Facts:

The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (PBMEO) is a

legitimate labor union composed of the employees of the respondent Philippine
Blooming Mills Co., Inc., with the officers and members of the petitioner Uuion.

Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass

demonstration at Malacañang on March 4, 1969, in protest against alleged abuses
of the Pasig police, to be participated in by the workers in the first shift (from 6
A.M. to 2 P.M.) as well as those in the regular second and third shifts (from 7 A.M.
to 4 P.M. and from 8 A.M. to 5 P.M., respectively); and that they informed the
respondent Company of their proposed demonstration.

The parties stipulated that the company, after learning the mass demonstration,
informed the union panel that they even if the demonstration is an inalienable
right granted by the Constitution, it should not unduly prejudice the normal
operation of the company.  As such, they warned the PBMEO representatives that
workers who belong to the first and regular shifts, who without previous leave of
absence approved by the Company, particularly , the officers present who are the
organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to report for work the following
morning (March 4, 1969) shall be dismissed, because such failure is a violation of
the existing CBA (collective bargaining agreement which fixes the working shifts of
the employees) particularly Article XXIV: NO LOCKOUT — NO STRIKE’; and,
therefore, would be amounting to an illegal strike.

Because the petitioners and their members proceeded with the demonstration
despite the pleas of the respondent Company that the first shift workers should
not be required to participate in the demonstration and that the workers in the
second and third shifts should be utilized for the demonstration, respondent
Company charged the petitioners with a “violation of Section 4(a)-6 in relation to
Sections 13 and 14, as well as Section 15, all of Republic Act No. 875, and of the
CBA providing for ‘No Strike and No Lockout.’ ”

In their answer, petitioners claim that they did not violate the existing CBA
because they gave the respondent Company prior notice of the mass
demonstration on March 4, 1969; that the said mass demonstration was a valid
exercise of their constitutional freedom of speech against the alleged abuses of
some Pasig policemen; and that their mass demonstration was not a declaration
of strike because it was not directed against the respondent firm.
After considering the aforementioned stipulation of facts submitted by the
parties, Judge Joaquin M. Salvador, in an order dated September 15, 1969, found
herein petitioner PBMEO guilty of bargaining in bad faith and herein petitioners,
as directly responsible for perpetrating the said unfair labor practice were
considered to have lost their status as employees of the respondent Company.

Issue:
Whether the respondents’ act of concluding that the petitioners acted in bad faith
for proceeding with the demonstration and expelling them from the company is
unconstitutional.

Held:
No.  The pretension of their employer that it would suffer loss or damage by
reason of the absence of its employees is a plea for the preservation merely of
their property rights. Such apprehended loss or damage would not spell the
difference between the life and death of the firm or its owners or its
management.

While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights
over property rights is recognized. Because these freedoms are “delicate and
vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society” and the “threat of
sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual application of
sanctions,” they “need breathing space to survive,” permitting government
regulation only “with narrow specificity.”

In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of expression well as their right of

assembly and of petition against alleged persecution of local officialdom, the
employees and laborers of herein private respondent firm were fighting for their
very survival, utilizing only the weapons afforded them by the Constitution — the
untrammelled enjoyment of their basic human rights.  The condition in which the
employees found themselves vis-a-vis the local police of Pasig, was a matter that
vitally affected their right to individual existence as well as that of their families.
Material loss can be repaired or adequately compensated. The debasement of the
human being broken in morale and brutalized in spirit-can never be fully
evaluated in monetary terms.

The primacy of human rights — freedom of expression, of peaceful assembly and

of petition for redress of grievances — over property rights has to be sustained.
There was a lack of human understanding or compassion on the part of the firm in
rejecting the request of the Union for excuse from work for the day shifts in order
to carry out its mass demonstration. And to regard as a ground for dismissal the
mass demonstration held against the Pasig police, not against the company, is
gross vindictiveness on the part of the employer, which is as unchristian as it is
unconstitutional.

The respondent company is the one guilty of unfair labor practice. Because the
refusal on the part of the respondent firm to permit all its employees and workers
to join the mass demonstration against alleged police abuses and the subsequent
separation of the eight (8) petitioners from the service constituted an
unconstitutional restraint on the freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and
freedom petition for redress of grievances, the respondent firm committed an
unfair labor practice defined in Section 4(a-1) in relation to Section 3 of Republic
Act No. 875, otherwise known as the Industrial Peace Act. Section 3 of Republic
Act No. 8 guarantees to the employees the right “to engage in concert activities
for … mutual aid or protection”; while Section 4(a-1) regards as an unfair labor
practice for an employer interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the
exercise their rights guaranteed in Section Three.”  The insistence on the part of
the respondent firm that the workers for the morning and regular shift should not
participate in the mass demonstration, under pain of dismissal, was as heretofore
stated, “a potent means of inhibiting speech.”

Apart from violating the constitutional guarantees of free speech and assembly as
well as the right to petition for redress of grievances of the employees, the
dismissal constitutes a denial of social justice likewise assured by the fundamental
law to these lowly employees. Section 5 of Article II of the Constitution imposes
upon the State “the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and
economic security of all of the people,” which guarantee is emphasized by the
other directive in Section 6 of Article XIV of the Constitution that “the State shall
afford protection to labor …”. Respondent Court of Industrial Relations as an
agency of the State is under obligation at all times to give meaning and substance
to these constitutional guarantees in favor of the working man; for otherwise
these constitutional safeguards would be merely a lot of “meaningless
constitutional patter.” Under the Industrial Peace Act, the Court of Industrial
Relations is enjoined to effect the policy of the law “to eliminate the causes of
industrial unrest by encouraging and protecting the exercise by employees of
their right to self-organization for the purpose of collective bargaining and for the
promotion of their moral, social and economic well-being.” It is most unfortunate
in the case at bar that respondent Court of Industrial Relations, the very
governmental agency designed therefor, failed to implement this policy and failed
to keep faith with its avowed mission — its raison d’etre — as ordained and
directed by the Constitution.

Management has shown not only lack of good-will or good intention, but a
complete lack of sympathetic understanding of the plight of its laborers who
claim that they are being subjected to indignities by the local police, It was more
expedient for the firm to conserve its income or profits than to assist its
employees in their fight for their freedoms and security against alleged petty
tyrannies of local police officers. This is sheer opportunism. Such opportunism and
expediency resorted to by the respondent company assaulted the immunities and
welfare of its employees. It was pure and implement selfishness, if not greed.

If free expression was accorded recognition and protection to fortify labor

unionism such as in the Republic Savings Bank vs CIR, where the complaint
assailed the morality and integrity of the bank president no less, such recognition
and protection for free speech, free assembly and right to petition are rendered
all the more justifiable and more imperative in the case at bar, where the mass
demonstration was not against the company nor any of its officers.

WHEREFORE, judgement is hereby rendered:

(1) setting aside as null and void the orders of the respondent Court of Industrial
Relations dated September 15 and October 9, 1969; and

(2) directing the re instatement of the herein eight (8) petitioners, with full back
pay from the date of their separation from the service until re instated, minus one
day’s pay and whatever earnings they might have realized from other sources
during their separation from the service.

With costs against private respondent Philippine Blooming Company, Inc.

PASEI v. Drilon
G.R. No. 81958 June 30, 1988, Sarmiento, J.
Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc., is engaged principally in the recruitment
of Filipino workers, male and female of overseas employment. It challenges the
constitutional validity of Dept. Order No. 1 (1998) of DOLE entitled “Guidelines
Governing the Temporary Suspension of Deployment of Filipino Domestic and
Household Workers.” It claims that such order is a discrimination against males
and females. The Order does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic
helpers and females with similar skills, and that it is in violation of the right to
travel, it also being an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power. Further, PASEI
invokes Sec 3 of Art 13 of the Constitution, providing for worker participation in
policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be
provided by law. Thereafter the Solicitor General on behalf of DOLE submitting to
the validity of the challenged guidelines involving the police power of the State
and informed the court that the respondent have lifted the deployment ban in
some states where there exists bilateral agreement with the Philippines and
existing mechanism providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare and
protection of the Filipino workers. 

ISSUE:

Whether or not D.O. No. 1 of DOLE is constitutional as it is an exercise of police

power.

RULING:

 “[Police power] has been defined as the "state authority to enact legislation that
may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general
welfare."  As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition of restraint upon liberty or
property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It is not capable of an exact
definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all-
comprehensive embrace.

“The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure
should be nullified. There is no question that Department Order No. 1 applies only
to "female contract workers,"  but it does not thereby make an undue
discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that "equality before the law"
under the Constitution  does not import a perfect Identity of rights among all men
and women. It admits of classifications, provided that (1) such classifications rest
on substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to the purposes of the law; (3)
they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all
members of the same class. 
The Court is satisfied that the classification made-the preference for female
workers — rests on substantial distinctions.

WALTER LUTZ, as Judicial Administrator of the Intestate of the deceased

Antonio Jayme Ledesma, plaintiff-appellant v. J. ANTONIO ARANETA, as
collector of Internal Revenue, defendant-apppelle

G.R No. L-7856. December 22, 1955

REYES, J.B L., J.:

FACTS:

Appelant in this case Walter Lutz in his capacity as the Judicial Administrator of
the intestate of the deceased Antonio Jayme Ledesma, seeks to recover from the
Collector of the Internal Revenue the total sum of fourteen thousand six hundred
sixty six and forty cents (P 14, 666.40) paid by the estate as taxes, under section 3
of Commonwealth Act No. 567, also known as the Sugar Adjustment Act, for the
crop years 1948-1949 and 1949-1950. Commonwealth Act. 567 Section 2 provides
for an increase of the existing tax on the manufacture of sugar on a graduated
basis, on each picul of sugar manufacturer; while section 3 levies on the owners
or persons in control of the land devoted tot he cultivation of sugarcane and
ceded to others for consideration, on lease or otherwise - "a tax equivalent to the
difference between the money value of the rental or consideration collected and
the amount representing 12 per centum of the assessed value of such land. It was
alleged that such tax is unconstitutional and void, being levied for the aid and
support of the sugar industry exclusively, which in plaintiff's opinion is not a public
purpose for which a tax may be constitutionally levied. The action was dismissed
by the CFI thus the plaintiff appealed directly to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the tax imposition in the Commonwealth Act No. 567 are
unconstitutional.

RULING:

Yes, the Supreme Court held that the fact that sugar production is one of the
greatest industry of our nation, sugar occupying a leading position among its
export products; that it gives employment to thousands of laborers in
the fields and factories; that it is a great source of the state's wealth, is one of the
important source of foreign exchange needed by our government and is thus
pivotal in the plans of a regime committed to a policy of currency stability. Its
promotion, protection and advancement, therefore redounds greatly to the
general welfare. Hence it was competent for the legislature to find that the
general welfare demanded that the sugar industry be stabilized in turn; and in the
wide field of its police power, the law-making body could provide that the
distribution of benefits therefrom be readjusted among its components to enable
it to resist the added strain of the increase in taxes that it had to sustain.

The subject tax is levied with a regulatory purpose, to provide means for the
rehabilitation and stabilization of the threatened sugar industry. In other words,
the act is primarily a valid exercise of police power.

LAO H. ICHONG, in his own behalf and in behalf of other alien residents,
corporations and partnerships adversely affected. by Republic Act No.
1180, petitioner, vs. JAIME HERNANDEZ, Secretary of Finance, and MARCELINO
SARMIENTO, City Treasurer of Manila,respondents.

Constitutional Law – Treaties May Be Superseded by Municipal Laws in the

Exercise of Police Power
Lao Ichong is a Chinese businessman who entered the country to take advantage
of business opportunities herein abound (then) – particularly in the retail
business. For some time he and his fellow Chinese businessmen enjoyed a
“monopoly” in the local market in Pasay. Until in June 1954 when Congress
passed the RA 1180 or the Retail Trade Nationalization Act the purpose of which
is to reserve to Filipinos the right to engage in the retail business. Ichong then
petitioned for the nullification of the said Act on the ground that it contravened
several treaties concluded by the RP which, according to him, violates the equal
protection clause (pacta sund servanda). He said that as a Chinese businessman
engaged in the business here in the country who helps in the income generation
of the country he should be given equal opportunity.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted

principles?

HELD: 

Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case,
there is no conflict at all between the raised generally accepted principle and with
RA 1180. The equal protection of the law clause “does not demand absolute
equality amongst residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated
alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and
liabilities enforced”; and, that the equal protection clause “is not infringed by
legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it
applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for
making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do
not.”

For the sake of argument, even if it would be assumed that a treaty would be in
conflict with a statute then the statute must be upheld because it represented an
exercise of the police power which, being inherent could not be bargained away
or surrendered through the medium of a treaty. Hence, Ichong  can no longer
assert his right to operate his market stalls in the Pasay city market.
ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN PHILIPPINES v. SECRETARY OF
AGRARIAN REFORM, GR No. 78742, 1989-07-14
Facts:
The Constitution of 1987... he State of an agrarian reform program:
SEC. 4.  The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on
the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or
collectively the lands they till or, in the case of... other farmworkers, to receive a
just share of the fruits thereof.  To this end, the State shall encourage and
undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities
and reasonable retention limits as the
Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity
considerations, and subject to the payment of just compensation.  In determining
retention limits, the State shall respect the right of small landowners.  The
State shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing.
the enactment of R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law of 1988,... which President Aquino signed on June 10,... 1988.
G.R. No. 79777... the constitutionality of P.D. No. 27, E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, and
R.A. No. 6657.
The subjects of this petition are a 9-hectare riceland worked by four tenants and
owned by petitioner Nicolas Manaay and his wife and a 5-hectare riceland worked
by four tenants and owned by petitioner Agustin Hermano,... Jr.  The tenants
were declared full owners of these lands by E.O. No. 228 as qualified farmers
under P.D. No. 27.
questioning P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 on grounds inter alia of
separation of powers, due process, equal protection and the constitutional
limitation that no private property shall be taken for public use... without just
compensation.
They contend that President Aquino usurped legislative power when she
promulgated E.O. No. 228.  The said measure is invalid also for violation of Article
XIII, Section 4, of the Constitution, for failure to provide for retention limits for...
small landowners.  Moreover, it does not conform to Article VI, Section 25(4) and
the other requisites of a valid appropriation.
They invoke the recent cases of EPZA v. Dulay[5] and Manotok v. National Food
Authority.[6] Moreover, the just compensation contemplated by the Bill of Rights
is payable in money or in cash and not in the form of bonds or other things of
value.
the executive order also deprives the petitioners of their property rights as
protected by due process.  The equal protection clause is also violated because
the order... places the burden of solving the agrarian problems on the owners
only of agricultural lands.
that in declaring the beneficiaries under P.D. No. 27 to be the owners of the lands
occupied by them, E.O. No. 228 ignored judicial prerogatives and so violated due
process.  Worse, the measure would not solve the agrarian... problem because
even the small farmers are deprived of their lands and the retention rights
guaranteed by the Constitution.
it is contended that P.D. No. 27, E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 (except Sections 20 and
21) have been impliedly repealed by R.A. No. 6657.
G.R. No. 79310
This petition seeks to prohibit the implementation of Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No.
229.
The petitioners claim that the power to provide for a Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program as decreed by the Constitution belongs to Congress and not the
President.
the
President could exercise legislative power until the Congress was convened, she
could do so only to enact emergency measures during the transition period.
Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 would still have to be annulled for violating the
constitutional provisions on just compensation, due process, and equal
protection.
they contend that taking must be simultaneous with payment of just
compensation as it is traditionally understood, i.e., with money and in full, but no
such payment is contemplated in Section 5 of the E.O. No. 229.
Section 6 thereof provides that the Land Bank of the Philippines "shall
compensate the landowner in an amount to be established by the government,
which shall be based on the owner's declaration of current fair mar... ket value as
provided in Section 4 hereof, but subject to certain... controls to be defined and
promulgated by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council." This compensation
may not be paid fully in money but in any of several modes that may consist of
part cash and part bond, with interest, maturing periodically,... or direct payment
in cash or bond as may be mutually agreed upon by the beneficiary and the
landowner or as may be prescribed or approved by the PARC.
lleges that President Aquino had no authority to fund the Agrarian Reform
Program... the appropriation is invalid because of uncertainty in the amount
appropriated.
the sugar planters have failed to show that they belong to a different class and
should be differently treated.
the constitutional prohibition is against the payment of public money without the
corresponding appropriation
G.R. No. 79744
The petitioner now argues that:
(1)   E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 were invalidly issued by the President of the
Philippines.
(2)   The said executive orders are violative of the constitutional provision that no
private property shall be taken without due process or just compensation.
(3)   The petitioner is denied the right of maximum retention provided for under
the 1987 Constitution.
E.O Nos. 228 and 229... violating the doctrine of separation of powers.  The
legislative power granted to the President under the Transitory
Provisions refers only to emergency measures that may be promulgated in the
proper exercise of the police power.
As for the validity of the issuance of E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, he argues that... they
were enacted pursuant to Section 6, Article XVIII of the Transitory Provisions of
the 1987 Constitution which reads:
The incumbent president shall continue to exercise legislative powers until the
first Congress is convened.
distinctions between the police power and the power of eminent domai... was
eminent domain because the property involved was wholesome and intended for
a public use.
Property condemned under the police power is noxious or intended for a noxious
purpose, such as a... building on the verge of collapse, which should be
demolished for the public safety, or obscene materials, which should be
destroyed in the interest of public morals.  The confiscation of such property is
not compensable,... he taking of property under the... power of expropriation,
which requires the payment of just compensation to the owner.
Every restriction upon the use of property imposed in the exercise of the police
power deprives the owner of some right theretofore enjoyed, and is, in that
sense, an abridgment by the State of rights in property without making
compensation.
Whenever the use prohibited... ceases to be noxious - as it may because of
further changes in local or social conditions - the restriction will have to be
removed and the owner will again be free to enjoy his property as heretofore.
As for the power of expropriation, P... which sustained a zoning law under the
police power... eminent domain as encompassing public acquisition of private
property for... improvements that would be available for "public use," literally
construed.
Preservation of the landmark was held to be a valid objective of the police...
power.
o the extent that the measures under challenge merely prescribe retention limits
for landowners,... But where, to carry out such regulation, it becomes necessary
to deprive such owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the
maximum area allowed,... there is definitely a taking under the power of eminent
domain for which payment of just compensation is imperative.
The argument of the small farmers that they have been denied equal protection
because of the absence of retention limits has also become academic under
Section 6 of R.A. No. 6657
Classification
Equal protection... that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated
alike both as to the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed
Basically, the requirements for a proper exercise of the power are... it is not
correct to say that only public agricultural lands may be covered by the CARP as
the Constitution calls for "the just distribution of all agricultural lands.
"political question... are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity
It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a
particular measure.
the requirement for public use has already been settled for us by the Constitution
itsel
The second requirement,... the payment of just compensation... s held in Republic
of the Philippines v. Castellvi,[4... following conditions concur
The purposes specified in P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131 and R.A. No. 6657 are only an
elaboration of the constitutional... injunction that the State adopt the necessary
measures "to encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural
lands to enable farmers who are landless to own directly or collectively the lands
they till." That public use, as pronounced by the... fundamental law itself, must be
binding on us.
(1) the expropriator must enter a... private property; (2) the entry must be for
more than a momentary period; (3) the entry must be under warrant or color of
legal authority; (4) the property must be devoted to public use or otherwise
informally appropriated or injuriously affected;... and (5) the utilization of the
property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive
him of beneficial enjoyment of the property.
Section 16(e) of the CARP Law provides that:
Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of
rejection or no response from the landowners upon the deposit with an
accessible bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP
bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR... shall take immediate possession of
the land and shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines.  The DAR
shall thereafter proceed with the redistribution of the land to... the qualified
beneficiaries.
the determination of just compensation is a function addressed to the courts of
justice and may not be usurped by any other branch or official of the
governmen... the determination of the just compensation by the DAR is not by
any means... final and conclusive upon the landowner or any other interested
party, for Section 16(f) clearly provides:
DAR is only preliminary... courts of justice will still have the right to review with
finality
SEC. 18.  Valuation and Mode of Compensation. - The LBP shall compensate the
landowner in such amount as may be agreed upon by the landowner and the DAR
and the LBP, in accordance with the criteria provided for in Sections 16 and 17,...
and other pertinent provisions hereof, or as may be finally determined by the
court, as the just compensation for the land.
(1)  Cash payment
(2)  Shares of stock in government-owned or controlled corporations, LBP
preferred shares, physical assets or other qualified investments in accordance
with guidelines set by the PARC;
3)  Tax credits which can be used against any tax liability;
(4)  LBP bonds,... Such a program will involve not mere millions of pesos.  The cost
will be tremendous.
Such amount is in fact not even fully available at this time.
Section 18 of the CARP Law is not violative of the Constitution.
The recognized rule, indeed, is that title to the property expropriated shall pass
from the owner to the expropriator only upon full payment of the just
compensation.  Jurisprudence on this settled principle is... consistent both here
and in other democratic jurisdictions.
all rights acquired by the tenant-farmer under P.D. No. 27, as recognized under
E.O. No. 228, are retained by him even now under R.A. No. 6657
Issues:
roc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 should be invalidated because they do not provide
for retention limits as required by Article XIII, Section 4 of the Constitution is no
longer... tenable.
Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 should be invalidated because they do not provide
for retention limits as required by Article XIII, Section 4 of the Constitution is no
longer... tenable.
E.O. No. 229 violates the constitutional requirement that a bill shall have only one
subject, to be expressed in its title, deserves only short attention.  It is settled that
the title of the bill does not... have to be a catalogue of its contents and will
suffice if the matters embodied in the text are relevant to each other and may be
inferred from the title.
The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land.
The challenge to Proc. No. 131 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 on the ground that no
retention limits are prescribed has already been discussed and dismissed.
he DAR shall conduct summary administrative proceedings to determine the
compensation for the land by requiring the landowner, the LBP and other
interested parties to submit evidence as to the... just compensation for the land,
within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the notice.  After the expiration of the
above period, the matter is deemed submitted for decision.  The DAR shall decide
the case within thirty (30) days after... it is submitted for decision.
Ruling:
The promulgation of P.D. No. 27 by President Marcos in the exercise of his powers
under martial law has already been sustained in Gonzales v. Estrella and we find
no reason to modify or reverse it on that issue.  As for the power of President
Aquino to promulgate Proc. No. 131 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, the same was
authorized under Section 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987
Constitution,... An appropriation law is one the primary and specific purpose of
which is to authorize the release of public funds from the... treasur
The creation of the fund is only incidental to the main objective of the
proclamation, which is agrarian reform.
R.A. No. 6657 does provide for such limits now in Section 6 of the law, which in
fact is one of its most controversial provisions.  This section declares:
Retention Limits. - Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person may own
or retain, directly or indirectly, any public or private agricultural land, the size of
which shall vary according to factors governing a viable... family-sized farm, such
as commodity produced, terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by
the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) created hereunder, but in no
case shall retention by the landowner exceed five (5) hectares.  Three
(3) hectares may be awarded to each child of the landowner, subject to the
following qualifications:  (1) that he is at least fifteen (15) years of age; and (2)
that he is actually tilling the land or directly managing the farm; Provided, That
landowners whose... lands have been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall
be allowed to keep the area originally retained by them thereunder, further, That
original homestead grantees or direct compulsory heirs who still own the original
homestead at the time of the approval of... this Act shall retain the same areas as
long as they continue to cultivate said homestead.
But restriction imposed to protect the public health, safety or morals from
dangers threatened is not a taking.
o the police power, on the other hand, they assigned the less intrusive task of
preventing harmful externalities
So long as suppression of a privately authored harm bore a plausible relation to
some legitimate "public purpose," the pertinent measure need... have afforded
no compensation whatever.
there is an... exercise of the police power for the regulation of private property in
accordance with the Constitution.
What is required is the surrender of... the title to and the physical possession of
the said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the
farmer-beneficiary.  This is definitely an exercise not of the police power but of
the power of eminent... domain.
(1) public use... just compensation.
Principles:
that... private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation.
Eminent domain is an inherent power of the State that enables it to forcibly
acquire private lands intended for public use upon payment of just compensation
to the owner.
as in the case of the police power, that the welfare of the people is the supreme
law.
he power of expropriation is by no means absolute... private property shall not be
taken for public use without just... compensation"
Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken
from its owner by the expropriator.[39] It has been repeatedly stressed by this
Court that the measure is not the taker's gain... but the owner's loss.[40] The
word "just" is used to intensify the meaning of the word "compensation" to
convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the... property to be taken
shall be real, substantial, full, ample... deal here with an actual taking of private
agricultural lands that has dispossessed the... owners of their property and
deprived them of all its beneficial use and enjoyment, to entitle them to the just
compensation mandated by the Constitution.
Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court of
proper jurisdiction for final determination of just compensation.
The fundamental rule in expropriation matters is that the owner of the property
expropriated is entitled to a just compensation, which should be neither more nor
less, whenever it is possible to make the assessment, than the money...
equivalent of said property.  Just compensation has always been understood to
be the just and complete equivalent of the loss which the owner of the thing
expropriated has to suffer by reason of the expropriation.
It is well-settled that just compensation means the equivalent for the value of the
property at the time of its taking.  Anything beyond that is more, and anything
short of that is less, than just compensation.  It means a fair and... full equivalent
for the loss sustained, which is the measure of the indemnity, not whatever gain
would accrue to the expropriating entity.  The market value of the land taken is
the just compensation to which the owner of condemned property is entitled,...
the market value being that sum of money which a person desirous, but not
compelled to buy, and an owner, willing, but not compelled to sell, would agree
on as a price to be given and received for such property.
"Just compensation" for property taken by condemnation means a fair equivalent
in money, which must be paid at least within a reasonable time after the taking,
and it is not within the power of the Legislature to substitute for such payment
future obligations,... bonds, or other valuable advantage.[... we do not deal here
with the traditional exercise of the power of eminent domain.  This is not an
ordinary expropriation where only a specific property of relatively limited area is
sought to be taken by the State from... its owner for a specific and perhaps local
purpose.  What we deal with here is a revolutionary kind of expropriation.
his kind of expropriation is intended for the... benefit not only of a particular
community or of a small segment of the population but of the entire Filipino
nation, from all levels of our society, from the impoverished farmer to the land-
glutted owner.
Its purpose does not cover only the whole territory of... this country but goes
beyond in time to the foreseeable future, which it hopes to secure and edify with
the vision and the sacrifice of the present generation of Filipinos... heir intention
was to allow such manner of payment as is now provided for by the CARP Law,
particularly the... payment of the balance (if the owner cannot be paid fully with
money), or indeed of the entire amount of the just compensation, with other
things of value
Accepting the theory that payment of the just compensation is not always
required to be made fully in money, we find further that the proportion of cash
payment to the other things of value constituting the total payment, as
determined on the basis of the areas of the lands... expropriated, is not unduly
oppressive upon the landowner... he other modes, which are likewise available to
the landowner at his option, are also not unreasonable... because payment is
made in shares of stock, LBP bonds, other properties or assets, tax credits, and
other things of value equivalent to the amount of just compensation.
1.  R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are
SUSTAINED against all the constitutional objections raised in the herein petitions.
2.  Title to all expropriated properties shall be transferred to the State only upon
full payment of compensation to their respective owners.
3.  All rights previously acquired by the tenant-farmers under P.D. No. 27 are
retained and recognized.
4.  Landowners who were unable to exercise their rights of retention under P.D.
No. 27 shall enjoy the retention rights granted by R.A. No. 6657 under the
conditions therein prescribed.
5.  Subject to the above-mentioned rulings, all the petitions are DISMISSED,
without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.