Succession Cases Page |1
G.R. No. L-22601            October 28, 1966
PRIMA G. CARRILLO and LORENZO LICUP, plaintiffs and appellants,
vs.
FRANCISCA SALAK DE PAZ and ERNESTO BAUTISTA, defendants and
appellees.
Filemon Cajator for plaintiffs and appellants.
Tomas Besa for defendants and appellees.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac
dismissing a suit to recover ownership and possession of 2/3 of 1/2 of Lot
No. 221 of the Cadastral Survey of Tarlac.
Severino Salak and Petra Garcia were the owners of Lot No. 221 of the
Cadastral Survey of Tarlac, covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 41543,
with an area of 1,334 square meters. Petra Garcia died on September 21,
1941. On August 16, 1943, Severino Salak sold to Honoria Salak for P812.00
his ½ portion of said lot. A year later, on December 5, 1944, Severino Salak
died.
Sometime in January 1945, Honoria Salak and other members of her family
died — massacred by the Japanese.
As a result, two settlement proceedings were instituted in the Court of First
Instance of Tarlac: (1) Special Proceeding No. 3, to settle the estates of
Severino Salak and Petra Garcia and (2) Special Proceeding No. 23, to settle
the estates of the Salak family (parents Simeon Salak and Isabel Carrillo;
and children Adolfo, Honoria, Consuelo and Ligaya).
On September 4, 1946, a Project of Partition was submitted in Special
Proceeding No. 3, which the court approved on November 19, 1946. Said
project adjudicated inter alia  Lot No. 221, which was given thereunder to
Francisca Salak de Paz (1/4 of it in her capacity as heir, and the other 3/4 by
purchase and/or exchange with her co-heirs, Rita Sahagun, Aurea Sahagun
and Ernesto Bautista). From 1946 up to the present Francisca Salak has
possessed all of Lot No. 221.
On the other hand, in Special Proceeding No. 23, on February 26, 1948, the
court a quo held that the heirs entitled to the estates of the Salak family were
Agustina de Guzman Vda. de Carillo (3/4 share) and Ernesto Bautista (1/4
share), applying the survivorship presumption [Rule 123, Sec. 69(ii), now
Rule 131, Sec. 5(jj) of the Rules of Court], thus: (1) Simeon Salak died first —
his properties went to the children Adolfo, Honoria, Consuelo and Ligaya (1/4
each); (2) Honoria, Consuelo and Ligaya died next — Honoria's and
Consuelo's properties went to their mother, Isabel; those of Ligaya went to
her son, Ernesto Bautista;1 (3) Isabel died next — her properties went to her
son Adolfo; and (4) Adolfo died last — his properties went to his maternal
grandmother, Agustina. Agustina thereby succeeded to the properties that
came by intes-state succession from Honoria Salak and Isabel
Carrillo, including ½ of Lot No. 221.
On November 9, 1948, Agustina de Guzman Vda. de Carrillo filed an action
in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac (docketed therein as Case No. 351)
against the heirs in Special Proceeding No. 3 to recover ½ of Lot No. 221
which as aforementioned has been possessed by Francisca Salak de Paz.
On April 24, 1950, Agustina died.
On June 8, 1950 the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Tarlac in Special Proceeding No. 23, and further decreed
that the properties inherited by Agustina de Guzman Vda. de Carrillo were
subject to reserva troncal.
On November 6, 1950, Ernesto Bautista filed a petition in Special Proceeding
No. 23 for the execution of the judgment therein. Said petition was heard on
November 10, 1959, after a copy was served on the lawyer of Prima Carrillo,
the latter being a party thereto as administratix of the estate of her deceased
mother Agustina. Acting on said petition, the lower court issued its order of
November 14, 1950, which reads in part:
. . . the Court, in view of the death of the reservista, Doña Agustina
de Guzman Vda. de Carrillo, declares all the interest of the
said reservista  Doña Agustina de Guzman Vda. de Carrillo as well
as that of her heirs in the three-fourths share adjudged to
the reservista, definitely terminated, and that the reservee, the minor
Ernesto Bautista, is entitled to the immediate delivery to him of the
said three-fourths share declared reserved to him in the decision of
the Court of Appeals of June 8, 1950. . . . (Record on Appeals, pp.
213-214)
On December 20, 1960, the lower court dismissed Civil Case No. 351. The
order of dismissal reads in part:

By virtue of the existence of third-degree relatives of Adolfo Salak,
the portion of Lot No. 221, inherited by Agustina de Guzman was
never released from the reserva, so as to convert the ownership of
Agustina de Guzman into an absolute one. Upon her death on April
24, 1950, therefore, the property did not pass by inheritance to her
legal heirs, but rather reverted to the family trunk of the Isabel-Adolfo
line. Such being the case, the estate of Agustina de Guzman, the
Present plaintiff in this case, has no cause of action against the
defendants.
In resume, the adjudication in Special Proceeding No. 23, Intestate
Estate of the late Simeon Salak and Isabel Carrillo, which included
Lot No. 221, has become res judicata which cannot be disturbed in
this case. (Record on Appeal, p. 209)
On April 22, 1963, Prima Carrillo and Lorenzo Licup filed the present suit for
recovery of 2/3 of 1/2 of No. 221 against Francisca Salak de Paz and Ernesto
Bautista.2
On June 20, 1963, defendants Francisco Salak de Paz and Ernesto Bautita
filed a motion to dismiss upon the grounds that the cause of action is barred
by prior judgement and by the statute of limitations.
On November 19, 1963, the court a quo dismissed the complaint on the
ground of res judicata, finding the suit barred by the order of delivery dated
November 14, 1950 in Special Proceeding No. 23.
Plaintiffs Prima Carrillo and Lorenzo Licup thereupon appealed to Us upon
questions of law.
Several grounds were advanced to support the motion to dismiss: that the
cause of action is barred by prior judgment and by the statute of limitations.
Although the action was dismissed by the lower court expressly upon the
ground of res judicata, it did not totally disregard the defense of prescription.
Thus, said court pointed out that:
Prima Carrillo being then the administratrix of the estate of her
mother, she is also deemed to have been notified of the petition for
execution of judgment in Special Proceeding No. 23, and of the order
of November 14, 1950. As of then, therefore, Prima Carrillo (even
though as administratrix) personally knew that Ernesto Bautista
claimed to be the sole reservee of all the properties inherited by Da.
Agustina from the Salak Family, among which was Lot No. 221 in
question, but she did not file any opposition thereto. It was her
Succession Cases Page |2
opportunity to assert her right as reservee by opposing the petition
or, failing in this, to contest or to ask to be relieved from the order of
November 14, 1950. Instead, she allowed about thirteen (13) years
before she commenced the present action. (Decision, Record on
Appeal, pp. 214-215; emphasis supplied)
At any rate, this Court can resolve this appeal on the issue of prescription. As
ruled in the cases of Garcia Valdez vs. Soterana Tuazon, 40 Phil. 943
and Relativo v. Castro, 76 Phil. 563, when the trial judge decides a case in
favor of a party on a certain ground, the appellate court may uphold the
decision below upon some other point which was ignored or erroneously
decided in favor of the appellant by the trial court.
Reserva troncal  in this jurisdiction is treated in Article 891 of the new Civil
Code and Article 811 of the old Civil Code, which states:
The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which
the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another
ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property
as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of
relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to the line
from which said property came.
The reserva troncal arose — as had been finally decided by the Court of
Appeals in Special Proceeding No. 23 — when Agustina acquired by
operation of law all the properties of her descendant Adolfo (grandson), who
acquired them by gratuitous title from another ascendant, Isabel (Adolfo's
mother).
According to Manresa, the reserva is extinguished upon the death of
the reservista, as it then becomes a right of full ownership on the part of
the reservatarios, who can bring a reivindicatory suit therefor. Nonetheless,
this right, if not exercised within the time for recovering real properties, can
be lost by prescription:
Pero extinguida la reserva por la muerte del reservista, cambian por
completo las relaciones y condiciones juridicas de las personas y de
las cosas, como ya se ha indicado. La obligacion de reservar se
convierte en la de entregar los bienes a quien correspondan,
obligacion que pasa a la herencia del reservista fallecido y deben
complir sus herederos. Y el derecho a la reserva se convierte en el
derecho al dominio pleno de esos bienes. Si a la muerte del
reservista se comple la condicion resolutoria de existir parientes
dentro del tercer grado que pertenezcan a la linea de donde los

bienes proceden, a estos parientes pasa desde aquel momento por
ministerio de la ley el dominio absoluto de aquellos bienes, y, por
consiguiente, el derecho para reclamarlos, pudiendo disponer
libremente de aquellos o de este, y transmitirlos a sus herederos,
puesto que la ley no lo prohibe. Y si no sobrevive al reservista
ninguno de dichos parientes, queda extinguida la obligacion de
reservar, por no haberse complido aquella condicion resolutoria
impuesta por la ley, y en su virtud vuelven los bienes al pleno
dominio del ascendiente, y pertenecen a su herencia conforme al art.
651. Y como nada ordena la ley en sentido contrario, tenemos por
indudable que no tiene el caracter de personalisimo ninguno de esos
derechos, que nacen con la extincion de la reserva, pertenecen a la
herencia y se transmiten a los herederos, aunque el causante no los
hubiere ejercitado por si mismo, salvo cases de renuncia,
incapacidad o prescripcion.
xxx           xxx           xxx
C) Extincion de la reserva.—Las mismas condiciones exigidas para
el nacimiento de la reserva son necesarias para su existencia. Al
faltar una de ellas, la reserva muerte. Tres son, por tanto, las
principales causas de extincion:
1.a. Muerte del ascendiente.—Sea el que quiera el destino definitivo
de los bienes, en virtud de la naturaleza condicional de los derechos
que crea el art. 811, es lo cierto que la reserva, como tal, una vez
necida a compaña al ascendiente obligado a ella hasta su muerte.
Muerto el ascendiente, cesa toda obligacion de reservar; falta el
sujeto pasivo de la reserva.
xxx           xxx           xxx
Ademas de las tres causas expresadas, pueden señalarse otras que
expondremos a continuacion.
xxx           xxx           xxx
Y 5.a La prescripcion, si se disfrutan como libres los bienes por los
herederos del ascendiente durante el tiempo y con las condiciones
marcadas por la ley. (Manresa, Comentarios Al Codigo Civil
Español, Vol. 6, 1911 Ed., pp. 288-289, 316-318).
Scaevola also states the view that prescription can apply against
the reservatarios  to cut off their right to the reservable property:
Succession Cases Page |3
f) Prescipcion.—Este modo extintivo de los derechos tiene solo
applicacion a los parientes del tercer grado del descendiente, porque
no habiendo reserva si no acepta el ascendiente, no hay que hablar
de prescripcion extintiva respecto de el.
Tocante a los parientes con derecho a la reserva, es aplicable la
doctrina, porque pueden no ejercer su derecho por ignorar la muerte
del descendiente opor otra causa.
Dada esta posibilidad, entendemos que, tratandose de un derecho
real sobre bienes inmuebles, prescribira a los treinta años (art.
1.693) (1), contados desde la aceptacion de la herencia por el
ascendiente, momento determinante del derecho al ejercicio de la
reserva (art. 1.969) ; transcurridos, pues, treinta años desde la
aceptacion sin que los parientes favorecidos por la ley hayan
solicitado la constitucion de la reserva, se extenguira esta, y el
ascendiente o sus derecho-habientes adquiriran el pleno dominio de
los bienes reservables por su naturaleza, pero que no fueron objeto
de reserva. (Scaevola, Codigo Civil Comentado, Vol. 14, 1944 Ed.,
p. 360).
Plaintiffs-appellants herein, as reservatarios, had the right to claim the
property 2/3 of 1/2 of Lot No. 221 — from Francisca Salak de Paz, who has
been possessing it in the concept of an owner, from April 24, 1950 when
Agustina died. And the Court of Appeals' decision affirming the existence
of reserva troncal, promulgated on June 8, 1950, rendered it all the more
doubtless that such right had accrued in their favor from the time Agustina
died. It is clear, therefore, that the right or cause of action accrued in favor of
the plaintiffs-reservatarios herein on April 24, 1950.
Section 40 of the Code of Civil Procedure fixes 10 years as the period of
prescription for actions to recover real property, counted from the time the
cause of action accrued. This is the applicable law because Article 1116 of
the New Civil Code provides that "Prescription already running before the
effectivity of this Code [August 30, 1950] shall be governed by laws
previously in force."
Plaintiffs-appellants' suit herein, having been filed only on April 22, 1963, or
more than ten (10) years from April 24, 1950, has prescribed.
And having reached such conclusion, We deem it unnecessary to pass upon
the question of whether the suit is also barred on the ground of res judicata.
 Succession Cases Page |4

WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal appealed from is hereby affirmed on

the ground of prescription, with costs against appellants. So ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar,

Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.
Barrera, J., is on leave.

Footnotes

1
 Thus, Ernesto Bautista was an heir in both Special Proceeding No.
3 and Special Proceeding No. 23.

2
 Plaintiff Prima Carrillo claims to be a reservatario (as sister of Isabel
Carrillo and aunt of propositus Adolfo), while plaintiff Lorenzo Licup is
the surviving husband of Luz Carillo (likewise a sister of Isabel
Carrillo and aunt of prepositus Adolfo). Prima and Lorenzo claim to
be heirs of Luz.

G.R. No. 83484 February 12, 1990
CELEDONIA SOLIVIO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CONCORDIA JAVELLANA
VILLANUEVA, respondents.
Rex Suiza Castillon for petitioner.
Salas & Villareal for private respondent.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision dated January 26, 1988 of the
Court of Appeals in CA GR CV No. 09010 (Concordia Villanueva v.
Celedonia Solivio) affirming the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No.
13207 for partition, reconveyance of ownership and possession and
damages, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiff
and against defendant:
a) Ordering that the estate of the late Esteban Javellana, Jr.
be divided into two (2) shares: one-half for the plaintiff and
one-half for defendant. From both shares shall be equally
deducted the expenses for the burial, mausoleum and
related expenditures. Against the share of defendants shall
be charged the expenses for scholarship, awards, donations
and the 'Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Memorial
Foundation;'
b) Directing the defendant to submit an inventory of the
entire estate property, including but not limited to, specific
items already mentioned in this decision and to render an
accounting of the property of the estate, within thirty (30)
days from receipt of this judgment; one-half (1/2) of this
produce shall belong to plaintiff;
c) Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff P5,000.00 as expenses
of litigation; P10,000.00 for and as attorney's fees plus costs.
SO ORDERED. (pp. 42-43, Rollo)
Succession Cases Page |5
This case involves the estate of the late novelist, Esteban Javellana, Jr.,
author of the first post-war Filipino novel "Without Seeing the Dawn," who
died a bachelor, without descendants, ascendants, brothers, sisters,
nephews or nieces. His only surviving relatives are: (1) his maternal aunt,
petitioner Celedonia Solivio, the spinster half-sister of his mother, Salustia
Solivio; and (2) the private respondent, Concordia Javellana-Villanueva,
sister of his deceased father, Esteban Javellana, Sr.
He was a posthumous child. His father died barely ten (10) months after his
marriage in December, 1916 to Salustia Solivio and four months before
Esteban, Jr. was born.
Salustia and her sister, Celedonia (daughter of Engracio Solivio and his
second wife Josefa Fernandez), a teacher in the Iloilo Provincial High School,
brought up Esteban, Jr.
Salustia brought to her marriage paraphernal properties (various parcels of
land in Calinog, Iloilo covered by 24 titles) which she had inherited from her
mother, Gregoria Celo, Engracio Solivio's first wife (p. 325, Record), but no
conjugal property was acquired during her short-lived marriage to Esteban,
Sr.
On October 11, 1959, Salustia died, leaving all her properties to her only
child, Esteban, Jr., including a house and lot in La Paz, Iloilo City, where she,
her son, and her sister lived. In due time, the titles of all these properties
were transferred in the name of Esteban, Jr.
During his lifetime, Esteban, Jr. had, more than once, expressed to his aunt
Celedonia and some close friends his plan to place his estate in a foundation
to honor his mother and to help poor but deserving students obtain a college
education. Unfortunately, he died of a heart attack on February 26,1977
without having set up the foundation.
Two weeks after his funeral, Concordia and Celedonia talked about what to
do with Esteban's properties. Celedonia told Concordia about Esteban's
desire to place his estate in a foundation to be named after his mother, from
whom his properties came, for the purpose of helping indigent students in
their schooling. Concordia agreed to carry out the plan of the deceased. This
fact was admitted by her in her "Motion to Reopen and/or Reconsider the
Order dated April 3, 1978" which she filed on July 27, 1978 in Special
Proceeding No. 2540, where she stated:

4. That petitioner knew all along the narrated facts in the
immediately preceding paragraph [that herein movant is also
the relative of the deceased within the third degree, she
being the younger sister of the late Esteban Javellana, father
of the decedent herein], because prior to the filing of the
petition they (petitioner Celedonia Solivio and movant
Concordia Javellana) have agreed to make the estate of the
decedent a foundation, besides they have closely known
each other due to their filiation to the decedent and they
have been visiting each other's house which are not far away
for (sic) each other. (p. 234, Record; Emphasis supplied.)
Pursuant to their agreement that Celedonia would take care of the
proceedings leading to the formation of the foundation, Celedonia in good
faith and upon the advice of her counsel, filed on March 8, 1977 Spl.
Proceeding No. 2540 for her appointment as special administratrix of the
estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. (Exh. 2). Later, she filed an amended petition
(Exh. 5) praying that letters of administration be issued to her; that she be
declared sole heir of the deceased; and that after payment of all claims and
rendition of inventory and accounting, the estate be adjudicated to her (p.
115, Rollo).
After due publication and hearing of her petition, as well as her amended
petition, she was declared sole heir of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr.
She explained that this was done for three reasons: (1) because the
properties of the estate had come from her sister, Salustia Solivio; (2) that
she is the decedent's nearest relative on his mother's side; and (3) with her
as sole heir, the disposition of the properties of the estate to fund the
foundation would be facilitated.
On April 3, 1978, the court (Branch II, CFI, now Branch 23, RTC) declared
her the sole heir of Esteban, Jr. Thereafter, she sold properties of the estate
to pay the taxes and other obligations of the deceased and proceeded to set
up the "SALUSTIA SOLIVIO VDA. DE JAVELLANA FOUNDATION" which
she caused to be registered in the Securities and Exchange Commission on
July 17,1981 under Reg. No. 0100027 (p. 98, Rollo).
Four months later, or on August 7, 1978, Concordia Javellana Villanueva
filed a motion for reconsideration of the court's order declaring Celedonia as
"sole heir" of Esteban, Jr., because she too was an heir of the deceased. On
October 27, 1978, her motion was denied by the court for tardiness (pp. 80-
81, Record). Instead of appealing the denial, Concordia filed on January 7,
1980 (or one year and two months later), Civil Case No. 13207 in the
Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 26, entitled "Concordia Javellana-
Succession Cases Page |6
Villanueva v. Celedonia Solivio" for partition, recovery of possession,
ownership and damages.
On September 3, 1984, the said trial court rendered judgment in Civil Case
No. 13207, in favor of Concordia Javellana-Villanueva.
On Concordia's motion, the trial court ordered the execution of its judgment
pending appeal and required Celedonia to submit an inventory and
accounting of the estate. In her motions for reconsideration of those orders,
Celedonia averred that the properties of the deceased had already been
transferred to, and were in the possession of, the 'Salustia Solivio Vda. de
Javellana Foundation." The trial court denied her motions for reconsideration.
In the meantime, Celedonia perfected an appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA
GR CV No. 09010). On January 26, 1988, the Court of Appeals, Eleventh
Division, rendered judgment affirming the decision of the trial court in
toto. Hence, this petition for review wherein she raised the following legal
issues:
1. whether Branch 26 of the RTC of Iloilo had jurisdiction to
entertain Civil Case No. 13207 for partition and recovery of
Concordia Villanueva's share of the estate of Esteban
Javellana, Jr. even while the probate proceedings (Spl. Proc.
No. 2540) were still pending in Branch 23 of the same court;
2. whether Concordia Villanueva was prevented from
intervening in Spl. Proc. No. 2540 through extrinsic fraud;
3. whether the decedent's properties were subject to reserva
troncal in favor of Celedonia, his relative within the third
degree on his mother's side from whom he had inherited
them; and
4. whether Concordia may recover her share of the estate
after she had agreed to place the same in the Salustia
Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation, and notwithstanding
the fact that conformably with said agreement, the
Foundation has been formed and properties of the estate
have already been transferred to it.
I. The question of jurisdiction—

After a careful review of the records, we find merit in the petitioner's
contention that the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, lacked jurisdiction to
entertain Concordia Villanueva's action for partition and recovery of her share
of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. while the probate proceedings (Spl,
Proc. No. 2540) for the settlement of said estate are still pending in Branch
23 of the same court, there being as yet no orders for the submission and
approval of the administratix's inventory and accounting, distributing the
residue of the estate to the heir, and terminating the proceedings (p. 31,
Record).
It is the order of distribution directing the delivery of the residue of the estate
to the persons entitled thereto that brings to a close the intestate
proceedings, puts an end to the administration and thus far relieves the
administrator from his duties (Santiesteban v. Santiesteban, 68 Phil. 367,
Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank v. Escolin, et al., L-27860, March
29, 1974, 56 SCRA 266).
The assailed order of Judge Adil in Spl. Proc. No. 2540 declaring Celedonia
as the sole heir of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. did not toll the end of
the proceedings. As a matter of fact, the last paragraph of the order directed
the administratrix to "hurry up the settlement of the estate." The pertinent
portions of the order are quoted below:
2. As regards the second incident [Motion for Declaration of
Miss Celedonia Solivio as Sole Heir, dated March 7, 1978], it
appears from the record that despite the notices posted and
the publication of these proceedings as required by law, no
other heirs came out to interpose any opposition to the
instant proceeding. It further appears that herein
Administratrix is the only claimant-heir to the estate of the
late Esteban Javellana who died on February 26, 1977.
During the hearing of the motion for declaration as heir on
March 17, 1978, it was established that the late Esteban
Javellana died single, without any known issue, and without
any surviving parents. His nearest relative is the herein
Administratrix, an elder [sic] sister of his late mother who
reared him and with whom he had always been living with
[sic] during his lifetime.
xxxxxxxxx
2. Miss Celedonia Solivio, Administratrix of this estate, is
hereby declared as the sole and legal heir of the late
Succession Cases Page |7
Esteban S. Javellana, who died intestate on February 26,
1977 at La Paz, Iloilo City.
The Administratrix is hereby instructed to hurry up with the
settlement of this estate so that it can be terminated. (pp, 14-
16, Record)
In view of the pendency of the probate proceedings in Branch 11 of the Court
of First Instance (now RTC, Branch 23), Concordia's motion to set aside the
order declaring Celedonia as sole heir of Esteban, and to have herself
(Concordia) declared as co-heir and recover her share of the properties of
the deceased, was properly filed by her in Spl. Proc. No. 2540. Her remedy
when the court denied her motion, was to elevate the denial to the Court of
Appeals for review on certiorari. However, instead of availing of that remedy,
she filed more than one year later, a separate action for the same purpose in
Branch 26 of the court. We hold that the separate action was improperly filed
for it is the probate court that has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and
legal distribution of the estate.
In the interest of orderly procedure and to avoid confusing and conflicting
dispositions of a decedent's estate, a court should not interfere with probate
proceedings pending in a co-equal court. Thus, did we rule in Guilas v.
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, L-26695, January 31,
1972, 43 SCRA 111, 117, where a daughter filed a separate action to annul a
project of partition executed between her and her father in the proceedings
for the settlement of the estate of her mother:
The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under
administration only after the payment of all the debts and the
remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the
same. The finality of the approval of the project of The
probate court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction to make
distribution, has power to determine the proportion or parts
to which each distributed is entitled. ... The power to
determine the legality or illegality of the testamentary
provision is inherent in the jurisdiction of the court making a
just and legal distribution of the inheritance. ... To hold that a
separate and independent action is necessary to that effect,
would be contrary to the general tendency of the
jurisprudence of avoiding multiplicity of suits; and is further,
expensive, dilatory, and impractical. (Marcelino v. Antonio,
70 Phil. 388)

A judicial declaration that a certain person is the only heir of
the decedent is exclusively within the range of the
administratrix proceedings and can not properly be made an
independent action. (Litam v. Espiritu, 100 Phil. 364)
A separate action for the declaration of heirs is not proper.
(Pimentel v. Palanca, 5 Phil. 436)
partition by itself alone does not terminate the probate
proceeding (Timbol v. Cano, 1 SCRA 1271, 1276, L-15445,
April 29, 1961; Siguiong v. Tecson, 89 Phil. pp. 28, 30). As
long as the order of the distribution of the estate has not
been complied with, the probate proceedings cannot be
deemed closed and terminated Siguiong v. Tecson, supra);
because a judicial partition is not final and conclusive and
does not prevent the heirs from bringing an action to obtain
his share, provided the prescriptive period therefore has not
elapsed (Mari v. Bonilia, 83 Phil. 137). The better practice,
however, for the heir who has not received his share, is to
demand his share through a proper motion in the same
probate or administration proceedings, or for reopening of
the probate or administrative proceedings if it had already
been closed, and not through an independent action, which
would be tried by another court or Judge which may thus
reverse a decision or order of the probate or intestate court
already final and executed and re-shuffle properties long ago
distributed and disposed of. (Ramos v. Ortuzar, 89 Phil. 730,
741-742; Timbol v. Cano, supra; Jingco v. Daluz, L-5107,
April 24, 1953, 92 Phil. 1082; Roman Catholic v. Agustines,
L-14710, March 29, 1960, 107 Phil. 455, 460-461; Emphasis
supplied)
In Litam et al., v. Rivera,  100 Phil. 364, where despite the pendency of the
special proceedings for the settlement of the intestate estate of the deceased
Rafael Litam the plaintiffs-appellants filed a civil action in which they claimed
that they were the children by a previous marriage of the deceased to a
Chinese woman, hence, entitled to inherit his one-half share of the conjugal
properties acquired during his marriage to Marcosa Rivera, the trial court in
the civil case declared that the plaintiffs-appellants were not children of the
deceased, that the properties in question were paraphernal properties of his
wife, Marcosa Rivera, and that the latter was his only heir. On appeal to this
Court, we ruled that "such declarations (that Marcosa Rivera was the only
heir of the decedent) is improper, in Civil Case No. 2071, it being within the
exclusive competence of the court in Special Proceedings No. 1537, in which
Succession Cases Page |8
it is not as yet, in issue, and, will not be, ordinarily, in issue until the
presentation of the project of partition. (p. 378).
However, in the Guilas case, supra, since the estate proceedings had been
closed and terminated for over three years, the action for annulment of the
project of partition was allowed to continue. Considering that in the instant
case, the estate proceedings are still pending, but nonetheless, Concordia
had lost her right to have herself declared as co-heir in said proceedings, We
have opted likewise to proceed to discuss the merits of her claim in the
interest of justice.
The orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, in Civil Case No. 13207
setting aside the probate proceedings in Branch 23 (formerly Branch 11) on
the ground of extrinsic fraud, and declaring Concordia Villanueva to be a co-
heir of Celedonia to the estate of Esteban, Jr., ordering the partition of the
estate, and requiring the administratrix, Celedonia, to submit an inventory
and accounting of the estate, were improper and officious, to say the least,
for these matters he within the exclusive competence of the probate court.
II. The question of extrinsic fraud—
Was Concordia prevented from intervening in the intestate proceedings
by extrinsic fraud  employed by Celedonia? It is noteworthy that extrinsic
fraud was not alleged in Concordia's original complaint in Civil Case No.
13207. It was only in her amended complaint of March 6, 1980, that extrinsic
fraud was alleged for the first time.
Extrinsic fraud, as a ground for annulment of judgment, is
any act or conduct of the prevailing party which prevented a
fair submission of the controversy (Francisco v. David, 38
O.G. 714). A fraud 'which prevents a party from having a trial
or presenting all of his case to the court, or one which
operates upon matters pertaining, not to the judgment itself,
but to the manner by which such judgment was procured so
much so that there was no fair submission of the
controversy. For instance, if through fraudulent machination
by one [his adversary], a litigant was induced to withdraw his
defense or was prevented from presenting an available
defense or cause of action in the case wherein the judgment
was obtained, such that the aggrieved party was deprived of
his day in court through no fault of his own, the equitable
relief against such judgment may be availed of. (Yatco v.
Sumagui, 44623-R, July 31, 1971). (cited in Philippine Law

Dictionary, 1972 Ed. by Moreno; Varela v. Villanueva, et al.,
96 Phil. 248)
A judgment may be annulled on the ground of extrinsic or
collateral fraud, as distinguished from intrinsic fraud, which
connotes any fraudulent scheme executed by a prevailing
litigant 'outside the trial of a case against the defeated party,
or his agents, attorneys or witnesses, whereby said defeated
party is prevented from presenting fully and fairly his side of
the case. ... The overriding consideration is that the
fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party
from having his day in court or from presenting his case. The
fraud, therefore, is one that affects and goes into the
jurisdiction of the court. (Libudan v. Gil, L-21163, May 17,
1972, 45 SCRA 17, 27-29; Sterling Investment Corp. v. Ruiz,
L-30694, October 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 318, 323)
The charge of extrinsic fraud is, however, unwarranted for the following
reasons:
1. Concordia was not unaware of the special proceeding
intended to be filed by Celedonia. She admitted in her
complaint that she and Celedonia had agreed that the latter
would "initiate the necessary proceeding" and pay the taxes
and obligations of the estate. Thus paragraph 6 of her
complaint alleged:
6. ... for the purpose of facilitating the settlement of the
estate of the late Esteban Javellana, Jr. at the lowest
possible cost and the least effort, the plaintiff and the
defendant agreed that the defendant shall initiate the
necessary proceeding,  cause the payment of taxes and
other obligations, and to do everything else required by law,
and thereafter, secure the partition of the estate between her
and the plaintiff, [although Celedonia denied that they agreed
to partition the estate, for their agreement was to place the
estate in a foundation.] (p. 2, Record; emphasis supplied)
Evidently, Concordia was not prevented from intervening in the proceedings.
She stayed away by choice. Besides, she knew that the estate came
exclusively from Esteban's mother, Salustia Solivio, and she had agreed with
Celedonia to place it in a foundation as the deceased had planned to do.
Succession Cases Page |9
2. The probate proceedings are proceedings in rem. Notice
of the time and place of hearing of the petition is required to
be published (Sec. 3, Rule 76 in relation to Sec. 3, Rule 79,
Rules of Court). Notice of the hearing of Celedonia's original
petition was published in the "Visayan Tribune" on April 25,
May 2 and 9, 1977 (Exh 4, p. 197, Record). Similarly, notice
of the hearing of her amended petition of May 26, 1977 for
the settlement of the estate was, by order of the court,
published in "Bagong Kasanag" (New Light) issues of May
27, June 3 and 10, 1977 (pp. 182-305, Record). The
publication of the notice of the proceedings was constructive
notice to the whole world. Concordia was not deprived of her
right to intervene in the proceedings for she had actual, as
well as constructive notice of the same. As pointed out by
the probate court in its order of October 27, 1978:
... . The move of Concordia Javellana, however, was filed
about five months after Celedonia Solivio was declared as
the sole heir. ... .
Considering that this proceeding is one in rem and had been
duly published as required by law, despite which the present
movant only came to court now, then she is guilty of laches
for sleeping on her alleged right. (p. 22, Record)
The court noted that Concordia's motion did not comply with the requisites of
a petition for relief from judgment nor a motion for new trial.
The rule is stated in 49 Corpus Juris Secundum 8030 as follows:
Where petition was sufficient to invoke statutory jurisdiction
of probate court and proceeding was in rem no subsequent
errors or irregularities are available on collateral attack.
(Bedwell v. Dean 132 So. 20)
Celedonia's allegation in her petition that she was the sole heir of Esteban
within the third degree on his mother's side was not false. Moreover, it was
made in good faith and in the honest belief that because the properties of
Esteban had come from his mother, not his father, she, as Esteban's nearest
surviving relative on his mother's side, is the rightful heir to them. It would
have been self-defeating and inconsistent with her claim of sole heirship if
she stated in her petition that Concordia was her co-heir. Her omission to so
state did not constitute extrinsic fraud.

Failure to disclose to the adversary, or to the court, matters
which would defeat one's own claim or defense is not such
extrinsic fraud as will justify or require vacation of the
judgment. (49 C.J.S. 489, citing Young v. Young, 2 SE 2d
622; First National Bank & Trust Co. of King City v. Bowman,
15 SW 2d 842; Price v. Smith, 109 SW 2d 1144, 1149)
It should be remembered that a petition for administration of a decedent's
estate may be filed by any "interested person" (Sec. 2, Rule 79, Rules of
Court). The filing of Celedonia's petition did not preclude Concordia from
filing her own.
III. On the question of reserva troncal—
We find no merit in the petitioner's argument that the estate of the deceased
was subject to reserva troncal and that it pertains to her as his only relative
within the third degree on his mother's side. The reserva troncal provision of
the Civil Code is found in Article 891 which reads as follows:
ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant
any property which the latter may have acquired by
gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister,
is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired
by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within
the third degree and who belong to the line from which said
property came.
The persons involved in reserva troncal are:
1. The person obliged to reserve is the reservor (reservista)
—the ascendant who inherits by operation of law property
from his descendants.
2. The persons for whom the property is reserved are the
reservees (reservatarios)—relatives within the third degree
counted from the descendant (propositus), and belonging to
the line from which the property came.
3. The propositus—the descendant who received by
gratuitous title and died without issue, making his other
ascendant inherit by operation of law. (p. 692, Civil Law by
Padilla, Vol. II, 1956 Ed.)
S u c c e s s i o n C a s e s P a g e | 10
Clearly, the property of the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., is not
reservable property, for Esteban, Jr. was not an ascendant, but the
descendant of his mother, Salustia Solivio, from whom he inherited the
properties in question. Therefore, he did not hold his inheritance subject to a
reservation in favor of his aunt, Celedonia Solivio, who is his relative within
the third degree on his mother's side. The reserva troncal applies to
properties inherited by an ascendant from a descendant who inherited it from
another ascendant or 9 brother or sister. It does not apply to property
inherited by a descendant from his ascendant, the reverse of the situation
covered by Article 891.
Since the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., died without descendants,
ascendants, illegitimate children, surviving spouse, brothers, sisters,
nephews or nieces, what should apply in the distribution of his estate are
Articles 1003 and 1009 of the Civil Code which provide:
ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants,
illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral
relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased
in accordance with the following articles.
ART. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor
children of brothers or sisters, the other collateral relatives
shall succeed to the estate.
The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or
preference among them by reason of relationship by the
whole blood.
Therefore, the Court of Appeals correctly held that:
Both plaintiff-appellee and defendant-appellant being
relatives of the decedent within the third degree in the
collateral line, each, therefore, shall succeed to the subject
estate 'without distinction of line or preference among them
by reason of relationship by the whole blood,' and is entitled
one-half (1/2) share and share alike of the estate. (p. 57,
Rollo)
IV. The question of Concordia's one-half share—
However, inasmuch as Concordia had agreed to deliver the estate of the
deceased to the foundation in honor of his mother, Salustia Solivio Vda. de
Javellana (from whom the estate came), an agreement which she ratified and

confirmed in her "Motion to Reopen and/or Reconsider Order dated April 3,
1978" which she filed in Spl. Proceeding No. 2540:
4. That ... prior to the filing of the petition they (petitioner
Celedonia Solivio and movant Concordia Javellana) have
agreed to make the estate of the decedent a
foundation, besides they have closely known each other due
to their filiation to the decedent and they have been visiting
each other's house which are not far away for (sic) each
other. (p. 234, Record; Emphasis supplied)
she is bound by that agreement. It is true that by that agreement, she did not
waive her inheritance in favor of Celedonia, but she did agree to place all of
Esteban's estate in the "Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation" which
Esteban, Jr., during his lifetime, planned to set up to honor his mother and to
finance the education of indigent but deserving students as well.
Her admission may not be taken lightly as the lower court did. Being a judicial
admission, it is conclusive and no evidence need be presented to prove the
agreement (Cunanan v. Amparo, 80 Phil. 227; Granada v. Philippine National
Bank, L-20745, Sept. 2, 1966, 18 SCRA 1; Sta. Ana v. Maliwat, L-23023,
Aug. 31, 1968, 24 SCRA 1018; People v. Encipido, G.R.70091, Dec. 29,
1986, 146 SCRA 478; and Rodillas v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. 58652, May 20,
1988, 161 SCRA 347).
The admission was never withdrawn or impugned by Concordia who,
significantly, did not even testify in the case, although she could have done
so by deposition if she were supposedly indisposed to attend the trial. Only
her husband, Narciso, and son-in-law, Juanito Domin, actively participated in
the trial. Her husband confirmed the agreement between his wife and
Celedonia, but he endeavored to dilute it by alleging that his wife did not
intend to give all, but only one-half, of her share to the foundation (p. 323,
Record).
The records show that the "Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation"
was established and duly registered in the Securities and Exchange
Commission under Reg. No. 0100027 for the following principal purposes:
1. To provide for the establishment and/or setting up of
scholarships for such deserving students as the Board of
Trustees of the Foundation may decide of at least one
scholar each to study at West Visayas State College, and
the University of the Philippines in the Visayas both located
in Iloilo City.
S u c c e s s i o n C a s e s P a g e | 11
2. To provide a scholarship for at least one scholar for St.
Clements Redemptorist Community for a deserving student
who has the religious vocation to become a priest.
3. To foster, develop, and encourage activities that will
promote the advancement and enrichment of the various
fields of educational endeavors, especially in literary arts.
Scholarships provided for by this foundation may be named
after its benevolent benefactors as a token of gratitude for
their contributions.
4. To direct or undertake surveys and studies in the
community to determine community needs and be able to
alleviate partially or totally said needs.
5. To maintain and provide the necessary activities for the
proper care of the Solivio-Javellana mausoleum at Christ the
King Memorial Park, Jaro, Iloilo City, and the Javellana
Memorial at the West Visayas State College, as a token of
appreciation for the contribution of the estate of the late
Esteban S. Javellana which has made this foundation
possible. Also, in perpetuation of his Roman Catholic beliefs
and those of his mother, Gregorian masses or their
equivalents will be offered every February and October, and
Requiem masses every February 25th and October llth, their
death anniversaries, as part of this provision.
6. To receive gifts, legacies, donations, contributions,
endowments and financial aids or loans from whatever
source, to invest and reinvest the funds, collect the income
thereof and pay or apply only the income or such part thereof
as shall be determined by the Trustees for such endeavors
as may be necessary to carry out the objectives of the
Foundation.
7. To acquire, purchase, own, hold, operate, develop, lease,
mortgage, pledge, exchange, sell, transfer, or otherwise,
invest, trade, or deal, in any manner permitted by law, in real
and personal property of every kind and description or any
interest herein.
8. To do and perform all acts and things necessary, suitable
or proper for the accomplishments of any of the purposes
herein enumerated or which shall at any time appear
 S u c c e s s i o n C a s e s P a g e | 12

conducive to the protection or benefit of the corporation,
including the exercise of the powers, authorities and
attributes concerned upon the corporation organized under
the laws of the Philippines in general, and upon domestic
corporation of like nature in particular. (pp. 9-10, Rollo)
As alleged without contradiction in the petition' for review:
should be conveyed to the "Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javallana Foundation,"
of which both the petitioner and the private respondent shall be trustees, and
each shall be entitled to nominate an equal number of trustees to constitute
the Board of Trustees of the Foundation which shall administer the same for
the purposes set forth in its charter. The petitioner, as administratrix of the
estate, shall submit to the probate court an inventory and accounting of the
estate of the deceased preparatory to terminating the proceedings therein.

The Foundation began to function in June, 1982, and three SO ORDERED.

(3) of its eight Esteban Javellana scholars graduated in
1986, one (1) from UPV graduated Cum Laude and two (2) Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.
from WVSU graduated with honors; one was a Cum Laude
and the other was a recipient of Lagos Lopez award for
teaching for being the most outstanding student teacher.

The Foundation has four (4) high school scholars in Guiso

Barangay High School, the site of which was donated by the
Foundation. The School has been selected as the Pilot
Barangay High School for Region VI.

The Foundation has a special scholar, Fr. Elbert Vasquez,

who would be ordained this year. He studied at St. Francis
Xavier Major Regional Seminary at Davao City. The
Foundation likewise is a member of the Redemptorist
Association that gives yearly donations to help poor students
who want to become Redemptorist priests or brothers. It
gives yearly awards for Creative writing known as the
Esteban Javellana Award.

Further, the Foundation had constructed the Esteban S.

Javellana Multi-purpose Center at the West Visayas State
University for teachers' and students' use, and has likewise
contributed to religious civic and cultural fund-raising drives,
amongst other's. (p. 10, Rollo)

Having agreed to contribute her share of the decedent's estate to the

Foundation, Concordia is obligated to honor her commitment as Celedonia
has honored hers.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is granted. The decision of the trial
court and the Court of Appeals are hereby SET ASIDE. Concordia J.
Villanueva is declared an heir of the late Esteban Javellana, Jr. entitled to
one-half of his estate. However, comformably with the agreement between
her and her co-heir, Celedonia Solivio, the entire estate of the deceased