decline, or the result of itsown unruly nature?
As theirworks raise thisquestion, it seems the two historians were not only
engaged in the rewriting of Roman history or in a conceptual revision of
classical concepts; theywere also involved in a critical debate about the
institutionof dictatorship as such. It is likely thatMarcus Antonius' law that
officially abolished dictatorship in 44 BC (the Lex Antonia de dictatura in
perpetuum tollenda) sparked this debate."3 It was rekindled when two
decades later, the senate and the people sought to revive the institutionby
twice offeringAugustus theDictatorate, which he declined.'4 More impor
tantly,theirhistories challenged the republican regime as a whole, directly
implicating it in its own collapse.'5 Unlike Livy and Sallust who ascribed
the fall of the republic to various external causes and theircorrupt effects,'6
Dionysius and Appian's diagnoses suggested the preponderance of internal
reasons for the inherent instability, decline, and ultimately fall of the
Roman republic. Their histories, for the first time, radically reinterpreted
and explicitly questioned dictatorship. This venerated republican magis
tracy, the ultimate guardian of theRoman constitution,met its firstcritics.
Certainly, I am not suggesting to oppose Dionysius and Appian against
more renowned and influentialhistorians of their times in thename of some
objective, 'true' factual attributes of theRoman institutionof dictatorship.
Rather, I seek to revisit the incipient discursive encounter between tyranny
and dictatorship. In particular, I examine how the two concepts gradually
came to be associated with new meanings as theywere increasingly fused.
I consider Dionysius and Appian's unprecedented equation by focusing on
the historical narratives, conceptual translations, and theoretical arguments
thatpermitted the identification of the two terms. It is, however, the nor
mative implications of this encounter that I find intriguing and which have
not hitherto been adequately appreciated politically or illuminated inter
pretatively. By identifying the Roman dictator with the Greek tyrant,
Dionysius and Appian introduced a new understanding of emergency pow
ers, directly challenging inheritedpolitical views and philosophical beliefs.
As I see it, the twoGreek historians inaugurated a radical conceptual trans
formation in the language of classical politics. With a different political
history invested with new meanings and values and brought inside the

broader category of tyranny,dictatorship acquired a polyvalence and ambi

guity that it originally lacked and which came to characterize the tyranni
cal depiction of themodem dictator.
Part one of thisessay recreates the intellectual background thatpreceded
Dionysius andAppian's synthesis in order to underscore thenovelty of their
respective approaches. To associate the dictator and the tyrantwas not the
most obvious thing to do at the time. Rather, the norm was to consider
tyrannya corrupted form of monarchy, a pathological outgrowth of royal
power perverted by unjust kings.'7 Thus, the tyrantwas primarily a bad king
injusti).'8In thiscontext,Dionysius and
(,uoX6r&pdacx.ri)xAE,/regis
Appian's historical writings represent a decisive shift in thehistory of polit
ical concepts. Parts two and three discuss how Dionysius and Appian dis
placed the traditional interest in the relationship between the king and the
tyrantwith a new curiosity about the tyrantand the dictator. The twoGreek
historians found the tyrantand the dictator to be almost identical, thereby
blurring previous empirical, analytical, and normative distinctions between
them."9This blurring entailed as well a serious reworking of the classical
theories of tyrannyand a departure frommore canonical definitions. Part
four explores some of the implications resulting from the equation of the
tyrantand the dictator, including the possibility that the downfall of the
Republic may have been the fatal result of particular constitutional choices
and institutional flaws. Crucially, Dionysius and Appian demythologized
the institutionof dictatorship, dispelling its republican aura. From a more
general point of view, theirapproaches recast the relationship of Athenian
democracy and theRoman republic, indicating a key difference between
the two regimes that could potentially contribute to current debates on
executive emergency powers and constitutional dictatorship in liberal
democratic states.
The King, theDictator, and theTyrant
Livy offers a historically influential account of the origins of dictator

ship.20 In 501 BC, a few years after the deposition and exile of the king
Tarquinius Superbus and in the face of external dangers caused by the
aggression of neighboring tribes, a dictator was appointed for the firsttime
bymeans of a lexdictatorecreando.2'
Althoughhis appointment
appears
to have been constitutional in accordance with certain established rules and
procedures, his public display generated a "great fear" among theplebeians.
Their sudden dread at the sheer sight of dictatorial power, a power beyond

416 PoliticalTheory
appeal at the time and not subject to countervailing checks, rendered

them obedient while at the same time subduing their enemies and protect
ing the nascent republic.22
Aside from the element of fear and the powerful effects of docility that
both dictatorship and tyrannyseemed to produce, Livy's narrative does not
suggest other similarities. This absence is not surprising. From the first
moment of encounter of the two concepts in late antiquity as Rome
expanded eastwards around the timneof the Punic wars and the tyrantwas
brought into the republican language of politics and literature,we find a
clear conceptual division of labor.23The tyrantoccupied a fixed, well
defined position in theRoman imaginary, plainly and unambiguously dis
tinguished from thedictator. They marked dissimilar forms of political rule,
carrying contrasting, even antithetical meanings. The dictator denoted a
legal and regular though extraordinary magistracy intended to protect the
public good inmoments of crisis and danger; tyrannydesignated an unjust
and violent power, the destruction of the common interest, and the down
fall of legality and freedom.
The many differences that set them apart were, in fact, too obvious and
dramatic to have been ignored. Dictatorship was a constitutional office
appointed legally through the cooperation of the higher republican author
ities and according to "what the law commanded."24 The tyrantacquired his
power extra-constitutionally, through force, deceit, and the violent over
throw of the established regime.25Moreover, the dictator had a concrete
task, the elimination of threatsduiing a crisis and a return to the status quo
ante bellum. Although the salvation and re-establishment of the constitution
was the strictcommission of the clictator,no such authorization existed for
the tyrantwhose acts were arbitraryand indeterminate, directed toward the
satisfaction of his selfish desires and private interests.26The dictator's
actions were generally considered to be inspired by a strong civic commit
ment to the public good, a realmanifestation of the patriotic attachment of
the republican citizen. He was the guardian of the republican order; the
tyrant its usurper. In short, the dictator was a servant who defended what
the tyrantaspired to acquire and destroy.
The contrasts proliferate.Most significantly perhaps, the institution of
dictatorship was temporally bound.27 The dictator's rule could never exceed
a six-month period and upon the successful completion of his assignment
he had to abdicate.28 Tyranny, however, entailed an attempt to seize control
of a government in order to hold it indefinitely.Whereas the dictator sus
pended the constitution or parts of it for a limited period, the tyrantdid so
for an unspecified period, normalizing his rule and endeavoring to habituate

the people to it.29Dictatorship was exceptional and provisional; tyranny

"unnatural" but permanent.30 Because the dictator lacked the legislative
powers that the tyrantsimply usurped he could notmodify, alter, or abolish
the established constitutional structurebut only suspend it.Thus, while the
dictator appealed to the exception to uphold the norm, the tyrantattempted
tonormalize the exception. Finally, Roman dictatorshipwas not itselfa form
of government, but ratheran institutionalcomponent of a broader republican
regime. Tyranny by contrast was generally treated as a regime-type of its
own, albeit a perversion and a deviation of the just forms of political rule.
The ancient Romans knew these distinctions, which might have had
some bearing on theirhistorical inquiries and on how theyunderstood their
institutions.However, therewere some telling similarities between dicta
torship and tyrannythatcould not have escaped notice. For example, dicta
torship and tyrannywere both closely associated with regal rule and in
particular with its strongerpersonalistic and autocratic versions. In thewrit
ings of thePolybius and Cicero this affinity is reflected in the intimate and
bothconceptsenjoyedwithkingship.3'
privilegedrelationship
There is here, however, a slight but indicative divergence between the
Roman philosopher and theGreek historian.Although Cicero, like Polybius,
considered tyrannyas a perverted form of monarchy, he also thought that
dictatorship, a decisive higher authoritywith a plenitude of power to over
come the forces of dissolution, rescued thebest monarchy had to offer,"for
safety prevails over caprice."32 Cicero commended the survival of monar
chical powers (especially those necessary forwar or civil discord) in the
institutionand practice of dictatorship.33For him, dictatorship appeared as
a remnant of monarchy, a necessary but temporary retreat to royal powers,
and an advantageous return to the deposed form of personalistic rule.34 In
cases of emergency, theKing's regal authority was revived, so as to set
aside the limitations imposed by the collegiate arrangement, themixed
character of the republic, and by the special curtailments of jurisdiction. For
Polybius, however, themonarchical derivation of tyrannyprimarily explained
the vicious excesses of the former. In his famous cyclical theoryof regime
change, Polybius described how the absolute power of kingship necessarily
degenerates into tyranny,that is, into the ruler's instrumentfor the limitless
pursuit of his lawless pleasures and passions.35 Although Cicero agreed
with Polybius' views on the immanent threat of corruption, he also
acknowledged the best of monarchy. The ideal of kingship is realized, but,
paradoxically, only briefly and provisionally, that is, dictatorially. For
Polybius, however, tyranny represented theworst of monarchy, a natural
deviation from the right form and a necessary slip into lawlessness.

418 PoliticalTheory
Itwould be wrong to underestimate the difference between dictatorship

and tyrannyas itemerges out of the contrasting figures of the dictator as the
good, temporary king and the tyrant as an unjust, corrupted monarch.
However, even though Cicero's understanding of dictatorship contains
positive elements ofmonarchy while Polybius' concept of tyrannyembodies
itsnegative aspects, both conceptualizations reveal a close affinitywith regal
power, or what Dio Cassius described as "a love formonarchy" (c'pon7a
/ovapXia5).36 This affinitybetween dictatorship and kingship recalls ear
lier classical Greek explorations into the nature of tyranny,suggesting cer
tain similarities between dictatorship and tyranny.One similarity is a
common claim to supreme power (KV6pto5 irdvzv/majus imperium) once
held by a legitimatemonarch.37 In thisview, the supreme power over the life
and death of their subjects, a power without collegiality, characterize both
dictatorship and tyranny.This autocratic form of power also suggests
another similarity between the two concepts regarding their indeterminate
and tense relation with the established legal order and theiralarming prox
imity to anomie.38After all, theRomans drew a thin line separating theking
from the tyrant in relation towhether a king ruled by law or according to
his desires, and itwas recognized in the force of corruption to transform
kings into tyrants.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the dreadful incidents of Sulla (82-79
BC) and Caesar (49 BC, 48-47 BC, 46-45 BC, 45-44 BC) would finally
draw attention to these similarities, inviting a serious reexamination of dic
tatorship.Dionysius seems to have been the first to undertake such a revi
sion, and Appian the second.39 Dionysius, a contemporary of Livy, wrote
his history of Rome at the conclusion of a tumultuous, transitional period
between the lateRepublic, its fall, and the consolidation of imperialmonar
chy. His Roman Antiquities, consisting of 20 books, began to appear in 7
BC, approximately two decades after his permanent move to Rome, at a
moment when theproblem of dictatorship was again a topical issue, acquir
ing a new historical and political salience perhaps through the ambiguous
legacy of Cicero's late writings on Caesar and Antonius.40 Unlike most of
his fellow historians, Dionysius developed a distinct understanding of dic
tatorship, proposed a new history of its origin and evolution, and pro
foundly reassessed its involvement in the fall of the republic.
Appian closely followed and furtherdeveloped Dionysius' approach on
dictatorship although he completed his Roman History one century and a
half later, around 162 AD in a mature and relatively stable imperial order.
From the vantage point of a consolidated imperial monarchy, Appian
looked back at the instability of the republic and linked dictatorship to a

series of disruptive and violent civic conflicts thatbrought about the col
lapse of the res publica. As an emergency magistracy, dictatorship played a
decisive role in the republic's slow and painful descent intodiscord and dis
order.4" Its direct interventions in the politics of social conflict enjoy a
prominent place inAppian's depiction of the gradual dissolution and ulti
mate death of republican institutions.With Appian, dictatorship remained
where Dionysius had relegated it, fallen from its previously loftyconstitu
tional position and irremediably tainted by its association with tyranny.
Dionysius and the Elective Tyranny of Dictatorship
Dionysius' account of the historical origins of the firstdictatorship dif

fered sharply from and even at times contradicted Livy's.42 Several exam
ples illustrate this divergence. First, Dionysius located its birth three years
later thanLivy, in 498 BC. More importantly,he underplayed the influence
of external factors in the creation of this emergency institution thatwere
central in Livy's account. Dionysius' narrative stressed almost exclusively
the central role of domestic politics.43 It depicted a fragile nascent republi
can order struggling for balance and stability.A highly polarized society,
fracturedby theproblem of thedebts, shaken by popular unrest, and threat
ened by civic discord between the patricians and the plebeians, challenged
thisquest for survival. In this immediate volatile post-monarchical context,
Dionysius firmly located the republican genesis of dictatorship at a critical,
foundational junction amidst fierce debates over thepolitical identityof the
republic, the distribution of freedoms and protections of the different
orders, and the shape of its constitutive norms and rules.
Dionysius identifies as themain reason behind the establishment of dic
tatorshipa law proposed by the consul Publius Valerius (Publicola) and rat
ified by the people. This law sparked a quarrel that further inflamed the
conflict between the two orders on the question of debts, endangering the
incipient republic.4 Publicola's law strengthened considerably the position
of theplebeians by granting the right to appeal (ius provocationis) toRoman
citizens, proposing thatno Roman should be punished without a trial.This
law made it illegal for a magistrate to put a citizen to death without a trial
before a popular court, that is, before one's peers (provocation ad popu
lum).45The right to appeal was thus established as a protection of the ple
beians against thepolitical and social predominance of thepatricians in the
republic.46Defendants could now appeal the judgment of the consuls to the
people and its assemblies,47 an innovation both Livy and Cicero recognized

420 PoliticalTheory
as "the unique defense of liberty."48Nevertheless, as Dionysius bluntly

reports, in order to "prevent the plebeians from creating any fresh distur
bances,"the senate proposed the creation of a new superior magistracy
endowed "with authority over war and peace and every othermatter, pos
sessed of absolute power and subject to no accounting for either its coun
sels or its actions."49
Dictatorship was therefore deliberately designed to stop the political
ambitions of themultitude and "to the end that the poor might offer no
opposition," the senate "introduce[d] into the government a magistracy of
equal power with tyranny (luoTv'pavvov apXrjv), which should be supe
rior to all the laws."50 The dictator (3tKz`ropa;) was instituted against
Publicola's legal right to appeal. The implication of the senate's judgment
was, as Dionysius reports, "thatwhile this law remained in force the poor
could not be compelled to obey themagistrates . .. whereas, when this law
had been repealed, all would be under the greatest necessity of obeying
orders.""5With the dictator, as Livy himself recognized, "there was neither
appeal nor help anywhere."52 The plebs subsequently ratified the senate's
plan for this temporarymagistracy. But as Dionysius argued, the nobility
deceived and misguided them to vote against their own interests, thereby
approving the abolition of the law that guarded their freedom.53The new
decree was immediately put into effect.The senate deliberated and the first
dictator was appointed to restore order.After he "terrified the turbulentand
the seditious," he took a census, made a yearly trucewith Rome's neigh
boring enemies, and resigned.54
Dionysius' approach is not only more detailed thanLivy's but also more
sociologically sensitive and politically alert. He associated closely the cre
ation of dictatorship with social struggles, thebalance of power between the
contending classes, their strategic reasoning and sense of self-interest, and
in particular, with the political, legal, and social advancements of the poor
after the expulsion of the kings.55Thus, inDionysius' narrative dictatorship
appears from its very beginning as an aristocratic political instrumentaim
ing at quelling domestic turmoil and preserving the interests and authority
of the patricians.56
Dionysius redefined this new powerful magistracy of dictatorship "elec
tive tyranny" (a('peT4wpavvi5), thus radically transforming itsmeaning
within the context of Roman political thought.57The critical thrust of
Dionysius' drastic historical revisionism becomes more palpable in light
of his undeniably pejorative views on tyranny.In his critical discussion of
Thucydides, for instance, he portrayed tyranny as a bad form of political
power thatexcludes themany from common life by depriving themof those

things that are universally advantageous and useful.58This synoptic disap

proval resonates throughout Dionysius' Roman history. Based on the
description of its genesis, dictatorship was more of a political weapon in
Rome's ongoing civic struggles than a military magistracy aimed at exter
nal foes.59The senate deliberately designed dictatorship as an instrument
for domestic emergencies. Its purpose was to spread fear and insecurity
among the disobedient masses, abolish legal protections and rights if
needed, suppress popular dissent, and protect the interest and privileges of
the patricians. This may explain why, as Theodor Mommsen observed,
"since the fall of monarchy, the suppression of dictatorship became in
Rome the objective of the party of liberty."60
As a supreme device of repression, the result of "an aristocratic plot,"
institutionallyengineered for situations of class warfare, dictatorship neces
sarilymilitarized political contestation.61The fact that the firstarchaic name
for the dictator was magister populi underscores the primary function of a
military commander.62Dictatorship not only criminalized political conflict
and militarized the city but also transformed the political adversary into a
hostis, a public enemy, against whom the dictator could legally apply in full
force the law of war.63As Clinton Rossiter observes, "the resort to thedicta
torship converted theRoman Republic and its complex constitution into the
simplest and most absolute of all governments-an armed camp governed
by an independent and irresponsible general."'MAll thiswould have sounded
familiar toGreek ears. Tyrants "know well thatall who are subject to their
tyrannyare theirenemies ((Opoi ),"Xenophon's "Hieron" laments, as they
live "in a perpetual state of war."65Tyranny was a friendless power, and the
militarization of the political was considered a defining attributeof tyranni
cal rule.66Aristotle, in his historical and comparative investigations on the
nature of this formof boundless power, concurred: the tyrantis a war-maker,
a "6orAollff00ol."67 The tyrannical city was always under siege; and so it
was with Rome under the rule of a dictator.68
These similarities may have informedDionysius' sweeping redefinition
of dictatorship as "elective tyranny."On the one hand, dictatorship was
tyrannical because itwas absolute and unaccountable, entailed the discre
tionary use of themeans of violence, the ability to breach the laws at will,
and threatened the life, liberties, and property of its subjects while seeking
to protect and advance partial class interests against the common good. On
the other hand, itwas also elective. The people explicitly consented to
sacrifice temporarily their freedomwhen they ratified the senate's proposal.
That theywere fooled and manipulated, as Dionysius maintained, does not
alter the fact that in the end they sanctioned the new law, thus surrendering

422 PoliticalTheory
to a "voluntary tyranny" (avOCaipzov zypavviha).69 With the Romans,

the tyrantbecame a constitutional choice inmoments of crisis and tyranny
took the new form of arbitrarypersonal rule by consent.
Dionysius' radical reappraisal not only challenged established views on
dictatorship, italso questioned classical definitions of tyranny.For instance,
from thewell-known Greek designations of tyrannyas a particular form of
rule over unwilling subjects, against the law, and in the service of the
private interests of the ruler,Dionysius retained the two last attributes,
illegality and partial interests, and reduced the significance of the first,
involuntary rule.70As a consequence, the non-consensual foundations of
tyrannyand its association with usurpation became less important in his use
of the term,given thathe thought itpossible to have a tyrannyconsented to
by themany as long as the ruler remained unaccountable and outside the
law, enjoying full powers over his subjects while seeking to advance
particular social interests. In thisway, Dionysius distanced himself from
the classical meanings traceable at least to Herodotus' story of the first
tyrantGyges, according towhich tyrannywas an act of usurpation in vio
lation of established norms and rules regulating the acquisition of power.7'
Dionysius drew attention instead to the nature and quality of rule itself and
not to themethod of itspossession, thusdeparting from the view of tyranny
as a violation of the procedural law of succession. This reformulation of
tyranny anticipates themedieval distinction between tyranny ex defectu
tituli (with respect to the illegitimate and non-consensual acquisition of
power) and tyrannyquoad exercitium (with respect to theway of exercis
ingpower).72
This subtraction of theprinciple of consent from the attributesof tyranny
was not fully innovative considering theAristotelian category of "elective
tyranny" thatwas included in his typology of royalty.73Aristotle distin
guished among several types of kingship, dissimilar but still partaking in
the same regime form,allowing for a more complex, comparative approach.
Dionysius' approach directly relies on one of Aristotle's royal sub-types,
the obscure and almost unknown to us archaic, pre-democratic Greek insti
tution of aesymnetae, under which a military commander was elected and
granted additional powers to save the city from external dangers.74After the
completion of themission, the aesymnetes abdicated. Aristotle considered
this ancient practice tyrannical because itwas absolute in themanner of its
rule, notwithstanding its likely origin in popular support or through the
established legal forms and procedures. Such regimes "are of the nature of
tyrannies,"Aristotle writes, "because they are despotic, but of the nature of
kingships because they are elective and rule over willing subjects."75 The

aesymnetes is thus a hybrid of tyranny and kingship, blending absolute,

personalistic power with consent in moments of exceptional danger.76
Pittacus, the ruler ofMitylene, for example, was officially an aesymnetes
before he became the legendary tyrantand one of the seven sages.77
Dionysius' appropriation of the Aristotelian category of "elective
tyranny" is crucial for his concluding narrative on Sulla, whose dictator
ship he assessed as having one positive, if inadvertent effect: it finally
compelled theRomans to realize the truenature of thismagistracy insofar
as itexposed the real face of dictatorship in termsof the tyrantwithin.78 So
cruel and harsh was Sulla's dictatorship, Dionysius wrote, "that the
Romans perceived for the first timewhat theyhad all along been ignorant
of, that dictatorship is a tyranny."79
Dionysius' comment does not indict
Sulla for abusing theRoman magistracy and its extraordinary powers or
for violating its constitutional limitations, as Mommsen would later do in
his famous distinction between two types of dictatorship.80 Nor does
Dionysius inflect his notion of tyrannywith such subjective moral charac
terizations as Sulla's personal lust to power. Rather, Dionysius' indictment
of Sulla is predicated on the emergency institution of dictatorship itself,
devised to tyrannize the republic, even ifonly temporarily and by consent.
In short, forDionysius, Sulla was the tyrannical symptom of dictatorship,
not its cause.
Appian and theTemporary Tyranny of Dictatorship
This incipient but compelling critical redefinition of the republican

emergency magistracy was further explored and developed almost a
century and a half later in thewritings of another Greek historian, Appian
of Alexandria.8" Although Appian's approach is quite dissimilar to that of
Dionysius, itnonetheless shares with the lattera common understanding of
Roman dictatorship. Thus, theirwritings on dictatorship complement one
another and theirshared vision of the tyrannyof dictatorship sets theirwork
apart from theother historians of their time. In fact,Appian's narrative con
firmsDionysius' interpretation of the tyrannical nature of dictatorship.
Dionysius' thorough examination of the firstRoman dictator is matched
only byAppian's equally meticulous discussion of Sulla, one of the last to
ascend to absolute power.82
In his history of the Roman republic, Appian shows how during the
civil wars Sulla resorted to the institutionof dictatorship by walking a thin
line between legality and anomie. After invadingRome in 82 BC and taking

424 PoliticalTheory
advantage of the death of the two consuls during the civil war, Sulla 'con
vinced' the senate to appoint an interrex.He subsequently 'persuaded' the
interrex not to organize and supervise the elections for the new consuls
but instead to appoint him dictator for an indefinite period and with leg
islative powers.83The interrexfollowed Sulla's 'suggestion' and proposed a
new law which was approved by a weakened and demoralized centuriate
assembly thus formally appointing Sulla dictator (flauiAv`v tKczrwap),
and establishing, in effect,a dictatorship by popular election.84As ifhistory
were repeating itselfwithin just a few centuries, "the Romans welcomed this
treachery of an election as an appearance and pretence of freedom and
appointed Sulla as tyrant
with absolute power (zvpavvov avzoKpaTopa) for
as long as he wished."85 Like the closing of a circle, the republic's beginnings
met the republic's end: in "voluntary servitude."86
Like Dionysius, Appian redefined Sulla's dictatorship as a tyrannical
form of rule.87What exemplified Sulla's tyrannywas not external, solely
because of his skillfulmanipulation of his appointment procedure. Nor was
the tyrannical character of his rule due simply to the crimes he committed
and the visceral terrorhe unleashed. Likewise, Sulla's dictatorship could
not be explained by his legislative constituent powers (dictator legibus
scribendis et reipublicae constituendae) which gave him unlimited powers
tomake laws and amend the constitution.88Rather, the tyrannical nature of
Sulla's rule was inscribed in the very logic of his dictatorial position as
such. As Appian claimed, following on Dionysius' steps, dictatorship is in
itself a form of tyrannyand thus "even in the past the dictator's power had
been tyrannical."89Dictatorship had always been a tyrannical power, irre
spective of Sulla's procedural irregularities and innovations.
If Appian was right, however, therewould be no difference between
Sulla and all the previous dictators, all of whom would look like tyrants.
Obviously this cannot be the case since Appian iswell aware of the histor
ically distinct character of Sulla's dictatorship. It was the violation of the
temporary limits of dictatorship that accounts forSulla's historical unique
ness. By removing the time limits, Sulla unleashed the tyrant residing
within the emergency magistracy, and itsdreadful powers. While in thepast
the tyrannyof dictatorship "was limited to short periods" (ouiyw XpOVCo
6'o0pltopKvW), with Sulla itbecame "indeterminate" (doputao).90 Here,
Appian's approach recalls Plutarch's, insofar as itwas the latterwho a
century earlier had defined Caesar's dictatorship as tyrannical precisely
because itwas perpetual and who also identifiedSulla as "nothing else than
always a tyrant."91But Plutarch did not qualify his definition. It was in
Appian's histories, as Mario Turchetti correctly notes, that "dictatorship

was originally a tyrannical power, even if itwas short-term limited. But for
the firsttime, granted without limits, itbecame a perfect tyranny."92
Appian's distinction between dictatorship and tyrannyderives from the
fact that the first is a limited form of the latter.The dictator is a temporary
tyrant,whose tyranny is short-lived, regulated, and bounded. Thus, the dif
ference between Sulla and previous dictatorswas that the latterwere limited.
InAppian's narrative, thedictator resembles an interimtyrant,restrained and
contained, designed to exercise "tyrannical power" (zvpavviic4 Maipyijv)
only inbriefmoments of grave emergencies not exceeding the sixmonths of
unlimited power, not subject to appeal and to countervailing checks, when
the law undoes the temporal chains thatbind him.93As a slumbering tyrant,
he lies dormant in normal times,waking up only temporarilyduring a crisis
towear his dictatorial mantle. By being appointed for an indefiniteperiod,
Sulla seems to have fulfilled the tyrannical logic of dictatorship. From a lim
ited tyranny,periodic and segmented,94Sulla moved to a formof tyrannythat
was, forAppian, pure and absolute (evwXrji; zypavvi5).95
Appian's argument is subtle but decisive. The constitutional principle of
time-limits does not indicate an essential difference between these two
forms of power but rather an internal differentiation of degree between a
limited and an unlimited tyranny.The temporary suspension of the law
amounts to a provisional abolition that subordinates it to the arbitrary rule
of human will. Dictatorship and tyrannypartake in the same species of
power: supreme, discretionary, arbitrary,personal, and violent. Two varia
tions on a common theme, the dictator is a temporary tyrantand the tyrant
a permanent dictator. Sulla's magistracy is thus at once both typical and
unique in that it realized the genuinely tyrannical nature of dictatorship by
ridding it of temporal limits. By redefining dictatorship as a temporary
tyranny and tyranny as a permanent dictatorship, Appian registered the
deep affinities between the two concepts, thereby reaffirmingDionysius'
view of dictatorship as tyrannical by nature.96
To be sure,Appian's account is not identical toDionysius'. Their inten
tions and preoccupations were not similar as the historical, biographical,
cultural, and political contexts of theirrespective histories diverged sharply.
Many differences separate the two Greek historians. Even on the issue of
dictatorship, there are some discrepancies in tone and orientation. Appian
appears ambivalent toward the tyrannical effects of dictatorship as in one
occasion he displayed a kind of appreciation for how in the past dictator
ship had served Rome. He thus acknowledged that this exceptional magis
tracy "had been useful in former times."97However, it is unclear why he

426 PoliticalTheory
thought so and how this relates to his more systematic, informed observa
tions on dictatorship and its role in the demise of the republic, where there
is no mention of any positive advantage. Might it be that he held a prag
matic view according towhich thedictator as a short-term tyrantcould still
be useful in certain occasions? Here, the interpretativedifficulty relates to
whether Appian, while stressing the usefulness of dictatorship, recognized
the necessity of tyranny formoments of crisis. This puzzle pertains to the
consistency and clarity ofAppian's account and how thisbrief commentary
could fit into his broader narrative. But the fact remains that even in this
case Appian upheld his description of dictatorship as an absolute power,
thus concurring not only with his explicit analysis of this institution as
tyrannical and unlimited but also with Dionysius' version of unaccount
ability.When it comes to their descriptive understanding of the nature of
dictatorship the similarities between the two Greek historians are more
pronounced than any of the differences thatmay set them apart.
Dictatorship and theLegalization of Tyranny
Dionysius and Appian's strikingly original contribution is to have

noticed a tyrannical presence in the republican institution of dictatorship.
By doing so, the two Greek historians inaugurated a powerful revision of
one of ancient republicanism's more esteemed institutionsand a conceptual
transformationwith some critical ramifications. The firstand most signifi
cant is theheterodox redefinitionof dictatorship, now understood as a 'tem
porary tyrannyby consent.' This redefinition points at a novel theoryof the
Roman magistracy as 'legalized tyranny.'Dictatorship represents the legal
ization of tyrannywherein the tyrant is legally summoned by a higher
instance of the republican constitution inmoments of danger to protect the
existing order.As Cicero himself finally came to recognize (but only in the
particular case of Sulla thusmissing the general significance of his own
observation), while "in other cities, when tyrantsare established all laws
are extinguished and destroyed, in the republic it is by law that a tyrant
was established."98 As legalized and proceduralized tyranny,dictatorship
embodies the desire to tame and control the tyrant.There is a yearning to
use his supreme powers for one's own advantage, for love of country. To
command the tyrantand unleash him with full discretion against enemies
and for one's own collective survival iswhat makes dictatorship an attrac
tive option. 'Legal tyranny'promises that absolute power outside the law
can be domesticated without losing any of its repressive effects.

A second implication is that this atypical view of dictatorship as legal

tyranny challenges the historiography of Dionysius and Appian's times,
unsettles received opinions about this exceptional emergency office, and
implicates it in the fall of theRoman republic. For instance, the twoGreek
historians depart significantly fromLivy's more canonical narrative of dic
tatorship and accountability according towhich a dictator could be charged
with crimes committed after laying down his office. For theRoman histo
rian, although the right to appeal was suspended during thedictator's actual
tenure of office, it could be reactivated following his resignation, thus
allowing forhis impeachment as a private person. Livy mentioned only one
such case where a dictator, Gaius Manius, and his master of horse were
brought to trial afterholding office in 314 BC.99 Unfortunately, it is impos
sible to know how Dionysius and Appian described or interpreted this event
because the relevant books of theirhistories thatmight have mentioned it
have not survived."l? Because the historical sources are very scanty and
those that survive vary on this issue there is no conclusive evidence to
resolve theirdiffering versions between Dionysius and Appian on the one
hand and Livy on the other, the problem of the accountability of dictator
ship remains undecided and controversial."'0 Andrew Lintott, who ismore
inclined to side with Livy on thismatter, recognizes that "how absolute the
power of the dictator was, seems to have been an issue which was deter
mined not by statute or by any clear rule, but by casuistry, and it remained
debatable at the timewhen the annalist traditionwas being developed in the
last two centuries of theRepublic. As with many uncertain constitutional
issues, the differentpositions that could be taken reflected either an aristo
cratic, authoritarian ideology or one thatwas popular and libertarian."102
Here, however, the question is not to choose between Livy on the one
hand and Dionysius and Appian on the other, in a futile search for histori
cal objectivity, but rather to underscore the originality of two less known,
underestimated reinterpretationsof dictatorship that stand out as the only
surviving accounts that share a similar tyrannical depiction of thisRoman
extraordinary institution,and which have customarily been disregarded in
favor of Livy's single reference. Once these two dissenting interpretations
are taken seriously, not only do we witness in detail the ancient formation
of what Melvin Richter has called "family concepts," but we also gain a
privileged access to an unusually audacious revision of the classical
republicanregime-type.'03
Dionysius and Appian's Greco-Roman synthesis altered the normative
connotations associated with classical ideal of dictatorship. It demystifies
the republican portrayal of dictatorship and exposes themonster lurking

428 Political Theory
behind the hero, thewolf inside the soldier, the anomie inhibiting the law.
The towering reputation dictatorship enjoyed with itsmartial aura of nobil
ity,an ethical embodiment of civic virtue and patriotism, are now all cast
aside as institutional and oratory ornaments to reveal that dictatorship is
another name for tyranny.As a consequence their histories disclosed a
tyrannical kernel hidden inside the institutional fabric of republican
government.
Furthermore, an additional ramification is that both Dionysius and
Appian's views question much later attempts, such as those ofMommsen
and Carl Schmitt, to distinguish between two different dictatorships: an
older, ancient dictatorship and its irregular,radical reinvention by Sulla and
Caesar. 104
Against this influential interpretationof two types of dictatorship,
the one commissarial and the other constituent, the two Greek historians
point to the historical continuity and institutional consistency of Roman
dictatorship. For instance, in their historical revisions of Roman history,
Sulla's dictatorial tyranny loses all of its exceptional or innovative charac
ter. It is neither an unfortunate anomaly nor an erratic occurrence. His dic
tatorship does not signify a break in the history of the institution. Instead,
it is regarded as the repressed but permanent, endemic tyrannical possibil
ityof dictatorial powers. Tyranny, therefore, is seen as an integral part of
dictatorship. They may differ from a formal point of view but they are sim
ilar in substance. In fact, if the twoGreek historians did not consider Sulla's
rule accidental or ground-breaking, it is only because they situated its
tyrannical deeds within the very structure and logic of this supreme emer
gency magistracy thatoffers itself to abuse.105
Here, one cannot help but notice the tragic irony,even poetic justice, of
Dionysius and Appian's histories. Although theRomans took pride in over
throwing themonarchy, elevating the removal of Tarquinius to a republican
foundational myth, to an anti-tyrannical institutingact, theywere ultimately
unable to rid themselves of the (bad) king.'06And along with praising them
selves for theirdevotion to the law and theirpatriotic respect for tradition
and custom, theRomans opened up a permanent gap, an internal fissure in
the legal edifice of their republic. To save the city, the constitution created
this void, this empty space of the law, the space of a-nomia, where the dic
tator comes to encounter the tyrant in their common ambition to fill it up
with thepower once owed by thekings. It is ironic thatdespite theRomans'
renowned hatred of kings (odium regni), the expulsion of Tarquinius, and
the collegiality of the consuls, the tyrantwas never really barred from the
city but rather remained harbored within the republican institution of dic
tatorship.'07By retaining the kingly powers, the Romans 'inadvertently'

preserved as well their tyrannical potential and failed to fully break away
from theirmonarchical past.'08
In fact,kingship, whose abolition was predicated on thedangers itposed
to liberty,was preserved by the republic in the 'minimal' form of dictator
ship with the utmost task of defending the city in its most vulnerable
moments.'09 In theRoman republic, the enemy of freedom was elevated as
its defender. And what was meant to be used against internal and external
enemies was turnedultimately against theRoman constitution itself,which
thus fell victim to its own dangerous creation. Plotting to strengthen exec
utive power beyond law, the constitution ended up caught in its own trap,
undermining the freedoms thathad sustained itsvery existence and identity.
By importing the tyrantinto their republic after the expulsion of the kings
under the guise of extraordinary emergency powers, the ancient Romans
made an ill-fated choice that eventually contributed to the loss of their lib
erty. To lose their libertas, what the citizens feared and hated themost,
finally became a reality.With Sulla and Caesar the dictator is finally
exposed: he is the tyrantwithin a free city, a Trojan horse situated at the
heart of theRoman constitution. Thus, Tarquinius might have been ban
ished but his abusive, tyrannical powers survived in the new emergency
magistracy and returnedwith a vengeance to play an active part in the con
flicts thatbrought the republic to an end.
Many centuries later, this reinterpretationof dictatorshipwould reverber
ate inmodern political thought in a radically altered historical context.With
the returnof dictatorship and itsdissemination through republican doctrines
of politics, themoderns gradually rediscovered its tyrannical nature. From
this rich and fascinating period, one telling example stands out. It is in
Thomas Jefferson'swritings thatDionysius and Appian's analysis is fully
resuscitated and brought to itsultimate conclusion. In a section of his Notes
on Virginia regarding the defects of the Virginia State constitution he
denounced two proposals made in 1776 and 1781 "to create a dictator,
investedwith every power legislative, executive, and judiciary, civil and mil
itary,of life and of death, over our persons and over our properties.""10
Jeffersonused his disagreement with these two proposals as an occasion
not only to deplore dictatorship but, more tellingly, to attack tyranny.
Commenting on theRomans, he keenly reproached theirrepublican consti
tutionbecause it "allowed a temporary tyrantto be erected, under the name
of a Dictator; and that temporary tyrant, after a few examples, became
perpetual.""' Temporality is the crucial feature, the one that blends the
tyrantand the dictator together.More forthrightthanDionysus and Appian,
Jefferson explicitly recognized the extent of the destructive potential of

430 PoliticalTheory
tyrannical rulewhich he did not think could be tamed and regulated in the
formof dictatorship. The temporal constraintswould not last forever to per
petually bind this extraordinary device of domination and to compel it to
act for the preservation of the republic. Once included in the constitutional
arrangement of dictatorship, tyrannybecomes a permanent, endemic threat
to that same arrangement. This threat arises because the tyrantcannot be
moderated by or accommodated within an institutionalmechanism and an
overarching constitutional system of mixed powers. Instead, he will throw
themixed constitution out of balance. The tyrant,who inhibits the dictator,
will seek to permanently unbind himself from the legal restrictions and use
his exceptional power to subvert constitutional constraints.
The ancient Greeks noticed early on thisunruly drive of tyrannyand reg
istered it in classical political philosophy. Tyranny is excessive, "unlimited"
(dCoptaw0oTvpacvvi 5), strivingvoraciously forabsolute sovereignty(aixramov
KpiO5)."2 It amounts, for Herodotus, to hubris, as the tyrant's desires
overreach, never to be satisfied."'3 Plato's description of the excess of
tyrannyremains telling as well. The tyrannical life,Gorgias commends, is
"a life of insatiable licentiousness," that same lifewhich Socrates deplored
as "always greedy, suffering from unfulfilled desires."'"14Tyranny is pure
immoderation caught in the vicious circle of power for the sake of power.
These classical depictions of tyrannical power question directly the capac
ity of legal stipulations regulating dictatorship ever to succeed in perma
nently containing and neutralizing the tyrantwithin the dictator.
In addition, Jeffersondid not shy away from drawing a second conclu
sion from the tyrannical character of dictatorship. The Roman constitution
was self-defeating for the simple reason that although the dictatorship was
"proved fatal" to the republic, itwas also indispensable to it."5 Rome's
republican constitution was trapped in a deadly paradox: its factional poli
tics, an "unfeeling aristocracy," and a "ferocious" and impoverished people
made its survival inmoments of internal dissension dependent on a tyrant
who would save the republic only to destroy it himself at a later time."6
Herein lays the Jeffersonian paradox: by its very nature the Roman
republic could not survive emergencies without the assistance of tyranny,
the very form of political rule thatmost endangered its very existence.
Consequently, the instrument thatwas vital for the survival of the republic
was simultaneously the tool of its downfall. As a "remedy," dictatorship is
worse than themalady, yet it is essential.' ' Hence theparadoxical situatilon
of an institution that is both essential to the ancient republic's survival as
well as the cause of its ultimate demise. The Jeffersonianparadox directly
questions the ideal of the republican constitution and in particular its claim

of stability and permanence generated and sustained by an institutional

equilibrium."8 It is not a coincidence thatJeffersonwas particularly severe
in his judgment of Roman republicanism: its structural defects outdo any
possible benefits and therefore it is not a model to emulate."9
Aside the issue of historical reception, there is a much broader implica
tion. IfDionysius and Appian are right and dictatorship is indeed another
name for tyrannical rule, a significant historical and political difference
between theAthenian democracy and the Roman republic comes to the
fore. The fusion of the dictator and the tyrant in these interpretationspro
vides a unique point of entry to reconsider the broader question of the rela
tionship between the two ancient regimes and points to the likely relevance
of this account of the Roman experience with dictatorship to current
debates on emergency powers and constitutional regimes of exception in
liberal democracies.'20 Here I will comment briefly only on one aspect of
this relationship in need of furtherelaboration elsewhere.
Although democratic Athens and republican Rome are often identifiedas
the two archetypical free regimes of antiquity, theydiverged on the crucial
issues of the role of absolute, autocratic power within their respective polit
ical and legal frameworks.Whereas democratic Athens banned the tyranni
cal form of power in the name of freedom, theRoman republic legalized it
in the name of liberty.
What was excluded from the constitutional arrange
ment ofAthens was fully included in themixed regime of Rome. From the
writings of Dionysius andAppian it seems as though theRoman constitution
welcomed unwittingly the tyrantto cross over the line separating the state of
nature (and war) and the city.Dictatorship is the result of this republican
invitation.By contrast, ancient democracy was the only regime we know of
that legislated explicitly against the tyrant, designating him a "public
enemy" (7rco2&Lo0) and calling for his assassination.'2' Not only was the
tyrantoutlawed, but as has been correctly noted, "In Athens therewas no
provision in the constitution for dealing with emergencies such as the
Roman tumultus or themodem martial law."'122Considering this difference
from the perspective of Dionysius and Appian's histories, it seems that
while in democratic Athens the tyrantwas an enemy to be resisted, in
republican Rome he was a friend to rely on. These are two very different
attitudes toward tyrannical power.
This distinction is important because it suggests thatwhile historically
republics could accommodate themselves to the tyranny of dictatorship,
democracies could not. This also denotes two different attitudes toward
power, its scope and directionality, and its relationship to the law. From
the perspective of democratic, anti-tyrannical legislation the figure of the

432 PoliticalTheory
temporary tyrantmust have looked not only paradoxical, but deeply unrea
sonable and dangerous. How is itpossible that inmoments of crisis a free city
appeals to a tyrantfor its survival as theonlymeans to restore order? Can the
tyrant
whom Cicero described, following Plato, as "themost monstrous of the
wild beasts in thecruelty of his natuire ... who desires no bond of shared law,
no partnership in human life with his fellow citizens" be constitutionally
bound as to safeguard the republic?123Can a tyrantever be trusted?Can he
defend liberty?From a democratic standpoint, the republican theoryof dic
tatorshipnow viewed through the lens of Dionysius and Appian asks of citi
zens that they entrust provisionally their freedoms, life, and property to a
power theymost fear and find insufferable, "since no freeman willingly
endures such a rule."124 It demands to surrender the defense of the city to its
enemy and itundoes the civic vow of democratic citizenship.
Finally, and more crucially, Dionysius and Appian help us grapple with
the politically pressing issue of whether it is wise for citizens of constitu
tional democracies to grant extraordinary emergency powers for security
reasons (even if temporally limited and constitutionally defined) to an office
which stands in an ambiguous relation to the rule of law.125Especially in a
timewhen democratic republics are willingly or tacitly opting to suspend
some of their constitutional liberties for purportedly greater security,
Dionysius and Appian's radical reinterpretation of Roman dictatorship
appears astonishingly salient. Of course, one should not expect to find in
their ancient histories precise answers and definitive solutions to today's
problems and dilemmas regarding constitutional dictatorship and the threat
of terrorism.But precisely because they recognized thatRoman dictatorship
can enjoy a semblance of democratic legitimacy and accommodate itself
with electoral consent, their investigation into the origins and effects of this
ancient exceptional institutioncould advance a more informed, critical, and
politically incisive understanding of emergency regimes in liberal democra
tic states. The enduring legacy of the twoGreek historians is to have refor
mulated the question of whether the citizens or theirelected representatives
in exceptional moments of crisis should have recourse to a dictator in terms
of themore fundamental issue about the relative advantages of tyrannyand
itsunpredictable,
counter-productive
consequences.
Notes
1. Fossey John Cobb Hearnshaw, "Democracy or Dictatorships?" The Contemporary
Review, 286 (1934), p. 432. Also see, Gaetano Mosca, The Ruling Class, Hannah D. Kahn
(trans.), New York: McGrawn-Hill Book Company, 1939, pp. 355, 486; Giovanni Sartori, The

Theory of Democracy Revised, Vol. I, Chatham, New Jersey: Chatham House Publishers,
1987, p. 204.
2. Norberto Bobbio, Democracy and Dictatorship, Peter Kennedy (trans.), Minneapolis:
University ofMinnesota Press, 1989, p. 166.

3. For example, see E. E. Kettlet, The Story ofDictatorship. From theEarliest Times till
Today, London: Ivor Nicholson and Watson, 1937; Alfred Cobban, Dictatorship: Its History
and Theory, New York: Haskell House Publishers, 1939; Oscar J?szi and John D. Lewis,
Against the Tyrant: The Tradition and Theory of Tyrannicide, Illinois: The Free Press, 1957;
Maurice Latey, Patterns of Tyranny, New York: Atheneum, 1969; Maurice Latey, Tyranny: A
Study in the Abuse of Power, London: Macmillan, 1969; Raymond Aron, De la dictature,
Paris: Ren? Julliard, 1961; Raymond Aron, Machiavel et les tyrannies modernes, Paris: Edi
tions de Fallois, 1993; Brian Loveman, The Constitution of Tyranny: Regimes of Exception in
Latin America, University of Pittsburgh, 1993; Alan Axelrod and Charles Phillips, Dictators
and Tyrants: Absolute Rulers and Would-Be Rulers inWorld History; Facts on File, 1995; Daniel
Chirot, Modern Tyrants: The Power and Prevalence of Evil in Our Age, New Jersey: Princeton
University Press, 1996; Simon Tormey, Making Sense to Tyranny: Interpretations of
Totalitarianism, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995; Roger Boesche, Theories of
Tyranny From Plato to Arendt, University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State
University Press, 1996; For three noticeable exceptions, see ?lie Hal?vy, The Era of
Tyrannies: Essays on Socialism and War, New York: New York University Press, 1966, p. 308;
Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, New York: A Harvest Book, 1975, p. 6;
Andrew Arato, "Good-bye toDictatorship?" Social Research, 67:4 (2000), pp. 926,937. Franz
Neumann adopts a different view in his "Notes on the Theory of Dictatorship." See Franz
Neumann, The Democratic and theAuthoritarian State: Essays inPolitical and Legal Theory,
Herbert Marcuse (ed.), New York: The Free Press, 1957, pp. 233-256. For an illuminating dis
cussion of dictatorship and tyranny in the twentieth century, see Melvin Richter, "A Family of
Political Concepts: Tyranny, Despotism, Bonapartism, Caesarism, Dictatorship, 1750-1917,"
European Journal of Political Theory, 4:3 (2005), pp. 242-243.
4. Chantal Millon-Delson, "Dictature et despotisme, chez les Anciens et chez les
Modernes," Revue Fran?aise D'Histoire des Id?es Politiques, 6 (1997), pp. 245-251.
5. Claude Nicolet, "Dictatorship in Rome," Peter Baehr and Melvin Richter (eds.),
Dictatorship inHistory and Theory. Bonapartism, Caesarism, and Totalitarianism, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 263.

6. Itmay well be that Cromwell was the firstmodern to be considered by many of his
contemporaries to be both a tyrant and a dictator. Pierre Jeannin, "Cromwell: une dictature
introuvable?" Maurice Duverger, Dictatures et L?gitimit?, Paris: PUF, 1982, pp. 143-158;
R. Zaller, "The Figure of theTyrant inEnglish Revolutionary Thought," Journal of theHistory
of Political Ideas, 54 (1993), pp. 585-610.

7. Claude Nicolet, L'id?e r?publicaine enfrance (1789-1924), Paris: Gallimard, 1994,
p. 101-105.
8. Fran?ois Hinard, "De la dictature ? la tyrannie. R?flexions sur la dictature de Sylla,"
Fran?ois Hinard (ed.), Dictatures, Actes de la Table ronde de Paris, 27-28 f?vrier 1984, Paris:
De Boccard, 1988, pp. 87-96.
9. For the Greek historians of the Roman empire, see G. W Bowersock, Augustus and
theGreek World, Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1965; G. W Bowersock, "Historical Problems
in Late Republican and Augustan Classicism," T. Gelzer, F. W Bowersock (eds.), Le classi
cisme ? Rome aux I si?cle avant et apres J.-C, Geneva: Fondation Hardt, 1978, pp. 65-72; Bettie
Forte, Rome and theRomans as theGreeks Saw Them, Rome: American Academy inRome,

434 PoliticalTheory
1972; E. L. Bowie, "The Greeks and their Past in the Second Sophistic," Studies inAncient
Society, M. I. Finley (ed.), London: Routledge and K. Paul, 1974, pp. 166-209; Hugh J.
Mason, Greek Terms for Roman Institutions, Toronto: American Studies in Papyrology, 1974;
Andr? Hurst, "Un critique grec dans la Rome d'Auguste: Deny s d'Halicarnasse," ANRW II.
30.1, 1982, pp. 839-865; Claude Nicolet (ed.), Demokratia et Arisokratia. A propos de Caius
Gracchus: mots grecs et r?alites romaines, Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1983; Emilio
Gabba, "The Historians and Augustus," Fergus Millar and Erich Segal (eds.), Caesar
Augustus: Seven Aspects, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984, pp. 61-88; Erich S. Gruen, The
HellenisticWorld and the Coming of Rome, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984,
pp. 316-356; Robert Syme, "Greeks Invading the Roman Government," Roman Papers, 4,
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988, pp. 1-20; Claude Nicolet, "Dictateurs Romains,
strat?goi autokratores et g?n?raux carthaginois," Dictatures, pp. 27-47; I. S. Moxon, J. D.

Smart, and A. J.Woodman (eds.), Past Perspectives. Studies inGreek and Roman Historical
Writings, Cambridge: Cambridge University 1986; George A. Kennedy

Press, (ed.), The
Cambridge History of Literary Criticism. Vol. I: Classical Criticism, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1989; Kurt A. Raaflaub and Mark Toher (eds.), Between Republic and
Empire: Interpretations of Augustus and His Princip?te, Berkeley: University of California

Press, 1990; Michael Grant, Greek and Roman Historians: Information and Misinformation,
London: Routledge, 1995; Paul Cartledge, Peter Garnsey, Erich Gruen (eds.), Hellenistic
Constructs: Essays in Culture,
History, and Historiography, Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1996; Simon
Swain, Hellenism and Empire: Language, Classicism, and
Power in the Greek World, AD 50-250, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996; David S. Potter,
Literary Texts and theRoman Historian, London: Routledge 1999; Fergus Millar, The Roman
Republic in Political Thought, Hanover and London: The University Press of New England,
2002, pp. 37-49; Timothy E. Duff, The Greek and Roman Historians, London: Bristol
Classical Press, 2003.
10. T. J.Cornell, "The formation of the historical tradition of early Rome," Past Perspectives.
Studies inGreek and Roman Historical Writings, pp. 74, 80-81; Emilio Gabba, Dionysius and
theHistory of Archaic Rome, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991, pp. 10-11, 21-22,
87-96, 152; Harvey C. Mansfield, Taming thePrince. The Ambivalence ofModern Executive
Power, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989, pp. 84-85; Gregory S. B?cher,
"The Origins, Program, and Composition of Appian's Roman History," Transactions of the
American Philological Association, 130 (2000), pp. 411-458; Duff, The Greek and Roman
Historians, p. 118.
11.Nicolet, "Dictateurs Romains, strat?goi autokratores et g?n?raux carthaginois," pp. 35-36,
38; Schultze, "Dionysius of Halicarnassus and his audience," p. 128; Gabba, Dionysius and
theHistory of Archaic Rome, pp. 23-59; Matthew Fox, "History and Rhetoric inDionysius of
Halicarnassus," The Journal of Roman Studies, 83 (1993), p. 42; Alain M. Gowing, The
Triumviral Narratives of Appian and Cassius Dio, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan
Press, 1992, pp. 283-287; Swain, Hellenism and Empire, pp. 253,414-421; Millar, The Roman
Republic in Political Thought, pp. 38-39; Mario Turchetti, Tyrannie et Tyrannicide de
l'Antiquit? ? nos jours, Paris: Presses Universitairesde France, 2001, pp. 162-164.
12. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1971, Book V: 70-77, pp. 211-237; Appian, Roman History: The Civil Wars, Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002, Book I: 98-115, pp. 181-215.
13. Cicero, "Philippic I," Philippics, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001,
1, p. 23; Cicero, "Philippic II," Philippics, 36, p. 155; Appian, The Civil Wars, Book 111:25,
p. 565; Dio Cassius, Roman History, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001.
Book 54:51, p. 401, Book 54:2, pp. 283-285.

14. Res Gestae DiviAugusti, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002, 5, p. 353;
Theodor Mommsen, Le droit public romain, Paris: Thorin et fils, ?diteurs, Vol. IV, 1894,
pp. 428-429, 436-438; Ronald Syme, The Roman Revolution, Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2002, pp. 53-54; Cobban, Dictatorship. Its History and Theory, p. 331; Arthur Kaplan,
Dictatorships and "Ultimate" Degrees in theEarly Roman Republic 501-201 BC, New York:
Revisionist Press, 1977, pp. 6, 165.
15. Cl?mence
Schultze, "Dionysius of Halicarnassus and his audience," Past Perspectives.
Studies in Greekand Roman Historical Writings, pp. 131-134; B?cher, "The Origins,
Program, and Composition of Appian's Roman History," pp. 431, 433-437, 441.
16. For example, see Sallust, The Conspiracy of Catiline, New York and London: Penguin
Books, 1963, Book I: 10-12, p. 181-183; Livy, History of Rome, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1998, Book I: Preface, pp. 3-9; Gabba, Dionysius and theHistory ofArchaic
Rome, pp. 211-213.
17. Polybius, The Histories, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, Book VI: 7-8,
pp. 283-285; Cicero, De Re Publica, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, Book I: 33,
42, pp. 77, 97-99; Book II: 26-29, 32, pp. 150, 167-169. Also, see Roger Dunkle, "The
Rhetorical Tyrant in Roman Historiography: Sallust, Livy, Tacitus," Classical World, 65
(1971), pp. 12-20; Alain Michel, La philosophie politique a Rome d'Auguste a Marc Aur?le,
Paris: Armand Colin, 1969, pp. 22-27.
18. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999,
Book VIII: 10, p. 491; Cicero, De Re Publica, II: 27, p. 159; Melvin Richter, "A Family of
Political Concepts: Tyranny, Despotism, Bonapartism, Caesarism, Dictatorship, 1750-1917,"
p. 224.
19. For the merging of the Roman king and the Greek tyrant, see Roger Dunkle, "The
Greek Tyrant and Roman Political Invective of the Late republic," Transactions
and
Proceedings of theAmerican Philological Association, 98 (1967), pp. 151-171.

20. Livy, History of Rome, Book II: 18, pp. 275-277; Cicero, De Re Publica, Book II: 56,
p. 69-71. More generally, see D. Cohen, "The Origin of Roman Dictatorship," Mnemosyne,
4:10 (1957), pp. 300-318.
21. Livy, History of Rome, Book II: 18, pp. 275-277. Also see, Clifton Walker Keyes, "The
Constitutional Position of theRoman Dictatorship," Studies inPhilology, 14 (1917), pp. 298
305; Mommsen, Le droit public romain, Paris: Thorin et fils, ?diteurs, Vol. III, 1893, p. 163;
Andrew Lintott, The Constitution of the Roman Republic, Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1999, pp. 109-113.
22. Livy, History of Rome, Book II: 18, pp. 277. A reaction mentioned by Cicero as well.
Cicero, De Re Publica, Book I: 60, p. 95; Nicolet, "Dictateurs Romains, strat?goi autokratores
et g?n?raux carthaginois," p. 30.
"The Greek Tyrant and Roman Political Invective of the Late Republic,"
23. Dunkle,
pp. 153-156; "Tyrannus: Notes sur la notion de la tyrannie chez les Romains
J. B?ranger,
particuli?rement a l'?poque de C?sar et de Cicer?n," Revue de ?tudes Latines, 13 (1935),
pp. 89-90; J?szi and Lewis, Against the Tyrant, pp. 10-11; Mario Turchetti, Tyrannie et
Tyrannicide de l'Antiquit? ? nos jours, pp. 160-164; Cicero, "Pro rege Deiotaro," Orations,
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000, p. 501-541; Jean-Louis Ferrary, "Cicer?n
et la. dictature," Dictatures, pp. 97-105; Neal Wood, Cicero's Social and Political Thought,
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988, pp. 155-158.

24. Livy, History of Rome, Book II: 18, pp. 275-276; Mommsen, Le droit public romain,
Vol. Ill, pp. 162-163.

436 PoliticalTheory
25. Aristotle, Politics, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990, Book V: 10,
pp. 457; Plato, The Republic, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994, Book VIII:
19, p. 333; Book II: 3, pp. 117-119; Diogenes Laertius, "Plato," Lives ofEminent Philosophers,
Vol. I, Cambridge: Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000, III: 83, p. 349; Heredotus' story of
Gyges, the first tyrant, exemplifies the violent, murderous beginnings of tyranny.Herodotus,
Histories, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995, Book I: 8-15, pp. 11-19;
Cicero, De re publica, Book I: 64, pp. 101-103. For the relationship between tyranny and
violent usurpation, see Dolores Hegyi, "Notes on the Origins of Greek Tyrannis," Academia
scientiarum Hungarica, Acta Antiqua, 13 (1965), pp. 303-318; H. W. Plecket, "The Archaic
tyrannis," Talanta, 1 (1969), pp. 19-61; Jules Labarbe, "L'apparition de la notion de tyrannie
dans la Gr?ce archa?que," L'Antiquit? Classique, 40 (1971), pp. 471-504.
26. Aristotle, Politics, Book IV:8, p. 327; Book VI:2, p. 507; Polybius, The Histories, Book
VI:7,pp. 283-284.
27. Cicero, Laws, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994, Book 111:3, p. 467.
28. This contrasts with the arbitrariness and indeterminacy of tyranny thatmade law its
enemy. For an insightful discussion of this aspect of tyranny, tyranny as freedom, see Arlene
W. Saxonhouse, "The Tyranny of Reason in theWorld of the Polis," The American Political
Science Review, 82:4 (1988), pp. 1261-1275.
29. Aristotle, Politics, Book V:9, 10-11, p. 467.
111:11, pp. 269-271; Book V:9, p. 459-475; Plato, The Laws,
30. Aristotle, Politics, Book
Book VIII, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 832c, pp. 137-139; Nicolet,
"Dictatorship in Rome," p. 265; Lucien Jerphagnon, "Que le tyran est contre-nature. Sur
quelques clich?s de 1'historiography romaine," Actes du Colloque: La Tyrannie, Centre de

Publication de l'Universit? de Caen: Cahiers de philosophie politique et juridique, 1984,
pp. 39-50.
31. Herodotus, Histories, Book 111:80, p. 105; Aristotle, Politics, Book 111:5, p. 207;
Cicero, De
Re Publica, Book 11:32, pp. 169; Dio Cassius, Roman History, Book IV: 13
(Zonaras), p. 107; Mommsen, Le droit public romain, Vol. Ill, pp. 7, 164-165, 191-197; D.
Cohen, "The Origins of Dictatorship," pp. 300-318; F. E. Adcock, Roman Political Ideas and
Practice, Ann Arbor: The University ofMichigan Press, 1967, p. 46; Mansfield, Taming the
Prince. The Ambivalence ofModern Executive Power, pp. 82-85. Polybius and Cicero rec
ognized in the tyrant a deviant ruler, an unjust king. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book
VIII: 10, pp. 489-491; Cicero, De Re Publica, 11:27, p. 159; Book I: 28-31, 60, 62, pp. 69
71, 93-95, 97; Book II: 25-27, 32, pp. 155-161, 169; Polybius, The Histories, Book VI:7,
pp. 284-285. Tyranny was regarded as an almost inevitable, natural perversion of kingship in
that the limits separating them did not mark any real difference. See, Aristotle, Politics,
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994, Book 111:5, p. 209; Aristotle,
Nicomachean Ethics, Book VIII: 10, pp. 489-491; Aristotle, Rhetoric, Book 1:8, p. 89;
Polybius, The Histories, Book VI:7, p. 285; Cicero, De Re Publica, Book 11:25, 157; Claude
Nicolet, "Polybe et les institutions romaines," Entretiens sur l'Antiquit? Classique de la
Fondation Hardt, XX, Gen?ve: Vandoeuvres, 1974, p. 209-265; Neal Wood, Cicero's Social and
Political Thought, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988, pp. 156-157.
32. Cicero, De Re Publica, Book I: 30. p. 95; Dio Cassius, Roman History, Book IV: 13
(Zonaras), pp. 107-109; Carl Schmitt, Die Dictatur, Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1994,
p. 21; Clinton Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship: Crisis Government in the Modern
Democracies, New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2004, pp. 17-18.
33. Cicero, De Re Publica, Book 1:40-43, pp. 93-101; Book 11:26-30, 32, pp. 157-163,169;
Dio Cassius, Roman History, Book IV: 13 (Zonaras), p. 107. Also, see Jean-Louis Ferrary,

"Cicer?n et la dictature," pp. 97-105; B?ranger, "Tyrannus: Notes sur la notion de la tyrannie
chez les Romains particuli?rement a l'?poque de C?sar et de Cicer?n," pp. 89-90.
34. Clinton 1.Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship, p. 17.
35. Polybius, The Histories, Book VI: 7, pp. 284-285; Kurt von Fritz, The Theory of the
Mixed Constitution inAntiquity. A Critical Analysis of Polybius's Political Ideas, New York:
Columbia University Press, 1954; T. Cole, "The Sources and Composition of Polybius VI,"
Historia, 13 (1964), pp. 440-486; Claude Nicolet, "Polybe et les institutions romaines," Emilio
Gabba (ed.), Polybe. Entretiens sur l'Antiquit? classique, Geneva: Vandoeuvres, 1973,
pp. 209-259;S. Podes, "Polybius and his Theory of Anacydosis?Problems of not just
Ancient Political Theory," History of Political Thought, 12:4 (1991), pp. 577-587.
Roman History, Book IV: 13 (Zonaras), p. 109.
36. Dio Cassius,
37. Aristotle, Politics, Book 111:4,p. 201, Book 111:9, p. 249; Polybius, The Histories; Book
111:86, 87, pp. 213,215; Cicero, De Re Publica, Book 1:32, p. 77, Book 1:60, p. 95, Book 11:32,
p. 169. Also see, James F. McGlew, Tyranny and Political Culture inAncient Greece, Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1993, pp. 9. Here, the term anomia refers to its original ancient
Greek meaning and not to itsmodern appropriation by Emile Durkheim.
38. For tyranny as anomy, see Plato, Republic, Book IX: 572b, 575a-b, pp. 339, 349; Plato,
Statesman, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995, 302e-303a, p. 163; Aristotle,
Politics, Book IV:8, pp. 325-327; Dionysius, Roman Antiquities, Book V:70, p. 211. Raymond
Weil, "De la tyrannie dans la pens?e politique grecque de l'?poque classique," Dictatures et
L?gitimit?, p. 38. For an insightful discussion of nomos, anomie, and tyranny,see Angel Sanchez
de la Torre, La tyrannie dans la Gr?ce antique, Paris: ?ditions Bi?re, 1999, pp. 23-124.
39. P.-M., Martin, L'id?e de royaut? ? Rome. Vol. II. Haine de la royaut? et s?ductions
monarchiques (du IVe si?cle av. J.-C. auprincipat august?en), Clermont-Ferrand: Adosa, 1994,
pp. 104-105.
40. Hinard, "De la dictature ? la tyrannie. R?flexions sur la dictature de Sylla," pp. 89-92;
Ferrary, "Cicer?n et la dictature," pp. 101-105.

41. Martin, L'id?e de royaut? ? Rome. Vol. II. Haine de la royaut? et s?ductions monarchiques
(du IVe si?cle av. J.-C. au principat august?en), pp. 104-105.
42. For a brief but clear comparative presentation of the two accounts, see Kaplan,
Dictatorships and uUltimate" Degrees in theEarly Roman Republic 501-201 BC, pp. 18-20;
Fox, "History and Rhetoric inDionysius of Halicarnassus," pp. 134-135; H. Hill, "Dionysius
of Halicarnassus and the Origins of Rome," The Journal of Roman Studies, 51:1-2 (1961),
p. 92; Emilio Gabba, "Diogini e la dittatura a Roma," Tria Corda. Scritti in onore di Arnaldo
momigliano, Como: Biblioteca di Athenaeum, 1983, pp. 215-228.
43. Emilio Gabba, Dionysius and theHistory of Archaic Rome, pp. 140-141; Lintott, The
Constitution of the Roman Republic, p. 110; Mommsen, Le droit public romain, Vol. Ill,
p. 163; Paul M. Martin, L'id?e de royate ? Rome. Vol. I. De la Rome royale au consensus
r?publicain, Paris: Adosa, 1982, p. 302.
44. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities, Books V: 70, p. 211. Cicero proposes
a different account of Publius Valerius and his legislation. Cicero, De Re Publica, Book 11:31,
p. 165.
Lintott, "Provocado: From the Struggle of theOrders to the Principate," Aufstieg
45. A. W
und Niedergang der r?mischen Welt, 1:2 (1972), pp. 226-267; A. W Lintott, Violence in
Republican Rome, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, pp. 12-13; A. W Lintott, The
Constitution of theRoman Republic, p. 33. Also see, A. H. J.Greenidge, "The Procedure of the
'Provocado,'" The Classical Review, 9:1 (1895), pp. 4-8; A. H. J.Greenidge, "The 'Provocatio
Militiae' and Provincial Jurisdiction," The Classical Review, 10:5 (1896), pp. 225-233;

438 Political Theory
E. S. Staveley, "Provocado during the Fifth and Fourth Centuries BC," Historia, III (1954
1955), p. 412-428. Cloud J.Duncan, "The Origin of Provocation RPh, 72:1 (1998), p. 25-48.
46. M. Humbert, "Le tribunatde la pl?be et le tribunal du people: remarques sur l'histoire de
la provocation ad populum" M?langes de l'Ecole Fran?aise de Rome, 100 (1988), pp. 431-503;
Mich?le Ducos, Les Romains et la Loi. Reserches sur les rapports de la philosophie grecque et
de la tradition romaine ? lafin de la R?publique, Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1984, pp. 71-79.
47. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities, Books V: 70, pp. 211-215; Livy,
History of Rome, Book II: 7-8, pp. 239-245; Plutarch, "Public?la," Lives, Vol. I, Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998, sections xi-xii, pp. 531-535.
48. Livy, History of Rome, Book 111:55, p. 183; Cicero, De Re Publica, Book 11:31, 53,
p. 165; Cicero, De Oratore, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, Book 11:199, p. 343.
Also, see Ch. Wirszubski, Libertas as a Political Idea at Rome during the Late Republic and
Early Principate, Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press, 1950, pp. 25-27.
49. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities, Books V: 70, p. 211.
51. Dionysiusof Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities, Books V: 70, p. 213.
52. Livy, History of Rome, Book 11:18, 29-30, p. 277, 313-315; Mommsen, Le droit public
romain, Vol. IV, p. 461.
55. Gabba, Dionysius and theHistory of Archaic Rome, p. 140.
56. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities, Books V: 70, 71, pp. 215, 213, 217.
57. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities, Books V: 73, p. 223. Also, see Forte,
Rome and theRomans as theGreeks Saw Them, p. 200; Nicolet, "Dictateurs Romains, strat?goi
autokratores et g?n?raux carthaginois," pp. 30, 34-37, 42; Hinard, "De la dictature ? la tyrannie.
R?flexions sur la dictature de Sylla," pp. 94-96; Ferrary, "Cicer?n et la dictature," p. 103.
58. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, "Thucydides," Critical Essays. Vol. 1: Ancient Orators,
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1973, 51, p. 617; Hurst, "Un critique grec dans
la Rome d'Auguste: Denys d'Halicarnasse." pp. 841-843; Gabba, Dionysius and theHistory
of Archaic Rome, p. 147.

59. Gabba, Dionysius and theHistory of Archaic Rome, p. 140.
60. Mommsen, Le droit public romain, Vol. IV, p. 187.
61. Gabba, Dionysius and theHistory of Archaic Rome, p. 140; Mansfield, Taming the
Prince. The Ambivalence ofModern Executive Power, pp. 84-85; Hugh J.Mason, "The Roman
Government in Greek Sources: The Effect of Literary Theory on the Translation of Official
Titles," Phoenix, 24:2 (1970), pp. 153-154.
62. Cicero, De Re Publica, Book 1:63, p. 95; Cicero, De Legibus, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, Book 111:3, p. 467; Lintott, The Constitution of the Roman Republic, p. 110;
Giuseppe Valditara, Studi sul magister populi. Dagli ausiliari militari del rex aiprimi magistrati
repubblicani, Milano: Giuffr?, 1989.
63. Mommsen, Le droit public romain, Vol. Ill, pp. 187.
64. Clinton Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship. Crisis Government in the Modern
Democracies, p. 25.
65. Xenophon, "Hieron," Scripta Minora, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
2000, 4, p. 35; 6, p. 29.
66. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book VIII: 12, pp. 497-499; Lucian, "The Downward
Journey, or theTyrant," Lucian, Vol. 11, 11,Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999,
p. 23; Melvin Richter, "A Family of Political Concepts: Tyranny, Despotism, Bonapartism,
Caesarism, Dictatorship, 1750-1917," p. 224.

67. Aristotle, Politics, Book V:9, p. 463.

68. Mommsen, Le droit public romain, Vol. Ill, pp. 187; Rossiter, Constitutional
Dictatorship. Crisis Government in the
Modern Democracies, p. 25.
69. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities, Books V: 70, p. 211; Nicolet,
"Dictateurs Romains, strat?goi autokratores et g?n?raux carthaginois," pp. 34-35. For the con
cept of "voluntary tyranny," see JimMacAdam, "Voluntary Tyranny," University of Ottawa

Quarterly, 56:2 (1986), pp. 153-161.
70. Aristotle, Politics, Book III: 9, p. 251, Book IV: 8, pp. 325-326; Book V: 8, p. 441;
Book V: 8, p. 457; Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book VIII: 10, p. 491; Xenophon,
Memorabilia, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, Book: IV: 6, p. 345.
71. Herodotus, Histories, Book I: 8-15, pp. 11-19.
72. J?szi and Lewis, Against theTyrant: The Tradition and Theory of Tyrannicide, pp. 7,26-27.
73. Aristotle, Politics, Book III: 9, p. 247.
74. Aristotle, Politics, Book III: 9-10, pp. 251-253, 261-263, Book IV: 8, p. 325. Also, see
Raymond Weil, "De la tyrannie dans la pens?e politique grecque de l'?poque classique,"
Dictatures et L?gitimit?, pp. 42-47; Roger Boesche, "Aristotle's 'Science' of Tyranny," History
of Political Thought, 14 (1993), pp. 1-25.

75. Aristotle, Politics, Book III: 9, p. 251.
76. Aristotle, Politics, Book IV: 8, pp. 325-327.
77. Aristotle, Politics, Books III: 9, p. 251. For the tyranny of Pittacus, see A. Andrewes,
The Greek Tyrants, New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1956, pp. 92-99; Claude Moss?, La tyran
nie dans la Gr?ce antique, Paris: PUF, 1969, 14-15; H. W. Pieket, "The Archaic Tyrannis,"
Atalanta, 1 (1969), pp. 19-61. Dionysius supplements Aristotle's observation about this extra
ordinary office by reporting an additional broader function, that of restoring the Republic to
its foundational principles against the destructive force of corruption. Here, the dictator
assumes the form of the founder and legislator.
78. For a different, less sympathetic, interpretation of Dionysius' appropriation of this
Aristotelian term, see Mason, "The Roman Government in Greek Sources: The Effect of
Literary Theory on theTranslation of Official Titles," pp. 153-154, 159.

79. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities, Books V: 77, p. 235; Gabba, Dionysius
and theHistory ofArchaic Rome, p. 143; Nicolet, "Dictateurs Romains, strat?goi autokratores
et g?n?raux carthaginois," p. 30.
80. Mommsen, Le droit public romain, Vol. IV, pp. 425-470.
81. Istvan,Hahn, "Appians Darstellung der sullanischen Diktatur," Acta classica Universitatis
Scientiarum Debreceniensis, 10-11 (1974-1975), pp. 111-120.
82. For Appian's interest in emergencies and conflicts, see Gowing, The Triumviral
Narratives of Appian and Cassius Dio, p. 280; B?cher, "The Origins, Program, and
Composition of Appian's Roman History," p. 420.

83. Appian, The Civil Wars, Book I: 99, pp. 183-185; Mommsen, Le droit public romain,
Vol. IV, p. 440.
84. Appian, The Civil Wars, Book I: 3, 99, pp. 7, 183-185; Kaplan, Dictatorships and
"Ultimate" Degrees in theEarly Roman Republic, p. 144.
85. Appian, The Civil Wars, Book I: 99, 3, p. 183, 7. On Appian's conceptual equation, see
James Luce Jr.,"Appian's Magisterial Terminology," Classical Philology, 56:1 (1961), pp. 25-27.
86. Appian, The Civil Wars, Book 11:137, p. 481.
87. Nicolet, "Dictateurs Romains, strat?goi autokratores et g?n?raux carthaginois,"
pp. 37-39, 42.

440 PoliticalTheory
88. Appian, The Civil Wars, Book I: 99, p. 185. Also, see Kaplan, Dictatorships and
"Ultimate" Decrees in the Early Roman Republic 501-202 BC, p. 144; Fr?d?ric Hurlet, La
dictature de Sylla: Monarchie ou magistrature R?publicaine? Brussels: Institut Historique
Belge de Rome, 1993, pp. 93-108; Mommsen, Le droit public romain, Vol. IV, pp. 425-470.
89. Appian, The Civil Wars, Book I: 99, p. 183.
90. Appian, The Civil Wars, Book I: 99, p. 183. In addition, the exceptional traitof Sulla's
tyranny also was due, according toAppian, to the unparalleled fact that "he was the firstman,
so far as I know," who "desired to turn himself . . . from a tyrant into a private citizen" and
"had the courage to lay down his tyrannical power voluntarily." Appian, The Civil Wars, Book
I: 3, 104, p. 7, 195.
91. Plutarch, "Caesar," Lives VII, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994, 53:1-2,
pp. 575; Plutarch, "Lysander and Sulla," Lives TV, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
2000, 1:1, p. 447.
92. Turchetti, Tyrannie et Tyrannicide de l'Antiquit? ? nos jours, p. 163.
93. Appian, The Civil Wars, Book I: 3, p. 7.
94.1 say "almost all" because there are three recorded cases, that of Furius Camillus II (390
BC), L. Aemilius Mamercinus Privenas (316 BC), and M. Servilius Pulex Geminus (202 BC),
which violated the six-month limit.Another irregular dictatorship was that ofMinucius in 217
BC. T. A. Dorey, "The Dictatorship of Minucius," The Journal of Roman Studies, 45: 1-2.
(1955), pp. 92-96. For these and some additional violations, see Saint-Bonnet, L'?tat d'excep
tion, pp. 59-60.
95. Appian, The Civil Wars, Book I: 99. pp. 183-184.
96. Appian's tyrannical dictatorship reappears timidly and ambivalently in Jean-Jacques
Rousseau's republican vision. Although Rousseau approves of the institution and the practice,
he warns, echoing Appian, that "in the crises that call for its establishment the state is soon
destroyed or saved, and once the pressing need has passed, the dictatorship becomes tyranni
cal or useless." Departing clearly from his more canonical and "precise" definition of tyranny
as usurpation of royal authority, Rousseau places it in the void opened up by the absence of
temporal limits, suggesting that the tyrant is a permanent dictator. This formulation evokes
Appian in that the affinity between the dictator and the tyrant unfolds in a temporal horizon.
For this reason Rousseau insists that the best protection against this ominous prospect is to
never extend or prolong a dictator's commission. However, there is an important difference
between the two thinkers.While Appian understands the temporal factor as only one of degree,
Rousseau sees it as a bridge allowing the crossing from one form of rule over to another. In
that sense, although the Roman institution of dictatorship appears to be liable to abuse once it
is abused it is not the same anymore. It has undergone a qualitative transformation into some
thing else: tyranny.Here one can sense the presence of Rousseau's canonical definition. The
dictator who has violated the law regulating the length of his magistracy has in fact usurped a
title "without having any right to it." In that sense, the tyrant remains a usurper, he who by vio
lating the temporal restrictions seizes illegally dictatorial power. Tyranny is again a stolen,
degenerated form of a supreme executive rule and not the secret truthof dictatorship, not even
its dark side. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "Du Contract Social; ou, Principes du Droit Politique,"
uvres Compl?tes, Volume III, Gallimard: Biblioth?que de la Pl?iade, 1964, Book IV: 7,
pp. 458, 423; Pierangelo Catalano, "Le concept de dictature de Rousseau ? Bolivar: essai pour
une mise au point politique sur la base du droit romain," Dictatures, pp. 7-25; Jean Ferrari,
"Rousseau, Kant et la tyrannie," Actes du Colloque: La Tyrannie, pp. 177-189.
97. Appian, The Civil Wars, Book 1:16, p. 33.

98. Cicero, "The Third Speech on theAgrarian Law," Orations, Vol. IV, Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1930, III: 5, p. 489.
99. Livy, History ofRome, Book 9:26, pp. 263-267; Kaplan, Dictatorships and "Ultimate"
Decrees in theEarly Roman Republic 501-202 BC, pp. 93-94; Lintott, The Constitution of the
Roman Republic, p. 112.
100. It isworth noting, however, thatDiodorus of Sicily (80-20 BC), another Greek historian
contemporary of Livy, does not confirm this interpretation.Although Diodorus recounts the dic
tatorship of Gaius Manius, he does notmention the story of his impeachment. Diodorus of Sicily,
Library ofHistory, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002, Book 19:76, p. 43.
101. It seems thatDionysius and Appian's re-interpretation of tyranny is empirically con
tradicted by the lex repetundarum or recovery law, contained in a fragmented bronze tablet,
and which suggests that the dictator could be brought to trial after the end of his tenure in
office.Without knowing, however, the exact dating of the law, its duration, and most impor
tantly its author, it is difficult to ascertain with certainty the extent and character of its legal
impact on dictatorship. For example, most scholars have suggested that the law was authored
by Gaius Gracchus in his struggle toweaken the senatorial class and thus has been interpreted
as an instrument in the political warfare between the orders. Two questions are relevant here:
(1) How did the demise of Gracchus affect this law? (2) Is it not the case that the law itself is
a telling instance of how the institution of dictatorship was turned into a site of political strug
gle and that the problem of the accountability of the dictator was a contested, open-ended
issue, depending on relations of power and political interests? On this see, Emilio Badi?n,
"Lex Acilia Repetundarum," The American Journal of Philology, 74:4 (1954), pp. 374-384;
A. N. Sherwin-White, "The Date of theLex Repetundarun and itsConsequences," The Journal
of Roman Studies, 62 (1972), pp. 83-99; A. N. Sherwin-White, "The Lex Repetundarum and
the Political Ideas of Gaius Gracchus," The Journal of Roman Studies, 72 (1982), pp. 18-31.
102. Lintott, The Constitution of theRoman Republic, p. 112.
103. Richter, "A Family of Political Concepts: Tyranny, Despotism, Bonapartism, Caesarism,
Dictatorship, 1750-1917," pp. 221-248.
104. Mommsen, Le droit public romain, Vol. Ill, pp. 193-194; Vol. IV, pp. 425-470; Carl
Schmitt, Die Diktatur, Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1994, p. 3; Saint-Bonnet, L'?tat d'ex
ception, pp. 47-70; Nicolet, "Dictatorship inRome," pp. 265-276; Andrew Arato, "Good-bye
toDictatorship?" pp. 925-933.
105. Hinard, "De la dictature ? la tyrannic R?flexions sur la dictature de Sylla," pp. 87-105.
106. Appian, The Civil Wars, Book 1:11, p. 185; Plutarch, "Comparison of Solon and
Public?la," Lives, II-III, pp. 569-575; Dio Cassius, Roman History, Book IV: 13 (Zonaras),
p. 109; Ch. Wirszubski, Libertas as a Political Idea at Rome during the Late Republic and
Early Principate, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968, p. 64. As Aristotle percep
tively observed regarding Greek tyrants, "a mode of securing tyranny is tomake itmore like
kingship." Aristotle, Politics, Book V: 9, p. 467.
107. Martin, L'id?e de royaut? ? Rome. Vol. II. Haine de la royaut? et s?ductions monar
chiques (du IVe si?cle av. J.-C. au principat august?en), pp. 3-11.
108. Mommsen, Le droit public romain, Vol. III, p. 193; Dio Cassius, Roman History,
Book IV: 13 (Zonaras), p. 107.
109. Dio Cassius, Roman History, Book IV: 13 (Zonaras), p. 107.
110. Thomas Jefferson, "Notes on Virginia: Query XIII," Joyce Appleby and Terence Ball
(eds.), Jefferson. Political Writings, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 332.
Michael Zuckert offers an illuminating interpretation of Jefferson's objections to Roman
dictatorship within the context of the neo-republican revival. See, Michael P. Zuckert, The

442 PoliticalTheory
Natural Rights Republic. Studies in theFoundation of theAmerican Political Tradition, Notre

Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1996, pp. 212-219.
111. Jefferson, "Notes on Virginia: Query XIII," p. 335 (emphases added).
112. Aristotle, The Art of Rhetoric, Book I: 8, p. 89.
113. Herodotus, Histories, Book 111:81, p. 107,
114. Plato, Gorgias, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996, 493, p. 417;
Plato, The Republic, Book IX: 578, p. 361.
115. Jefferson, "Notes on Virginia: Query XIII," p. 334.
116. Jefferson, "Notes on Virginia: Query XIII," pp. 334-335. Also, see Spinoza, A
Political Treatise, New York: Dover Publications, 1951, chapter X:l, pp. 378-379.
117. Jefferson, "Notes on Virginia: Query XIII," p. 335. For dictatorship as a "remedy," see
Mommsen, Le droit public romain, Vol. Ill, p. 169.
118. Polybius, The Histories, Book VI: 10, p. 291; Cicero, De Re Publica, Book II: 57, p. 167.
119. Jefferson, "Notes on Virginia: Query XIII," pp. 334-335.
120. For the concept of constitutional dictatorship, see Schmitt, Die Dictatur; Frederick M.
Watkins, "The Problem of Constitutional Dictatorship," Friedrich and Mason (eds.), Public
Policy, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1940, pp. 324-378; Carl J. Friedrich,
Constitutional Government and Democracy, New York: Ginn and Company, 1950, pp. 572-588;
Clinton Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship: Crisis Government in theModern Democracies,
pp. 3-32, 288-314; Bruce Ackerman, "The Emergency Constitution," The Yale Law
Journal, Vol. 113:5 (2004), pp. 1029-1091. For a recent opposite approach that opposes the
historical and conceptual continuity of constitutional dictatorship, see Giorgio Agamben, State
of Exception, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2005, p. 6-11. Clinton Rossiter,
Constitutional Dictatorship: Crisis Government in theModern Democracies, pp. 5, 8, 288.
121. Antocides, "On theMysteries," Minor Attic Orators: Antiphon, Andocides, Vol. I,
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982, Book I: 96-98, p. 413; Benjamin D.
Meritt, "Greek Inscriptions: Anti-tyrannical Inscription," Hesperia, 21 (1952), pp. 355-359;
Lysias, Against Eratosthenes', Lucian, "Tyrannicide," Lucian. Vol I, Cambridge, Mass.:

Harvard University Press, 1996; Martin Ostwald, "Athenian Legislation against Tyranny and
Subversion," Transactions of the American Philological Association, 86 (1955), 110-128;
Jaszy and Lewis, Against the Tyrant: the Tradition and Theory of Tyrannicide; Antony J.
Podlecki, "The Political Significance of Athenian 'Tyrannicide' Cult," Historia, 15:2 (1966),
pp. 129-141; F. L. Ford, Political Murder: From Tyrannicide toPolitical Terrorism, Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985; Michael W Taylor, The Tyrant Slayers. The Heroic
Image in theFifth Century BC: Athenian Art and Politics, Salem: Ayer, 1992.
122. Robert J. Bonner, "Emergency Government in Rome and Athens," The Classical
Journal, 18:3 (1922), p. 144; Saint-Bonnet, L'?tat d'exception, pp. 45-46.
123. Cicero, De Re Publica, Book II: 26, p. 157; Plato, Republic, Book VIII, 566b, p. 321.
124. Aristotle, Politics, Book IV:8, p. 327.
125. For the continuity between Roman dictatorship and modern theories and practices of
the state of emergency, see Mommsen, Le droit public romain, Vol. IV, p. 187.
Andreas Kalyvas is an assistant professor of political science at The New School for Social
Research inNew York City. He is the author of Democracy and thePolitics of theExtraordinary:
Max Weber, Carl Schmitt, Hannah Arendt (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming). He is
currently completing a coauthored book manuscript on liberalism and republicanism while
working as a monograph on tyranny and dictatorship inWestern political thought.


The Tyranny of Dictatorship When The Greek Tyrant Met The Roman Dictator

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The Tyranny of Dictatorship When The Greek Tyrant Met The Roman Dictator

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The Tyranny of Dictatorship: When the Greek Tyrant Met the Roman Dictator

Author(s): Andreas Kalyvas

This content downloaded from 128.235.251.160 on Mon, 22 Dec 2014 07:53:28 AM

The Tyranny ofDictatorship Sag

The articleexamines the inauguralencounterof theGreek theoryof tyranny

Keywords: Dionysius; Appian; tyranny;dictatorship; Athens; Rome;

For most of the twentiethcentury theconcepts of dictatorship and tyranny

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ancients had formulated as political enslavement. Accordingly, throughout

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dictator.' This historical and conceptual revisionism inaugurated a compar

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broader category of tyranny,dictatorship acquired a polyvalence and ambi

The King, theDictator, and theTyrant

Livy offers a historically influential account of the origins of dictator

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appeal at the time and not subject to countervailing checks, rendered

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the people to it.29Dictatorship was exceptional and provisional; tyranny

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Itwould be wrong to underestimate the difference between dictatorship

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Dionysius and the Elective Tyranny of Dictatorship

Dionysius' account of the historical origins of the firstdictatorship dif

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as "the unique defense of liberty."48Nevertheless, as Dionysius bluntly

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things that are universally advantageous and useful.58This synoptic disap

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to a "voluntary tyranny" (avOCaipzov zypavviha).69 With the Romans,

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aesymnetes is thus a hybrid of tyranny and kingship, blending absolute,

Appian and theTemporary Tyranny of Dictatorship

This incipient but compelling critical redefinition of the republican

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This content downloaded from 128.235.251.160 on Mon, 22 Dec 2014 07:53:28 AM

This content downloaded from 128.235.251.160 on Mon, 22 Dec 2014 07:53:28 AM

Dictatorship and theLegalization of Tyranny

Dionysius and Appian's strikingly original contribution is to have

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A second implication is that this atypical view of dictatorship as legal

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This content downloaded from 128.235.251.160 on Mon, 22 Dec 2014 07:53:28 AM

This content downloaded from 128.235.251.160 on Mon, 22 Dec 2014 07:53:28 AM

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of stability and permanence generated and sustained by an institutional

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This content downloaded from 128.235.251.160 on Mon, 22 Dec 2014 07:53:28 AM

University ofMinnesota Press, 1989, p. 166.

Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 263.

of Political Ideas, 54 (1993), pp. 585-610.

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strat?goi autokratores et g?n?raux carthaginois," Dictatures, pp. 27-47; I. S. Moxon, J. D.

Writings, Cambridge: Cambridge University 1986; George A. Kennedy

Empire: Interpretations of Augustus and His Princip?te, Berkeley: University of California

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Proceedings of theAmerican Philological Association, 98 (1967), pp. 151-171.

particuli?rement a l'?poque de C?sar et de Cicer?n," Revue de ?tudes Latines, 13 (1935),

Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988, pp. 155-158.

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quelques clich?s de 1'historiography romaine," Actes du Colloque: La Tyrannie, Centre de

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Ferrary, "Cicer?n et la dictature," pp. 101-105.