ESTITUTO YNOT v.

INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

Facts:

Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos has given orders prohibiting the interprovincial movement of
carabaos and the slaughtering of carabaos not complying with the requirements of Executive Order No.
626, effective October 25, 1980.

On January 13, 1984, the petitioner transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo
when the same was confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for the
violation of E.O. 626-A. A case was filed by the petitioner questioning the constitutionality of executive
order and the recovery of the carabaos. After considering the merits of the case, the confiscation was
sustained and the court declined to rule on the constitutionality issue. The petitioner appealed the
decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court but it also upheld the ruling of RTC.

His claim is that the penalty is invalid because it is imposed without according the
owner a right to be heard before a competent and impartial court as guaranteed by due
process. He complains that the measure should not have been presumed, and so
sustained, as constitutional.

the case of Pesigan v. Angeles 5 is not applicable here. The question raised there was
the necessity of the previous publication of the measure in the Official Gazette before it
could be considered enforceable. We imposed the requirement then on the basis of due
process of law. In doing so, however, this Court did not, as contended by the Solicitor
General, impliedly affirm the constitutionality.

the due process clause was kept intentionally vague so it would remain also
conveniently resilient. This was felt necessary because due process is not, like some
provisions of the fundamental law, an "iron rule" laying down an implacable and
immutable command for all seasons and all persons. Flexibility must be the best virtue
of the guaranty. The very elasticity of the due process clause was meant to make it
adapt easily to every situation, enlarging or constricting its protection as the changing
times and circumstances may require.

The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing 13 which, generally
speaking, may not be dispensed with because they are intended as a safeguard against
official arbitrariness.

The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power which
both restraints and is restrained by due process. The police power is simply defined as
the power inherent in the State to regulate liberty and property for the promotion of the
general welfare. 18 By reason of its function, it extends to all the great public needs
and is described as the most pervasive, the least limitable and the most demanding of
the three inherent powers of the State, far outpacing taxation and eminent domain. 

Even if a reasonable relation between the means and the end were to be assumed, we
would still have to reckon with the sanction that the measure applies for violation of the
prohibition. The penalty is outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being
transported, to be meted out by the executive authorities, usually the police only.
To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police
power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably
necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is
violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard
in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the
administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is
a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of
separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to
the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution
of the properties arbitrarily taken. For these reasons, we hereby declare Executive
Order No. 626-A unconstitutional.

The strength of democracy lies not in the rights it guarantees but in the courage of the
people to invoke them whenever they are ignored or violated. Rights are but weapons
on the wall if, like expensive tapestry, all they do is embellish and impress. Rights, as
weapons, must be a promise of protection. They become truly meaningful, and fulfill
the role assigned to them in the free society, if they are kept bright and sharp with use
by those who are not afraid to assert them.

Issue:

Is E.O. 626-A unconstitutional and a valid exercise of police power?

"ORDINANCE REGULATING THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF

PRIVATE MEMORIAL TYPE CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF
QUEZON CITY AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION THEREOF" provides:

Sec. 9. At least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall
be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been
residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be determined by
competent City Authorities. The area so designated shall immediately be developed
and should be open for operation not later than six months from the date of approval
of the application.

seven years after the enactment of the ordinance, the Quezon City Council passed the following
resolution:

RESOLVED by the council of Quezon assembled, to request, as it does hereby

request the City Engineer, Quezon City, to stop any further selling and/or transaction
of memorial park lots in Quezon City where the owners thereof have failed to donate
the required 6% space intended for paupers burial.

Pursuant to this petition, the Quezon City Engineer notified respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. in
writing that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 would be enforced
Respondent Himlayang Pilipino reacted by filing with the Court of First Instance of Rizal Branch XVIII
at Quezon City, a petition for declaratory relief, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction
(Sp. Proc. No. Q-16002) seeking to annul Section 9 of the Ordinance in question The respondent
alleged that the same is contrary to the Constitution, the Quezon City Charter, the Local Autonomy
Act, and the Revised Administrative Code.

Petitioners argue that the taking of the respondent's property is a valid and reasonable exercise of
police power and that the land is taken for a public use as it is intended for the burial ground of
paupers. They further argue that the Quezon City Council is authorized under its charter, in the
exercise of local police power, " to make such further ordinances and resolutions not repugnant to
law as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this
Act and such as it shall deem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the
prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort and convenience of the city and the
inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein."

On the other hand, respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. contends that the taking or confiscation of
property is obvious because the questioned ordinance permanently restricts the use of the property
such that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all beneficial use
of his property.

There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area
of an private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health,
morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking
without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges
of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose,
the city passes the burden to private cemeteries.

As a matter of fact, the petitioners rely solely on the general welfare clause or on implied powers of
the municipal corporation, not on any express provision of law as statutory basis of their exercise of
power. The clause has always received broad and liberal interpretation but we cannot stretch it to
cover this particular taking. Moreover, the questioned ordinance was passed after Himlayang
Pilipino, Inc. had incorporated. received necessary licenses and permits and commenced operating.
The sequestration of six percent of the cemetery cannot even be considered as having been
impliedly acknowledged by the private respondent when it accepted the permits to commence
operations.