CONSUELO SEVILLE JUTIC vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No.

L-44628, August 27, 1987

FACTS:

Vicente Sullan and the other respondents filed a complaint with the then Court of First Instance against
the petitioners for partition and accounting of the properties of Arsenio Seville, alleging they are heirs of
the decedent.

The petitioners, averred in their answer, that they are the owners of Lots 170 and 172 and improvements
thereon; that they are the surviving heirs of Melquiades Seville. Melquiades Seville in turn is the brother of
the deceased Arsenio Seville; that Melquiades Seville and his family have been in actual possession,
occupation and cultivation of Lots Nos. 170 and 172 since 1954 continuously and peacefully in concept of
owner, up to the time of his death. After his demise his heirs succeeded to the occupation and possession
of the said parcel of land and improvements with the knowledge of the plaintiffs and with the
acquiescence of Arsenio Seville during his lifetime. That even during the lifetime of the deceased Arsenio
Seville it had been his desire, intention and his wish that Lots 170 and 172 shall be owned by Melquiades
Seville, the father of the herein defendants.

During his lifetime, Arsenio Seville owned – (1) a parcel of agricultural land described as Lot No. 170; (2)
a parcel of agricultural land described as Lot No. 172; (3) a residential house erected on Lot 172; (4) rice
and corn mills and their respective paraphernalia; and (5) five carabaos in the possession of the
petitioners. On March 4, 1963, Arsenio Seville executed an affidavit in favor of Melquiades Seville. On
May 15, 1970, Arsenio Seville died intestate, single, without issue, and without any debt.

On September 19. 1972, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the private respondents. The
petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not there was a valid donation from Arsenio Seville to Melquiades Seville.

RULING:

No. The Supreme Court held that the trial court was correct in stating that “a close reading reveals that
Exhibit 4 is not a donation inter vivos or mortis cause but a mere declaration of an intention and a desire.
It is not a concrete and formal act of giving or donating.”

There clearly was no intention to transfer ownership from Arsenio Seville to Melquiades Seville at the time
of the instrument’s execution. It was a mere intention or a desire on the part of Arsenio Seville that in the
event of his death at some future time, his properties should go to Melquiades Seville. It is quite apparent
that Arsenio Seville was thinking of succession. Donations which are to take effect upon the death of the
donor partake of the nature of testamentary provisions and shall be governed by the rules established in
the title of succession.

Also, the petitioners could not have accepted something, which by terms of the supposed “donation” was
not given to them at the time. The affidavit could not transmit ownership except in clear and express
terms.

Furthermore, the homestead application was later prosecuted in the name of Arsenio Seville and the land
was mortgaged by him to the Philippine National Bank in consideration of a loan. Arsenio dealt with the
land and entered into transactions as its owner. All these happened with the knowledge and
acquiescence of the supposed done, Melquiades Seville. Contrary to the petitioners’ allegations in their
brief, there was no immediate transfer of title upon the execution of Exhibit 4.

Wherefore, the petition is hereby dismissed. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.