Peace Psychology Book Series

Series Editor: Daniel J. Christie

Kathleen Malley-Morrison
Sherri McCarthy
Denise Hines Editors

International
Handbook
of War, Torture,
and Terrorism
Peace Psychology Book Series

Series Editor: Daniel J. Christie

For further volumes:

http://www.springer.com/series/7298
Kathleen Malley-Morrison
Sherri McCarthy • Denise Hines
Editors

International
Handbook of War,
Torture, and Terrorism
Editors
Kathleen Malley-Morrison Sherri McCarthy
Department of Psychology Department of Educational Psychology
Boston University Northern Arizona University
Boston, MA, USA Yuma, AZ, USA

Denise Hines
Department of Psychology
Clark University
Worcester, MA, USA

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Preface

In the first decade of the twenty-first century, every continent except Antarctica
witnessed at least one major assault from forces within or beyond their borders;
in some areas, armed conflict was prolonged. All of these incursions have had
enormous impact on ordinary people and civil society.1 Moreover, regions
that were not themselves subjected to direct assaults often sent troops to fight
elsewhere in the world, and not necessarily for peacekeeping purposes. When
state and nonstate political and military leaders initiate armed aggression to
promote their agendas, the people in their communities may react in a variety
of ways: for example, they may personally take up arms; they may provide
political and verbal support to their leaders; they may protest actively—either
violently or nonviolently—against their leaders’ military activities; and/or
they may leave the area or declare their own neutrality.
From a psychological perspective, it is important to understand the kinds
of reasoning that individuals bring to bear on the efforts of their leaders to
engage them in armed conflict and/or other forms of aggression. In this book,
we examine conceptions of war, torture, terrorism, and national security held
by ordinary people from nine major regions of the world—Western Europe,
Russia and the Balkan Peninsula, the Middle East, the Gulf States (analyses
of responses for this region are only available in the sections of this book for
definitions and invasion), Africa, South and Southeast Asia, East Asia, Central
and South America, and North America. We also provide an in-depth analysis
of the socio-cognitive and emotional/motivational mechanisms that underlie
the thinking of people from these regions concerning the potential right of
governments to invade other countries or torture prisoners in times of war.
Because so much of the world has been carved up into nation states, with
borders often created rather arbitrarily by the states with the most armed might,
analyses of military conflict have often focused on individual countries and
their involvement in global wars or more circumscribed violence. However,
armed conflicts among groups are, with increasing frequency, not a matter of
one country invading another to enhance economic or political power, or of a
colony fighting for its independence, but a matter of regional issues with cultural
and religious roots that sometimes extend beyond the emergence of nation

1
Civil society has been defined in many ways; it is used here to refer to individuals as well
as voluntary groups, including NGOs, operating outside of the business and governmental
spheres, to pursue common goals and values.

v
vi Preface

states. Thus, in this book, our focus is on the views of individuals in key
regions of the world that vary in regard to the level of current and recent
conflict, with less emphasis on the specific countries within each region.
In the first decade of the twenty-first century, the United Kingdom/
Anglophone region, consisting of Canada and the United States, along with
Australia, the United Kingdom, and Northern Ireland, has experienced the
least amount of armed conflict on its own soil, despite suffering from some
terrorist activities (Project Ploughshares 2010). On the other hand, the United
States, to the dismay of many of its allies, has contributed to armed conflict in
many other areas of the world, particularly the Middle East. These actions were
fueled in part by military expenditures that amounted, in 2008, to 696.3 billion
dollars—nearly half of all the military expenditures in the world ($1,547.8 bil-
lion) that year (Project Ploughshares 2009). It is also noteworthy that the US
monthly contribution of police, military experts, and troops to UN peacekeep-
ing forces as of April 2011 was relatively small ($110 billion), as compared, for
example, to the United Kingdom ($284 billion), Canada ($213 billion), France
($1,467 billion), and Italy ($1,944 billion) (United Nations 2011).
The regions that were most highly subjected to domination by colonial
and foreign powers throughout most of the twentieth century—that is, the
Middle East, South and Southeast Asia, and Africa—are the regions still
experiencing the most armed conflict on their own soil in the early twenty-
first century. In Europe, particularly Eastern and Central Europe, armed
conflict in the post-Cold War period has been characterized by intrastate vio-
lence reflective of nationalistic strivings—for example, in Chechnya, where
efforts to separate from Russia had been squelched by 2009, although spo-
radic fighting continued into 2011. Overall, since WWII, the predominant
form of armed conflict has consisted of “societal” warfare—that is, armed
clashes related to civil, ethnic, and communal conflicts (Marshall and Cole
2009). In 2009, some of the best known of these societal wars were in the
Sudan (particularly involving Darfur and South Sudan), Somalia, and the
Democratic Republic of Congo, as well as Israel (Gaza). The term “societal
warfare” also applies to countries with serious armed conflict related to the
production and sale of illegal drugs; in 2009, the major countries involved in
that kind of societal warfare included Afghanistan, Colombia, Mexico, and
Myanmar (Marshall and Cole 2009).
Throughout the world, there still live some people whose collective mem-
ories are marked by World War II, the Cold War, and/or the colonial wars of
liberation. In many regions, the younger generations have little direct experi-
ence with war; in others, dealing with armed conflict is a daily struggle lead-
ing to daily losses. In many regions, the leaders of some countries and groups
have long been committed to peaceful coexistence, whereas the leaders of
other countries and groups have long based their power on commitments to
retaliation and conquest. An important task for psychologists is to understand
better the kinds of thinking that allow ordinary citizens within these regions
to tolerate, support, or resist the aggressive agenda of their leaders.
This chapter begins with a brief overview of some of the issues related to
major armed conflicts, torture, and terrorism at the beginning of the twenty-first
century. It then describes the international collaborative research project
that produced the findings discussed in this volume; this section provides
Preface vii

information on research methodology, including the composition of the inter-

national collaborative known as the Group on International Perspectives on
Government Aggression and Peace (GIPGAP), the nature of the international
survey, and sample recruitment. The remainder of this chapter is devoted
primarily to an overview of the coding systems developed for each of the four
major sections of this volume, which are the following: (1) definitions of war,
torture, and terrorism; (2) conceptions of national security; (3) judgments
concerning the acceptability of invasion; and (4) judgments concerning the
acceptability of torture. The analyses done for these last two sections build on
and extend the work of Alfred Bandura (e.g., 1999) on moral disengagement
and engagement. In particular, we consider the extent to which the sociocog-
nitive mechanisms he identified as fundamental to moral disengagement can
be identified in the responses of ordinary people making judgments about the
extent to which governments have a right to invade other countries and tor-
ture prisoners during times of war.

Invasion, Torture, and Terrorism

in the Twenty-First Century

Armed Conflicts

The post-World War II decline in the frequency of armed conflicts has contin-
ued into the first decade of the twenty-first century. Depending upon the
definition of armed conflict being used in different reports, estimates vary
regarding the number of such conflicts occurring in any 1 year; nevertheless,
there is general agreement that interstate violence in particular has declined.
Defining armed conflict as “a political conflict in which armed combat
involves the armed forces of at least one state (or one or more armed factions
seeking to gain control of all or part of the state), and in which at least 1,000
people have been killed by the fighting during the course of the conflict”
(Ploughshares 2010, p. 5), the Ploughshares Project indicates that there were
40 such armed conflicts in 2000 and only 28 such conflicts (in 24 different
countries) in 2009—the latter figures being the lowest since Ploughshares
began tracking armed conflict in 1985. According to the Center for Systemic
Peace (CSP) 2009 Annual Report, in which armed conflict is defined to
include interstate and civil wars with a minimum threshold of 500 directly
related deaths, “the global magnitude of warfare has decreased by over 60%
since peaking in the mid-1980s, falling by the end of 2009 to its lowest level
since 1960” (Center for Systemic Peace 2009, p. 4).
Although there were armed conflicts in the Middle East, Africa, and South
and Southeast Asia throughout the early twenty-first century, these conflicts
by no means directly involved all of the countries in each region. For exam-
ple, in 2008, according to Project Ploughshares, 20% of the 50 countries in
Africa experienced armed conflict—which accounted for over 39% of all the
conflicts in the world that year. Similarly, in Asia, 19% of the 42 countries
were subject to armed conflict—again just over 39% of all the world conflicts
of the time. During the same year, in the much smaller region of the Middle
viii Preface

East (14 countries), armed conflict in only four countries (29% of the countries
constituting that region) accounted for 14% of the world’s armed conflicts.
Less than 10% of the armed conflicts occurred in Europe (specifically, in part
of Russia) and the Americas (44 countries), primarily in Central and South
America, where there has been prolonged armed conflict in Colombia, South
America. On the other hand, armed forces from the Americas and Europe
were involved in some of the armed conflicts in the other regions—again, not
necessarily as peacekeepers.
Although the number of armed conflicts in any one year has declined fairly
steadily since the end of World War II, the establishment of the United
Nations, and the establishment of other international nongovernmental orga-
nizations (INGOs) and NGOs, the percentage of deaths that are civilian rather
than military personnel has increased. Among the contributors to noncomba-
tant deaths are aerial bombings by foreign interventionary forces (particu-
larly in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan) and “high-casualty terrorist
bombings” (HCTB) (defined by CSP as “bombings by nonstate actors result-
ing in 15 or more deaths”), which have increased dramatically since the 9/11
attacks in the United States.

Definitions of War
In general in this book, we use the terms “war” and “armed conflict” inter-
changeably; indeed, “war” is often defined as “armed conflict.” A typical dic-
tionary definition of war is “A state of open, armed, often prolonged conflict
carried on between nations, states, or parties” (The Free Dictionary 2010).
From a scientific point of view, such a definition is of limited usefulness
because of its vagueness. What is meant by “open” conflict? How long is
“prolonged?” Consequently, within the professional literature, “war” and the
related term “armed conflict” are often operationally defined in more con-
crete terms—for example, as military actions involving 1,000 or more com-
bat deaths (e.g., Leblang and Chan 2003). Moreover, within the academic
community, there have been many efforts to differentiate between different
types of war, as well as controversies concerning the best definitions of those
different types. For example, global wars have been differentiated from small
wars, for which there are many different synonyms, such as “brushfire wars,”
“guerilla wars,” “internal wars,” “interventions,” “political wars,” and “revo-
lutionary wars” (Beaumont 1995). Similarly, “classic wars” (between nations)
have been differentiated from “post-national wars,” generally characterized
by a lack of concern with national borders, an emphasis on protecting human
rights wherever they may be violated, and a military effort to control what is
seen as a global terror risk (Beck 2005).
Although authors vary in the extent to which they use precise terms to
define these different types or levels of warfare, they often focus on quantita-
tive criteria such as lives lost. For example, Collier et al. (2004) defined civil
wars as violent conflicts, internal to a country, resulting in at least 1,000 bat-
tle-related deaths a year. They provide one additional criterion, intended to
distinguish civil wars from massacres: that is, nongovernmental forces must
be responsible for at least 5 % of the deaths. Sambanis (2004) provided an
extensive analysis of problems regarding definitions of civil war that rely on
Preface ix

absolute thresholds for number of combat deaths and offered a much more
articulated definition that includes such criteria as the following: (a) the
warring parties having publicly stated political objectives; (b) the involve-
ment of the government as one of the warring parties; (c) local representation
and recruitment of insurgents; (d) the ability of the weaker party to sustain
effective resistance; (e) at least 500–1,000 deaths; and (f) a peace that lasts at
least 6 months following a treaty.
Some definitions of war and of particular types of war focus on the pre-
sumed motives of the leaders. In one classic definition, Oppenheim (1952)
said that war is “a contention between two or more States through their armed
forces, for the purpose of overpowering each other and imposing such condi-
tions of peace as the victor pleases” (p. 54, cited in Dinstein 2001, p. 4).
Cramer (2006) defined diversionary wars as “any use of force embarked upon
to help solve domestic political problems” (p. 198). These are only two exam-
ples of how the definition of war varies with motive; the emphasis on these
motives becomes particularly strong when the focus is on “just wars.”
Philosophers, theologians, political theorists, and others have argued for
centuries over whether it is possible to differentiate between just and unjust
wars. In a classic book on the issue, Walzer (1977) delineated what he viewed
as necessary criteria for considering a war to be just; these criteria involved
both the reasons for going to war (jus ad bellum) as well as the way the war is
conducted (jus in bello). To meet the criteria for jus ad bellum, (1) there must
be a just cause or purpose for declaring war (e.g., stopping a genocide); (2) the
motivation and intent behind going to war must be morally right (e.g., it must
not be aimed at increasing territory or control of natural resources); (3) it must
be initiated and declared openly by a legitimate authority; (4) it must be a last
resort, after all peaceful alternatives to force have been seriously tried and
exhausted; (5) there must be a chance of success; and (6) the universal good
that comes from war must outweigh the universal harm (Orend 2005).
The second set of criteria, jus in bello, which refer to the conduct of the
war once it has been declared, involve both an internal jus in bello (concerned
with the responsibility to do everything possible to maintain the rights of
one’s citizens) and external jus in bello, which comprises six more rules: (1)
respect and obey international laws concerning weapons; (2) carefully dis-
criminate between civilians (who have noncombatant immunity) and legiti-
mate targets who are harming individuals and their rights; (3) maintain
proportionality in the use of force (i.e., use only the amount of force appropri-
ate to and necessary for achieving their goal); (4) consistent with the Geneva
Conventions, keep prisoners of war (POWs, who are no longer engaged in
harm) away from battle zones until the war ends, and then exchange them for
one’s own POWs; (5) use no weapons that are mala in se or “evil in them-
selves” (e.g., rape, genocide, ethnic cleansing); and (6) refrain from reprisals
(Orend 2005).
In addition to the criteria for identifying a just war before and during the
war, Orend (e.g., 2006) and others have stressed the importance of achieving
justice in the postwar period, jus post bellum. The seven main principles of a
just termination of war include the following: (1) the peace settlement, which
should be publically declared, should be reasonable and not an act of revenge;
x Preface

(2) the settlement should ensure the rights whose violation caused the war in
the first place; (3) the settlement must discriminate among leaders, soldiers,
and civilians; (4) punishment must be proportionate, and leaders who perpe-
trated war crimes should be brought to justice; (5) soldiers from all sides of
the conflict who committed war crimes should also be held accountable; (6)
there should be financial restitution without taxing civilians or usurping
resources needed for reconstruction; and (7) rehabilitation and reform may be
necessary (e.g., demilitarization and disarmament) (Orend 2005).
Despite the many efforts made to define a “just war,” there remains much
controversy surrounding the issue of whether a war can ever truly be just or
whether a nation ever absolutely has the right to invade another. In fact, many
of the criteria in each of the two sets are highly controversial. For example,
the rehabilitation criterion in the jus post bellum set is controversial because
it may mandate a state’s transformation into a new regime (Orend 2005),
which may conflict with the ideologies of that state, and thereby involve an
imposition of the values and principles of one state on another. The aim of a
just war, however, is to achieve peace, not to wipe out a nation or expand one
nation’s military and territorial control and power. Beginning, maintaining,
and ending a war appropriately, peacefully, and justly, however, is almost
always—if not always—an arduous burden to surmount.
The concept of just war, particularly jus ad bellum, is also controversial
because of the efforts of many perpetrators of war to present their aggression
in sheep’s clothing, to cloak it in the language of moral principles. As is dis-
cussed in a later section of this chapter, Albert Bandura has devoted consider-
able attention to the processes of moral disengagement that allow individuals
to perpetrate inhumane acts while trying to convince themselves and others
of the morality of their undertakings. One of our interests in this study was to
discover whether ordinary people around the world used the language of just
war when defining war and considering whether they believed one country
ever has the right to invade another country.

The Persistence of Torture

There are no “just torture” principles comparable to the “just war” principles
recognized by the United Nations. Indeed, in Article 5 of its Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UNDHR) of December 10, 1948, the General
Assembly of the United Nations declared unequivocably, “No one shall be
subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punish-
ment.” This principle has been reiterated in countless human rights docu-
ments in the years since 1948. Nevertheless, although declared illegal by
many national, regional, and international laws, torture continues to occur
around the world. A study conducted by Amnesty International from early
1997 to mid-2000 revealed that state officials in more than 150 countries had
been accused of torture and other forms of ill-treatment. In nearly half of
these countries, such officially sanctioned torture was widespread or persistent,
and in more than half of them, the torture in some cases led to death (Amnesty
International n.d.). In its 2005 report, Amnesty International included such
Preface xi

Western industrialized countries as Austria, Belgium, Canada, France,

Sweden, and the United States in their list of 132 countries in which torture
was being used by security forces, the military, and other authorities.
Since 2005, the reports of torture taking place in various parts of the world
continue to grow and to implicate the top leaders of many governments,
including the United States. In his 2010 statement to the United Nations,
Manfred Nowak, Special Rapporteur on Torture, reported:
Unfortunately, some of the Governments who had invited me, including China,
Jordan, Indonesia … put me under intense surveillance and made various attempts
to obstruct my independent fact-finding by preparing places of detention or intimi-
dating witnesses and detainees.... Quite a number of Governments did not respond
to my requests or failed to issue invitations for me to conduct missions to their ter-
ritories, including in Europe (Belarus); Asia and the Middle East (Afghanistan, Fiji,
India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Yemen); Africa
(Algeria, Cote d’Ivoire, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Liberia, Libya and
Tunisia); and Latin America (Bolivia). Some Governments issued an invitation but
did not agree to the terms of reference, including confidential interviews with
detainees, and/or postponed or cancelled the mission at the last minute. These
include the United States (with respect to our joint study on the situation of detain-
ees at Guantanamo Bay), the Russian Federation (“postponed” indefinitely) and
Equatorial Guinea…. My worst experience was in respect of Zimbabwe.

Citizens from many of the countries listed as lacking in cooperation with

the investigation concerning use of torture (Afghanistan, India, Iraq, Israel,
Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Egypt, the United States, and Russia) contributed to
the research reported in this volume.
Clearly, many people believe that torture (generally by some other name) is
an essential tool in the “war against terrorism”—an important enough tool to
make them feel justified to dismiss the international prohibitions against it. For
example, the 2010 Executive Report for Human Rights Watch noted that:
International efforts to combat terrorism since the 9/11 attacks in the United States
have done incalculable damage to the absolute prohibition on torture. The global
ban on torture is a cornerstone of international law, binding on all nations in peace
and at war, and no exceptions or justifications are permitted. The attack on the tor-
ture prohibition by the US government under President George W. Bush has rightly
received widespread international condemnation…. Far less attention has been paid
to the other side of the Atlantic, where leading European governments continue to
flout their obligations to prevent and eradicate torture worldwide—and betray their
declared values—through intelligence cooperation with countries that torture.
France, Germany and the United Kingdom—pillars of the European Union and
important allies in the fight against terrorism—demonstrate, through policy state-
ments and practice, a willingness (even eagerness) to cooperate with foreign intel-
ligence services in countries like Uzbekistan and Pakistan—notorious for abusive
practices…. (Human Rights Watch 2010)

Participants from France, Germany, and the United Kingdom also contributed
to the findings reported in this volume regarding torture, terrorism, and war.
In 2010 and 2011, partly in connection with the Wikileaks revelations,
considerable information became available regarding approval for “enhanced
interrogation” techniques, identified by many sources as forms of torture, at
the highest level of the US government. Moreover, a report from Physicians
for Human Rights (2010) indicates that in addition to engaging in torture,
medical personnel working for the CIA engaged in illegal experimentation
on detainees as part of their post-9/11 “Enhanced Interrogation Program.”
xii Preface

Based on his alleged role in the Wikileaks revelations, “Bradley Manning

himself became a victim of policies approved at the highest levels of the US
government, which have been condemned as forms of torture.” Immediately
after World War II, there was tremendous support for the complete ban of
torture. Is that support diminishing? How do ordinary citizens around the
world define torture, and what do they think about granting governments a
right to impose torture on prisoners? These are among the questions we
address in this volume.

What Is Terrorism?

The terms “terrorism” and “terrorist” appear in the international news media
every day. Terrorist alert systems, as well as antiterrorism and counterterror-
ism programs, are now operative in many countries and international organi-
zations. For example, in December 1996, the General Assembly passed
resolution 51/210, establishing an Ad Hoc Committee “to elaborate an inter-
national convention for the suppression of terrorist bombings and…to address
means of further developing a comprehensive legal framework of conven-
tions dealing with international terrorism” (United Nations 2011). In 2001,
the United Nations established a Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) pur-
suant to resolution 1373 (2001), and in resolution 1566, which passed unani-
mously in October, 2004, the UN Security Council explicitly condemned any
acts of terrorism:
Criminal acts, including (those) against civilians, committed with the intent to cause
death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a
state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons,
intimidate a population or compel a government or international organizations to do
or to abstain from doing any act, which constitute offences within the scope of and
as defined in the international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, are
under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical,
ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature.

Although this statement provides a somewhat vague and indirect definition

of terrorism, defining it primarily in terms of its intents and purposes, subse-
quent working groups have been unable to establish a more precise definition
of terrorism satisfactory to all group members. As of April 15, 2011, the
chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee Negotiating Comprehensive Anti-
Terrorism Convention reported that “specific sticking points” slowing the
work of the committee included “a definition of terrorism and extradition
procedures.”
There appear to be several major stumbling blocks to the achievement of
consensus concerning an acceptable meaning of “terrorism.” One issue men-
tioned during the 15th session of the UN Ad Hoc Committee in April 2011 is
as follows: “Some delegations emphasized that terrorism should not be equated
with the legitimate struggle of peoples under colonial or alien domination and
foreign occupation for national liberation and self-determination” (United
Nations Ad Hoc Committee 2011). Another issue involves the debate over
whether the concept of “state terrorism” should be included in an official UN
definition of terrorism: “Some delegations also reiterated their view that the
Preface xiii

convention should address terrorism in all its forms and manifestations,

including State terrorism, and that activities undertaken by the armed forces
of States not regulated by international humanitarian law should also fall
within its scope” (United Nations Ad Hoc Committee 2011).
Despite ongoing debate within the United Nations and its relevant com-
mittees over an acceptable definition of terrorism, other groups and nations
have felt compelled to formulate their own definition. In the aftermath of the
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States, the European
Union, like the UN, saw an increasingly urgent need to cooperate more
closely with the United States in developing international counterterrorism
initiatives (Congressional Research Service 2011). In 2002, the EU extracted
some parts of the UN statement on terrorism, defining terrorist acts as being
executed with the aim of “seriously intimidating a population, or unduly
compelling a Government or international organization to perform or abstain
from performing any act, or seriously destabilising or destroying the funda-
mental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or
an international organization” (Quaker Council for European Affairs 2007).
Part of the EU’s “Framework for Combating Terrorism,” this definition pro-
vides examples of terrorism, including, but not limited to, attacks on a per-
son’s life or physical integrity, kidnapping, and the release of dangerous
substances (Quaker Council for European Affairs 2007). The EU also
identifies threats to commit any of the listed acts as terrorism (Quaker Council
for European Affairs 2007). NATO, also in agreement with the UN, has
deemed terrorism “a universal scourge that knows no border, nationality or
religion… a challenge that the international community must tackle together”
(NATO 2011).
Even within the United States, official definitions vary, with the Department
of Defense, the FBI, and the State Department each having their own
definitions. The Department of Defense defines terrorism as “the calculated
use of unlawful violence to inculcate fear, intended to coerce or to intimidate
governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political,
religious, or ideological” (Burgess 2003). The FBI’s official definition is sim-
ilar but not identical: “Terrorism is the unlawful use of force or violence
against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian
population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objec-
tives” (Quaker Council for European Affairs 2007). The State Department
offers yet another definition of terrorism as “premeditated, politically moti-
vated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational
groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience”
(Center for Defense Information 2003). All three definitions identify terror-
ism with politically motivated violence, yet such a general component retains
a great deal of ambiguity and specifically avoids dealing with the concerns
being expressed in the UN over rebellion against misuse of authority and the
possibility of terrorism being committed by states.
It is interesting to look at the difference between the definitions for “war”
and for “terrorism.” The aforementioned American definitions of terrorism
do not stray greatly from Prussian theorist Carl von Clausewitz’s seminal
definition of war as “the continuation of political intercourse with the addition
xiv Preface

of other means” (Center for Defense Information 2003). Given the debates
surrounding the issue of war, such as whether a war is ever just, it is not sur-
prising that defining terrorism is also a struggle.
Thus, there remains considerable scholarly and diplomatic skepticism as
to whether terrorism can ever be defined. To this end, terrorism expert Walter
Laqueur says: “Even if there were an objective, value-free definition of ter-
rorism, covering all its important aspects and features, it would still be
rejected by some for ideological reasons” (Center for Defense Information
2003). Acquiring a working definition, however, serves more purposes than
just the obvious one of establishing a standard agreement among all nations
about what constitutes terrorism. “By defining terrorism one can also define
the preferred means of countering it. Defining terrorism also allows terrorists
to be defined (or not), justifying (or not) any action that is being taken against
them” (Center for Defense Information 2003). By defining terrorism, coun-
terterrorism has the potential to exist.
Many international organizations exist in which sovereign states around
the world have come together to develop counterterrorism strategies. These
include the following: the Counterterrorism Task Force (CTTF) of the Asia
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum (ARF),
the European Union, the G-8, the G-20, and NATO. NATO “has developed a
consistent policy with respect to terrorism, which combines forceful condem-
nation of terrorism in all its forms, a commitment to unity and solidarity in
the face of this threat, and a determination to combat it for as long as is neces-
sary. Terrorism is now a standing item on the agendas of both the North
Atlantic Council and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council” (U.S. Department
of State, Office of Electronic Information, Bureau of Public Affairs n.d.). The
alliance has also established many counterterrorism initiatives, such as the
Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI). The distribution of membership illus-
trates as well that counterterrorism and antiterrorism are more often than not
international efforts, further emphasizing the need for an international
definition of terrorism and counterterrorism.
The US also has its own antiterrorism programs that deal with terrorist
attacks on its citizens, whether domestic or abroad. The Nonproliferation,
Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR) provides funding
for programs such as the Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) Program, Terrorist
Interdiction Program (TIP), Counterterrorism Engagement with Allies, and
Counterterrorism Financing. The United States is also involved in some
smaller counterterrorism partnerships. For example, in May 2011, President
Obama of the United States and President Medvedev of the Russian Federation
released a joint statement on their counterterrorism cooperation. In light of
the January 2011 bombing at Domodedovo Airport and the attempt to bomb
planes headed for the US in October 2010, the presidents stated that the pro-
tection of the traveling public was a main focus of their counterterrorism
efforts, intending “to enhance [their] cooperation by putting in place measures
to strengthen security in airports serving [their] two countries and enhance
cooperation on other modes of transportation” (Whitehouse.gov 2011). This
alliance is an example of an international counterterrorism initiative with a
slightly narrower focus than initiatives like the G-8 or the G-20.
Preface xv

In the context of all this furor over terrorism and how it should be defined
and handled, some important questions arise: given debates about an appro-
priate definition of terrorism at top levels of government and international
organizations, how do ordinary people define terrorism? More importantly:
who benefits from fears of terrorists? Do terror warning levels and terrorist
alerts always keep people safer? Are there groups who profit from public
anxiety over the possibility of a terrorist attack? Do fears of terrorists increase
the likelihood that ordinary people will support acts of aggression that violate
international law, such as torture? Questions such as these underlie much of
the work reported in this book.

War, Torture, and Terrorism: Perspectives from Ordinary

People in Civil Society

How do ordinary people from different regions around the world respond to
the persistence of war and torture? How do they define terrorism, and how
serious do they think the threat of terrorism is? What kinds of thinking allow
some people to support their governments or other leaders in the undertaking
of various forms of aggression? Why would citizens support leaders who
desire to break up their families and send them off to kill and/or be killed?
What kinds of reasoning allow some people to judge the infliction of pain,
injury, and/or death on another human being as acceptable behavior? What
kinds of reasoning characterize people who do not condone such aggressive
behaviors on the part of their leaders? Do arguments for and against state
aggression vary by region? In comparison to people living in relatively peace-
ful regions, do people who live in parts of the world that have been suffering
directly from armed conflict in recent years differ in the ways they reason
about governmental aggression? These are the kinds of questions that have
been pursued for the last several years by an international collaborative of
researchers—the Group on International Perspectives on Governmental
Aggression and Peace (GIPGAP).

The GIPGAP Research Program

GIPGAP: The Core Group

The core members of the GIPGAP are located at Boston University, and con-
sist primarily of psychology faculty and students, but also include some
members of the International Relations Department. This research team
evolved following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, particularly in
response to the United States government’s invasion of Iraq. In the next few
years after 9/11, international representation in GIPGAP grew; a pilot survey
was developed, tested, and modified, and the current project was launched.
The Core GIPGAP team (otherwise known as the Core Group) consists of a
faculty advisor (Malley-Morrison), several postdocs, and international gradu-
ate and undergraduate students concerned with issues of violence. Although
xvi Preface

membership varies somewhat from year to year as some students graduate

and move ahead with their careers, and other students from various regions
join, international students and colleagues participating in the Core Group
have come from countries as diverse as Portugal, Germany, Italy, Greece,
Turkey, Russia, Israel, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, the Philippines, India,
Indonesia, South Korea, Japan, China, Colombia, and Peru. Thus, we had a
broad range of perspectives on which to draw in developing both the survey
and the coding manuals.

GIPGAP: International Contributors

The International GIPGAP team (known as the International Group) consists

of faculty and graduate students from a range of academic departments,
including psychology, sociology, and international relations, in more than 40
countries. These international contributors were recruited through a number
of different approaches: networking by Core Group members, notices in
Announcements from the APA Division of International Psychology, notices
in International Psychology Bulletin, and invitations during presentations at
international psychology conferences. With approval from the appropriate
institutional authorities, these contributors administered the Personal and
Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS) to ordinary
people from multiple countries in every major region of the world: Western
Europe (Iceland, France, Portugal, Spain, Germany, and Sweden); Russia and
the Balkan Peninsula states (Greece, Slovenia, Serbia); the Middle East
(Turkey, Afghanistan, Israel, Lebanon, Iraq, Kuwait, the United Arab
Emirates, and Saudi Arabia); the Persian Gulf (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, and
Qatar); Africa (Egypt, Nigeria, Angola, Ghana, Botswana, Zambia, and South
Africa); Central and South America (Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Brazil, Colombia,
Peru, and Argentina); South and Southeast Asia (Pakistan, India, Indonesia,
Laos, Malaysia, and the Philippines); the Far East (China, Japan, and Korea);
and a region we identified as a UK/Anglo “cultural region,” which included
Great Britain, Northern Ireland, the United States, Australia, and Canada.
Although today Great Britain and Northern Ireland are both legally parts
of the United Kingdom (of Great Britain and Northern Ireland), we, for the
most part, treat them separately in this book because Northern Ireland, for
much of its history, was a subject of British rule, as were Australia, Canada,
and the United States. It was the Great Britain part of the current United
Kingdom that colonized what is now the United States, Australia, and Canada
(and many other regions); it was not Northern Ireland that engaged in impe-
rialistic expansion. Thus, in this and other chapters in this book, we report on
findings from separate Great Britain and Northern Ireland samples.

The PAIRTAPS

The Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey

(PAIRTAPS) has six sections: (1) judgments concerning the extent to which
Preface xvii

governments have the right to perform such acts of aggression as invading

another country, killing innocent civilians in times of war, and torturing pris-
oners during times of war; (2) judgments concerning the rights of individuals
to grow up and live in a world of peace, and the right to demonstrate against
war and in favor of peace; (3) views concerning patriotism and the United
States’ involvement in the Iraq war; (4) projected emotional responses that
might be experienced following direct or indirect exposure to acts of govern-
mental violence; (5) definitions of war, torture, terrorism, peace, reconcilia-
tion, and rights; and (6) views on the achievability of peace and the relationship
of national security to individual and family security.
Several of the items in Sections 1 and 2 are direct expressions of human
rights guarantees (e.g., freedom from torture, right to assembly) established
in United Nations agreements. For Sections 1–3, and 6, respondents indicated
on a scale from 1 (total disagreement) to 7 (total agreement) the extent to
which they agreed with each item (e.g., “Sometimes a country has the right to
ignore international treaties or international human rights agreements.”).
Then, in their own words, they provided an explanation of the reasoning
behind their rating on the item. Sections 4 and 5 call only for open-ended
qualitative responses—for example, examples of emotions that would be felt
in the face of governmental aggression, and definitions of terms. For the pur-
poses of this volume, chapter authors were asked to focus only on qualitative
responses to the following selected items: (a) definitions of war, torture, and
terrorism (from Section 5 of the PAIRTAPS); (b) sometimes one country has
the right to invade another country (from Section 1); (c) the government has
the right to order the torture of prisoners in time of war (from Section 1); (d)
national security is essential for individual and family security (from Section
6); and (e) the best way to achieve national security is…(from Section 6).
Also analyzed were participants’ responses to three of the emotional
response scenarios from Section 4. The instructions for all three scenarios
were the following: (1) “Assume that you have very direct and dramatic
exposure to each of the situations below—that is, either you witness them
directly or you see them happening live on a TV show or documentary that
exposes you to the event in the most immediate and dramatic way. Please
indicate first how you would feel in the situation and then what you would
want to do.” The first item stated that “Another country is indiscriminately
bombing a major city in your country, and women, children, the elderly, and
civilian men are running around bloody and screaming. What would you
feel? What would you want to do?” The second, related, item stated: “Your
country is indiscriminately bombing a major city in another country, and
women, children, the elderly, and civilian men are running around bloody
and screaming. What would you feel? What would you want to do?” The
third item was as follows: “Military officials are torturing somebody sus-
pected of having information about terrorists. What would you feel? What
would you want to do?”
All researchers contributing to this project adhered to human subjects
ethical guidelines. The anonymous survey responses were collected between
2005 and 2008. In some cases (e.g., Nigeria), shortened versions of the sur-
vey were administered because the respondents were unfamiliar with taking
xviii Preface

surveys. The survey could be completed either online on a secure website or

as a paper-and-pencil measure. Individual chapter authors made the decision
as to which procedure best protected their participants’ rights and safety. In
many of the Western countries, both procedures were used, although the bulk
of the responses were submitted over the Internet.
Although most chapter authors analyzed responses to most, if not all, of
these items, some items had been omitted from some surveys, and most of the
chapter authors analyzed and reported on results from only one of the two
bombing scenarios. Despite such relatively minor differences in coverage of
survey items, each section of this volume ends with an integrative chapter
summarizing similarities and differences found across regions in the themes
that emerged.
In addition to responding to the PAIRTAPS items, participants completed
a background information form asking for basic demographic information
such as age, gender, ethnicity, nationality, and religion, as well as whether
they or any family member had been in the military, and whether they had
participated in any protest activities. Participants typically responded to the
survey in their native language, although in several of the countries, particu-
larly the African countries (e.g., South Africa, Nigeria), the participants had
been educated in English and responded in English. Translations of survey
items from English to another language were either done independently by at
least two native speakers of the other language who then compared transla-
tions and resolved differences in translations, often in consultation with
members of the Core Group, or they were translated from English to the other
language and then back-translated to identify problems in the translation. A
similar process was followed for the translations of responses in other lan-
guages into English.

Sections A and B: Grounded Theory Coding of Definitions

and National Security Items

The qualitative responses to the definitions of war, torture, and terrorism and
to the two national security items were coded according to a grounded theory
approach. That is, we did not start out with a particular theoretical framework
and then strive to fit the responses into that framework. Instead, we followed
the procedures recommended by Strauss and Corbin (1998), proceeding from
open coding to axial coding, using a process of constant comparison. During
the open-coding phase, we divided the qualitative responses to the definitions
and national security items into units of meaning (“codeable units”) that var-
ied in length from one word (e.g., “Disgusting”) to phrases (e.g., “Only in
defense of one’s own citizens”) and entire sentences (e.g., “Torture is never
ever acceptable”).
At the axial level of coding, the relationships among the more fragmented,
seldom-used categories initially identified were reviewed, and, where appro-
priate, these categories were organized into more inclusive categories. For
example, in regard to qualitative responses to the item, “National security is
essential to individual and family security,” preliminary thematic categories
Preface xix

for threats to security (e.g., “Yes. If there is a chance for someone to take
advantage of a breach of security, then someone will take it”), defense (e.g.,
“It’s essential for defense”), and governmental responsibility (e.g., “This is
the government’s duty”) were ultimately integrated into a more inclusive cat-
egory that we named “Need to protect.” This need to protect category became
a subcategory of an even more inclusive category, “reasons why national
security is essential for family and individual security.” Moreover, further
reviews of the evolving category system allowed us to identify specific sub-
categories of “need to protect,” including “to protect values” (e.g., “Yes we
need to protect ourselves, our culture which terrorists lack …or else we will
go back to medieval times”), feel safe (e.g., “I feel safer knowing that there
are people working to remove the threat of terrorism”), and protect from evil
(e.g., “As long as bad people exist, people will need someone to protect them.
We need to protect ourselves from the evil of the world”). In a grounded
theory analysis, data collection, coding, conceptualizing, and theorizing take
place simultaneously, and analyses of new responses are compared both with
analyses of previous responses and with the concepts emerging from those
analyses. A more detailed summary of the procedures followed, and the cat-
egories derived for Section A (“Definitions of War, Torture, and Terrorism”)
and Section B (“Perspectives on National Security”) can be found in the
introductory chapters to each of those sections.

Sections C and D: Judgments on Invasion and Torture

In the final two sections of this volume, our focus is on understanding the
forms of social cognition that individuals bring to their judgments concerning
invasion (Section C) and torture (Section D). The coding systems for the
invasion and torture items were developed using a modified form of deduc-
tive qualitative analysis (Gilgun 1999), informed by the work of Albert
Bandura on moral disengagement and personal agency.
Bandura (e.g., 1999, 2002) has identified several types of reasoning—
which he calls mechanisms of moral disengagement—that provided a useful
framework for the analysis of arguments concerning the extent to which gov-
ernments have the right to order invasions of other lands and torture prisoners
during times of war. Based on his description of these forms of reasoning, the
Core Group has identified a complementary series of mechanisms, which we
loosely call mechanisms of moral engagement. Although we present a brief
overview of Bandura’s theory of moral disengagement and engagement here,
our focus in our analyses was on the mechanisms rather than on the value-
laden constructs of moral disengagement and engagement per se.
According to Bandura (1999), moral disengagement processes mediate
between moral standards and actual behaviors; they allow individuals to
behave immorally or tolerate immorality by others, even when these behaviors
violate their own moral standards. Thus, moral disengagement theory shares
assumptions with theories of cognitive dissonance and dissonance resolution
(cf. Festinger 1957; Matz and Wood 2005), as well as with theories of escala-
tion and self-justification (cf. O’Leary and Wolinsky 2009; Wolff and Moser
xx Preface

2008), all of which suggest that humans will go through a variety of psycho-
logical machinations to allow themselves to feel good about themselves and
avoid feelings of guilt, despite various forms of misbehavior. In Bandura’s
view, these mechanisms of moral disengagement allow individuals to violate
moral standards while continuing to maintain their self-image as caring human
beings. More specifically, he suggests that when individuals commit injurious
acts, they generally try to legitimatize and excuse their behavior in order to
avoid feeling guilt, regret, negative emotions, and/or other self-sanctions.
Although Bandura’s (1999) theory was developed primarily to explain
how individuals could excuse themselves for behaving in ways that violate
universal moral codes, it is also applicable at group and state levels of behav-
ior. For example, Bandura and his colleagues have applied the construct of
moral disengagement to prisoner-guard relationships (Osofsky et al. 2005),
weapons manufacturers (Bandura 1990), the tobacco industry (White et al.
2009), group massacres (Bandura 1999), and capital punishment (Osofsky
et al. 2005), as well as to everyday, nonviolent moral lapses in behavior,
including in the corporate world (Bandura et al. 2000).
In addressing the problems of inhumane behavior, Bandura (1999) identified
eight overlapping and interrelated mechanisms of moral disengagement,
which he classified into four major groups: (1) mechanisms involving the cog-
nitive reconstruction of harmful behavior; this group includes moral
justifications, euphemistic labeling, and advantageous comparisons, all of
which serve to psychologically reconstruct harmful behavior into something
more benign; (2) mechanisms that misrepresent, minimize, and/or disregard
the negative consequences of injurious behavior; (3) mechanisms that serve to
remove or obscure personal accountability for harmful behavior (e.g., through
displacing or diffusing responsibility for the misconduct); and (4) mechanisms
that devalue the recipient of the harm through dehumanizing and/or blaming
the victim or situation. Overall, these mechanisms of moral disengagement
can operate independently and/or simultaneously in ways that allow individu-
als to be complicit in the perpetration of acts that are harmful toward others
without feeling guilty or subjecting themselves to self-sanctions.
Considerable empirical support has been found for the role of moral dis-
engagement in tolerance for governmental aggression. For example, McAlister
(2001), an internationally prominent moral disengagement scholar, found
that moral disengagement was related to individual support for military
bombings of the former Yugoslavia and Iraq. Examining attitudes from over
21 nations, Grussendorf et al. (2002) found that moral disengagement was
employed in accepting the use of deadly force in response to a threat. In addi-
tion to support for war, Aquino et al. (2007) found that moral disengagement
was linked to support for lethal punitive actions against perpetrators of the
9/11 attacks as well as detainee abuse in Iraq. Thus, Bandura’s (1999) theory
is particularly valuable for understanding individual agreement with and
rationalizations for various forms of state aggression, including invading
countries and torturing individuals who are seen as some sort of threat.
Bandura (1999) and others (e.g., Grussendorf et al. 2002; McAlister et al.
2000) recognize that not everyone acts in ways that violate their own and more
general moral codes. In contrast to moral disengagement, moral engagement
entails a conscious commitment to behave in ways that conform to one’s
Preface xxi

moral standards, regardless of circumstances. Personalizing the victim,

accepting responsibility, exercising personal agency, being sympathetic and
empathetic, and recognizing the negative effects of inhumane behavior, all
contribute to moral engagement. Bandura further emphasizes the power of
humanization, social obligation to helping others, and recognition of every-
one’s common humanity across differing political, ethnic, religious, and
social groups. In his view, moral engagement and treating others with human-
ity are reflective primarily of empathy, but also of perceived similarity and
social or moral obligation.
Arguably, these characteristics of moral engagement may also be associ-
ated with support for humanitarian interventions, which Walzer (1977) argues
are a justifiable response (in the context of “reasonable expectations of suc-
cess”) to acts that “shock the moral conscience of mankind” (p. 107).
Moreover, Walzer indicates that he is referring specifically to “the moral con-
victions of ordinary men and women” (p. 107)—the same reference group of
interest to our research group. In his view, “clear examples of what is called
‘humanitarian intervention’ are very rare” (p. 101). “Indeed,” he says, “I have
not found any, but only mixed cases where the humanitarian motive is one
among many” (p. 101). Whether the rarity of cases of pure humanitarian
intervention is linked to a lack of moral engagement in ordinary citizens con-
cerning the well-being of people in other countries, the disinterest of states in
committing resources for humanitarian purposes, some combination of these
forces, and/or other factors, is not clear; however, Bandura’s (1999) argument
that humanitarian justifications for inhumane behavior constitute forms of
moral disengagement is consistent with Walzer’s arguments concerning the
rarity of true humanitarian intervention.
Exercising moral agency has dual aspects—inhibitive and proactive.
According to Bandura (2002), the inhibitive form of moral agency is the pro-
cess that allows individuals to refrain from behaving inhumanely, whereas the
proactive form expresses itself in the power to behave humanely. Bandura
noted that individuals guided by proactive moral agency base “their sense of
self-worth so strongly on human convictions and social obligations that they
act against what they regard as unjust or immoral even though their actions
may incur heavy personal costs” (p. 194). He also argued that when exercising
proactive morality, people act in the name of humane principles even when
experiencing pressure to engage in expedient and harmful behavior. When
morally engaged people “disavow use of valued social ends to justify destruc-
tive means. They sacrifice their well-being for their convictions. They take
personal responsibility for the consequences of their actions. They remain sen-
sitive to the suffering of others” (Bandura 1999, p. 203). Thorkildsen (2007)
added that moral engagement “controls the regulation of humane behavior and
the inhibition of inhumane behavior because it represents a vision of how the
world ought to function” (p. 115). Although there has been less research on
moral engagement than moral disengagement, McAlister (2001) found that
students’ attitudes regarding war changed in the direction of increased moral
engagement when the students were exposed to information that countered the
tendency towards moral disengagement; his findings indicate that not only do
different social messages influence reasoning about moral issues, but that
moral engagement can indeed be promoted.
xxii Preface

Informed by Bandura’s theory, we developed a coding manual with guide-

lines for coding two items related to invasion: (1) the right to invade item
(“Sometimes one country has the right to invade another country”) and (2)
the scenario items (e.g., “Your country is indiscriminately bombing a major
city in another country, and women, children, the elderly, and civilian men
are running around bloody and screaming. What would you want to do?”).
Responses to the right to invade item were organized first into two major
types: invasion-tolerant and invasion-intolerant. The invasion-intolerant
responses were then coded for themes reflective of Bandura’s mechanisms of
moral disengagement. Specifically, we identified four main invasion-tolerant
coding categories reflective of the mechanisms he identified: (1) displace-
ment of responsibility (with subcategories for deferral to the government and
deferral to the international community/UN), (2) advantageous comparison/
positive consequences (including responses approving of war if done as a last
resort), (3) attribution of blame, and (4) pseudo-moral justification (with sub-
categories for self-defense/preemptive strike and pseudo-assistance); in addi-
tion, we had a category for general pro-invasion for responses that had no
specific codeable argument in support of a state right to invasion.
The invasion-intolerant responses fell into three categories based on the
parallel set of moral engagement mechanisms that we identified in our exten-
sion of Bandura’s work. These categories included the following: (a) accept-
ing responsibility (which included subcategories for respect for government/
sovereignty and honor international mandates), (b) appreciating conse-
quences (with two subcategories, recognizing negative consequences and
recognizing better alternatives/violence as unnecessary), and (c) principled
moral justification (including nonviolence/concern with peace and, human
rights/concern for others, which in turn included subcategories for human
rights/concern for others and equality and freedom); there was also a cate-
gory for general invasion intolerance or anti-invasion.
The coding categories for responses to the bombing scenarios were
designed to address as much as possible Bandura’s emphasis on the role of
agency in moral conduct, while also reflecting the fact that some of the
responses to the scenarios seemed to show agency in the service of moral
disengagement. We first identified two types of responses: (a) those suggest-
ing agency on behalf of moral disengagement (which we labeled “personal
disengagement”) and (b) those indicating agency on behalf of moral engage-
ment (which we labeled “personal engagement”). The personal disengage-
ment category included the following subcategories: (a) denial of responsibility
(which included a subcategory for responses showing reliance on the govern-
ment/military) and (b) antisocial agency (which included subcategories for
vengeful agency and harming emotions); some responses could be coded only
for general personal disengagement. The personal engagement category
included subcategories for: (a) general responsibility (with appeal to the
international community as a subcategory), (b) pro-social agency (with two
subcategories, self-referenced agency and helping emotions), and (c) human-
izing agency (with a subcategory for genuine assistance). A much more
extensive discussion, with examples, of all coding categories and subcategories
for the invasion and bombing items can be found in the introductory chapter
in the section on perspectives on invasion.
Preface xxiii

We also used concepts from Bandura’s moral disengagement and engage-

ment theory in developing a coding manual for the state right to torture item
and the scenario asking participants what they would want to do if directly
and dramatically exposed to the torture of a prisoner during times of war. Not
surprisingly, there were a number of similarities between the torture coding
manual and the invasion/bombing coding manual.
The major torture-tolerant coding categories were the following: (a) pseudo-
moral justification (with subcategories for advantageous comparison and last
resort); (b) euphemistic labeling; (c) denial of responsibility (with subcatego-
ries for diffusion of responsibility, displacement of responsibility, and indiffer-
ence); (d) misrepresenting, minimizing, or disregarding the consequences of
torture; (e) dehumanization; and (f) attribution of blame (including a subcate-
gory for revenge). The major torture-intolerant coding categories were the fol-
lowing: (a) principled reasoning (including personal moral principles, honor
international mandates, humanization, and respect human rights), (b) descrip-
tive language, (c) principled comparison (including endorsing better alterna-
tives and noting that torture is ineffective/not useful), (d) awareness of negative
consequences of torture, and (e) exonerating the prisoner. There were also cod-
ing categories for unspecified torture tolerance and unspecified torture intoler-
ance for responses that provided no argument in support for their vague
agreement or disagreement with a state right to torture.
Finally, in regard to the scenario concerning the torture of someone sus-
pected of knowing a terrorist, most responses could be coded for level of
personal involvement. The personal engagement coding category was posi-
tive action (with subcategories for unspecified positive action, political/insti-
tutional activism, promote moral awareness, and agentic alternative
solutions). The other levels of personal involvement included the following:
(a) passivity regarding torture, (b) compliance with torture, and (c) helpless-
ness. A much more extensive discussion, with examples, of all coding catego-
ries and subcategories for the torture items can be found in the introductory
chapter in the section on perspectives on torture.

The Final Coding Process

As the Core Group developed these coding manuals on an ever-expanding

international coding manual sample, it made the coding manuals available to
the International Group. The International Group was invited to conduct their
own deductive qualitative analysis (i.e., an analysis informed by Bandura’s
theory) or to use the Core Group’s manuals for coding the data. We did not
want to be restrictive in regard to any group member’s coding, but rather to
encourage them to use consistent category labels when discussing the same
or similar types of arguments. The Core Group also offered to do the coding
of the responses from any country, as long as they had been translated into
English or could be translated by a member of the Core Group.
As previously noted, coding manuals were developed and refined by the
local group and shared with the international team members. Each of the four
section of this book focuses on the responses to a particular set of items
(definitions, national security, invasion, or torture); coding of the responses
xxiv Preface

for each section was conducted by a team assigned to that section under the
supervision of the team leader for that section. All coding was done by at least
one team member and then reviewed by the team leader; in the case of the
four countries for which responses to one set of questions were coded by an
investigator from that country, a random sample of the coded responses was
coded independently by the team leader for that section, and feedback was
provided until the international team member was completely reliable.

This Volume

The first chapter in each of the four sections of this volume (definitions of
war, torture, and terrorism; perspectives on national security; perspectives on
invasion; and perspectives on torture) describes the coding system and vari-
able formation process for all the chapters in that section. Each introductory
methods chapter is followed by eight or nine regional chapters and then a
final integrative chapter for the section. The sections of the book for definitions
and invasion include nine regional chapters: Western Europe, the UK/Anglo
countries (Great Britain, Northern Ireland, the United States, Canada, and
Australia), Russia and the Balkan Peninsula, the Middle East, the Gulf States,
Africa, Latin America, South and Southeast Asia, and East Asia. The other
two sections (national security and torture) have only eight regional chapters,
as there is no chapter for the Gulf States in either of those sections. In each
regional chapter, the lead author provides a historical and political context for
the survey findings presented in that chapter. The findings typically take the
form of first a description of the distribution of responses across the major
coding categories and then the results of some simple exploratory analyses
(mostly nonparametric) designed to identify possible differences in response
patterns based on demographic variables such as gender, participation in the
military, religion, and nationality. Because we cannot assume that our sam-
ples are representative of the population in the regions studied for this book,
it should not be assumed that our exploratory findings can be generalized to
those populations. Our emphasis is always on the qualitative responses, as
they provide the most direct access to the thoughts and feelings, the argu-
ments and motivations, and the fears and goals of our diverse sample of men
and women from around the world.

Boston, MA, USA Kathleen Malley-Morrison

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Acknowledgments

This book could not have been completed without the efforts of many people
around the world. We are grateful to all of them, including: Regina Amarello,
Namira Bachrie, Emily Bales, David Batuner, Mary Blumenfeld, Jennifer
Casey, David Cebel, Maria Dasklopoulos, William Dubbs, Elizabeth Ellison,
Thalia Farrietta, Maxine Kyuang, Kealin McCormick, Lauren Moss-Racusin,
and Emma Thomas for all of their work.

xxvii
Contents

Preface .................................................................................................. v

Section I Definitions of War, Torture, and Terrorism

1 Coding and Variable Formation for Definitions

of War, Torture, and Terrorism ................................................... 3
Elizabeth Planje and Tristyn Campbell
2 Definitions of War, Torture, and Terrorism
in Western Europe ........................................................................ 15
Mathilde Salmberg, Carla Machado,
Silja Bara Ómarsdottir, Milena Doerfer,
Ashley Brown, Laura Marcucci, Michael Corgan,
Mariana Barbosa, Julia Koenig,
Elizabeth Leembruggen-Kallberg,
and Christine Roland-Levy
3 Definitions of War, Torture, and Terrorism
in Great Britain, Northern Ireland, Australia,
Canada, and the United States..................................................... 27
John M. Davis, Elizabeth Planje, Carol J. Davis,
James Page, Michael Whitely, Shane O’Neil,
and Doe West
4 Definitions of War, Terrorism, and Torture
in the Balkan Peninsula and Russia ............................................ 49
Sherri McCarthy, Vlado Miheljak, Nebojsa Petrović,
Marko Polič, Charikleia Tsatsaroni, Nadide Pinar Kulakoglu,
Anna Medvedeva, Alev Yalcinkaya, Shane O’Neil,
and Elizabeth Stern
5 Definitions of War, Torture, and Terrorism
in the Middle East ......................................................................... 63
Majed Ashy, Elizabeth Planje, Abdul Kareem Al-Obaidi,
Lane Smith, Dalit Yassour-Boroschowitz,
Helena Syna Desivilya, Kamala Smith, Linda Jeffrey,
William Tastle, Feryal Turan, Alev Yalcinkaya,
and Rouba Youssef

xxix
xxx Contents

6 Definitions of War, Torture, and Terrorism

in the Gulf States ........................................................................... 81
Heyam Mohammed, Raja Tayeh, Elizabeth Planje,
and Gregory Malley
7 Definitions of War, Torture, and Terrorism in Africa ................ 95
Mahlon Dalley, Jacqui Akhurst, Adeniyi Famose,
Natoschia Scruggs, Laura Marcucci, Abdelali Abdelkader,
Shane O’Neil, Helena Castanheira, Eduardo Correia,
and William Tastle
8 Definitions of War, Torture, and Terrorism
in Latin America ........................................................................... 113
Eros DeSouza, Michael Stevens, Amanda Clinton,
Laura Marcucci, Madison Mellish, Rodrigo Barahona,
Eddy Carillo, Ricardo Angelino, Luciana Karine de Souza,
and Sherri McCarthy
9 Definitions of War, Torture, and Terrorism
in South and Southeast Asia ......................................................... 133
Janice Jones, Ma. Regina E. Estuar, Evan E. Diehnelt,
Sherri McCarthy, Ellora Puri, Megan Reif, Leslie Flores,
Nisha Raj, Dylan Rose, Darshini Shah, Haslina Muhamad,
and Jas Jafaar
10 East Asian Definitions of War, Torture, and Terrorism ............. 145
David Oh, Alice Murata, Hillary Mi-Sung Kim,
Michelle Murata, and Andrea Jones-Rooy
11 Integrative Summary for Definitions of War,
Torture, and Terrorism ................................................................. 163
Abram Trosky, Mathilde Salmberg, Laura Marcucci,
and Shane O’Neil

Section II National Security

12 Introduction to National Security Coding System ..................... 183

Lauren Groves and Andrea Mercurio
13 Views on National Security in Western Europe ......................... 189
Michael Corgan, Helena Castanheira, Albertina Aros,
Sandra Carina Fulquez, Matt Pita, Mariana Barbosa,
Julia Koenig, Elizabeth Leembruggen-Kallberg,
Carla Machado, Silja Bara Ómarsdottir,
Christine Roland-Levy, and Mathilde Salmberg
14 Views on National Security: the United Kingdom,
Northern Ireland, Australia, Canada,
and the United States of America ................................................ 205
Lauren Groves, John M. Davis, James Page,
Michael Whitely, Dylan Rose, and Doe West
Contents xxxi

15 Views of National Security in Balkan and Russia ...................... 223

Marko Polič, Vlado Miheljak, Nebojsa Petrović,
Sherri McCarthy, Charikleia Tsatsaroni,
and Anna Medvedeva
16 Views on National Security in the Middle East .......................... 239
Lane Smith, Mohammad Bahramzadeh, Sherri McCarthy,
Tristyn Campbell, Majed Ashy, Helena Syna Desivilya,
Abdul Kareem Al-Obaidi, Kamala Smith, Alev Yalcinkaya,
William Tastle, Feryal Turan, Dalit Yassour-Boroschowitz,
and Rouba Youssef
17 Views on National Security in Africa .......................................... 257
Mahlon Dalley, Jacqueline Akhurst, Davies Banda,
Abdelali Abdelkader, Alexandra Dick, Helena Castanheira,
and Eduardo Correia
18 Views on National Security in Latin America ............................ 273
Eros DeSouza, Michael Stevens, Jorge Luna-Torres,
Ricardo Angelino, Rodrigo Barahona, Eddy Carillo,
Amanda Clinton, Luciana Karine de Souza,
and Sherri McCarthy
19 Views on National Security in South
and Southeast Asia ........................................................................ 283
Kalyani Raj, Nisha Raj, Sherri McCarthy,
Ma. Regina E. Estuar, Ariel Stone, Tristyn Campbell,
Telma Almeida, Darshini Shah, Ellora Puri, Megan Reif,
Haslina Muhammad, and Jas Jafaar
20 Views on National Security in East Asia ..................................... 301
Hillary Mi-Sung Kim, Hwan Ho Lee, Nari Yoo,
Dong Youn Cho, Bryan Bonseok Koo, Alice Murata,
Andrea Jones-Rooy, and Michelle Murata
21 National Security: An Integration ............................................... 315
Andrea Mercurio and Madeleine Logan

Section III Invasion

22 Methods for Coding Perspectives on a State Right

to Invasion and Bombing Scenarios ............................................ 325
Tristyn Campbell
23 Perspectives on Invasion in Western Europe ............................. 335
Carla Machado, Julia Koenig, Mariana Barbosa,
Mathilde Salmberg, Jaime Lam, Ariel Stone,
Sophie Cox, Tristyn Campbell, Telma Almieda,
Elizabeth Leembruggen-Kallberg, Michael Corgan,
Silja Bara Ómarsdottir, and Christine Roland-Lévy
xxxii Contents

24 Perspectives on Invasion: Great Britain,

Northern Ireland, United States, Canada,
and Australia ................................................................................. 359
James Page, John M. Davis, Michael Whitely, Ariel Stone,
Tessa Schaaf, and Doe West
25 Perspectives on Invasion in Russia and the Balkans ................. 381
Sherri McCarthy, Anna Medvedeva, Tristyn Campbell,
Nebojsa Petrović, Vlado Miheljak, Marko Polič,
and Charikleia Tsatsaroni
26 Perspectives on Invasion in the Middle East .............................. 401
Majed Ashy, Rouba Youssef, Tristyn Campbell,
Alev Yalcinkaya, Abdul Kareem Al-Obaidi,
Dalit Yassour-Boroschowitz, Helena Syna Desivilya,
Feryal Turan, Kamala Smith, Lane Smith, Atherine Steiner,
and William Tastle
27 Gulf States’ Perspectives on Invasion.......................................... 413
Raja Tayeh, Heyam Mohammed, Tristyn Campbell,
and Gregory Malley
28 African Perspectives on Invasion ................................................ 421
Laura Johnson, Grace Kibanja, Abdelali Abdelkader,
Mahlon Dalley, Ting Wu, Jacqui Akhurst, Davies Banda,
Natoschia Scruggs, Eduardo Correia,
and Helena Castanheira
29 Latin American Perspectives on the Right to Invasion ............. 443
Amanda Clinton, José Anazagasty, Michael Stevens,
Eros DeSouza, Bailey Pescatore, Laura Marcucci,
Ricardo Angelino, Rodrigo Barahona, Luciana Karine de Souza,
Eddy Carillo, and Sherri McCarthy
30 Perspectives on Invasion in South and Southeast Asia .............. 467
Ma. Regina E. Estuar, Nico A. Canoy,
Sherri McCarthy, Ariel Stone, Tristyn Campbell,
Megan Reif, Emily Mulloy, Ellora Puri, Haslina Muhamad,
and Jas Jaafar
31 Perspectives on Invasion in East Asia ......................................... 487
Etsuko Hoshino-Browne, Alba N. Villamil, Ting Wu,
Hillary Mi-Sung Kim, Ariel Stone, Alice Murata,
Michelle Murata, and Andrea Jones-Rooy
32 Patterns in the Justification of Invasion
and Responses to Attack ............................................................... 507
Alfred McAlister, Tristyn Campbell, and Erin Murtagh
Contents xxxiii

Section IV Perspectives on Torture

33 Methods of Assessing Perspectives on Torture ........................... 521

Charikleia Tsatsaroni
34 Perspectives on Torture in Western Europe ............................... 531
Julia Koenig, Eric Fischer, Mathilde Salmberg,
Mariana Barbosa, Silja Bara Ómarsdottir,
Michael Corgan, Alex Stankiewicz,
Elizabeth Leembruggen-Kallberg, Carla Machado,
Scott Borrelli, and Christine Roland-Levy
35 Perspectives on Torture in Great Britain,
Northern Ireland, the United States, Canada,
and Australia ................................................................................. 551
John M. Davis, Jenet Cory, Carol J. Davis,
Tristyn Campbell, and Michael Whitely
36 Perspectives on Torture in Russia
and the Balkan Peninsula ............................................................. 565
Charikleia Tsatsaroni, Sherri McCarthy,
Natalia Parnyuk, Nebojsa Petrović, Marko Polič,
Anna Medvedeva, Mimi Maritz, and Vlado Miheljak
37 Perspectives on Torture in the Middle East ................................ 583
Abdul Kareem Al-Obaidi, Stephen Gailliot,
Charikleia Tsatsaroni, Melike Eger,
Helena Syna Desivilya, Dalit Yassour-Boroschowitz,
Lane Smith, Kamala Smith, Rouba Youssef,
and Alev Yalcinkaya
38 Perspectives on Torture in Africa ................................................ 599
Mahlon Dalley, Savreen Hundal, Davies Banda,
Jacqui Akhurst, Abdelali Abdelkader, Adeniyi Famose,
Natoschia Scruggs, and Eduardo Correia
39 Perspectives on Torture in Latin America .................................. 617
Amanda Clinton, José Anazagasty, Javier Fortín,
Luciana Karine de Souza, Sherri McCarthy,
Tristyn Campbell, Alex Stankiewicz, Ricardo Angelino,
Rodrigo Barahona, Eddy Carillo, Eros DeSouza,
and Michael Stevens
40 Perspectives on Torture in South and Southeast Asia ............... 631
Savreen Hundal, Sherri McCarthy, Ma. Regina E. Estuar,
Darshini Shah, Ellora Puri, Megan Reif, Haslina Muhamad,
and Jas Jafaar
41 Perspectives on Torture in East Asia ........................................... 645
Etsuko Hoshino-Browne, Ting Wu, Alba N. Villamil,
Hillary Mi-Sung Kim, Alice Murata, Michelle Murata,
and Andrea Jones-Rooy
xxxiv Contents

42 Torture: Integrative Chapter ....................................................... 663

Kimberly Rapoza and Megan Clapp
43 Conclusions .................................................................................... 677
Kathleen Malley-Morrison, Andrea Mercurio,
and Andrew Potter

Index ....................................................................................................... 691

Contributors

Abdelali Abdelkader Department of Political Science, University of Saida,

Saida, Algeria
Jacqueline Akhurst Department of Psychology, York St John University,
York, North Yorkshire, UK
Abdul Kareem Al Obaidi Institute of International Education, New York,
NY, USA
Telma Almeida Unibersidade Catolica Portuguesa, Diogo Bote, Portugal
Jose Anazagasty University of Puerto Rico, Mayagüez, Puerto Rico
Ricardo Angelino School of Medical Sciences, National University
of La Plata, La Plata, Argentina
Albertina Aros Educational Psychology, Northern Arizona University-
Yuma, Yuma, AZ, USA
Majed Ashy Psychology Department, Bay State College, North Andover,
MA, USA
Mohammad A. Bahramzadeh Department of Political Science,
Arizona Western University, Yuma, AZ, USA
Davies Banda Health and Life Sciences, York St. John University, York, UK
Rodrigo Barahona Counselor, Brookline, MA, USA
Mariana Barbosa Universidade Catolica Portugesa, Lisbon, Portugal
Scott Borrelli University of Maryland (deceased)
Ashley Brown Department of Psychology, Boston University, Boston,
MA, USA
Tristyn Campbell Psychology Department, Boston University, Boston,
MA, USA
Nico Canoy Psychology Department, Ateneo de Manila University,
Quezon City, Philippines

xxxv
xxxvi Contributors

Eddy Carillo Universidad Independiente & Director of the Center

for Psychoanalytic Studies of the Association for Socio-Critical
Psychoanalysis, San Jose, Costa Rica
Helena Castanheira Psychology Department, New School for Social Re-
search, New York, NY, USA
Dong Youn Cho Asia Pacific Studies, Graduate Institute of Peace Studies,
Kyung Hee University, Seoul, Korea
Megan Clapp Psychology Department, Suffolk University, Boston,
MA, USA
Amanda Clinton Psychology Program, University of Puerto Rico,
Mayagüez, Puerto Rico
Michael Corgan Department of International Relations, Boston University,
Boston, MA, USA
Eduardo Correia ISCTE Business School in Lisbon, Lisbon, Portugal
Jenet Cory Psychology Department, Binghamton University, Vestal,
NY, USA
Sophie Cox The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, USA
Mahlon Dalley Psychology Department, Eastern Washington University,
Cheney, WA, USA
Carol J. Davis Texas State University, San Marcos, TX, USA
John M. Davis Department of Psychology, Texas State University, San
Marcos, TX, USA
Helena Syna Desivilya Department of Sociology and Anthropology,
Yezreel Valley College, Emek Yezreel, Israel
Eros DeSouza Department of Psychology, Illinois State University, Normal,
IL, USA
Luciana Karine de Souza Department of Psychology, Universidade
Federal de Pernambuco, Federal University of Minas Gerais, Pampulha Belo
Horizonte, Brazil
Alexandra Dick VA Boston Healthcare Systems, Boston, MA, USA
Evan E. Diehnelt University of Wisconsin, Madison, WI, USA
Milena Doefer Counseling Psychology, Boston College, Chestnut Hill,
MA, USA
Melike Eger Department of Psychology, University of Alabama,
Tuscaloosa, AL, USA
Ma. Regina Estuar Department of information Systems and Computer
Science, Ateneo de Manila University, Quezon City, Philippines
Adeniyi Famose Joavic’s Foundation, Lagos, Nigeria
Contributors xxxvii

Eric Fischer Department of Sociology, Universität Bielefeld, Bielefeld,

Germany
Leslie Flores Department of Psychology, Boston University, Boston,
MA, USA
Javier Fortin Francisco Marroquin University, Guatemala City, Guatemala
Sandra Carina Fulquez Universidad Autonoma de Baja California,
Baja California, Mexico
Stephen Gailliot George Washington University, Washington, DC, USA
Lauren Groves Department of Psychology, Boston University, Boston,
MA, USA
Etsuko Hoshino-Browne Department of Psychology, Bryn Mawr College,
Bryn Mawr, PA, USA
Savreen Hundal National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, MD, USA
Jas Jafaar Department of Anthropology and Sociology, Faculty
of Arts and Sciences, University of Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
Linda Jeffrey College of Education, Rowan University, Glassboro, NJ, USA
Laura Johnson Croft Institute of International Studies, University of
Mississippi, Oxford, MS, USA
Janice Jones Doctoral Leadership Studies Department, Cardinal Stritch
University, Milwaukee, WI, USA
Andrea Jones-Rooy Department of Political Science, University of
Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA
Grace Kibanja Department of Educational, Organizational & Social
Psychology, Makerere University, Kampala, Uganda
Hillary Mi-Sung Kim School of Social Work, Rutgers University,
New Brunswick, NJ, USA
Julia Konig Lehrstuhl für Klinische Psychologie und Psychotherapie,
Munchen, Germany
Bryan Bonseok Koo Georgetown Public Policy Institute, Washington,
DC, USA
Nadide Pinar Kulakkoglu Psychology Department, Boston University,
Boston, MA, USA
Nadide Pinar Kulakoglu Psychology Department, New York University,
New York, NY, USA
Jaime Lam Japanese Exchange and Teaching Program, Tsu City,
Mie Prefecture, Japan
Hwan Ho Lee Faculty of General Education, Center for the Reconstruction
of Human Society, Kyung Hee University, Seoul, Korea
xxxviii Contributors

Elizabeth Leembruggen-Kallberg Webster University-Leiden, EA Leiden,

The Netherlands
Jorge Luna-Torres Corporacion Educativa B. F. Skinner, Lima, Peru
Carla Machado Department of Psychology, University of Minho, Braga,
Portugal
Gregory Malley The Carroll School, Lincoln, MA, USA
Kathleen Malley-Morrison Department of Psychology, Boston University,
Boston, MA, USA
Laura Marcucci National Alliance on Mental Illness, Washington, DC, USA
Mimi Maritz Department of Psychology, Boston University, Boston,
MA, USA
Alfred McAlister Behavioral Sciences, School of Public Health, University
of Texas, Austin, TX, USA
Sherri McCarthy Educational Psychology, Counseling and Human Rela-
tions, Northern Arizona University, Yuma, AZ, USA
Anna Medvedeva University of Eastern Finland, Helsinki, Finland
Madison Mellish Latin American Studies and Psychology, Boston
University, Boston, MA, USA
Andrea Mercurio Psychology Department, Boston University, Boston,
MA, USA
Vlado Miheljak University of Ljubljana, Ljubljana, Slovenia
Heyam Mohammed Department of Curriculum and Instruction,
College of Education, Kuwait University, Jamal Abdul Nasser, Kuwait
Haslina Muhamad Department of Anthropology and Sociology, University
of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
Emily Mulloy Psychology Department, Boston University, Boston,
MA, USA
Alice Murata Department of Counselor Education, Northeastern Illinois
University, Chicago, IL, USA
Michelle Murata Department of Psychology, American University,
Washington, DC, USA
Erin Murtagh Psychology Department, Boston University, Boston,
MA, USA
Shane O’Neil Psychology Department, Boston University, Boston,
MA, USA
David Young Oh Counseling Psychology, John Hopkins University,
Baltimore, MD, USA
Contributors xxxix

Silja Bara Omarsdottir Institute of International Affairs and Center for

Small State Studies, University of Iceland, Vesturbær, Reykjavik, Iceland
James Page Department of Peace Studies, School of Humanities,
University of New England, Madgwick, NSW, Australia
Bailey Pescatore Psychology Department, Boston University, Boston, MA,
USA
Nebojsa Petrović Faculty of Psychology, University of Belgrade,
Belgrade, Serbia
Matt Pita Industrial Organizational Psychology Department, Florida
Institute of Technology, Melbourne, FL, USA
Elizabeth Planje Counseling Program, Lesley University, Cambridge,
MA, USA
Marko Polič Department of Psychology, University of Ljubljana,
Ljubljana, Slovenia
Andrew Potter Department of School Psychology, University of California
at Berkeley, Berkeley, CA, USA
Ellora Puri Department of Political Science, University of Jammu, Jammu,
India
Kalyani Raj Indira Gandhi National Open University, New Delhi, India
Nisha Raj Neuroscience Program, Emory University, Atlanta, GA, USA
Megan Reif Political Science and International Studies, University of
Colorado Denver, Denver, CO, USA
Christine Roland-Levy Université de Reims Champagne-Ardenne, Paris,
France
Dylan Rose Psychology Department, Boston University, Boston, MA, USA
Mathilde Salmberg Licensed Clinical Psychologist, Washington, DC,
USA
Tessa Schaaf Psychology Department, Boston University, Boston, MA, USA
Natoschia Scruggs Asylum Division, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security, Arlington, VA, USA
Darshini Shah Health Education Library for People, Mumbai, India
Kamala Smith Behavioral Health Analyst, Abt Associates, Cambridge,
MA, USA
Lane Smith University of Maryland - College Park, College Park, MD, USA
Alex Stankiewicz Anatomy and Neurobiology Studies, Boston University
School of Medicine, Boston, MA, USA
Katherine Steiner Clinical Psychology, Alliant international University,
San Francisco, CA, USA
xl Contributors

Elizabeth Stern Psychology Department, Boston University, Boston,

MA, USA
Michael Stevens Department of Psychology, Illinois State University, Nor-
mal, IL, USA
Ariel Stone Psychology Department, Boston University, Boston, MA, USA
William Tastle Ithaca College, School of Business, Ithaca, NY, USA
Raja Tayeh Director of Institutional Research, Doane College, Crete,
NE, USA
Abram Trosky Department of Political Science, Boston University,
Boston, MA, USA
Charikleia Tsataroni Psychology Department, Boston University, Boston,
MA, USA
Feryal Turan Department of Sociology, Ankara University, Ankara, Turkey
Alba N. Villamil Department of Sociology, Harvard University, Cambridge,
MA, USA
Doe West Quinsigamond Community College, Worcester, MA, USA
Michael Whitely Educational Psychology, Kent State University, Kent, OH,
USA
Ting Wu Medical College of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, WI, USA
Alev Yalcinkaya Department of Psychology, Yeditepe University,
Instanbul, Turkey
Dalit Yassour-Boroschowitz Department of Human Services, Emek Yezreel
College, Emek Yezreel, Israel
Nari Yoo Department of Peace and Global Governance, Graduate Institute
of Peace Studies, Kyung Hee University, Seoul, Korea
Rouba Youssef Department of Psychology, University of Rhode Island,
Kingston, RI, USA
 Section I
Definitions of War, Torture,
and Terrorism
 Coding and Variable Formation
for Definitions of War, Torture,
and Terrorism
Elizabeth Planje and Tristyn Campbell
On various versions of the Personal and
Institutional Rights to Governmental Aggression
and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS), participants were
asked to provide definitions for the following
terms: war, torture, terrorism, peace, and recon-
ciliation. Definitions of war, torture, and terror-
ism were analyzed for this volume; definitions of
peace and reconciliation were analyzed for a sec-
ond volume. In this chapter, we describe the cod-
ing manual and procedures for coding definitions
of war, torture, and terrorism, as well as the pro-
cedures for the creation of variables from the
coded qualitative responses.
The Coding Process
Although this section of the volume reports on
responses to purely qualitative items (i.e.,
definitions) from the PAIRTAPS, analyses for
other sections of the book addressed both quantita-
tive (rating scale) and qualitative responses. In all
cases, qualitative responses were blindly coded for
purposes of statistical analysis, with the coders
having no knowledge of the country or region that
was the source of the responses for the sample they
were coding. The blind coding procedures were
used to help minimize the impact of any coders’
biases regarding particular countries or regions
while coding. Coders were also trained to try to
think outside of their own culture and to consider
the fact that many responses were translated from
the original language in which they were written.
K. Malley-Morrison et al. (eds.), International Handbook of War, Torture, and Terrorism,
Peace Psychology Book Series, DOI 10.1007/978-1-4614-1638-8_1,
© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2013
1
Using a grounded theory approach, and mini-
mizing the risks inherent in imposing categories
derived from one country and/or culture onto
other countries and/or cultures, we created our
coding manuals for definitions of war, torture,
and terrorism through analysis of responses from
a diverse international sample. Consistent with a
grounded theory approach, manuals were con-
tinually revised, but versions were finalized for
the current study.
In all three definitions manuals, definitional
responses were segmented into separate units of
meaning called codeable units and each unit
received a code. The smallest meaningful unit in
any particular answer could range from a single
word or a phrase to the entire answer. For exam-
ple, one person defined war as “unjustifiable vio-
lence between two parties,” which can be broken
into two codeable units. Specifically, the partici-
pant told us that war is “unjustifiable violence”
and that war is violence “between two parties.”
The first unit can be coded into the moral judg-
ment category and the second unit shows a focus
on conflict. Although each codeable unit is coded
independently of any other codeable units and
each codeable unit can receive only one code,
coders were also encouraged to consider the unit
and its possible code in the context of the whole
response in order to better understand the intended
meaning. Throughout this chapter, when we dis-
cuss exemplars of particular coding categories
from definitional responses with more than one
codeable unit, the unit that is the exemplar is
3
4 E. Planje and T. Campbell
italicized. In cases when there is only one
codeable unit or all the codeable units fit into a
single category, nothing is italicized. The term
“response” is used to refer both to complete
answers and to single codeable units; the entire
group of codeable units makes up each response
set. Manuals were structured so that the major
categories included one “general” subcategory as
well as a number of more specific thematic sub-
categories. Units were coded into the general
subcategories only if they could not be reliably
coded into the more specific subcategories.
Definitions of War
The five main categories in the war coding man-
ual are causes of war, focus on conflict, qualify-
ing criteria for war, outcomes of war, and moral
judgment. Table 1.1 provides examples of
responses coded into each major category, as well
as all its subcategories. There was also an unco-
deable category for responses that were not code-
able into any of the five main categories.
Definitions of War Focusing
on Its Causes
Responses that described events or factors that
lead to war were coded into the major category of
causes, which had subcategories for general
causes, last resort, and motivation/intent (which
in turn had subcategories for political motivation,
self-defense, and moral judgment). Responses
were coded into the general subcategory for
causes if they made vague references to precipitat-
ing events without being judgmental and without
attributing blame to any party. Responses in the
last resort subcategory identify war as something
that happens when all other means have failed.
Responses mentioning reasons why people choose
to go to war and involving a sense of agency are
coded into the motivation or intent category. Some
of these motivation/intent responses specifically
mentioned a political motivation (either explicitly
or by implication) or self-defense as a reason for
war, and made a moral judgment on the reason for
going to war (including an implication that such
reasons demonstrated selfishness).
Definitions of War Identifying
It as Conflict
Many of the definitions of war were similar to
dictionary definitions of war, identifying it with
conflict. Responses that simply give a synonym
for war without adding anything significant (e.g.,
“conflict” or “fight”) were coded under focus on
conflict only. Some responses indicated that war
can include nonphysical aspects (such as strug-
gles over issues or beliefs) and were coded as
nonphysical conflict.
Definitions Providing Qualifying
Criteria
Some responses added qualifiers to their
definitions (beyond such simple additions as
“between groups” or “parties”) to identify specific
criteria for considering conflict and aggression as
a war. The qualifying criteria coding category
was created to capture responses that identified
the criteria for considering fighting or conflict to
be war, or that specifically described elements of
war. The qualifying criteria category includes a
general category as well as five thematic subcat-
egories: (a) scale or intensity of conflict, (b)
duration/frequency of conflict, (c) groups with
official or legal recognition as having the politi-
cal power necessary to be considered adversaries
in a war, (d) nonofficially recognized or informal
groups engaging in armed conflict, and (e) one-
sided aggression. Responses describing scale or
intensity of conflict indicate that a war requires a
certain amount of fighting and destruction to be
called a war, or describe war as using weapons or
arms or involving violence in the fighting.
Responses coded under duration/frequency
show concern with how long the fighting or attack
lasts and how many attacks are sustained. The
following response illustrates several examples
1 Definitions Coding and Variable Formations 5

Table 1.1 Categories for definitions of war

Major category Category Examples
Causes of war General causes “Failure to reason with the other person then allow the emotions take
over” (2)
Last resort “The absolute last step to solve a conflict”
“All else has failed”
Motivation/intent “Invasion of a country into another to achieve some goal”
“When two people have two different views that they are fighting to
preserve”
Political motivation “Conflict between opposing countries for the sake of a country’s benefit”
“A continuation of policy by other means”
Self-defense “Is the use of weapons by a country on the other for self defense issues”
“Violent response to an aggressor nation”
Moral judgment “Tragic and inhumane provocation that starts with avarice”
on cause “Something that is aroused by people only thinking about their own
benefits”
Focus on conflict General conflict “Armed conflict between states or nations”
“Fighting each other”
Nonphysical conflict “Deliberate actions against another, often involving violence but could
also be verbal or other actions”
Qualifications General qualifications “Military action between two countries”
for war “Organized violent conflict”
Scale or intensity “A large scale battle between two or more nations or large tribes”
of conflict “Violent conflict between countries or groups”
Duration/frequency “Repeated and prolonged attacks of force by one country upon another” (2)
Groups officially or “One nation state taking up arms against another (except for civil war
legally recognized as where it’s within a nation)”
holding political power “A large scale battle between two or more nations or large tribes”
Nonofficially recog- “One nation state taking up arms against another (except for civil war
nized/informal groups where it’s within a nation)”
“A large scale battle between two or more nations or large tribes”
One-sided aggression “An attack of one nation on another”
“One nation state taking up arms against another (except for civil war
where it’s within a nation)”
Outcomes General outcomes “Hurt, blood, innocent killing, money”
“When all people die and you find no food, land is taken and destroyed
and you cannot go anywhere”
Concrete outcomes “Devastation of human life/resources”
“When all people die and you find no food, land is taken and destroyed
and you cannot go anywhere” (3)
Abstract outcomes “Anger, hostility, hatred, violence” (3)
“A state in which every person feels miserable because of violence”
Moral judgment None “Immoral doings”
“Killing unnecessarily”
“Don’t like it, don’t need it” (2)
“Pointless”
Uncodeable None “George Bush thinking he’s a big deal”
“War”
“Clear”
“With current weapons of mass destruction, I believe total war is
something of the past”
Note: When a response contains multiple codeable units, the italicized word or phrase is the unit serving as an exemplar
of the category; a number appearing after the response indicates the number of codeable units in the response falling
into the given category
6 E. Planje and T. Campbell
of codeable units (italicized) falling into this cat-
egory: “Sustained armed conflict between two or
more distinct groups. A single terrorist act does
not constitute a war, however an ongoing series
of attacks can be defined as one.” This response
indicates the participant’s views as to what are
necessary criteria for labeling conflict as war.
The respondent also describes the conflict as
“armed” and indicates that two or more groups
must be involved in order for the conflict to be
considered a war. Some responses specifically
identify the kinds of groups that are involved in a
conflict deserving the label of war. Responses
mentioning officially recognized groups indicate
that recognized political bodies such as nations
or countries have the power to make decisions to
go to war, and so fighting qualifies as war when
used by these groups.
Responses in the nonofficially recognized
groups category classify fighting as war even when
the combatants are more informal groupings of
people such as tribes or rebels or groups fighting
within a country. In our view, recognizing that
responses differed in their criteria when deciding
what kinds of groups could be considered warring
groups was important, given international stan-
dards for conduct in war and the established rights
for parties at war. If there are groups in conflict
that are not recognized as being in a war, such as a
group rebelling against its own government, mem-
bers of the rebel (or other) group might not be
afforded the rights that soldiers representing their
country would have under standards of war.
The final subcategory under qualifying crite-
ria is one-sided aggression, in which responses
indicate that war can occur when one country
aggresses against another and includes actions
such as invasion.
Definitions of War Focusing
on Outcomes
The main category for outcomes of war applies to
responses that focus on what happens after, or as
a result of war, including both physical and
psychological harm. The general subcategory
was used when it was unclear whether the out-
come mentioned could be coded reliably into one
of the specific subcategories of concrete and
abstract outcomes. Responses coded as concrete
focus on the physical, tangible effects of war or
fighting, such as death, violence, injury, and
destruction. Abstract outcomes focused on the
more intangible effects of war, including emo-
tions and sensations, such as sadness and pain.
Finally, responses in the main category of moral
judgment make a judgment on the act of war itself
and should be distinguished from judgments on
the intentions of those who go to war, which were
coded into the moral judgment on causes of war
subcategory for causes of war. The uncodeable
category was created to account for responses that
did not fit into any of the other five main catego-
ries, did not make sense, or did not address the
question; it did not include cases when the respon-
dent left the space for a definition blank.
Definition of Torture
Definitions of torture fell into six major thematic
coding categories: (a) focus on intent, motivation,
or emotion; (b) characteristics of the individual
being tortured; (c) conditions that give rise to
torture; (d) judgments; (e) focus on method; and
(f) focus on outcome. There was also an addi-
tional category for uncodeable responses.
Definitions of Torture Focusing
on Intent, Motivation, or Emotion
Responses falling into the focus on intent/motiva-
tion/emotion category refer to the intended result of
the torture, answering the question of why people
torture, what they seek to accomplish. These
responses mention an explicit drive or motive to
torture rather than the method behind torture; for
example, in the response “[torture is] physical harm
with the purpose of causing harm or getting infor-
mation,” the respondent describes a method, “phys-
ical harm,” and provides two motivations for torture,
“causing harm” and “getting information.”
The main category for focus on intent/
motivation/emotion is split into two large
1 Definitions Coding and Variable Formations
subcategories identifying different kinds of intent:
destructive and constructive. Responses that iden-
tify the purpose of torture as creating a destructive
outcome or torture for torture’s sake fall into the
destructive intent category, regardless of whether
the respondent appears to see this intent as good or
bad; codeable units expressing judgments of
intents as good or bad are coded into the judg-
ments category. Two subcategories under destruc-
tive intent capture responses describing the goal of
torture as (a) to pressure or break a person or (b)
to cause pain. The latter category also includes
responses describing torture as deliberate or
willful, as we assume this indicates that the intent
is to harm. Responses indicating that torture is
done for the pleasure of the torturer imply sadism
and are included in the sadistic subcategory of
judgments.
Responses coded for constructive intent
defined torture as intended to gain something,
without necessarily indicating whether the
respondent considered this goal to be good or
bad. Four kinds of goals were identified in the
responses: (a) information or compliance, (b)
strategic advantage, (c) self-gain, and (d) punish-
ment. Responses falling into the information or
compliance subcategory identified torture as a
way of extracting information or getting the vic-
tim to submit to the will of the torturer. Responses
in the strategic advantage subcategory viewed
torture as a tool of power or political interest.
Some responses, coded for self-gain, indicated
that perpetrators had goals when they used tor-
ture but were not specific as to what those goals
might be. Finally, some responses, coded into the
punishment category, viewed torture as a tool for
punishing; any indication of rejection or support
for the use of torture as a tool was coded into the
judgments category, which is described in more
detail in a later section.
Definitions of Torture Focusing
on the Victim or the Context
A number of responses focused on the victim of
torture—responses that we put into the category
of characteristics of the individual being tor-
tured. In addition to a general characteristics
7
subcategory for responses like “soldiers” or
“animals,” there were subcategories for definitions
focusing on attributes of victims, such as (a)
helpless or powerless or (b) unwilling and held
against their will.
A third category for definitions of torture was
used for responses referring to the conditions
under which torture becomes implemented—for
example, “a result of the inability to resolve an
issue by peaceful diplomatic means,” “incapabil-
ity to negotiate,” and “lack of feelings.”
Judgmental Definitions of Torture
Responses that indicate how the respondent feels
about torture (e.g., tolerating or condemning it),
or his or her views of its morality, justice, or
humanity, were coded into a major judgments
category, with a general subcategory plus subcat-
egories for tolerance of torture and intolerance of
torture. In the general category, responses indi-
cated some sort of judgment, but it was unclear
whether the respondent tolerated or rejected tor-
ture. When possible, responses were coded into
one of two large judgment subcategories indicat-
ing either tolerance or intolerance of torture. The
tolerance of torture included a further subcate-
gory for responses indicating that torture was
sometimes necessary or acceptable as a last
resort. Some complex responses contained some
codeable units that showed tolerance of torture
and some that showed intolerance, as the exam-
ple in Table 1.2 for this category illustrates. In
responses rejecting torture, five types of
justifications were codeable into further subcate-
gories: those identifying torture as (a) unneces-
sary, (b) unlawful or unjust, (c) immoral/
inhumane/abusive, (d) sadistic or sick (for the
purpose of the sick torturer’s enjoyment), and (e)
as a violation of human rights.
Definitions of Torture Focusing
on Methods
Many of the definitions of torture contain code-
able units describing what happens in torture;
that is, they focus on the method used to torture
8 E. Planje and T. Campbell

Table 1.2 Categories for definitions of torture

Major category Category Examples
Focus on intent General intent “Hurting another for a purpose”
“The infliction of any type of pain on a person that does not have a
medical reason”
Destructive intent “Physical pain inflicted upon an individual with or without a purpose”
“To submit someone to physical and psychological extreme suffering
with the objective of humiliating him and extract information”
Pressure or break “Physical or mental abuse used to erode another person’s stamina”
“Attempting to destroy a persons’ resolve through unsavory means”
Cause pain “The use of painful techniques to inflict pain on a person(s)”
“Planned physical or mental injury against an individual”
“Purposefully harming someone”
Constructive intent “Anything that inflict bodily or psychological harm on another as a
means to an end”
“Physical pain inflicted upon an individual with or without a purpose”
Information or “Subjecting a person to physical or mental distress in order to get
compliance information or compliance”
“When the government tries to get information from people or about
a crime someone committed” (2)
Strategic advantage “A tactic to win a war”
“Showing domination of one person by another”
Self-gain “Causing harm for personal gain with no regard for the tortured person”
“Acts against another’s will to serve a purpose to yourself”
Punishment “To inflict someone with severe pains as a way of punishment”
Characteristics of General “The using of undesirable ways to gain useful information from enemies”
individual being characteristics “The physical or psychological abuse of a prisoner”
tortured Helplessness “Torment and hurt someone in a defenseless position”
Unwilling subject “The art of holding someone against their will and using unusually
cruel punishment”
Conditions that None “This is what governments do to people in prisons”
give rise to torture “When someone is brutally harmed, especially during times of war”
“It is inhumane work and it always happens after a problem occurs
and it creates more problems” (3)
Judgments concerning General judgments “Torture is very bad and I feel bad when they do it but governments
morality/justice/ say it is necessary to do in some cases; torture is universal…it
humanity happens around the world”
Tolerant “Needed to extract useful and valuable info”
“Inflicted pain for good reason”
Sometimes “Cruelty, sometimes necessary”
necessary/last “Basic mechanism to obtain information that cannot be gathered any
resort other way”
Intolerant “No torture”
“Excruciating pain that should be banned everywhere”
Unnecessary “Unnecessary pain for personal pleasure”
“Not needed generally”
Unlawful/unjust “Unjustified suffering”
“The unlawful mistreatment of a detained person”
Immoral/ “Physical or mental abuse in order to obtain something”
inhumane/abusive “A vile act that shows humans at their worst”
Sadistic/sick “Sadistic act”
“Act of sick people”
“Inflicting mental and physical pain on a human being to gain
information or to satisfy ones disgusting need for violence”
Violation of human “A situation where human rights is ignored”
rights “Dehumanizing other people for information or sport”
(continued)
1 Definitions Coding and Variable Formations 9

Table 1.2 (continued)

Major category Category Examples
Focus on method General method “Harassing an individual for an unnecessary reason”
“Taking any means necessary to gain information from a person”
Hurting/harming “Causing severe pain to someone”
Physical “Using strong violence upon a body with some physical object” (2)
“Any interrogation involving physical methods, including extended
interrogation, isolation, sleep deprivation and other ‘milder’ forms of
torture” (3)
Psychological/ “Pain, humiliation, injustice”
abstract “Induced mental or physical injury”
“Threat of physical harm against someone”
Focus on outcomes General outcomes “Destroying someone”
only “The permanent and intentional harming of a person by either
physical or psychological methods”
Physical outcomes “Torture is when people feel pain in their body because the police
believe that they have done something wrong or they want informa-
tion from the person; some people lose their body parts, like their
eyes, because powerful people abuse them; no one can control this”
Psychological/ “Mentally destroying a person’s soul”
abstract outcomes “An activity whereby permanent physical or psychological injury is
caused in a controlled environment”
Uncodeable None “See Geneva Convention”
“Man’s choice”
“Listening to anything by Akon”
“Actually, you do not need to ask me this. Just look at Israel and
Palestine and you will know what war, torture and terrorism mean”
Note: When a response contains multiple codeable units, the italicized word or phrase is the unit serving as an exemplar
of the category; a number appearing after the response indicates the number of codeable units in the response falling
into the given category

someone, defining torture as what it is without
mention of motives or moral judgments. Some of
these responses (e.g., “using any means to get
information”) are rather nonspecific and were
coded into a general methods subcategory. The
other major subcategory was focus on hurting/
harming, which had subcategories for (a) physi-
cal methods and (b) psychological/abstract
methods.
Definitions of Torture Focusing
on Outcomes
The final major coding category for definitions of
torture was outcomes. These responses reflect a
long-term perspective, describing what happens
after torture has occurred, or what it leaves in its
wake, rather than simply describing the processes
involved. In cases where it is unclear if the
respondent is thinking of the process or the out-
come, such as simply supplying the word “harm,”
coders were instructed to default to the methods
category in order to reserve the outcomes cate-
gory for responses showing a more definitive per-
spective considering the aftermath of torture.
Finally, as in war, there was an uncodeable
category following the same criteria as above in
definition of war.
Definition of Terrorism: Valence
The definition of terrorism manual is different
from the manuals for the definitions of war and
torture in that it has two levels of coding—valence
10 E. Planje and T. Campbell

Table 1.3 Valence coding for terrorism

Major category Category Examples
Valence Negative “When the stupid Muslims hide behind religion to do bad things and make
this beautiful religion look bad. Islam is good. You can ask the people who
have converted to Islam”
“Cowardly and evil way to inspire change”
Neutral “Terrorism is perpetrated by a group of people, not necessarily a government,
but an organized group with commonalities among members”
Effort to understand “The feeling that things are happening to you that are unprovoked. In my
terrorism mind the people we call terrorists see us as terrorists also”
Positive regarding “Freedom fighters”
terrorism “Rebelling of people or groups for causes of injustice”

and themes. Coding at the themes level is consis-
tent with the coding for the war and torture manu-
als; it is from a grounded theory approach and
responses are broken up into codeable units with
each unit receiving a code. At the valence level,
the entire definition, no matter how complex, is
coded into one of four valence categories: (a) a
negative (generally intolerant) perspective towards
terrorism, (b) a neutral or relatively detached
valence, (c) an apparent effort to understand ter-
rorists and/or why terrorism occurs, or (d) evi-
dence a positive regard or at least tolerant stance
regarding terrorism (see Table 1.3). Again, coders
were instructed to be careful to err on the side of
choosing neutrality and not project their own ori-
entation towards the words provided. For example,
a response defining terrorism as “destruction, kill-
ing” would be coded for neutral valence because
the respondent is not clear about his or her feeling
towards those methods. This orientation is consis-
tent with the training coders were given for the
thematic coding for all items for which they were
told not to assume a respondent was making value
judgments unless those judgments were explicitly
stated or met the criteria outlined in the coding
manuals. The goal of the valence coding category
system for definitions of terrorism is to capture the
overall flavor of the responses as well as to sepa-
rate responses showing positive judgments from
those showing negative judgments.
Definition of Terrorism: Themes
After a response is coded in its entirety for
valence, it can then be broken down into codeable
units for thematic coding. There are four major
thematic categories: (a) causes of or motivation
for terrorism, (b) terrorism as a process or method,
(c) outcomes of terrorism, and (d) judgments con-
cerning terrorism (see Table 1.4). The following
example illustrates codeable units that fall into all
of the categories except outcomes: “Terrorism is
the immoral use of physical violence against
innocent civilians to achieve an ideological pur-
pose by causing fear and destruction.” This
response would receive a valence code of nega-
tive for calling terrorism “immoral” and saying
it’s used against “innocent civilians.” The first
codeable unit, “the immoral use,” would receive a
moral judgment code. Next, the response tells us
about the methods, specifically physical methods,
calling it the “use of physical violence.” The
response highlights the motivation behind terror-
ism as having an ideological motivation when
indicating that it is done “to achieve an ideologi-
cal purpose.” Next, the response indicates a men-
tal method in describing terrorism as operating
“by causing fear.” Finally, there is another code-
able unit identifying physical methods of “destruc-
tion” as being used to achieve the aforementioned
ideological goal.
Responses coded in the causes or motivation
category focus on why terrorism happens.
Responses in the general subcategory for cause/
motivation describe terrorism as having a goal or
purpose without providing any specifics. The
other subcategories for causes/motivation specify:
(a) ideology, (b) political agenda, (c) emotional
causes, (d) negative environmental conditions, (e)
last resort, (f) not religion, and (g) no motivation.
The ideological motivation subcategory captures
1 Definitions Coding and Variable Formations 11

Table 1.4 Categories for definitions of terrorism

Major
category Category Examples
Cause/ General cause “Unacceptable way of reaching your goal, kind of illness”
motivation Ideological motivation “People who fight for idealism”
“Different groups of people inflicting harm on others due to their beliefs”
“Freedom fighters”
Political agenda “People threatening to attack other people if their demands are not met by the government.
The attach may happen regardless of whether the demands have been met or not”
“The creation of fear in order to achieve anarchy”
International “The attacking of another country or nation in response to one’s own nation’s own beliefs
and expectations”
Emotional causes “An expression of senseless rage against innocent people to get a point across”
Negative environmental “Social problems that cause destruction”
conditions “A minority group of people who are extremist religious”
Last resort “A kind of fight used by people who are not able to use other ways of fight”
“Last resort in getting global response: e.g. Palestine, N. Ireland”
Not religion “Acts against all religions”
“People who do not understand their religion do this, not just people who misunderstand Islam”
“People say that this is related to religion but it is not”
No motivation “Torturing a country for no real and rational reason”
“Causing mass fear and destruction for no reason”
Process/ General method “To make people frightened, it is a kind of weapon used by anti-social elements”
method Physical method “When one group of people violently attack someone or something outside the bounds of
normal warfare”
“Using a display of violence to frighten others”
Mental method “Instilling fear in others to advance a political or ideological belief”
“Underground war- use of terror. Sneaky and sly”
Outcomes General outcomes “To create a mess in the world”
Physical outcomes “When innocent people die because of someone else’s beliefs, either political or religious”
“Activities linked to physical, economic and psychological damage”
Emotional outcomes “Using a display of violence to frighten others”
“Cause terror”
“Activities linked to physical, economic and psychological damage”
Disruption of peace “It is what destroys peace”
and stability “Against peace and humanity”
Disruption of economy “Activities linked to physical, economic and psychological damage”
Judgments General judgments “Not to be tolerated”
“Unacceptable way of reaching your goal, kind of illness”
Moral judgment “Individuals who have no respect or morals for their own life and others’ life”
“Barbarism”
Immoral acts “Physical action with horrific results and with the intention of frightening people”
“An insidious irrational cowardly style of murder” (4)
Motivation “Grouped selfishness”
Appeal to relativity “Is dependant on your side”
“The killing of civilians in any war. One mans terrorist is another’s freedom fighter”
“The use of violence to achieve political ends. A terrorist to one is a hero to another”
Legal judgment “Unjustifiable violence, crime”
Illegal acts “Illegal means of achieving political goals”
“Invading someone or someplace illegally”
Motivation “Misguided crime, fanatical”
“The use of either indiscriminate or targeted violence leading to or potentially to a loss of
life in pursuit of a personal or group agenda not sanctioned by law”
Real life None “Look at Israel and what it does to Palestinians”
reference “Sounds like Peru”
“USA - excuse to perpetuate violence. Extreme passion....”
Uncodeable None “Mankind (as opposed to God)”
“No idea”
“Terrorist”
“The price of decent chocolate”
Note: When a response contains multiple codeable units, the italicized word or phrase is the unit serving as an exemplar of the category;
a number appearing after the response indicates the number of codeable units in the response falling into the given category.
12
responses that describe terrorism as driven by an
ideology or motivated by a specific religion or
general beliefs; however, codeable units that pass
judgment on the ideology are coded instead into
the judgment category. Political motivation cap-
tures responses defining terrorism as something
motivated by a political agenda, either explicitly
or implicitly; these responses define terrorism as
aimed at manipulating power or enforcing com-
pliance. The political motivation subcategory
includes a further subcategory labeled interna-
tional for definitions indicating that terrorism is
something occurring between different countries
or motivated by threats from another country.
Responses coded for emotional causes show less
implicit agency than responses in the other causes/
motivations subcategories, but rather mention
emotional or mental states as the reason why ter-
rorism is used. Also included under the major cat-
egory of cause/motivation are responses describing
conditions that are perceived to contribute to the
use of terrorism—specifically, negative environ-
mental conditions (e.g., extreme poverty).
Responses that describe terrorism as a last resort,
or as perpetrated by people who do not understand
their religion (not religion), or as committed by
people with no motivation, are also captured in
subcategories under cause/motivation.
Responses coded into the process or method
category describe the methods of terrorists or
characterize terrorism as a means to an end, often
stating another objective of terrorism. The gen-
eral subcategory of the process/method category
captures responses that are unclear as to whether
the method is physical or mental; in addition,
there are subcategories for (a) mental and (b)
physical forms of terrorism. One respondent
defined terrorism as “the creation of fear in order
to achieve anarchy.” This response illustrates a
mental method, “the creation of fear,” as a pro-
cess used to achieve an outcome, “anarchy.”
As the preceding example shows, the out-
comes category refers to effects or intended
effects of terrorism. These outcomes, as is true of
the outcome category for definitions of torture,
were differentiated from codeable units that
might be worded as an outcome but really imply
E. Planje and T. Campbell
a process as a means to another end. Under out-
comes, there are subcategories for physical and
emotional outcomes; in addition, there are two
other outcome subcategories—the disruption of
peace and stability and the disruption of
economy.
As is true of the manuals for definitions of war
and torture, the definition of terrorism manual
has a category for judgments, but in the terrorism
manual, that category is split into two large sub-
categories: (a) moral judgments and (b) legal
judgments. Both subcategories contain further
subcategories differentiating between judgments
made relating to the acts of terrorism versus judg-
ments made about the motivation behind terror-
ism. The moral judgment category also has a
subcategory capturing responses that question
the use of the label of terrorism; these responses
appear to appeal to the relativity of the term. In
addition to the four major thematic categories,
there was another major category for real life ref-
erences, which included responses that referred
to specific examples from history or current
events to define terrorism. Finally, as in the other
two definitions manuals, an uncodeable category
was used for responses that do not fit in any of the
categories, do not address the question, or do not
make sense to the coder.
Quantitative Analyses
In order to investigate the potential correlates of
different definitions of war, torture, and terrorism
in each chapter, we conducted exploratory analyses
designed to assess the potential role of demographic
variables such as nationality, gender, participation
in protest, participation in the military, and having
a relative who has been in the military in the use
of major types of definitions. Thus, we computed
chi-square contingency tests to determine
whether, for example, more women than men
provided a particular definition of war (or torture
or terrorism) and whether more respondents with
a relative in the military defined each term differ-
ently than respondents without a relative in the
military. For each participant, we also summed
1 Definitions Coding and Variable Formations
the responses falling into all the subcategories
for each major category, thereby creating count
scores (sums) for each coding category. For
example, consider this definition of war: “a situa-
tion where countries make it their mandate to
inflict violence against innocent civilians to assert
world dominance and dictate their own policies
against the country with which they’ve gone to
war.” This definition identifies political motiva-
tions behind why people go to war and therefore
was given a 1 (“present”) for the political motiva-
tion subcategory under causes. Because two dif-
ferent political motivations, “to assert world
dominance” and to “dictate their own policies
against the country,” are mentioned, the definition
would also receive a count score of 2 for the politi-
cal motivation coding category. The scoring of
themes for both presence/absence and number of
mentions allowed us to run exploratory t tests,
ANOVAs, and correlations with count scores indi-
cating the number of examples participants gave
of particular types of definitions.
Preliminary analysis suggested a change
related to the structuring of subcategories in the
definitions of war manual, particularly in regard
to causal moral judgment. Based on the themes
arising in the results, the research team (after
much debate) decided to make causal moral
judgments a subcategory of causes rather than a
subcategory of judgments. Statistical analysis
indicated that causal moral judgments, when
removed from causes and combined with moral
judgments, provided a more stable and interpre-
table set of findings. In the definition of war dis-
cussed above, the participant explained,
“countries make it their mandate to inflict vio-
lence against innocent civilians.” The reference
to intention to hurt innocent people is a judgment
about an underlying motivation for war. This
specific codeable unit would receive a count
score of 1 for the causal moral judgment subcat-
egory and also a count score of 1 for moral
judgments.
In another example of our variable formation
procedures, a respondent’s definition of war was:
13
“Armed conflict between two or more countries/
political groups/cultures, etc.” This response was
given a count score of 4 for describing four dif-
ferent qualifications: one for the intensity
(“armed”), two for official groups (“countries”
and “political groups”), and one for unofficial
groups (“cultures”). When analysis involved
count scores, the variables were named after the
main coding category and the word “sum” was
added to that variable name to show that the vari-
able represents the summed total of all the code-
able units from all the subcategories in the main
category. For analyses of presence/absence
scores, the variables were named after the main
coding category with the word “presence” added
to the end to indicate that the participant provided
at least one example of a response in at least one
of the subcategories of a major category. Thus,
the response “Armed conflict between two or
more countries/political groups/cultures, etc.”
received a qualifications sum score of 4 and
qualifications presence score of 1.
In addition to computing scores for each
definitional response category, we created some
superordinate definitional categories by adding
together common subcategory scores across all
three definitions. That is, the manuals for
definitions of war, torture, and terrorism shared
similar categories, and so “sum” or “presence”
categories were created that summed responses
in those similar coding categories across the war,
torture, and terrorism definitions. (See Table 1.5
for the coding categories that were common to all
three definitions and consequently could be
summed to create more inclusive scores.)
All results presented in the regional chapters
included in this section of the book had p values
less than or equal to 0.05 if they are identified as
statistically significant, and had p values between
0.056 and 0.10 if they are identified as marginally
significant. Only results that achieved an alpha of
0.05 (or, in some chapters, were marginally
significant) are presented. Moreover, because our
samples were convenience samples only, these
findings should be considered tentative only.
14 E. Planje and T. Campbell

Table 1.5 Categories added across definitions

Major category Definition Categories contributed to total
Causes/motivation War Causes sum
Torture Conditions
Terrorism Negative environmental causes, emotional causes
Political motivation War Political motivation
Torture Strategical advantage
Terrorism Political agenda
Last resort War Last resort
Torture Last resort
Terrorism Last resort
Methods War Nonphysical conflict, scale or intensity
Torture Methods sum
Terrorism Methods sum
Abstract War Abstract outcomes
Outcomes Torture Psychological methods
Terrorism Emotional outcomes, disruption of peace, disruption of economy
Physical outcomes War Concrete outcomes
Torture Physical outcomes
Terrorism Physical outcomes
Causes/motivation judgments War Causes moral judgment
Torture None
Terrorism Moral judgment motivation, legal judgment motivation
Judgment not including tolerance War Moral judgment, causes judgment
Torture Judgment intolerant sum
Terrorism Judgment sum
Judgment including tolerance War Moral judgment, causes judgment
Torture Judgment sum
Terrorism Judgment sum
 Definitions of War, Torture,
and Terrorism in Western Europe 2
Mathilde Salmberg, Carla Machado, Silja
Bara Ómarsdottir, Milena Doerfer, Ashley Brown,
Laura Marcucci, Michael Corgan, Mariana Barbosa,
Julia Koenig, Elizabeth Leembruggen-Kallberg,
and Christine Roland-Levy

This chapter considers Western European

definitions of war, torture, and terrorism. The
introduction includes a brief overview of major
historical events followed by recent conflicts and
developments related to torture and terrorism in
Western Europe. The focus then shifts to a
descriptive report of our study examining per-
sonal definitions of the terms war, torture, and
terrorism by participants from France, Germany,
Iceland, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden.
The grouping of countries as “Western
Europe” tends to vary depending on the geo-
graphical, cultural, economic, and political con-
texts being considered. However, the following
countries are typically included in the Western
European region: Austria, Belgium, Britain,
Finland, France, Greece, Germany, Iceland,
Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
the microstates Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco,
San Marino, and the Vatican City. The countries
from which we recruited participants for the
research described in this chapter thus represent
only part of Western Europe. All of the countries
described in this chapter are in the European
Union (EU) and have ceded part of their sover-
eignty to the EU, except for Iceland, which is a
candidate for EU membership. All except
Sweden, which is committed to neutrality, are
members of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO).
Historical Context and Background
The prolonged history of conflict and wars in
Western Europe has undoubtedly influenced the
definitions of war, torture, and terrorism held by
Western Europeans today. In early modern
Europe, an extended war, commonly referred to
as the Thirty Years War (1618–1648), was carried
out between crusaders for Catholicism and pro-
ponents of Protestantism. The war was initially
fought by the Catholic Holy Roman Empire
against its Protestant subjects in Bohemia;
however, it quickly spread to most of Europe,
including Austria, Denmark, France, Germany,
the Netherlands, Poland, Russia, Spain, and
Sweden, and the conflict evolved into an extended
and extremely destructive war (Johnson 2002;
Malley-Morrison 2009). The war concluded in
1648 with the Peace of Westphalia treaty, which
compromised territorial, political, and religious
interests of the countries involved (Helfferich
2009). The Peace of Westphalia is important his-
torically as it established the notion of societies
organized into individual, independent states and
prohibited sovereigns from requiring feudal loy-
alties from monarchs in other states or requiring
the subjects of another sovereign to adopt a par-
ticular religion (Malley-Morrison 2009).
Many Western European countries continued
to put forth remarkable efforts to carry on the

K. Malley-Morrison et al. (eds.), International Handbook of War, Torture, and Terrorism, 15

Peace Psychology Book Series, DOI 10.1007/978-1-4614-1638-8_2,
© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2013
16
tradition of establishing empires. Britain became
a frontrunner in extra-European imperialism,
closely followed by France, Portugal, and Spain,
all of which had interests around the world.
While expansionist efforts were being pursued
abroad, revolutionary changes gained momen-
tum in many parts of Europe. A large segment of
the French people challenged the traditional
privileges held by the nobility and clergy, a
movement that eventually resulted in the French
Revolution (1788–1789). The French Revolution
brought an end to time-honored ways of govern-
ing and absolute monarchy and yielded more
power to the people.
Over the course of the Napoleonic Wars
(1799–1815), France expanded its territories dra-
matically, creating a French Empire that was in
many ways comparable to the Habsburg, Ottoman,
and Russian Empires. Gradually, the French
Empire became weakened through its extended
involvement in active warfare and eventually dis-
integrated, similarly to the Habsburg and Ottoman
Empires. The Congress of Vienna (1814–1815),
which took place at the end of the Napoleonic
Wars, briefly reduced the forces driving conti-
nental imperialism into Europe (Polley 2000).
Ongoing competition over territory and arms
generated increasing tensions among European
countries in the twentieth century. The assassina-
tion of the heir to the Austrian throne prompted a
conflict between Austria–Hungary and Serbia
that in turn initiated World War I (1914–1918).
The war was expected to be short-lived; however,
the involvement of numerous world powers and
the introduction of modern weaponry resulted in
a lengthy and enormously costly war. The major
belligerents were the Dual Alliance, consisting of
Austria–Hungary and Germany, and the Entente
powers, originally including France, Russia, and
Britain, which were shortly followed by several
other significant world powers, including the
United States. The war ended after Austria and
the Ottoman Empire surrendered and Germany
agreed to an armistice. The massive causalities of
the war caused significant strain on European
society, prompting changes in the governments
of France and Britain, revolutions in Germany
M. Salmberg et al.
and Russia, and the disintegration of the Austro-
Hungarian and Ottoman Empires (Cook and
Stevenson 2005).
Although World War I shattered some major
empires, continental imperialism quickly resur-
faced when Adolph Hitler came to power in
Germany and implemented an ambitious expan-
sionist foreign policy that led to the outbreak of
World War II in Europe (1939–1945). The main
belligerents included the Axis partners of
Germany, Italy, Japan, and their allies against the
combined powers of Britain, Russia, China, the
USA, and their allies (Cook and Stevenson 2005).
Although most of the armed conflicts were ini-
tially situated in Europe, the battlegrounds
expanded into Africa, the Asian Pacific, and
beyond, particularly with Japan’s entry into the
war. By the time it ended, World War II had pro-
duced enormous losses of human lives, destruc-
tion of substantial parts of the European Jewish
population, and social and economic ramifications
that were felt around the world (Polley 2000).
The Post-world War II Era
in Western Europe
World War II was followed by escalating tension
between the USA and the Soviet Union, which
evolved into the Cold War. As the “Iron Curtain”
fell, this conflict reinforced the postwar division
of Europe into eastern and western parts. While
Eastern Europe was controlled by the Soviet
Union and governed by communist regimes, most
of the Western European countries tended to have
more democratic governments with capitalist
economies, although for many decades this was
less true of Portugal and Spain. NATO was
formed early in the postwar period with the pur-
pose, according to its first secretary general, Lord
Ismay, being “to keep the Russians out, the
Americans in, and the Germans down” (Reynolds
1994, p. 13).
In 1950, the European Coal and Steel
Community, which later became the EU, was cre-
ated by Belgium, France, Germany, Italy,
Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. Its purpose
2 Western European Definitions
was to promote stability in the region following
the end of World War II, as well as to look after
the economic and political interests of the mem-
ber states. The EU currently has 27 member states
(EUROPA n.d.). The fall of the Iron Curtain in
1989, the reunion of East and West Germany, and
the Soviet Union’s disintegration in 1991 has
decreased the differences between Eastern and
Western Europe, which have moved towards inte-
gration (Polley 2000).
Although the Western European countries
have avoided major wars among themselves
since the end of World War II, many of them have
participated in NATO initiatives and other peace-
keeping efforts abroad. For example, after Iraq
invaded Kuwait, the coalition in the Persian Gulf
War (1990–1991) received support from France,
Spain, and Britain, as well as Greece, Italy, the
Netherlands, Norway, Belgium, and Denmark; a
number of other countries contributed medical
equipment, transport, or logistical resources
(Peters and Deshong 1995). Several NATO mem-
ber states were also involved in the Balkan war in
different capacities, including the 1994 forces
against Bosnian Serbs and the 1999 bombing
campaign against the former Yugoslavia, to which
France, Germany, Portugal, Spain, Italy, the
Netherlands, Norway, Belgium, and Denmark
contributed militarily (Polley 2000).
Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the
USA, most of the Western European countries
were initially supportive of the US war on terror,
and a number of them supported US and British
military action against al Qaeda and the Taliban
regime in Afghanistan in 2001 (Gordon and
Shapiro 2004). However, support plunged as the
USA announced its plans for military deploy-
ment beyond Afghanistan (Gallis 2004) and pro-
ceeded with the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Divisions
occurred within the EU and among European
governments, neither the UN nor NATO was able
to agree on how to progress on this issue, and the
traditionally strong European–American rela-
tions were severely damaged. Public opinion
against the invasion was strong across Europe,
and the governments of France, Germany, and
Russia vehemently articulated their opposition to
17
the war. Despite the strong opposition within
their countries, the governments of Britain, Spain,
Poland, and Italy supported the invasion of Iraq,
which further reinforced the conflicts around this
issue (Gordon and Shapiro 2004).
Terrorism in Western Europe
Although the 9/11 terrorist attacks have made the
issue of terrorism additionally sensitive in
Western Europe, the area already had ample
experience with terrorism. It has been estimated
that between 1950 and 1995, terrorist acts led to
2,777 deaths in Western Europe (Bowden and
Davis 2007). During that time, Britain had the
highest number of deaths, followed by Spain,
Italy, France, and Germany. Some of these terror-
ist acts appear to have been related to difficulties
integrating marginalized groups into the political
process (Engene 2004).
Since 1995, Western Europe has continued to
experience numerous terrorist acts. For example,
in reaction to Britain’s involvement in the Iraq
war, London’s public transportation system was
attacked by Islamist suicide bombers in 2005,
resulting in 52 deaths and 700 injured (Intelligence
and Security Committee 2006). France has a his-
tory of several surges of extreme right-wing ter-
rorism, ethnic terrorism, and terrorism by extreme
ethnic nationalists—mostly related to republican-
ism and the centralist state’s attempt to control
national minorities (Engene 2004). In 1995, the
Paris subway was attacked by the Algerian Armed
Islamic Group (GIA) apparently because of the
French government’s involvement in the Algerian
Civil War; in the bombings, eight people were
killed and more than 100 were wounded
(Bouteldja 2005). Spain has witnessed numerous
acts of terrorism by nationalist movements, pri-
marily related to the Basque struggle for libera-
tion, right-wing groups opposing the Basque
movement, and extreme left terrorism (Engene
2004). In 2004, Islamic fundamentalists carried
out a bombing in Madrid because of Spain’s
involvement in the Iraq war (Castanheira and
Borrelli 2009). In Italy, terrorism became a
18
frequent occurrence after democracy was rees-
tablished in the 1950s. A particularly destructive
bombing by an extremist right-wing group took
place in Bologna in 1980 where 85 people were
killed and an estimated 200 were injured. Finally,
many terrorist events by right- and left-wing
extremists in Germany have been related to the
integration of East Germany.
The relationship between terrorism and prob-
lems integrating fringe groups into the political
process may explain the absence or low incidence
of terrorism attacks in Austria, Denmark, Finland,
Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Norway, and Sweden, all of which tend to have a
high tolerance for diverse political activity and
integrate fringe groups politically (Engene 2004).
At the same time, there have been concerns about
increasing intolerance and hostility towards
immigrants in Denmark, Italy, Austria, and the
Netherlands. It has been reported that some polit-
ical parties have used the threat of terrorism to
restrict Muslim immigration and to label Muslims
as extremists (Gallis 2004). Some analysts have
identified Western Europe as a potential recruit-
ment ground for ideological terrorists, referenc-
ing the 9/11 attack leaders who came from a cell
in Germany and the bombings in England and
Spain carried out by terrorists born in those
countries (Pincus 2005). On the other hand,
Europol reported that out of the 515 reported ter-
rorist attacks in the EU in 2008, only one was an
attempted Islamist terrorist attack intended to
cause mass casualties (European Police Office
2009).
Among the groups that have been identified as
sources of terrorist activities in Europe since Cold
War days are secret “stay behind armies,” coordi-
nated by NATO and managed by the US Central
Intelligence Agency to organize resistance against
a potential Soviet invasion and prevent a political
shift to the left (Ganser 2005). The armies in
Italy, Turkey, Germany, France, Portugal,
Belgium, and Sweden were either connected to
terrorism or suspected of such links. For exam-
ple, there is evidence that the USA and Britain
feared that a leftist power shift in Italy could pose
an internal threat to NATO and that these con-
cerns led to several terrorist attacks launched by
M. Salmberg et al.
the Italian secret army. After the Italian stay
behind army was exposed, ensuing investigations
uncovered secret armies in other Western
European countries (Ganser 2005).
Recent efforts to counter terrorism in Western
Europe include increased international collabora-
tion by the EU, which includes sharing police
information and intelligence, broadening the
scope of warrants, reinforcing external border
controls, and improving capabilities for tracking
asylum seekers. Additionally, France has increased
of its police resources dedicated to counterterror-
ism, and Britain increased its number of suspects
on their terrorist list (Gallis 2004).
Torture in Western Europe
Although many Western Europe countries pro-
fess support for the international laws against tor-
ture, it has been reported that France, Germany,
and Britain have cooperated with intelligence
services in countries that are making use of
torture and other forms of ill-treatment as
interrogation methods (Sunderland 2010). This
cooperation has been done for the purposes of
policing, collecting intelligence to counteract
terrorism, and supporting court proceedings
against terrorist suspects. German and British
officials have publicly stated that they at times
find the use of intelligence obtained under torture
acceptable. Additionally, the governments of
Britain, Germany, France, Austria, Sweden, the
Netherlands, and Italy have returned or attempted
to return terrorist suspects to countries where
they faced real risks of being tortured (Sunderland
2010). Also, Spain has received repeated atten-
tion for reports of torture of prisoners, asylum
seekers, and immigrants by police officers
(Amnesty International 2009).
Definitions of War, Torture, and
Terrorism in Western Europe
This section presents findings concerning
definitions of war, torture, and terrorism from the
Western European countries that participated in
2 Western European Definitions
our study. All of the men and women in these
samples responded to the Personal and
Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace
Survey (PAIRTAPS) (Malley-Morrison et al.
2006), which includes items asking for definitions
of war, torture, and terrorism in an open-ended
response format.
The Western European sample consisted of
1,012 participants from France, Germany, Iceland,
Portugal, Spain, and Sweden. In this sample, 560
participants identified as female and 445 partici-
pants as male; 7 participants chose to not identify
their gender. More specifically, there were 31
male and 25 female participants from France, 30
male and 66 female participants from Germany,
29 male and 76 female participants from Iceland,
274 male and 312 female participants from
Portugal, 40 male and 42 female participants from
Spain, and 42 male and 38 female participants
from Sweden. The participants were recruited into
the study through university courses, informal
networking channels, student organizations, peace
organizations, veteran’s associations, and various
internet sites. Because the study involves the
analysis of data from available samples, and from
only a limited number of Western European coun-
tries, it is important not to overgeneralize or over-
interpret the findings reported here; at the same
time, the opportunity to consider how a diverse
sample of Western Europeans, responding to the
same survey in their own languages, define war,
torture, and terrorism in their own words in a time
of global unrest and fear is a rather unique strength
of the study.
Coding Manuals
Using a grounded theory method (Gilgun 2006;
Strauss and Corbin 1998), coding manuals were
developed for each item. These manuals were
designed to categorize all definitions into emer-
gent groupings rather than to force them into cat-
egories derived from a preconceived set of criteria
(Gilgun 2006). For purposes of coding, each
definition was first divided into codeable units
(units of meaning), each of which could be coded
according to criteria in the relevant manual. Any
19
definition could have one or more codeable units;
for example, a definition of war as “hell, moti-
vated by greed” has two codeable units, and a
definition of terrorism as “an evil, perpetrated by
mad men for personal gain” has three codeable
units. The definitions of war coding manual
include criteria for coding responses into four
main categories, each of which has one or more
subcategories; the major categories are: (a) war
as a last resort, (b) motivations/intents for war,
(c) focus on war as conflict only, and (d) scale or
intensity of conflict.1 The manual for definitions
of torture includes 32 different coding subcatego-
ries within six major categories. The six major
response categories are: (a) focus on intent, moti-
vation, or emotion; (b) characteristics of the indi-
vidual being tortured; (c) conditions that give rise
to torture; (d) judgment concerning morality/jus-
tice/humanity; (e) focus on method or process;
and (f) focus on outcome [only]. The coding
manual for definitions of terrorism differed from
the war and terrorism manuals by requiring two
levels of coding. The first level, valence, reflects
the overall affective orientation of the definition,
specifically whether it exhibits tolerance, neu-
trality, or intolerance of terrorism or an effort to
understand the terrorism. The second level of
coding is consistent with the procedures for the
war and torture coding; at this level, each code-
able unit is assigned to the major categories of
causes/motivations, process, outcome, or judg-
ments. For more details concerning the coding
systems, see Chap. 1 in this volume.
In the section that follows, we use the terms
“responses” and “codeable units” interchange-
ably to refer to the independent units of meaning
coded within participant definitions of war, tor-
ture, and terrorism.
Definitions of War
Regarding the meaning of “war,” many partici-
pants provided definitions that focused on conflict.
These definitions (21 % of all the war responses) were
1
Names of coding categories are in italics.
20
generally dictionary-type definitions, consisting of
short phrases or synonyms for war such as
“conflict,” “battle,” or “combat.” The second
most frequent theme, constituting 15 % of the
definition of war responses, provided somewhat
more elaborative descriptive definitions such as
“armed conflict” and “violent assault.” Another
group of responses (11 % of the definition of war
responses) identified war with the involvement of
recognized regions, nations, or governments,
using specific words to describe the parties
involved such as “countries.” Another 10 % of
the definition of war responses consisted of a
general moral judgment concerning the acts of
war itself; judgments concerning the motives for
a specific war were coded separately. In one
example of a moral judgment response, a 19-year-
old woman from France described war as “acts of
Barbary.” Very few participants described war as
an act of self-defense, suggesting that Western
Europeans, at least as represented by our conve-
nience sample, tended not to view war merely as
an act of self-protection against a threatening
group or nation.
Definitions of Torture
When participants were asked for their definitions
of torture, the largest category that emerged
(16 % of all definition of torture responses)
included definitions describing methods of tor-
ture, particularly physical methods: for example,
“the inflicting of physical pain” or “using strong
violence.” The next most common type of
definition (14 % of the definition of torture)
presented a view of torture as somewhat more
psychological, abstract, or conceptual. One
French participant identified torture as both a
physical and psychological process, saying it
involves “inflicting degrading physical or mental
suffering to a human being.”
The task of defining torture appeared to elicit
judgmental responses in many participants: 22 %
of definitions of torture describing at least one
way in which torture is intolerable. Definitions
showing intolerance fell either into the general
M. Salmberg et al.
intolerance subcategory (e.g., defining torture as
“unacceptable”) or into one of five more specific
subcategories showing intolerance. The type of
intolerance response occurring with the most
frequency (8 % of the torture definitions) identified
torture as cruel or immoral; for example, one
Icelander defined torture as “inhumane methods.”
Although many of the definitions of torture
indicated that it was unacceptable, 1 % of the
definitions of torture identified certain situations
under which torture may be viewed as necessary.
These responses tended to echo the common
justification for using torture in the “ticking bomb
scenario,” which is a hypothetical situation in
which a person holding pertinent information
regarding an imminent terrorist attack will dis-
close information that will prevent the attack if
he or she is being tortured (Human Rights Watch
2010). This type of rationalization was reflected
in responses such as one from a 25-year-old
woman from Germany who said that torture is
“tactical use of torture to get information” and a
20-year-old woman from Iceland who said: “If it
is the last resort, it is ok to do it to obtain valuable
information.”
Definitions of Terrorism
More than 100 formal definitions of terrorism have
been identified in the literature (Record 2003). The
only common denominator of these definitions is
that terrorism involves violence or the threat of
violence—a rather broad definition that could
include anything from a fight at the playground to
forceful diplomacy or war. Some of the current
definitions also reference the inculcation of fear,
the innocence of victims, and political, ideological,
or religious motivations; many of the definitions
are formulated in ways that exclude state terrorism
(Record 2003).
In the current study, a number of patterns
emerged among the participants’ personal
definitions of terrorism. Analyses of the definitions
for valence revealed that 47 % of all the terrorism
definitions had a negative valence. For example,
a 26-year-old French woman defined terrorism as
2 Western European Definitions
an “illegal, murderous act for imposing one’s
ideas” and a 19-year-old Portuguese said terror-
ism is “a cowardly act directed to the innocent
ones and that causes fear, terror and instability all
over the world.” On the other hand, 45 % of the
definitions of terrorism were neutral in valence,
such as the response from a Swedish participant
who defined terrorism without any value-laden
language: “violence against country/people.” A
small portion of the definitions of terrorism (1 %)
were characterized by a positive valence; for
example, an Icelandic participant said that terror-
ism is “visionary groups that want to change
something politically corrupt.” Finally, 7 % of
the definitions of terrorism revealed an effort to
understand terrorism. For example, a 26-year-old
man from Sweden noted that “terrorism is not
created by one party; it depends on the actions of
several parties. Diplomacy and compromises are
desirable in order to stop terrorism.”
In addition to being coded for valence, the
definitions of terrorism were also coded for
themes. About 20 % of the definitions of terrorism
exhibited some sort of judgment, which could be
broken into the subcategories of moral judgment
(19 % of all definitions of terrorism) or legal judg-
ment (2 % of all definitions of terrorism). These
thematic judgment categories applied to the code-
able units that explicitly described participants’
personal assessment of the acts, motivation, or
legality of terrorism. For example, a French par-
ticipant defined terrorism as “acts committed in
the name of a belief, of a religion that one was
taught in an extreme manner, with a dangerous
interpretation that can bring terrible acts.” This
complex response also included a codeable unit
that specifically judges the actions of terrorism as
“terrible”; that unit was coded into the category
for a moral judgment of terrorism. A German
definition, which was coded as neutral in valence,
includes a legal judgment about terrorism, defining
it as a “struggle of political groups that falls out-
side of the ‘rules of play’ of war.”
A total of 34 % of the definitions of terrorism
identified terrorism with some kind of process or
method, with 25 % of the definitions of terrorism
identifying terrorism as a physical process or
21
method. Definitions in this category included one
from a Spanish 23-year-old man who said that
terrorism is a “form of political violence exer-
cised to achieve ends with economical or politi-
cal interest.” The second most common type of
definition referred to the presence of a political
agenda; 11 % of the terrorism definitions noted
that a primary motivation for terrorism is a politi-
cal goal and included the ideas of manipulation
or enforced compliance.
Exploratory Analyses of Potential
Demographic Correlates of Definitions
We conducted several exploratory statistical anal-
yses to assess the extent to which particular
definitions of war, torture, and terrorism appeared
to vary in relation to demographic characteristics.
In our discussion of the findings from these
exploratory analyses, we use the term “statisti-
cally significant” to describe group differences
that reached the criterion of p £ 0.05 and “margin-
ally significant” to refer to group differences
where the p value was between 0.056 and 0.10.
Chi-square analysis revealed several significant
group differences in the variables created based
on common coding categories across definitions
of war, torture, and terrorism (see Table 2.1). In
particular, women and war protesters showed
similar response patterns across definitions that
were different from the response patterns of men
and non-protesters. For example, significantly
more women and participants involved in protests
referred to outcomes or effects of war, torture,
and terrorism than men and non-protesters.
Similarly, significantly more women and protest-
ers than men and non-protesters (a) defined war,
terrorism, and torture in terms of methods used
and (b) referred to political motivations underly-
ing the three forms of aggression. In addition,
significantly more protesters than non-protesters
provided at least one moral judgment across all
definitions.
Analyses of variance (ANOVAS) were also
conducted on an exploratory basis to determine
whether there were any patterns in types of
22 M. Salmberg et al.

Table 2.1 Definitions of war, torture, and terrorism: percentages of responses in inter-definitional coding categories
by demographic groups and chi-square values
Categories Group 1a Group 2a c2
Male Female
Outcomes Ex 15 22 8.09**
Abstract outcomes Ex 17 26 11.65***
Physical outcomes Ex 17 28 14.56***
Political motivation Ex 10 15 3.83*
Methods Ex 32 42 11.95***
Protest No protest
Outcomes Ex 25 15 13.74***
Abstract outcomes Ex 32 17 29.96***
Physical outcomes Ex 30 19 15.03***
Methods Ex 48 33 23.31***
Political motivation Ex 19 9 21.92***
Moral judgments Ex 36 29 5.77*
Moral judgments not including tolerance of torture Ex 36 29 5.36*
Note: “Ex” at the end of a variable name signifies that the presence/absence variable was created by assigning a 1 to that
variable if the participant had at least one response in that category or any of its subcategories. Please refer to the
Methods chapter for a more detailed description of how these variables were created
*
p £ 0.05; **p £ 0.01; ***p £ 0.001
a
The numbers in these columns are the percent of the specified demographic group that gave responses falling into each
of the specified categories

definitions across the six nations in this sample. Table 2.2 Definitions of war: percentages of responses
These analyses suggested that the different in coding categories for definitions of war by demographic
groups and chi-square values
national samples differed significantly in the
extent to which they included moral judgments, Categories Group 1a Group 2a c2
methods, causes, physical outcomes, and abstract Male Female
Nonphysical conflict 11 5 5.55*
outcomes across all three definitions. Post hoc
Focus on conflict only 41 53 9.31**
comparisons utilizing Scheffe’s test showed that Protest No protest
respondents from Iceland and Portugal scored Nonphysical conflict 5 10 5.76*
significantly higher on moral judgments in their * **
p £ 0.05; p £ 0.01
definitions of war, torture, and terrorism than a
The numbers in these columns are the percent of the
German respondents. German participants scored specified demographic group that gave responses falling
significantly higher on methods summed across into each of the specified categories
all three definitions than respondents from France,
Iceland, Portugal, and Spain. In addition, Swedish
respondents scored significantly higher on meth- German respondents scored significantly higher
ods than respondents from France, Iceland, and than Portuguese respondents on references to
Portugal. Spanish respondents scored significantly abstract outcomes in their definitions of war, tor-
higher on causes across all three definitions than ture, and terrorism.
German and Portuguese respondents. German There were also some group differences
respondents scored higher on physical outcomes specific to definitions of one of the key terms but
for war, torture, and terrorism than Portuguese not the others. As can be seen in Table 2.2,
respondents, and Swedish respondents scored significantly more men and non-protesters than
higher on physical outcomes than both women and protesters identified war with its non-
Portuguese and French respondents. Finally, physical (abstract) outcomes. For example, a
2 Western European Definitions 23

Table 2.3 Definitions of terrorism: percentages of responses by demographic groups and chi-square values
Categories Group 1a Group 2a c2
Male Female
Emotional causes 6 2 5.31*
Relative military No relative military
Ideological motivation 15 5 12.35***
Negative environmental conditions 5 2 4.69*
Protest No protest
No motivation 2 <1 4.77*b
Negative environmental conditions 7 2 7.46**
Appeal to relativity 7 1 13.87***
*
p £ 0.05; **p £ 0.01; ***p £ 0.001
a
The numbers in these columns are the percent of the specified demographic group that gave responses falling into each
of the specified categories
b
Fisher’s exact test

nonphysical description of war is “an open
opposition on an issue.” Women, on the other
hand, more often used descriptors that focused on
synonyms for conflict only than did men.
For the definition of terrorism (see Table 2.3),
significantly more men than women referred to
emotional causes of terrorism. Similarly,
significantly more participants with a relative in
the military made mention of ideological motiva-
tions behind terrorism than participants without a
relative in the military. Also, as compared with
their counterparts, significantly more participants
with relatives in the military and protesters
mentioned the negative environmental conditions
underlying terrorism in their definitions.
Moreover, significantly more protesters than non-
protesters defined terrorism as a relative concept
that depended on one’s frame of reference
(Table 2.3). Finally, for definitions of torture,
significantly more men and participants in the
military depicted torture as a means to an end
without indicating their personal views on this
topic; they provided significantly more.
Summary and Discussion
This study considered the personal definitions of
war, terrorism, and torture of 1,012 participants
from France, Germany, Iceland, Portugal, Spain,
and Sweden. The results appeared consistent with
what one may expect from a region with a long-
standing history of warfare followed by peace,
integration, international interventions in other
areas, and concerns regarding terrorism. The
definitions were analyzed with a focus on overall
themes and trends across the region rather than in
individual countries.
A number of patterns emerged among the
responses. For the definitions of torture and ter-
rorism, participants most frequently described
physical processes/methods, indicating that their
immediate associations were with concrete, tan-
gible actions. Regarding the definitions of war,
the participants primarily focused on the conflict
itself by simply providing a synonym or specific
qualifications of what made a conflict a war, such
as a level of destruction or involvement of a
legally recognized nation/group. The dearth of
responses identifying war with negative emotions
may relate to the rarity of war on Western
European soil since the end of WWII. Participants
with little or no direct experience with war may
offer more abstract textbook-style definitions,
whereas individuals with more direct and per-
sonal experience with war may provide more
emotion-laden definitions.
The definitions of torture and terrorism gener-
ally contained more judgments than those associ-
ated with the definition of war (23 % and 20 % of
24
responses, as opposed to 14 %). The participants
may perceive terrorism as a more imminent
threat than war, as war has not been a direct
threat to many of the participants. It is also pos-
sible that the almost constant discussion of war-
related issues in literature and news media may
have desensitized participants to this topic.
Comparatively, terrorism and torture have
recently become widely debated topics, which
may have contributed to stronger emotional
responses.
An examination of the extent to which there
were similarities in definitions across the three
terms revealed that higher percentages of the
definitions of torture (24 %) and terrorism (30 %)
were coded for intent or motivation than were
definitions of war (9 %). This relative difference
suggests that the participants generally did not
consider the cause or motivation behind war to
the same extent as they did in regards to torture
and terrorism. It is possible that diffusion of
responsibility comes into play when ordinary
people from Western Europe consider the mean-
ing of war. War-related decisions may be associ-
ated with anonymous governmental agencies,
whereas terrorism and torture may feel more
amorphous and personally threatening.
In a contrasting pattern, responses coded for
outcomes occurred somewhat more frequently in
definitions of war (15 %) and terrorism (13 %)
than in definitions of torture (4 %). If reliable,
this difference implies that the consequences of
war and terrorism may be more readily retrieved
than outcomes of torture—perhaps because the
physical consequences of war and terrorism can
be seen so much more easily in the public
media.
This study, like all studies, has limitations,
including the limited selection of Western
European countries, restricted and varied sample
sizes, and selection of participants through vari-
ous nonrandom methods; consequently, as noted
before, the results should be interpreted with cau-
tion and not be generalized to the Western
European population as a whole. At the same
time, this study offers a unique opportunity to
learn about Western European perceptions of
M. Salmberg et al.
war, terrorism, and torture and to consider how
these definitions may have been shaped by the
participants’ experiences and history.
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 Definitions of War, Torture,
and Terrorism in Great Britain,
Northern Ireland, Australia,
Canada, and the United States
John M. Davis, Elizabeth Planje, Carol J. Davis,
James Page, Michael Whitely, Shane O’Neil,
and Doe West
Unlike other chapters in this section, all of which
focus on a single geographic region, this chapter
reports on countries [the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK), the
United States (US), Canada, and Australia]
located in three different geographical regions of
the world: Western Europe, North America, and
the Pacific. These major predominantly English-
speaking countries share, in addition to a com-
mon language, similar forms of governments,
similar legal systems, similar educational sys-
tems, and shared media, and popular culture. They
were all, at some point in their history, part of the
British Empire. We refer to this set of countries
throughout this volume as the UK/Anglo
countries or region. However, because Great
Britain once colonized Northern Ireland just as it
colonized the USA, Canada, and Australia, we
recruited separate samples from Great Britain
and Northern Ireland in our pursuit of a sample of
“voices” from the region.
There is clear archeological evidence of pre-
historic human habitation in all three geographic
regions now occupied by these Anglo countries.
In the first millennium BC, what is currently the
UK was inhabited by the Celts. However, the
territory was frequently invaded by Romans,
Norsemen, Saxons, Angles, and Danes (Perry
1993; Rapoza and Stuart 2009). Each of these
invaders left their influence on the culture of the
UK. The geographic areas that are currently the
USA, Canada, and Australia were sparsely inhab-
ited in the past by groups variously referred to as
K. Malley-Morrison et al. (eds.), International Handbook of War, Torture, and Terrorism,
Peace Psychology Book Series, DOI 10.1007/978-1-4614-1638-8_3,
© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2013
3
“native,” “indigenous,” “Indian,” “Inuit,” and
“aboriginal” peoples. In addition to the influence
left by invaders, these original inhabitants have
also shaped the current cultures of these countries.
Great Britain’s successful expansion and coloni-
zation united the countries in language and cul-
ture (Brendon 2007; Ferguson 2002; James 1994).
Although the phrase “all for one and one for all”
was not coined to describe the relationship among
countries, it nevertheless can be applied loosely to
the bond that unifies Great Britain, Northern
Ireland, the United States, Canada, and Australia.
Today, all four countries are often considered to
be at the core of Western contemporary civiliza-
tion (Roberts 2007). They are highly developed
and modernized, with an estimated July 2010
composite population of 427,856,806. The USA
(population 310,232,863) is the third most
populous country in the world, with the UK (popu-
lation 62,348,447) ranking 22nd, Canada
(population 33,759,742) ranking 36th, and
Australia (population 21,515,754) ranking 54th
(CIA World Factbook 2011). All four countries
have market-oriented economic systems, similar
patterns of production, and affluent living stan-
dards. The media of all four are independent, well-
developed, and a major influence on the thinking
of their citizenry. There are strong links among the
media of all four, a reality that is not always fully
recognized. Because of their population size and
because of the historical, cultural, and economic
influence of the USA and the UK, the media of the
UK and the USA exert greater influence beyond
27
28
their borders than do the media of Canada and
Australia (CIA World Factbook 2011).
The four countries have varying forms of
democratic government. The United Kingdom,
Canada, and Australia have heads of state sepa-
rate from the elected heads of government (Davis
and Davis 2009; Rapoza and Stuart 2009). The
monarch of Great Britain, Queen Elizabeth II, is
the head of state (since February 1952). Both
Canada and Australia recognize the British
monarch as head of state, with a governor-general
appointed by and representing the queen. Like
the UK, Canada and Australia elect prime minis-
ters to serve as heads of government. As of June
2011, David Cameron was Prime Minister of
Great Britain (since May 2010), Stephen Harper
was Prime Minister of Canada (since February
2006), and Julia Gillard was Prime Minister of
Australia (since June 2010). The United States
combines head of state and head of government
in the office of the elected president. In January
2009, Barack Obama became President of the
United States (CIA World Factbook 2011).
The UK, Canada, and Australia are parliamen-
tary democracies. The United States is a constitu-
tion-based federal republic with a strong democratic
tradition. Britain’s American colonies revolted in
1776 and in 1783 achieved recognition as the
United States of America. Formerly a British
colony, Canada became a self-governing dominion
in 1867 (Bumsted 2007). However, Canada still
has strong emotional ties to Great Britain. The
Commonwealth of Australia was established when
six British colonies became federated in 1901.
Although the entire island of Ireland was granted
independent status in 1921, conflicts between
groups that wanted Ireland to continue as part of
the United Kingdom and those that wanted inde-
pendence continued for decades; today, the south-
ern portion of the island is the Irish Republic, and
Northern Ireland is part of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland. For the pur-
poses of this chapter, we recruited separate samples
from Great Britain (Rapoza and Stuart 2009) and
Northern Ireland (Whitely and Linsenmeier 2009).
The ethnic makeup of the United Kingdom is
92% White (83% English, 9% Scottish, 5% Welsh,
J.M. Davis et al.
3% Northern Irish), 2% Black, 2% Indian, 1%
Pakistani, 1% mixed, and 1% others. The ethnic
makeup of the United States is 80% White, 13%
Black, 4% Asian, and 1% American Indian and
Alaskan native. The ethnic makeup of Canada is
28% British, 23% French, 4% Aboriginal peoples,
and 47% others. Thus, Canada is the most ethni-
cally diverse and inherently multicultural of the
four countries (Bickerton and Gagnon 2004). The
ethnic makeup of Australia is 92% White, 7%
Asian, and 1% aboriginal and others (CIA World
Factbook 2011).
Official Definitions of War, Torture,
and Terrorism
There are multiple official definitions of war, tor-
ture, and terrorism. Before discussing the experi-
ences of the UK/Anglo countries in regard to
these forms of violence, and before exploring the
definitions provided by ordinary people from
those UK/Anglo countries, we examine a variety
of officially recognized definitions.
Definitions of War
The Oxford English Dictionary (2010b) defines
war as “Hostile contention by means of armed
forces, carried on between nations, states, or rulers,
or between parties in the same nation or state; the
employment of armed forces against a foreign
power, or against an opposing party in the state”.
Merriam-Webster’s Seventh New Collegiate
Dictionary defines war as: “A state of usually open
and declared armed hostile conflict between states
or nations; a period of such armed conflict”
(Merriam-Webster 2011).
Definitions of Torture
Torture has been defined as “the infliction of
severe physical or psychological pain as an
expression of cruelty, a means of intimidation,
deterrent or punishment, or as a tool for
3 U.K. Anglo Definitions
the extraction of information or confessions.
Sometimes torture is practiced even when it
appears to have little or no functional purpose
beyond the gratification of the torturer or because
it has become the norm within the context”
(Oxford English Dictionary 2010a). In 1948, the
United Nations established the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, which places limi-
tations on the state in regard to the use of torture
in time of war. The United States Bill of Rights,
the English Bill of Rights, and the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms all proscribe use
of torture. Australia is the only Western democ-
racy that has no bill of rights; however, a number
of laws have been enacted to protect human
rights. Many criticisms have been leveled against
Australia for its past and present treatment of
aboriginals, and the decimation of huge portions
of the indigenous population by the English set-
tlers could certainly be seen as falling under the
heading of “torture.”
Definitions of Terrorism
There are many differing viewpoints concerning
an appropriate definition for terrorism (Cooper
2001; Davis 2004); however, most of the avail-
able definitions recognize and explain at least
one of four primary facets of terrorism: its target,
its objective, its motive, and the legitimacy of
the action. In addressing what he sees as the
indiscriminate use and application of the word
“terrorism,” Pillar (2001) noted that the United
Nations General Assembly has failed to reach an
internationally accepted definition. In Pillar’s
view, the most salient aspect of terrorism con-
sists in the fact that it is a method rather than a
set of causes or adversaries. Thus, in Pillar’s
words, “terrorism is a problem of what people
(or groups or states) do, rather than who they are
or what they are trying to achieve” (p. 18).
Hoffman (1998) addressed some of the reasons
terrorism is so difficult to define, pointing out that
even different departments and agencies of the US
Government (e.g., the US Department of State,
the US Federal Bureau of Investigation, the US
29
Department of Defense) use different definitions
for terrorism. He further noted that terrorism is
often erroneously considered to be synonymous
with “guerilla warfare” or “violent criminal
behavior” but emphasized that it is important to
distinguish it from these other terms. He con-
cluded that the most viable and commonly used
definition is the one contained in Title 22 of the
United States Code, Section 2656f(d):
“Premeditated politically-motivated violence per-
petrated against non-combatant targets by subna-
tional groups or clandestine agents, usually
intended to influence an audience” (p. 38).
Involvement in Armed Conflict,
Invasion, and/or Occupation
The many close ties among the UK/Anglo coun-
tries have often but not always led to support for
each other’s involvement in armed conflicts.
Canada was very supportive of Great Britain’s
involvement during the Boer War of 1899–1902,
whereas the USA was much less supportive, a
fact that nearly gave rise to a US–Canada conflict.
During World War I, the “Dominions and Crown
Colonies” of Great Britain, including Australia
and Canada, assisted their “mother country” in its
war against the Axis powers, as did the USA,
although the USA assumed the role of an “associ-
ated power” rather than formally declaring war.
Ireland participated in the war as part of the
United Kingdom, but the nationalists used the
war to launch their own rebellion to gain inde-
pendence from Great Britain. Following WWI,
Ireland was partitioned into the Irish Free State
(now the Republic of Ireland) and Northern
Ireland. The latter maintained its status as part of
the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom
entered World War II in 1939, as did Canada and
Australia. The USA remained neutral until the
bombing of Pearl Harbor in December 1941. The
USA emerged from the war as the world’s stron-
gest power (Soldz and Shalom 2009). The Irish
state remained neutral throughout the war.
Following World War II, Great Britain engaged
in a number of conflicts. Some were directed at
30
maintaining colonial strongholds of strategic or
economic value. Conflicts occurred in the Middle
East and as part of the civil war in Ireland (Rapoza
and Stuart 2009). Since the end of World War II,
Canada has advocated multilateralism and has
made efforts to work collaboratively with other
nations to resolve global issues (Cooper et al.
1993; Davis and Davis 2009). All four countries
are original members of the United Nations
founded in 1945 (United Nations 1986), and two
of them, the United States and the United
Kingdom, are permanent members of the UN
Security Council. In 1949, the United States,
Great Britain, and Canada became founding
members of NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (Roberts 2007).
The Korean War
The next armed conflict in which all four coun-
tries were involved was the Korean War, which
began on June 25, 1950, when North Korea
crossed into the Republic of Korea. It was an
enormous assault involving many different points
of attack and landings of seaborne detachments.
When the United Nations called for cessation of
hostilities to no effect, President Truman ordered
the US Navy and Air Force into action and later
committed American troops to the support of the
South Koreans. The Canadian Government
voiced its agreement with these moves to halt
aggression but did not place troops in Korea for
several months. However, in July, three Canadian
destroyers were sent to Korean waters to support
the United Nations’ efforts. These ships helped in
the evacuation of Inchon and were soon joined by
a Royal Canadian Air Force squadron and later
by the Canadian Army Special Force. The 25th
Canadian Infantry Brigade joined the effort in
April 1951 as the crisis deepened and fighting
intensified, and later became part of the British
Commonwealth Division of the UN forces, which
also included troops from the United Kingdom
and Australia. Fighting continued in Korea until
July 1953, when the Korea Armistice Agreement
J.M. Davis et al.
was finally signed. Although not able to provide
fighter squadrons to the UN, Canada contributed
22 Royal Canadian Air Force pilots who served
with the American units. Altogether 26,791
Canadians served in the Korean War and the
Book of Remembrance includes the names of
516 Canadian troops who fell in that war (Morton
2003, 2007). The Korean War was the “first time
in history an international organization [the UN]
had intervened effectively with a multi-power
force to stem aggression and the UN emerged
from the crisis with enhanced prestige” (Evanhoe
2010). During the Korean War, South Koreans
suffered the greatest loss of life among the Allied
forces. However, the United States (54,246
deaths), the British (1,078 deaths), and the
Australians (340 deaths) suffered greatly as well
(Roberts 2007).
The Vietnam War
In other post-WWII armed conflicts, the UK/
Anglo countries did not always agree about
appropriate actions. After World War II, the
French had sought to regain the colonial control
they had held for 200 years over what was then
called French Indochina. Under the leadership of
Ho Chi Minh, the Vietnamese resisted and in
1954, after losing the battle of Dien Bien Phu, the
French withdrew. Although the United States
provided some material support to the French
effort during the 1950s, President Eisenhower,
resisted domestic pressures to send American
military personnel. However, soon after taking
office in January 1961, President Kennedy
reversed Eisenhower’s policy and sent 500 “advi-
sors” to South Vietnam. Kennedy kept the number
of American personnel in Vietnam relatively
small: at the time of his assassination, there were
approximately 16,000 American military “advi-
sors” in Vietnam. When Johnson assumed the
presidency after Kennedy’s assassination, he
escalated the level of American involvement—
over 560,000 personnel took part in the war dur-
ing his presidency. Although President Johnson
3 U.K. Anglo Definitions
requested that British troops join the Americans
fighting in Vietnam, Prime Minister Harold
Wilson refused to send any (Leifer 1998; Howard
and Louis 1998; Roberts 2007).
Canada officially declined to participate in the
Vietnam War, and demonstrations against the war
were common throughout Canada. Even today,
many people—including many Canadians—
believe that Canada dissociated itself completely
from the Vietnam War; however, although she
was not engaged militarily, the country profited
hugely from the Vietnam War, primarily by sup-
plying equipment and supplies (including napalm
and munitions) to American forces (Levant
1986). Despite the country’s official neutrality,
about 30,000 Canadian volunteers fought together
with the Americans, and 110 died (Davis and
Davis 2009).
Australia, as a member of the Southeast Asia
Treaty Organization (SEATO), contributed sub-
stantial combat forces that joined the American
troops to Vietnam. Moreover, a substantial num-
ber of British and New Zealanders fought in
Australian uniforms alongside the Americans.
One authority (Roberts 2007) reported that
Australian pressure contributed to Johnson’s
escalation of the war.
The Terrorist Attack on 9/11/2001
and the War in Afghanistan
The wars of the twentieth century followed mostly
traditional patterns. However, a new era of interna-
tional conflict began on the morning of Tuesday,
September 11, 2001, when two hijacked airplanes
struck the twin towers of the World Trade Center
in New York City, a third hijacked plane struck the
Pentagon, and a fourth crashed in a field in
Pennsylvania when passengers struggled with the
hijackers for control. Almost 3,000 people were
killed in this attack on the United States (Roberts
2007). Initially, it was seen as a surprise attack;
however, reflection brought the realization that it
was simply the most dramatic of a series of radical
Islamic terrorist assaults over a period of 20 years.
The most notable of these include the 1982 attack
31
on US marines in Beirut; the February 1993 attack
on the twin towers in New York City led by Ranzi
Josef; the October 1993 attack against US troops
in Mogadishu; the November 1995 and June 1996
attacks against US bases in Saudi Arabia; the
August 1998 attack against American embassies in
East Africa; and the October 2000 attack against
the USS Cole in Yemen (Roberts 2007). Although
these earlier attacks received only passing attention
and were largely ignored both by the American
public and their politicians, the attack on 9/11 could
not be dismissed. The hijackers were soon revealed
to be connected to Osama bin Laden’s Islamic fun-
damentalist terrorist organization, al-Qaeda, and to
al-Qaeda’s training camps in Afghanistan (Gaddis
2004). The Taliban, the extreme fundamentalist
government of Afghanistan, had harbored and pro-
tected Osama bin Laden and the al-Qaeda training
camps.
In the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attack,
there was a rapid outpouring of support for the
USA by many foreign leaders, including those of
Great Britain, Canada, and Australia. The first
foreign leader contacted after the 9/11 attack by
President Bush was Tony Blair, Prime Minister
of England. About 6 months later, after other
efforts to pressure the Taliban to reject al-Qaeda
and Osama bin Laden had failed, an attack on the
Taliban was mounted in a joint effort by the USA,
Great Britain, Canada, Australia, and troops from
many other nations. Interestingly, a large part of
the fighting forces against the Taliban consisted
of other Afghan groups working in close
cooperation with small numbers of special forces
from the four countries. All of the four UK/Anglo
countries have taken major roles in the hostilities
in Afghanistan and in the efforts to defeat the
Taliban and al-Qaeda and to rebuild Afghanistan.
The UK and Canadian involvement has contin-
ued, focusing on working closely with the Afghan
army, police, and civil administration.
The War in Iraq
Closely related to the war in Afghanistan was the
war in Iraq. Both President Bush and Prime
32
Minister Blair argued strongly that the war on
terrorism that had begun shortly after the 9/11
attack on the USA must also address Saddam
Hussein’s Iraq. Iraq, an openly-declared enemy
of Israel and the West, was considered the world’s
foremost state-sponsor of terrorism (Roberts
2007) and a major destabilizing force in the
Middle East. Saddam Hussein had attacked Iran
and pursued a bloody 9-year war with that coun-
try, had attacked Kuwait, and had harbored ter-
rorists including the internationally infamous
Abu Nidal, and had played cat and mouse with
the UN team of inspectors charged with deter-
mining whether Iraq was developing nuclear
weapons. In addition, Hussein had used chemical
weapons against citizens of his own country. The
USA delayed invasion of Iraq while seeking both
a broad coalition of support and sanction of the
United Nations Security Council. Eventually,
after 7 months of unsatisfactory efforts to achieve
broader support, President Bush and Prime
Minister Blair ordered troops into Iraq along with
a “Coalition of the Willing.” Australia quickly
joined the US/UK-led coalition of military forces
in 2003 with approximately 2,000 personnel and
contributed in important ways to the effort. In
contrast, Prime Minister Chrétien of Canada
decided not to join the coalition, a decision sup-
ported by most Canadians. On the other hand,
although sending no troops to Iraq, Canada has
aided the US effort in several ways, including (1)
training police and army officers in Iraq, (2) help-
ing write the new Iraqi constitution, and (3)
allowing NORAD-stationed Canadian Air Force
troops to fly combat missions in Iraq (Davis and
Davis 2009).
What About Torture?
According to the British historian, Roberts (2007),
one common cultural aspect of the English-
speaking peoples is their propensity to be merci-
less in times of war; although not easily angered
in most situations, their brutality comes to the
surface in wartime. According to Roberts, during
the twentieth century, English-speaking peoples
J.M. Davis et al.
were guilty of many war crimes. For example,
two Australian officers were court-martialed and
executed after being convicted of murdering eight
Boer prisoners of war. Atrocities also took place
during the Mau Mau rebellion in Kenya, the My
Lai massacre in Vietnam, and the prisons in Abu
Ghraib in the Iraq war. Roberts concludes, how-
ever, that English-speaking peoples differ from
those in other cultures in their determination to
punish the perpetrators of wartime atrocities.
Their open societies and free press guarantee such
retribution. In many other societies, crimes of war
are often not even recognized as crimes, much
less punished. Roberts (2007) argues that in
English-speaking countries, the strong belief in
the inalienable rights of individuals and in the rule
of law guarantees that those who mistreat will be
severely disciplined (p. 30).
There are arguments, however, both for and
against the use of torture in time of war that are
taken seriously within the military professions.
Even those who argue in favor of using torture
typically acknowledge that torture is morally
wrong. They do, however, argue that there are
occasions when it is the lesser of two evils. Its
most frequent justification is the argument that it
serves national security in rare and extreme cases
that are sometimes labeled “the ticking time
bomb” scenario. According to this argument, in
the event that a captured enemy has information
about an imminent and massive attack, the use of
torture may extract that information and save
many lives (Rodin 2007; Wolfendale 2007).
Despite the persistence of disagreements con-
cerning the justifiability of torture, it is a viola-
tion of international law.
Methods
Participants
The total UK/Anglo sample consisted of 1,041
participants recruited from Australia, Canada,
the United Kingdom (including separate samples
from Great Britain and Northern Ireland), and
the United States. This sample included 268
3 U.K. Anglo Definitions
participants from Australia (127 males and 141
females), 118 participants from Canada (39
males and 79 females), 93 participants from
Great Britain (54 males and 39 females), 102
participants from Northern Ireland (47 males
and 54 females, and 1 gender undisclosed), and
460 participants from the United States (214
males and 246 females). The participants in the
survey were recruited in several ways, including
networking, and posting the survey on several
Internet websites.
The participants ranged in age from 18 to 90.
Participants reported their religious affiliation as
Christian (83%), Agnostic/Atheist (15%),
Muslim (0.2%), Buddhist (0.4%), or others (1%).
Sixty percent of respondents reported belonging
to the middle class, while only 2% reported
belonging to the upper class. Twenty-two per-
cent reported having been in the military, and
77% reported having a relative who had been in
the military. All participants completed the
Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression
and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS), either in hard
copy form or online. As part of responding to the
PAIRTAPS, participants provided their own
definitions of the terms war, torture, and
terrorism.
The PAIRTAPS
Participant definitions for each term were coded
into coding manuals developed using grounded
theory methods which are designed to identify
and organize recurrent themes within a set of
qualitative responses (Strauss and Corbin
1998). The coding categories, formulated to be
as inclusive as possible, were created based on
analyses of completed surveys from a represen-
tative international sample of respondents.
Coding categories were constructed, edited,
and reconstructed using an iterative process, and
each category was tested for interrater reliabil-
ity. Qualitative results displayed in the tables
reflect percentages of individual categories; in
the written analyses, subcategories were
sometimes added together to provide a richer
context.
33
Results
What Is War?
Participants’ definitions of war were first broken
into codeable units (if they contained more than
one codeable theme), and then each unit was coded
into one of four content-based categories: (1)
causes or precipitating factors of war; this main
category included subcategories for responses
portraying war as a last resort; responses referring
to the motivation/intent(s) behind war, such as
political or self-defense motivations; and responses
conveying a moral judgment about a motivation or
intent for war; (2) qualifications or criteria for
defining a conflict as war (i.e., scale/intensity,
duration, composition of conflicting groups, and
one-sidedness); (3) outcomes of war, both concrete
and abstract; and (4) moral judgments not associ-
ated specifically with the causes of war; there was
also a separate category for uncodeable units.
Definitions Focusing on Causes
Fifteen percent of all definitions of war were coded
into the main category for causes of war. The per-
cent of responses in each of the subcategories of
the main category labeled causes of war can be
seen in Table 3.1, along with examples of
definitions focusing on causes. Within the causes
category, the most common type of definition
focused on political motivations for war; 38% of
the responses within the causes category identified
war with its political motivation. For example, an
18-year-old Australian man defined war as “a
political tool to gain more power for the aggres-
sor’s nation-state.” In addition to the 38% of
definitions coded for political motivation, 27% of
the responses in the causes of war category were
coded for motivation/intent; 14% were coded for
moral judgment, and 5% for self-defense; also, 9%
of the causal definitions were coded into the gen-
eral causes subcategory. About 1% of all the
definitions of war defined it as something that was
a last resort; about 2% were a moral judgment
regarding a given motivation or reason for war.
34 J.M. Davis et al.

Table 3.1 Sample responses for definitions of war: causes

Category Percent Country Age Gender Response
General causes 1 (9) Australia 26 Female Two parties disagree on an issue which
causes battle
Last resort 1 (7) United Kingdom 19 Female Death, last resort, never really justified
Motivation/intent 4 (27) Canada 31 Male Bigger in scale than a skirmish or battle.
Trying to achieve a change between factions
through violent means
Political 6 (38) USA 19 Male When people try to take over another country
Self-defense 1 (5) Australia 21 Female Mainly when large groups of people, either
different countries or different religions,
raise armies and fight one another because of
differing opinions, because one is invading
and the other is defending, or because one is
after something the other won’t give
Moral judgment 2 (14) Northern Ireland 24 Male An act to verify killing people and to gain
personal wealth for your country
Note: Two figures are presented in the percent column for definitions of war in each subcategory. The first percentage
figure is the percentage of war definitions coded into the specified subcategory out of the total number of definitions of
war. The second percentage (in parentheses) indicates the percentage of war definitions coded into the subcategory out
of all the war definitions in the causes of war category. For example, political motivation represented 6 percent of all the
definitions of war and 38 percent of the war definitions in the causes of war category

Definitions Focusing on War as Conflict
Thirty-one percent of the definitions of war
identified it with conflict (see Table 3.2). The vast
majority of conflict responses identify war with
general conflict (95%) such as “fighting” as
opposed to specifically nonphysical conflict (5%)
such as “intelligence battle.”
Specification of characteristics
(qualifications) that are needed to define a
conflict as a war was the basis of another major
coding category for definitions of war (see
Table 3.2). The qualifications category included
subcategories for definitions identifying groups
officially or legally recognized as holding polit-
ical power, nonofficially recognized groups,
intensity or scale of the conflict, one-sided
aggression, duration or frequency, and general
qualifications. The most common subcategory
was comprised of definitions indicating that
war is something that is fought by groups
officially or legally recognized as holding polit-
ical power (about 18% of all responses and
25% of the definitions with qualifications). Less
commonly occurring definitions indicated that
wars can also be fought by nonofficially
recognized/informal groups, such as tribes,
rebels, or civil war (4% of all responses and 6%
of qualifications). Another popular type of
qualifier in definitions of war focused on the
intensity or scale of the conflict; 20% of
qualifications responses were coded into this
category (15% of all definitions of war). Finally,
about 6% of responses falling into the
qualifications subcategory of conflict definitions
(4% of all definitions of war) indicated that war
involves one-sided aggression—for example,
“invasion” or “occupation.”
Definitions Focusing on Outcomes
and Judgments
Relatively few of the definitions of war were
coded into the outcomes of war category (see
Table 3.3), which accounted for only 9% of all
the definitions of war. The subcategory contain-
ing the largest number of outcome responses,
72% of outcome definitions (and 6% of all
definitions of war), identified war with its
concrete outcomes and 20% of the outcome
definitions referred to abstract outcomes. One
19-year-old Australian woman included both
types of outcome in her multiunit definition, saying
that war is “Blood, terror, unnecessary killing.”
3 U.K. Anglo Definitions 35

Table 3.2 Sample responses for definitions of war: conflict and qualifications
Category Percent Country Age Gender Response
General conflict 29 (95) Australia 53 Male Large-scale violence between groups,
with at least 1,000 deaths
Nonphysical conflict 2 (5) Canada 31 Female When two or more groups fight each
other until one gives up or is completely
destroyed. It could be done financially,
with weapons or physically
General qualifications 5 (12) United Kingdom 20 Male Any violent act between one group
and another
Scale or intensity 15 (20) USA 25 Female Two or more military forces or groups
of people bearing arms are involved in
conflict with each other
Duration/frequency 2 (2) USA 26 Male Sustained violence between two or more
parties
Groups officially 18 (25) Northern Ireland 19 Male When two or more countries battle
or legally recognized unnecessarily to achieve some satisfaction
as holding power
Nonofficially recognized/ 4 (6) Australia 21 Female A time of conflict and violence between
informal groups two or more parties (e.g., two countries,
two races, two ethnic groups, two religions)
One-sided aggression 4 (6) United Kingdom 55 Female One nation-state taking up arms against
another (except for civil war where it’s
within a nation)
Note: Two figures are presented in the percent column for definitions of war in each subcategory. The first percentage
figure is the percentage of war definitions coded into the specified subcategory out of the total number of definitions of
war. The second percentage (in parentheses) indicates the percentage of war definitions coded into the subcategory out
of all the war definitions in the conflict or qualifications of war categories, respectively. For example, one-sided aggres-
sion represented 4% of all the definitions of war and 6% of the war definitions in the qualifications of war category

Table 3.3 Sample responses for definitions of war: outcomes of war, moral judgments
Category Percent Country Age Gender Response
General outcomes of war 1 (8) Australia 26 Female Where the lives of individuals are threatened
Concrete outcomes 6 (72) Northern Ireland 28 Female Hurt, blood, innocent killing, money
Abstract outcomes 2 (20) United Kingdom 59 Female Terrifying
Moral judgments 4 Canada 35 Female Unnecessary death and strife as the result
of one country’s actions against another
Note: Two figures are presented in the percent column for definitions of war in each subcategory (moral judgments is a
major category so the only number presented represents the percentage of war definitions coded for moral judgments
out of the total definitions of war). The first percentage figure is the percentage of war definitions coded into the
specified subcategory out of the total number of definitions of war. The second percentage (in parentheses) indicates the
percentage of war definitions coded into the subcategory out of all the war definitions in the outcomes of war category.
For example, concrete outcomes represented 6% of all the definitions of war and 72% of the war definitions in the
qualifications of war category

The remaining 8% of responses in the outcome
category were responses describing more general
outcomes; for example, a 21-year-old Australian
woman began her definition by saying war is “a
conflict between 2 or more politically motivated
parties,” and then referred to outcomes that could
be either physical or abstract by adding “involv-
ing violent measures that harm others.” About
4% of the definitions of war expressed a general
moral judgment not related to causes of war.
36 J.M. Davis et al.

Table 3.4 Sample responses for definitions of torture: focus on intent, motivation or emotion
Category Percent Country Age Gender Response
General destructive intent <1 (1) Australia 24 Female Inflicting harm with or without
purpose and malicious intent
Intent to pressure 1 (4) USA 20 Male Means of physical and/or
or break a person psychological pain inflicted on
a person in order to have them
submit to certain terms
Intent to cause pain, 5 (18) United Kingdom 48 Male Intent to prolong harm
suffering or harm
General constructive intent 3 (9) Canadian 19 Female Hurting someone whether
physically, emotionally, or
psychologically, for no reason or
to get something from them
Information or compliance 15 (54) Northern Ireland 19 Male Causing physical or emotional
disturbance to gather information
Strategic or tactical advantage 1 (3) Northern Ireland 19 Female Using pain as a form of control
Achieve personal goal 1 (4) United Kingdom 28 Male To make another suffer for one’s
personal gain
As a punishment 2 (7) Canada 18 Female Unnecessary punishment that is
too extreme or undeserved
Note: Two figures are presented in the percent column for definitions of torture in each subcategory. The first percentage
figure is the percentage of torture definitions coded into the specified subcategory out of the total number of definitions
of torture. The second percentage (in parentheses) indicates the percentage of torture definitions coded into the subcat-
egory out of all the torture definitions in the intent of torture category. For example, as a punishment represented 2% of
all the definitions of torture and 7% of the torture definitions in the intent of torture category

What Is Torture? tactical or strategic advantage, intent to achieve

Participant definitions of torture were coded into
six main content-based categories: (a) focus on
intent, (b) characteristics of individuals being
tortured, (c) conditions giving rise to torture, (d)
judgments, (e) methods, and (f) outcomes.
Focus on Intent
The intent category for definitions of torture was
used for responses referring to the reasons or
goals underlying the act of torture. Within the
broad category for intent, there were two major
subcategories, each of which had its own subcat-
egories: (a) destructive intent (with specific sub-
categories for definitions identifying torture with
intent to cause pain, suffering, or harm, and
intent to pressure and/or break a person) and (b)
constructive intent (with specific subcategories
for definitions equating torture with intent to
gain information or compliance, intent to gain
a personal goal, or intent to use torture as a
punishment).
The percent of definitions of torture in each of
the intent subcategories can be seen in Table 3.4,
along with examples of definitions focusing on
intent. Intent categories were broken down into
destructive and constructive intent. The summed
subcategories of constructive intent represented a
larger portion of intent responses than destructive
intent; 20% of the total number of definitions of
torture and 77% of the definitions in the intent
category were coded into one of the constructive
intent subcategories. The largest percentage of
constructive intent responses equated torture
more specifically with the intent of gaining infor-
mation or obtaining compliance (54% of intent
responses and 15% of all torture definitions).
Very few definitions (less than 1% of all torture
definitions in the Anglo sample) portrayed torture
as a behavior with a destructive intent.
3 U.K. Anglo Definitions 37

Table 3.5 Sample responses for definitions of torture: characteristics, conditions, and judgments
Category Percent Country Age Gender Response
General characteristics 1 (24) USA 19 Female A process used to get prisoners
of war to divulge valuable
information
Helplessness/powerlessness 2 (32) Australia 21 Female When somebody without power is
violently coerced into taking part
in an activity that violates their
rights
Unwilling subjects being 2 (16) Northern Ireland 22 Male A form of abuse against a person’s
held against will will
Conditions that give rise <1 USA 20 Female It is one of the many instruments
to torture of war
General judgments <1 (1) Australia 64 Male Inflicting pain with extreme
prejudice
Tolerant judgments <1 (2) Northern Ireland 45 Male Horrible necessary
Sometimes necessary <1 (1) United Kingdom 23 Female Sometimes necessary in order
to find out valuable info
Intolerant/condemning 4 (18) Canada 28 Female Imposing pain on others, in order
judgments to gain information or just for
sheer fun. Horrible. Sometimes
worse than death
Unnecessary 2 (12) Australia 53 Male Deliberate infliction of unneces-
sary suffering on individuals
Unlawful/unjust 2 (10) Canada 40 Male The unlawful mistreatment
of a detained person
Immoral/inhumane/cruel/ 8 (42) USA 42 Female Cruelty
abusive/vile
Sadistic/sick 2 (10) United Kingdom 62 Female To inflict pain for the sadistic
pleasure or to extract information
Violation of human rights 1 (4) Northern Ireland 31 Male To infringe on another human
beings human rights causing them
pain/anguish
Note: Two figures are presented in the percent column for definitions of torture in each subcategory. The first percentage
figure is the percentage of torture definitions coded into the specified subcategory out of the total number of definitions of
torture. The second percentage (in parentheses) indicates the percentage of torture definitions coded into the subcategory
out of all the torture definitions in the characteristics, conditions, or judgments of torture category. For example, unlawful
represented 2% of all the definitions of torture and 10% of the torture definitions in the judgments of torture category

Characteristics of Individuals American man provided an example of this kind

Being Tortured
A second main coding category was used for
definitions that focused on victims of torture and
their attributes—characterizing them, for exam-
ple, as helpless/powerless or as unwilling sub-
jects, being held against their will (see Table 3.5).
Responses in the characteristics category
accounted for 5% of the definitions of torture,
with definitions referring to tortured people as
helpless or powerless accounting for 32% of the
characteristics definitions. A 20-year-old
of response in explaining that torture is some-
thing that is inflicted “upon someone who cannot
defend himself.”
Conditions That Give Rise to Torture
The third main coding category was used for any
responses that discussed places, people, events,
and situations that are conducive to torture. Less
than 1% of all torture definitions fell into this
conditions category, which is illustrated by a
response from a 23-year-old Australian woman
38 J.M. Davis et al.

Table 3.6 Sample responses for definitions of torture: method and outcome
Category Percent Country Age Gender Response
General method 1 (3) USA 20 Male Pain
Hurting/harming 2 (5) Australia 53 Male Deliberate infliction of unnecessary
suffering on individuals
Physical harm 20 (47) Australia 21 Female Any means of physical, emotional,
verbal, or derivational acts which aim
to hurt, dehumanize, or extract
information out of a living thing
Psychological/mental/ 19 (45) United Kingdom 62 Male Inflicting physical or mental pain
abstract harm on others while taking no account
of their suffering
General outcome <1 (22) Northern Ireland 18 Male Destroying someone
Physical outcome 1 (41) USA 33 Female Intentional infliction of severe
physical or psychological pain or
severe impairment in bodily function
as a means of coercion or punishment
Psychological/mental/ 1 (37) Canada 19 Female Physically harming someone to the
abstract outcome point where it affects them not only
physically but emotionally and
mentally as well
Note: Two figures are presented in the percent column for definitions of torture in each subcategory. The first percentage
figure is the percentage of torture definitions coded into the specified subcategory out of the total number of definitions
of torture. The second percentage (in parentheses) indicates the percentage of torture definitions coded into the subcat-
egory out of all the torture definitions in the method or outcome of torture categories, respectively. For example, physical
harm represented 20% of all the definitions of torture and 47% of the torture definitions in the methods of torture
category

who defined torture as “something that wouldn’t
happen in normal circumstances.”
Judgments Concerning Morality/
Justice/Humanity
The fourth main category was used for responses
conveying a judgment that torture is right, wrong,
justifiable, or inhumane. The subcategory toler-
ant included definitions that indicated approval
of torture, at least under some circumstances—
for example, “sometimes necessary.” The subcat-
egory tolerant accounted for 1% of all definitions
of torture. The majority of definitions of torture
in the judgments category fell into the intolerant
subcategory, which had further subcategories:
unnecessary, unlawful/unjust, immoral/inhu-
mane, and violation of human rights.
The percent of responses in each of the sub-
categories for judgments can be seen in Table 3.5,
along with examples of definitions coded for
judgments. The subcategory immoral/inhumane
contained the largest percentage of judgments
responses, representing 42% of the judgments
definitions and 8% of all torture definitions.
These responses identify torture as an abusive
practice, or as a 77-year-old woman from the
United Kingdom wrote, torture is “always a sub-
human action.”
Focus on Method
Definitions of torture that identified it with differ-
ent acts or methods of torture were coded into a
main methods category. Method subcategories
included hurting/harming, physical, and psycho-
logical. The method category (see Table 3.6) was
the largest torture category, comprising 42% of
all definitions of torture. The physical and psy-
chological subcategories of the methods category
were the largest subcategories, with 47% and
45% of the methods responses, respectively.
Focus on Outcome
The sixth category, which included 2% of all
definitions of torture, was used for responses that
3 U.K. Anglo Definitions 39

Table 3.7 Sample responses for definitions of terrorism: valence

Category Percent Country Age Gender Response
Negative regarding 24 Australia 77 Female A personal war by bigots, who are not
terrorism allowed to discuss their objections to
other factional interests
Neutral regarding 72 United Kingdom 21 Female Hurting innocent people to instill terror
terrorism
An effort to understand 4 Canada 70 Female Violent guerilla warfare used to express
terrorism grievances by militant extremists
Positive regarding <1 Canada 19 Male A group of people that goes against the
terrorism super powers
Note: The percentage displayed indicates each subcategory of valence in relation to total responses for terrorism overall.
For example, 72% of all terrorism responses described terrorism with a neutral valence

defined torture in terms of its consequences. This
outcome category included subcategories for
physical and psychological outcomes; examples
are in Table 3.6.
What Is Terrorism?
Valence
Unlike the coding systems for war and torture,
definitions of terrorism were coded not only for
themes but also for valence. That is, in addition
to having specific thematic content, each
definition could be coded for affective leaning—
as negative, neutral, or positive regarding terror-
ism or as indicating an effort to understand
terrorism (see Table 3.7 for examples of each
form of valence). Nearly three-fourths (72%) of
the definitions of terrorism were coded as
neutral in valence, and 24% percent of definitions
of terrorism responses were categorized as
negative in valence.
After being coded for valence, each definition
of terrorism was coded into a thematic category.
Many of these thematic categories were compa-
rable to thematic categories for the war and tor-
ture definitions as well—particularly the causes
and outcomes categories.
Causes/Motivations
One main thematic category (that included 30%
of all the definitions of terrorism) was for responses
identifying terrorism with its causes/motivations.
The main causes/motivations category included
subcategories for ideological motivation, politi-
cal agenda, international motivation, emotional
causes, negative environmental conditions, last
resort, and a general causes/motivation category
(for those responses that were not specified fur-
ther into subcategories of causes/motivation) (see
Table 3.8). The subcategory accounting for the
largest proportion of causes/motivations
responses (34% of causes/motivations definitions
of terrorism responses) was political agenda, fol-
lowed by ideological motivation (23% of causes/
motivation definitions) and general motivation
(20% of causes/motivation definitions). The
remaining subcategories each contained fewer
than 10% of causes/motivation definitions.
Process/Method
Another main category, process/method, used for
responses that described how terrorism is carried
out, contained 39% of all the terrorism
definitions—the largest percentage of all the main
terrorism coding categories. This process/method
category included three subcategories: general
processes/methods, physical processes/methods,
and mental processes/methods. The physical sub-
category accounted for 71% of process/methods
responses and 28% of definitions of terrorism
responses, while the mental subcategory accounted
for 21% of process/methods responses (8% of
definitions of terrorism responses). The general
subcategory accounted for 8% of process/meth-
ods responses (3% of definitions of terrorism
responses). Examples of these different types of
responses can be found in Table 3.9.
Table 3.8 Sample responses for definitions of terrorism: cause/motivation
Category Percent Country Age Gender Response
General motivation 6 (20) Australia 53 Male Violence used to gain publicity
Ideological motivation 7 (23) USA 43 Female Attacking innocent people to make
a political or religious statement
Political agenda 10 (34) Canada 29 Male Violence with the expressed purpose
of achieving political objectives that
reach beyond the effects of the
violence itself
International 2 (7) Australia 20 Feale The result of organized groups
plotting attacks against other
countries or beliefs
Emotional causes 2 (6) Northern Ireland 34 Female Troubled individuals
Negative environmental 1 (4) Northern Ireland 28 Female Why is this happening?
conditions Society breed these things
Last resort 1 (3) United Kingdom 59 Female When one side feels that they are
not being heard—then they go to
desperate measures to be heard
No motivation 1 (3) USA 22 Male Massive murders of members of a
different race, religion, or national-
ity for no particular reason
Note: Two figures are presented in the percent column for definitions of terrorism in each subcategory. The first percent-
age figure is the percentage of terrorism definitions coded into the specified subcategory out of the total number of
definitions of terrorism. The second percentage (in parentheses) indicates the percentage of terrorism definitions coded
into the subcategory out of all the terrorism definitions in the cause/motivation of terrorism category. For example,
international represented 2% of all the definitions of terrorism and 7% of the terrorism definitions in the cause/motiva-
tion of terrorism category

Table 3.9 Sample responses for definitions of terrorism: process/method, outcomes

Category Percent Country Age Gender Response
General process 3 (8) Australia 24 Female Harmful, illegal acts committed in protest
and promotion of specific ideologies
Physical process 28 (71) USA 38 Male Damaging places and/or killing innocent
people to scare them into seeing things
your way
Mental process 8 (21) United Kingdom 49 Male Attempts to impose the will of some
against the will of others using acts of
extreme and/or indiscriminate violence
(i.e., terror)
General outcomes <1 (2) Canada 49 Male People who are extreme and desperate
who do something to harm others
Physical outcomes 4 (24) Northern Ireland 28 Female It is evil and destructive
Mental outcomes 10 (57) United Kingdom 28 Male Creating fear
Disruption of peace 3 (15) USA 21 Female To induce widespread panic in a society
and stability for a purpose deemed by a specific group
Disruption of <1 (1) Australia 28 Male A military tactic that will do anything as
economy a means to get people to be afraid,
thereby causing economic/emotional
harm. It’s a term tossed around far too
emotionally these days
Note: Two figures are presented in the percent column for definitions of terrorism in each subcategory. The first percentage
figure is the percentage of terrorism definitions coded into the specified subcategory out of the total number of definitions
of terrorism. The second percentage (in parentheses) indicates the percentage of terrorism definitions coded into the sub-
category out of all the terrorism definitions in the process/method or outcomes of terrorism category. For example, mental
process represented 8% of all the definitions of terrorism and 21% of the terrorism definitions in the process/method of
terrorism category
3 U.K. Anglo Definitions 41

Table 3.10 Sample responses for definitions of terrorism: judgments, real life reference
Category Percent Country Age Gender Response
General judgments 1 (12) USA 42 Female Stupidity
General moral judgments 3 (31) USA 36 Male Horrible and dark side of human race
Immoral acts 3 (23) Northern Ireland 19 Male When groups of people bully different
parties in a certain city or country in a
bad manner, e.g., bombings
Immoral motivation <1 (3) Australia 31 Female Cowardly opposition
Appeal to relativity 2 (15) USA 20 Female Eye of the beholder
General legal judgments <1 (3) Northern Ireland 53 Male Terrorists should feel full weight of
law and be locked away from decent
society for a long time
Illegal acts 1 (12) Australia 24 Female Harmful, illegal acts committed in
protest and promotion of specific
ideologies
Illegal motivation <1 (1) Australia 37 Male Unconventional warfare against the
civilian population, often when the
conflict is not recognized by the UN
Real life reference 1 USA 26 Female What the USA is doing against so
many countries. What capitalism does
to ALL developing nations
Note: Two figures are presented in the percent column for terrorism definitions in each subcategory. The first percentage
figure is the percentage of terrorism definitions coded into the specified subcategory out of the total number of definitions
of terrorism. The second percentage (in parentheses) indicates the percentage of terrorism definitions coded into the
subcategory out of all the terrorism definitions in the judgments and real life reference of terrorism category. For
example, acts of terrorism represented 3% of all the definitions of terrorism and 23% of the terrorism definitions in the
judgments of terrorism category

Outcomes accounted for 12% of judgments. Moral judg-

Definitions focusing on the consequences of ter-
rorism were coded into the main category, out-
comes; 18% of the definitions of terrorism were
coded as identifying terrorism with its outcomes.
The outcomes category included several subcat-
egories: general outcomes, physical outcomes,
mental outcomes, disruption of peace and stabil-
ity, and disruption of the economy. The emotional
subcategory accounted for 57% of outcomes
responses (10% of definitions of terrorism
responses). The physical and disruption of peace
and stability subcategories accounted for 24% of
outcomes (4% of definitions of terrorism) and
15% of outcomes responses (3% of definitions of
terrorism), respectively.
The remaining summed main categories, judg-
ments and real life reference, contained 11% and
1% of definitions of terrorism responses, respec-
tively. Moral judgments accounted for the vast
majority of judgments responses (72% of judg-
ments), while legal judgments accounted for 16%
of judgments, and the general judgments category
ments were further broken down into general
moral judgments, immoral acts, immoral motiva-
tion, and appeal to relativity, which each
accounted for 3%, 3%, <1%, and 2% of definitions
of terrorism, respectively. Legal judgments were
further broken into general illegal judgments,
illegal acts, and illegal motivation, which each
accounted for roughly 1% of definitions of terror-
ism responses. Table 3.10 provides subcategories
and percentages for each of these main catego-
ries, along with examples.
Exploratory Analyses
As indicated in Chap. 2 of this volume, several
types of analyses were conducted to explore pos-
sible demographic group differences in the fre-
quency of particular definitions of war, torture,
and terrorism; consistent with a qualitative
approach and a focus on respondents’ personal
definitions of terms, chi-square analyses were
42
Table 3.11 Definitions of war, torture, and terrorism: percentages of responses in coding categories with combination
scores from all three items by demographic groups and chi-square values
Group 1a
Categories Male
Abstract outcomes 57
Moral judgment 4 55
Military
Abstract outcomes 65
Political motivation 44
Moral judgments 39
Relative military
Abstract outcomes 58
Methods 94
Protest
Political motivation 36
Moral judgment 54
Note: These categories were created by summing responses in equivalent categories and all three definitions
*
p £ 0.05; **p £ 0.01; ***p £ 0.001
a
The numbers in these columns are the percent of the specified demographic group that gave responses falling into each
of the specified categories
used for many of the comparisons. For example,
important comparisons between men and women
used chi-squares to maintain the focus on what
people said, rather than restricting analyses to tra-
ditional approaches for determining whether one
gender scored significantly higher than another on
some mean score. Nevertheless, both chi-square
analyses and more traditional tests of group dif-
ferences such as t tests and ANOVAs were run.
When statistical analysis revealed significant
results through both chi-squares and t tests, chi-
square results were given preference. However,
when t tests with count scores revealed group dif-
ferences not found through chi-square analysis
for presence or absence of particular themes, those
t test results were considered possible indicators
of areas for future research and therefore were
reported. Nevertheless, because the findings were
derived from convenience samples, all results
should be considered as purely exploratory. When
differences are described as “statistically
significant,” they had a p value of 0.05 or smaller;
the term “marginally significant” refers to differ-
ences with a p value between 0.056 and 0.10.
Analyses of variance revealed significant dif-
ferences among nationalities in the frequency of
morality-based definitions of all three terms (war,
J.M. Davis et al.
Group 2a c2
Female
49 5.46*
19.10***
Nonmilitary
51 7.61**
29 11.11***
50 5.06*
No relative military
47 9.36**
88 9.46**
No protest
29 4.50*
45 5.55*
torture, and terrorism), with post hoc tests indicat-
ing that participants from Northern Ireland had
higher scores for moral judgment use than those
from the United Kingdom and the United States.
Chi-square analyses revealed other significant
group differences in the use of the higher order
variables created by combining responses in com-
mon categories (i.e., abstract outcomes, moral
judgments, political motivation, moral judgments,
and methods) across the three definitions. (Refer
to Table 3.11 for percentages of responses in cod-
ing categories including all three definitional
items.) Three groups were more likely than their
counterparts to provide at least one moral judg-
ment when their definitions of war, torture, and
terrorism are considered as a set: women, protest-
ers, and participants who had not been in the
military. Specifically, across definitions, (1)
significantly more women than men included a
moral judgment in their definitions, (2)
significantly more participants who had taken part
in protests included a moral judgment in their
definitions than those who had not protested, and
(3) significantly more of the participants who had
not served in the military provided a moral judg-
ment than those who had served. Although these
findings indicate that significantly more women,
3 U.K. Anglo Definitions
Table 3.12 Torture: percentages of responses in coding
categories by demographic groups and chi-square values
Group 1a Group 2a c2
Categories Male Female
Constructive intent 4 7 5.05*
Tolerant presence 2 0.6 4.87*
Intolerant presence 29 42 16.45***
Protest No protest
Intolerant presence 44 31 13.27***
Note: “Presence” at the end of a variable name signifies
that the presence/absence variable was created by assign-
ing a 1 to any participant who had at least one response in
that category or any of its subcategories. Please refer to
the Methods chapter for a more detailed description of
how these variables were created
*
p £ 0.05; ***p £ 0.001
a
The numbers in these columns are the percent of the
specified demographic group that gave responses falling
into each of the specified categories
protesters, and nonmilitary people included some
sort of moral judgment in their definitions, they
do not indicate the extent to which those judg-
ments expressed rejection or support for war, tor-
ture, or terrorism. Additionally, men, veterans,
and participants with a relative in the armed forces
were significantly more likely to utilize abstract
outcomes across definitions than women, those
without a military background, and respondents
without a relative in the military. Inclusion of
methods in definitions of war, torture, and terror-
ism was significantly more apparent among par-
ticipants with a relative in the military, as opposed
to those without family in the armed forces.
Finally, veterans and protesters were significantly
more likely than counterparts to cite at least one
political motivation when defining war, torture,
and terrorism than civilian and those who did not
participate in protests.
In addition to running exploratory analyses
across definitions, we ran analyses for each of the
thematic categories separately by definition.
Table 3.12 summarizes the group differences that
were found on several of the torture coding cate-
gories. Chi-squares revealed that significantly
more women than men defined torture in a way
that showed their intolerance for the behavior,
and significantly more protesters than nonpro-
testers defined torture in a way that indicated
43
intolerance. In addition, significantly more
women than men referred to the constructive
intent of torture in their definitions. Finally,
significantly more men than women provided
definitions that indicated tolerance for torture.
Chi-square analyses revealed no significant dif-
ferences between participants with military service
and those without such service in their likelihood
of including an expression of intolerance for tor-
ture in their definitions. However, a t test analysis
comparing count scores revealed significantly
higher levels of intolerance of torture (both the
general subcategory and the intolerant sum) in
participants who had not been in the military than
those who had served. Additional analyses revealed
that although, as previously indicated, significantly
fewer men than women made moral judgments
when defining the key terms (see earlier discus-
sion), men scored significantly higher than women
on tolerance for torture; thus, the men were less
likely than women to make moral judgments about
torture, but when they did make moral judgments,
they were more likely to be tolerant of torture than
were the women. See Table 3.13 for t test findings
for definitions of torture.
Analyses of t test count scores for definitions
indicating intolerance for torture revealed gender
differences in reasons given to justify torture. On
the one hand, women scored significantly higher
than men on number of responses describing tor-
ture as coded in the following three categories:
unnecessary, immoral, cruel, or inhumane, and
sadistic, as well as in showing general intoler-
ance for torture. On the other hand, men had
significantly higher scores for defining torture as
a violation of human rights. In addition, men
scored significantly higher than women in
defining torture as a tolerant sum. As compared
with respondents who had never been involved in
an antiwar protest, respondents who had partici-
pated in a protest scored higher in the tendency to
define torture as immoral, cruel, or inhumane,
and as sadistic or sick. Participants who had pro-
tested scored significantly higher on intolerance
than nonprotesters. Participants with relatives in
the military also had higher scores for defining
torture as a violation of human rights than those
who did not have relatives in the military.
44 J.M. Davis et al.

Table 3.13 Definitions of torture: t test findings for demographic group means of coding categories
Group 1 Group 2 t df
Categories Male Female
Tolerant sum 0.03 (0.20) 0.01 (0.08) 2.21*** 529.19
Immoral, cruel, or inhumane 0.05 (0.23) 0.11 (0.33) 2.80*** 837.00
Unnecessary 0.04 (0.20) 0.07 (0.26) 2.03* 868.71
Sadistic torture 0.02 (0.13) 0.07 (0.27) 3.78*** 694.28
Violation of human rights 0.03 (0.17) 0.01 (0.09) 2.22* 616.66
Protest No protest
Intolerant sum 0.54 (0.71) 0.38 (0.63) 3.31*** 556.34
Immoral, cruel, inhumane 0.24 (0.45) 0.17 (0.41) 2.19* 567.93
Sadistic torture 0.09 (0.29) 0.03 (0.17) 3.31*** 414.32
Relative military No relative military
Violation of human rights 0.02 (0.15) 0.01 (0.08) 2.02* 842.66
Military Nonmilitary
General intolerant 0.02 (0.16) 0.09 (0.30) 3.74*** 292.94
Intolerant sum 0.32 (0.58) 0.45 (0.67) 2.26* 176.60
Note: “Sum” at the end of a variable name indicates the category was created by adding all the subcategories of the
major category together. Standard deviations appear in parenthesis next to the means. Please refer to the Methods chap-
ter for a more detailed description of how these variables were created. Standard deviations appear in parentheses next
to means
*
p £ 0.05; ***p £ 0.001

In relation to definitions of terrorism, t tests Table 3.14 Definitions of terrorism: percentages of

revealed a significantly higher sum score of legal responses in coding categories by demographic groups
and chi-square values
judgments from participants who had been in the
military than those who had not served. Group 1a Group 2a c2
Conversely, participants who have not been in the Categories Male Female
military provided significantly more definitions Ideological motivation 10 16 5.26*
of terrorism in the subcategories making up moral Emotional causes 1 5 9.76**
judgments (there is no table with these findings Protest No protest
Ideological motivation 9 16 8.40**
because there are fewer than three results). In
Appeal to relativity 5 2 6.55**
addition, chi-squares revealed that more protest-
*
ers than nonprotesters appealed to the relativity p £ 0.05; **p £ 0.01
a
The numbers in these columns are the percent of the
of the use of the term “terrorism.” specified demographic group that gave responses falling
Unlike earlier findings in this chapter analyz- into each of the specified categories
ing moral judgment variables, where women and
protesters showed similar response patterns,
women and protesters differed in the extent to variables and chi-square associations for
which they identified terrorism with particular definitions of terrorism.
motivations. Specifically, chi-square analyses In regard to definitions of war, chi-square
indicated that significantly more nonprotesters analyses revealed that women, protesters, and
and women, as compared to their counterparts, nonmilitary personnel were significantly more
defined terrorism in terms of ideological motiva- likely to use moral judgments in defining war
tion. Women were also more likely than men to than their counterparts (Table 3.15). In addition,
include emotional causes of terrorism in their nonprotesters were more likely than protesters to
definitions. Refer to Table 3.14 for percentages of define war as nonphysical conflict and as a gen-
responses in coding categories by demographic eral focus on conflict.
3 U.K. Anglo Definitions
Table 3.15 Definitions of war: percentages of responses in
coding categories by demographic groups and chi-square
values
Group 1a Group 2a c2
Categories Male Female
General moral judgment 11 17 6.76**
Military Nonmilitary
General moral judgment 5 16 9.85**
Protest No protest
Nonphysical conflict 2 4 4.45*
Focus on conflict 59 70 9.98**
General moral judgment 19 12 8.96**
*
p £ 0.05; **p £ 0.01
a
The numbers in these columns are the percent of the
specified demographic group that gave responses falling
into each of the specified categories
In addition, as shown in Table 3.16, t tests
revealed that men and people who were in the
military also scored higher than their counter-
parts for inclusion of qualifications regarding war
in their definitions. In addition, people who had
not protested had higher scores on focus on
conflict for definitions of war than protesters.
Discussion and Conclusions
This chapter focused on definitions of war, tor-
ture, and terrorism from four major English-
speaking countries: Australia, Canada, the United
Kingdom (with separate samples from Great
Britain and Northern Ireland), and the United
States. The first part of the chapter presented rea-
sons for considering the four major English-
speaking countries as a group even though they
are not in a single geographic region. These four
countries are at the core of Western civilization
with many cultural similarities. All are diverse
and open societies. They share a common lan-
guage, a democratic form of government, mar-
ket-oriented economic systems, independent
media, and material prosperity.
After discussing a number of official definitions
of war, torture, and terrorism, the chapter pro-
vided a brief summary of the involvement of each
of these countries in wars and conflicts. Particular
emphasis was placed on conflicts since World
45
War II. In addition, it is noteworthy that conflicts
involving any of these countries almost always
involved all four. For example, when the Nazis
attacked England at the onset of World War II,
Canada quickly came to her defense, Australia
followed, and the United States later did also.
The Korean War involved all four countries. Even
the Vietnam War involved all of them, although
Canada participated primarily as a supplier of
munitions. Even in the present conflicts in
Afghanistan and Iraq, all four are deeply involved.
The unity clearly demonstrates their “all for one
and one for all” relationship.
Because of their common language, common
traditions, and similar forms of government and
legal systems, the four countries also share a
common approach to the questions of war, tor-
ture, and terrorism. This background provides the
context for examining the responses of partici-
pants to the questions: “What is war?” “What is
torture?” and “What is terrorism?”
Consistent with the pioneering nature of this
cross-national study, participants were encour-
aged to express their views in their own words
rather than choose from a predetermined set of
response choices. This method is particularly
effective in eliciting emergent themes that might
go undetected by more traditional survey tech-
niques. Participants’ responses were examined,
analyzed, and then coded into main categories
and subcategories that yielded frequencies within
categories, dominant themes, and a diversity of
responses to each question. The purpose of these
qualitative analyses is to begin to describe and
construct emergent definitions of war, torture,
and terrorism from the bottom up, in other words,
from the views of ordinary people, rather than
from the top down, that is from the views of
scholars, official sources and dictionaries.
When asked to define war, participants pro-
vided a great variety of responses that were then
grouped into five main categories and several
subcategories. A focus on conflict was the predom-
inant theme in the definitions of war. A secondary
theme specified that war was a conflict typically
involving groups that officially or legally hold
power. Thus, the preponderance of definitions of
war provided by the UK/Anglo sample do not
46
Table 3.16 Definitions of war: t test findings for demographic group means of coding categories
Group 1
Categories Male
Qualifications of war sum 1.52 (1.15)
Military
Qualifications of war sum 1.61 (1.15)
Protest
Conflict war sum 0.61 (0.52)
Note: “Sum” at the end of a variable name indicates the category was created by adding all the subcategories of the
major category together. Standard deviations appear in parenthesis next to the means. Please refer to the Methods chap-
ter for a more detailed description of how these variables were created. Standard deviations appear in parentheses next
to means
*
p £ 0.05; **p £ 0.01; ***p £ 0.001
differ notably from official definitions of war that
one might find in policy statements or
dictionaries.
In response to the question “What is torture?”
participants provided responses that were grouped
into six main categories and a number of subcat-
egories. A review of these categories and subcat-
egories reveals that large numbers of responses
focused on physical harm and psychological
harm as well as the attempt to gain information or
compliance by using torture. A substantial num-
ber of responses also contained the description of
torture as immoral, inhumane, and cruel.
In response to the question, “What is terror-
ism?” participants again provided a great variety
of responses. These responses were coded accord-
ing to valence (positive/neutral/negative/an effort
to understand). The responses were also coded
according to theme into seven main categories. In
terms of valence, nearly three-fourths (72%) of
the participants provided responses that were
coded as neutral. Twenty-four percent of
responses were coded as negative; 4% were
coded as an effort to understand, and <1% were
coded as expressing a positive valence for terror-
ism. Interestingly, an example of a response that
was coded as showing a positive valence for ter-
rorism came from a 19-year-old Canadian male.
The response was “a group of people that goes
against the super powers.”
Responses to the question “What is terror-
ism?” were also coded using seven categories.
The category with the largest number of responses
focused on terrorism as a process or a method.
J.M. Davis et al.
Group 2 t df
Female
1.20 (1.11) 4.17*** 864.48
Nonmilitary
1.31 (1.13) 2.62** 161.38
No protest
0.75 (0.53) 3.75*** 641.88
The category with the second-largest number of
responses focused on cause or motivation behind
terrorist acts. The category with the third-largest
number of responses focused on outcomes of ter-
rorist acts.
Similarities and differences in the definitions
of war, torture, and terrorism were analyzed with
quantitative analyses on the following five vari-
ables: nationality (Australians/Canadians/English/
Irish/American), gender (males/females), military
service (yes/no), a relative in the military (yes/
no), and engagement in political protest (yes/no).
There were many more similarities than differ-
ences; however, the differences that did appear
provide useful avenues for further research.
When nationalities were compared across all
definitions (war, torture, terrorism), morality-
based scores were significantly higher for partici-
pants from Northern Ireland than for those from
England and the United States.
Gender differences appeared in a number of
areas. Women were significantly more likely than
men to make moral judgments in their definitions
of war, torture, and terrorism. In regard to toler-
ance for torture, women showed significantly
greater intolerance than men. Moreover, women
provided significantly more responses describing
torture as unnecessary, immoral, and sadistic,
while men provided significantly more responses
describing torture as a violation of human rights.
In regard to terrorism, significantly more women
than men attributed terrorism to ideological moti-
vation and referred to emotional causes of terror-
ism in their definition.
3 U.K. Anglo Definitions
Participants who had not served in the military
were significantly more likely than those who
had served to make moral judgments in their
definitions of war, torture, and terrorism. In
regard to tolerance for torture, there were no
significant differences between those who had
served in the military and those who had not. In
regard to terrorism, those who had served in the
military were significantly more likely than those
who had not served to include political motiva-
tions in their definition.
Participants who had taken part in political
protest were significantly more likely than those
who had not to make moral judgments in their
definitions of war, torture, and terrorism. In
regard to tolerance for torture, protesters showed
significantly greater intolerance than nonprotest-
ers. In regard to terrorism, protesters were
significantly more likely than nonprotesters to
include political motivations in their definition.
Having summarized the qualitative and quan-
titative results, we deem it appropriate to com-
ment briefly on the methodology of this research.
The purpose of the research was not to assess
agreement or disagreement with official
definitions of war, torture, and terrorism but
rather to explore the conceptualizations of ordi-
nary people concerning these terms. Thus, the
methodology of the present research was largely
qualitative. Definitions were obtained using
open-ended survey questions, and these
definitions were then broken into units and the
units coded into categories and subcategories.
Most of the analyses, therefore, focused on fre-
quencies within coded categories and subcatego-
ries and on identification of emerging themes.
Qualitative research such as this generally
occurs in the early pioneering work into a new
field. However, even these preliminary results
suggest a number of practical applications.
Foremost among these is that the findings and the
emerging themes of the present research can
inform policymakers and government officials.
In democratic countries with strong media (such
as those included in this chapter), government
officials and policymakers must take into account
the views and understanding of ordinary citizens.
The data reported here provide the views of
47
ordinary people on the important topics of war,
torture, and terrorism, and these are well worth
consideration by government officials and
policymakers.
The results also have value for the ordinary
citizen who wants to be informed about the diver-
sity and breadth of views held by ordinary people
in the Anglo countries. Even well-informed indi-
viduals often assume that the views they hold
may be more prevalent than in fact is the case.
This is a natural phenomenon because of the ten-
dency of people to congregate with others similar
to themselves and communicate most openly
with those who share their views. The findings of
the present research can serve as a corrective to
this natural parochialism.
In conclusion, we want to offer several sug-
gestions for future research. It would be very use-
ful to replicate these results with larger, and more
representative, samples. If the themes and pat-
terns that emerged in the present research can be
replicated, it would greatly increase the confidence
that these themes are durable and valid. Another
direction for future research would involve devel-
oping quantitative instruments to measure agree-
ment and disagreement with the themes and
definitions that predominated in the present
research. Clearly, this pioneering work has
opened up a number of promising avenues for
both application and future research.
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 Definitions of War, Terrorism,
and Torture in the Balkan 4
Peninsula and Russia

Sherri McCarthy, Vlado Miheljak, Nebojsa Petrovic’ ,

Marko Polič, Charikleia Tsatsaroni,
Nadide Pinar Kulakoglu, Anna Medvedeva,
Alev Yalcinkaya, Shane O’Neil, and Elizabeth Stern

Russia and the Balkan Peninsula countries have
been at the crossroads between Western European
and Eastern Asian cultural traditions since those
cultural traditions began. Perhaps because of this
long history of confrontations between cultures, there
have been many conflicts within this region, and
boundaries defining states have changed more than
once. The long history of conflicts may account for
why many citizens of the countries in this region
find it important to transcend nationalism and to
create, cite, and attempt to adhere to international
standards, such as the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights adopted by the United Nations
(1948). On the other hand, the long-standing ten-
sions among perspectives, goals, and lifestyles may
also account for the awareness of and loyalty to
particular family and ethnic histories, including
specific religious beliefs, language dialects, dietary
traditions, and codes of social conduct that are
common in the countries in this region.
Russia and the Balkan states, despite their
close proximity to each other, are characterized
by a heterogeneity of fairly insular cultures.
Conflicts and differences in perspectives are
long-standing and can often be distinguished
along national or religious lines. Currently, each
country in the region is characterized by a major-
ity culture, with varying proportions of minority
cultural representation. The assortment of cul-
tures throughout the region (predominantly South
Slavic, Russian, Germanic, Greek, Roman, and
Turkish in origin) is similar, but the majority
culture in each country differs (Dawisha and
Parrott 1994). Orthodox Christianity is the most
common religion, followed by Islam. For purposes
of the current chapter, the specific countries
included for analysis were Russia, Greece,
Slovenia, and Serbia. Brief descriptions of each
of these four countries appear next, followed by a
discussion of a qualitative analysis of all of the
data gathered in this region. For a more detailed
description of each individual country, please
refer to State Violence and the Right to Peace: An
International Survey of the Views of Ordinary
People (Malley-Morrison 2009).
Balkan Peninsula Region
The Balkan Peninsula is a geopolitical and cul-
tural region of southeastern Europe that is
named for the Balkan Mountains, which range
from central Bulgaria to eastern Serbia, with a
population of about 55 million people. Most of
the southeastern peninsula in Europe extends
south from central Europe into the Mediterranean
Sea and includes the countries of Albania,
Bosnia, Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece,
Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia,
Slovenia (though by geographical criteria, only
about 25 % of this country is actually on the
peninsula, and the rest is often counted as part

K. Malley-Morrison et al. (eds.), International Handbook of War, Torture, and Terrorism, 49

Peace Psychology Book Series, DOI 10.1007/978-1-4614-1638-8_4,
© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2013
50
of Central Europe), and the portion of Turkey
not on the Asian continent (Kaplan 1994). In its
long history, the peninsula underwent conquest
by the empires of ancient Greece: the Byzantine
Empire and the Ottoman Empire.
Greece
The influence of Greek history and philosophy on
modern Western civilization is well known, but
occupation by the Ottoman Empire made it difficult
for Greeks to be aware of their own cultural heri-
tage during the 400 years their country was sub-
jected to Ottoman domination. As a result of
Ottoman rule, Greece was largely isolated from the
Renaissance, the Enlightenment, and the Industrial
Revolution. Modern democracy, said to have been
born in Greece, was not reestablished there until
the late twentieth century. Prior to this, twentieth-
century Greece was plagued with war and conflict,
including the Balkan wars, the two world wars, a
civil war, and several military dictatorships, the
last ending in 1974. Greece added islands and
territories starting with its 1829 independence
from the Ottoman Empire and continuing into the
beginning of the twentieth century. Currently, it
consists of a peninsula and over 2,000 islands, with
an area of approximately 132,000 km2. In 2010,
the population was just under 11 million people
(CIA World Factbook 2010)
Greek Orthodox is the predominant religion in
Greece; the majority of Greek citizens (97 %
according to the US State Department) identify
as Greek Orthodox, but people of other faiths
have the legal right to practice their religions
(International Religious Freedom Report 2007).
About 2 % of the population are either Jewish or
subscribe to other Christian denominations.
Despite being a relatively small portion of the
population, many Jews have found a haven in
Greece for the last 2,000 years. Prior to World
War II, Thessaloniki and Athens were the sites of
large Jewish communities; over half of
Thessaloniki’s population was Jewish in the early
twentieth century, making it one of the largest
Jewish populations in the world. In Post-World
S. McCarthy et al.
War II, there are an estimated 5,000 Jewish
people living in Greece, predominantly in Athens
(Schoenberg 2011).
A major shift in the population of Greece
occurred following the Treaty of Lausanne in
1923; at this time, Greece and Turkey agreed to a
population transfer based upon cultural and reli-
gious identity. In accordance with this treaty,
500,000 Muslims left Greece and resettled in
Turkey while 1,500,000 Greeks left Turkey for
Greece (CIA World Factbook 2011).
Serbia
Formerly referred to as Yugoslavia or the Kingdom
of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, the Republic of
Serbia is a land-locked nation in the heart of
Central and Southeastern Europe. Its capital city,
Belgrade, is one of the largest cities in Southeastern
Europe. Currently, whether or not Kosovo is
considered part of Serbia is in dispute. According
to the constitution of Serbia, it is recognized by
approximately 130 countries, including Russia,
China, Greece, Romania, India, and Spain. If so,
the country covers 88,361 km2 and has a popula-
tion of about 9 million people. According to the
USA, Germany, France, Saudi Arabia, and about
60 other countries, Kosovo is not part of Serbia.
In that case, the country covers approximately
78,000 km2 and has a population of about 7.5 mil-
lion (CIA World Factbook 2010).
Many archeological sites show a long history
of culture in Serbia. It was, for example, impor-
tant to the Roman Empire, with 17 Roman
Emperors being born in present-day Serbia, more
than in any other modern country except what is
present-day Italy (Jonson and Archer 1996).
Moreover, the Roman Emperor Constantine I,
who spread Christianity throughout the Roman
Empire, was born in Serbia (Mazowar 2000).
Serbs eventually formed a medieval kingdom that
evolved into a Serbian Empire, reaching its peak
in the fourteenth century as one of the most pow-
erful states in Europe. From the sixteenth to nine-
teenth centuries, the Ottoman Empire (and
intermittently the Hapsburgs) occupied Serbian
4 Balkan Peninsula and Russian Definitions
territories (Kaplan 1994). Then, in the early nine-
teenth century, after the Serbian revolution,
Serbia expanded its territory and became the
region’s first constitutional monarchy. Later, it
was among the first countries in southeastern
Europe to abolish feudalism and serfdom. The
Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was cre-
ated in 1918 and later—in 1929—became known
as Yugoslavia (New World Encyclopedia n.d.).
During World War II, Axis powers created the
Independent State of Croatia, comprised of land
from modern Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
and parts of Serbia’s Province of Vojvodina,
thereby creating tensions between Serbs and
Croats (Banac 1984). Nazis also created concen-
tration camps throughout Serbia, including the
Belgrade Fairgrounds and Staro Sajmište, one of
the largest European camps. Ninety percent of
the Serbian Jewish population as well as hun-
dreds of thousands of other Serbs and Roma gyp-
sies died in these camps, with estimates ranging
between 330,000 and 700,000 Serbian victims
(Schoenberg 2011).
By late 1944, Communists were established
as the ruling elite in Serbia; under their rule,
around 70,000 Serbians perished between 1944
and 1946, including 10,000 Belgraders. The
Communist takeover deposed the monarchy and
produced a totalitarian Communist state with
Serbia as a republic and Kosovo and Vojvodina
as provinces under the Socialist Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia (Serbia 2011). By the late 1960s,
conflict among the Communist political leaders
led to gains in power for pro-decentralization
supporters, including Aleksandar Ranković, a
high-ranking Communist official (Parrott 1995)
working with Marshall Tito who supported
Tito’s decision to break Yugoslavia away from
domination by the Soviet Union. By the early
1970s, pro-decentralization reformers in
Yugoslavia, especially from Slovenia and
Croatia, succeeded in attaining decentralization
of powers (Banac 1992), including granting
considerable autonomy to Kosovo and
Vojvodina, and recognizing a Muslim Yugoslav
nationality. Such concessions met with consid-
erable opposition from Serbian officials who
51
viewed them as incompatible with Yugoslavia’s
commitment to Marxism, particularly in their
support for Albanian nationalism. The efforts of
Slobodan Milošević, who rose to power in 1989,
to reverse the granting of increased autonomy to
Kosovo and Vojvodina ultimately led to the sepa-
ration of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Herzegovina,
and Macedonia from Yugoslavia (Allison and
Bluth 1998).
Although the fall of the Berlin Wall was fol-
lowed by progress towards a multiparty system in
Serbia, much of Eastern Europe descended into
violence. During the leadership of Milošević,
social unrest increased in Serbia, and the United
Nations (UN) responded to his Communist poli-
cies by imposing an economic embargo on Serbia.
Although many Serbians, struggling just to sur-
vive, tolerated his policies, other groups, led by
student organizations and NGOs, engaged in
largely nonviolent resistance activities through-
out the 1990s.
The Dayton Agreement, signed in Paris in
1995, ended the war in Bosnia. The war in Croatia
also ended around this time, and the UN embargos
were loosened. This was a short respite, however,
because disregard for human rights in Kosovo soon
became an escalating crisis. Repression was widely
used against ethnic minorities and those who dis-
agreed with the government. NATO’s threats did
not force compliance, and confrontations between
Serbian security forces and Kosovo Albanians
escalated, resulting in a NATO military interven-
tion that involved 3 months of heavy bombing until
Milošević capitulated and withdrew from Kosovo.
In 2000, the people of Serbia participated in a large
demonstration, widely recognized as a democratic
revolution, and removed him from power. In 2001,
the country’s suspension from the UN was lifted.
This led to the end of the international isolation
Serbia had endured for years. Slobodan Milošević
was accused of war crimes and crimes against
humanity committed during the wars in Croatia,
Bosnia, and Kosovo at the International Criminal
Tribunal of the former Yugoslavia and detained
until he died in 2006 (CIA World Factbook 2010).
The downfall of Milošević led to the beginning of
negotiations between the EU and Serbia, aimed at
52
acceptance of Serbia into the EU (CIA World
Factbook 2010).
From 2003 to 2006, Serbia was part of the
“State Union of Serbia and Montenegro” (formerly
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia). In a referen-
dum on May 21, 2006, 55 % of Montenegrin vot-
ers voted in favor of independence from Serbia.
Kosovo followed suit in February of 2008, by also
declaring independence from Serbia. In February
of 2008, the parliament of Serbia’s southern prov-
ince of Kosovo declared independence, although
Serbia considers Kosovo to be an “autonomous
province”; it is currently governed by a UN mis-
sion (CIA World Factbook 2010). Serbia today is
considered to have an “emerging and developing
economy” (International Monetary Fund 2011)
and to be one of the few free Balkan states (CIA
World Factbook 2010); it is seeking to join both
NATO and the EU.
Ethnic composition within Serbia is as fol-
lows: Serb 83 %, Hungarian 4 %, Bosnian 2 %,
Romany (Gypsy) 1 %, Slav 1 %, Montenegrin
1 %, and other 8 %. Religious affiliation is as fol-
lows: Serbian Orthodox 85 %, Catholic 6 %,
Muslim 3 %, other 5 %, and Protestant 1 %
(Petrovic et al. 2009).
Slovenia
Slovenia is located between Italy, Croatia,
Hungary, and Austria. The majority of people
speak the country’s official language, Slovene;
other common languages include Hungarian and
Italian. It is the richest Slavic country per capita.
The literacy rate exceeds 99 %. The population is
approximately 57 % Catholic, 3 % Orthodox and
2 % Muslim, with the remainder of the population
belonging to different religious groups or citing no
religious affiliation. Ethnicities include Slovene
(83 %); ethnic groups from the former Yugoslavia
including Serbs, Croatians, Bosnians, Macedonians,
and Montenegrins (5 %); Hungarian, Albanian,
Italians, Roma, and other minorities (3 %); and
unknown or undeclared (8.9 %) (CIA World
Factbook 2010).
Slovenia has a long past but a short history.
Stone tools dated at over 250,000 years old have
S. McCarthy et al.
been unearthed there. Various regions of modern-
day Slovenia were ruled by people of Germanic
(Bavarian), Slavic, Roman, and Hungarian ori-
gin, falling under the rule of the Holy Roman
Empire, the Frankish Kingdom, the Hapsburg
Monarchy, and the First French Empire, among
others (Kaplan 1994; Mazowar 2000). Christianity
first became prevalent in Slavic areas of Slovenia
in the eighth century (Mazowar 2000). It was not
until the sixteenth century that Slovene began to
appear as a regional ethnic identity (Mazowar
2000).
During the twentieth century, there were many
changes in boundaries of Slovenia and the parties
in power there. In the early parts of the century,
the land that is now Slovenia was divided, with
the State of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs account-
ing for one part (which became the Kingdom of
Yugoslavia), while the remaining parts were
under Italian rule. In the 1940s, Slovenia, as part
of Yugoslavia, was divided among the Axis pow-
ers. Shortly thereafter, it was reunited (along with
the western region that had been separated under
Italian rule) under the Socialist Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia (Banac 1984). From then until the
country declared sovereignty in 1991, its history
converged with Serbia, recounted above. In
2004, Slovenia joined the UN and became a
member of NATO. Because of strong ties to
Europe, Slovenia was the first of the former
Yugoslav Republics to become part of the EU
(Republic of Slovenia, n.d.)
Russia
Russia’s history is intertwined with the Balkan
region. Initially, many of the same tribal groups
that eventually settled in the Balkan Peninsula
occupied the vast Russian steppes along with the
Rus. The Cyrillic alphabet and common or simi-
lar languages and dialects were shared. Later,
wars shaped interactions. Russia was an ally dur-
ing the World Wars in defeating the Axis powers.
Although Boris Yeltzin, particularly during his
early years in power in Russia, took a generally
“liberal-internationalism” approach to the Balkan
states, Putin took a more hard-line approach to
4 Balkan Peninsula and Russian Definitions
Russian national interest above all, in his years in
power (Headley 2008).
Since the dissolution of the USSR, the Russian
Federation extends to the Arctic Circle in the
north, bordering the Barents, Laptev, East
Siberian, and Bering Seas. To the west, Russia
extends into the Pacific past Japan and nearly to
Alaska. In the east, it touches the Atlantic via the
Gulf of Finland and Baltic Sea and borders
Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Belarus, and the
Ukraine. It extends past the Black Sea to the
Caspian Sea in the south and borders China,
Mongolia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Georgia.
Both the highest and lowest elevations in Europe
are within Russia (Dawisha and Parrott 1994).
Historically, Russia encompassed even more
area than this, but it is still by far the largest coun-
try on the planet, covering two continents, nine
time zones, and nearly 17,100,000 km2. Russia is
nearly twice the size of the USA, with less than
half the population. The literacy rate is higher
(over 99 %). In terms of religion, the majority of
the population identify themselves as Russian
Orthodox, and about 10 % are Muslim (CIA
World Factbook 2011).
Throughout the country’s history, war has
been common. In recent history, Russia was a
primary force in defeating Germany and Japan.
During tsarist Russia, expansionism was common,
accomplished by military force. Prior to that, the
Mongol invasions played a major role in the
history of Russia (McCarthy et al. 2009).
In recent history, Russia has undergone con-
tinuous social change. The revolution in 1917
overthrew the monarchy and established the
USSR, an experiment in Marxism. After Lenin’s
death, Stalin turned the country into a totalitarian
police state. Following Stalin’s death, the USSR
gradually became less controlled until finally, in
1991, due to many nationalistic uprisings, eco-
nomic hardships, and other factors, it simply
ceased to exist. The relative isolation from the
rest of the world, heavy losses during World War
I and II, experiences during the Cold War, and
tumultuous political and economic changes over
the last century are likely to have shaped the
views of the Russian people regarding war, tor-
ture, and terrorism.
53
The problem of “dedovschina” by youth
within the military is of great concern to the
Russian public. Dedovschina is a form of severe
hazing of new conscripts which sometimes
results in death. One example that received
worldwide attention was that of a 19-year-old
conscript who was beaten so badly that amputa-
tion of his legs and genitals was necessary (NPR
2006). Another documented occurence was in an
Air Force academy in the Moscow region where
senior servicemen robbed new recruits of the
money they received for donating blood (Russia
Today 2010). This phenomenon has drawn the
attention of the military as well as the public.
Attempts at intervention have been in place for
the last few years, and the phenomenon has been
studied. As criminal gangs become more com-
mon, their initiation rites also fall into the cate-
gory of torture, or “dedovschina,” as do other
types of youth initiation rites. “Dedovschina” is
seen as a widespread problem among Russian
youth, and defined not only as a form of torture
but also as a current social problem (Human
Rights Watch 2004).
According to a Russian military expert who
has studied the dedovschina problem, two recent
changes in the military conscription process are
responsible. Currently, many young people are
excused from military service—up to 60 %.
Those who are excused tend to come from
wealthier and more socially prominent families.
Those unable to avoid the draft are generally
from less privileged, poorer, and less-educated
segments of the population. They also tend to be
less socialized by traditional Russian standards
of conduct and are viewed by many as of a low
level physically and intellectually due to the
severe poverty and lack of traditional socializa-
tion and education they have experienced grow-
ing up. Many of them have been socialized on the
streets, in a “survival of the fittest” culture, where
surviving by manipulating those who are weaker
is common. They also have no strategies for cop-
ing with the high stress, unfamiliar authority
structure, and constant risk involved in military
service, and they respond by torturing those per-
ceived as the weakest (Parnyuk 2009, personal
communication).
54
Table 4.1 Manifestations of dedovschina observed in a day in a typical unit
Behavior
Verbal insults
Coercion to the fulfillment of another’s duties
Theft of personal items and money
Getting up at night not connected with the discharge
of duties to harass others sexually
Money extortion
Beatings
Mockery
Extortion of food, personal property
Table 4.1 provides a summary of the manifes-
tations of “dedovschina” observed in one day in a
typical Russian military unit. The forms of
“dedovschina” observed included the following
behaviors toward others: verbal insults; coercion
to fulfill another’s duties; theft of personal prop-
erty and money; extortion of money, food, and
personal property; beatings; and mockery.
According to one official (Parnyuk 2009, per-
sonal communication):
Service in the army is associated with many
difficulties including constant risk of life….
Manipulation through physical or moral humilia-
tion is the basis of “dedovschina”. Essentially,
“dedovschina” is a form of torture among youth
related to a breakdown in the former socialization
and education processes within Russia. It is not
correct to relate this problem only to the army, but
it is appearing more frequently in society due to a
lack in appropriate upbringing during adolescence.
..This is a form of bullying directed toward weaker
or lower-status individuals by other individuals
who perceive themselves as under threat. It is also
defined as a form of torture. Personal relations
among conscripts are a concern to commanders of
all levels within the Russian military. The army
can’t overcome the problem alone, however.
Success depends on the constant participation of
the state and community in bringing up an intel-
lectually developed, physically and mentally strong
person.
Defining hazing and bullying as forms of tor-
ture and attempting to take steps to prevent this
problem within Russia is notable. In fact, 2009
was proclaimed by the President as “The Year of
S. McCarthy et al.
Number of individuals Number of individuals
engaged in behavior behavior was directed toward
12 11
12 11
3 8
4 6
6 3
6 3
7 1
8 2
the Youth” in order to focus more attention on the
need to prevent antisocial behavior through
appropriate socialization in an attempt to prevent
“dedovschina” in the future.
Analysis of Responses
from the Balkans and Russia
Earlier in this volume, a thorough description of
the processes utilized for coding and categorizing
qualitative responses—and examples from the
coding manual—were given. In the remainder of
this chapter, an overview of the patterns of
responses submitted by citizens in Russia and the
Balkans is provided.
The Sample
Participants were recruited in several ways,
including networking, distributing surveys at uni-
versities and shopping malls, and posting the sur-
vey on several websites. All participants
completed the Personal and Institutional Rights
to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS),
either in hard copy or online, in a language with
which they were familiar. The 593 participants
were recruited from Russia, Greece, Serbia, and
Slovenia. Specifically, the sample included 313
participants from Russia (104 men, 206 women,
3 unknown), 97 participants from Greece (45
men, 47 women, 5 unknown), 83 participants
4 Balkan Peninsula and Russian Definitions
from Serbia (38 men, 45 women), and 100 par-
ticipants from Slovenia (44 men, 55 women, 1
unknown).
Ages of the participants ranged from 18 to 90.
A vast majority of participants identified them-
selves as Christian Orthodox (83 %), particularly
Russian Orthodox, Greek Orthodox, or Serbian
Orthodox. Other religious affiliations were
Agnostic/Atheist (reported by 15 % of partici-
pants), Muslim (0.2 %), Buddhist (0.4 %), and
others (1.3 %). Regarding socioeconomic status,
61 % of participants reported belonging to the
middle class, while only 2 % reported belonging
to the upper class. Finally, with regard to military
service, 22 % of participants reported they had
been in the military, and 77 % reported having a
relative who had been in the military at some
point.
Coding Process
In this chapter, we are concerned with partici-
pants’ responses to three open-ended questions
asking for definitions of war, torture, and terror-
ism. The coding process was based on grounded
theory, which seeks to capture and organize per-
tinent information within a set of qualitative
responses. After the surveys were collected, a
representative international sample was used to
develop coding manuals for each of the definitions.
The coding manuals were designed to organize
the responses into distinct, substantive categories
and to maximize the amount of information
retained in analysis while minimizing the number
of answers that could not be coded. It was impor-
tant to glean as much information as possible
from the responses as well as to consider philo-
sophical and logical issues when deciding how to
organize the answers. It was also necessary to
keep the coding manuals grounded in the
responses and not read too much into superficial
differences in content or semantics, especially
because of potential language differences. All
coding manuals were constructed, edited, and
reconstructed by a multidisciplinary research
team and were tested for inter-rater reliability.
55
Demographic Correlates of Response
Categories
Each answer to the definitions of items was divided
into codable units. This meant that each answer
could potentially be coded for several different
themes. Each codable unit was processed in dis-
crete form—i.e., each theme in the coding manual
was identified as either present or absent in each
codable unit. In addition, “presence” scores were
calculated across common categories for the three
items (war, torture, and terrorism), so that any par-
ticipant who gave at least one codable response in
one of the common categories (e.g., “physical out-
comes”) received a presence score for that new
variable (“physical outcomes presence”).
Several exploratory analyses were conducted
to investigate the possibility of demographic dif-
ferences on definitions of each term plus the
cross-definitional coding categories. Of interest
was the extent to which groups based on gender,
military service, having a family member in the
military, and involvement in protest differed in
their use of particular types of themes in their
definitions of war, torture, and terrorism. We
began with chi-square analyses because of our
interest in whether members of each group did or
did not provide a particular type of definition for
each term. Because we also calculated continu-
ous scores for each variable, based on how many
responses within a particular category a participant
provided, we also conducted t tests. We include
t-test findings only when they report additional
information beyond chi-square findings; that is,
when both t-tests and chi-square findings are
significant, we report only the chi-square findings.
All significant group differences found in chi-
square analyses are reported in Table 4.2.
Definitions of War in the Balkans
and Russia
Coding Guidelines for Definitions of War
Participants’ definitions of war were coded into
several major thematic categories, most of
which also included specific subcategories.
56 S. McCarthy et al.

Table 4.2 Definitions of war, torture, and terrorism: percentages of responses in coding categories by demographic
groups and chi-square values
Categories Group 1a Group 2a
Male Female
All physical outcomes presence 27 38 7.47**
Military Nonmilitary
General moral judgments: war 45 33 4.37*
Intolerant: torture 60 43 9.48**
All physical outcomes presence 16 34 13.33***
All methods presence 53 67 5.31*
Relative military No relative military
All moral judgment intolerance presence 60 73 4.25*
Protest No protest
Intolerant: torture 62 46 6.57**
All causes: presence 24 14 5.14*
Note: “Presence” following a variable name signifies that the presence/absence variable was created by assigning a 1 to
a new cross-definitional coding category created to indicate that at least one response in that category or any of its
subcategories in the definitions of any of the key terms (war, torture, and terrorism) was provided
*
p £ 0.05; **p £ 0.01; ***p £ 0.001
a
The numbers in these columns are the percent of the specified demographic group that gave responses falling into each
of the specified categories

These categories were for responses that
identified war with (a) the causes or precipitat-
ing factors of war, including definitions por-
traying war as a last resort; (b) the motivation/
intent(s) behind war, such as political or self-
defense motivations, as well as responses that
conveyed a moral judgment about a motivation
or intent for war; (c) conflict, either physical or
nonphysical; (d) qualifications (criteria) for
war, with subcategories for scale/intensity,
duration, types of combatants, and one-sided-
ness; (e) outcomes of war, both concrete and
abstract; and (f) moral judgments unrelated to
causes.
Definitions Focusing on Causes
The causes major category of responses is for
definitions identifying factors contributing to or
leading up to a war. This grouping accounted for
about 10 % of all responses. Within the causes
category, the most common theme (about 5 % of
all responses) referred to political motivation as a
primary cause of war. For example, an 18-year-
old Russian woman defined war “as a struggle for
world domination,” and a 46-year-old Greek man
said war is “the continuation of politics with dif-
ferent means.” Fewer than 1 % of responses indi-
cated that war is a last resort, and only about 1 %
included a moral judgment of a given motivation
or reason for war, such as the Slovenian response
that described war as a “primitive way of prob-
lem solving.” By contrast, 17 % of the definitions
that were non-cause-related included a moral
judgment.
Chi-square analyses revealed no significant
group differences in likelihood of providing
responses referring to causes of war; however t
tests revealed that participants who had protested
against war provided more definitions of war
identifying it with its causes than did those who
had not protested; similarly, participants who had
served in the military gave more definitions
focusing on the causes of war than did their coun-
terparts who had not served in the military.
War as Conflict
The major category for definitions with a focus
on conflict accounted for 14 % of all the definitions
of war; for example, one Slovenian respondent
defined war as a “state of violence.” Nonphysical
4 Balkan Peninsula and Russian Definitions
conflict was mentioned in only 1 % of responses,
indicating that participants’ visions of war are
more related to open physical conflict than to ver-
bal disagreement. As a 19-year-old man said, war
is “weapons, death, people dying.”
Qualifying Criteria for War
A substantial number of the definitions of war
(25 % of all responses) specified criteria for call-
ing a conflict a war. For example, 9 % of the
definitions focused on the intensity or scale of the
conflict—such as the definition of a 21-year-old
woman who defined war as “the most violent
act.” The type of group involved in conflicts was
also specified in many of the definitions of war;
for example, 7 % of all the definitions referred to
groups officially or legally recognized as holding
political power (e.g., “the military,” “countries”).
A typical response in this category, provided by a
53-year-old man, indicated that war is “armed
struggle between countries.” Only about 1 % of
the definitions referenced nonofficially recog-
nized groups, such as tribes, rebels, or civil war.
About 4 % of responses indicated that war
involves one-sided aggression—for example,
invasion or occupation.
Definitions Addressing Outcomes
A substantial portion of the definitions of war
(28 % of all those definitions) equated war with
its outcomes. Among outcomes, the most fre-
quent category of response, accounting for 19 %
of all responses, discussed a concrete outcome of
war. A 29-year-old woman simply defined war as
“death.” Nine percent of the responses defined
war in terms of more abstract outcomes; for
example, a 28-year-old man defined war as “sor-
row” and a Slovenian participant defined war
simply as “horror.” Other responses, with multi-
ple codable units, included both concrete and
abstract outcomes in their definition of war; for
example, a 19-year-old Russian woman said war
is “blood, pain, cruelty, death, chaos.”
Moral Judgments Regarding War
Seventeen percent of all definitions of war were
coded as a general moral judgment (as opposed
to a moral judgment concerning the causes of
57
Table 4.3 Percentages responses from Russia and the
Balkans in each of the terrorism valence categories
Coding category for valence Percentage of responses
Valence
Negative judgment 37
Neutral judgment 61
Effort to understand or justify 1
Positive judgment 1
Note: The number refers to the percent of the individual
category out of the total responses
war). “Atrocious, repulsive” is how a 59-year-old
Greek woman defined war, and a 39-year-old
Russian woman described it as “idiocy.” Chi-
square analysis (see Table 4.3) revealed that
significantly more respondents with military
experience than those without military experi-
ence provided at least one response that was
coded in this general moral judgments category.
Definitions of Terrorism in the Balkans
and Russia
Coding Guidelines for Definitions
of Terrorism
Participants’ definitions of terrorism were coded
on two different levels: valence and themes.
Regarding valence, all responses from the sample
were coded into one of four types of valence: (1)
negative regarding terrorism, (2) neutral, (3) an
effort to understand terrorism, and (4) positive
regarding terrorism.
In regard to themes, the responses were coded
into five different content-based categories. The
first major category was for responses that dis-
cussed cause/motivation for terrorism. Cause/
motivation was further specified into the follow-
ing subcategories: ideological motivation; politi-
cal agenda, including international political
agenda; emotional causes; negative environmen-
tal conditions; last resort; not religion; and no
motivation. The second major category, process/
method, was for responses that focused on aspects
of how terrorism is carried out. This category
includes physical and mental methods of terror-
ism. The third major thematic category, outcomes,
58
was for responses that described or discussed the
consequences or ramifications of terrorism. This
category includes physical and emotional out-
comes of terrorism, as well as disruption of peace
and stability and disruption of economy.
The fourth major category, judgments, was
for responses that conveyed a judgment about
the moral or legal righteousness of terrorism.
This included the subcategory, moral judgment,
which was further divided into judgments regard-
ing acts of terrorism, motivation, and appeal to
relativity. There was also a subcategory for
legality judgments, which was further divided
into judgments concerning acts of terrorism and
motivation. The fifth category, real life reference,
was used for responses that alluded to personal
or historical events as examples of terrorism.
Finally, a miscellaneous/uncodable category was
used for responses that did not fit into any of the
other categories.
Level 1 Coding: Valence
Regarding overall valence, 61 % of the definitions
were neutral regarding terrorism, 37 % were neg-
ative regarding terrorism, and about 1 % revealed
an effort to understand terrorism or were positive
regarding terrorism.
Level 2 Coding: Themes
Definitions of terrorism coded into the cause/
motivation thematic category accounted for 23 %
of all the definitions of terrorism. The general
form of cause/motivation was the most com-
monly coded subcategory, representing 9 % of
the definitions of terrorism. The subcategories of
ideological motivation and political agenda each
included about 4 % of the definitions, whereas
only about 2 % of the definitions fell into the
emotional causes subcategory and only about
1 % were coded for negative environmental
conditions.
A second major thematic category for terror-
ism definitions, the process/method category,
accounted for 29 % of all those definitions, mak-
ing it the largest of the coding categories for
definitions of terrorism. The physical method
subcategory accounted for 25 % of all responses,
S. McCarthy et al.
whereas the mental method subcategory
accounted for 3 % of all responses. Only 1 % of
the total responses could be coded into the gen-
eral category of process/method.
The major category of outcomes contained
16 % of all the definitions of terrorism. The phys-
ical outcome subcategory was the most common
type of outcome mentioned, accounting for 7 %
of all responses. For example, a Slovenian par-
ticipant defined terrorism as “executing acts that
cause damage to people.” The emotional outcome
and disruption of peace and stability subcatego-
ries were less common, representing 5 % and 2 %
of all responses, respectively.
Applying to 28 % of all responses, judgments
was the second largest major category for
definitions of terrorism and included general
judgments such as the Slovenian response that
defined terrorism as “prohibited behavior.” Moral
judgment was the most often coded subcategory
within this major category, accounting for 11 %
of all responses. The second most frequent type
of moral judgment responses in definitions of ter-
rorism were those describing acts of terrorism,
accounting for 8 % of all responses. Legal judg-
ment and its subcategories accounted for only
about 3 % of the total responses. The real life ref-
erence subcategory was the least frequently
coded category for this sample, with only about
1 % of all responses. Only about 3 % of the
definitions of terrorism in this sample did not fit
into any of the major categories.
Chi-square and t-test analyses revealed no
significant group differences in the likelihood or
frequency of use of any of the definitions of
terrorism.
Definitions of Torture in the Balkans
and Russia
Coding Guidelines for Definitions
of Torture
Participant definitions of torture were coded into
six major categories based on thematic content.
The first category—focus on intent, motivation, or
emotion—was for responses that discussed the
4 Balkan Peninsula and Russian Definitions
reasons or goals underlying the act of torture.
Negative reasons for torture were coded under
destructive intent and included intent to cause,
pain, suffering, or harm and intent to pressure and/
or break a person. “Positive” reasons for torture
were coded into the constructive intent category,
with subcategories for intent to gain information
or compliance, intent to gain tactical or strategic
advantage, intent to achieve a personal goal, and
intent to use torture as a punishment.
The second major category—characteristics
of the individual being tortured—was for
responses that referred to victims of torture and
their attributes. This included portrayals of vic-
tims of torture as characterized by helplessness/
powerlessness or as unwilling subjects, being
held against their will. The third major category—
conditions that give rise to torture—was for any
definitions referring to places, people, events, or
situations that are conducive to torture.
The fourth major category—judgment con-
cerning morality/justice/humanity—was for
responses that conveyed some sort of judgment
on whether torture is right, wrong, justifiable,
and/or inhumane. The tolerant subcategory
included responses that indicated some tolerance
or approval of torture, at least under some cir-
cumstances, including asserting that it is some-
times necessary or can be used as a last resort.
The intolerant/condemning subcategory was for
responses that expressed disapproval of torture;
this subcategory included responses describing
torture as unnecessary, unlawful/unjust, immoral/
inhumane/cruel/abusive/vile, sadistic/sick, or as
a violation of human rights.
The fifth major category—focus on method—
was for responses that referred to specific acts or
methods of torture. The subcategory, hurting/
harming, includes additional subcategories for
physical and psychological/abstract methods
of torture. The sixth major category—focus on
outcome only—was for responses that identified
torture with its consequences or ramifications,
especially for the victim. In addition to a general
outcome subcategory, this category also had
two subcategories, for responses referring to
either the physical outcomes or the psychological/
59
abstract outcomes of torture. Finally, there
was an uncodable category for responses that did
not fit within any of the previous major
categories.
Within the focus on intent major category, into
which 20 % of all the torture definitions were
coded, constructive intent: information or com-
pliance was the most common subcategory of
response, representing 9 % of all the definitions
of torture. Four percent of the definitions were
coded into the subcategory of destructive intent:
to cause pain, suffering, or harm. For example, a
Slovenian participant defined torture as “to show
somebody physical supremacy with the help of
torture techniques,” thereby linking torture with
the intent to show power. Another Slovenian
explained that torture is “psychological and phys-
ical violence with which we try to get some infor-
mation.” More generally, another Slovenian
called torture “torment with reason,” without
specifying the reason.
Only 3 % of the definitions of torture were
coded into the major category for characteristics
of the victim; most of these (2 % of all the
responses) were coded into the helplessness/pow-
erlessness subcategory, with only about 1 % of
total responses coded in the unwilling captive sub-
category. No responses were coded into the major
category for conditions that give rise to torture.
The definitions of torture were coded not only
for moral judgments but also more specifically for
whether the judgment indicated tolerance or
intolerance for torture. Within the judgment cate-
gory, the majority of responses were disapproving
of torture and consequently were coded into the
intolerant/condemning subcategory. A 20-year-
old Russian woman defined torture as “a terrible
thing,” and a 62-year-old Greek man defined it as
“the worst outcome for everyone.” The subcate-
gory of intolerant/condemning represented 10 %
of all the definitions of torture. The subcategories
of immoral/inhumane/cruel/abusive/vile and
unlawful/unjust accounted for 10 % and 3 % of
the definitions, respectively. Only about 1 % of
responses fell into the sometimes necessary/last
resort subcategory of tolerant judgments regard-
ing torture.
60
Chi-square analyses revealed that significantly
more protestors and participants who had been in
the military defined torture in a way that indicated
intolerance than non-protestors and participants
who had not served in the military (see Table 4.2).
Findings Bridging War, Torture,
and Terrorism Responses
In addition to group differences in likelihood of
specific definitions of war, torture, and terror-
ism, there were also group differences in
response patterns that cut across the three differ-
ent definitions. When defining war, torture, or
terrorism, protestors and participants without
family members in the military provided more
responses using moral judgments than their
counterparts (see Table 4.2). Participants who
had served in the military were more likely than
those who had not served in the military to
describe the methods involved in war, torture,
and terrorism. t tests revealed that women
described significantly more outcomes in their
definitions of war, torture, and terrorism.
In other analyses, women and participants
who had not been in the military were significantly
more likely than their counterparts to focus on
physical outcomes in their definitions of war, tor-
ture, and terrorism. In addition, participants who
had protested against war were more likely than
those who had not protested to include causes
when defining war, torture, and terrorism.
Concluding Thoughts
Perhaps because of the long history of tribal and
national conflict and recent experiences with the
sometimes devastating consequences of extreme
nationalism, respondents from the Russian/
Balkans Peninsula region were likely to equate
war, torture, and terrorism with serious physical
outcomes. Moreover, when their definitions
included moral judgments regarding government
involvement in such activities, these judgments
were primarily negative, reflecting intolerance
S. McCarthy et al.
for state aggression. As Dawisha and Parrott
(1994) note, nations are not so much ancient
entities as “a product of modern historical pro-
cesses and contingencies” (p. 57). The findings of
our analyses suggest that as Russia and the Balkan
Peninsula nations continue to evolve, they do so
in a context where their citizens have limited sup-
port for the use of violence to achieve ends.
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index.htm
 Definitions of War, Torture,
and Terrorism in the Middle East 5
Majed Ashy, Elizabeth Planje, Abdul Kareem
Al-Obaidi, Lane Smith, Dalit Yassour-Boroschowitz,
Helena Syna Desivilya, Kamala Smith, Linda Jeffrey,
William Tastle, Feryal Turan, Alev Yalcinkaya,
and Rouba Youssef

The term “Middle East” was conceived in 1902
by Alfred Mahan, a United States Navy flag
officer, to describe an area covering a large
region in northeastern Africa and southwestern
Asia (Adelson 1995). The term was created by
outsiders for military purposes, not by the people
living there. Today, the Middle East is consid-
ered to include nineteen territories: Armenia,
Afghanistan, Bahrain, the Gaza Strip, Egypt,
Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon,
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, United
Arab Emirates, the West Bank, and Yemen (CIA
World Factbook 2011).1 The Middle East is a
diverse region with various ethnicities, tribes,
government systems, religions, sects, political
ideologies, landscapes and weather, economic
situations, traditions, and histories. Living in
these 16 countries are Jews, Christians, and
Muslims, along with adherents of other older
religions, such as the followers of prophets
Abraham and Noah. The area is also rich in the
variety of ethnic groups, which include Arabs,
Kurds, Turks, Persians, Indians, and European
and Eastern Jews, among others (Owen 2004).
Religious sects and movements include Sunnis,
Shiites, Reform Jews, Orthodox Jews, Christian
1
In the current volume, we have separate chapters to
discuss the Persian Gulf Countries of Bahrain, Kuwait,
Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates; Egypt is also
considered in chapters on Africa.
Orthodox and Maronites (in Lebanon), and
Christian Copts (in Egypt). There are nationalis-
tic movements among Arabs, Iranians, Turks,
Egyptians, Pakistanis, and others.
Politically, the Middle East is characterized by
a wide range of ideologies, including Communism,
Socialism, Liberalism, and Secularism; Jewish,
Christian, and Muslim religious extremism; and
atheism and antireligion movements. Political
systems also vary widely across the region. Some
of the countries, such as Iran, are theocracies.
Some, such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan, are
Kingdoms with kings and queens. Some, such as
Qatar and Oman, are Emirates with sultans or
princes. Others, such as Syria and Egypt, are
republics with presidents. In most of the Middle
Eastern republics, there is a single party system
and sometimes minor parties, and the president
rules for life. At a parliamentary level, many
Middle Eastern countries—including Egypt (a
republic) and Morocco and Jordan (kingdoms)—
hold elections. Turkey, Lebanon, and Israel hold
presidential elections.
Each country has its own constitution and
laws. Some of these laws are drawn from Islam,
especially family laws, while others are drawn
from sources such as Western laws. In fact, con-
tradictory to common belief, all Middle Eastern
countries have secular systems (i.e., there is sepa-
ration between religion and government) with the
exception of Iran, where religious scholars rule,
and Saudi Arabia, where the constitution is based

K. Malley-Morrison et al. (eds.), International Handbook of War, Torture, and Terrorism, 63

Peace Psychology Book Series, DOI 10.1007/978-1-4614-1638-8_5,
© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2013
64
on Islam. Only Iran and Pakistan have the word
“Islamic” in their names. Most Middle Eastern
countries define themselves by ethnicity and use
the word “Arab,” “Egypt,” “Turk,” “Afghan,” or
“Israel” in their names (Owen 2004). Not all
Arabs are Muslims, and not all Muslims are
Arabs. While Muslim and Arab are often associ-
ated with each other in Western thought, Muslim
refers to religious orientation while Arab is an
ethnicity. In fact, the Arabs constitute only about
20% of the 1.5 billion Muslim population, and
about 15% of 300 million Arabs are not
Muslims.
Despite the widespread belief that the Middle
East has been continuously involved in wars
throughout history, a review of the past 100 years
reveals that in the Middle East, there were fewer
wars and significantly fewer people killed in
armed conflict than, for example, in Europe or
Asia, where more than 60 million people were
killed in WWI and WWII alone (Weinberg 2005).
With the exception of the Iraq–Iran war in the
1980s, most recent Middle East wars ended
within days, with several hundred or a few thou-
sand killed on each side. For example, the Israeli–
Lebanese war of 2006 ended within a month with
approximately 1,500 killed on the Lebanese side
and 200 killed on the Israeli side. Several of the
wars in the Middle East in the past 200 years
involved colonization by foreign powers, such as
Great Britain and France, and fights for indepen-
dence, such as the Egyptian resistance to British
occupation and the Syrian resistance to French
occupation in the late nineteenth and early twen-
tieth centuries. Some of the Middle Eastern coun-
tries, such as Israel, Palestine, and Iraq, have been
in various brief wars for decades. Some, such as
Lebanon, have experienced prolonged internal
unrest; others, such as Oman, have been living in
peace for decades.
The Middle East is rich in natural resources,
such as oil and natural gas. In Saudi Arabia, Iran,
and the Gulf states, oil is the main source of eco-
nomic prosperity, while in Egypt, Yemen, Turkey,
or Jordan, tourism is a major source of income.
Wars and instability in the Middle East can
threaten both of these sources of income to the
M. Ashy et al.
countries of the region. The economic systems in
the Middle East also vary, with most countries
having some mixture of capitalism and social-
ism. For example, all countries in the Middle
East have free health care for all citizens for life
and free education from preschool to the end of
college, in addition to having private hospitals,
schools, and colleges. Some of these countries,
for example, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States, and
Egypt, support free business and investments,
whereas others, such as Syria, adhere to more
strict forms of socialism that limit free trade.
Some, such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey, are
larger in size than France and Germany, and
some, such as Bahrain, are very small islands.
Some, for example, Pakistan, Egypt, and Turkey,
have populations approaching or exceeding a 100
million, and others, such as Qatar and Bahrain,
have populations of several hundred thousand.
Some are mainly deserts, whereas others have
diverse landscapes that include mountains, arable
areas, snow, rivers, and seas (Fisher 1978).
The Middle East is the cradle of civilization
where the earliest human civilizations were
established. The civilizations of the Middle East
contributed in major ways to various foundations
of human knowledge. The productions of these
civilizations included establishing and fostering
the foundations of writing, math, farming, phi-
losophy, and architecture; moreover, the region
was home to the earliest contributions in medi-
cine, poetry, arts, chemistry, astronomy, and
physics. In addition, the Middle East is the birth-
place of the three major world religions: Judaism,
Christianity, and Islam. It is also the birthplace of
the prophets and the important historical figures
of these religions, from Noah and Abraham to
Moses, the Virgin Mary, Jesus, and Mohammed
(peace be upon them all). These early civiliza-
tions included the Sumerians, Acadians,
Babylonians, and Assyrians in Iraq; the Pharaohs
in Egypt; the Phoenicians in Syria and Lebanon;
and the Israelites, the Nabateans, and the Sabaeans
in Saudi Arabia. These civilizations ruled the
Middle East during various periods in history
starting from 3500 to 600 BC (Black 2003). The
Persians in Iran ruled the Middle East from the
5 Middle East Definitions
sixth century BC until the defeat of the Persian
Empire by the Arabic Islamic Empire in the sev-
enth century AD. During that time, the Roman
and Macedonian Empires were in frequent wars
with the Persian Empire and ruled parts of the
Middle East bordering the Mediterranean, such
as parts of Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon (Black
2003). The Arabic Islamic Caliphates ruled the
Middle East from the seventh century AD until
the eleventh century AD when the Turkish Seljuk
arrived from central Asia, gained control of the
region, and eventually formed the Ottoman
Empire, which lasted until the defeat of the Turks
and their ally, Germany, at the end of WWI
(Goffman 2002).
In 1918 AD, the British and French govern-
ments arranged a secret treaty called the Sykes–
Picot Agreement to partition the Middle East
between them. Colonization was disguised as a
League of Nations Mandate to form protector-
ates. For example, Great Britain colonized Egypt,
Iraq, and some Gulf states, while France colo-
nized Syria and some North African States. Most
of the maps of the current states of the Middle
East were formed as a result of this treaty
(Fieldhouse 2006). The maps were drawn in ways
designed to make it hard for these states to be
independent and self-sufficient. For example,
some of the oil-rich states were created with very
small populations to make it hard for them to pro-
tect themselves or do oil exploration; as a result,
they had to sign various binding defense and oil
exploration agreements with other countries. On
the other hand, some Middle East countries with
large populations were left with very few natural
resources for economic and social development.
The colonizers also made political decisions that
have had major consequences to this day in
Sudan, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, in addition to
various political decisions that led to conflicts
over land between the Israelis and Palestinians
(Fieldhouse 2006).
By the start of the twentieth century, various
independence movements had started in the
Middle East. King Abdul Aziz Al Saud unified
Arabia and established modern Saudi Arabia in
1932 after several military victories and political
65
alignments. The British rewarded Sharif Hussein
for his efforts in the Arab revolution against the
Ottomans, which contributed to the fall of the
Ottoman Empire, by appointing his sons as kings
over Jordan, Syria, and Iraq. Hussein’s sons were
overthrown in Iraq and Syria by various military
coups, and eventually, the Ba’ath party took con-
trol of both countries. The Ba’ath party was
formed by a Christian Arab called Michel Aflaq.
It split later into the Ba’ath parties of Syria and
Iraq. During the Cold War, both countries, in
addition to South Yemen, aligned themselves
with the Soviet Union, while the Gulf States,
Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, Jordan, and Israel were
closer to the United States. Egypt switched sides
after the death of Nasser, who had ties to the
Soviet Union, and during the presidency of
Anwar Sadat, who signed the Egyptian–Israeli
peace treaty brokered by President Jimmy Carter
of the United States.
The Cold War and the political alignments of
the time contributed to much of the cultural,
sociopolitical, and economic realities of today.
The communist, socialist, and nationalist ideolo-
gies are still present in various countries in the
Middle East, and Russia is a major player in
Middle Eastern politics. For example, the current
governments in Syria and Iran are allies, and both
are close to Russia. Iran was a strong ally of the
United States until the Iranian Islamic revolution,
the fall of the Shah of Iran in the late 1970s, and
the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
The United States and others in the West
supported Saddam Hussein in initiating the Iraq
war against Iran in the late 1970s, which lasted
8 years and caused the death of about one million
people on both sides. That war, in addition to the
Iranian support of groups, such as Hezbollah of
Lebanon and its rhetoric against Israel, Iran’s
nuclear program, the American Embassy hostage
crises, and various ideological and political
conflicts, caused the relations between the United
States and Iran to become extremely strained.
Early in the 1990s, following the end of the
Iraq–Iran war in the late 1980s, Saddam invaded
Kuwait, claiming that it was a part of Iraq. This act
initiated the first Gulf war against Iraq. Kuwait
66
was liberated, but that war changed the Middle
East. The Iraq invasion of Kuwait was a shock to
Arabs who were working for and believed in Arab
nationalism. The oil-rich Gulf States found them-
selves in the position of having to ask for the help
of the world in general, and the United States and
Great Britain in particular, for survival and to liber-
ate Kuwait. That war split the Arabs and fostered
religious extremism in the Middle East by groups
that saw the foreign military presence in the Arab
world as an occupation and a repeat of the Crusades
or colonization, not as an international effort to
protect the Gulf States. In 2003, and after various
accusations of weapons of mass destruction hid-
den in Iraq, the United States invaded Iraq and
overthrew the Ba’ath party. Saddam was later exe-
cuted after an Iraqi trial found him guilty of the
mass murder of thousands of Kurds and Shiites.
Historically, almost all of the world’s super-
powers have ruled or attempted to rule the Middle
East (Black 2003). These superpowers included
the Greeks, the Romans, the Persians, the
Pharaohs, the Israelites, Alexander the Great, the
Tatars from East Asia, the Arab and Turkish
Islamic Caliphates, the British, the Soviets, and
the French. The Middle East has been a target for
colonization due to its strategic geopolitical loca-
tion in the world, its control of the important sea
passages between the East and the West, and
more recently due to its natural resources of gas
and oil.
Among these colonization attempts was the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the late 1970s
(Saikal et al. 2006). After the Soviets established
a loyal military government in Afghanistan, both
the United States and Pakistan supported and
funded the Mujahedeen again the Soviets. Arab
Jihadists were encouraged to join the fight, and
various Jihadist groups were founded in
Afghanistan, including one established by Bin
Laden, which was later called Al Qaeda. After the
defeat of the Soviets, the Mujahedeen divided
themselves into groups, according to ethnicity or
religious sects. Each was supported by a regional
power, and some were in the drug business.
A group of Afghani religious students in Pakistan
formed a group called Taliban and, with the
M. Ashy et al.
support of the Pakistanis, were able to defeat all
rivals and establish a unified government in
Afghanistan. The government of Taliban applied
a very strict interpretation of Islam that put them
in conflict with their Hindu and Buddhist nations
in East Asia and the Shiite Iran and with the West
over human and women’s rights (Saikal et al.
2006). In the 1990s, Al Qaeda shifted its focus to
challenging the powers of the West and started a
campaign of terror by using bombs that targeted
civilians and Western interests in the Muslim
world, Africa, and Asia. They used religious and
political rhetoric, and developed over time a very
strict and extreme militant interpretation of Islam
to rationalize these crimes. The rhetoric ranged
from declaring a war against the Crusaders, to
wanting to free Palestine, to wanting the foreign
armies to leave Arabia, and to wanting the estab-
lishment of the Islamic Caliphate. In 2001, Al
Qaeda committed the terrorist attacks of
September 11th that initiated the American inva-
sion of Afghanistan in 2001 and the toppling of
the Taliban government. The full consequences
of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars on the region are
still developing.
The Middle East Sample
Description of Sample
As pointed out in the introduction to this chapter,
the identification of a particular group of coun-
tries as belonging to the Middle East was done
rather arbitrarily by powers outside of the
ambiguously identified area now called the
Middle East. For the purposes of this chapter, we
have a somewhat broad representation of the var-
ious cultures and nations that fall into the area
generally called the “Middle East.” Included are
a fairly modernized and secularized Muslim
country largely inhabited by ethnic Turks (Turkey,
27% of the sample); a small, largely Jewish state
with very close ties to the West (Israel, 31% of
the sample); a small country with substantial
Christian and Muslim populations (Lebanon,
23%); several predominantly Muslim and Arab
5 Middle East Definitions
states—Saudi Arabia (4%), Jordan (7%), Iraq
(3%), Afghanistan (3%), and Iran (2%); and the
remaining 1% from other Middle Eastern coun-
tries. The participants from these countries vary
greatly in the amount of armed conflict and threat
to which they have been exposed or in which
they have been directly involved, with Jordan
and Saudi Arabia having had less direct involve-
ment than the other countries. Although its cul-
ture and location justify considering Egypt as a
Middle Eastern country, for the purposes of the
present volume, it is included in the Africa chap-
ter; in addition, four of the Gulf State countries,
Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, and Qatar, geographi-
cally and culturally part of the Middle East, are
considered in the Gulf States chapter.
The Middle East sample was assembled using
several different techniques, including recruit-
ment through personal networks, snowball sam-
pling, collaboration with researchers in selected
countries, and posting of links to an online survey.
The large majority of respondents were living in
the country they represented, but the remaining
participants—for example, refugees or students—
were living in other countries at the time they
responded to the survey. If the participants were
not currently living in one of the selected Middle
East countries, they had to have been born in that
country, identify themselves ethnically with that
country (e.g., as an Iraqi or a Saudi), and have
spent significant time in the country; also, consis-
tent with the rest of the sample, they must have
responded to at least one of the items in the
PAIRTAPS survey and be over the age of 18.
The final Middle East sample showed a fairly
broad range of demographic characteristics.
Overall, the majority of the participants were
women (60%), although men were the majority
in the samples from Afghanistan (63%), Iran,
(60%), and Jordan (51%). A majority of the par-
ticipants self-identified as middle class (67%),
followed by upper middle class (18%), working
class (8%), lower class (3%), and upper class
(2%). The sample includes people employed as
hairdressers, musicians, food servers, lawyers,
and human resources workers, as well as stu-
dents, retirees, and unemployed people. Although
67
fewer than half of the participants responded to
an item asking whether or not they had a relative
who had been in the military, of the 229 partici-
pants who did respond, 63% indicated they had a
relative who had been in the army; overall, nearly
a third (27%) of the sample indicated they had a
relative in one of the armed forces. A third
reported involvement in some kind of protest
against war; for example, some Lebanese partici-
pants indicated that they had been involved in the
March 14, 2005 protest. A large segment of the
sample identified their current religion as Islam
(44%), followed by Judaism (26%), and
Christianity (23%), with only 3% identifying
themselves as atheistic, agnostic, or lacking a
religion. Less than 1% of the sample reported a
religion other than those listed above.
The Personal and Institutional Rights
to Aggression and Peace Survey
One of the major sections of the Personal and
Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace
Survey (PAIRTAPS) asks participants to provide
their own definitions of key terms such as war,
torture, and terrorism. The definitions of these
three terms were coded and analyzed for the pur-
poses of this chapter. Coding manuals for each
definition were developed using a grounded the-
ory approach with a broad international sample
of responses, from which common themes were
identified and grouped by meaning. Specifically,
each definition was broken down into codeable
units, and every codeable unit within each
definition was coded. Codeable units are defined
by separate units of meaning within a response
and do not necessarily indicate the length of a
response. Although many definitions had just one
codeable unit (e.g., “war means complete destruc-
tion”), others had several (e.g., war is “Chaos,
massacre, death. Humans losing value and
becoming an object”). For more information con-
cerning coding and variable formation, see the
introductory chapter (Chap. 1) to this section.
Coded definitions were then analyzed both
qualitatively and quantitatively. The qualitative
68 M. Ashy et al.

analysis provided a breakdown of sample Table 5.1 Definitions of war: frequency of codable units
responses based on the categories into which they in each category
were coded. The quantitative analyses were an Major Percentage of
exploratory effort with our nonrepresentative category Category responses (%)
sample to determine whether there were any dif- Causes General causes 2
of war Last resort <1
ferences between demographic groups in the
Motivation/intent 4
likelihood and frequency of giving responses in
Political motivation 5
particular coding categories. Chi-square results
Self-defense 1
are presented first, with t-test results reported in 3
Moral judgment on
the absence of significant chi-square findings. We cause
also ran analysis of variance (ANOVA) to explore Causes subtotal 16
possible differences among religious groups in Focus on General conflict 8
types of definitions provided. Due to the limited conflict Nonphysical conflict 2
sample size, any statistics presented are meant as Conflict subtotal 9
initial findings that will require further studies Qualifications General qualifications 2
before one could make conclusions about the for war Scale or intensity 7
larger Middle Eastern population. of conflict
Duration/frequency <1
Officially or legally 7
recognized groups
Definitions of War Nonofficially 2
recognized groups
In regard to definitions of war, the coding manual One-sided aggression 3
has five major categories that arose from themes Qualifications subtotal 21
in the data: (a) outcomes of war; (b) causes of Outcomes General outcomes 4
war; (c) qualifications (criteria) for war; (d) Concrete 21
focus on conflict only; and (e) moral judgments. Abstract 15
There was also a category for responses that were Outcomes subtotal 46
uncodeable. When asked to provide their Moral Same 14
judgment
definitions of war, 438 participants provided
Uncodable Same <1
responses, with the number of codable units per
Note: The number in the percentage column refers to the
participant varying from 1 to 10, yielding 1,223 percent of responses in the individual category out of the
codable units (henceforth also called “responses”). total set of definitions of war responses
Table 5.1 shows the frequency of responses that
were coded into each category as well as the sub-
totals for each major category. Afghanistan who said that with war comes “the
Every participant from the Iraqi refugee sam- destruction of a culture, people or way of life for
ple defined war with a single response such as political, personal or moral reasons.” References
“destruction” or “instability.” Many of the other to outcomes such as these comprised 46% of the
participants provided more complex responses, total responses to the definitions of war item.
with multiple codable units. Responses describ- Some of the outcomes described were specifically
ing the outcomes of war were found throughout physical outcomes, such as “death,” “hostages,”
the larger sample, such as the response from a or “blood.” Not only did the larger category of
49-year-old man from Jordan who said of war outcomes account for the majority of codeable
that “it is conflicts that start between countries units, but the subcategory of physical (concrete)
that result in extremism, massacres, hostages, outcomes was the most frequently provided
and violation of the rights of the country and its type of definition, accounting for 21% of all
security” or the 32-year-old woman from responses.
5 Middle East Definitions 69

Table 5.2 Definitions of war: means, standard deviations, and t-test results by demographic group for
coding categories
Categories Group 1 Group 2 t df
Male Female
One-sided aggression 0.13 (0.35) 0.06 (0.24) 2.17* 260
Military Nonmilitary
Causes sum 0.53 (0.80) 0.26 (0.56) 3.24*** 192.21
Qualifications sum 0.85 (1.41) 0.56 (0.90) 1.98* 181
Nonofficially 0.12 (0.47) 0.02 (0.14) 2.16* 133
recognized groups
Relative military No relative military
Qualifications sum 0.38 (0.86) 0.76 (1.06) 2.60* 127
Protest No protest
Qualifications sum 0.79 (1.22) 0.51 (0.94) 2.39* 246
Officially recognized groups 0.26 (0.48) 0.16 (0.38) 2.12* 247
Note: Standard deviations appear in parentheses next to means. “Sum” at the end of a variable name indi-
cates that the category was created by adding scores from all the subcategories composing the larger cate-
gory. Please refer to the Methods chapter for a more detailed description of how these variables were
created
*
p £ 0.05; ***p £ 0.001

Other definitions of war mentioned abstract
outcomes such as “sorrow” and “fear.” One
28-year-old Afghan woman listed several physi-
cal outcomes of war but also listed a more
abstract emotional consequence. In her view, war
is “an invasion of a nation for political empower-
ment. It is marked by bloodshed, violence and
death. Most importantly, it rapes a nation of its
women; destroys its land and natural resources;
leaves its citizens in a state of despondent mourn-
ing.” This response not only describes both
abstract and concrete outcomes but, among other
themes, also points to the causes of war (“for
political empowerment”), specifically noting
political motivation as a factor leading up to war.
Five percent of the responses fell into the cate-
gory of political motivation, such as one from a
57-year-old Turkish man, who explained, “I see it
as a demonstration of power mostly caused by
politicians trying to show their power by putting
the opposite nation into a difficult situation. It is
something people never deserve.” Other responses
identified causes that were not specifically
identified as political, such as a 25-year-old
Lebanese man who pointed out more general
motivating factors that lead to war: “conflict,
fighting for different goals and interests.” Overall,
responses falling in the larger category of causes
made up 16% of the codeable units. t tests
revealed that participants who had been in the
military had significantly more responses in this
category than nonmilitary-affiliated participants.
(See Table 5.2 for results of all t-test comparisons
for definitions of war.)
Responses describing the characteristics of war
and the major theme of characterizing or qualify-
ing war were provided as frequently as responses
that fell into the subcategory of outcomes describ-
ing physical outcomes of war (both were 21% of
the total codable units). t tests revealed group dif-
ferences in the extent to which participants pro-
vided responses labeled as “qualifications.” People
who participated in the military and people who
had relatives in the military provided significantly
more qualification responses than who had not
served in the military or did not have relatives in
the military, respectively. People who had pro-
tested also provided more qualification responses
than people who had not.
These responses classified as “qualifications”
were further subdivided into one of six subcate-
gories: meeting a certain scale or intensity, being
70
conducted by groups that are officially recog-
nized as holding political power, being conducted
by groups that are not officially recognized,
occurring as a one-sided attack, having a certain
duration or frequency, or any other kind of
qualification. Responses describing specifically
the scale or intensity of war, such as this 40-year-
old Turkish woman who called war “[a] massacre
which destroys humanity together with all soci-
etal phenomena, values, institutions, as well as
individuals, to an extent which is irreparable
throughout generations,” comprised 7% of the
total codable units. Other responses echoed the
theme of qualifying war as reaching the intensity
of being “violent” or “armed,” such as this
response from a 24-year-old Israeli woman who
identified war as the “use of weapons and conflict
between states.” This response also contains an
example of a codeable unit qualifying war as
something occurring between officially recog-
nized groups (“between states”), which also com-
prised 7% of codeable units. These responses
describing official groups are in contrast to those
that recognize war as something that can happen
not just between countries or states, as this
23-year-old Israeli woman indicates in her
description of war as “the use of physical vio-
lence against a political entity or an organized
group of sorts.” Interestingly, people who had
been in the military, and therefore have been
associated with an official group that would be
involved in combat, showed higher use of defining
war as something that can occur between
unofficially recognized groups than people with-
out military experience. Additionally, people
who had protested provided significantly more
responses that defined war in reference to official
groups than people who had not protested.
A 59-year-old Saudi Arabian man illustrates the
less frequently presented theme (3%) of one-sided
aggression by defining war as “a campaign of
hatred by one nation against another.” People with-
out family members in the military provided more
responses in this subcategory of defining war as
one-sided, and men also provided significantly
more such responses than women.
Codeable units describing war as conflict
(implying a more two-sided involvement) com-
M. Ashy et al.
Table 5.3 Definitions of war: percentages of responses
in coding categories by demographic groups and chi-
square values
Categories Group 1a Group 2a c2
Military Nonmilitary
Self-defense 6.7 1.6 5.56*
Nonphysical 5.8 1.1 5.96*
conflict
Relative No relative
military military
Focus on 12.8 28.4 7.72**
conflict
a
The numbers in these columns are the percent of the
group that gave responses falling into each of the specified
categories
*
p £ 0.05; **p £ 0.01
prised 9% of the codeable units. These responses
echo the classic definition of war as armed conflict
and are well illustrated by the response of an
18-year-old Lebanese woman who defined war as
“a conflict between countries.” It is interesting
that a standard definition like “conflict” captures
only a minority of participant responses; war
seems to have strong connotations for many par-
ticipants going beyond the textbook definitions.
Chi-square analyses revealed that participants
who did not report having family in the military
were significantly more likely to define war as a
conflict than those who did report family in the
military. (See Table 5.3 for significant chi-square
results for definitions of war.) In other words,
participants who did not have family members in
the military were significantly more likely to pro-
vide classic dictionary definitions of war (defining
it as conflict) than those who did have relatives in
the military.
The subcategory of nonphysical conflict was
created to capture responses that recognized war
as more than physical conflict alone, as seen in
this definition from a 29-year-old Israeli man
(who has been in the military): “A situation of
fighting, non-cooperation, and at times non-
acknowledgment among states.” Although he
refers to fighting, he also recognizes noncoopera-
tion and non-acknowledgment as aspects of war.
Chi-square analysis indicated that participants in
the military were significantly more likely than
those who are not in the military to define war by
5 Middle East Definitions
describing nonphysical conflict. It is interesting
that participants involved in the military and pre-
sumably trained for physical conflict were more
likely to provide descriptions of nonphysical
conflicts in their definitions of war.
In addition to describing outcomes, causes,
and characteristics of war, 14% of the definitions
of war provided a moral judgment about war.
Responses were coded in the moral judgment
category when they indicated support or rejection
of war, and in this sample, some responses
included both tolerance and intolerance of war. A
23-year-old Turkish man explained that to him,
war is “murder—except to protect freedom.” A
24-year-old Afghan man echoed this ambiva-
lence, calling war “the end of mankind. Two stu-
pid entities, or more, using human bodies to play
chess. A useless engagement when diplomacy
seems to fail or isn’t given a chance. A necessary
evil when the enemy is hell-bent on destroying
life.” Despite describing war as “murder” and
using the metaphor of a game of chess in which
human bodies are the pieces, these participants
also described times in which war would be
justified—when it is perceived as protecting free-
dom and ending further killing.
Strong judgments about war can also be seen
in the words of a 26-year-old Turkish woman
who identified war with “People murdering each
other. One cannot say ‘sometimes necessary’ for
the war. It is the worst situation people can expe-
rience.” A 33-year-old Turkish man commented,
“I know both how necessary it is and how ugly it
is. I cannot be against it, but it has to be the last
solution.” This reply contains not only a moral
judgment but also a causal theme, indicating that
war must be the last resort. This last resort theme
was not very common, however, accounting for
less than 1% of the definitions of war.
Another related category captured responses
that defined war in a way that was justified, such
as when it is used for self-defense; these types of
responses were also rare, comprising only 1% of
all the definitions of war. Chi-square analysis
revealed, however, that participants in the mili-
tary were significantly more likely than those not
in the military to justify war as self-defense.
Given that members of the military are part of an
71
organization that might take part in war, it seems
unsurprising that they are in a group that might
express more tolerance or justification for war.
Definitions of Torture
In definitions of torture, 415 participants pro-
vided definitions with 1–6 codeable units, yield-
ing a total of 743 codeable units. There are six
major categories in the definition of torture man-
ual, some of which are similar to those in the
definition of war. In definitions of torture,
responses fell under (a) judgments, (b) focus on
methods, (c) outcome, (d) intent, (e) characteris-
tics of the individual being tortured, and (f) con-
ditions giving rise to torture. There was also a
category in torture for responses that were not
codeable in the other categories.
As in definitions of war, participants often
included judgments when providing definitions of
torture, and responses falling under that category
accounted for 43% of the codable units. (See
Table 5.4 for percentages of definitions of torture
falling into the different torture coding catego-
ries.) Chi-square analyses highlighted group dif-
ferences in use of moral judgments when defining
torture (see Table 5.5 for results of chi-square
analyses) and indicated that people who had been
in the military were significantly more likely to
show tolerance of torture than those who had not
and people who had never protested against war
were also significantly more likely to show toler-
ance of torture than protestors. Conversely, peo-
ple who had family members in the military were
significantly more likely to show intolerance of
torture than those who did not.
Tolerant responses accounted for only 13% of
the responses making moral judgments, while
intolerant responses accounted for 87% of moral
judgment responses. A 29-year-old Turkish woman
said of torture: “It should never be applied any
creature in any conditions (even in war).” This
response highlights a general intolerance, which
accounted for 11% of the definitions of torture
in the sample. Responses describing torture as
inhumane, cruel, immoral, etc., accounted for
15% of the definitions. Responses in this category
72 M. Ashy et al.

Table 5.4 Frequency of codable units in each category Table 5.5 Definitions of torture: percentages of responses
for definitions of torture in coding categories by demographic groups and chi-
square values
Major Percentage
category Category of responses (%) Category Group 1a Group 2a c2
Focus on General intent 1 Military Nonmilitary
intent Destructive intent <1 Tolerance 14.4 5.6 6.50*
Pressure or break <1 presence
Cause pain 1 Relative No relative
Constructive intent 2 military military
Information or 5 Constructive 0.8 5.7 4.57*
compliance intent
Intolerance 66.9 50.0 5.48*
Strategic advantage 1 presence
Self-gain <1 Protest No protest
Punishment 2 Tolerance 5.9 12.9 4.49*
Intent subtotal 13 presence
Characteristics General 2 Note: “Presence” at the end of a variable name signifies
of individual characteristics that the presence/absence variable was given a score of
being tortured Helplessness 1 1 if the participant had at least one response in that cate-
Unwilling subject 1 gory or any of its subcategories. Please refer to the
Characteristics 4 Methods chapter for a more detailed description of how
subtotal these variables were created
*
p £ 0.05
Conditions Same 1 a
The numbers in these columns are the percent of the
Judgments General judgments <1 group that gave responses falling into each of the specified
concerning Tolerant 0 categories
morality/ Sometimes 4
justice/ necessary/last resort
humanity
Intolerant 1
Unnecessary 1
Unlawful/unjust 4 were often short, like the repeated codable units
Immoral/inhumane/ 15 in this response from a 21-year-old Turkish
abusive
woman, “Inhuman. Cruelty.”
Sadistic/sick 3
As with definitions of war, when providing
Violation of human 3
rights definitions of torture, a few participants gave
Judgments subtotal 43 responses that contained codeable units indicat-
Focus General method 1 ing both tolerance and intolerance of torture. An
on method Hurting/harming 11 example of this ambivalence came from a
Physical 11 30-year-old Israeli woman who defined torture as
Psychological/ 11 “[a] temporary act, immoral and meant to
abstract [achieve] only a supreme goal,” and added, “[T]
Methods subtotal 35 his concept is difficult for me.” Another partici-
Focus on General outcomes <1
pant called torture, “[o]ne of the most cruel and
outcomes only Physical 2
monstrous actions invented by man,” but this
Psychological/ <1
abstract 35-year-old Israeli man allowed for “[t]olerance
Outcomes subtotal 3 towards torture only as an opportunity to prevent
Uncodable Same 1 many others from being tortured.”
Note: The number in the percentage column refers to the t tests revealed group differences related to
percent of responses in the individual category out of the personal participation in the military, family
total set of definitions of torture responses participation in the military, and gender, but not
5 Middle East Definitions
Table 5.6 Definitions of torture: means, standard devia-
tions, and t-test results by demographic group for coding
categories
Categories Group 1 Group 2 t df
Male Female
Last resort 0.05 (0.25) 0.01 (0.09) 2.10* 182
Immoral, 0.21 (0.41) 0.31 (0.52) 2.11* 391
cruel
Military Nonmilitary
Last resort 0.07 (0.26) 0.01 (0.15) 2.25* 156
Relative No relative
military military
Unnecessary 0.38 (0.19) 0.00 (0.00) 2.27* 129
Note: Standard deviations appear in parentheses next to
means
* that responses interpretable as either methods or
p £ 0.05
protest, for frequency of responses in subcatego-
ries of moral judgments related to torture. (See
Table 5.6 for all significant group differences
identified in t-test analyses.) In reference to
definitions of torture expressing intolerance, par-
ticipants with a family member in the military
had significantly more responses describing tor-
ture as unnecessary than those who did not have
family in the military. In addition, in comparison
to men, women had significantly more responses
that defined torture as immoral, cruel, or inhu-
mane. In order to address the possibility that gen-
der and military service were confounded, we ran
some two-way ANOVAs. These analysis revealed
a main effect for gender with men scoring higher
than women and a main effect for military status
with people in the military scoring significantly
higher than those not in the military in defining
torture as a last resort. There was no significant
interaction effect.
A response from a 20-year-old Iranian woman
who said torture is “imposing pain and being
inhumane” not only includes a moral judgment,
illustrating the subcategory of torture as immoral/
inhumane, but also points to the methods of tor-
ture by describing torture partly as “imposing
pain.” Definitions equating torture with its
methods accounted for 35% of the definitions of
torture. This major category included subcatego-
ries for physical methods, nonphysical methods,
and more general harming methods, as illustrated
73
in the example above. Some definitions had
multiple codeable units from these three subcat-
egories, as is illustrated by the following example
from a 31-year-old woman from Jordan who
described torture as “excessive hitting, cutting
parts of the body, destroying psychology and per-
sonality.” This multipart response specifies actual
methods that might be used in torture, both physi-
cal (hitting and cutting) and nonphysical (destroy-
ing psychology and personality). Although
“destroying psychology and personality” could
be seen as consequences of torture and therefore
coded as outcomes, the coding manual indicates
outcomes should be coded in methods unless
strong evidence suggests otherwise. (See Chap. 1
for more a more detailed description of the cod-
ing manuals and methods.)
Responses illustrating a focus on the effects of
torture were coded as outcomes and comprised
3% of the total responses. For example, a 29-year-
old woman from Jordan described torture as “the
destruction of souls, deforming bodies, and hand-
icapping.” These words portray a perspective that
considers permanent outcomes or effects that are
present long after the actual act of torture is over.
Another theme that was present in the
responses was the identification of the intent
behind torture, a major category accounting for
13% of the definitions of torture. A 23-year-old
Israeli man, for example, described torture
entirely by its purpose: “A few aspects: 1. For
purposes of hearing information 2. For private
purposes of educating rapists, etc.” This response
highlights the most frequently occurring subcat-
egory within the overall intent category—that the
purpose of torture is to get information or com-
pliance from the person being tortured (40% of
the intent responses). An 18-year-old Lebanese
woman also gave a response that fits this subcat-
egory when she defined torture as “a tool that the
police use against criminals to make them admit
their wrong.” Chi-square analyses revealed that
respondents who did not have family members in
the military were more likely than their counter-
parts to define torture by describing constructive
intent, such as torture as a means for gaining
something else, like information or power.
74
Interestingly, for a few of the participants, tor-
ture appeared to be a helpful tool, although its
apparent usefulness did not seem to clarify the
moral dilemma torture posed, as with this 25-year-
old Israeli man’s response in which torture is
defined as “[a] means of achieving interests (espe-
cially information) from someone who cannot
oppose, while crushing basic human rights. This
means should be avoided, except for when it is the
only way to self defense- that will prevent an imme-
diate disaster.” This response is rich in themes, and
although the respondent sees torture as an effective
way to get information, he also views it as a method
that has moral implications and can be justified
only under certain conditions. This response also
highlights the moral ambiguity discussed earlier
with the other examples of judgmental responses.
In identifying torture as a tool to gain information,
however, some participants raised not only ques-
tions of the moral validity of the procedure but also
of the validity of the information elicited. A
49-year-old Afghan man explained that torture is
“unjustly using force to make someone admit to
something that he may or may not have done. Some
people might say what they are expected to say to
get out of torture.” This concern echoes an issue
highlighted in the public debate over torture: Does
it ever produce reliable information?
Definitions of Terrorism
Definitions of terrorism were coded using a slightly
different analytic approach. Entire definitions were
analyzed first for the valence exhibited by the
entirety of the response and then secondly were
broken down into codeable units to code for
themes (as with definitions of war and torture).
For valence, each response was identified in its
entirety as viewing terrorism in a negative light, a
neutral light, a way that demonstrated an effort at
understanding, or a positive light. The thematic cod-
ing section had six main categories: (a) judgments,
(b) real-life reference, (c) process and methods,
(d) causes and motivations, (e) outcomes, and
(f) uncodable.
Table 5.7 provides examples of definitions of
terrorism coded into each valence category. Only
M. Ashy et al.
three responses were identified as regarding
terrorism positively, all of which were from
Turkey. A 20-year-old man explained: “If it serves
to obtain rights, then it’s okay. It is a word which
is misunderstood these days.” Responses were
almost equally divided between negative and
neutral valences (49% and 47%), and the remain-
ing 4% indicated some effort to understand ter-
rorism. Responses were coded as indicating an
effort to understand terrorism if they did not sup-
port the actions of terrorism or condemn the
actions, but showed some thought about why
people might use terrorism—for example, “An
organization which is provoked by dominant
nations and is supposedly claiming its rights by
force,” from a 20-year-old Turkish man.
Alternatively, these kinds of response might show
ambivalence—for example, “A tactical practice
of cowardly people and low-lives on the one
hand, the only outlet of the weak on the other
hand,” from a 35-year-old Israeli man.
The extra coding level of valence also helps
differentiate between responses that might be
coded for similar themes but display different
attitudes the participant might have towards
terrorism. This is illustrated in the following
examples from two Turkish women who both
describe terrorism as causing fear, bloodshed,
and by listing physical methods: “certain groups
intimidating the opposite side by harming them
physically and trying to obtain what they wish,
and these groups attacking innocent people and
shedding blood” (35-year-old) and, “Something
that I don’t want. It contains terror, fight, peace-
lessness, blood, sadness” (66-year-old). While
the first response describes methods and out-
comes that people might find undesirable, the
participant does not indicate her attitude toward
terrorism by using a judgment word that illus-
trates more than a culturally bound connotation,
so this response was coded as neutral regarding
valence. The second response, however, clearly
indicated that participant has a negative reaction
to terrorism, in addition to describing what ter-
rorism entails.
Valence also helped pinpoint the difference
between two responses identified as making
moral judgments about the motivation behind
5 Middle East Definitions 75

Table 5.7 Sample responses for valence in definitions of terrorism

Valence Country Age Gender Example
Negative Israel 22 F A group of people who are sick in the head
whose goal in life is to blow people up
Lebanon 19 M A fatal network that has no mercy, no morals,
and no religion
Saudi Arabia 24 F Terrible actions done by brainwashed people to
harm random innocent people. Also originally
drawn by political reasons
Iraq 29 M Idiots with bug’s brains
Turkey 19 F Those responsible for it need to be punished
Neutral Lebanon 20 M It’s an activity that individuals do against a
country or a certain group by hurting them or
impacting their nation and their lives
Jordan 22 F A slogan raised against a group that kills and
torture with a claim that they are Muslims
Iran 43 M Threat to one’s government
Saudi Arabia 18 F Causing terror
Effort to understand Israel 28 F An action that has no choice to it, that all other
ways of achieving the goal has failed, and no
other option remains
Jordan 21 F Not all terrorism is terrorism
Lebanon 19 M People who have no other way of proving their
message
Positive Turkey 22 M Defenders of natural living
Turkey 20 M (From the state’s viewpoint) a fight of people
looking for freedom and rights
Note: M male, F female

terrorism. A 20-year-old Iranian woman dis-
played an effort to understand terrorism, calling
terrorism “an act performed by good people who
were brainwashed to read their holy texts
wrong,” while a 23-year-old man displayed a
negative attitude toward terrorism, defining it as
“vigilantism at its worst by evil bastards.” While
on the one hand the woman shows negative judg-
ments about terrorism by describing it as the
“wrong” way to interpret scripture, on the other
hand, she describes how “good people” might
have gotten involved in terrorism by being
“brainwashed.” In the man’s response, both the
people and the actions involved are “evil”—
there is no ambivalence of judgment. As for
themes, however, both responses were coded as
showing moral judgments.
Table 5.8 shows the frequency of codeable
units in each thematic coding category for
definitions of terrorism. Consistent with the large
number of responses identified as having a nega-
tive valence, the most commonly identified theme
of moral judgment (a subcategory of judgments)
comprised 32% of the responses. Some partici-
pants defined terrorism entirely with moral judg-
ments, as in the response from this 21-year-old
Turkish woman—terrorism is “inhumane, brutal,
disrespectful, merciless.” In the Iraqi refugee
sample, all but two of the participants defined ter-
rorism through a judgment, either as a moral
judgment, calling it “bad” or “unacceptable,” or
as the legal judgment, “crime.” Moral judgment
responses made up 28% of the total codeable
units, while fewer responses (4%) indicated a
judgment on the legality of terrorism, as in the
response of an 18-year-old Lebanese woman,
who described terrorism as “illegal way to hurt
others.” t tests revealed a group difference for
military status, with participants not in the mili-
tary providing significantly more legal judgments
76 M. Ashy et al.

Table 5.8 Definitions of terrorism: frequency of codable terrorism is “something that America has associ-
units in each category ated with Muslim Arabs.” This woman also added
Major Percentage of a critique of America, pointing out, “but it does
category Category responses (%) more than terror in Iraq.” Responses like this also
Cause/ General cause 3 point to a real-life reference of terrorism, which
motivation Ideological motivation 4
is also illustrated in the response from a 23-year-
Political agenda 5
old Israeli woman who wrote that terrorism
International <1
“exists all over the world.” Real-life references
Emotional causes 2
accounted for 3% of the codeable units in
Negative environmental 1
conditions definitions of terrorism.
Last resort 1 Additionally, in this sample, participants
Not religion 1 spoke of the association between Arabs and ter-
No motivation 1 rorism in various ways, such as a 21-year-old
Causes subtotal 18 Lebanese man who associated terrorism with
Process/ General method 3 “Arabian people, but not Lebanese (we are
method Physical 19 Phoenician people).” Another young Lebanese
Mental 3 participant, a 20-year-old woman, questioned the
Method subtotal 25 perceived connection between Arabs and terror-
Outcomes General outcomes 1 ism: “Please, how many people included the
Physical 7
Arabs in their definition. It’s funny what the
Emotional 8
media can do, and even more funny the people
Disruption of peace 6
and stability
that believe it. Terrorism is killing civilians to
Disruption of economy <1 hurt the government. And not only the Arabs are
Outcomes subtotal 22 doing this. Aren’t we all big civilized occidental
Judgments General judgments <1 countries?” Alternatively, a 23-year-old Turkish
Moral judgment 16 woman defined terrorism as the “U.S.A. and
Acts of terrorism 8 Turkish Republic.”
Motivation 2 A 20-year-old Jordanian woman also men-
Appeal to relativity 2 tioned America and questioned the use of the
Legal judgment 1 word terrorism, calling it “one big conspiracy…
Acts of terrorism 3 the Bush Admin and the USA and its allies have
Motivation <1 spun a web of lies so tangled, anyone who contra-
Judgments subtotal 32 dicts it is now labeled a terrorist.” Responses like
Real-life Same 3 this were considered to fit in a subcategory under
reference
moral judgment that relates to the relativity of the
Uncodable Same 1
term terrorism, and although such responses
Note: The number in the percentage column refers to the
percent of responses in the individual categories and sub- account only for 2% of the codeable units, they
categories out of all the definitions of terrorism point to the need for dialogue among representa-
tives from different countries with different views
both on the nature of terrorism and its definition.
regarding terrorism than participants in the Interestingly, participants who indicated that they
military. were antiwar activists by reporting participation
Other responses illustrated the salience of in protest were significantly more likely than
exploring definitions of terrorism by participants those who had not protested to appeal to the rela-
from Middle Eastern countries, not only because tivity of the word “terrorism.” A 28-year-old
of the application of the word “terrorism” to woman from Afghanistan attributed the use of
groups originating from that region but also, as a the word “terrorism” to dominating powers, call-
20-year-old Israeli woman points out, because ing it “a term created by the neo colonialists in
5 Middle East Definitions
order to create a sense of impending doom and
fear in its citizens such that they would be willing
to accept any violent means to ‘protect’ their
social welfare and ‘peace’.” Another Afghan
respondent, a 24-year-old man, defined terrorism
as “using illegal methods to fight a proxy war”
and then spoke of Israel’s use of the word terror-
ism, explaining, “This word has many sub mean-
ings because the Israelis used it to steal the land
of the Palestinians and to scare the British away.
Yet they call Palestinians terrorists, when they
are only trying to reclaim their land and protect
their children.” A 26-year-old Israeli woman also
associated her country with the use of the word,
explained that it “depends how you look at it, it is
possible to view us as terrorists as well,” and
concluded, “it is a horrible thing on all sides.”
A 20-year-old Turkish man indicated another fac-
tor in why some people are labeled terrorists
while others are not: “Until they have a land, they
are condemned; after they get what they want,
they become heroes.”
As one of the responses cited earlier explained,
terrorism is a concept that gets overgeneralized to
Muslims. Several responses spoke to this issue,
defining terrorism simply as “against religion” or
explaining, “Islam forbade it.” Responses like
these and from the one of a 38-year-old woman
from Jordan seem to focus not on providing a
definition of terrorism but rather on making sure
the world knows that terrorism “has no relation to
Islam and [is] one of the most important enemies
of Islam.” These responses comprising only 1%
of the codeable units are rich in meaning and
seem to contain a message from participants to
readers from a different culture.
Many participants provided a more concrete
description of terrorism in their responses, and
codeable units describing physical methods or
processes of terrorism accounted for the largest
subcategory of responses, at 19%. Responses in
this category include descriptions of “violence”
(multiple participants) and “killing and terroriz-
ing innocent people to achieve your own agenda”
(49-year-old Afghan man). Other participants
listed specific methods, as in the response from
this 31-year-old Israeli woman: “When people
blow up cars, place bombs, catch terrorists.”
77
A 65-year-old Israeli man defined terrorism as
“acts of violence against a civilian public and
civilian targets that disrupt the life of the popula-
tion.” This response contains not only a descrip-
tion of physical methods of terrorism but also of
the disruption that occurs as an outcome of terror-
ism. Other responses mentioning disruption of
peace and stability, such as “disturbing peace
and civilian security” (19-year-old Lebanese
woman), comprised 6% of the total codable units
and were coded in a subcategory under the larger
outcomes category, which comprised 22% of the
sample. Responses coded as outcomes were
identified as describing the effects, rather than
the means, of terrorism. A 28-year-old Israeli
woman explained that terrorism is “a horrible
and low act that causes pain and suffering to
many individuals in the population,” a quote that
illustrates other types of outcomes, such as physi-
cal (7% of codable units) or emotional (8%)
effects.
Analysis Across Items
Although coding manuals for definitions of war,
torture, and terrorism were developed indepen-
dently of each other based on a grounded theory
approach, the three groups of researchers who
developed the manuals were part of a larger group
of researchers that made decisions about mean-
ingful ways to group themes, which is why there
are similar themes, such as outcomes, across
items. This similarity reflects not only the fact
that the manuals were derived by different teams
from the same research group but also the fact
that war, torture, and terrorism are all violent
events with identifiable causes, methods, and
outcomes; moreover, all are appropriate subjects
for moral and legal judgments and often evoke
real-life examples.
As noted in Chap. 1 of this volume, the devel-
opment of similar coding categories across
definitions allowed us to analyze demographic
predictors of themes that were consistent across
the three definitions. Table 5.9 shows the chi-
square results for the new “All” coding category
variables created by combining information
78 M. Ashy et al.

Table 5.9 Definitions of war, torture, and terrorism: per- Table 5.10 ANOVA results of all variables for religion now
centages of responses in common coding categories by
Group
demographic groups and chi-square values
Variable F Significance differences
Categories Group 1a Group 2a c2 Abstract outcomes 5.84 0.00 2 > 1, 3
Male Female Moral judgments not 3.60 0.01 3 > 1, 2
All physical 44.2 55.1 4.53* including tolerance
outcomes presence Moral judgments 4.29 0.00 3 > 1, 2
All last resort 9.1 1.6 12.21*** Methods 9.82 0.00 3 > 1, 2
presence
Last resort 4.22 0.00 3 > 1, 2
Military Nonmilitary
Note: 1 Christian, 2 Jewish, 3 Muslim
All abstract 52.3 39.4 4.44*
outcomes presence
All last resort 11.2 2.4 9.48**
presence
All methods 71.0 54.1 7.87** were also more likely than men to equate at least
presence one form of aggression with its physical out-
All causal moral 14.0 6.1 5.26* comes. Finally, participants who have taken part
judgments presence
in protests were more likely than those who had
Relative No relative
not to point to political motivation behind war,
military military
All methods presence 42.6 61.8 6.40* torture, or terrorism.
All moral judgment 86.1 70.6 6.67** ANOVA revealed that there are some differ-
presence ences as a function of religion in how participants
Protest No protest defined war, torture, and terrorism. For example,
All political 23.7 15.1 3.97* Muslims scored significantly higher than both
motivation
Christians and Jews on defining the three con-
Note: All of these variables were created by combining cepts by using themes such as moral judgment,
information in common categories across the three
definitions. Please refer to the Methods chapter for a more last resort, and methods, while Jews scored
detailed description of how these variables were created higher than Christians and Muslims on the
a
The numbers in these columns are the percent of the abstract outcome variable (see Table 5.10).
group that gave responses falling into each of the specified
categories
*
p £ 0.05; **p £ 0.01; ***p £ 0.001
Discussion

The current geopolitical, socioeconomical, and

across the three definitions and giving a score of
1 when there was at least one response in the new
multi-definitional category. Analyses revealed
that people in the military were more likely than
people not in the military to provide responses in
the following five categories: causes, last resort
(a subcategory of causes), moral judgment related
to causes/motivation, methods, and abstract out-
comes. Respondents without a relative in the
military were significantly more likely to describe
methods than their counterparts. Men were more
likely than women to provide codeable units
describing one or more of the items as occurring
as a last resort, and chi-square analysis indicated
that there was no significant relationship between
gender and membership in the military. Women
legal realities in the Middle East are in part
responses to or outcomes of various realities or
threats of war, torture, and terrorism. These three
concepts have one thing in common: the use of
violence and coercion in order to achieve a goal.
As in other regions in the world, the accumulated
history of the use of violence against people in the
Middle East and by people in the Middle East
contributed to the formation of an “education of
violence” that supports, romanticizes, idealizes,
and admires violence and coercion as a means to
achieve goals. However, similar to what happened
in Europe after WWII, awareness of the conse-
quences and pains of violent experiences, and its
futility, have increasingly shaped new beliefs and
attitudes in the Middle East: the rejection violence
5 Middle East Definitions
in all its forms. It is important to consider this
context while examining the various responses of
participants from the Middle East.
A major theme in our Middle East sample was
the focus on outcomes, which can be viewed as
rejection of war, torture, and terrorism and a
warning against their consequences, not just on
theoretical bases but also on experienced realities
in the Middle East. As a 40-year-old Turkish
woman said, war is “[a] massacre which destroys
humanity together with all societal phenomena,
values, institutions, as well as individuals, to an
extent which is irreparable throughout genera-
tions.” Members of the military and their fami-
lies, who either have experienced or might
experience directly the consequences of war, view
war as a last resort. Military service is mandatory
in many Middle Eastern countries and most fami-
lies will bear the consequences of wars and tor-
ture. In addition, women in the Middle East tend
to be the ones who experience and endure suffer-
ing due to loss of loved ones or physical destruc-
tion and mutilation. Thus, we see gender
differences across concepts, with women not con-
sidering war or torture even as a last resort, which
might reflect a total rejection of war as an option.
Terrorist attacks have killed more Muslims
than non-Muslims. Muslims not only have to suf-
fer the murder and destruction of these attacks
but also have to endure the militant counter
attacks by their governments and by international
powers that might cause many civilian casualties
and limit freedoms and delay progress. In addi-
tion, they have to cope with economical hardships
79
and the desire of some naïve individuals to see
the complex and diverse religions and cultures of
the Middle East through the prism of paranoia.
For example, some responses defended Islam
against the charge of terrorism, while others
pointed out the cynicism of those who exploit the
fear of terrorism in order to adopt certain govern-
mental policies. We argue that these responses
were not only definitions but also complaints
against war, torture, and terrorism; expressions of
pain; calls for peace and justice; and an assertion
of shared human morals and values.
References
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Fieldhouse D (2006) Western imperialism in the Middle
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Fisher W (1978) The Middle East: a physical, social, and
regional geography. Routledge, London
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World War II. Cambridge University Press, Boston
 Definitions of War, Torture,
and Terrorism in the Gulf States
Heyam Mohammed, Raja Tayeh,
Elizabeth Planje, and Gregory Malley
Political and Cultural Context
The countries of the Gulf States, sometimes
called the Arab Gulf or Persian Gulf, share many
characteristics. From their tribal cultures and tra-
ditions, to religion and political policy, a strong
cultural assimilation has transpired as a result of
the close proximity of these nations and the
nomadic nature of the people who once roamed
the area hundreds of years ago. Currently, the
majority of these Gulf nations are run by a royal
family, and these families have shown strong
opposition to dissent. Kuwait, for example, has
recently been under fire after a March 10th, 2011,
report claiming Kuwaiti police tortured two for-
eign migrant workers to death after they were
accused of stealing from farm owners and setting
fire to their crops (Kuwaiti Authorities Torture
Migrant Workers to Death 2011).
In this chapter, we consider definitions of
war, torture, and terrorism provided by ordinary
people from Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, and Qatar.
We begin with a brief introduction to the cultural
and historical context of the region, starting with
the distinction between “Arab” and “Muslim.”
Questions such as “Who is a Muslim?” and “Do
their religious beliefs affect the way Muslims
look at things such as war?” are important ques-
tions that must first be answered before respon-
sible conclusions about perspectives on invasion
in the Gulf States can be drawn. Muslims, by
K. Malley-Morrison et al. (eds.), International Handbook of War, Torture, and Terrorism,
Peace Psychology Book Series, DOI 10.1007/978-1-4614-1638-8_6,
© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2013
6
definition, are people who submit their soul,
faith, and beliefs to God (Allah). According to
Merriam-Webster Dictionaries, Arabs are defined
as (a) a member of the Semitic people of the
Arabian Peninsula or (b) a member of an Arab-
speaking people. Now that these definitions have
been established, it is important to note that not
all Arabs are Muslims, and not all Muslims are
Arabs. In fact, Arabs represent only 18 % of
the Islamic population! Muslims comprise 20 %
of the world’s population, with the largest con-
centration of Muslims living on the Indian
subcontinent.
In these Muslim nations, the holy book is the
Qu’ran, which has many similarities to earlier
monotheistic texts, namely, the Jewish Bible
(including the Torah) and the New Testament in
the Christian Bible. These similarities include
the belief in the God of Abraham and all of
the prophets mentioned in both the Old and
New Testament, the day after, the Virgin Mary,
and that Jesus was a spirit and a word from God,
and doing good deeds in life. In addition, all three
religions share some laws and the belief in the
Ten Commandments. The Islam religion began in
the holy cities of Mecca and Medina in what is
today Saudi Arabia, with the work of prophet
Mohammed Ben Abdellah and his journey to
spread the word of God. As both the cradle for
the Islamic religion and the final resting spot of
Islam’s great prophet, Saudi Arabia remains
vitally important to Muslims today.
81
82
Many Muslims within the Gulf States follow
the Wahhabi interpretation of Islamic religious
law (Shari’a). The most important aspect in the
Wahhabi interpretation is the “essential oneness
of God (Allah)” (Wahhabi 2011). Leaders are
sworn in to do the work of Allah and are given
tremendous power. Under this system, govern-
ment leaders are believed to have God’s blessing.
Therefore, dissent is discouraged because any
objection to government can be deemed an objec-
tion to God. The result is the creation of an envi-
ronment wherein power is centralized and human
rights may be marginalized. Whereas the United
States was created on the basis of a separation
between church and state, religion continues to
play a central role in the countries surrounding
the Arab Gulf. In Oman, for example, dissent is
not well received by the government. Abdullah
Al Riyami, a citizen of Oman, was arrested on
July 12, 2005, for criticizing the government. Not
unlike the role of Julian Assange in the Wikileaks
scandal, Al Riyami posted research on the Internet
that did not portray the government in Oman in a
very positive light. According to Amnesty
International, such criticisms serve to educate the
general population on their rights as people and
to highlight the malfeasances of an overly power-
ful government (Amnesty International 2011a).
Some progress has been demonstrated by the
government of Qatar to put more emphasis on the
preservation of human rights; however, Amnesty
International has criticized that government for
its unwillingness to fully protect the rights of
women (Amnesty International 2011b).
Torture, long an accepted practice in most
parts of the world, continues to be identified by
human rights groups as a problem in the Gulf
States region. To give one example, towards the
end of the twentieth century, the Bahrain monar-
chy appeared to have taken significant steps to
reduce the prevalence of state-sponsored torture
inside their borders. However, a 2007 Human
Rights Watch report concluded that “officials
again have used torture and ill-treatment, particu-
larly during the interrogation of security suspects”
(Human Rights Watch 2010). More recently,
early in 2011, there were many antigovernment
H. Mohammed et al.
demonstrations in Bahrain in response to what
was widely perceived as human rights violations
and denial of political freedom.
Findings: Definitions of War,
Terrorism, and Torture
This study examines individual perspectives
regarding the definitions of war, torture, and ter-
rorism, among citizens of the current Gulf States.
These perspectives are vital to understand given
the Gulf War and other recent wars in that region.
Methodology
We used the hard copy version of the Personal and
Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace
Survey (PAIRTAPS; Malley-Morrison et al. 2006)
to collect data from citizens of the Gulf Region.
The PAIRTAPS’s three items associated with
definitions of war, torture, and terrorism were
coded and analyzed. Participants were invited to
take the survey voluntarily in the cities of Kuwait,
Kuwait; Manama, Bahrain; Muscat, Oman; and
Doha, Qatar. All of the 179 people who partici-
pated in this study were born in the region and
had at least one parent who was also born in the
region. Participants were from Kuwait (41 % of
the sample; n = 73), Bahrain (27 %; n = 48), Oman
(21 %; n = 37), and Qatar (12 %; n = 21).
The sample size was relatively small and is
not intended as a representative sample but rather
as a convenience sample gathered for an explor-
atory study. The majority of the participants were
male (n = 107, 60 %), and their mean age was
31 years. More than 75 % of the sample was
Muslim (n = 139, 78 %), with two participants
identifying as Agnostic (1 %) and 21 % (n = 38)
not reporting a religion. Forty percent of the sam-
ple (n = 72) reported their religious sect as gener-
ally “Muslim,” whereas 31 % (n = 56) specified
their religion as Sunni and 6 % (n = 11) as Shiite.
Coding manuals for definitions of war, terror-
ism, and torture were developed by the GIPGAP
group utilizing a grounded theory perspective.
6 Gulf States Definitions 83

Table 6.1 Sample definitions of war responses: outcomes and moral judgments
Coding Category Percent Country Sample response
Outcomes of war
General 8 (15) Kuwait Suffering
Oman Dark destiny
Bahrain Fear, suffering
Qatar Torturing people
Concrete 26 (53) Kuwait Death
Oman Massive destruction of each progress civilization
Bahrain Destruction, final destruction, and the oppression of humanity
throughout history
Qatar Vandalism, killing, and destruction
Abstract 16 (32) Kuwait Destruction, pains, suffering, decadence, and deterioration
Bahrain Destruction and instability
Moral judgment 13 Kuwait Horrible events that cause harm, resentment, and hate among nations
Oman Ruin human being
Qatar Chaos lead to destroy society
Note: Two figures are presented in the percent column for outcomes of war and it subcategories. The first percentage
figure is the percentage of outcomes coded into the specified subcategory out of the total number of definitions of war.
The second percentage (in parentheses) indicates the percentage of outcomes coded into the subcategory out of all the
responses in the outcomes of war category. Moral judgment is a major category with no subcategories; consequently, it
has no second number in parentheses

Responses were divided into codeable units as
long as each unit had an independent significant
meaning.
Definitions of War
Overall, 159 participants responded to the item
“What is your definition of war?” which yielded
345 codeable units. Within these definitions of
war, five major themes were identified: outcomes,
moral judgments, causes of war, qualifications
(criteria) for war, and a focus on conflict; there
was also a category for uncodeable responses.
The major category of outcomes accounted for
49 % of all the definitions of war provided in the
Gulf States sample. Table 6.1 provides examples
of responses coded into the outcomes category.
Concrete outcomes comprised 53 % of the out-
comes responses and 26 % of the total codeable
units in the sample. An example of a concrete
outcome response was that war is “two countries
fighting and loss of souls and money.” In addi-
tion, 32 % of the outcome responses (16 % of the
total codeable units) referred to abstract out-
comes such as “loss of souls” and “fear.” Some
responses did not clearly point to either concrete
or abstract outcomes and were coded in the more
general category of outcomes. Examples of such
general outcomes responses include defining war
as “[a] situation that affect[s] two countr[ies] for
different reason[s]”; such definitions accounted
for 8 % of all war definitions and 15 % of the
definitions of war focusing on outcomes.
The next most common type of response pro-
vided a moral judgment regarding war, such as in
the previously cited response describing war as
“horrible events.” Such responses represented
13 % of all the definitions of war. One participant
provided several codeable units exhibiting judg-
ments about war: “War is one of the most hideous
crimes humans can commit. God created us to live
in peace and harmony, not to fight each other. It is
disgusting to see human beings kill each other.”
Table 6.2 presents examples of definitions
coded into the major category of causes of war and
its subcategories. Thirteen percent of the definitions
of war were coded into the general causes of war
84 H. Mohammed et al.

Table 6.2 Sample definitions of war: causes

Coding Category Percent Country Example response
Causes of war
General 1 (13) Kuwait It is a conflict that occurs for reasons that are not announced or
announced
Motivation/intent 1 (8) Kuwait Conflict and continuous killing for some goal
Political 2 (29) Kuwait Conflicts between countries in order to occupy land or society
Oman The injustice of nation leaders
Qatar The erratic behavior of States to resolve a problem
Self defense 1 (8) Kuwait Should only be for defense
Moral judgment on cause 3 (42) Kuwait Love of destructive violence that is in control over the minds
of humanity
Oman Killing without reasons
Bahrain Aggression on others for no reason
Qatar Fight between two countries unnecessary
Note. Two figures are presented in the percent column for causes of war for each subcategory. The first percentage figure
is the percentage of causes of war coded into the specified subcategory out of the total number of definitions of war. The
second percentage (in parentheses) indicates the percentage of causes of war coded into the subcategory out of all the
war definitions in the causes of war categories, respectively

category and included responses indicating that
war occurs “for some goal” (which was coded
specifically into the motivation/intent subcategory
that accounted for 8 % of the cause definitions).
Responses indicating a moral judgment regarding
causes of war were the most frequently occurring
kind of response within all the definitions focusing
on causes, comprising 42 % of all responses
emphasizing war’s causes. For example, defining
war as “the proliferation of murder without causes”
judges war itself as murder but also explains that
the reasons for war are unjustified (in that this par-
ticipant indicates that there are no justifiable causes
for the violence). Definitions of war focusing on
political causes of war were another fairly com-
mon type of cause definition (29 % of all the
definitions referring to a cause).
Table 6.3 presents examples and information
on the types of responses that fell into the last two
major definitions of war categories: conflict and
qualifications. Overall, 7 % of all definitions of
war fell into the major category of conflict, with
14 % of conflict responses describing nonphysi-
cal conflicts and 86 % describing general or
physical conflict. The general conflict or physical
conflict category contained responses such
as “the concept of aggression between countries”
or “conflict and fight[s] between states.”
The category accounting for nonphysical
responses was created to capture responses such
as “political disagreement.” Overall, 20 % of all
definitions of war were coded into the major cat-
egory of qualifications. Ten percent of responses
overall—and 48 % of the qualifications
definitions—fell into the subcategory of officially
recognized groups and qualified war by describ-
ing it as a process that occurs among groups that
are officially recognized as holding political
power; for example, war occurs when “two or
more countries fight each other.” Other relatively
popular qualifications for war were scale or inten-
sity of conflict (28 % of the qualifications) and
one-sided aggression (23 % of the qualifications).
Definitions of Torture
Overall, 152 participants responded to the item,
“What is torture?,” and yielded 276 codeable
units. In addition to uncodeable responses, there
were six major thematic categories: methods,
outcomes, judgments, a focus on intent, charac-
teristics of the individual being tortured, and con-
ditions that give rise to torture (the latter two
categories had few responses from this sample
and thus are not considered further).
6 Gulf States Definitions 85

Table 6.3 Sample definitions of war: conflict and qualifications

Coding Category Percent Country Example responses
Focus on conflict only 7 (86) Kuwait Conflict
Oman Military conflict
Qatar Conflict and fight
Nonphysical conflict 1 (14) Kuwait Disagreement in opinions between countries
Qatar Political disagreement
Qualifications for war
Scale or intensity of conflict 6 (28) Kuwait Is a mass killing of one country by another regardless
of the causes
Oman Frightened, killing, and damage
Bahrain Invade, kill, and ruined nations
Qatar Destruction, killing, and looting
Officially recognized 10 (48) Kuwait Conflicts between countries in order to occupy land or society
groups Oman Fight between two or more countries
Bahrain Fighting between two countries
Qatar The erratic behavior of states to resolve a problem
One-sided aggression 5 (23) Kuwait Aggression against another country and violating its rights
and security
Oman One state invaded another one
Bahrain Aggression of one or more country against another
Qatar When state attack another state
Note: Two figures are presented in the percent column for definitions of war for each subcategory. The first figure is the
percentage of war definitions coded into the specified subcategory out of the total number of definitions of war. The
second percentage (in parentheses) indicates the percentage of war definitions coded into the subcategory out of all the
war definitions in the conflict or qualifications of war categories, respectively

Table 6.4 provides examples of responses coded
into the two major categories of methods and out-
comes. Responses describing methods accounted
for 35 % of the total codeable units. Within the
methods category, the most commonly given sub-
type of torture definition was physical methods of
torture. One example of such a response comes
from a Kuwaiti man who described in detail that
torture is “[when] the person feels pain and
watch[es] himself dying but does not die, in fact
[torture] is worse than death, it is blood and pierc-
ing eyes (inserting sharp objects in the eyes), and
forcefully removing nails, and sexual pain.”
Physical methods accounted for 17 % of the total
codeable units and 49 % of the methods major
category. Psychological methods were the second
most commonly mentioned methods (30 % of
methods responses) and included responses like
“hatred to others” and “humiliation.”
Similar responses (see Table 6.4) referred to
outcomes of torture and were distinguished from
methods because they reflected a long-term per-
spective looking at permanent damage. Outcomes
represented 7 % of the total codeable units, with
physical outcomes representing the largest sub-
category with 45 % of the outcomes responses,
and psychological outcomes getting somewhat
less emphasis (30 % of all outcomes responses).
The response “deformity, hitting” serves as an
example to illustrate the difference between out-
comes and methods: whereas hitting is coded for
physical method, deformity indicates a permanent
outcome or enduring effect that the torture has on
the torture survivor.
The largest major category for definitions of
torture was judgments, with 42 % of the
definitions falling into that category (see
Table 6.5). Judgments could show tolerance or
intolerance, and therefore, the major category
was divided into two major subcategories of
tolerance (including the general tolerance and
necessary subcategories) or intolerance (including
86 H. Mohammed et al.

Table 6.4 Sample definitions of torture: methods and outcomes

Coding Category Percent Country Example response
Focus on method
General 1 (2) Qatar Torture human by using different methods
Harmful method 7 (19) Qatar Hurt person and make him suffer
Oman The use of aggression
Physical 17 (49) Bahrain The exhausting of a body that is from Allah
Oman Hitting people
Psychological 11 (30) Oman Dread
Kuwait Is exposing a person to what he cannot tolerate of moral and psychological
pains, regardless of the cause
Focus on outcome 2 (25) Bahrain The destruction of [a] human
Physical 3 (45) Oman Killing and humiliation
Psychological 2 (30) Kuwait The destruction of souls, deforming bodies, and handicapping
Note: Two figures are presented in the percent column for definitions of torture in each subcategory. The first percentage
figure is the percentage of torture definitions coded into the specified subcategory out of the total number of definitions
of torture. The second percentage (in parentheses) indicates the percentage of torture definitions coded into the subcat-
egory out of all the torture definitions in the method or outcome of torture categories, respectively

Table 6.5 Sample definitions of torture: judgments

Coding Category Percent Country Example response
Judgment
General <1 (<1) Bahrain Worse action could be done
Tolerant 1 (3) Oman It could be beneficial in some cases
Fair to the criminals and the oppressors, the oppressors of the innocent
Necessary 1 (3) Qatar Sometimes needed
General intolerance 11 (26) Bahrain No excuse to do this act
Qatar Beating without right
Unlawful 5 (13) Bahrain Criminality
Immoral 15 (36) Kuwait Not taking care of a soul from Allah, The High Praise to Him
Oman Unethical
Kuwait Must not exist among people
Sadistic 2 (4) Qatar Savage
Violation of human 5 (13) Kuwait Stealing the freedom of a person
rights Oman Rejected because [it is] against humanitarian principles
Note: Two figures are presented in the percent column for definitions of torture for each subcategory. The first percent-
age figure is the percentage of torture definitions coded into the specified subcategory out of the total number of
definitions of torture. The second percentage (in parentheses) indicates the percentage of torture definitions coded into
the subcategory out of all the torture definitions in the judgment of torture category

the general intolerance, unlawful, immoral,
sadistic, and violation of human rights subcate-
gories). One response did not clearly show sup-
port or rejection of torture and was coded into
the general judgments subcategory.
Tolerant responses comprised a small minor-
ity (3 %) of judgment responses (1 % of the total
sample). Responses indicating tolerance were
equally divided among those justifying torture as
either necessary/last resort (e.g., “sometime[s]
necessary”) or those showing general tolerance
(e.g., “[torturers] have the right to torture the
oppressor”).
Responses displaying intolerance of torture
fell into categories rejecting torture as unlawful
(13 % of intolerant responses), immoral (36 %),
6 Gulf States Definitions 87

Table 6.6 Definitions of torture sample responses: intent

Coding Category Percent Country Example response
Focus on intent
General 2 (18) Qatar Methods [used] on the individuals for a particular purpose
Destructive intent 1 (7) Kuwait Physical and psychological punishment that [people] suffer
for a reason or no reason
Constructive intent 2 (21) Kuwait The use of all methods of hitting and insults for some goal
Information 2 (21) Kuwait The use of all immoral methods in order to investigate a person
Bahrain Extract information [with] hate
Punishment 3 (25) Bahrain The use of deviant means to punish individuals
Oman Punishment of [an] individual [who] did something or not
Note: Two figures are presented in the percent column for definitions of torture in each subcategory. The first percentage
figure is the percentage of torture definitions coded into the specified subcategory out of the total number of definitions
of torture. The second percentage (in parentheses) indicates the percentage of torture definitions coded into the subcat-
egory out of all the torture definitions in the intent of torture category

sadistic (4 %), a violation of human rights (13 %),
and general intolerance (26 %). Interestingly, no
responses in this sample rejected torture with the
argument that torture is unnecessary, which was
a category developed due to the prevalence of
responses found in a mixed international sample
used for coding manual development. Responses
describing torture as immoral were not only the
most common type of intolerant response, but
they also represented the second most common
subcategory of definitions of torture overall
(15 % of the total codeable units for the torture
item). Many responses contained many multiple
codeable units, all of which expressed intoler-
ance of torture: “Torture is one of the most inhu-
mane acts a person can commit. It is a violation
of human rights. Nobody is ever deserving of any
sort of torture, whether physical or psychologi-
cal.” Another participant explained, “in Islam
[torture] is prohibited and inhumane.”
Among responses defining torture as unlawful
were those equating it with “unjustified crime” or
a “crime against the people.” Some responses
specifically identified torture as a violation of
human rights or, as one participant wrote, torture
is “the ruins of human rights.” Responses coded
as sadistic were similar to those that described
torture as “savage,” consistent with the idea
one participant offered that torture derives from
the “desire to make people suffer, it might be [a]
psychological problem.” Generally intolerant
responses did not offer specific reasons for reject-
ing torture but rather explained, for example, that
torture is an “unaccepted method” or is “some-
thing ugly and bad.”
Finally, 10 % of the responses comprised the
major category of intentions behind torture (see
Table 6.6), with 25 % of intent responses describ-
ing torture as occurring as a punishment.
Responses offering punishment as the intention
for torture might also include an indication of tol-
erance, for example, explaining that “[torture] is
the punishment for everyone who commits and
crime and does sin.” Another participant rejected
torture while defining torture as punishment,
writing that torture is “the use of deviant means
to punish individuals.”
Definitions of Terrorism
Overall, 157 participants responded to the item,
“What is your definition of terrorism?” yielding
228 total codeable units. Definitions of terrorism
were analyzed on two levels: (1) each entire
definition was coded for valence, and then (2)
definitions were divided into codeable units and
analyzed for themes (as with definitions of war
and torture).
Definitions were considered in their entirety
as to whether they reflected positive, negative, or
neutral valence or if they displayed an effort to
88
Table 6.7 Definitions of terrorism: valence
Coding category Percent Country
Negative 43 Kuwait
Oman
Bahrain
Qatar
Neutral 57 Kuwait
Oman
Bahrain
Qatar
Effort to understand terrorism 0 Oman
Oman
Positive 0 Oman
Note: The numbers reported reflect the percent of the single coding category out of the total codeable units
understand terrorism (see Table 6.7). The only
example of a positive definition came from a
woman from Oman, who wrote “beautiful.” It is
possible that she responded to the wrong prompt,
as participants were also asked their definitions
of peace, with the spaces for responding appear-
ing close to one another. A slight majority of par-
ticipants provided neutral definitions (57 % of all
terrorism responses) with many participants also
providing negative definitions (43 %). Neutral
definitions describe terrorism without indicating
a judgment towards terrorism, such as defining
terrorism as “scaring the safe citizens in all places
in the country” or “fear and destruction.” Negative
definitions express complete rejection of terror-
ism, for example, “Terrorism is a hideous act of
psychological torture. Since it is considered as a
form of torture, it violates human rights and
should be obliterated.”
Additionally, less than 1 % of definitions of
terrorism expressed an effort to understand ter-
rorism, such as the following response describing
terrorists as a “group of individuals [who are]
misled which stands under the false [logic] to dis-
perse fear among people.” This response does not
fully condemn terrorists but rather sees them as
misled people.
In regard to themes, in addition to uncodeable
responses, there were six major categories: meth-
ods, outcomes, causes, judgments, and real-life
H. Mohammed et al.
Sample response
The enemy of humanity
The killing of innocent civilian for no reasons
Terrorism people for illegitimate purposes
Not in Islam
Rejection of the reality that he lives in
Civilian killing
Fear, assault
Extremism
New phrase that target[s] Muslims
The movement expresses a misunderstanding
and impede[s] [the] political state
Beautiful
references (the last of which was not represented
in this sample). Similarly, as with definitions of
torture, the most commonly coded subcategory
among definitions of terrorism captured responses
describing physical methods (12 % of total code-
able units).
Table 6.8 shows examples of responses
describing methods, which as a major category
accounted for 20 % of the total codeable units.
Responses describing specifically physical
methods, such as “civilian killing” and “explo-
sions and harm to innocent people,” comprised
63 % of the methods responses. Mental meth-
ods, such as the response discussed earlier
defining terrorism as “a hideous act of psycho-
logical torture,” comprised 21 % of the methods
responses.
Again, as with definitions of torture, definitions
of terrorism that described outcomes were differ-
entiated from those describing methods because
outcomes indicated the potential long-term effects
of terrorism. The major category of outcomes
accounted for 34 % of the total codeable units.
Responses described physical (38 % of outcomes)
or emotional outcomes (25 % of outcomes), indi-
cated a disruption of peace and stability (35 % of
outcomes), or provided general outcomes (6 %
of outcomes). Responses sometimes contained
multiple outcomes such as “fear and instability”
(an emotional outcome and a disruption of stability).
6 Gulf States Definitions 89

Table 6.8 Definitions of terrorism sample responses: methods

Coding Category Percent Country Example response
Process/method
General 3 (16) Kuwait Aggression
Oman Curled method
Bahrain The torment and killing peoples without guilt
Physical 12 (63) Kuwait Is robbery and stealing and hitting in the wrong way
Oman Killing and devastation
Bahrain Act of violence and detestation
Qatar Killing innocent without right
Mental 4 (21) Kuwait Psychological torture
Oman Horror
Bahrain Brain washing the youth and pushing them to do evil to others
Qatar Intimidation and insecurity
Note: Two figures are presented in the percent column for definitions of terrorism for each subcategory. The first per-
centage figure is the percentage of torture definitions coded into the specified subcategory out of the total number of
definitions of torture. The second percentage (in parentheses) indicates the percentage of torture definitions coded into
the subcategory out of all the process/method torture definitions

Table 6.9 Definitions of terrorism sample responses: outcomes

Coding Category Percent Country Example response
Outcomes
General 2 (6) Kuwait Violation of the rights of others
Oman Devastation
Physical 13 (38) Kuwait Very painful and leads to destruction, deterioration
Oman Hitting up a person and sometimes up to death
Bahrain Loss of life and fear
Emotional 7 (21) Kuwait Scaring the safe citizens in all places in the country
Bahrain A phenomena that carried (brought) loss of hope and sadness
Disruption of 12 (35) Kuwait Trying to shake the security of a country by opposing persons or groups
peace and stability Oman The desire of instability and destruction
Bahrain Conflicting with peace
Qatar Instability, violation of international treaties
Note: Two figures are presented in the percent column for definitions of terrorism in each subcategory. The first percent-
age figure is the percentage of torture definitions coded into the specified subcategory out of the total number of
definitions of torture. The second percentage (in parentheses) indicates the percentage of torture definitions coded into
the subcategory out of all the torture definitions in the outcome of torture category

Table 6.9 provides more examples of outcomes,
along with the percent of responses in each cate-
gory out of the entire set of definitions of
terrorism.
Responses describing causes as to why terror-
ism occurs accounted for 20 % of the total code-
able units. Table 6.10 shows examples from the
various subcategories under causes. The most
common kind of cause response (47 % of the
major category) made a point about terrorism
being different from religion or against religion.
For example, a woman from Kuwait defined ter-
rorism as “a group of people fighting the govern-
ment while hidden behind the name of Islam, but
it does nothing but destruction and killing and
spreading terror among people.” Another partici-
pant simply wrote that terrorism is the “defama-
tion of Islam.”
90 H. Mohammed et al.

Table 6.10 Definitions of terrorism sample responses: causes

Coding Category Percent Country Example response
Cause/motivation
General 3 (16) Kuwait Rejection of the reality that he lives in
Oman The desire of instability and destruction
Bahrain Act of detestation
Qatar Extremist
Ideological 2 (11) Kuwait Fanaticism for an opinion and trying to apply it on the society by force
motivation Oman Group of extremist, an act that Muslims have stuck with
Bahrain The killing of innocent souls for political purposes
Political agenda 3 (16) Kuwait The use of violence or threat against political purposes
Oman The movement expresses a misunderstanding and impede made political state
International 1 (5) Kuwait Trying to shake the security of a country by opposing persons or groups
Emotional causes 1 (5) Kuwait A new term given to anyone who revenges from a certain situation
Not religion 9 (47) Kuwait Islam forbade it
Oman Criminal ravage group destroyed the Islamic image
Bahrain Terrorism has no religion
Qatar Defamation of Islam
No motivation 0 (0) Oman Killing innocent people for no reason
Note: Two figures are presented in the percent column for definitions of terrorism in each subcategory. The first percent-
age figure is the percentage of torture definitions coded into the specified subcategory out of the total number of
definitions of torture. The second percentage (in parentheses) indicates the percentage of torture definitions coded into
the subcategory out of all the torture definitions in the cause or motivation of torture categories, respectively

Similar to torture, the largest major category
of definitions of terrorism responses was judg-
ments (26 % of the total set of definitions of ter-
rorism). Table 6.11 provides examples of
judgments responses, including those in the sub-
categories for moral judgments and legal judg-
ments. Judgmental responses were most frequently
coded into the general moral judgments subcate-
gory (48 % of judgments); these responses made
moral judgments that did not specifically point to
the acts or motivation behind terrorism. Responses
involving general moral judgments include
definitions defining terrorism as “unethical,”
“Satan,” and “black poison” and comprised 63 %
of the moral judgments category.
The definitions of terrorism also included
responses identifying immoral acts involved in
terrorism and the in motivation behind terrorism,
both seen respectively in the following example:
terrorism is “a disabled way to solve problems
because ignorance is the basis.” These responses
comprised 12 % and 16 % of judgments responses,
respectively. The legal judgments category was
also divided into general judgments, such as
“injustice,” and those whose judgment focuses on
the acts of terrorism, such as “individuals commit-
ting crimes.” The general legal judgments category
accounted for 8 % of judgments, while the illegal
acts subcategory accounted for 4 % of all the judg-
ments responses. There were no responses refer-
ring to legal judgments regarding motivation.
It was only on definitions of terrorism that
exploratory statistical analyses yielded some
demographic differences. T-tests revealed that in
comparison to people without a relative in the
military, people with family members in the mili-
tary provided significantly more judgments when
giving definitions of terrorism. t-Tests also indi-
cated that people with relatives in the military
provided more responses falling under the moral
judgments subcategories regarding terrorism and
fewer responses falling under legal judgments
subcategories regarding terrorism (see
Table 6.12). Chi-square analyses revealed only
one group difference in likelihood of using a par-
ticular theme: specifically, significantly more
men than women explicitly said that terrorism is
not a product of a particular religion.
6 Gulf States Definitions 91

Table 6.11 Sample definitions of terrorism: judgments

Coding Category Percent Country Example response
Judgments
General 2 (13) Kuwait Killing selves without a right
Bahrain Disgust
Qatar Not excused
Moral judgment 12 (48) Kuwait The disease of the society
Oman Unethical
Bahrain A picture that reflects the reality of human beasts
Qatar Underdevelopment of human
Immoral acts 3 (12) Kuwait Brain washing the youth and pushing them to do evil to others
Oman Injustice to the other rights
Bahrain Violation of the rights of others
Motivation 4 (16) Kuwait A group of individuals who have wrong views that they concluded and
came out with a fanatic thought
Oman Group of individuals that misled which stands under the false logos to
disperse fear among people
Bahrain Terrorism people for illegitimate purposes
Appeal to relativity 0 (0) Oman The movement expresses a misunderstanding and impede made political
state
Bahrain A slogan raised against a group that kills and torture with a claim that
they are Muslims
Legal judgment 2 (8) Kuwait Criminality
Oman Injudicious
Qatar Instability, violation of international treaties
Illegal acts 1 (4) Kuwait Terrorism is a hideous act of psychological torture. Since it is considered
as a form of torture, it violates human rights and should be obliterated
Oman Individuals committing crimes
Note: Two figures are presented in the percent column for definitions of terrorism in each subcategory. The first percent-
age figure is the percentage of torture definitions coded into the specified subcategory out of the total number of
definitions of torture. The second percentage (in parentheses) indicates the percentage of torture definitions coded into
the subcategory out of all the torture definitions in the judgment of torture categories

Table 6.12 Definitions of terrorism: t-test findings for demographic group means of coding categories
Coding Category Group 1 Group 2 t df
Relative military No relative military
Terrorism legal judgment sum 0.04 (0.19) 0.13 (0.34) 1.71* 83.49
Terrorism moral judgment sum 0.43 (0.57) 0.20 (0.40) 1.90* 39.97
Terrorism judgments sum 0.50 (0.58) 0.28 (0.45) 1.75* 43.22
Note: Sum at the end of a variable name indicates that the variable was created by adding scores on all the subcategories
of the major category. Please refer to the Methods chapter for a more detailed description of how these variables were
created. Standard deviations appear in parentheses next to means
*
p £ 0.05

A final set of exploratory analyses was con-
ducted using scores created by combining com-
mon categories (e.g., causes, outcomes, and
moral judgments) across definitions. These anal-
yses revealed only two statistically significant
findings. Specifically, t-tests indicated that people
without a relative in the military provided
significantly more causes when defining war, tor-
ture, and terrorism than people without family
members in the military, and chi-square analyses
92
with Fisher’s exact tests revealed that significantly
more people who had never been in the military
used a moral judgment when defining war, tor-
ture, or terrorism than people who had served in
the military.
Discussion
The survey responses received from the partici-
pants in this study are useful in highlighting the
extent to which participants from the Gulf States
are generally critical of violent tactics and the
extent to which they reject the linking of terror-
ism with Islam. Although some media outlets
make it seem as if Islamic and Muslim people
endorse the terrorist acts of extremist military
factions like the Taliban (e.g., Karim 2003), the
current study, and other studies like it, has dem-
onstrated that the general population in these
countries does not support the death and violence
that these organizations have produced. Only one
participant provided a definition of terrorism that
seemed to have a positive valence, while nearly
half of the participants were very negative about
terrorism in their definitions. The remainder of
participants provided neutral definitions, making
it unclear what their overall orientation towards
terrorism was.
One other interesting note about the terrorism
responses was the tendency for participants to
mention the separation between religion and ter-
rorism. While the terrorist organizations use reli-
gion as a major selling point, citizens not affiliated
with these groups deny their religious legitimacy
(Al-Khattar 2003). The fact that nearly half of the
participants felt it necessary to make this point
could be evidence of their distaste for the idea
that these organizations are in some way warriors
of Islam and probably their recognition that many
people in the West make a fallacious link between
terrorism and Islam as a religion (Karim 2003).
Views on torture, like the views on terrorism,
were primarily negative. Only 7 % of those who
used judgment statements when defining torture
claimed any right for its use. The rest of the
H. Mohammed et al.
judgment statements harshly condemned its use.
One participant even stated that “[t]orture is one
of the most inhumane acts a person can commit.”
The perspectives on war were far less negative
than the perspectives on torture on terrorism,
however. Some participants did express strong
hatred for war; as one participant posited, “God
created us to live in peace and harmony, not to
fight each other. It is disgusting to see human
beings kill each other.” However, when compared
to the definitions of torture and terrorism, people
seemed to have a much higher tolerance for its
prevalence. War, unlike terrorism and torture, is
not seen as being the actions of citizens. Instead,
war is seen as the language of nations.
One interesting finding from the exploratory
quantitative analyses was that participants who
did not have military experience were more likely
than their counterparts to use moral judgments
when defining war, torture, or terrorism. In
essence, it seems the harsh realities of war tend to
override the idealistic moral language often asso-
ciated with these words. Perhaps these firsthand
exposure to war and death enlightened these par-
ticipants to the sometimes random and meaning-
less ways lives can be taken. In an environment
such as the military, where the most valuable
human right—the right to life—can be taken so
quickly, the inherent rights of any individual are
minimized. It may be that individuals who have
direct experience with the military life can see
these losses better than others.
References
Al-Khattar AM (2003) Religion and Terrorism, An
Interfaith Perspective, Praeger Publishers: Westport, Co
Amnesty International (2011a) Further information on
UA 187/05(MDE 20/004/2005, 15 July 2005): fear of
torture or ill-treatment/possible prisoners of con-
science [Press release]. Retrieved from http://www.
amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE20/005/2005/
en/4a2fe811-fa1a-11dd-999c-47605d4edc46/
mde200052005en.pdf. 20 July 2005
Amnesty International (2011b) Qatar human rights.
Retrieved 18 March 2011 from http://www.amnesty-
usa.org/our-work/countries/middle-east-and-north-
africa/qatar
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Human Rights Watch (2010) Torture redux: the revival of
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 Definitions of War, Torture,
and Terrorism in Africa 7
Mahlon Dalley, Jacqui Akhurst, Adeniyi Famose,
Natoschia Scruggs, Laura Marcucci, Abdelali
Abdelkader, Shane O’Neil, Helena Castanheira,
Eduardo Correia, and William Tastle

Africa is the second largest and second most
populated continent on earth (Africa Guide 2009;
Miniwatts Marketing Group 2009; Sayre 2003).
There are 53 countries, including the seven island
countries, the total comprising close to 20% of
the world’s land area. The most common catego-
rization divides the African continent into five
subregions: Northern Africa, which lies North of
the Sahara Desert, runs along the Red Sea on the
east coast and the Mediterranean Sea to the north,
and extends to the Atlantic Ocean; Western
Africa, the land west of 10° east longitude;
Eastern Africa, the land from the Red Sea south
along the Indian Ocean to Mozambique; Central
or Middle Africa, which is defined as a portion of
the African continent south of the Sahara Desert,
east of Western Africa, and west of the Great Rift
Valley; and Southern Africa, the portion south of
10° latitude to the southern tip of the continent
surrounded by the Indian Ocean to the east and
the Atlantic Ocean to the west (New World
Encyclopedia, Africa 2011).
There is general consensus within the scientific
community that human life originated in Africa.
Fossils of early humans have been found in the
subregion of Eastern Africa, suggesting that this
is where key stages of human evolution occurred.
Approximately three million years ago, Homo
sapiens spread from Africa to other continents
(Davidson 1991; Stahl 2005). There is also evi-
dence that some of the first human civilizations
emerged around Egypt’s Nile valley in Africa and
then extended from modern Uganda north to
Sudan (Davidson 1991). The first West African
empires appeared as early as 4,000 years ago as a
result of long distance trade and the ability to
manipulate stone and metals. These evolved from
small groups of hunter-gatherers to clans and then
became more complex autonomous city-states
and kingdoms, including the Bantu-speaking
people in western Africa, whose language spread
throughout civilizations in eastern Africa. By the
ninth century, several large empires had devel-
oped and by the fifteenth century, these city-states
flourished among the sub-Saharan African regions
through inter-empire trading (Reader 1997).
Religion has at once divided and united
regions of the continent. African indigenous reli-
gions involved practices and rituals connected to
their cultural identity and communities. Even
though religious practices have varied by ethnic
groups, religion was and still is deeply connected
to customs and is often shared by several differ-
ent African societies (Doumbia and Doumbia
2004). Some common features include beliefs in
ancestral spirits, rites marking the passage from
childhood to adulthood or from life to death, and
the idea of sacrifice. In several African traditions,
there is a belief in the cyclical nature of reality
with the living standing between their ancestors
and the unborn. Even though most Africans today
are either Christians or Muslims, many elements
of such traditions are still present in tribal reli-
gions and customs (Bennett 1984). The role of
religion among Africans is crucial to their way of
life. Often misunderstood by western cultures,

K. Malley-Morrison et al. (eds.), International Handbook of War, Torture, and Terrorism, 95

Peace Psychology Book Series, DOI 10.1007/978-1-4614-1638-8_7,
© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2013
96
African practices are actually deep, meaningful
expressions that show love toward one another,
nature, and humanity as a whole (Doumbia and
Doumbia 2004).
The thirteenth century marked the invasion of
Africa by foreign nations, as several Muslim rul-
ers of the Ottoman Empire increased their pres-
ence and power in Northern Africa, and the
enslavement of populations changed the conti-
nent’s history. By the end of the fifteenth century,
dynasties had formed in the upper Niger River
Basin, West of Sudan. The fifteenth century also
marked the beginning of the exploration of the
African coast by the Portuguese. Some cite
resources like gold and grain as the precipitators
for European exploration of the continent, while
others attribute it to the start of the slave trade
(Bennett 1984). The Portuguese created the first
slave markets, and by the end of the sixteenth
century, about 10% of Lisbon’s population were
slaves. Because of the great plague of the four-
teenth century, slave markets originally emigrated
to Europe and eventually shifted to the plantations
in the New World by the middle fifteenth century.
The Catholic Church in Rome had a profound
effect on Africa, as the Pope legitimized the slave
trade and later colonialism via papal bulls issued
in the mid-fifteenth century. The Spanish were
the first to extend the slave trade to the New
World, transporting enslaved Africans to the
Spanish Americas beginning in 1502 and con-
tinuing throughout the colonies until 1716 and as
late as 1863 in Puerto Rico and 1866 in Cuba
(Bennett 1984). Estimates indicate that between
the fifteenth and nineteenth centuries, around 15
million Africans were taken from their continent
into the Americas as slaves.
By the end of the eighteenth century, Britain
had lost its 13 colonies in North America, Spain
and Portugal had lost most of South America, and
Holland had difficulty holding on to the East
Indies. Colonialism seemed at a standstill until
the late nineteenth century’s “scramble for
Africa.” During that time, European colonial
powers created colonial nation states in most of
the African territory, leaving only two indepen-
dent nations—Liberia and Ethiopia. The European
M. Dalley et al.
leaders from Britain, France, Belgium, Germany,
Spain, Portugal, and Italy divided Africa based on
their own discretion (Peterson 2010). No Africans
were involved in the partitioning of their land.
By 1900, most of the African continent had
lost its independence and was completely under
European rule (Oliver and Atmore 2005). A sea
of change in African politics swept the continent
throughout the twentieth century as two world
wars, independence movements for many African
countries, the establishment and defeat of apart-
heid in South Africa, and several civil and tribal
wars, many waged at the expense of human
atrocities, altered the character and composition
of the continent.
Africans fighting in the First World War
included peasants who joined up voluntarily for
the wages offered as well as many who were
forced by their chiefs to participate (The story of
Africa, 2009). Some estimates suggest that over
two million Africans—most of whom were civil-
ians—were killed during WWI (Nosotro n.d.).
Analyses of regional casualties suggest that
100,000 men from East Africa alone and 65,000
from French North Africa and West Africa died
(Anderson 2004). The total war brought food
shortages to many African colonies through the
disruption in international trade, government
plans to charge taxes and remove manpower from
many rural communities, and climatic difficulties.
There were also shortages of guns, which made it
difficult for farmers to prevent or stop wild pigs
and elephants from coming into their fields and
destroying their crops. Some African colonies,
such as Gabon, served as battlegrounds for coun-
tries such as Germany and France; these armed
conflicts only increased the impact of the food
shortage, among other consequences. As a result,
many Africans left their families to find work in
other villages. Others protested and demanded
equal rights—with food supply a main concern
(Rich 2007). Following World War I, the price of
all commodities rose in Africa, and the poverty
rate reached an all time high (The Story of Africa
2009), and inflation soared (Rich 2007).
The European powers solicited African man-
power during WWII also. Five hundred thousand
7 African Definitions
Africans saw combat as fighters for the French
and British governments. Recruitment was more
refined than in WWI, although pressure was
applied by chiefs and forced labor has been docu-
mented within the agriculture and mining indus-
tries. Most Africans rallied to the war effort after
the invasion of Ethiopia (The Story of Africa
2009). The country played an important role in
the increased commodity production during
WWII, such as increased production of rubber
and tin mining; however, workers were forced to
work in terrible conditions and food prices con-
tinued to increase.
When WWII ended, Africans urged compen-
sation from the colonial powers in return for their
life-changing experiences and sacrifices during
both wars. Many men were out of work after
World War II, but they were still under the reign
of the European powers. Thus began the seeds of
discontent and eventually a push to decoloniza-
tion and independence in the 1950s and 1960s
(The Story of Africa 2009).
The Democratic Republic of the Congo’s evo-
lution post-WWII illustrates the fast pace of
independence and its consequences. The
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)
became an independent state with its own prime
minister and president in 1960 after having only
5 months to prepare for independence from
Belgium. However, in the same year it gained its
independence, the military turned on its white
leaders and claimed leadership over the Congo.
The mutinies created mass chaos, and by the end
of 1960, there were four different factions claim-
ing control the government. Widespread panic
for the 100,000 Belgium people residing in the
Congo prompted the Belgian government to send
troops to try to protect the whites from greatly
increased violence. In the 1990s, the situation in
the Congo exploded into chaos, war, and wide-
spread suffering. Beginning in August 1998, the
violence led to the largest war in modern African
history. Counting those who died of disease
and starvation, approximately 5.4 million peo-
ple lost their lives and millions more were dis-
placed. Even though the war officially ended in
2003, 1,000 people died daily in 2004 from
97
preventable malnutrition and disease (Canadian
Broadcasting Corporation 2004). According to
the Human Rights Watch (HRW 2006), between
August 2002 and March 2003, the UPC (French:
Union des Patriotes Congolais) arrested and tor-
tured over 100 protesters and was also responsi-
ble for the murder of a Kenyan peacekeeper in
January of 2004 and the kidnapping of a
Moroccan peacekeeper later that year (Human
Right Watch n.d.).
Africa continues to be the world’s poorest and
most underdeveloped continent despite plentiful
natural resources. Recent causes for underdevel-
opment appear to include the spread of HIV/
AIDS and malaria, serious human rights viola-
tions, failed central planning, high levels of illit-
eracy, lack of access to foreign capital, and
frequent tribal and military conflict ranging from
guerrilla warfare to genocide (Sandbrook 1985).
According to the United Nations’ Human
Development Report in 2003, the lowest ranked
25 nations (151st to 175th) were in Africa, where
the people are overwhelmed with poverty, illiter-
acy, malnutrition, and inadequate water supply
and sanitation, as well as poor health.
There is a great disparity between the state of
development of different African regions in
postcolonial Africa, as shown by rankings of
Africa’s best and worst governed regions and the
overall quality of the government. The 2009
Ibrahim Index of Governance (Mo Ibrahim
Foundation n.d.) is the first index of governance
by African nations and is organized by region as
well as country. It addresses issues such as health,
education, and level of poverty, as well as human
and democratic rights. Governance in each
country is given a score that ranges from 1 to 100.
According to the 2010 index, Mauritius,
Seychelles, Botswana, Cape Verde, and South
Africa are the best-governed countries in Africa,
and the Congo (Democratic Republic), Chad, and
Somalia are the worst. Two countries we surveyed
were in the highest fifth of the rankings, Botswana
and South Africa; none of those surveyed were in
the “most poorly governed” group. Ghana, Egypt,
Algeria, and Zambia were in the top 20. The other
two countries that were surveyed, Nigeria and
98
Angola, were ranked 37th and 42nd, respectively
(Mo Ibrahim Foundation n.d.).
Of particular interest in this chapter are
definitions of war, torture, and terrorism
from these select countries—Egypt and Algeria
representing Northern Africa; Ghana and Nigeria,
Western Africa; Zambia, Eastern Africa; Angola,
Central or Middle Africa; and Botswana and
South Africa representing Southern Africa. All of
these countries are located in a continent besieged
with violence from imperialistic powers as well
as from within but with major differences regard-
ing current economic and political status.
Methods
Participants, Measures, and Procedures
The African sample included 425 participants
from the eight countries of Algeria, Angola,
Botswana, Egypt, Ghana, Nigeria, South Africa,
and Zambia. Not all participants answered all
questions; therefore, some responses were fewer,
and in some cases substantially fewer, than the
number of participants. In fact, the countries of
South Africa with 139 participants, and Zambia
with 30, provided no definitions of torture.
Even when South Africans and Zambians gave
definitions of war and terrorism, there were no
data on their religion, class, military status, and
whether they had protested or not. Participants
were recruited in several ways, including net-
working, class surveys at universities, and post-
ing surveys on Internet websites. Participants
completed the Personal and Institutional Rights
to Aggression and Peace (PAIRTAPS) in eight
African countries (Malley-Morrison et al. 2006),
either in hard copy form or online.
Half of the 393 participants responding to
gender indicated that they were women, with
Algeria, Botswana, and South Africa close to a
60:40 ratio favoring women; Nigeria and Zambia
close to a 55:45 split for women; but Angola,
Egypt, and Ghana showing ratios of 67:33, 61:39,
and 82:18 favoring men. Many of the 425 partici-
pants were from South Africa (32.7%) and the
M. Dalley et al.
least from Algeria (2.8%). However, as noted
above, South African as well as Zambian partici-
pants did not complete many of the PAIRTAPS
demographic items such as religion, class, mili-
tary, and protest participation. Respondents of all
eight countries gave definitions of war and terror-
ism; however, there were no definitions of torture
from South African and Zambian participants.
Ages ranged from 18 to 74.
Of the 226 African participants who provided
demographic information on religion, 60%
identified themselves as Christians, 35% Muslim,
4% atheist/agnostic or no religion, and the other
1% Jewish, Hindu, and others. It should be noted
that Christians came mostly from sub-Saharan
Africa, whereas the majority of Muslims came
from the Arab countries of Egypt and Algeria.
From the 237 that responded to the social class
question, approximately 90% self-identified
themselves as lower, working and middle class
with 19% identified as lower class, 21% working
class, 50% middle class, 7% upper middle class,
and 3% as upper class. Most of the respondents
(91%) had never been in the military, although
40% had a family member who was serving or
had served in the military. When asked if they
had ever been involved in any sort of protest
against war and in favor of peace, only 17 of the
229 who responded to the question affirmed
being in a protest, 7 from Botswana, 4 from
Angola, and 3 each from Algeria and Ghana.
South African and Zambian participants did not
respond to the religion, social class, protest, and
two military questions; therefore, sweeping gen-
eralizations about the demographics of this sam-
ple cannot be accurately made.
Creation of the Coding Manuals
In this section, we are concerned with partici-
pants’ definitions of war, torture, and terrorism.
The coding process was based on grounded the-
ory, which seeks to capture and organize all of
the pertinent information within a set of qualita-
tive responses. After the surveys were collected,
a representative international sample was used to
7 African Definitions
develop coding manuals for each of the
definitions. The coding manuals were designed
to organize the responses into distinct, substan-
tive categories and to maximize the amount of
information retained in analysis while minimiz-
ing the number of answers that would be uncode-
able. Although it was important to glean as much
information as possible from responses, as well
as to make philosophical and logical consider-
ations when deciding how to organize the
answers, it was necessary to keep the coding
manuals grounded in the responses observed and
to not read too much into superficial differences
in content or semantics. All coding manuals were
constructed, edited, and reconstructed over a
period of time and were tested for inter-rater
reliability. In the next section, we describe the
distribution of definitions among major catego-
ries of responses and report on findings from an
exploratory analysis of demographic correlates
of response frequencies. Because our participants
are members of convenience samples, these anal-
yses are very preliminary and primarily for
hypothesis-generating purposes.
For purposes of coding, every definition of war,
torture, and terrorism was first broken into code-
able units, and each unit was coded into a coding
category. In the report that follows on patterns in
definitions, the term “definition” or “response”
should be understood to mean “codeable unit.”
For further information on the coding process,
please see Chap. 2 of this volume.
Definitions of War
Coding Manual for Definitions of War
Participants’ definitions of war were coded into
five content-based categories: (a) causes or pre-
cipitating factors for war; this category included
subcategories for last resort, motivations/inten-
tions for war (including political and self-defense
motives) and moral judgments on presumed moti-
vations for war; (b) war as conflict (physical or
nonphysical); (c) qualifications (criteria) for war
(i.e., scale/intensity, duration, nature of groups
99
involved, and one-sidedness); (d) outcomes (both
concrete and abstract); and (e) non-motivation-
related moral judgments. All other responses
were put into an uncodeable category.
Distribution of War Responses
into Coding Categories
Causes of War
Overall, the causes category, which included
responses mentioning factors contributing to or
leading up to war, accounted for about 14% of all
African definitions of war. Within the causes cat-
egory, the most common example of a primary
cause of war was political motivation; this sub-
category applied to 33% of all definitions of war
in the causes category and 5% of all the definitions
of war. For example, a 56-year-old South African
woman defined war as “a struggle for power
between two or more nations.” Fewer than 1% of
the definitions referred to war as a last resort.
Only about 3% were a moral judgment on a given
motivation or reason for war, and 5% were of a
moral judgment not related to presumed motiva-
tions. Table 7.1 provides additional examples of
responses defining war in terms of its causes as
well as examples of moral judgments not related
to causes.
Conflict and Qualifications
of War Intensity as Defining
Characteristics of War
The single largest subcategory, accounting for
about 17% of all definitions of war, was primarily
a general dictionary type of definition, equating
war with conflict. Other responses (43% of all the
definitions of war) identified defining character-
istics (qualifications) that made a conflict a war.
The most common qualifier, making up 38% of
qualifications and 16% of all definitions of war,
was for definitions indicating that it was degree
of intensity that qualified a conflict to be a war.
The type of group involved in conflicts was
another important qualifier in definitions of war.
The third most common type of definition
identified war with groups officially or legally
100 M. Dalley et al.

Table 7.1 Examples of definitions of war focusing on causes and moral judgments
Coding category % Country Age Gender Quotes
Political cause/ 5 (33) Angola 50 M A different way to conduct politics
motivation Botswana 23 F Fighting between people or countries because
of political or civil situation
Egypt 23 M War is stupid; it is the result of selfish goals
on the part of greedy countries
S. Africa 36 M An organized attack with troops by a country to
another or a group to another or ruling party. The
reason behind is a search of leadership or influence
Zambia 39 F Killing of one another because of disagreement
on policies
Moral judgments 5 (–) Algeria 35 M War is disaster
Angola 27 M Unnecessary evil
Botswana 20 F Hate, defense
Egypt 36 F The lowest level humans can fall to
Ghana 22 F Massive abuse of man by killing with gun
Note: The first percentage figure in each row of the percent column is the percentage of causes and moral judgments
coded into the specified subcategory out of the total number of definitions of war. The second percentage (in parenthe-
ses) indicates the percentage of responses coded into the subcategory out of all the responses in the causes/motivations
of war category. Moral judgment is a major category with no subcategories; consequently, it has no second number in
parentheses
M male, F female

recognized as holding political power; this sub-
category accounted for 27% of qualifications and
12% of all definitions of war. About 5% of
definitions associated war with nonofficially rec-
ognized/informal groups, such as tribes, rebels,
or civil war, and another 5% indicated that war
involves one-sided aggression—for example,
invasion or occupation. Nonphysical conflict was
mentioned in only about 3% of the definitions of
war. Table 7.2 provides additional examples of
definitions in the conflict and qualifications cate-
gories as well as examples of concrete and
abstract outcomes.
Outcomes
Responses identifying war with its outcomes
constituted about 17% of all definitions of war.
The most frequent type of outcome definition
(53% of the outcomes and 9% of all definitions of
war) identified war with its concrete outcomes.
About 7% of the definitions referred to abstract
outcomes. A 22-year-old man from Botswana
included both an abstract and a concrete outcome
when he identified war as “a period of unrest and
bloodshed.” Only 1% of all responses fell outside
of these major categories.
Exploratory Analyses: Demographic
Correlates of Definitions of War
In the following discussion of exploratory analy-
ses undertaken to identify possible demographic
correlates of particular definitions of war, any
differences described as “statistically significant”
reached a criterion of at least 0.05 and any differ-
ences described as “marginally significant” had a
p value between 0.055 and 0.10. As can be seen
in Table 7.3, significant group differences were
found in the occurrence of particular definitions
of war. According to chi-square tests, men were
significantly more likely than women to provide
causes of war within their definitions (such as
events leading up to conflict), and women were
marginally more likely than men to reference
political motives for going to war. Chi-square
analysis revealed that participants who had served
in the military were significantly more likely than
their counterparts to include moral judgments on
reasons for going to war and on the act of war
7 African Definitions 101

Table 7.2 Examples of definitions of war focusing on conflict, qualifiers, and outcomes
Coding category % Country Age Gender Quotes
Focus on conflict 17 (86) Algeria 18 F Two countries fighting against each other
Angola 44 F A conflict between parties
Botswana 56 F When there is a fight
Ghana 39 M A struggle between opposing forces
Nigeria 38 M Struggle
S. Africa 64 F Conflict
Qualifications 12 (27) Algeria 21 M Two countries fighting against each other
officially Botswana 23 M Happens between countries because of a
recognized certain issue
groups Egypt 29 F When another country fights your country
or your government
Ghana 63 M Fighting between nations
S Africa 59 M Armed conflict between states
Concrete 9 (53) Algeria 25 M Is killing and damage
outcomes Botswana 23 F Fighting among states, killings and
destruction of each other
Egypt 24 M Destroying everything, people dying and
people immigrating to other countries,
losing family…everything
Ghana 43 M Massive destruction of life and property by
gun
S. Africa 58 F Taking formal action which results in fatal
casualties against another country/
countries over disagreements between the
two (or more) countries
Abstract 7 (39) Angola 45 M The greatest cause of disgrace in the world
outcomes
Botswana 21 F Antipeace and stability
Egypt 26 M The absence of peace
Nigeria 30 M A state of hostility
S. Africa 30 F War is centralized terror, undertaken by
individuals who have volunteered to do so.
War is also the opportunity to make profit
from violence
Note: The first percentage figure in the % column for each row is the percentage of responses coded into each of the
specific conflict, qualifiers, and outcomes subcategories out of the total number of definitions of war. The second
percentage (in parentheses) indicates the percentage of responses coded into each of the specified subcategories out of
all the responses in the conflict, qualifiers, and outcomes of war categories
M male, F female

itself and marginally more likely to refer to gen-
eral outcomes of war; by contrast, the respon-
dents who had not been in the military were more
likely to define war simply as conflict or to
include qualifications in their definitions of war.
Finally, those not in the military were marginally
more likely than veterans to identify qualifications
for war, including level of conflict, duration of
attacks, and participation of legally recognized
political groups.
Participants with a family member in the mili-
tary, as opposed to those without such a connec-
tion to military service, made significantly more
moral judgments on the act of war itself and mar-
ginally more moral judgments on specific causes
of war. Independent sample t-tests indicated that
102 M. Dalley et al.

Table 7.3 Definitions of war: percentages of responses the group of participants who did not have rela-
in coding categories by demographic groups and chi- tives in the military provided significantly more
square values
qualifications for war (including references to the
Categories Group 1a Group 2a c2 scale or intensity of the attack and the one-sided
Male Female nature of the aggression) than the group who did
General causes 8 3 4.13*
have a relative in military service. Finally, partici-
of war
Political 7 13 3.18^
pants without relatives in the military gave mar-
motivation ginally more definitions of war simply as conflict
Military Nonmilitary than the group with a relative in military service.
Moral judgment 48 13 17.56***b Individuals who had protested in favor of
presence peace were more likely than their counterparts to
Causal moral 19 4 9.71*b identify war with its causes and particularly to
judgment
make a moral judgment concerning the motiva-
Noncausal moral 38 10 13.56**
judgment
tions behind war. Participants who had never par-
Outcomes 52 33 3.32^ ticipated in a protest were significantly more
of war presence likely than their counterparts to mention abstract
Focus on conflict 0 49 18.49*** outcomes of war, including emotions such as fear
only presence or pain. Finally, when mentioning participants
Qualifications 29 51 3.66^ in war, non-protesters made significantly more
for war presence
references than protesters to the involvement of
Intensity 14 39 4.83*
of conflict
informal groups (such as tribes or rebels).
Relative No relative
One-way analyses of variance, conducted to
military military determine if groups based on current religious
Moral judgment 30 9 12.93*** affiliation differed in the ways in which they
presence defined war, revealed a number of statistically
Noncausal moral 24 6 12.14*** significant differences. Specifically, participants
judgment
identifying themselves as atheist/agnostic gave
Causal moral 11 3 4.96^b
judgment
significantly more definitions identifying war
Qualifications 36 50 3.44^ with conflict, more examples of motivations, and
for war presence more specific references to self-defense as a type
Scale or intensity 29 41 2.86^ of motivation than Muslims. Christians were
of conflict significantly more likely than Muslims to iden-
One-sided 4 12 2.92^ tify war with conflict and to qualify their
aggression
definitions by referring to the intensity of conflict,
Protest No protest
the involvement of officially recognized political
Moral judgment 19 4 6.47*
of cause groups, and the participation of nonofficially rec-
Focus on conflict 63 40 3.14^b ognized groups. Lastly, as compared to Christians,
only presence Muslims made significantly more references to
Abstract outcomes 0 20 4.03^b concrete outcomes and abstract outcomes in their
Note: “Presence” at the end of a variable name signifies definitions, along with more moral judgments on
that the presence/absence variable was created on the the act of war.
basis of a participant having at least one response in the
specific major category or any of its subcategories. Please
Analyses of variance also revealed significant
refer to the Methods section for a more detailed descrip- differences in patterns of responding based on
tion of how these variables were created self-identified social class of participants. Scheffe
*
p £ 0.05; **p £ 0.01; ***p £ 0.001; ^0.051 < p < 0.10 post hoc multiple comparisons indicated that
a
The numbers in these columns are the percent of the
specified demographic group that gave responses falling
participants from the working, middle, and upper
into each of the specified categories middle classes scored significantly higher on
b
Fisher’s exact test references to conflict than lower class participants.
7 African Definitions 103

Table 7.4 Examples of definitions of torture: constructive intent categories

Code % Country Age Gender Quotes
Information 14 (50) Angola 56 F Method used to extract confessions
or compliance Botswana 20 F Inflicting pain on an individual to make him/her
release information
Egypt 32 M What governments do to get information
Ghana 59 F Inflicting pain on a person to elicit information
Nigeria 42 M Using force to confess
Punishment 8 (29) Botswana 22 F Infliction of pain on someone as a punishment
Ghana 18 M An act of causing severe pain in order to punish
or let someone say yes to what he says no
Nigeria 30 M Bodily infliction as punishment
Note: The first number in the percent column represents the percent of responses in that category out of the total
response set for definitions of torture. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percentage of responses in that
category out of all the constructive intent responses
M male, F female

Upper middle respondents scored significantly
higher than lower, working, and middle class indi-
viduals on examples of the duration/frequency of
conflict as defining characteristics of a war. Finally,
working class participants were significantly more
likely than lower classes to reference legally rec-
ognized political groups within their definitions.
Definitions of Torture
judgments regarding torture and is broken into
responses tolerating torture and those expressing
intolerance. The fifth category, focus on method,
was for responses identifying different acts or
methods of torture. The sixth category, focus on
outcome, was for responses specifically mention-
ing the consequences or ramifications of torture,
including physical as well as psychological,
mental, abstract, or conceptual outcomes, espe-
cially for the victim.

Coding Manual for Definitions

of Torture
Participants’ definitions of torture were coded
into six major categories based on content; only a
few responses were considered uncodeable. The
first category, focus on intent, motivation, or emo-
tion, was for responses that discussed the reasons
or goals underlying the act of torture; it had
two subcategories, constructive intent (torture
designed to get something, like compliance) and
destructive intent (torture designed to break
someone or cause pain). The second category,
characteristics of the individual being tortured,
captures responses that referred to specific attri-
butes of victims of torture, including helpless-
ness/powerlessness and being held against one’s
will. The third category captures conditions that
give rise to torture. The fourth category captures
Distribution of Torture Responses
into Coding Categories
Focus on Intent, Motivation, or Emotion
Within the broad category of focus on intent, moti-
vation, or emotion, the constructive intent subcat-
egory for information or compliance had the most
responses; it included 50% of intent responses and
14% of all the torture definitions. A 56-year-old
Angolan woman defined torture in this way,
describing it as a “method used to extract confes-
sions.” Punishment, another subcategory under
constructive intent, was the second most common
in constructive intent theme, with 29% of intent
definitions and 8% of all torture definitions.
Table 7.4 provides examples of responses falling
into the information or compliance and punish-
ment subcategories of constructive intent.
104 M. Dalley et al.

Table 7.5 Examples of definitions of torture focusing on inhumanity or methods

Code % Country Age Gender Quotes
Immoral/ 11 (47) Algeria 35 M Inhumane treatment
inhumane Angola 50 M Inhumane act of repression
Botswana 22 F Subjection to inhuman and degrading treatment
Egypt 32 F A crime against humanity
Ghana 34 M Inhuman act perpetuated against fellow human being
General hurting/ 18 (44) Angola 23 M Excessive abuse on another person
harming Botswana 22 F Deliberate infliction of pain
Ghana 48 F Inflicting pains on a living thing specifically human
beings
Nigeria 23 M Method of inflicting pain
Physical 12 (30) Angola 40 F To inflict physical suffering on someone
Botswana 22 F Causing physical pain for another person
Ghana 24 M Treating or beating somebody through uses of items
which hurt
Nigeria 32 M Unbearable physical pain
Note: The first number in the percent column represents the percent of responses in the specified category out of the total
response set for definitions of torture. The second number (in parenthesis) refers to the percentage of responses in that
category out of all the inhumanity and methods responses, respectively
M male, F female

Characteristic of Victims and Conditions
that Give Rise to Torture
Fewer than 5% of all the responses referred to
characteristics of the victim. Within this rela-
tively small group of responses, the majority
(60%) were coded into the helplessness/power-
lessness subcategory For example, a 35-year-old
Egyptian male explained, “people who have
power torture the powerless to feel strong.” About
4% of all responses fell into the category for con-
ditions leading to torture.
Judgments Concerning Morality/
Justice/Humanity
The vast majority of responses (98%) falling
into the judgment category were disapproving of
torture and coded for intolerance. Only one
response out of 426 was coded into the tolerant
category, and the response from a 27-year-old
Egyptian man included both tolerance and intol-
erance: “the government uses torture to get what
it wants; sometimes it is correct to do and some-
times it is wrong.” Another response, by a
26-year-old Egyptian man, indicated judgment
but not clearly for or against torture: “govern-
ments say it is necessary to do in some cases.”
Immoral/inhumane/cruel/abusive/vile responses
were the most common type of judgment,
accounting for 11% of all responses. The general
intolerant/condemning category accounted for
about 7% of all definitions of torture. Table 7.5
provides examples of responses falling into the
immoral/inhumane subcategory of the judgments
category.
Focus on Methods of Torture
The method thematic category was the largest
category of all, encompassing about 40% of all
the definitions of torture. The general subcategory
hurting/harming yielded about 18% of all
definitions of torture, and the subcategories phys-
ical methods and psychological methods
accounted for about 12% and 7% of all the
definitions of torture, respectively. Some partici-
pants mentioned both physical and psychological
methods, such as this 27-year-old male from
Ghana who defined torture as “causing pain to
somebody mentally or physically.” Examples of
7 African Definitions
definitions of torture that focused on methods can
be found in Table 7.5.
Fewer than 1% of all the responses defined
torture in terms of its outcomes, and fewer than
1% of the responses did not fit within any of the
categories and were coded as uncodeable.
Demographic Correlates of Torture
Responses
As was done for the definitions of war, we ran a
number of simple statistical analyses on an
exploratory basis to determine the extent to which
definitions of torture varied in relation to demo-
graphic characteristics of the sample.
As can be seen in Table 7.6, significant group
differences were also found for the qualitative
torture definitions. Chi-square tests indicated that
significantly more women than men provided
responses that (a) referred to torture as punish-
ment; (b) equated torture with hurting/harming;
(c) focused on any intent, motivation, or emotion
behind torture; (d) included at least one example
of a torture method; and (e) referred to a con-
structive intent of torture (i.e., to gain something).
Independent t-tests supported these results. Chi-
square tests also showed that women were mar-
ginally more likely than men to include the idea
of pain, suffering, and harm in their definitions.
Finally, men were marginally more likely than
women to reference conditions that could lead to
torture, such as corruption or the inability of indi-
viduals to coexist.
Themes within torture definitions were also
contingent upon participation in the military.
Chi-square tests demonstrated that significantly
more of the respondents with military experience
than their counterparts gave responses in the fol-
lowing categories/subcategories: (a) the strate-
gic, militant, or political motivation behind
torture; (b) specific conditions that give rise to
torture (such as aggression/conflict); (c) intoler-
ance of torture; and (d) judgments regarding the
morality of torture. Alternately, significantly
more participants without experience in the mili-
tary than veterans referenced (a) the physical
105
actions of hurting or harming an individual;
(b) focus on any intent, motivation, or emotion
behind torture; and (c) focus on at least one
method of torture, such as physical or
psychological aggression. Significantly more
nonmilitary individuals than veterans described
the use of torture as a punishment as well as
equating torture with at least one form of con-
structive intent.
The presence of a relative in the military also
contributed to significant differences in the use of
particular definitions of torture. Significantly
more participants with family in the military than
their counterparts included at least one judgment
concerning morality/justice/humanity as well as
at least one intolerant/condemning judgment.
Individuals with a relative in the military were
marginally more likely than nonmilitary relatives
to include (a) constructive intent, (b) conditions
that could result in torture, and (c) the idea that
torture is immoral/inhumane. Significantly more
individuals without any military relations than
their counterparts gave definitions coded for
(a) torture as punishment, (b) the hurting/harm-
ing processes of torture, (c) at least one method
used for torture, (d) specifically physical forms of
torture, and (e) psychological methods. Finally,
those with no military relatives were also margin-
ally more likely than military family to give at
least one example of an intent, motivation, or
emotion behind torture (such as revenge).
There were also some group differences
related to involvement in protests against war.
Specifically, significantly more participants with
previous involvement in a war protest as com-
pared with non-protestors defined torture as caus-
ing pain, suffering, or harm and referred to the
destructive intent behind torture. Protesters were
marginally more likely than non-protesters to
mention psychological outcomes such as anguish
or distress.
One-way analyses of variance were also run to
determine whether particular types of definition
varied by religion. These analyses revealed that
as compared with Muslims, Christians made
significantly more references to torture as a pun-
ishment, to the general infliction of harm as a
106 M. Dalley et al.

Table 7.6 Definitions of torture: percentages of responses in coding categories by demographic variables
and chi-square associations
Categories Group 1a Group 2a c2
Male Female
Focus on intent, motivation, 37 54 6.16*
or emotion presence
Constructive intent presence 35 49 4.60*
Focus on method presence 57 70 4.26*
As a punishment 11 20 4.10*
Hurt/harming 26 42 6.72**
To cause pain, suffering, harm, etc. 2 7 3.86^b
Conditions that give rise to torture 8 3 2.87^
Military Nonmilitary
Strategic or tactical advantage, 14 1 14.91***b
to exercise power, or to win war
Conditions that give rise to torture 29 4 21.18***b
Intolerant/condemning 38 9 15.15**b
Judgment concerning morality/ 62 30 9.11**
justice/humanity
Hurt/harming presence 10 64 23.20***
Hurt/harming 0 37 11.70**
Focus on intent, motivation, 23 48 4.38*
or emotion sum
Focus on method presence 10 70 29.59***
Information or compliance 5 28 5.33*
Constructive intent presence 24 44 3.07^
As a punishment 0 17 4.15^b
Relative military No relative military
Judgment concerning morality 46 22 10.96**
/justice/humanity presence
Intolerant/condemning presence 46 22 10.96**
Intolerant/condemning 20 8 5.38*
Constructive intent 4 0 4.41^b
Conditions that give rise to torture 11 3 4.91^b
Hurting/harming presence 36 71 21.31***
Hurt/harming 24 43 6.07*
Immoral/inhumane/cruel/abusive/vile 21 12 2.83^
As a punishment 6 22 8.28**
Focus on method presence 43 76 19.67***
Physical method 10 28 7.99**
Psychological, mental method 6 17 4.74*
Focus on intent motivation or emotion 40 54 3.00^
presence
Protest No protest
Destructive intent presence 25 2 21.10**b
To cause pain, suffering, harm, etc. 19 2 15.67**b
Psychological, mental outcome 6 0 12.12^b
Note: “Presence” at the end of a variable name signifies that at least one response in that category or any
of its subcategories was given. Please refer to the Methods chapter for a more detailed description of how
these variables were created
*
p £ 0.05; **p £ 0.01; ***p £ 0.001; ^0.051 < p < 0.10
a
The numbers in these columns are the percent of the group that gave responses falling into each of the
specified categories
b
Fisher’s exact test
7 African Definitions
method of torture, and to physical methods of tor-
ture, whereas Muslims gave significantly more
examples than Christians of the strategic, mili-
tary, or political intent of torture; the motivation
to obtain personal gain through torture; conditions
that give rise to torture; judgments intolerant or
condemning of torture; statements that torture is
unlawful/unjust; and statements that torture is a
violation of human rights.
One-way analyses of variance also revealed
that upper class participants gave significantly
more constructive intent responses (torture as
intended to achieve an objective) than partici-
pants from the lower class, working class, middle
class, and upper middle class. Working class
respondents gave significantly more examples of
physical processes involved in torture than
respondents from lower and middle classes.
Definitions of Terrorism
Coding Definitions of Terrorism
Participants’ responses to the question “What is
Terrorism?” were coded on two different levels:
valence and themes. The categories in the valence
level were negative regarding terrorism, neutral,
an effort to understand terrorism, and positive
regarding terrorism.
At the second level, themes, the responses
were coded along six different content-based
categories: cause/motivation(s) for terrorism,
process/method, outcomes, judgments (with sep-
arate subcategories for moral judgments and legal
judgments), real-life references, and finally unco-
deable responses.
Distribution of Terrorism Responses
into Coding Categories
Valence
Regarding the general valence of the definitions
of terrorism, about 71% of responses were coded
as neutral, 23% as negative, 6% of responses as
making an effort to understand terrorism, and
fewer than 1% of responses as positive.
107
Causes/Motivations and Process/Methods
for Terrorism
Table 7.7 provides sample responses and percent-
ages of themes in the causes/motivations and
process/methods categories for definitions of
terrorism. The cause/motivation section was the
largest thematic category for this sample, account-
ing for about 35% of all responses. The subcate-
gory political agenda was the most common
within this section, accounting for 14% of all
responses. The second most common subcate-
gory was ideological motivation, with 6% of the
total responses. The general category, cause/
motivation, represented 5% of the all responses.
The rest of the cause/motivation categories each
yielded only 3% or less of all responses. Thirty-
one percent of the definitions of terrorism fell
under the thematic category, process/method,
making it the second largest second for this sam-
ple (see Table 7.7). The physical method category
accounted for 22% and the mental method cate-
gory for 6% of all torture definitions.
Outcomes
The outcomes section contained about 21% of all
responses within its categories. The physical out-
comes, emotional outcomes, and disruption of
peace and stability categories each yielded about
6% of all responses. The disruption of economy
category accounted for less than 1% of all
responses.
Judgments, Real-Life Reference,
and Uncodeable
The judgments section was one of the smaller
thematic categories, accounting for 9% of all
responses. Acts of terrorism under legal judg-
ments was the most commonly coded category
with 23% of judgments and 3% of all responses.
The moral judgment category and its subcategory
immoral acts both yielded about 2% of all
responses, while the other categories represented
less than 1% of all responses. The real-life refer-
ence category accounted for about 4% of all
responses. About 1% of all responses in this sam-
ple did not fit into any of the major categories and
were coded under the miscellaneous/uncodeable
category.
108 M. Dalley et al.

Table 7.7 Examples of definitions of terrorism focusing on cause/motivation or method

Code % Country Age Gender Quotes
Political agenda 14 (42) Algeria 21 F Violent actions of a group of opponents of govern-
ments or ideologies
Botswana 21 M Organized violence and intimidation for political
purposes
Egypt 23 M People do it because they do not like the government
Ghana 2 F The threat of violence to obtain political demands
Nigeria 29 F Violent action intended to influence government
plan
South Africa 60 F Subversive acts of sabotage carried out by a political
or religious force in order to bring about change
Zambia 43 M Politically motivated destruction of infrastructure
and humans by groups of people with evil ideologies
and beliefs
Physical process/ 22 (70) Algeria 24 F Drop bombs in a country in the name of patriotism
method
Botswana 39 M A group of individuals indiscriminately damaging
property/killing people
Egypt 30 M To kill civilians
Ghana 26 M Bombing killing or attacking of a country by a
particular or group
Nigeria 42 M Use of violence to achieve goals
South Africa 38 F Innocent people being killed/maimed by a few
extremist people without those people being aware
of any threat to themselves
Note: The first percentage in each row in the percent column represents the percent of responses in the specified cate-
gory out of the total response set for definitions of terrorism. The percent in parenthesis represents the percent of the
individual category out of the major category under which it is classified
M male, F female

Demographic Correlates of Terrorism more likely to mention physical outcomes of ter-

Responses
As can be seen in Table 7.8, significant group
differences were established for a number of
demographic variables within qualitative terror-
ism definitions. According to chi-square tests,
women were significantly more likely than men
to include any process/method—such as describ-
ing terrorism as a means to an end.
Participants with experience in the military
were significantly more likely than their counter-
parts to explain that terrorism was not the product
of a religion but rather was carried out by indi-
viduals who did not understand their faith; inde-
pendent sample t-tests supported this result.
In comparison to the veterans, the group of respon-
dents with no military experience were marginally
rorism and significantly more likely to make ref-
erence to the processes and method of terrorism,
particularly the physical methods of terrorism
(such as violent attacks). Participants with no
involvement in the military scored significantly
higher than military participants on (a)
psychological methods of terrorism, (b) any legal
judgment on terrorism, and (c), more specifically,
judgment on the legality of acts of terrorism.
Participants who had a relative in the armed
forces were significantly more likely than their
counterparts to include the following themes in
their definitions: (a) negative environmental
conditions as a motivating factor for terrorism,
(b) disruption of peace and stability as an out-
come of terrorism, and (c) moral and legal judg-
ments. By contrast, participants who did not have
7 African Definitions 109

Table 7.8 Africa definitions of terrorism: percentages of within their definitions. Finally, participants with
responses in coding categories by demographic variables no military relatives also gave significantly more
and chi-square associations
examples of outcomes of terrorism (such as
Categories Group 1a Group 2a c2 physical destruction or emotional pain) than their
Male Female counterparts.
Process/method 48 60 3.95*
Finally, respondents who had participated in a
presence
peace protest were significantly more likely than
Military Nonmilitary
Not religion 25 4 14.85**b
those with no protest experience to make a moral
Physical outcomes 25 10 3.84^b judgment on the acts/outcomes of terrorism. Chi-
Process/method 10 47 10.22** square tests also indicated that protesters were
presence significantly more likely than non-protesters to
Physical method 10 36 5.49* reference causes/motivations behind terrorism.
Relative No relative Respondents who had never participated in a
military military peace protest made significantly more references
Negative 7 0 7.36**b than protesters to disruption of peace and stabil-
environmental
conditions
ity as an outcome of terrorism.
Disruption of peace 16 4 7.03** Similar to definitions of war and torture, anal-
and stability yses of variance, with Scheffe post hoc multiple
Judgments presence 18 7 4.27* comparisons, identified significant differences in
Outcomes presence 37 25 2.77^ African definitions of terrorism based on partici-
Moral judgment 16 7 3.30^ pants’ current religious faith. Specifically, these
presence comparisons showed that Muslims scored higher
Cause/motivation 41 61 6.19** than Christians on the idea that terrorism is not a
presence
religion, disruption of the economy as an out-
Process/method 31 53 7.65**
presence come on terrorism, general moral judgment, and
Ideological 3 11 3.89* the inclusion of real-life current events within
motivation definitions. By contrast, Christians scored
Political agenda 19 39 7.53** significantly higher than Muslims on references
Physical method 23 43 6.85** to physical methods and psychological methods
Protest No protest of terrorism.
Cause/motivation 29 4 15.11**b Lastly, there were also social class differences
Acts of terrorism 21 1 21.74**b in the presence and frequency of specific themes
moral
within terrorism definitions. Significant group
Note: “Presence” at the end of a variable name signifies differences were found for passing moral judg-
that at least one response in that category or any of its
subcategories was given. Please refer to the Methods ment on the acts/outcomes of terrorism, with the
chapter for a more detailed description of how these vari- upper middle class scoring significantly higher
ables were created than middle class. Finally, upper class scored
*
p £ 0.05; **p £ 0.01; ***p £ 0.001; ^0.051 < p < 0.10 significantly higher than those from lower, work-
a
The numbers in these columns are the percent of the
group that gave responses falling into each of the specified ing, and middle classes on appealing to relativity
categories within their responses—considering the terrorists’
b
Fisher’s exact test perspective and how they view their actions.

relatives in the military were significantly more Discussion

likely than their counterparts to reference: (a)
ideological motivation, (b) political agenda as a In regard to definitions of war, the most com-
motivating factor for terrorism, and (c) specific monly occurring definitions included the idea
physical methods of terrorism (such as bombing) that war focuses on conflict and also that it occurs
110
between officially recognized parties such as
nations or countries. Given the history of Africa,
particularly within the past two centuries of colo-
nization, slavery, civil wars, and eventual inde-
pendence, it is no wonder that the people of
Africa see war as involving conflict and political
powers more than any other elements of war.
Even though there were seven categories for
defining torture, the highest number of responses
were found in three categories as follows:
(a) constructive intent with the two subcategories
of gaining information or compliance from those
being tortured and torture as being punishment,
(b) intolerance as a form of morally judging tor-
ture with a subcategory of immoral/inhumane
responses to what is torture, and (c) methods of
torture specifically with subcategories of general
hurting or harming (e.g., deliberate infliction of
pain) and physical (e.g., causing physical pain).
Finally, definitions of terrorism focused on
two major categories as follows: (a) the cause or
motivation of terrorists with the subcategory of a
political agenda and (b) the process or methods
specifically used such as a physically hurting or
harming others. In a rather surprising finding,
about seven out of ten saw terrorism as neutral
and only about a quarter saw terrorism as nega-
tive. This was unexpected since in countries such
as the United States in which terrorism is at a
high level of awareness, one would anticipate
that the negatives would be much higher and neu-
tral valence much lower. Future research is
needed to determine how various countries
affected differently by terrorism would have dif-
ferent attitudes toward terrorism.
It must be noted that we sampled only 8 of 53
African countries from disparate regions; there-
fore, sweeping generalizations about Africans
within this chapter would be highly inappropri-
ate, as the history of each country has been unique
in its geography, amount of colonization, and
establishment of its own political governance.
Yet Africa is unique in that all but two countries
were colonized by Europe, all of Africa has been
affected by slavery to some degree, governmental
and political destabilization in the pursuit of
independence have taken place at a rapid pace
over the past 40 years, and horrific civil wars
M. Dalley et al.
have infamously marked the African experience
of decolonization and tribal wars (Bennett 1984;
The Story of Africa 2009).
One of the most striking differences found in
our study were how African men and women
responded to the definitions of war, torture, and
terrorism. More men than women defined war in
references to causes or events leading up to war,
whereas women seemed more likely to look at
the politics of war. It may be that African women
are more sensitive to subtleties such as political
motives, rather than referring to war simply as
conflicts, as men did. Women defining torture
referred to it more as punishment, discussed more
the methods of torture, and wrote more about
how torture is related to hurting or harming an
individual than did men. Women were also more
concerned with the intent, motivation, and emo-
tions behind torture and in some cases included
the idea of pain, suffering, and harm more often
than did men. Even though African women were
seen as more compassionate and understanding
of torture, there was at the same time more elabo-
ration from women than men that torture included
attempts to gain something, constructive intent.
Men were more likely to reference conditions
that could lead to torture, such as corruption or
the inability of individuals to coexist. Women are
sometimes the first citizens to suffer at the hands
of tyrants and dictators (Kanogo 1987; Lyons
2004; White 2007); therefore, it may be that
women look beyond the immediate cause of war
and torture and focus more on the subtleties and
consequences affecting them and their children.
Of course, this is only a speculation and much
more research would be needed to verify these
hypotheses about gender and definitions of war,
torture, and terrorism.
Military as an institution, and war from with-
out and within, has dominated many African
countries (Oliver and Atmore 2005). For dicta-
tors to have existed and still exist in many parts
of Africa, a dominant show of military force was
and is needed. Several of the African countries
that we surveyed have had or now have a strong
showing of military might from Algeria, Egypt,
Ghana, Nigeria to South Africa (Central
Intelligence Agency n.d.) In our African sample,
7 African Definitions
we found many differences in definitions of war,
torture, and terrorism between participants who
had served in the military or had relatives who
had served in the military as compared to their
counterparts. For example, respondents with a
military background were more likely than those
without military experience to cite more causes
of war, and more moral judgments about war,
noting selfish reason such as personal gain,
whereas those without military experience relied
more on the traditional definition of war as
conflict. Similarly, respondents with military
experience gave definitions emphasizing that tor-
ture could give a strategic or tactical advantage to
win a war and mentioned conditions or circum-
stances under which torture is used, such as lack
of feeling, yet also gave a clear indication that
they did not approve of torture or torturous meth-
odologies and provided moral judgments regard-
ing torture, citing justice, and humanity. Those
with military experience appear to see the utility
of torture but regard it as morally reprehensible.
When providing definitions of terrorism, those
with military experience made significantly more
responses in regard to the process or methods
used in terrorism, including physical methods of
terrorism and the physical outcomes, than did
nonmilitary participants. Interestingly, those with
military experience did not endorse religion as a
reason or cause for terrorism. This was surprising
again because of the media outlets and the US
press emphasizing “extreme Muslims” as a rea-
son for terrorism. It would appear that partici-
pants from African countries who were in the
military did not see religion as a contributing fac-
tor to terrorism. They were also more likely to the
tangible aspects that terrorism can have such as
the disruption of peace and stability. Participants
without military experience were more likely to
look at the abstract concepts of terrorism, such as
looking at the process or methods, particularly
the physical methods involved in terrorism and
focusing on the causes, motivations, and political
agendas.
We had only 17 participants who claimed to
have been in a protest on the PAIRTAPS ques-
tion, “Have you ever been involved in any sort of
protest against war and in favor of peace—e.g.,
111
by signing a petition, or participating in a march
or vigil?” The 17 participants were distributed as
follows: 3 each from Algeria and Ghana, 4 from
Angola, and 7 from Botswana, so findings related
to protest are extremely tentative and should not
be overinterpreted. Nevertheless, our results
showed that protesters more than those who had
not protested gave definitions of war that empha-
sized the causes and moral judgments of war and
marginally indicated more of a focus on conflicts.
When defining torture, protesters recognized the
destructive intent of torture, such as to pressure
or break a person or to cause pain, suffering, and
harm overwhelmingly more than their non-pro-
testers counterparts and were significantly more
likely than protesters to see torture as punish-
ment. In defining terrorism, more protesters more
than non-protesters gave causes and motivation
for terrorism. In addition, protesters saw acts of
terrorism as a moral issue more than non-protes-
tors. Non-protesters, on the other hand, indicated
more than protesters that religion was not a factor
but also saw terrorism as a disruption of peace
and stability more than the protesters. Again, the
lack of a significant number of protesters may
have swayed these results considerably.
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 Definitions of War, Torture,
and Terrorism in Latin America
Eros DeSouza, Michael Stevens, Amanda Clinton,
Laura Marcucci, Madison Mellish, Rodrigo Barahona,
Eddy Carillo, Ricardo Angelino, Luciana Karine de Souza,
and Sherri McCarthy
The following are current definitions from the
US government regarding war, torture, and ter-
rorism. War is defined as:
a breach in any of the international conventions
(signed at Geneva 12 August 1949), or any proto-
col to such convention to which the United States
is a party; prohibited by Article 23, 25, 27, or 28 of
the Annex to the Hague Convention IV, Respecting
the Laws and Customs of War on Land (signed 18
October 1907); which constitutes a grave breach of
common Article 3 (as defined in subsection (d))
when committed in the context of and in associa-
tion with an armed conflict not of an international
character; or of a person who, in relation to an
armed conflict and contrary to the provisions of the
Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use
of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices as
amended at Geneva on 3 May 1996 (Protocol II as
amended on 3 May 1996), when the United States
is a party to such Protocol, willfully kills or causes
serious injury to civilians. (US Code 2009a)
Torture is defined as:
an act committed by a person acting under the
color of law specifically intended to inflict severe
physical or mental pain or suffering (other than
pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions)
upon another person within his custody or physical
control; “severe mental pain or suffering” means
the prolonged mental harm caused by or resulting
from:
(a) The intentional infliction or threatened
infliction of severe physical pain or suffering;
(b) The administration or application, or threat-
ened administration or application, of mind-
altering substances or other procedures
calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or
the personality;
(c) The threat of imminent death; or
K. Malley-Morrison et al. (eds.), International Handbook of War, Torture, and Terrorism,
Peace Psychology Book Series, DOI 10.1007/978-1-4614-1638-8_8,
© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2013
8
(d) The threat that another person will imminently
be subjected to death, severe physical pain or
suffering, or the administration or application
of mind-altering substances or other proce-
dures calculated to disrupt profoundly the
senses or personality. (US Code 2009b)
International terrorism is defined as:
violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are
a violation of the criminal laws of the United States
or of any State, or that would be a criminal violation
if committed within the jurisdiction of the United
States or of any State; appear to be intended:
1. To intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
2. To influence the policy of a government by
intimidation or coercion; or
3. To affect the conduct of a government by mass
destruction, assassination, or kidnapping. (US
Code 2009c)
Although these official definitions appear
clear and succinct, in reality they carry multiple
meanings, depending on whom you ask. In other
words, these phenomena are subjective, complex,
and embedded in ecological contexts and nuances.
Thus, the purpose of this chapter is to examine
the existing scholarly literature on war, torture,
and terrorism, including the official definitions of
these terms, and then analyze people’s definitions
of war, torture, and terrorism among six Latin
American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia,
Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and Peru) and Puerto
Rico. Although Puerto Rico is a territory of the
USA, it is culturally and linguistically distinct
from the USA. Thus, Puerto Rico is not included
in the US sample or in the discussion of the chap-
ter dealing with the USA. Another purpose is to
113
114 E. DeSouza et al.

report on exploratory analyses of the extent to
which definitions of war, torture, and terrorism
varied across gender, prior military training, hav-
ing a relative in the military, and nationality.
Literature Review on War, Torture,
and Terrorism
independence of Panama from Colombia in order
to build and control the Panama Canal and pre-
vent Nicaragua from building a competing canal.
In fact, during the twentieth century, the USA has
regularly intervened in Latin American affairs
economically, politically, and militarily (for a
more complete review, see Booth 1988).

Latin America consists of 33 nations spanning War

from the southern part of North America (i.e.,
Mexico) to the southern part of South America
and has a total population of 600 million people
(Martinez-Diaz 2008). Despite the diversity that
exists within and across each nation, Latin
America as a whole shares some key features: (a)
a rich pre-Columbian past; (b) mostly Spanish or
Portuguese colonization; (c) by and large, a
racially mixed population; (d) independence from
the Iberian peninsula during the nineteenth cen-
tury; (e) weak political institutions; and (f) eco-
nomic inequality (Feldmann and Peräla 2004).
When relevant, the USA is discussed in this
chapter due to its widespread influence in Latin
America. That is, the USA hegemonic power or
asymmetry in power relations has dominated
Latin American history (Butler 2003). For exam-
ple, the USA–Spain War that ended in 1898
resulted in the USA acquiring Puerto Rico and
other territories in Latin America (LexJuris de
Puerto Rico 1996–2006). In addition, beginning
in the 1880s until the early twentieth century, the
USA used its military strength to influence the
Compared to other regions of the world (e.g.,
Europe and Asia), Latin America has experienced
very few major wars. Table 8.1 presents a list of
the large-scale international conflicts that occurred
in Latin America during the twentieth century
(Clem 2005; DeSouza and Stevens 2009).
Perhaps their participation in such few major
wars is one reason why there is little research on
perceptions of war among Latin Americans. For
example, to our knowledge, only one study has
investigated gender differences in perceptions
of war and included a Latin American sample.
DeSouza et al. (2011) found in a sample of US
and Peruvian college students that women were
less likely to justify state aggression (war)
against another country than men, even after
controlling for students’ age and race/ethnicity.
Even though only one study has addressed gen-
der differences within Latin American samples,
such gender differences appear to be wide-
spread, as evidenced by studies conducted out-
side Latin America. For example, a study with

Table 8.1 Conflicts that occurred in Latin America in the twentieth century
Conflict Years Countries involved Outcome
Chaco War 1932–1935 Bolivia vs. Paraguay Bolivia ceded much of its territory
to Paraguay
Peru–Ecuador War 1941 and 1995 Peru vs. Ecuador Ecuador recognized Peru’s
territorial claims
Soccer War 1969 El Salvador vs. Honduras After mediation from the
Organization of American States,
El Salvadorian forces withdrew
from Honduras, but the war
produced losses for both sides
Falklands/Malvinas War 1982 Argentina vs. Great Britain Argentine forces withdrew from the
Falklands/Malvinas
8 Latin American Definitions
adolescents and young adults from Estonia,
Finland, Romania, the Russian Federation, and
the USA showed that men were significantly
more likely to endorse the justification of war
and killing than women, as evidenced by
their endorsement of the statements: “War is
necessary” and “A person has the right to kill to
defend property” (McAlister et al. 2001).
Perceptions of Torture
Few studies have been conducted on Latin
Americans’ perceptions of torture. Globo (2008)
reported on a survey administered to a national
sample of Brazilians, which showed that 26% of
Brazilians admitted that they would use torture
themselves if they were police officers in order to
obtain information from suspected criminals.
Globo’s (2008) study may reflect not only
Brazilians’ but possibly also most of Latin
Americans’ perceptions of feeling unsafe and fear-
ful due to high crime rates, especially in urban
areas. These feelings of insecurity and anxiety have
important implications, in that they may lead many
individuals to tolerate a heavy-handed approach
(generally referred to as mano dura in Spanish) of
crime control, including violence, repression, and
violation of human rights, by the police (Goldstein
et al. 2007). Under such circumstances, they may
have a very restricted view of the kinds of behav-
iors that constitute forms of torture.
Terrorism
Latin America is also engaging in a “war on ter-
ror,” which, unlike the USA’s war that focuses
on international terrorism, focuses on segments
of its own population (i.e., “internal enemies” of
the state). Even though the two “wars” target dif-
ferent groups, the USA has intervened in Latin
America’s war, a role that we briefly review
here.
The USA has, for the most part, been inter-
ested in Latin America only when the USA’s
interests are at stake, neglecting endemic problems
115
in Latin America (e.g., widespread poverty,
mistreatment of indigenous peoples, political
oppression, human rights abuses). Rather than
fostering democracy and economic development,
the US response to Latin American social/politi-
cal/economic problems has mostly been to train
Latin American officer corps (e.g., through the
School of the Americas, which included teaching
techniques such as interrogation, torture, and
counterintelligence to eradicate the enemy within)
and equipping their military with US-made arms
(Weeks 2003). According to Taylor (1986), such
training and massive firepower are ultimately
ineffective and often counterproductive against
low-intensity conflicts with insurgents or terrorist
groups whose members hide among the local
population. In fact, US intervention has created a
climate of instability and violence, including
state-sponsored terrorism, which Feldmann and
Peräla (2004) define as “acts perpetrated by state
agents or by private groups acting on orders or on
behalf of a state, usually used by authoritarian or
totalitarian regimes to terrorize their population
and propagate anxiety in order to curb political
opposition” (p. 104).
Moreover, from the 1960s to 1980s, many
Latin American countries received advice, train-
ing, arms, technology, and finances from the USA
to fight terror with terror through the creation of
death squads, which were used by governments
as counterinsurgency tools against their own pop-
ulation (DeSouza and Stevens 2009; McSherry
2007, 2009). These squads engaged in disappear-
ances, extrajudicial executions, and torture (e.g.,
submarino in Spanish, near drowning or water
boarding; planton, forced standing; hanging in
contorted positions; confinement in boxes; sexual
violence; and forced nudity) to subdue internal
enemies (e.g., insurgents but also civilians, espe-
cially indigenous populations in the Andean
region of South America as well as Central
American countries)—a violation of the Geneva
Accords (McSherry 2007; Radcliffe 2007). Such
unlawful practices, which were extensively used
in Guatemala, Peru, and Colombia, for example,
are linked to “severe political repression, hun-
dreds of thousands of indigenous deaths, and
116
over a million refugees and internally displaced
persons” (Jackson and Warren 2005, p. 552).
Of particular importance was the creation of
Operation Condor in late 1973/early 1974, in
which some members of the military and police
corps of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile,
Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay formed
multinational death squads to engage in counter-
insurgency activities, some of which were
described above, against targeted dissidents in
the war on terror, which were essentially cross-
border kidnap–torture–murder clandestine opera-
tions (McSherry 2007, 2009). Others called these
activities the “dirty war” to describe state repres-
sion in which human rights violations were wide-
spread in Latin America. The dirty war was
characterized by concealment (e.g., secret round-
ups, secret detention centers, and secret execu-
tions); furthermore, the distinction between
terrorists and non-terrorists was blurred (Smith
and Roberts 2008). For example, many of the so-
called subversives were exiles “guilty” of criti-
cizing their government or asking for change,
such as a more equitable distribution of wealth
and a voice for oppressed groups in their country
of origin.
US attention to terrorism in Latin America has
intensified since September 11, 2001 (Sullivan
2010; Weeks 2006), with the USA pressuring
Latin American militaries to engage more in
domestic law enforcement to combat drug
trafficking, intelligence gathering on terrorist
groups, and border patrol. One such example is
Plan Colombia, the objective of which is essen-
tially to eradicate the source of cocaine—coca
crops; however, such a plan also created violence,
with indigenous populations being caught in the
middle of the conflict between military forces
and mafias, militias, drug traffickers, and interna-
tional terrorist groups (Radcliffe 2007). Through
the Organization of American States (OAS) and
the Rio Treaty (a.k.a. the Inter-American Treaty
of Reciprocal Assistance), cooperation between
the USA and Latin America has increased, as evi-
denced by the signing of OAS members to the
Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism in
2002 as well as by the counterterrorism efforts
E. DeSouza et al.
shown by Argentina, Colombia, Panama, Paraguay,
Mexico, and El Salvador (Sullivan 2010).
According to Sullivan (2010), terrorism is
currently active in the following Latin American
nations.
• Colombia: Specifically, operations by the left-
ist National Liberation Army (ELN; a Marxist
insurgent group formed in 1964 by urban
intellectuals inspired by Fidel Castro and Che
Guevara), such as inflicting casualties through
land mines and obtaining funds through drug
trafficking; actions of the leftist Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC; a Marxist–
Leninist insurgent group founded in 1964 by
Manuel Marulanda Vélez that claims to repre-
sent the rural poor), such as engaging in tacti-
cal-level attacks on governmental installations,
kidnapping for profit, and narco-trafficking;
and actions of the rightist paramilitary United
Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC; an
umbrella organization formed in 1997 to coun-
ter left-wing guerrillas in a way that the mili-
tary is unable to), such as obtaining funds
through drug trafficking.
• Cuba: Since 1982, Cuba has been listed as a
country that supports terrorism in Latin
America (e.g., ELN and FARC described
above); however, Cuban support of terrorism
has significantly decreased since 1992.
• Peru: Although the Shining Path (a Marxist
insurgent group based in the Andes that aims
to destroy capitalism) has been substantially
undermined since the 1990s with the capture
of its leader, Abimael Guzman, who was sen-
tenced to life in prison in 2006, two small fac-
tions carried out 61 terrorist attacks in 2008,
resulting in the deaths of 31 individuals.
• Venezuela: Its current government has evi-
denced some approval for the FARC and the
ELN and been accused by the Colombian gov-
ernment of harboring terrorists (Romo 2010)
and for support of Cuban and Iranian totalitar-
ian regimes.
• Tri-border area of Argentina, Brazil, and
Paraguay: This porous region, with a large
Muslim population, has been used for the
production and movement of illegal goods,
8 Latin American Definitions
including trafficking of arms and drugs, false
documents and money, and pirated goods
such as films. There are claims that these
activities have funded Middle-Eastern terror-
ist groups, such as Hezbollah and the Sunni
Muslim Palestinian group Hamas (Islamic
Resistance Movement). In addition, the USA
suspects that Hezbollah has been linked to
two bombings resulting in the deaths of over
100 people—the 1992 bombing of the Israeli
Embassy in Buenos Aires and the 1994
bombing of the Argentine–Israeli Mutual
Association.
To understand the causes of what is mostly
nongovernmental terrorism in Latin America,
Feldmann and Peräla (2004) investigated 1,840
unclassified, reported nongovernmental terrorist
incidents in 17 Latin American countries
(Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay,
Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela) during the post-
Cold War era (1980–1995). Feldmann and Peräla
(2004) defined nongovernmental terrorism as
planned, indiscriminant attacks on noncombatants
(e.g., civilians) to instill terror in society and
weaken the power of the government. They
excluded from the analysis government-sponsored
terrorist acts, armed incidents between guerrillas
and security forces, mob violence, and embassy
occupation of a pacifist nature. Their findings
revealed (a) a reliable relationship between non-
governmental terrorism and the deterioration of a
state’s human rights, supporting the theoretical
model that a state’s oppression of its people
empowers terrorist groups to act against such an
abusive regime; and (b) nongovernmental terror-
ism is most fertile where only some political and
civil liberties exist, a condition that typifies weak
democracies. Feldmann and Peräla also found that
past history of terrorist activity tends to get worse,
suggesting a vicious trend of escalating violence
over a period of time.
Previous research has indicated that within
and across nations there are a number of demo-
graphic variables that may be associated with
perspectives on governmental aggression. For
117
example, DeSouza et al. (2011) found that students’
age, race, and general tolerance for a govern-
ment’s general use of aggression were significantly
correlated with support for government retalia-
tion in response to a hypothetical terrorist attack.
That is, in comparison to their counterparts,
younger and White students, as well as those
more inclined to tolerate their government’s gen-
eral use of aggression, supported harsher govern-
mental retaliation following a hypothetical
terrorist attack. When the data were examined
separately by country, there was much more vari-
ability among Peruvian respondents’ support for
governmental retaliation than among US respon-
dents. The US findings were straightforward:
Military targets evoked significantly greater sup-
port for governmental retaliation than commer-
cial targets; high impact scenarios also evoked
more support for governmental retaliation than
low impact scenarios.
In addition, DeSouza et al. (2011) found a
significant gender difference, but only in the US
sample, with men being supportive of hasher
aggressive retaliation by their government than
women. Thus, US women may be more likely
than US men to support maintaining interna-
tional relations through diplomacy rather than
military intervention. Although there were no
such gender differences in the Peruvian sample,
the purpose of the current study is to examine
whether such gender differences may exist
among a larger, more diverse sample of Latin
Americans.
One possible explanation for the country dif-
ferences found in DeSouza et al.’s (2011) study is
that governmental retaliation to terrorist attacks
often spills over into the general population in
Latin America but not in the USA. That is, in the
war on the Shining Path, the Peruvian govern-
ment reacted with massive firepower, often not
discriminating between innocent peasants and
Shining Path terrorists (Kay 2007). In addition,
Peru’s antiterrorism laws ignored human rights
and legal protection of its citizens, including, but
not limited to, threatening and imprisoning
human rights activists, journalists, and anyone
critical of the government (Starn et al. 2005).
118
In fact, Latin American states have been respon-
sible for an alarming number of victims in the
name of fighting terrorists (Wickham-Crowley
1990). According to Feldmann and Peräla (2004),
over the last three decades, the impact of state
terrorism in Latin America has been far greater
than that committed by nongovernmental terror-
ist groups. Thus, non-US respondents (e.g.,
Peruvians and other foreign nationals) might
recall images of violence perpetrated by the state
under the rubric of a terrorist threat and be less
likely to support governmental retaliation for ter-
rorist attacks compared to US respondents.
In later chapters in this volume, Latin American
views of national security, invasion, and torture
are considered in some detail. In the current chap-
ter, we begin with more basic issues: How do
Latin Americans define war, torture, and terror-
ism, and do their views vary in relation to demo-
graphic characteristics like gender?
The Current Study
Sample
The sample consisted of 776 Latin American
adults. Of these, 51 (7%) were from Argentina,
103 (13%) from Brazil, 69 (9%) from Colombia,
63 (8%) from Costa Rica, 129 (17%) from
Nicaragua, 272 (35%) from Peru, and 89 (12%)
from Puerto Rico (Puerto Rico is not a country,
but it is treated as one in the analysis due to its
distinct culture, which sets it apart from the
USA). These participants defined war, torture,
and terrorism in their own words in a survey that
was part of a larger global investigation by
Malley-Morrison (2009) that covered 43 coun-
tries. The ages of the Latin American sample
overall ranged from 18 to 79 years, with an aver-
age age of 26.87 (SD = 10.40) years. The overall
sample is mostly female (62%), Christian (96%),
and middle class (55%, with an additional 26%
being working class, 14% being upper middle
class, 5% are of the lowest social class, and 1% of
the highest social class). In addition, most (91%)
reported that they had never served in the military
(only 4% ever served and 6% did not respond);
E. DeSouza et al.
however, most (43%) had a family member in the
military (36% indicated that they did not and
21% did not respond).
Design
The present study analyzed respondents’ written
definitions of war, torture, and terrorism by mov-
ing from a qualitative research approach to a
quantitative one based on grounded theory
(Gilgun 2005), which allows the creation of a
taxonomy made up of categories and subcatego-
ries. All categories and subcategories emerged
from the data without imposing a priori stan-
dards. The coding process began by unitizing all
written responses. A unit is an independent and
complete idea, which is placed into only one
category. Thus, all categories and subcategories
are mutually exclusive (i.e., a unit can only be
placed into only one category or subcategory);
however, a respondent may generate more than
one unit (i.e., independent idea). Only marginal
and statistically significant results were reported;
nonsignificant results were not.
All units were coded as present (1) or not pres-
ent (0). Thus, when appropriate (i.e., expected
cell count >5), we conducted chi-square analyses
to determine whether there were significant
differences in a given category/subcategory by
country. For the entire sample, we examined gen-
der differences, as well as differences by whether
the respondent, and any family member of the
respondent, ever served in the military. Only the
results that were statistically significant (with p
values less than 0.05) or marginally significant
(with p values between 0.10 and 0.05) were
reported. Nonsignificant results were omitted.
For further details regarding the methods as well
as descriptions of all categories and subcatego-
ries, see Chap. 2. In addition, note that the quali-
tative results section provides percentages based
on the number of responses coded for each cate-
gory divided by the total number of responses.
The percentages provided in the quantitative sec-
tion refer to the number of participants who pro-
vided responses coded for each category divided
by the total number of participants.
8 Latin American Definitions 119

Table 8.2 Definitions of war: causes

Example of response
Coding category % Country Age Gender Quote
General causes 2 (20) Colombia 21 Female Lack of communication
Last resort 1 (5) Brazil 21 Female Use of violence when there is no other
alternative
Motivation/intent 3 (25) Puerto Rico 20 Female Using force to achieve an objective
Political 3 (31) Costa Rica 37 Male Big transnational business by
governments
Brazil 24 Female Power disputes
Self-defense <1 (4) Peru 18 Male Fight against another to defend their
rights
Argentina 24 Male Depends on the situation, but typically,
it is the defense of a region with the
use of armed strength
Moral judgment 2 (14) Brazil 28 Male Human ignorance and evil of mankind
Puerto Rico 22 Male Inhuman mediation to win certain
causes
Note: Two figures are presented in the percent column for definitions in each subcategory. The first percentage figure is
the percentage of definitions coded into the specified subcategory out of the total number of definitions of war. The
second percentage (in parentheses) indicates the percentage of definitions coded into the subcategory out of all the
definitions in the causes of war category. For example, political definitions represented 3% of all the definitions of war
and 31% of the definitions in the causes of war category

Note that there are multiple voices in each
country that this study cannot address. Therefore,
caution is warranted when generalizing to other
groups, since our Latin American sample is one
of convenience.
Results and Discussion
What Is War?
To better understand lay definitions of war in
Latin America, we grouped categories that shared
a similar theme. In definitions of war, there were
five main thematic categories: (1) causes, (2)
focus on conflict, (3) qualifications of war, (4)
outcomes of war, and (5) moral judgments. There
was also a category capturing responses that were
uncodeable based on the coding manual.
Qualitative Analysis of War
Twelve percent of definitions of war responses
described causes leading up to war. General
causes accounted for 20% of causes definitions
of war and 2% of all definitions of war responses.
A 36-year-old Costa Rican man, for example,
defined war simply as “competition.” A 22-year-
old Brazilian woman echoed this kind of response
in defining war as “two groups with different
ideas fighting against each other.” Responses that
specified motivation or intent behind war were
coded under the subcategory of motivation/intent,
which was further broken down into subcatego-
ries, including political motivation. Responses
describing political motivation were the most
commonly used type of responses under the
causes major category, accounting for 31% of
causes and 3% of all definitions of war responses.
A 33-year-old Argentinian man described politi-
cal motivation when he defined war simply as
“capitalism.” Table 8.2 provides additional exam-
ples of responses coded for causes.
Within the Latin American sample, the most
common theme was focus on conflict only, which
was found in 21% of responses. This code cap-
tures definitions that gave a synonym for war;
many participants used words such as “battle,”
“conflict,” or “fighting.” The general category
120 E. DeSouza et al.

Table 8.3 Definitions of war: conflict and qualifications

Example of response
Coding category % Country Age Gender Quote
Focus on conflict only
General conflict 21 (92) Brazil 23 Female Fight between people
Nonphysical conflict 2 (8) Nicaragua 45 Male Different political ideas
and philosophies
Qualifications of war
General qualifications 2 (8) Puerto Rico 38 Female Warlike conflicts between
countries
Scale or intensity 12 (42) Nicaragua 27 Female Armed conflict between human
beings
Duration/frequency <1 (<1) Colombia 44 Male Night of aggression against
two countries
Groups officially or legally 10 (35) Peru 18 Male Conflicts between nation
recognized as holding power
Nonofficially recognized groups 3 (10) Costa Rica 26 Female Fight between two armed groups
One-sided aggression 2 (6) Puerto Rico 51 Female One fighting against the other
Note: Two figures are presented in the percent column for definitions in each subcategory. The first percentage figure is
the percentage of definitions coded into the specified subcategory out of the total number of definitions of war. The
second percentage (in parentheses) indicates the percentage of definitions coded into the subcategory out of all the
definitions in the conflict or qualifications of war categories, respectively. For example, one-sided aggression repre-
sented 2% of all the definitions of war and 6% of the definitions in the qualifications of war category

focuses on conflict only, including responses that
simply give a synonym for war, without any fur-
ther elaboration. Table 8.3 provides further exam-
ples of responses illustrating a focus on conflict.
Table 8.3 also provides examples of different
qualifications of war. Qualifications refer to
descriptions about war that go beyond conflict
but describe a characteristic of war such as its
size, time, or the parties involved. Scale or inten-
sity of conflict, used in 12% of definitions of war
responses, was indicated by participants who
mentioned the use of violence, a certain level of
fighting/destruction, and/or the use of specific
weapons within war. This subcategory accounted
for 42% of qualifications responses. For exam-
ple, a 24-year-old man from Argentina noted,
“armed confrontation between two countries or
groups of individuals,” and a 22-year-old woman
from Costa Rica defined war as a “large scale
fight between various countries or on an interna-
tional level.”
The next most used subcategory is an officially
or legally recognized authority (e.g., Congress)
that holds political power to make a decision to
declare war as opposed to terrorists or insurgency
groups. This subcategory accounted for 10% of
the definitions of war responses and 35% of
qualifications responses. An example from a
25-year-old Brazilian woman reads “When
nations are not able to resolve their conflicts in a
civilized way and choose combat.”
Table 8.4 provides examples of outcomes of
war. The most frequently used subcategory in
outcomes (54% of outcomes) focuses on concrete
outcomes (i.e., the physical, tangible effects of
war or fighting, such as death, violence, injury,
and destruction). Thirteen percent of definitions
of war responses included concrete outcomes,
which was the second highest code given to Latin
American definitions of war. These responses
mentioned physical effects of war such as death,
devastation, or injury. For example, a 22-year-
old woman from Puerto Rico noted that war was
“death of innocents, destruction,” and a 21-year-
old man from Colombia wrote, “massacres,
deaths, poverty.”
The next most frequently used outcomes sub-
category (40% of outcomes) was rather abstract,
8 Latin American Definitions 121

Table 8.4 Definitions of war: outcomes of war, moral judgments

Example of response
Coding category % Country Age Gender Quote
General outcomes of war 2 (6) Peru 19 Male The problems that bad
governments produce
Concrete outcomes 13 (54) Nicaragua 47 Male Death
Abstract outcomes 10 (40) Puerto Rico 46 Female Suffering
Moral judgments 12 Brazil 28 Female Absurd barbarity
Note: Two figures are presented in the percent column for definitions in each subcategory (moral judgments is a major
category, so the only number presented represents the percentage of definitions coded for moral judgments out of the
total definitions of war). The first percentage figure is the percentage of definitions coded into the specified subcategory
out of the total number of definitions of war. The second percentage (in parentheses) indicates the percentage of
definitions coded into the subcategory out of all the definitions in the outcomes of war category. For example, concrete
outcomes represented 13% of all the definitions of war and 54% of the definitions in the qualifications of war category

Table 8.5 Definitions of war: percentages of responses in coding categories by demographic groups and chi-square
values
Demographic groupsa c2
Categories Male Female
Concrete outcomes 18 25 4.53*
Argentina Brazil Colombia Costa Rica Nicaragua Peru Puerto Rico
Focus on conflict 51 57 45 55 54 29 55 43.86***
Scale/intensity of 49 36 21 30 33 18 17 33.82***
conflict
Officially 36 26 18 29 25 9 37 48.23***
recognized groups
Concrete outcomes 11 5 17 19 30 33 15 44.95***
Abstract outcomes 2 6 11 2 16 28 11 52.00***
*
p £ 0.05; ***p £ 0.001
a
The numbers in these columns are the percent of the group that gave responses falling into each of the specified
categories

focusing on the intangible effects of war, includ- Quantitative Analysis of Definitions

ing emotions and sensations caused by war, such
as sadness and pain. It should be noted that the
category of concrete outcomes is different from
abstract outcomes; 10% of the sample referenced
abstract outcomes, which include intangible
effects of war such as emotion, which is evi-
denced by a 22-year-old Peruvian woman in the
following part of her answer: “…rage, resent-
ment, hate.”
Finally, 12% of the definitions of war exhib-
ited some sort of moral judgment on the act of
war itself, not on the motivations or intentions
behind it. For example, an 18-year-old Peruvian
man wrote, “state of chaos, bestial act of the
human species.” Table 8.4 provides additional
examples of moral judgment responses.
of War
In regard to quantitative analysis, there were
infrequent explanations of factors that might
cause or motivate a country to go to war. It is
interesting that the analyses showed neither
gender differences nor significant differences
related to having served or having a family
member serve in the military in any of the
causes of war categories. By contrast, we found
a number of demographic group differences on
some of the more common definitions. For
example, chi-square analyses revealed
significant country differences in definitions
related to conflict. (See Table 8.5 for percent-
ages of responses in coding categories by
demographic groups and chi-square values.)
122
The country with the lowest frequency of
conflict responses was Peru and the country
with highest frequency was Brazil.
Chi-square analyses also revealed significant
country differences in the use of definitions fall-
ing into the qualifications subcategory of scale or
intensity of the conflict. The country with the
lowest frequency was Puerto Rico, closely fol-
lowed by Peru. The country with the highest fre-
quency was Argentina, which experienced a
major conflict with Great Britain over the
Falklands/Malvinas in 1982. In regard to another
fairly popular subcategory of qualifications
responses, specifically references to officially or
legally recognized authority involved in war, chi-
square analyses again revealed significant differ-
ences among countries. Puerto Rican respondents
were most likely to provide this form of
qualification, closely followed by respondents
from Argentina, with Peruvian respondents
providing the lowest percentage of responses in
this category.
In regard to outcomes, chi-square analyses of
the occurrence of concrete outcomes (i.e., the
physical, tangible effects of war or fighting, such
as death, violence, injury, and destruction) in
definitions of war revealed significant differences
by country and gender, with Peru having the
highest percentage of responses in this category
and Brazil having the lowest. As can be seen in
Table 8.5, significantly more women than men
referred to concrete outcomes in their definitions.
Chi-square analyses also revealed significant
country differences in the abstract outcomes sub-
category, with Peru having the largest proportion
of responses in this subcategory and Costa Rica
having the lowest.
What Is Torture?
Six major categories emerged from the definitions
of torture: (1) intent/motivation, (2) characteris-
tics of the victims, (3) conditions that give rise to
torture, (4) judgment concerning torture, (5)
focus on method/technique, and (6) outcomes.
However, only four major categories were
E. DeSouza et al.
mentioned by a relatively large number of
participants, with responses in categories 2 and 3,
including their subcategories, garnering fewer
than 4% of the responses.
Qualitative Analysis of Torture
Definitions in the category focus on intent,
motivation, or emotion including all of its subcat-
egories represent 16% of torture definitions. The
most common type of intent response fell into the
subcategory for constructive intent, referring to
torture as, for example, a means to get informa-
tion (37% of intent responses). A 21-year-old
man from Peru wrote that torture is a “means of
obtaining information.” Table 8.6 provides addi-
tional examples of responses describing intent.
Only a small portion of definitions of torture
provided descriptions of characteristics of the
victims involved in torture or mentioned the con-
ditions that lead to torture. Examples of responses
coded into these categories are provided in
Table 8.7.
Judgments indicating intolerance towards tor-
ture accounted for 32% of definitions of torture
responses. Among responses describing general
intolerance were those like the following from a
59-year-old Columbian man defining torture as
an “unjust method.” In the Latin American
definitions of torture, 17% of responses noted
that torture was immoral/inhumane/cruel/abusiv
e/vile. This is a subcategory found within the
intolerant/condemning subcategory of judgment.
This immoral subcategory represented 52% of all
judgment responses for definitions of torture. For
example, a 26-year-old from Argentina wrote,
“abusive act, violent injustice, dehumanizing
against an innocent subject.” Table 8.8 provides
examples of responses from each subcategory
under judgments.
Altogether, responses equating torture with its
methods represented 45% of definitions of tor-
ture. Responses falling into the general method
category (6% of all methods responses in
definitions of torture) describe what happens in
torture, without mentioning motives or making
inherent moral judgments. For example, a
description from a 23-year-old woman from
8 Latin American Definitions 123

Table 8.6 Definitions of torture: focus on intent, motivation, or emotion

Example of response
Coding category % Country Age Gender Quote
Focus on intent/motivation/ <1 (3) Nicaragua 42 Female An act to cause fear
emotion general
General destructive intent <1 (1) Brazil 19 Female Purposeful physical and
psychological maltreatment
Intent to pressure or break <1 (1) Nicaragua 25 Female To break someone little by little
a person
Intent to cause pain, suffering, 1 (9) Nicaragua 18 Male To cause pain to a person
or harm
General constructive intent 4 (27) Brazil 26 Male Unjust way of getting something
Information or compliance 6 (37) Puerto Rico 48 Male Coercion by force
Strategic or tactical advantage 1 (5) Colombia 43 Male Abuse of authority
Achieve personal goal <1 (3) Peru 18 Female Attempt against the life of a
person for personal gains
As a punishment 2 (14) Peru 21 Female Very severe penalty
Note: Two figures are presented in the percent column for definitions in each subcategory. The first percentage figure is
the percentage of definitions coded into the specified subcategory out of the total number of definitions of torture. The
second percentage (in parentheses) indicates the percentage of definitions coded into the subcategory out of all the
definitions in the intent of torture category. For example, as a punishment represented 2% of all the definitions of torture
and 14% of the definitions in the intent of torture category

Table 8.7 Definitions of torture: characteristics and conditions

Example of response
Coding category % Country Age Gender Quote
General characteristics <1 (19) Peru 25 Female Aggression toward people or animals
Helplessness/powerlessness 1 (48) Brazil 30 Female Act with violence against someone
who is helpless
Unwilling subjects being 1 (33) Puerto Rico 19 Male Hurt someone against his will
held against will
Conditions that give rise <1 Brazil 24 Male Action by someone who is unable to
to torture negotiate
Note: Two figures are presented in the percent column for definitions in each subcategory (conditions that give rise to
torture is a major category, so the only number presented represents the percentage of definitions coded for conditions
out of the total definitions of torture). The first percentage figure is the percentage of definitions coded into the specified
subcategory out of the total number of definitions of torture. The second percentage (in parentheses) indicates the per-
centage of definitions coded into the subcategory out of all the definitions in the characteristics or conditions of torture
category. For example, general characteristics represented 1% of all the definitions of torture and 19% of the definitions
in the characteristics of torture category

Costa Rica reads torture is “extortion to the
human being to obtain information.” Table 8.9
provides additional examples of responses refer-
ring to methods of torture.
Within methods of torture, the subcategory of
hurting/harming accounted for 16% of the Latin
American definitions of torture and 36% of the
methods responses; these definitions mentioned
that torture was harmful but without any physical
or psychological details. An example of such a
response was from a 23-year-old Argentinean
man who wrote, “to cause suffering on another
124 E. DeSouza et al.

Table 8.8 Definitions of torture: judgments

Example of response
Coding category % Country Age Gender Quote
General judgments 0 (0)
Tolerant judgments <1 (1) Brazil 19 Male Valid method of coercion
Sometimes necessary <1 (1) Peru 21 Male Something inhuman, but at times
necessary
Intolerant/condemning 7 (22) Puerto Rico 40 Female Ignorance
judgments
Unnecessary 1 (4) Argentina 23 Female Unnecessary act of violence
Unlawful/unjust 3 (9) Brazil 26 Male Unjust way of getting something
Immoral. Inhumane/cruel/ 17 (52) Colombia 40 Female Maltreatment
abusive/vile
Sadistic/sick 2 (5) Brazil 40 Female Having pleasure in another’s
suffering
Violation of human rights 2 (7) Colombia 78 Female Disrespect of humans and lack
of human rights
Note: Two figures are presented in the percent column for definitions in each subcategory. The first percentage figure is
the percentage of definitions coded into the specified subcategory out of the total number of definitions of torture. The
second percentage (in parentheses) indicates the percentage of definitions coded into the subcategory out of all the
definitions in the judgments of torture category. For example: unlawful represented 3% of all the definitions of torture
and 9% of the definitions in the judgments of torture category

Table 8.9 Definitions of torture: method and outcome

Example of response
Coding category % Country Age Gender Quote
Focus on method
General method 3 (6) Argentina 22 Male Actions they exercise against
a person to obtain information
Hurting/harming 16 (36) Costa Rica 22 Female Pain
Physical harm 15 (33) Peru 20 Female Hitting someone
Psychological/mental/ 11 (25) Peru 25 Female Actions that humiliate and cause
abstract harm harm to a person
Focus on outcome
General outcome 1 (29) Argentina 21 Female Abuse, damage, abuse
Physical outcome 1 (63) Peru 20 Male Death
Psychological/mental/ <1 (8) Nicaragua 43 Female Injuries, consequences of
abstract outcome anything that hurts people
Note: Two figures are presented in the percent column for definitions in each subcategory. The first percentage figure is
the percentage of definitions coded into the specified subcategory out of the total number of definitions of torture. The
second percentage (in parentheses) indicates the percentage of definitions coded into the subcategory out of all the
definitions in the method or outcome of torture categories, respectively. For example, physical harm represented 15%
of all the definitions of torture and 33% of the definitions in the methods of torture category

person.” In addition, 15% of the definitions of
torture were coded as physical methods, which
include concrete physical measures used in tor-
ture. For example, a 38-year-old Nicaraguan
woman noted, torture is “to hit, harm without
measure.” The code of psychological methods
was given to 11% of responses. An example
given by a 24-year-old Costa Rican woman was
“a way to manipulate and hurt someone.” These
three subcategories (general methods, physical
8 Latin American Definitions 125

Table 8.10 Definitions of torture: percentages of responses in coding categories by demographic groups and chi-
square values
Categories Demographic groupsa c2
Relative military No relative military
Intent: information 10 5 4.36^
Military No military
General method 11 4 3.76*
Physical method 39 21 5.50*
Psychological method 36 15 8.98*
Male Female
Hurting method 18 25 4.52*
Argentina Brazil Colombia Costa Rica Nicaragua Peru Puerto Rico
Intolerance 10 25 7 6 7 9 7 29.77***
Cruel/inhumane 16 16 35 21 32 25 18 16.99**
Physical method 22 18 22 32 33 16 18 20.30**
*
p £ 0.05; **p £ 0.01; ***p £ 0.001; ^0.051 < p < 0.10
a
The numbers in these columns are the percent of the group that gave responses falling into each of the specified
categories

methods, and mental methods) add up to a total of
42% of responses coded for methods of torture.
Quantitative Analysis of Definitions
of Torture
Under the constructive intent subcategory, some
responses defined torture as an attempt to extract
information from individuals or coerce their com-
pliance. Slightly over 8% (n = 65) of the total
sample gave responses falling into this subcate-
gory. However, as can be seen in Table 8.10, there
was a marginally significant difference related to
having a family member in military service, with
those having a family member in the military
being more likely to give responses in this
subcategory than those who did not.
Responses in the intolerance towards torture
category clearly show disapproval of the use of
torture. About 10% (n = 80) of the total sample
showed disapproval; chi-square analyses revealed
significant country differences (see Table 8.10),
with Brazilians making the highest proportion of
responses in this category and Costa Ricans the
lowest. Chi-square analyses also revealed
significant national differences in the use of
definitions indicating that torture is cruel, inhu-
mane, and abusive (given by almost 24% of the
sample), with Colombians giving the highest
proportion of those responses and Brazilians the
lowest. No other significant group differences
were found for either type of response.
Table 8.10 also shows the findings from chi-
square analyses of responses in the general meth-
ods category, which applied to only 4% (n = 31)
of the definitions of torture. The only significant
difference as based on military service, with par-
ticipants who had served in the military being
more likely to give responses in this subcategory
than those who did not. In regard to responses
coded for hurting, harming, or causing pain
(without identification of specific methods),
which were provided by 22% (n = 173) of the
total sample, there were significant country dif-
ferences (with Puerto Ricans making the highest
proportion of such responses and Nicaragua the
fewest) as well as significant gender differences
(with more women giving more of these exam-
ples than men).
Slightly under 22% (n = 168) of the total sam-
ple specified physical processes or methods of
torture in their definitions. There were significant
country differences, with Nicaragua having
the highest frequency and Peru the lowest.
There were no significant gender differences, but
126
Table 8.11 Definitions of terrorism: valence
Example of response
Coding category % Country
Negative regarding terrorism 31 Brazil
Neutral regarding terrorism 63 Colombia
An effort to understand terrorism 6 Costa Rica
Positive regarding terrorism 0 Brazil
Note: The number displayed indicates the percentage of responses in each valence subcategory in relation to total num-
ber of responses. For example, 63% of all definitions of terrorism responses described terrorism with a neutral valence
respondents who had served in the military gave
more of these examples than those who did not
(see Table 8.10).
The following subcategory describes the psy-
chological processes or methods of torture,
including the threat of physical pain. Slightly
under 16% (n = 121) of the total sample cited this
subcategory. There were no significant country or
gender differences, but there was a significant
difference for having served in the military (see
Table 8.10). Those who served in the military
were more likely to endorse this subcategory than
those who did not.
What Is Terrorism?
Four major thematic categories emerged from the
definitions of terrorism. They are (1) causes of/
motivations for terrorism, (2) terrorism as a pro-
cess, (3) outcomes of terrorism, and (4) judgment
concerning terrorism.
Qualitative Analysis of Terrorism: Valence
Within the Latin American sample, 63% gave
neutral definitions that appeared detached,
expressing neither a positive or negative attitude
toward terrorism. For example, the definition,
“group that looks to defend their ideas through
violence,” given by a 19-year-old Peruvian
woman, has a neutral connotation. On the other
hand, a negative definition was given by 31% of
participants. An example includes one from a
22-year-old woman from Nicaragua who wrote,
E. DeSouza et al.
Age Gender Quote
23 Female Absurd and inefficient way of solving
a problem
20 Male Utilization of arms to obtain an end
31 Female The only solution that they found
24 Male Reaction to oppression
“Group of people who commit repugnant acts
against people or nations.” A select percentage
(6%) made an effort to understand terrorism, and
0% of participants from Latin America expressed
a positive regard for terrorism. Additional exam-
ples of valence responses are in Table 8.11.
Qualitative Analysis of Terrorism: Themes
Twenty-four percent of definitions of terrorism
referred to causes/motivations behind terrorism.
The most frequent types of causes/motivation
example were those describing ideological moti-
vation (28% of causes and 7% of all definitions
of terrorism) and a political agenda (26% of
causes and 6% of all definitions of terrorism). For
example, a 22-year-old Brazilian woman
explained the ideological motivation in that ter-
rorism is constituted by “violent acts that support
a point of view.” A 20-year-old Nicaraguan man
described the political motivations behind terror-
ism by defining it as an “attempt to damage the
government by harming its people.” Table 8.12
provides additional sample responses of
definitions of terrorism describing causes.
Just as in definitions of torture, physical
method was one of the most common codes, used
for 23% of the definitions of terrorism responses
(82% of definitions of terrorism methods
responses). The use of physical method refers to
specific concrete physical techniques used to
obtain an outcome. For example, a 25-year-old
woman from Columbia defined terrorism as a
way “to spread terror through violent acts.”
Process/methods responses accounted for 28% of
8 Latin American Definitions 127

Table 8.12 Definitions of terrorism: cause/motivation

Example of response
Coding category % Country Age Gender Quote
General motivation 4 (17) Brazil 36 Male Violent acts in the name of a cause
Ideological motivation 7 (28) Puerto Rico 30 Female Defend ideals in a dangerous way
Political agenda 6 (26) Nicaragua 38 Female Conspire against the sovereignty of a
country
International 1 (5) Brazil 21 Female Criminal act that tries to hurt a
foreign country
Emotional causes 3 (13) Puerto Rico 25 Male Expression of fear, ignorance
Negative environmental conditions 1 (5) Brazil 24 Male Reaction to oppression
Last resort 1 (4) Peru 19 Female Lack of methods to transmit an idea
No motivation 1(2) Puerto Rico 32 Male Cause fear and damage without a
just cause
Note: Two figures are presented in the percent column for definitions in each subcategory. The first percentage figure is
the percentage of definitions coded into the specified subcategory out of the total number of definitions of terrorism. The
second percentage (in parentheses) indicates the percentage of definitions coded into the subcategory out of all the
definitions in the cause/motivation of terrorism category. For example, international represented 1% of all the definitions
of terrorism and 5% of the definitions in the cause/motivation of terrorism category

Table 8.13 Definitions of terrorism: process/method, outcomes

Example of response
Coding category % Country Age Gender Quote
General process 2 (7) Brazil 21 Female Radical movement
Physical process 23 (82) Puerto Rico 50 Female Bloody invasion from one country
to another
Mental process 3 (10) Argentina 24 Male Exercise their strength by
instilling fear
General outcomes 1 (4) Colombia 27 Female It causes pain to other people
Physical outcomes 10 (42) Brazil 22 Female Destruction
Mental outcomes 9 (37) Colombia 59 Male Action that causes terror
Disruption of peace and stability 4 (15) Puerto Rico 49 Female Threaten the security of another
nation
Disruption of economy 1 (2) Argentina 33 Male Differences in capitalism
Note: Two figures are presented in the percent column for definitions in each subcategory. The first percentage figure is
the percentage of definitions coded into the specified subcategory out of the total number of definitions of terrorism. The
second percentage (in parentheses) indicates the percentage of definitions coded into the subcategory out of all the
definitions in the process/method or outcomes of terrorism category. For example, mental process represented 3% of all
the definitions of terrorism and 10% of the definitions in the process/method of terrorism category

definitions of terrorism responses. Table 8.13
provides examples of additional responses coded
for process/methods in definitions of terrorism.
Twenty-five percent of definitions of terrorism
responses focused on various types of outcomes
(see Table 8.13). The focus is on what the actions
of terrorism produce, rather than the processes
themselves. The most commonly cited type of
outcome in definitions of terrorism was physical
outcomes (42% of outcomes and 10% of all
definitions of terrorism). For instance, a 26-year-
old Brazilian woman describes terrorism as
“group action against a group or government”
with the outcome being “that [terrorism] causes
the loss of lives.” Nine percent of definitions of
terrorism responses contained some sort of
128 E. DeSouza et al.

Table 8.14 Definitions of terrorism: judgments, real-life reference

Example of response
Coding category % Country Age Gender Quote
General judgments 1 (3) Brazil 23 Female As bad as war
Moral judgments 7 (35) Costa Rica 39 Male Barbaric humans
Immoral acts 8 (37) Colombia 51 Female Total violation of human rights
Moral motivation 2 (12) Costa Rica 58 Male Exacerbated ignorance and fantasy
Appeal to relativity 1 (4) Costa Rica 26 Male Depends on who did it and why
Legal judgments 0
Illegal acts 2 (8) Puerto Rico 19 Male Violate the law
Legal motivation 0
Real-life reference 1 Puerto Rico 32 Male Osama bin Laden, Iraq
Note: Two figures are presented in the percent column for definitions in each subcategory. The first percentage figure is
the percentage of definitions coded into the specified subcategory out of the total number of definitions of terrorism. The
second percentage (in parentheses) indicates the percentage of definitions coded into the subcategory out of all the
definitions in the judgments and real-life reference of terrorism category. For example, legal judgments of acts of terror-
ism represented 2% of all the definitions of terrorism and 8% of the definitions in the judgments of terrorism category

emotional outcome, which refers to emotions,
fear, or anxiety. A 20-year-old woman from Peru
simply wrote, “horror,” describing a feeling that
results from terrorism.
As with definitions of war and torture,
definitions of terrorism responses that indicated a
judgment were coded under a major category of
judgment. In definitions of terrorism, judgments
were then further differentiated between moral
judgments and legal judgments. Seven percent of
Latin American participants expressed moral
judgment, a code that includes general assess-
ments of the terrorists or terrorism, without men-
tioning ideology. For example, the moral judgment
code was given to the response “barbaric humans,”
written by a 39-year-old man from Costa Rica.
Other responses mentioned immoral acts (37% of
judgments and 8% of all definitions of terrorism)
involved in terrorism or the motivation behind it
(12% of judgments and 2% of all definitions of
terrorism). Legal judgments were also divided
between illegal acts (8% of judgments and 2% of
all definitions of terrorism) and motivation; how-
ever, no responses in this sample provided legal
judgments regarding the motivation behind terror-
ism. The distinction between a moral judgment
and a legal judgment is illustrated by the response
of a 45-year-old Brazilian woman: She defined
terrorism as an act against moral standards, “a
cowardly act,” and an act against the law, “illegal.”
Refer to Table 8.14 for additional examples of
responses making judgments.
Quantitative Analysis of Terrorism
About 6% (n = 40) of the total Latin American
sample gave definitions falling into the general
causes category. Chi-square analyses revealed
that respondents who did not have a family mem-
ber serve in the military were more likely to give
responses in this category than those who did (see
Table 8.15). Definitions of terrorism, like
definitions of war, rarely focused on the causes of
terrorism; participants with a family member in
the military were significantly more likely to men-
tion causes of terrorism than their counterparts.
The most common response for methods of
terrorism was physical actions, which included
comparisons of terrorism to warfare or torture.
About one-third (n = 224) of the total sample gave
responses in the physical process/methods sub-
category of process/methods. Frequency of phys-
ical methods responses differed significantly by
country, with Argentina using the category most
and Peru least. An emphasis on the physical was
also found in the approximately 15% (n = 100) of
the total sample who provided definitions coded
8 Latin American Definitions
Table 8.15 Definitions of terrorism: percentages of responses in coding categories by demographic groups and
chi-square values
Categories Demographic groupsa
Relative military No relative military
Causes/motivation 4 8
Male Female
Physical outcomes 10 17
Argentina Brazil Colombia
Physical process 46 35 38
* **
p £ 0.05; p £ 0.01
a
The numbers in these columns are the percent of the group that gave responses falling into each of the specified
categories
into the physical outcome subcategory of out-
comes. Significantly more women than men
identified terrorism with its physical outcomes
(see Table 8.15).
Overall, participants focused the physical and
emotional outcomes of terrorism. Women were
especially sensitive to the physical destruction
caused by terrorism, partially supporting our first
hypothesis. This finding is keeping with the study
of DeSouza et al. (2011). Interestingly, there were
not gender differences concerning emotional
outcomes.
The focus on the most visible aspects of ter-
rorism suggests a disregard to the more complex
negative outcomes of terrorism, such as the
breakdown of nonviolent ways to deal with social
change and grievances. We argue that many Latin
American governments neglect the motives of
people’s dissatisfaction, which may add fuel to
terrorist groups’ ideology. Both sides are unable
to find peaceful, workable solutions that benefit
people at large. According to Beasley-Murray
et al. (2009), neoliberalism policies in Latin
America have not worked well for most people,
who are typically poor. That is, market-driven
leaders have emphasized technocratic formulas
rather than engage in a democratic debate with
those who want to change the ways in which
wealth is distributed in Latin America in order to
lessen misery and poverty. It appears that most
Latin American governments have not had the
interest of the people in mind but rather have dis-
guised their neoliberal policies that seem to have
benefitted just the elite (Goldstein et al. 2007),
129
c2
4.00*
5.51*
Costa Rica Nicaragua Peru Puerto Rico
43 41 23 30 22.29**
therefore giving a rationale for violent groups to
emerge to combat such inequalities.
Conclusions
This study revealed definitions of war, torture,
and terrorism in our Latin American sample that
parallel official definitions (e.g., US govern-
ment); that is, they were brief and did not include
much contextual information. The media cover-
ing war, terrorism, and state violence may help
educate lay people to understand the complexity
and nuances of the causes, processes, and conse-
quences of such violence, as violence begets vio-
lence, and begin the process of dialogue and
positive social change in order to avoid those
“sitting on the fence” from becoming radicalized.
The media can also help by clarifying the blur-
ring of morality, law, and language, as there are
no easy moral answers to ethical dilemmas sur-
rounding the impulses toward war and violence,
including the use of torture to obtain information
that may save lives, as officials sometimes need
to dirty their hands for the greater good (Smith
and Roberts 2008).
Although we found some significant country
differences, there was not a pattern to these dif-
ferences. In addition, there were few significant
gender differences, or differences related to hav-
ing any family member serve in the military, sug-
gesting, overall, similar definitions across these
variables. The only noticeable trend concerned
the methods/techniques used in torture, suggesting
130
that those who have served in the military learned
about such methods/techniques there or became
more aware of them than those who did not.
Future research should investigate the curriculum
that is currently being used in military schools
and police academies in Latin America. This is
particularly important given the growing prolif-
eration of small arms trade in Latin American
countries, which is closely related to drug- and
gang-related violence.
According to Stohl and Tuttle (2008), gun
violence is the number one threat to public safety
in Latin America and the Caribbean, killing
about 90,000 people yearly. Thus, Latin
American residents may feel unsafe and fearful,
leading them to tolerate human rights violations
on the part of the police in order to feel a sense
of security (Goldstein et al. 2007). This may be a
reflection of our humanity, as most people are
more interested in maintaining security than
freedom. Therefore, future research should
investigate how fear of crime and tolerance of
police aggression restrict, rather than expand,
individual rights.
Although the twenty-first century has eco-
nomically (e.g., the 2004 ratification of a free
trade agreement between the USA and Central
American countries, including the Dominican
Republic) and politically (e.g., transition to
democracy in the 1980s and 1990s) begun well
for Latin America, recent history has shown too
frequently there has been just rhetoric concerning
human rights in Latin America (Campbell 1998).
For democracy to truly take hold there, protecting
human rights, including cultural, ethnic, and gen-
der rights, is one required element for countries,
groups, and individuals to coexist peacefully
(Diamond 1996).
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 Definitions of War, Torture,
and Terrorism in South 9
and Southeast Asia

Janice Jones, Ma. Regina E. Estuar, Sherri McCarthy,

Ellora Puri, Megan Reif, Leslie Flores, Nisha Raj,
Dylan Rose, Darshini Shah, Haslina Muhammad,
and Jas Jafaar

Southeast Asia is a region of the world located
between the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean.
There are many countries that comprise this
region, but in this chapter we focus on Laos, the
Philippines, Indonesia, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka,
and Malaysia. This region has a complex history
and complex current political structures.
American naval strategists coined the term
Southeast Asia in the 1940s, belying its increas-
ing significance. War, political insurgencies, and
colonization have all had an effect on the people
of this region. In 2005, there were roughly 557
million people living in this region of the world
(United States Census Bureau 2011).
Culture, Economy, and Politics
The people who live in this region seem to have
adopted a collectivist cultural viewpoint – that is,
they are more concerned about their families than
about themselves (Sue and Sue 2003). Individual
identities are embedded in and seen through the
lens of the family. When a family punishes one of
their members (if, e.g., that member has dishon-
ored them in some way), they do so by disowning
that individual. This act brings a great deal of
shame to the individual, who essentially no lon-
ger carries an identity.
Southeast Asia is religiously diverse. Although
Buddhism remains the predominant religion,
Catholicism and Sunni Islam are popular as well,
and religious minorities exist in every country.
Christian missionaries traveled to the area to
share their beliefs, although historically, Protestant
religions have had little success, while Catholics
have. Muslim traders helped spread the Islamic
religion throughout this region. Religious views
include shamanism, which maintains that sha-
mans are intermediaries or messengers between
the human world and the spirit worlds, with the
capability of healing illnesses by treating the soul.
Shamanism is predominant in rural areas, partic-
ularly in Malaysia (Sue and Sue 2003).
Although there has been a distinct Chinese
influence on the cultures of Southeast Asia, each
country has its own particular set of cultural val-
ues and norms. Moreover, each country in
Southeast Asia has its own set of laws for govern-
ing its citizens. Some laws have been shaped by
Western civilization, while others have been
heavily influenced by Eastern ideals. For exam-
ple, if a couple wishes to divorce, the Eastern cul-
tural ideals hold true. Financial issues, however,
have been inspired by Western practices and the
laws adopted tend to follow Western ideals.
Because some countries still have distinct rural
populations that are polar opposites from their
urban counterparts, it is not uncommon to find the
residents following rules that have been in effect
for centuries, rather than adopting the more mod-
ern approach to governing that is characteristic of
the country’s urban areas. It is difficult to enforce
laws and governmental ideals in rural areas.
Throughout this region, there is a wide range
of political ideals. Historically, the region has

K. Malley-Morrison et al. (eds.), International Handbook of War, Torture, and Terrorism, 133
Peace Psychology Book Series, DOI 10.1007/978-1-4614-1638-8_9,
© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2013
134
been governed by military and authoritarian gov-
ernments. Some of the countries have had democ-
racies, while others, like Malaysia, have had
theocracies and state religions. The Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has had a
strong impact on the political underpinnings of
this region. ASEAN was formed in 1967 and pro-
vides structure and support for economic growth,
cultural development, and peaceful discussions
around issues such as social progress, peace, and
stability. Countries that currently belong to this
organization include Indonesia, Malaysia, the
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Brunei, Burma,
Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. By uniting as
members of ASEAN, these countries have experi-
enced stronger economic outcomes, increased geo-
political stability, and increased trade. Since the
inception of ASEAN, no member countries have
experienced armed confrontations with each other,
due to the trust and confidence they have developed
with other members. The ASEAN has promoted
respect, freedom from political intervention, and
freedom from the fear of violence or use of threat
by the member countries (ASEAN 2011).
Southeast Asia is also rich in natural resources,
although this benefit is just one part of the econ-
omy. Recently, travel and tourism have played an
important role in the economic structure of the
region, as tourists have discovered the tropical
climate, attractive beaches, interesting cultures,
and opportunities for relaxation.
The people of Southeast Asia are an agrarian
population. Their primary products include fish,
rubber, sugar cane, coconut, and timber. Mining
is also a lucrative industry, although opponents
report that mining depletes the natural resources
an agrarian culture depends on for survival. In
addition, mining profits are often seen only by
those in the urban centers, while rural residents
do not benefit from mining on a large scale.
There are, however, sizable urban centers pres-
ent in these countries, and there is a distinct
dichotomy between the lifestyles and cultures of
the rural and urban areas. In the rural areas, it is
common to see agrarian lifestyles, with people
and oxen laboring in the fields to harvest crops.
In the large urban centers, 21st century life is the
norm with its mass transit, technology, and
J. Jones et al.
skyscrapers. Life in the urban centers is hectic
and energetic, whereas in the rural areas, it is
peaceful and slow-paced. Unlike the United
States, suburban areas are not common
(Hamilton-Merritt 1999).
Economic and social changes or pressures
have not always been positive for the people of
Southeast Asia. Environmental degradation due
to mining, poor pollution control, deforestation,
sewage disposal and management, and the deple-
tion of natural resources has begun to change the
face of Southeast Asia. Today, electronics and
textiles are big export businesses that provide a
significant revenue stream into this region for the
business owners but not for factory workers who
are paid a substandard wage. Extreme poverty,
soaring population rates, and the high cost of
living are exacting a toll. Additionally, many
Southeast Asian residents have immigrated to
other countries and many have refugee status. As
people move from farming and other agrarian
lifestyles into urban centers looking for work,
they often experience a culture shock that creates
psychological hardships. A struggling economy,
the loss of a familiar way of life as modernization
takes hold, and the challenges of the 21st century
are negatively affecting the people of this region
(Tourism Asia 2011).
War and Conflict
In the last 50–60 years, historians have docu-
mented the horrors and atrocities that have
affected this region through involvement in vari-
ous wars. Although other countries in other
regions of the world may have experienced skir-
mishes or smaller wars that have lasted last for
days or months, the wars that have affected this
region have lasted for years with heavy losses
and injuries. These losses have contributed to
other problems that weigh heavily on the people:
the depletion of supplies and other resources,
lack of societal/cultural progress, and mistrust of
government (Croisssant and Trinn 2009).
In the 16th century, trade became a major
draw. Europeans seeking trade opportunities, and
missionaries hoping to spread Christianity, came
9 S, SE Asia Definitions
to Southeast Asia. The British arrived during the
1800s. British rule helped create numerous
exporting opportunities along with a societal
structure that expanded the possibilities of the
area. As European powers took over the govern-
ing of these countries, however, power struggles
inevitably ensued (Emerson 1980).
In World War II, the conflict in Southeast Asia
was termed the Southeast Asian Theater. These
battles raged from 1941 to 1945 for the United States.
The bombing of Pearl Harbor on December 7,
1941, is often considered the start of the Southeast
Asian Theater. However, there were several prior
incidents that led up to the bombing. For exam-
ple, the United States declared a steel embargo
against Japan, hindering their war efforts, and
further angered Japan by supporting the
Nationalist Chinese. During World War II, the
Southeast Asian Theater experienced different
forms of fighting than had been waged during
other wars, due to the increase in technology and
weaponry, and attacks by sea and by air that con-
tributed significantly to loss of life.
The First Indochina War was fought between
1946 and 1954, mainly in North Vietnam,
although there were also conflicts in Laos and
Cambodia. After World War II, the French occu-
pied most of Indochina. The people started rebel-
ling against the French authority, and while this
war started as an insurgency, it eventually grew to
war status (Han 2010). Military equipment and
weapons were supplied by Russia to Indochina
and by the United States to the French (Liefer
1972). One of the goals of the Geneva Conference
in 1954 was to help restore peace to the people of
Indochina, who had suffered tremendously dur-
ing this war (Warner 1989).
The Vietnam War raged from 1955 to 1975.
The countries that had joined together to form the
South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO),
along with South Vietnam and the United States,
fought against North Vietnam and its communist
allies. The Communists of North Vietnam were
attempting to take over South Vietnam, an act
that spurred the United States into joining the war
(Shivkumar 1996). This war was euphemistically
labeled a “conflict,” but the loss of life was stag-
gering. In North and South Vietnam, there were
135
over 3 million casualties, there were over
1.5 million people lost in Laos and Cambodia
(Hirschman et al. 1995).
After the fall of Communism, the fear of ter-
rorism took its place. The bombings that occurred
in 2005 in Indonesia are recent examples of the
way terrorism is replacing war in the 20th cen-
tury. Communism and the wars surrounding it
were often nationalistic, particularly in Southeast
Asia. In the modern world, nationalism has been
increasingly discarded as a means for inciting
people to rebel. Many have already fought their
nationalistic fights, colonialism has been defeated,
and they no longer hold nationalistic grievances
motivating them to go to war (Swanström and
Björnehed 2004).
Instead of fighting wars that require the par-
ticipation of an entire state or people, a terrorist
act can be committed by a single person. This
fact furthers the fear of terrorism, as conventional
state reactions become increasingly irrelevant. In
particular, deterrence is significantly more
difficult to set up in an era where attacks from
outsiders can come in multiple forms. Instead,
more and more countries are conducting counter-
insurgency operations or going after terrorist
funding. The changing conditions have coincided
with changes in the sources of fear and how those
fears are managed (Ciorciari 2010).
Methods
Southeast Asia is being recognized as a rising
political and economic stronghold in today’s
world; however, it is also coming into greater
focus for the increasing conflicts and occurrences
of terror in the region. Although social scientists
have analyzed the political and economic aspects
of conflict and terror in various countries and
regions all over the world, an intensive study of
ordinary people’s attitudes about war and torture
in the Southeast Asia region has not hitherto been
undertaken. The following sections describe
responses from participants from several
Southeast Asian countries to three items on the
Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression
and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS; Malley-Morrison
136
et al. 2006): (a) definitions of war, (b) definitions
of torture, and (c) definitions of terrorism.
The survey was administered to 756 partici-
pants from Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Laos, and the Philippines. The respon-
dents were asked to provide their own definitions
of war, torture, and terrorism. Their responses
were coded in accordance with the project coding
manual and analyzed in order to have a better
understanding of how the respondents conceptu-
alized war, torture, and terrorism.
South and Southeast Asian Participant
Demographics
The sample consisted of 756 respondents, of
whom 34% were from the Philippines, 30%
were from India, 20% were from Malaysia, 8%
were from Pakistan, 3% were from both Indonesia
and Laos, and 1% were from Sri Lanka. The
total sample (53% female and 47% male)
ranged in age from 18 to over 65 years, with a
majority being between the ages of 18 and
25 years old. Most of the respondents reported
being raised Christian (42%), Muslim (30%),
or Hindu (24%), with fewer than 5% reporting
being raised Buddhist, Jewish, a follower of a
religion not listed, or atheist, agnostic, and/or
not having a religion growing up. Half of the
respondents (50%) indicated they belonged to
the middle class; the others considered them-
selves lower class (6%), working class (14%),
upper middle class (26%), or upper class (5%).
Very few respondents (5%) had served in the
military and 26% reported that they had a rela-
tive who had served in the military. Only 18%
of the respondents reported taking part in pro-
tests against war.
Southeast Asian Responses
for Definitions of War
A large number of the respondents (610 out of
756) responded to the item asking them to define
the word “war.” Most of the participants provided
more than one definition, for a total of 1,404
J. Jones et al.
codeable responses. A codeable unit could be a
sentence, a clause, or even one word, if it had a
significant meaning or connotation on its own. In
this section of the chapter, we use the terms
“responses” and “codeable units” interchange-
ably when we talk about the percentages of
responses in particular categories or demographic
differences in response frequencies. The coding
manual separates the units into five major the-
matic categories: (a) causes, (b) focus on conflict,
(c) qualifications, (d) outcomes, and (e) moral
judgments. Responses that did not describe any
of the five major themes were coded as uncode-
able. Refer to Chap. 1 for additional information
regarding methods.
About 12% of all responses fell into the major
category of causes, which included responses
describing an event that leads to the war. The
causes of war category has two broad
subcategories: (a) last resort and (b) motivation/
intent. Last resort refers to responses that men-
tion war as a last resort, something that could not
be avoided, or something that happens when all
efforts to avoid war fail (e.g., “war is a situation
when all means of reconciliation between two or
more than two countries fails”). Motivation/intent
refers to responses mentioning the reasons why
people choose to go to war; these responses gen-
erally involve a sense of agency (e.g., “when two
countries or entities fight over material
resources”). About 81% of the causes of war
responses were coded for motivation/intent,
whereas 4% were coded for last resort; the
remaining 15% were coded into the general
causes category. The motivation/intent category
has three additional subcategories: political pur-
pose, self-defense, and moral judgment. Thirty-
seven percent of motivation/intent responses
were coded for political purpose (e.g., “a conflict
involving a lot of violence and loss to gain a
political stronghold”), 26% as moral judgment
related to cause (e.g., “countries fighting for their
own selfish motives”), and 11% as self-defense
(e.g., “when two groups are fighting with one
another just to keep themselves alive”).
Nineteen percent of all responses fell into the
major category for focus on conflict only (“any
sort of conflict between two opposing parties”),
9 S, SE Asia Definitions
which includes general focus on conflict, non-
physical conflict (e.g., “sometimes it is conflict
without any physical damage, aka cold war”),
and qualifying or specifying terms (e.g., “military
conflict”). The majority of responses (90%)
coded as focus on conflict fell into in the general
category with only 10% identified as forms of
“nonphysical conflict.”
About 33% of the definitions of war responses
were coded for including qualifications or
specifications in the definitions. As there are
many types of qualifying terms that can be used
in definitions of war, that subcategory was further
divided into five types of qualifications: (a) scale
or intensity of conflict (e.g., “violent clash”), (b)
duration/frequency (e.g., “ongoing violent
conflict”), (c) groups officially or legally recog-
nized as holding political power (e.g., “a declared
attack by one nation-state on another”),
(d) nonofficially recognized/informal groups
(e.g., “violence between two or more people”),
and (e) one-sided aggression (e.g., “one country
attacking other country”). Of those five types of
qualifications, scale or intensity of conflict and
groups official or legally recognized as holding
political power occurred most frequently, consti-
tuting 43% and 34%, respectively, of the
qualifications responses.
Almost a quarter of all the responses were
coded into the outcomes major category. This cat-
egory is further divided into concrete outcomes,
referring to the physical, tangible effects of war or
fighting (e.g., “fights, bloodshed, separation from
families”), and abstract outcomes, referring to the
intangible effects of war, including emotions and
sensations (e.g., “sadness/sorrow,” “disharmony
amongst people”). Sixty-three percent of the out-
comes responses were considered concrete out-
comes of war, and 33% of the responses were
considered abstract outcomes of war.
Twelve percent of all the definitions of war
responses fell into the moral judgment major cat-
egory; responses in this subcategory make a judg-
ment only on the act of war itself, not on the
reason for going to war. Only 7 responses out of
the total of 1,404 responses were uncodeable by
our coding manual.
137
South and Southeast Asian Responses
for Definitions of Torture
Nearly all of the respondents (750 out of 756)
responded to the item asking them to define the
word “torture. The definitions provided for tor-
ture were also broken into independently code-
able response units. Once again, most of the
participants provided more than one definition,
for a total of 1,118 responses. The coding manual
for definitions of torture codes these responses
into six major categories: (a) focus on intent,
motivation, or emotion; (b) characteristics of
individual being tortured; (c) conditions that give
rise to torture; (d) judgment concerning morality/
justice/humanity; (e) focus on method; and
(f ) focus on outcome only.
Responses that were categorized as focus on
intent, motivation, or emotion included responses
addressing the intended result or goal of torture;
there were two types of emotional/motivational
definitions: (a) those indicating destructive intent
(responses such as “unnecessary cruelty” that
focused on the purpose of torture as creating a
destructive outcome) and (b) those indicating
constructive intent, referring to a response that
defines and characterizes torture as aimed at gain-
ing something (e.g., “inflicting pain, physical or
psychological, in order to achieve some goal”).
Overall, about 14% of definitions of torture
responses were coded as focus on intent, motiva-
tion, or emotion. About 18% of intent responses
were categorized as destructive intent, whereas
about 80% of intent responses were categorized
as constructive intent. Destructive intent included
the subcategories to pressure and/or break the
person (e.g., “is a medium to intimidate someone
to set an example for others”) and to cause pain,
suffering, harm, etc. (e.g., “causing another to
suffer for the purpose of making them suffer”).
Those subcategories accounted for 34% and 55%
of destructive intent responses, respectively. The
remaining 10% of destructive intent responses
were coded in the general destructive intent
category.
Constructive intent included the following
subcategories: (a) information or compliance
138
(e.g., “keeping a person on the verge of death with
pain in order to get some sort of information”),
(b) strategic or tactical advantage (e.g., “by giv-
ing torture, one is trying to be powerful”), (c)
achieve a personal goal, self-gain (e.g., “do pain-
ful things physically or mentally to gain what
they wants”), and (d) punishment (e.g., “physical
or mental violence meant to punish”). Of these
subcategories, information or compliance
occurred in 50% of constructive intent responses
and achievement of a personal goal or self-gain
was found in only 4% of those responses. Twenty-
four percent of the constructive intent responses
were coded as a punishment and 11% of them
were coded as strategic or tactical advantage.
Characteristics of the individual being tor-
tured (e.g., “wrong man in the wrong place”)
accounted for about 4% of all definitions of torture.
That category was divided into helplessness/
powerlessness (e.g., “abuse on someone unable
to defend themselves”) and unwilling subject/
being held against will (e.g., “people that are
imprisoned, hurt, salvaged”). About 46% of char-
acteristics responses and 2% of all definitions of
torture responses fell into the helplessness/pow-
erlessness subcategory. About 22% of character-
istics responses and 1% of all definitions of
torture responses were in the subcategory for
unwilling subject/being held against will.
Only two responses fell into the subcategory
for conditions that give rise to torture. These two
responses were: “Deranged actions arising from
an inability to get someone to do something
through intelligent persuasive measures” and
“abuse to human beings, who happened to be
drafted by the opposite party of the conflict.”
Themes expressing a judgment concerning
morality/justice/humanity (moral judgment) were
relatively common, accounting for about 27% of
all definitions of torture. This judgment category
had two subcategories: (a) tolerance and (b)
intolerant/condemning. The tolerant responses
showed some tolerance for the use of torture
(e.g., “it is necessary only to get information from
the terrorist or criminal people”). This tolerance
subcategory had an additional subcategory for
responses defining torture as sometimes neces-
sary/last resort (e.g., “wrong but possibly neces-
J. Jones et al.
sary”); 1% of all definitions of torture responses
were coded into that subcategory.
The five subcategories for intolerant/con-
demning responses were: (a) unnecessary (e.g.,
“totally unnecessary”), (b) unlawful/unjust (e.g.,
“mostly unjustified!”), (c) immoral/inhumane/
cruel/abusive/vile (e.g., “very immoral act,
nobody has the right to do so”), (d) sadistic/sick
(e.g., “have somebody suffer immense pain for
the purpose of extracting info from them or for
fun”), and (e) violation of human rights (e.g., “a
serious oppression of basic human rights”).
Immoral/inhumane/cruel/abusive/vile responses
accounted for 11% of the definitions of torture;
only about 1 or 2% of the definitions fell into the
other intolerant/condemning subcategories.
About 50% of the definitions of torture were
coded into the focus on method category,
indicating that they described what happens in
torture. The category included a subcategory for
hurting/harming (e.g., “hurting someone, abus-
ing them, inflicting inhuman pain on them”); this
subcategory accounted for 15% of all definitions
of torture responses and 31% of methods
responses. The hurting/harming category was
further divided into physical methods of torture
(e.g., “physical abuse inflicted on an individual to
get out info”) and psychological, mental, abstract,
or conceptual types of torture (e.g., “extreme
emotional or psychological abuse”). Thirty-five
percent of methods responses and 17% of all
definitions of torture responses fell into the physi-
cal methods subcategory and 31% of methods
responses and 15% of all torture responses fell
into the psychological, mental, abstract, or con-
ceptual subcategory.
A few of the responses (3% of the total
definitions of torture responses) were in the focus
on outcome only category (e.g., “can destroy
man’s mortality”). These responses addressed
specific effects or outcomes of torture and were
not just a description of the process. This out-
come category was divided into physical out-
comes (e.g., “murder”) and psychological,
mental, abstract, or conceptual outcomes (e.g.,
“mental imbalance”), with each of those subcat-
egories representing 1% of the definitions of
torture responses.
9 S, SE Asia Definitions
South and Southeast Asian Responses
for Definitions of Terrorism
A large number of the respondents (579 of 756)
responded to the item asking them to define the
word “terrorism,” providing a total of 860 responses.
The coding manual for terrorism has two levels of
coding: valence and theme. The valence coding is
designed to assess the overall orientation of the
response. Four valence categories were identified:
(a) neutral, (b) positive, (c) negative, and (d) aimed
at understanding terrorism. The thematic coding
focused on (a) causes or motivation of terrorism,
(b) terrorism as a process, (c) outcomes, and (d)
judgments (with subcategories for moral and (e)
legal judgments regarding terrorism).
In regard to the valence coding, over half of
all the terrorism responses (58%) were coded as
being neutral towards terrorism, while 36% were
coded as being negative regarding terrorism, 3%
as indicating an effort to understand terrorism,
and 2% as positive regarding terrorism.
In regard to themes, a majority (31%) of all
the definitions of terrorism fell into the process/
method categories, which describe the methods
of terrorists or characterize terrorism as a means
to an end. Responses in this major category could
also be coded as either physical (e.g., “using a
display of violence to frighten others”) or mental
(e.g., “like torture, using violent, psychological
methods”). The responses identifying physical
methods were more common (76% of process
responses and 24% of all the terrorism definitions)
than were those making reference to mental forms
of terrorism (17% of process responses and 5%
of the total). Seven percent of process responses
and 2% of definitions of terrorism responses fell
into the general process/method category with-
out clearly distinguishing between physical or
mental attacks.
Almost 20% of the definitions of terrorism
were categorized as exemplifying the theme of
causes or motivation. Most of the responses
within this category (35% of causes and 7% of
all responses) suggested political agenda as a
motivation for terrorism (e.g., “the creation of
fear in order to achieve anarchy”) with 9% of
causes and 2% of definitions of terrorism
139
responses specifying the motivation as an inter-
national motivation (e.g., “the attacking another
country or nation in response to one’s own
nation’s own beliefs and expectations”). Another
2% of definitions of terrorism and 10% of causes
described terrorism as caused by ideological
motivations (e.g., “people who fight for ideal-
ism”); 1% of the definitions of terrorism (7% of
causes) identified it with emotional causes
(e.g., “demonstration of frustration”), 1% (6% of
causes) identified it with negative environmental
conditions (e.g., “social problems that cause
destruction”), and 1% (3% of causes) indicated
that terrorism lacked a rational cause and had no
motivations (e.g., “torturing a country for no real
and rational reason”). Only four responses
described terrorism as a last resort (e.g., “a kind
of fight used by people who are not able to use
other ways of fight”), and two responses empha-
sized that terrorism was not associated with a
particular religion (e.g., “people say that this is
related to religion but it is not”).
Another 20% of all definitions of terrorism
responses were categorized as outcomes. Eight
percent of all definitions of terrorism (40% of
outcomes) defined terrorism in terms of emotional
outcomes (e.g., “all acts that cause fear, pair, anx-
iety… by enemies of society or government”),
6% (28% of outcomes) described physical
outcomes (e.g., “destruction of a country”), and
5% (25% of outcomes) described outcomes
involving disruption of peace and stability (e.g.,
“it is what destroys peace”). Less than 1% of the
definitions of terrorism (2% of outcomes) referred
to a disruption of the economy and 1% described
terrorism in terms of general outcomes without
specifying the nature of the outcome.
Eighteen percent of all the responses defining
terrorism fell into the category of judgments,
which included moral judgments and legal judg-
ments. Many of these definitions (87% of the
judgments) were coded into the general subcate-
gory of moral judgments (e.g., “barbarism”),
with 40% of moral judgments responses making
specific moral judgments on the acts of terrorism
(e.g., “causing unjustifiable suffering to another
life”), 11% of moral judgments responses mak-
ing moral judgments on the motivation behind
140 J. Jones et al.

terrorism (e.g., “grouped selfishness”), and 5% Table 9.1 Chi-square findings for demographic group
of moral judgments responses appealing to rela- percentages of war coding categories
tivity (e.g., “is dependent on your side”). The Categories Group 1a Group 2a c2
remaining 45% of moral judgment responses Male Female
were coded into the general moral judgments Motivation/intent 20 15 2.78^
presence
category. Eleven percent of the judgments
Outcomes presence 30 40 7.17**
responses fell into the subcategory of legal judg- Political 10 5 4.05*
ments (e.g., “lethal violence—usually outside Qualifications 5 2 5.41*
the law”). Scale or intensity 23 31 4.05*
of conflict
Finally, one percent of all the definitions of
Abstract outcomes 10 18 7.82**
terrorism referred to examples from history or
Military Nonmilitary
current events (e.g., “look at Israel and what it Causes of the war 38 21 4.34*
does to Palestinians”). presence
Motivation/intent 38 17 8.42**
presence
Outcomes for war 21 36 2.74^
Demographic Correlates of Definitions presence
of War, Torture, and Terrorism Motivation/intent 17 5 7.81**
general
Chi-square analyses were performed to examine Moral judgment 14 5 4.78*
of cause
the extent to which definitions of war, torture,
Protest No protest
and terrorism differed across demographic groups
Moral judgment 34 20 8.43**
in South and Southeast Asia. Given the fact that General moral 36 25 5.25*
our samples were convenience samples, all anal- judgment
yses are purely exploratory, and our summaries Note. Presence indicates that the participant provided a
of any demographic differences in definitions of response that was coded for that category and/or one of
war, torture, and terrorism indicated by these its subcategories. Refer to the Definitions Introduction to
Methods chapter for more information
tests should be considered tentative and do not *
p £ 0.05; **p £ 0.01; ***p £ 0.001; ^0.05 < p < 0.10
reflect judgments on the political, psychological, a
The numbers in these columns are the percent of the
or moral qualities of the demographic groups specified demographic group that gave responses falling
concerned. into each of the specified categories
Chi-square analysis revealed a number of
group differences in regard to definitions of war The pattern of significant group differences
(see Table 9.1). As compared to men, significantly varied some for definitions of torture (see
more women provided at least one of the out- Table 9.2). Significantly more men than women
comes themes, particularly abstract outcomes, as defined torture utilizing any of the categories
well as mentioning scale or intensity of conflict in emphasizing the characteristics of the individual
their definitions of war. However, significantly being tortured, along with providing intolerant/
more men described war in ways than empha- condemning definitions of torture. However,
sized politics and qualifications than women. significantly more women than men provided
Additionally, as compared to respondents who definitions that described torture as immoral,
had never been in the military, significantly more inhumane, cruel, abusive, and vile. Finally,
veterans gave at least one example of a cause of significantly more women than men employed at
war, a motivation/intent for war, and an outcome least one of the focus on method and hurting/
of war, as well as expressing a moral judgment harming themes in their definitions. Military
regarding causes. Significantly more protestors respondents were marginally more likely than
than non-protestors included moral judgments in their counterparts to give helpless/powerless
their definitions of war. responses.
9 S, SE Asia Definitions 141

Table 9.2 Chi-square findings for demographic group Table 9.3 Chi-square findings for demographic group
percentages of torture coding categories percentages of terrorism coding categories
Categories Group 1a Group 2a c2 Categories Group 1a Group 2a c²
Male Female Male Female
Characteristics 10 5 5.23* Process/method 38 46 4.17*
of individual being presence
tortured presence Physical method 29 40 7.11**
Focus on method 55 64 6.67** Military Nonmilitary
presence Process/method 24 44 4.42*
Hurting/harming 53 64 7.11** presence
presence Judgment presence 10 24 2.83^
Characteristics 4 1 5.08* Legal judgment 10 2 6.20*b
of individual being Physical method 21 36 2.92^
tortured Motivation legal 7 0.4 16.52*b
Intolerant/condemning 13 8 4.95*
Immoral/inhumane/ 17 24 4.18* Relative No relative
cruel/abusive/vile military military
Hurting/harming 23 31 4.75* Process/method 6 2 5.38*b
Military Nonmilitary Real-life reference 3 0.3 7.15*b
Protest No protest
Helplessness/ 10 3 4.38^b
powerlessness Cause/motivation 39 24 9.01**
presence
Relative No relative
Outcomes presence 33 24 3.59^
military military
Cause/motivation 12 7 3.65^
Focus on intent, 30 20 5.96* Political agenda 18 8 8.53**
motivation, or emotion Real-life reference 4 1 9.20**b
presence
Note: Presence indicates that the participant provided a
Constructive intent 26 17 4.97*
response that was coded for that category and/or one of its
presence
subcategories. Refer to the Definitions Introduction to
Focus on intent 2 0 8.20*b
Methods chapter for more information
Information 17 8 8.12** *
p £ 0.05; **p £ 0.01; ***p £ 0.001
or compliance a
The numbers in these columns are the percent of the
Protest No protest specified demographic group that gave responses falling
Focus on intent, 33 21 7.40** into each of the specified categories
motivation, or emotion b
Fischer’s exact test
presence
Constructive intent 28 18 5.08*
presence
Intolerant/condemning 49 38 3.74^ emotion in their definitions and at least one exam-
presence ple of constructive intent, particularly of torture
Information 17 10 3.65^ with the intent of gaining information or
or compliance compliance than did non-military respondents.
Note: Presence indicates that the participant provided a In addition, significantly more protestors than
response that was coded for that category and/or one of its
subcategories. Refer to the Definitions Introduction to non-protestors gave at least one example of a
Methods chapter for more information response identifying torture with a focus on intent,
*
p £ 0.05; **p £ 0.01; ***p £ 0.001 motivation, or emotion or constructive intent
a
The numbers in these columns are the percent of the and a description of torture as unlawful/unjust.
specified demographic group that gave responses falling
into each of the specified categories In addition, protestors were marginally more
b
Fischer’s exact test likely than non-protestors to give responses show-
ing intolerance and condemnation and to give an
example of a psychological method of torture.
As can also be seen in Table 9.2, as compared Chi-square analyses also yielded a number of
to their nonmilitary counterparts, significantly group differences in relation to definitions of ter-
more of the respondents in the military gave at rorism. As can be seen in Table 9.3, significantly
least one example of an intent, motivation, or more women, civilians, and respondents with
142
relatives in the military gave at least one example
of a process/methods definition as compared with
their counterparts. Both participants with a rela-
tive in the military and those who participated in
a protest referenced real-life examples of terror-
ism in their definitions significantly more than
their counterparts. Significantly more protestors
than non-protestors gave at least one example of
a cause/motivation definition and referenced a
political agenda in their definition of terrorism.
Finally, significantly more veterans made legal
judgments about terrorism and included legal
motivations in their definitions than civilians.
Conclusion
In summary, South and Southeast Asian respon-
dents described war as a destructive conflict filled
with violence that is generally between two or
more groups with some political power. They
mainly think of concrete, physical outcomes of
war rather than emotional or mental outcomes.
They also have strong personal feelings that war
is morally wrong. State-sponsored torture during
war is not accepted but rather viewed as an unjust
and sadistic act that is usually used to get infor-
mation or compliance. Participants viewed tor-
ture as involving both physical and psychological/
mental methods to harm people. A majority of the
South and Southeast Asian definitions of terror-
ism were neutral in valence, with participants
defining it in terms of concrete physical acts and
methods. In general, the definitions of terrorism
seemed to indicate strongly that political agenda
was considered to be the main motivating factor
for acts of terror. Many responses contained
implicit or explicit moral judgments, and a large
number of them defined terrorism in terms of
emotional rather than physical outcomes.
Although it is important to remember that our
exploratory findings come from a convenience
sample, this sample reflects a population that has
experienced war and terrorism and has probably
been exposed at least indirectly to the existence
of torture. The diversity of the problems facing
J. Jones et al.
the region mirrors the diversity of the people.
Given the male-dominated social order of
Southeast Asia, distinct gender-related research
might help to distinguish further any different
ideas about war, torture, and terrorism that the
men and women of South and Southeast Asia
hold. It also appears that it may be useful to
examine further the views of families who have
had a family member serve in a war or have
experienced torture or terrorism, as our prelimi-
nary findings suggest that those personal
experiences may influence the participants
reported views on the nature of war, torture, and
terrorism. Additionally, an expanded sample size,
broader geographic representation, and greater
religious diversity would allow further explora-
tion of demographic variables that may play a
role in how South and Southeast Asians think
about these forms of violence. Continuing glo-
balization will continue to impact gender roles
and socioeconomic statuses of participants,
which will require continued exploration of these
populations and their experiences of war, terror-
ism, and torture as we move through the 21st
century.
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2621726
 East Asian Definitions of War,
Torture, and Terrorism
David Oh, Alice Murata, Hillary Mi-Sung Kim,
Michelle Murata, and Andrea Jones-Rooy
East Asia is a regional designation represented by
Mainland China, Taiwan, Japan, and the two
Koreas.1 Its states and territories are bordered by
the Himalayas on the west, the Pacific Ocean on
the east, Mongolia and Russia to the north, and
the China Sea to the south. Although these coun-
tries differ among themselves politically, socially,
and economically, they share strong cultural
influences from Ancient China. This chapter is
intended to provide a deeper understanding of
East Asia by exploring the history of its inhabit-
ants, their modern realities, and their mental con-
structions of war, terrorism, and torture.
The region’s vast size and contributions to
world affairs make it impossible to ignore. The
population in East Asia accounts for 38% of the
population in Asia and 22% of the population of
the entire world. It has more than twice the popu-
lation of Europe and almost five times the
population of the USA. Geographically, the
region represents nearly 7% of the world.
Economically, the region contributes approxi-
mately 18% of the world’s nominal GDP (United
Nations 2009).
Rapid and successful industrialization and
reforms have transformed East Asia into a mostly
1
Although East Asia has many regional designations, this
chapter authors use the standardized East Asian studies’
designation of China, Japan, and Korea. In efforts to high-
light continuing sovereignty debates between China and
Taiwan, Taiwan will have its own review.
K. Malley-Morrison et al. (eds.), International Handbook of War, Torture, and Terrorism,
Peace Psychology Book Series, DOI 10.1007/978-1-4614-1638-8_10,
© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2013
10
developed region with a strong, rapidly growing
economy, and high standard of living. According
to the UN Human Development Index, a measure
of people’s ability to access education, health ser-
vices, proper nutrition, security, and quality of
life and freedoms, Hong Kong, South Korea, and
Japan are highly developed, similar to such coun-
tries as Sweden, Kuwait, and the USA (United
Nations 2009). The International Monetary
Fund (IMF) includes Hong Kong, South Korea,
Japan, and Taiwan on its advanced economy list
(International Monetary 2011a), and they are
considered within the top 30 countries for
the highest standard and quality of living
(The Economist Intelligence Unit 2005). In an
international evaluation, students in Hong Kong,
Taiwan, Korea, and Japan ranked in the top 10
for mathematics, top 11 in science, and top 16 in
reading (Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development 2006).
The strong economy, high standard of living,
and rapid globalization in East Asia have allowed
other contributions as well, such as in the arts,
academia, medicine, and technology. In 2009,
Charles K. Kao of China was awarded the Nobel
Prize in Physics for his work concerning the
transmission of light in fiber optic communica-
tion. LG and Samsung, two South Korean mobile
phone manufacturers, are the second and third
largest phone producers in the world (Kwan
2009), and Taiwan-born Ang Lee was the first
Asian and non-Caucasian director to receive an
Academy Award for Best Director.
145
146
Although most of the region enjoys generally
peaceful relationships with the rest of the modern
world, one country, North Korea, is embroiled in
conflict that has not ended officially since its
founding. In 2003, North Korea dropped out of
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and since
then, has conducted two nuclear tests and
launched six missiles. Most recently, North Korea
unilaterally withdrew its support for an armistice
ending the fighting with South Korea.
Ancient China
East Asian culture is regarded as a cultural out-
growth from Ancient China, one of the world’s
earliest civilizations. Its influence was widely
diffused throughout East Asia, and survives
mainly through the teachings of K’ung-fu-tzu,
Latinized as Confucius (551–479 bc) (Fairbanks
et al. 1989). The ideas of Confucius, who wrote
during the Zhou dynasty (1045–256 BCE), 100
years before Plato, were not widely received until
the Han dynasty, an ancient civilization roughly
contemporaneous with and comparable in size
and power to the Roman Empire. Confucius,
Ancient China’s most prominent scholar, devel-
oped a system of philosophy, Confucianism,
aimed at cultivating social harmony and good
government (Ebrey et al. 2006). His beliefs cen-
tered on the idea that everyone could learn li,
proper conduct determined by social status, and
on five strict and ethical roles of obedience and
responsibility (Grasso et al. 1997).
One role, “ruler and subject,” helped bolster
and substantiate the foundation of political
authority, making Confucius’s values popular
with later rulers in East Asia. Three of the five
roles—father and son, husband and wife, elder
brother, and younger brother—help to elucidate
the power structure within the family. The son,
wife, and younger brother are expected to prac-
tice subservience and obedience, and their fathers,
husbands, and elder brothers are expected to pro-
vide support (Grasso et al. 1997). Confucius’s
strong values regarding family, family loyalty,
and xiao or filial piety (i.e., respect to elders and
D. Oh et al.
ancestors) may be gleaned from the fact that three
of the five major roles he identified are family
roles (Fairbanks et al. 1989).
Early Confucian beliefs still influence East
Asia. The collectivistic values of duty and family
loyalty continue to inform expectations and
responsibilities of the people. Unlike other mod-
ern cultures, where individual life may be moti-
vated by state, religion, or individual desire, East
Asians are expected to consider their families
when they make decisions, and actions carried
out by an individual are largely seen as an act of
the family (Malley-Morrison and Hines 2004).
Although many individuals and families conduct
daily life beyond the rigid roles suggested by
Confucius, a closer examination of rituals, lan-
guage, and culture emphasize the strong value of
family and elders common in East Asia.
The tradition of family loyalty continues long
into the afterlife and many East Asians worship
their deceased ancestors. The strong bonds and
obligation to return to their ancestral burial
grounds result from the beliefs that their ances-
tors continue to exist, have interests in the matters
of the world, and possess the ability to influence
the fortune of the surviving family (Perez 1998).
East Asians are strongly aware of their heritage,
with many knowing and identifying with people
and events of a thousand or more years ago
(Buckley et al. 2006). In Japan, when third and
fourth generation Japanese city dwellers are
asked about their origin, they will name their
ancestor’s furusato or “old home” (Perez 1998).
East Asia Today
A brief look at modern East Asian history reveals
sweeping economic and political changes largely
viewed as revolutionary (Fairbanks et al. 1989).
The region experienced complete transforma-
tions with China shifting from a communist
country to one that values privatization, the two
Koreas splitting into a communist state and a
fully democratic state, and Japan introducing a
new constitution at the end of World War II
(WWII). In addition, the lives of East Asians
10 East Asia Definitions
have been challenged by physical destruction and
trauma of war. In the past 60 years, China, Japan,
and Korea have all witnessed brutal acts of vio-
lence and the terrors of war on their home front.
China and Korea were both involved in civil wars
that reverberate today. Japan experienced the
dropping of two nuclear bombs, instantly killing
hundreds of thousands of people and injuring
many others, many of whom were civilians,
resulting in a death toll of almost 400,000 people
(Denoon et al. 1996). The many changes in land
divisions and sovereignty, wars, and occupation
in the region’s recent history have all contributed
to a rise in national consciousness and patriotism
(Ebrey et al. 2006).
Both the region as a whole and each of the
individual countries have histories and cultures
that are likely to have affected their peoples’
views on war, torture, and terrorism. After a brief
consideration of the types of government and
political systems, land, and other unique aspects
of each state in the region, we present our findings
on the ways East Asians define the concepts of
war, terrorism, and torture.
China, Hong Kong, and Macau
Historically, China, now the People’s Republic of
China (PRC), has been a major influence in East
Asia. Today, its influence is felt around the globe.
China has a population of over 1.3 billion, 20%
of the world’s population, making it the world’s
largest and most populous country (UN Data
2009a). China’s population grew rapidly until the
implementation of the one child policy in 1979.
Most of China is rural and agrarian, with only
20% of its inhabitants living in larger towns and
major cities (Barnes 1993). Shanghai, the largest
city in China, is the tenth largest city in the world,
with nearly 17 million residents (Forstall et al.
2009). China is also known for geographic diver-
sity, which spans from subarctic to tropical. It has
the world’s highest mountain, the world’s sec-
ond-lowest desert depression, three of the world’s
longest rivers, one of the world’s driest deserts,
the world’s largest and highest dry plateau, and
147
two of the world’s largest fertile water basins
(Major 1989). Despite its geographic diversity,
92% of the population are ethnically Han Chinese.
The remaining minority belong to 55 other ethnic
groups, such as Tibetan, Manchu, Mongol, and
Zhuang. Although many languages are spoken,
the only official language is Mandarin, spoken
with a Beijing dialect (Grasso et al. 1997).
The PRC’s jurisdiction includes Mainland
China and the two special administrative regions,
Hong Kong and Macau. Despite disagreements
with Taiwan, the PRC includes Taiwan as one of
its provinces. The United Nations and many nation
states observe PRC as the sole governing body in
China (see Taiwan).2 The current government, the
Communist Party of China, has maintained sover-
eignty since 1949 and has power guaranteed by
the constitution. Many regard China as one of the
last remaining communist or socialist states, far
from the liberal democracy practiced in other parts
of Asia and the West. However, many reforms,
largely economic, have made it more difficult to
fit China under a particular label. The government
continues to monitor the Internet and press, limit
the freedom of assembly, religion, and reproduc-
tive rights, but it participates in a market economy,
built upon privatization.
Its unique ideologies have not kept China from
maintaining strong relationships with the demo-
cratic world. China is one of the five permanent
members of the UN Security Council and several
other multilateral, international organizations,
such as the World Trade Organization and Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation. China contributes
to policies designed to create a more peaceful and
harmonious world. Although China is recognized
as having the world’s largest standing army and
second largest defense budget, it has demon-
strated more progressive policies regarding weap-
ons of mass destruction. Since signing the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996, China
2
In efforts to highlight and inform the reader of sover-
eignty disputes between China and Taiwan, the chapter
authors have decided to refer to Taiwan as separate from
the PRC.
148
has not conducted nuclear tests. It is also the only
nuclear state committed to giving security assur-
ance to nonnuclear weapon states, precluding the
use or threat of nuclear weapons. It has been
committed to the “no first use” rule, a pledge to
use nuclear weapons only in defense against
nuclear attack.
China’s economy, now largely determined by
supply and demand, is one of the fastest growing
economies in the world, and it is the world’s third
largest trading power, behind the USA and
Germany (IMF 2011b). Additionally, the World
Economic Forum (WEF) ranked China as 13th
on their Global Competitiveness Index (WEF
2011). Recently, China has surpassed Japan as
the largest holder of the United States’ debt (U.S.
Treasury 2011).
Chinese Perspectives on Terrorism
Beijing identifies terrorism as one of the “three
evils,” along with separatism and religious fun-
damentalism, which, in its view, are all intercon-
nected threats to China’s national security and
regional stability (Chung 2006). Chien-peng
Chung from the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute
and Silk Road Studies Program (2006) states that
“Beijing sees terrorism as a violent expression of
the aim of ethnic separatism and the result of
zealous religiosity on the part of minorities that
threaten to displace the state as an object of adu-
lation” (p. 77). China’s counter-terrorist efforts
started in Xinjiang with a confrontation between
the police and armed rioters at Baren County in
1990. After the confrontation there were gun
attacks on policemen and officials and bombings
of buses and public buildings. The majority of
fatalities related to counter-terrorist efforts
resulted from conflict between soldiers and pro-
testors in Yining City in 1997. After the introduc-
tion of the yan da “strike hard” campaign in 1998,
the People’s Republic of China authorities have
reported very few incidents in Xinjiang. This
campaign started as a nationwide effort to strike
at skyrocketing crime but has targeted separatism
and illegal religious activities not only in Xinjiang
principally but also in Tibet (Chung 2006). Other
D. Oh et al.
terrorist attacks in the 1990s were thought to be
committed by a subset of Muslim extremists
(ethnic Uighur separatists) in the northwestern
Xinjiang region, some of whom reportedly
received training in Afghanistan (Kan 2005).
After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks
on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the
PRC authorities treated the global “war on ter-
ror” essentially as a foreign relations exercise to
protect its relations with the USA, and as an
excuse to crackdown on what it deemed to be ter-
rorist activities on the Chinese (Chung 2006).
The extent of China’s support on the war on ter-
ror has been debatable. Some US politicians have
said that China has helped the counter-terrorism
front, but compared to that of the Philippines,
Singapore, and Malaysia, their cooperation has
been irregular at best. Nonetheless, this coopera-
tion has helped the PRC’s bilateral relationship
with the USA since the US–China aircraft colli-
sion crisis of April 2001 (Kan 2005). In 2003,
President Bush initiated the Proliferation Security
Initiative (PSI), but in the Final Report issued in
2004, China had not joined and 9/11 officials
strongly urged China to do so because of past
issues concerning weapons proliferation and mil-
itary maritime safety (Kan 2005). China used its
position with the USA to put the East Turkestan
Islamic Movement (ETIM) on the US list of ter-
rorist organizations in August 2002 (Chung
2006). The PRC authorities have been responsi-
ble for detaining 12 people identified as Uighur
terrorists, who joined the Taliban, and also
accused another Uighur group, the East Turkistan
Liberation Organization, of terrorism and
specifically of killing a Chinese embassy diplo-
mat in Kyrgyzstan’s Bishkek in 2002 and 19
Chinese passengers on a China-bound Kyrgyz
bus in 2003 (Chung 2006).
Taiwan
Taiwan, an island group administered by the
Republic of China (ROC), maintains disagree-
ment with the PRC on its political status and
considers itself an independent, sovereign nation
with its own democratically elected president,
10 East Asia Definitions
constitution, and army. Until the Chinese Civil
War, which ended in 1949, the ROC was interna-
tionally recognized as the sovereign ruler of China
and was a founding member of the UN. After its
defeat, the ROC retreated to Taiwan and tempo-
rarily relocated its government to Taipei, ceding
control of Mainland China to the PRC (Tucker
1994).
At the close of the Cold War, the Western world
hoped to weaken the PRC’s connection to Russia
by improving diplomatic ties to the PRC (Cline
1992). As a result, the PRC was officially recog-
nized as the sovereign ruler of China, and in 1971,
the PRC replaced the ROC in the UN. Despite the
ROC’s loss of recognition as a de jure government,
it is largely regarded as a de facto entity, maintain-
ing diplomatic relationships through unofficial
embassies and consulates (Chiu 1992). Internally,
Taiwan continues to vacillate between remaining
an independent territory administered by the ROC,
claiming official independence as a sovereign
state, or unifying as the 23rd province of the PRC.
Taiwan has a population of 23 million, gov-
erned by a democratically elected President. Its
economy is very similar to Western, capitalistic,
market-driven economies, allowing it to advance
rapidly as the 26th largest economy in the world
(Prybyla 1992). According to the Organization
for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD 2006), Taiwan ranks high on measures of
freedom of the press, health care, public educa-
tion, economic freedom, and general social rights,
proving itself as one of the leaders in education
and development. In 2003, the executive branch
opened a bid to introduce same-sex marriage,
allow same-sex couples to adopt children, and
ban capital punishment. Although the bill did not
pass through the cabinet, Taiwan became the first
state in Asia to work towards extending rights to
same-sex unions, leading the debate not only in
Asia, but also across many developed nations.
Japan
Another highly developed nation state in East
Asia is Japan, an archipelago comprised of nearly
7,000 islands. It is roughly the size of Germany,
149
Zimbabwe, or Paraguay, and has a population of
127 million, making it the 10th most populous
country in the world. Its capital, Tokyo, is the
largest metropolitan city in the world with a popu-
lation of over 32 million. Less than one-fifth of
the land in this densely populated archipelago is
suitable for cultivation. However, warm summers,
abundant rainfall, and agricultural innovation
make Japan one of the most productive lands per
cultivated acre in the world (Fairbanks et al. 1989,
p. 325). Despite agricultural successes, the geog-
raphy and weather pose serious challenges. There
are nearly 500 active volcanoes in Japan, and the
country experiences an average of four earth-
quakes a day, with some earthquakes resulting in
tsunami tidal waves. Geographic concerns are
exacerbated by seasonal torrential typhoons, mon-
soon rains, riptides, and whirlpools (Perez 1998).
Despite its issues with natural resources and
threats of nature, Japan has developed into a
major economic power with the world’s third
highest gross domestic product (World Bank
2011). It contributes largely to international trade
as the world’s fourth largest exporter of goods
and the sixth largest importer. It continues to pro-
vide a high standard of living, education and lit-
eracy, ranking 8th in the UN Human Development
Index (UN Data 2009b). Life expectancy in Japan
is also the highest in the world, with the average
life span of 81 years (UN Data 2009b).
The long-living inhabitants of Japan are largely
homogenous, with nearly everyone in Japan shar-
ing the same genetic heritage, language, and reli-
gious and cultural history, and participating in the
same educational system (Perez 1998). Over 98%
are ethnically Japanese, and roughly 74% identify
as believing in Shinto, the ancient Japanese ani-
mist religion, while 64% identify as Buddhist.
The blending and adaptation of culture and reli-
gion found throughout East Asia is represented by
these figures, which show overlap in both Buddhist
and animist identification (Perez 1998).
At the end of WWII, a new constitution was
drafted, establishing a parliamentary democracy
with a constitutional monarch, similar to that of
the United Kingdom. The parliamentary system
is comprised of a bicameral legislature, called the
Diet, elected through universal suffrage. The Diet
150
is formally responsible for electing the Prime
Minister. The Emperor of Japan, as in the United
Kingdom, serves as a symbol of power and unity,
but holds no official power related to the govern-
ment. The end of WWII also served to end Japan’s
annexation of South Korea, dividing the united
former Korean empire into two diametrically
opposed states.
Japan has been very generous in providing
foreign aid to impoverished countries; under-
scoring Japan’s commitment to human rights
(Tuman et al. 2009). With the passage of time,
Japan faced increasing international pressure to
provide troops to assist in maintaining world
peace. Now, the increasing number of Japanese
“peacekeeping” troops overseas has caused
considerable public debate as to whether Japan
should continue to be defined as a “pacifist”
country.
Two Koreas
After Korea was divided into two separate nations
in 1949, North Korea’s effort to win control of
the south using guerilla warfare forced South
Korea’s military leaders to focus on counterin-
surgency operations (Korean War, n.d.). North
Korea’s armed forces were superior to South
Korea’s, but the USA and the United Nations sent
armed forces to help South Korea. Then the
Chinese moved to support North Korea. With the
added military force from China, North Korea
was able to defeat South Korea’s defenses at the
38th parallel. In July 1951, armistice talks began,
but were suspended until 1953. The Korean pen-
insula was decimated, and about 180,000 South
Korean and United Nations’ troops were killed
(Korean War, n.d.). With the armistice in place,
the 38th parallel has been replaced with a truce
line, but still, the two Koreas remain separate
entities.
North Korea
North Korea, officially the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea, is a country of nearly 24 million
D. Oh et al.
that sits between Mainland China and South
Korea and is roughly the size of Eritrea or Greece
(UN Data 2009c). The temperature is moderate,
with long cold winters and hot, humid summers.
Although North Korea is free from the severe
earthquakes found in China and Japan, spring
droughts are common and are followed by severe
flooding. In 2007, North Korea experienced the
heaviest rainfall in over 40 years, resulting in
severe flooding and a petition for international
aid. Nearly 80% of the land is covered in moun-
tains and highlands, with little arable land, espe-
cially for the country’s most enjoyed staple
food, short-grained white rice (Demick 2009,
November 2).
North Korea is one of the last five surviving
communist states; it is probably also the least
understood because information is tightly con-
trolled and managed (French 2005). North Korea
remains one of the most literate countries in the
world with a 99% literacy rate. Education is com-
pulsory to the secondary level and is provided by
the state, along with textbooks and uniforms
(Onishi 2009). Health care is also provided by
the state, although due to natural disasters and
industrial decline, many hospitals are without
equipment and supplies, electricity, or running
water (French 2005). North Korea’s life expec-
tancy is 63.8, similar to Burma and Pakistan, and
slightly lower than Russia. Although North Korea
officially recognizes religious freedom, reports
indicate widespread religious repression (Eckert
et al. 1990).
For nearly 20 years, North Korea maintained
parity with and even surpassed the economy of
South Korea. However, from the mid-1970s to
the 1990s, the country declined rapidly due to the
government’s rigid isolationist policies and
heavy military investment (French 2005). For
years, North Korea depended largely on the
friendly prices offered by Communist-bloc coun-
tries. However, by the late 1990s, with North
Korea unable to pay back Soviet loans, the Soviet
Union decided North Korea would pay world
prices. With the fall of Communist states in the
Eastern-bloc, the North Koreans suffered deeply.
With rising food and oil prices, electricity grew
scarce, manufacturing halted, exports were
10 East Asia Definitions
reduced, and the malnourished families found it
difficult to work, all of which created a vicious
cycle that continues to sink the country in steep
decline (Demick 2009, November 2). As many
as two million deaths in the 1990s were estimated
to be related to food shortages. Today, North
Korea relies heavily on international aid to feed
its citizens, produce electricity, and maintain the
country’s infrastructure. In the beginning years
of the 21st century, international aid and favor-
able weather conditions have steadily increased
the country’s GDP, which grew at a rate of 3.7%
in 2008, while South Korea expanded at 2.2%.
This difference can be largely explained by the
global economic crisis (Oh 2009).
Despite difficulties due to its isolation and
continued dependence on foreign aid, North
Korea continues to propagate its Marxist-Lenin-
based philosophy of self-reliance or juche.
Moreover, the country still invests the highest
percentage of its GDP in the military, more than
any other country in the world (Marshall 2009,
October 27). The country maintains about 20%
of the country’s men in the armed services
(Demick 2009, November 2).
Recently, however, the rigid policies that have
contributed to steep decline have shown small
signs of change. In 2002, North Korea announced
plans to establish an international capitalist
investment region free of government interaction
for 50 years, marking the most significant change
in policy since its founding (French 2002).
Despite evidence of potential reform, North
Korea remains a threat, especially to their neigh-
bor to the south.
Torture and Terrorism in North Korea
The use of torture in North Korea is known
throughout the world, but is currently affecting
thousands of its own people every year. In the
northeastern corner of North Korea, hidden
amongst the mountains in Haengyong, is the
location of Camp 22, also known as Kwan-li-so.
Here thousands of men, women, and children
prisoners accused of political crimes are held
(Windrem 2003). Most are imprisoned because
their relatives are thought to hold views critical
of the Korean government. Not only are the sus-
151
pects directly involved with a crime arrested, but
also three generations of their family are impris-
oned. If a prisoner is pregnant, an abortion is
immediately issued to prevent another generation
of political dissidents (Barnett and Finemore
2004). The inhumane conditions of this camp
were revealed in 2003 with reports that thousands
of prisoners are tortured and killed each year.
Testimonies from North Korean defectors, US
officials, and former inmates have detailed the
experimentation and execution of whole families
within the camp. Inmates are used to test biologi-
cal and chemical agents, and the majority die just
hours later. Guards are not only trained to beat
and kill prisoners but also are encouraged and
rewarded for these actions.
For over a decade, North Korea has been viewed
by the world as one of the biggest supporters of
terrorists. With regard to direct terrorist activities,
North Korea has been relatively quiet since the
1987 bombing of South Korean Airlines flight 858
(Nanto 2003). In 1994, the Clinton administration
and North Korea signed the Agreed Framework, a
plan for the denuclearization of the Korean penin-
sula. Pyongyang agreed to freeze its existing
nuclear program and allow monitoring in exchange
for fuel oil, light-water reactors, and normalization
of diplomatic relations, soon to be followed by a
request to be taken off the Terrorist Support List.
However, in 2002, North Korea took advantage of
the United States’ focus on Iraq and admitted they
were fostering a secret uranium enrichment pro-
gram, which violated the Agreed Framework.
After the USA began terminating their obligation
under the Agreement, North Korea retaliated by
reopening nuclear facilities frozen under the
Agreement and withdrawing from the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (Niksch and Perl 2007).
In September 2006, the Paris Intelligence
Online, a French Internet publication, reported
details of North Korean aid in arming and train-
ing Hizballah, an Iranian terror group. The report
indicated that North Koreans helped Hizballah
develop extensive underground military facilities
in southern Lebanon, including rocket launcher
sites (Nanto 2003).
In September 2007, the Japanese newspaper
Sankei Shimbun reported that North Korea
152
attempted to smuggle conventional arms, includ-
ing machine guns and anti-tank rocket launchers,
to the Tamil Tigers, a terrorist group in Sri Lanka
(Nanto 2003). Due to Japanese, French, South
Korean, and Israeli intelligence reports concern-
ing North Korea’s involvement in terrorist sup-
port acts with Hizballah and the Tamil Tigers,
two organizations on the U.S. International
Terrorist Organizations List, the Japanese gov-
ernment objected to North Korea’s removal from
the terrorist support list. In 2008, the Bush admin-
istration moved to formally remove North Korea
from the U.S. List of State Sponsors of Terrorism
in hopes of completing the disbandment of North
Korea’s plutonium nuclear installations at
Yongbyon, but this move was rejected by the
U.S. Congress (Niksch and Perl 2007).
South Korea
Mounting threats from the north have done little
to keep South Korea from flourishing, as they
have advanced steadily since their independence.
South Korea, officially the Republic of Korea or
more simply Korea, is a relatively small penin-
sula that connects to Mainland China through
North Korea (CIA World Factbook 2011). It is
roughly equal in landmass to Liberia, Honduras,
or the combined areas of England, Scotland, and
Wales. The present population is 48 million, close
to the populations of South Africa, Spain, or
Colombia, making it the third most densely pop-
ulated country in the world for significantly sized
countries (UN Data 2009c). The largest city,
Seoul, ranks as the world’s third largest metro-
politan city with nine million residents. The
weather is very hot and humid in the summers
and dry and cold in the winters, and only one-
fifth of the land is suitable for cultivation. The
rest of the landscape is comprised of mountains
and forests (CIA World Factbook 2011).
As with other states and territories in the
region, South Korea is a highly homogenous
country with nearly everyone identifying as
Korean. According to the 1995 census, the most
dominant religions are Christianity (26%, with
20% Protestant and 7% Roman Catholic),
D. Oh et al.
Buddhism (23%), and none (49%) (CIA World
Factbook 2011).
South Korea is a democracy, established in
1948, with three branches of government, the
executive, judicial, and legislative (CIA World
Factbook 2011). The President, who is the head
of state, is elected by popular vote to a single
5-year term. South Korea has emerged as a strong
economic power, ranking 15th in the world for
nominal GDP and 13th for purchasing power par-
ity. It is one of the newly industrialized and devel-
oped countries in Asia and has maintained
exceptionally high growth rates and rapid indus-
trialization since the Korean War, earning the
nickname the Miracle on the Han River. South
Korea is one of only two nations in Asia that is
considered to be a high-income member of the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development and is classified as an advanced
economy by the International Monetary Fund. It
is a member of the G-20 major economies and
has emerged as the world’s largest shipbuilder,
the world’s fifth largest carmaker, and a leader in
information technology (OECD 2006).
South Korea has a high standard of living,
according to the UN’s Human Development
Index, ranking 26th in the world. Korea was the
first country in the world to provide high speed
Internet to every primary, junior, and upper school
(Onishi 2009). While high school is optional,
97% of Koreans complete high school, the high-
est percentage of high school graduates in the
world. South Korea is also recognized for its
incredibly low birth rate of 8.55 per 1,000, mark-
ing it as the country with the seventh lowest birth
rate in the world (CIA World Factbook 2011).
Terrorism and Torture in South Korea
Since 1958, South Korea has experienced over
30 terrorism-related events, both abroad and at
home. Most of the involvements have included
bombings, shootings, hijackings, and kidnap-
pings. Between 1958 and 1990, North Korea was
responsible for almost all of the terrorist-related
events in South Korea; including multiple assas-
sination attempts on presidents, kidnappings of
South Korean fishermen, and bombings (Wang
et al. 2003). In response to the September 11,
10 East Asia Definitions
2001, terrorist attacks in the USA, South Korea
created a new national system of emergency
response for terrorism-related events. The five
divisions relate to specific types of terrorist
events: conventional terrorism, bioterrorism,
chemical terrorism, radiological terrorism, and
cyber-terrorism (Wang et al. 2003).
South Korea has refused to define torture in
domestic law, as required by the Committee
Against Torture (CAT), but has various laws in the
penal code that illustrate a much broader definition
than the CAT approves. These various laws pro-
hibit torture and other cruel, inhumane, or degrad-
ing treatment or punishment (Asian Human Rights
Commission 2008). Rarely are instances of tor-
ture committed by public officials reported
because the government assigns the responsibility
of “unclean” jobs to private companies, who hire
people to “handle” troublesome employees, pro-
testors, and unwanted solicitors (Asian Human
Rights Commission 2008). In some protest situa-
tions, it has been reported that those specifically
hired to eliminate the problem are sanctioned,
while the injured are arrested and charged.
The Current Study
In order to build and advance relationships, it is
important to understand how modern experience
has shaped individual perspectives. Moreover, as
nations rely more on each other for survival and
grow increasingly more interdependent, it is
imperative to understand each other’s views. This
chapter explores the wide-ranging views of East
Asians on terrorism, torture, and war. A summary
of how participants from this region defined the
terms is presented first, followed by an analysis
of group differences based on gender, religion,
and associations with the military.
Methods
In order to examine East Asian attitudes towards
terrorism, torture, and war, participants com-
pleted the Personal and Institutional Rights to
Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS)
(Malley-Morrison et al. 2006), available in a
153
pencil–paper or electronic version posted on the
Internet. Participants were recruited through per-
sonal contacts, colleges and universities,
churches, and other community organizations.
For the purposes of this chapter, responses to
three items on the PAIRTAPS were analyzed—
specifically those asking participants to give their
definitions of torture, terrorism, and war.
Participants were either born in China, Japan,
South Korea, and Taiwan, or had at least one par-
ent born in the East Asian region. In order of larg-
est to smallest, participants were from South
Korea (44%), Japan (33%), China (19%), Hong
Kong (2%), and Taiwan (2%).
Although the sample size is quite large for a
survey of this type, the sample is limited and not
representative of East Asia. Our convenience
sample is primarily female (n = 228, 56%), South
Korean (n = 178, 44%), self-described as Christian
(n = 162, 45%), single (n = 222, 55%) and middle
(n = 208, 50%) or upper-middle class (n = 115,
28%). The respondents had mostly graduated
high school (n = 141, 37%) or college (n = 134,
35%) and range in age from 18 to 87 with the
mean age of 30. Although most of the participants
(n = 270, 75%) had not personally served in the
military, a majority of them (n = 193, 57%) indi-
cated that they had at least one relative who had
been involved in military services. At the time of
data collection, the majority of the sample
reported that they had never participated in peace
education programs (n = 256, 73%) or protests
(n = 257, 76%).
Although recruiting efforts were made to cre-
ate as diverse a sample as possible, lack of fund-
ing, the expansiveness of the region, and
differences related to ethnicities, languages, lev-
els of development, and access to technology,
just to name a few, made it difficult to survey a
sample even remotely approximating the region’s
diversity. Additionally, most participants com-
pleted the survey via the Internet, although many
inhabitants of the region—for example in China,
where roughly 80% of the population live in rural
areas—have limited access to and familiarity
with the Internet. Furthermore, research was con-
ducted mainly through snowball procedures,
recruiting convenience samples through word-
of-mouth or personal networks from universities
154
and community centers or local organizations.
Because of varying levels of success in recruit-
ment, representation from the different areas in
the region is not proportionate, with South Korea,
the smallest country, having the most participants
in the sample.
Despite sample limitations and inter-country
differences, the data compiled in this survey rep-
resent the views of a region whose inhabitants
share many values, traditions, and culture, such
as filial piety, saving face, collectivism, and the
roots of their languages—all developments from
Ancient China. Furthermore, the current genera-
tions have experienced revolutionary war and
sweeping political and economic changes
(Fairbanks et al. 1989) that are likely to have
shaped the views of people in the region concern-
ing war, torture, and terrorism.
The Coding System
In order to analyze the responses, coding manu-
als were developed using the grounded theory
approach. Responses were broken down into
codeable units and subsequently coded for the
types of information each definition provided.
Percentages of major definitions identified in
coding were calculated using the total number of
responses to each item (war, torture, or terrorism)
as the base. This was important because many
participants provided more than one codeable
response when defining a term—for example,
indicating that war is an armed conflict that is
immoral, destructive, and carried out by the rich
and powerful for their own purposes.
Perceptions of Terrorism
East Asia’s experience with terrorism has been
relatively limited compared to other parts of the
world, except for the period of terrorism South
Korea experienced. It is important to consider
that with a sample with a mean age of 30 years
old, many of the participants would have been
very young around the end of this period of ter-
rorism. Although experiences with international
D. Oh et al.
or direct terrorism may seem limited, terrorism in
the last 20 years has grown into a more global
phenomenon with the tactics of fear spreading
widely. Despite enormous budgets, broad mili-
tary agendas, and extensive media coverage dedi-
cated to terrorism, the term itself is expansive,
often subjective, and has yet to be standardized
(Burgess 2003). Inconsistencies in definitions of
terrorism found in the literature are reflected in
the definitions provided by our sample. For
example, the East Asian sample’s definitions of
terrorism were distributed among the major cod-
ing categories as follows: (a) causes, 38%; (b)
process/method, 25%; (c) judgments 21%, and
(d) outcomes, 13%.
Researchers, government agencies, and schol-
ars have used all three facets (behavior, motiva-
tion, and outcome) to inform their definitions of
terrorism. For example, some researchers have
limited the scope of terrorism research to the use
of specific weapons, such as weapons of mass
destruction (Ackerman 2004), and some govern-
ment agencies have associated terrorism with
particular religious fundamentalist groups. Still
others have looked at the outcomes of terrorism—
for example, the number of fatalities—to explain
the variation of terroristic violence by country
(Sanchez-Cuenca 2009). Despite South Korea
and Japan’s support for the “War on Terrorism”
following the attacks of September 11, 2001,
most of the East Asian definitions of terrorism
lacked any explicit moral judgment concerning
terrorism; only 8% of the survey responses
included some type of value or moral judgment in
their definition.
Valence. When the definitions of terrorism
were more generally coded for emotional valence,
only 24% of the responses were classified as neg-
ative in tone. The participants providing negative
definitions usually focused on the detrimental
effects of terrorism or used strong language to
mark their disapproval. The negative judgments
varied in length from one word responses, such
as “evil” (19-year-old woman, China), “cow-
ardly” (25-year-old woman, Japan) or “cruelty”
(45-year-old man, South Korea) to more expanded
views such as defining terrorism as “a small
group trying to show their existence and make a
10 East Asia Definitions
statement to the public and government. To use
indiscriminate violence. I can’t understand this.
They are acting like children” (19-year-old
woman, Japan) or “bad, insane, needs to be
stopped” (23-year-old woman, China).
A large majority of the valence responses
(71%), however, were neutral in tone, focusing
on the actions or behaviors characterizing terror-
ism or the determinants and motivation behind
the acts, without making any judgments about the
appropriateness or acceptability of those acts and
motivations. A few of the valence responses (1%)
were characterized by a positive (e.g., sympa-
thetic, understanding) emotional tone—for
example, “the fight for one’s beliefs” (24-year-
old woman, China), the “result of being so
pressed by the others that they were forced to
revenge” (58-year-old woman, Hong Kong) and
the “lack of understanding between countries and
an anti-national action of protesting because an
agreement is not reached” (28-year-old man,
South Korea).
Finally, 4% of the responses coded for valence
reflected an attempt to understand terrorists.
Those responses sometimes displayed empathy
with the terrorists without legitimizing the acts,
but questioned the label itself. Responses seem to
indicate acceptance of the reasons for terrorism
while rejecting the actions and outcomes.
Examples include: “Terrorism depends on what
side you are on. Like the word itself it can be a
terror, but for the other side that aggresses, it can
be seen as martyrdom” (26-year-old man, South
Korea); “a necessary evil” (24-year-old man,
South Korea); “An attack by a less recognized
power to a more established and trusted body or
society. It’s not so much who is right but it’s
about who is viewed to be right that defines who
the terrorists are” (50-year-old man, Japan).
Although terrorism is a relatively new topic of
discussion in East Asia, the area has certainly not
been free of terrorism. Both Korea and Japan
supported the U.S.-led “War on Terror” follow-
ing the attacks of September 11, 2001. Japan
experienced terrorism internally with the 1995
Aum Shinrikyo Tokyo subway attacks; more
recently, on November 3, 2004, a Japanese tour-
ist in Iraq, Shosei Koda, was beheaded when
155
Japan refused to withdraw troops from Iraq
(Murata et al. 2009). China continues to remain
on watch regarding the East Turkestan Islamic
Movement and other Uighur separatist groups in
the Xinjiang Autonomous Region; the Japan
leadership also regards the Tibetan Buddhist
clergy, who are protesting for independence, as
terrorists (Chung 2006).
Perceptions of Torture
When participants were asked to give their
definitions of torture, nearly half the responses
(49%) detailed the methods used. The types of
methods mentioned included psychological (31%
of methods definitions), physical (38% of meth-
ods definitions), and more general responses
(14% of methods definitions) such as “fear and
horror” (27-year-old woman, South Korea), and/
or more general harming methods (18% of meth-
ods responses) such as “infliction of unbearable
physical pain and wounds on another” (58-year-
old man, China), “electric” (22-year-old man,
Taiwan) and “to inflict pain on your own and other
country’s people” (61-year-old woman, Japan).
The second most common type of torture
definition (25% of all responses) included the
motivations, intentions, or emotions underlying
torture, including “to get something from the one
being tortured” (58-year-old woman, Hong
Kong). Although many responses reflected a
more exploitative relationship—for example,
“longing for more benefits” (28-year-old man,
South Korea)—the most frequently mentioned
motivation or intention behind torture was to
coerce information or enforce compliance (14%
of all responses). The remaining responses
exploring the motivations and intentions included:
using torture for strategic or tactical advantage
or demonstrating power (2% of all responses), as
a punishment (2% of all responses), to cause
harm or suffering (1% of all responses), and to
pressure or demoralize an individual (1% of all
responses).
Several responses (17%) also included moral
judgments in their definitions of torture. A major-
ity of the judgments (14% of all responses) were
156
negative, expressing intolerant or condemning
views towards torture; examples include “an act
of brutality of human beings” (80-year-old
woman, South Korea), “cruel” (23-year-old
woman, Japan), and “inhuman treatment of
another human being” (29-year-old man, Hong
Kong). Positive judgments (3% of all responses)
were less emphatic and included more tolerant
views of torture, using statements such as “wrong
but possibly necessary” (21-year-old man, China)
and “torture is sometimes necessary because situ-
ations require it” (21-year-old man, South
Korea).
A few responses (5%) described characteris-
tics of the individuals being tortured—describing
the victim as, for example, someone with limited
or lesser power. Some responses discussed indi-
viduals being held against their will (16% of
characteristics responses). A smaller minority of
responses (2%) discussed the outcomes or conse-
quences of the use of torture.
Collectively, the samples’ responses are in
accord with the United Nations Convention on
Torture, which was signed and ratified by China,
Japan, and South Korea.
Definitions of War
For the definition of war, many of the responses
(27%) provided textbook definitions of the term,
defining it as conflict or similar terms (e.g., battle,
conflict). A small percentage of the responses
(4%) described war as involving non-physical
contact, such as verbal arguments. Thirty-four
percent of the definitions were qualifications
identifying the criteria for considering a conflict
to be a war. The most common qualifiers included
the use of adjectives to illustrate scale or inten-
sity of conflict (e.g., severe, brutal; 12% of the
total codeable units), as fighting between two or
more legally recognized states or powers (11% of
the total codeable units) or informal groups or
bands (7% of the total codeable units). Less com-
mon qualifiers described war as one-sided aggres-
sion or pressure (3% of the total codeable units)
or mentioned the frequency or duration of conflict
(1% of the total codeable units).
D. Oh et al.
Fifteen percent of the definitions included
judgments regarding war, with 9% involving
judgments on war actions, such as “war is dread-
ful because it blocks any mutual understanding,
accumulates only hatred and resentment and elic-
its revenge” (40-year-old woman, South Korea)
or “worst decision or shortcut to the fall of all
men, a challenge against God, the peak of greed”
(25-year-old man South Korea). Another 6% of
the definitions included moral judgments regard-
ing the motivation and cause of war, such as a
“lapse in judgment, to the point of illogical,
unnecessary loss of human life” (21-year-old
man, Japan) or the “state making unreasonable
demands from another state” (34-year-old
woman, South Korea). Most respondents emphat-
ically expressed an anti-war stance, with state-
ments such as, “a word, an act, a meaning that
should be erased from the whole world forever”
(25-year-old woman, Japan).
Twenty percent of the definitions of war
referred to its causes, with 30% of those responses
citing political reasons for war. Most participants
suggested individual state gains as a large moti-
vator, reflecting the one-sided goals of colonial
powers, with statements such as “when people
try to take over another country” (19-year-old
man, Taiwan), “it is a political tool to gain more
power for the aggressor’s nation state” (18-year-
old man, Japan) and “to control the other’s depen-
dence by using various strategies including
military force between the groups” (27-year-old
woman, South Korea). Other responses provided
more general political reasons such as national
interests—for example, “fighting between coun-
tries for selfish benefit” (25-year-old man, South
Korea). A small number of responses addressing
the causes of war (5%) believed war was a form
of self-defense. A minority of responses (4% of
responses coded for causes) suggested support
for war, but only after all options are exhausted,
as a last resort.
Nine percent of responses discussed the out-
comes of war, with 55% of the responses in this
category giving concrete examples, such as “mur-
der” (25 year old male, South Korea) or “an event
that involves death” (18-year-old man, Taiwan),
while 45% of responses in this category provided
10 East Asia Definitions 157

more abstract outcomes, such as “loss of peace” Table 10.1 The definition of terrorism: percentages of
(21-year-old man, China), “pain” (45-year-old responses in coding categories by demographic groups
and chi-square values
man, Japan) or “darkness” (32-year-old woman,
South Korea). War trauma experienced by cur- Group 1a Group 2a
Categories Male Female c2
rent generations throughout the region may help
Terrorism cause/ 51 41 2.75^
to explain survey responses, such as the frequency
motivation
of definitions citing political reasons for war
Military Non-military
rather than, for example, self-defense. The Terrorism cause/ 61 40 8.28**
responses may also reflect the occupation of motivation
South Korea and Japan by the USA, which still Terrorism process/ 45 60 3.77*
maintains a military presence in each country, method
and the continuing dispute of sovereignty between Note: Please refer to the methods chapter for a more
China and Taiwan. detailed description of how these variables were created
*
p £ 0.05; **p £ 0.01; ^0.05 < p < 0.10
a
The numbers in these columns are the percent of the
group that gave responses falling into each of the specified
Exploratory Analyses of Demographic categories
Differences in Response Patterns
Table 10.2 The definitions of torture: percentages of
To explore the extent to which selected character- responses in coding categories by demographic groups
and chi-square values
istics of respondents across the East Asia region
were associated with preferences for particular Group 1a Group 2a
Categories Military Non-military c2
definitions, we conducted several statistical tests.
These analyses were explicitly exploratory, and Torture character 0 11 7.80**
results are not intended to be generalized to the Torture methods 55 70 4.36*
Torture judgments 11 4 5.18*
larger population as the participants were not ran-
positive
domly selected from the populations in the coun-
Relative No relative
tries in the region. In efforts to inform future military military
research, marginally statistically significant Torture character 4 12 7.06**
findings (a = 0.10) are included in the following Torture judgments 19 32 5.88*
discussion of the chi square findings. Chi square negative
tests of independence revealed group differences Protest No protest
based on gender, participants’ military service, Torture judgments 33 22 2.95^
negative
whether participants had family members in the
military, childhood religion, and current religion. Note: Please refer to the methods chapter for a more
detailed description on how these variables were created
Chi square analyses revealed that men were *
p £ 0.05; **p £ 0.01; ^0.05 < p < 0.10
marginally more likely than women and partici- a
The numbers in these columns are the percent of the
pants with direct military experience were group that gave responses falling into each of the specified
significantly likely than those who had not served categories
in the military to define terrorism in terms of its
causes and motivations (see Table 10.1). In addi- without military experience gave significantly
tion, significantly more participants who had not more responses than those with military experi-
served in the military gave responses describing ence emphasizing the character of the torture
the process or methods used in terrorism than victim. Additionally participants whose family
participants who had served in the military. members had not served in the military gave
Chi square analyses revealed group differ- significantly more responses considering the
ences in definitions of torture, there were group character of the torture victim than their counter-
differences based on military participation and parts. The torture victim was usually character-
childhood religion (see Table 10.2). Participants ized as helpless or vulnerable. Moreover, as
158 D. Oh et al.

Table 10.3 The definitions of war: percentages of textbook definitions of war (e.g., using words
responses in coding categories by demographic groups like conflict or battle) and qualified their
and chi-square values
definitions of war, using words indicating the fre-
Group 1a Group 2a quency, duration, or severity of conflict.
Categories Military Non-military c2
Conversely, although participants with military
War judgments 44 32 3.39^
affiliation were generally more likely than their
War conflict 38 62 11.46***
counterparts to give judgments on war and link
War qualifiers 36 60 11.44***
war with its outcomes, significantly fewer of
Relative No relative
military military them simply defined it as conflict or offered
War judgments 40 27 4.31* qualifiers.
War outcome 23 10 7.00**
War conflict 45 69 14.49***
War qualifiers 47 63 6.04** Discussion
Note: Please refer to the methods chapter for a more
detailed description on how these variables were created This chapter considers ordinary East Asian’s
*
p £ 0.05; **p £ 0.01; ***p £ 0.001; ^0.05 < p < 0.10 definitions of terrorism, torture, and war in the
a
The numbers in these columns are the percent of the
group that gave responses falling into each of the specified
context of their history and their modern realities.
categories Findings from our grounded theory analysis not
only revealed some patterns in East Asian
definitions of terrorism, torture, and war but also
compared to their counterparts who had not suggested some useful directions for future
served in the military, significantly more of the research into potential group differences in such
veterans gave responses providing favorable definitions within the region; however, more rep-
judgments towards torture, and significantly resentative samples are necessary before conclu-
fewer responses discussing the methods used in sions about the issues raised in this chapter can
torture. As compared with their counterparts, be reached.
significantly more participants who did not have Although inconsistencies have been found in
family members affiliated with any military ser- the definitions of terrorism provided by govern-
vice made negative judgments on torture and ment agencies and literatures, the East Asian
were marginally more likely to discuss the inten- respondents’ definitions encompass the following
tions of torture. War-protestors were marginally three aspects of terrorism: its methods, causes/
more likely than non-protestors to make negative motivations, and outcomes. This finding suggests
judgments on terrorism. that any official definition of terrorism could
Several group differences in definitions of profitably incorporate all three aspects, which
war, particularly related to military affiliation, may help broaden the general understanding of
were also identified in chi square analyses (see the nature of terrorism. As Knobe (n.d.) argued,
Table 10.3). Specifically, as compared with their asking ordinary people what they really think
counterparts, significantly more participants with about terrorism and looking for patterns in their
military experience made moral judgments con- responses can provide a useful back-up for
cerning war, and marginally more participants researchers’ definitions of terrorism.
who had family members with military affiliation One of the interesting findings of our explor-
made judgments regarding war. Significantly atory analyses was that a large majority of the East
more participants with family members in mili- Asian definitions of terrorism were neutral in
tary service identified war with its outcomes of valence (emotional orientation), although states in
war than those who did not have family members this region (i.e., the PRC, Japan, and the ROK)
in the military. As compared with their counter- have taken terrorism seriously, especially after
parts, significantly more respondents without 9/11. The majority of responses did not include
personal or family military affiliation provided explicit moral judgments, although many responses
10 East Asia Definitions
had negative tones regarding the methods and
outcomes of terrorism. Respondents largely
seemed to shy away from incorporating moral
judgments into their definitions, putting more
emphasis on the causes/motivations underlying
terrorism. Maybe the colonialism and/or revolu-
tionary civil wars experienced throughout this
region lead respondents to consider that an act can
be viewed as terroristic by one side and as an act
motivated by a legitimate cause by the other side.
Indeed, the civil wars, such as clashes between the
Chinese Nationalist People’s Party (the basis of
Taiwan, officially Republic of China) and the
Chinese Communist Party (the basis of PRC) and
Korean War, resulted in a divided sovereignty
based on quite different political and economic
systems within a previously united nation state.
Currently, disputes have been witnessed between
the Beijing government and ethnic minority groups
in China, such as the Tibetan and the Uighurs.
While the PRC defines the unrests of ethnic minor-
ity groups as terrorism that threatens China’s
national security and regional stability by means
of separatism, they are also viewed as a legitimate
movement toward ethnic rights from the side of
ethnic minority groups (Chung 2006; Amnesty
International 2010, December 20).
Similarly, when asked to define torture, moral
judgments were not provided as often as methods
and intentions/motivations. However, some dif-
ferences related to military experience were
found: The respondents whose family members
had served in the military were significantly more
likely than their counterparts to made negative
judgments on torture. On the other hand, the par-
ticipants with direct military experience were
significantly more likely to make favorable judg-
ments compared to their counterparts. A specula-
tive explanation for these findings may be that
individuals with family members in the military
may be concerned with the possibility of those
relatives being torture; however, direct experi-
ence serving in the military may make individu-
als tolerant toward torture of their enemies, as a
tool to protect their own interests.
The East Asian definitions of war often
included explicit anti-war sentiments. This
finding is consistent with the argument made by
159
Brock-Utne (2000) and Barbosa et al. (2008) that
people who have experienced suffering from
wars are aware of what negative consequences
accompany wars. These negative responses var-
ied somewhat across groups. Significantly more
respondents who had a family member who had
served in the military made negative judgment on
war as well as discussing its outcomes. This
finding may reflect their vulnerability to stress
and anxiety regarding their family members’
safety in the military. The American Academy of
Child and Adolescent Psychiatry (2010, June)
also reported military families’ vulnerability to
stress and anxiety through deployment.
Finally, another provocative finding was that
although many responses defined war in terms of
the scale/intensity of conflicts between states or
powers, both the respondents whose family mem-
bers had served in the military and those who had
served in the military were significantly less
likely than their counterparts to describe war in
terms of its intensity or scale. These findings may
suggest that regardless of its intensity or scale,
the participants who had direct or indirect experi-
ences of military service tend to consider any
level of war as the same, maybe reflecting war’s
trauma as experienced by current generations of
the East Asia.
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 Integrative Summary for Definitions
of War, Torture, and Terrorism 11
Abram Trosky, Mathilde Salmberg, Laura Marcucci,
and Shane O’Neil

War, terrorism, and torture can each be thought of
as a manifestation of political violence—that is,
violence used as a means to achieve some group
end. In theory, the violence that characterizes
modern warfare is tactical and directed. In con-
trast to the indiscriminate or symbolic violence
that characterizes terrorism, warfare has tradi-
tionally been carried out by national militaries
against each other. However, the continuation of
weapons-as-aid from the developed to the devel-
oping world, the irresponsible regulation of its
distribution and the recirculation of Cold War
munitions stockpiles on the black market have
contributed to the growth of asymmetric warfare
involving non-state actors. Despite the periodic
romanticization of both battlefield and guerilla
warfare, observers have for centuries commented
on the awful, inertial power of violence to blur
these categories, begetting wanton pain, suffer-
ing, and death, the “senselessness” of which calls
into question violence’s very instrumentality.
Torture—the controlled, if surreptitious, applica-
tion of force that frequently spirals into some-
thing more sadistic—is emblematic of this terrible
transformation.
The fact that national power brokers regularly
euphemize violence to morally justify its use
paradoxically demonstrates the power that pub-
lic opinion carries: Cynical leaders still feel
required to feign legitimacy when presenting
their motives. The common language and content
of these appeals indicates the persistence of
some shared morality regarding violence, even
in a postmodern age (Walzer 2006, p. xxi).
Although “torture” is relatively morally unam-
biguous, wars of words are still being fought
over whether there are authentic justifications
for “war” and “terror”; hence, the importance of
this chapter cataloging definitions of these con-
cepts from around the world.
War
The moral and legal status of the use of force has
long been debated in the context of political
expediency: When, if ever, do political ends—
the projected good of some privileged group,
even a majority—justify war and its attendant
risks? Are there times when statespersons are
permitted to trade the life of a few to save many?
Soldiers are unique in that their oath of enlist-
ment places their lives in the absolute service of
these decision-makers as the primary currency of
such cost/benefit analyses. But how to differenti-
ate situations in which a government’s decision
to risk war hides an underlying motive that is pri-
marily self-serving has been long debated in
political theory. Machiavelli thought that citizen
soldier’s unquestioning allegiance was precisely
the virtue of a republic, whereas Kant thought
that warmongering would be self-regulated in

K. Malley-Morrison et al. (eds.), International Handbook of War, Torture, and Terrorism, 163
Peace Psychology Book Series, DOI 10.1007/978-1-4614-1638-8_11,
© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2013
164
republics, since the people would resist hostilities
that interrupted commerce and protest increased
taxes to fund standing armies.
Because the motives of national governments
are nearly always mixed, an example of a just war
seems as elusive or irrelevant as a Platonic form.
We observe this elusiveness, leading most respon-
dents to one of two conclusions regarding war: on
the one hand, a general condemnation and the
pacifistic hope of its elimination, and on the other,
a recognition of its permanence as a reason to
eliminate morality as a consideration in the strug-
gle for survival. However, this polarization in the
absence of a pure case may be an example of “the
perfect” becoming the enemy of “the good” in
the relationship of public opinion to international
ethics. Neither history’s sordid chronicling of one
war after another nor war’s projected persistence
obviates the question of how humans should
fight, to which precise definitions of proscribed
tactics, such as torture and terror, remain
extremely relevant.
Terrorism
Because government officials are prone not only
to national aggrandizement but self-aggrandize-
ment as well, citizens also grapple with questions
regarding the morality of violence in the domes-
tic context. Although the state is defined by its
monopoly on violence (Weber 2004, p. 29)—or
more precisely, on the legitimate use of force—
the law recognizes certain justified uses of lethal
force by individuals and nations against each
other, most commonly, in self-defense. But there
is a long-standing debate in political theory over
the extent to which citizens can forcefully resist
an unjust law. That they can resist at all is the
premise of civil disobedience and is relatively
uncontroversial. However, if laws systematically
deprive a group of the very rights upon which
that law’s authority is based (life, liberty, prop-
erty), that group might be justified in foregoing
attempts at peaceful resistance and use targeted
force against the system of law itself (Locke
A. Trosky et al.
1980, p. vii). As an activist and author of
Disobedience and Democracy, Zinn (2001)
points out that such a “focused act of violence”
may not be lawful, but it still can be just.
Terror tactics, by definition, cross this line.
Their object is not limited to the system itself but
extends to citizens, who are seen as complicit in
injustice by virtue of their silent consent. The
morally relativistic refrain “one group’s terrorist
is another’s freedom fighter” misses the fact that
terrorism is not merely a label that groups in
power use to smear their opponents; it has a real-
world referent—the callous killing of noncomba-
tants—of which either side may be guilty. There
is no cause, including freedom or the end of war,
that can justify the intentional sacrifice of inno-
cents against their will; this much is self-evident
(Etzioni 2010). Without some universal standard
like the respect for human rights that now ani-
mates international law, “justice” devolves to the
right of the stronger.
Recognition of a common legal, if not moral,
framework raises another timely question about
the norms of domestic and international politics
and the relationship of war to terror: If a citizens’
movement resists an oppressive government
justly (i.e., without resorting to terror), but revo-
lutionary conditions deteriorate, thereby threat-
ening civil war or state failure, do neighboring
countries and/or other members of the interna-
tional community have a right or duty to inter-
vene? The opinion of the United Nations on this
issue has evolved over the last decade, positing
(2001, 2005) and reaffirming (2006, 2009) a
“Responsibility to Protect” that justifies multilat-
eral intervention in four extreme cases: genocide,
ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity, and
war crimes (United Nations 2005). In these cases,
it could be said that a government itself is guilty
of terrorism.
However, the Responsibility to Protect
exhausts neither the possible definitions of state
terror nor the possible justifications for interven-
tion. Between headings on “Use of force under
the Charter” and “Peacekeeping,” the same docu-
ment that formalizes the Responsibility to Protect
features a separate section strongly condemning
11 Integrative Summary Definitions
terrorism. Naming it as one of the most serious
threats to international peace and security, the
UN affirms as part of its mission,
To maintain international peace and security, and
to that end: to take effective collective measures
for the prevention and removal of threats to the
peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression
or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about
by peaceful means, and in conformity with the
principles of justice and international law, adjust-
ment or settlement of international disputes or situ-
ations which might lead to a breach of the peace
(UN 2005).
Central among these “principles” is respect
for national sovereignty, the venerable corner-
stone of international law. This clause serves as a
warning to intervening nations, especially those
doing so unilaterally and with lethal force, that
they too can easily present a threat to peace.
Although human rights activists rightly bemoan
the euphemization of unintentional but foresee-
able civilian deaths incurred during wartime
operations as “collateral damage,” these do not
represent war crimes. However, if soldiers of the
invading nation incur avoidable/nonessential
civilian casualties, even under the pretense of
aiding oppressed others, the legal distinction
between them and the aggressors against whom
they are ostensibly fighting begins to break down.
When such deaths are systematic, repeated, and
reckless, the intervening nation may also be
guilty of state terror, or aggression, “the supreme
international crime” (Jackson 1949).
Fighting terror is not an exemption from the
prohibition against terror. The violation of
national sovereignty is, under certain circum-
stances, legally and morally permissible; the vio-
lation of international humanitarian law is never
morally permissible. In the terminology of the just
war tradition, legitimacy in permission to go to war
(jus ad bellum) does not provide blanket immunity
for illegitimacy in its execution (jus in bello).
This distinction is captured in the following
paragraph from the 2005 UN World Summit
under the heading “Terrorism”:
We recognize that international cooperation to
fight terrorism must be conducted in conformity
165
with international law, including the Charter and
relevant international conventions and protocols.
States must ensure that any measures taken to
combat terrorism comply with their obligations
under international law, in particular human rights
law, refugee law and international humanitarian
law (UN 2005).
Although this document does not mention tor-
ture, a resolution by the UN Security Council the
next year “Reaffirms also its condemnation in the
strongest terms of all acts of violence or abuses
committed against civilians in situations of armed
conflict in violation of applicable international
obligations with respect in particular to (i) torture
and other prohibited treatment” (UN 2006).
This UN resolution on state violence provides
an opportunity to elaborate on international
humanitarian law in the context of two recent
international conflicts—the US-led invasions of
Iraq and Afghanistan. The opening of these two
fronts in the so-called War on Terror and the
debate over the definition of torture and its use in
these conflicts were relatively recent when our
team administered the Personal and Institutional
Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey
(PAIRTAPS) and were therefore referenced fre-
quently in qualitative responses.
Torture
If terrorism is characterized by the death of inno-
cents, can torture, which normally inflicts harm
short of death on suspects presumed to be guilty,
be considered a terror tactic? Torture inflicted by
suspected terrorists and authoritarian dictator-
ships conforms with its historic instrumental use
of pain to elicit confessions, respectively. It is
also used retributively or punitively to protract
death, or to inflict mutilations or disfigurement
that deter dissent and inspire fear in the popu-
lace, as in the notorious South American “disap-
pearances,” or Robert Mugabe’s systematic
intimidation campaign during the 2008 elections
in Zimbabwe (Godwin 2011). These varieties
of torture are obvious transgressions; even if a
166
captive is guilty of the capital offense of treason,
“making an example of them” to would-be rebels
by protracting this process through torture trans-
gresses criminal and moral law by treating an
individual as a means rather than an end in them-
selves (Kant 1993, p. 36).
By this reasoning, governments condoning
the use of torture may be guilty of state terror, if
not a crime against humanity, but as with the
prosecution of other atrocities, it is unclear how
far up the chain of command guilt reaches
(Crawford 2007). The world lost a chance to
locate responsibility in the case of the US gov-
ernment’s use of “enhanced,” “severe,” or
“aggressive” interrogation techniques against
two Al Qaeda operatives when, in 2005, the chief
of the CIA’s National Clandestine Service
destroyed “hundreds of hours” of videotaped
interrogations (Gorman and Perez 2009). This
step was supposedly taken as a precaution to pro-
tect lower-level officers who were just following
orders but may as likely have been to protect the
identities of higher-level visitors who were giv-
ing the orders (Engelhardt 2007).
Could blame extend all the way to a citizenry
that tolerates or even advocates their govern-
ment’s use of torture to keep them safe? An
affirmative answer borders dangerously on the
terrorist’s rationale for random acts of violence
against the public. Several PAIRTAPS respon-
dents did defend the use of torture, provided it
yielded information that contributed to saving
lives. However, torturing a suspect to find and
defuse a ticking bomb is largely the stuff of
fiction; the connection and calculus between lives
saved and lives damaged through “advanced
interrogation techniques” are far more tenuous in
their common application of general intelligence
gathering.
The lead interrogator responsible for gather-
ing intelligence used to track down Al Qaeda
leaders in Iraq such as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi,
Matthew Alexander, eschewed harsh interroga-
tion techniques, calling them “a euphemism for
abuse, if not torture” (Alexander 2011). He esti-
mates that the incentive-based, cooperative
strategies his team used had an 80% success rate
A. Trosky et al.
but laments that these milder techniques were not
widely adopted by “old school” interrogators
(Gross and Miller 2011). A recently declassified
US government document [Declassified
Document 000353 (2002, p. 2)] corroborates his
methodological choice, noting “The application
of extreme physical and/or psychological duress
(torture) has some serious operational deficits,
most notably, the potential to result in unreliable
information.”
However, the same document goes on:
This is not to say that the manipulation of the sub-
ject’s environment in an effort to dislocate their
expectations and induce emotional responses is not
effective. On the contrary, systematic manipulation
of the subject’s environment is likely to result in a
subject that can be exploited for intelligence infor-
mation and other national strategic concerns
[Declassified Document 000353 (2002, p. 2)].
“Manipulation of the subject’s environment”
is troublingly vague, conceivably justifying
unethical privations that are elsewhere classed as
psychological torture. This class includes the
severe emotional abuse of “no-touch” torture—
the sleep, exercise, and communication depriva-
tion characteristic of solitary confinement.
Despite its mention in the declassified document,
the US government continues to deny its use of
torture, calling these conditions standard for “sin-
gle-occupancy cells” in level one military prisons
such as the Marine Corps Brig at Quantico and
the Guantanamo Bay detention facility. Hostile
interrogations, including those of US citizens,
have also taken place off American soil, during
extraordinary renditions to secret prisons (so-
called black sites), and, notoriously, at the US
prison at Abu Ghraib.
Under former US Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld, enhanced interrogation techniques pre-
viously limited to Army Special Access Programs
were extended to common soldiers and national
guardsmen and women. The cornerstone of
“enhancement” in this theater was tailored to what
were seen as the specific vulnerabilities of Arabic
males: coercive force coupled with sexual humili-
ation. This atmosphere of permissiveness vis-à-vis
racial discrimination and religious bigotry led to
11 Integrative Summary Definitions
widespread abuse. The ghastly images leaked
from Abu Ghraib confirmed what psychologists
have known for some time: “controlled” violence
easily takes on a life of its own when official
authorization and/or belief in the sanctity of one’s
cause facilitates the dehumanization of victims
(Milgram 1974; Bandura 1999).
Even if they had not resulted in death and
maiming, these acts would normally have been
prohibited under international humanitarian law,
namely, under the third and fifth articles of the
UN Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and the
UN Convention Against Torture (1984). Whereas
the official line has been to dismiss abuses like
those at Abu Ghraib as aberrations—the depraved
acts of a few, deviant individuals—psychiatrist
and historian Lifton (2004) has argued that war
regularly produces conditions favorable to crimi-
nal violations, with wars of counterinsurgency
particularly prone to such “atrocity-producing
situations.”
Torture, Terrorism, and War
in the Context of International
Humanitarian Law
Wars of aggression are prosecutable under the
1929 Kellogg–Briand Pact (“The General Treaty
for the Renunciation of War”), which was used as
the basis for the “crimes against peace” prose-
cuted by the Nuremberg Tribunal, as well as under
article two of the United Nations Charter. Wars of
defense, by contrast, are protected under the UN
Charter’s article 51 (1945), which states “Nothing
in the present Charter shall impair the inherent
right of individual or collective self-defense if an
armed attack occurs against a Member of the
United Nations, until the Security Council has
taken measures necessary to maintain interna-
tional peace and security.” In practice, because
nations retain the prerogative to determine what
constitutes their vital interests and to define threats
to that interest, the legality of defensive war has
provided a loophole for preemptive, even preven-
tative war-making, invoked, for instance, in the
Iraq and Vietnam Wars. Critics of these wars
argue that their protracted timetables and high
167
civilian casualties make them functionally indis-
tinct from wars of aggression (Burke 2004).
In neither of these conflicts, nor the one in
Afghanistan, has war officially been declared,
each having the characteristics of protracted
counterinsurgency operations rather than those of
a truly national foe that can be decisively defeated.
The USA has portrayed violation of the national
sovereignty of Afghanistan and Iraq as multilat-
eral decisions in an attempt to legitimate them.
However, only the coalition effort in Afghanistan
had UN Security Council backing despite this
being a sine qua non for a majority of the
American public to support the invasion of Iraq
(Benedetto 2003). Failure on these fronts—lack
of planning and lack of consensus—potentially
runs afoul of two just war principles: reasonable
chance of success and authorization by legitimate
authority, respectively.
The prosecution of the so-called War on
Terror, in which both Afghanistan and Iraq are
seen as fronts by the US military and intelli-
gence apparatus, also raises questions in its con-
formity to international humanitarian law. The
Bush administration’s unilateral declaration that
suspected members of international terrorist
organizations like Al Qaeda would be consid-
ered “illegal combatants” was an attempt to
void their protection under the Geneva
Conventions. However, “low-intensity” coun-
terinsurgency warfare is covered under interna-
tional humanitarian law (IHL): The third and
fourth articles of the Third Geneva Convention
of 1929, “relative to the Treatment of Prisoners
of War,” deal expressly with “armed conflict not
of an international character,” mentioning tor-
ture among its prohibitions several times, as
well as “outrages upon personal dignity, in par-
ticular, humiliating and degrading treatment,”
for all categories of belligerent: be they crew
members or laborers, correspondents or contrac-
tors, paramilitary or militia, sick or wounded
(International Committee of the Red Cross
1949). The Fourth Convention, “relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,”
outlaws terrorist tactics such as hostage-taking,
mutilation, and murder (International Committee
of the Red Cross 1949).
168
Even though civilians and captured soldiers
are accorded similar rights under these articles,
the viability of IHL depends on an active distinc-
tion between these groups on the part of all
involved: Soldiers cannot hide among civilians
and civilians cannot behave like soldiers. Even
members of “organized resistance movements,
belonging to a Party to the conflict and operating
in or outside their own territory, even if this terri-
tory is occupied” are covered by the Conventions,
provided they meet four conditions: “(a) that of
being commanded by a person responsible for his
subordinates; (b) that of having a fixed distinc-
tive sign recognizable at a distance; (c) that of
carrying arms openly; (d) that of conducting their
operations in accordance with the laws and
customs of war” (International Committee of the
Red Cross 1949). Decentralized and covert
terrorist tactics purposefully conform to none of
these. However, under the same body of law,
apprehended and detained terror suspects are
afforded the protection against mutilation and
murder that they deprived of their victims.
Lay Definitions of War, Torture, and
Terrorism from the PAIRTAPS Samples
Participants from 54 countries completed the
PAIRTAPS survey, in which they responded to
the following questions: What is your definition of
war? What is your definition of torture? What is
your definition of terrorism? In this chapter, we
are concerned with the responses to these ques-
tions and evaluate them across the regions. The 54
countries constitute 9 regions, organized as fol-
lows: Africa (Angola, Botswana, Egypt, Ghana,
Nigeria, South Africa, and Zambia), Russia and
the Balkan region (Greece, Russia, Serbia, and
Slovenia), East Asia (China, Japan, Hong Kong,
South Korea, and Taiwan), the Gulf States
(Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, and Qatar), Latin
America (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Nicaragua, Peru, and Puerto Rico), Middle
East (Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan,
Lebanon, Middle Eastern Other, Saudi Arabia,
and Turkey), South and Southeast Asia (India,
A. Trosky et al.
Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines,
and Sri Lanka), the USA/UK (Australia, Canada,
Northern Ireland, United Kingdom, and the United
States), and Western Europe (France, Germany,
Iceland, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden).
Coding Procedures
Definitions of war, torture, and terrorism were
first broken into codeable units, and then each
unit was coded. Many definitions contained more
than one codeable unit. For example, consider
the following definition of war: “It is caused by
greed, is immoral, and leads to the lost of count-
less lives.” That definition has three codeable
units: (a) cause (greed), (b) moral judgment
(immoral), and (c) outcome (loss of countless
lives). Each of these units receives its own code,
and no unit can be coded into more than one cat-
egory. For more information about the coding
system, see the introductory chapter to this sec-
tion of the volume. In our discussion of patterns
of findings across regions, we use the term
“responses” to refer to codeable units.
Definitions of War
Qualitative Analysis
On average, about 13% of all of the responses
from all the regions were concerned with the
causes of war. This thematic category was most
common in East Asia (20% of their responses)
and least common in Russia (10%) and the Balkan
region and in the Gulf States (8%). Among the
presumed causes of war, the category political
motives was the most common (4%) with the
most responses in East Asia (6%) and the USA/
UK (6%) and the least in the Gulf States (2%).
Another category that garnered on average 3% of
all responses was for moral judgments of the
causes of war; this category was most common in
East Asia (6%) and least common in Russia and
the Balkan region (1%).
The thematic category for responses that sim-
ply provided a synonym or defined war as a conflict
applied to about 19% of all responses, appearing
11 Integrative Summary Definitions
most often in East Asia (28%), Western Europe
(24%), the USA/UK (24%), and Latin America
(23%) and least often in the Middle East (10%)
and the Gulf States (8%). The vast majority of
these responses were coded for focus on conflict
only—about 17% of all responses, on average;
about 2% were coded for non-physical conflict.
About 32% of all responses identified
qualifications regarding the nature of a conflict
that justified calling it a war—emphasizing, for
example, criteria such as duration, intensity, or
legitimacy. This thematic category was most com-
mon in the USA/UK (48%), Africa (43%), and
Western Europe (37%) and least common in the
Middle East (21%), the Gulf States (21%), and
Russia and the Balkan region (25%). Accounting
for about 12% of responses, those that defined war
according to the scale or intensity of conflict (QSI)
were the most common examples of definitional
criteria. Representing about 11% of responses,
those that described war as between groups
officially or legally recognized as holding power
were a close second. This contrasts with about 3%
of responses that described war as involving non-
officially recognized/informal groups; this cate-
gory was slightly more common in East Asia (7%)
and Africa (5%). Lastly, about 4% of all responses
defined war as one-sided aggression.
About 25% of all responses were examples of
the outcomes of war. This thematic category was
most often found in the Gulf States (50%), the
Middle East (40%), and Russia and the Balkan
region (32%) and least often in the USA/UK
(9%), East Asia (9%), and Western Europe (15%).
Participants offered concrete outcomes, such as
death and destruction of property, in about 14% of
responses and abstract outcomes such as pain and
suffering, in about 8% of responses. Notably,
about 8% of responses from the Gulf States fell
under the general outcomes category for responses
that were not explicitly concrete or abstract; this
contrasts with the average, about 2%, for this cat-
egory among all the regions.
Finally, about 11% of responses were moral
judgments of the act of war itself. This was most
common in Russia and the Balkan region (17%)
and the Middle East (14%) and was least common
169
in the USA/UK (4%) and Africa (5%). Fewer
than 2% of responses in each region were catego-
rized as uncodeable.
Demographic Correlates of Definitions
of War
When running the statistical analysis for
definitions of war, the author of each region
examined whether response patterns were contin-
gent upon a variety of demographic variables.
These variables include: (a) gender, (b) participa-
tion in the military, (c) relatives’ participation in
the military, and (d) previous participation in a
protest in favor of peace. Within some regions,
the role of country, religion, and socio-economic
status was also analyzed. The information below
represents the results that each of the authors
reported within their respective chapter. The
same applies for statistical analysis of torture and
terrorism definitions.
Gender
Across all regions, gender contributed
significantly to many themes within definitions
of war. Among African participants men were
significantly more likely than women to refer-
ence general causes of war; conversely, African
women were significantly more likely than men
to reference specific political motivations behind
war. Among Western European participants,
women were significantly more likely than men
to focus on conflict when defining war—provid-
ing textbook definitions and referencing fighting
or battles. However, men from Western Europe
provided significantly more responses than
women with themes of non-physical conflict—
such as ideological opposition over beliefs.
When describing war, men from the UK/Anglo
region scored significantly higher than women on
general qualifications of war (e.g., explaining
that war is more than two groups in conflict).
More specifically, male participants from the
Middle East gave significantly more qualifications
of one-sided aggression, such as invasion.
In regard to the consequences of war, women from
Latin America were significantly more likely
than men to include concrete outcomes, such as
170
violence or destruction. Finally, women from the
UK/Anglo sample were significantly more likely
than their male counterparts to provide moral
judgment on war within their definitions.
Military Experience
Interestingly, civilian respondents from East Asia
and Africa provided significantly more responses
that focused on the conflict within war, while
military and former military from the Middle
East and Africa were significantly more likely to
reference non-physical conflict in their explana-
tions. Africans with military experience were
also significantly more likely to reference any
outcome of war. According to independent sam-
ple t-tests, participants from the Middle East and
Russia/the Balkans with previous military expe-
rience scored significantly higher than their coun-
terparts on any cause of war; chi-square tests also
indicated that military respondents from Africa
were significantly more likely to identify causes
of war. Additionally, veterans from Africa pro-
vided significantly more moral judgments than
their counterparts on these causes/motivations
behind war.
Independent sample t-tests indicated that those
in the military from the UK/Anglo region and the
Middle East scored significantly higher than their
counterparts on general qualifications for war.
More specifically, veterans from the Middle East
scored significantly higher than nonveterans on the
presence of non-officially recognized groups or
organizations as a qualification for war. By con-
trast, in other regions, civilian participants with no
experience in the military highlighted different
qualifications for war. For instance, civilian respon-
dents from Africa were significantly more likely to
reference the level/intensity of conflict within war.
Participants from South/Southeast Asia with no
military experience scored significantly higher than
their counterparts on one-sided aggression (such as
invasion) when describing war and scored
significantly higher on the presence of non-officially
recognized groups within war—the opposite of the
results from the Middle East. Civilians from East
Asia were significantly more likely to reference
overall qualifications for war without mentioning
specific characteristics.
A. Trosky et al.
Veterans from Africa, Russia/the Balkans, and
East Asia were significantly more likely than their
civilian counterparts to include moral judgments
of war in their definitions. Interestingly, it was
civilians from the UK/Anglo region who provided
significantly more moral judgments within
definitions than their military counterparts.
Relatives’ Military Experience
Individuals with no relatives in the military from
East Asia and the Middle East were significantly
more likely than their counterparts to identify
war with conflict (referencing words such as
“fight” or “battle”). Chi-square tests indicated
that in the East Asia region, participants with no
military relatives were also significantly more likely
to reference general qualifications of war; addi-
tionally, independent sample t-tests demonstrated
that in Africa and the Middle East regions, non-
military family members also scored higher on
war qualifications than their counterparts. When
describing the results of war, East Asian respon-
dents with relatives in the military were
significantly more likely than their counterparts
to include general outcomes in their definitions.
Finally, African and East Asian participants with
family in the armed forces offered significantly
more moral judgments regarding war than their
counterparts without relatives in the military.
Participation in a Protest in Favor
of Peace
Participants with no previous involvement in a
pro-peace protest from the UK/Anglo region pro-
vided significantly more definitions that focused
on conflict or battles than did their counterparts.
Interestingly, they were also significantly more
likely than the UK/Anglo protesters to reference
non-physical conflict, such as varying ideologies.
Respondents from Western Europe who had never
participated in a protest were also more likely
than protesters to include these themes. When
referring to characteristics of war, protesters from
the Middle East scored significantly higher than
non-protesters in the identification of qualifiers/
prerequisites necessary to call a conflict a war,
specifically the presence of officially recognized
groups. In the African sample, non-protesters
11 Integrative Summary Definitions
were significantly more likely than protesters to
refer to the parallel category, non-officially rec-
ognized organizations. Additionally, protesters
from Africa included significantly more moral
judgments on causes of war than their counter-
parts. Finally, protesters from the UK/Anglo
region, South/Southeast Asia, and Russia/the
Balkans were all significantly more likely than
non-protesters from those respective regions to
include moral judgments concerning war itself in
their definitions.
Religion
Significant group differences based on partici-
pants’ religion were evident within the definitions
of war provided by the African sample. Within
this region, those who self-identified as Muslims
were significantly more likely than those identi-
fying as Christians to include concrete outcomes,
abstract outcomes, and moral judgments on the
act of war in their definitions.
Definitions of Torture
Qualitative Analysis
On average, about 19% of all responses fell into
the thematic category focus on intent, motivation,
or emotion. This category was most common in
the USA/UK (28%), Africa (26%), and East Asia
and was least common in the Gulf States (10%),
the Middle East (12%), South and Southeast Asia
(13%), and Latin America (14%). Within this
thematic category, about 16% of responses on
average were coded for constructive intent,
with the subcategories information or compli-
ance and punishment yielding the most
responses—about 9% and 3% on average. The
number of responses coded for punishment was
low overall, although 8% of African responses
fell into this category. Defining torture as a tactic,
participants from East Asia gave more responses
that portrayed torture as being used to achieve a
personal goal. For instance, whereas self-gain
typically accounted for about 1% of the responses
in all regions, in East Asia, about 5% of the
171
responses fell into this category. In general, only
about 2% of all responses defined torture as an
effort to cause pain, suffering, and harm, although
about 5% of responses from the USA/UK fell
into this category. Definitions focusing on
destructive intent were infrequent, representing
on average only about 3% of all responses.
About 29% of all responses included a judg-
ment concerning the immorality/injustice/inhu-
manity of torture. This thematic category was
most common in the Middle East (42%) and the
Gulf States (40%) and was least common in East
Asia (18%) and the USA/UK (19%). The vast
majority of these responses were intolerant/con-
demning of torture, accounting for about 27% of
responses. The most commonly coded subcate-
gory within the broader judgment category was
for responses that characterized torture as
immoral/inhumane/cruel/abusive/vile, accounting
for about 11% of responses. The general intoler-
ant category, used for responses that did not fit
within the subcategories, represented about 8% of
all responses. About 3% of responses defined tor-
ture as unlawful/unjust. The category for responses
that portrayed torture as a violation of human
rights was fairly uncommon, averaging only
about 2% of all responses, but was more frequent
in the Gulf States where it accounted for about 5%
of responses. Paradoxically, tolerance of torture
was present in the same proportion (5%) in the
Middle East over the sample at large (2%).
On average, about 42% of responses discussed
the methods torture involves; this thematic cate-
gory was most frequent in South and Southeast
Asia (51%) and East Asia (49%) and was least
frequent in the Middle East (34%) and the Gulf
States (36%). Participants gave examples of
physical harming methods in about 15% of
responses and psychological harming methods
in about 13% of responses. About 12% of
responses included harming methods that were
not explicitly physical or psychological.
Finally, responses that discuss the outcomes of
torture yielded only about 3% of all responses on
average; however, this theme was more common
in the Gulf States, where it accounted for about
7% of responses.
172
Among the rare forms of definitions of torture
were responses identifying characteristics of
individuals being tortured (about 4% of all
responses), including definitions focusing on the
helplessness/powerlessness of the individual
(about 2% of responses). Also rare were responses
describing the conditions that give rise to torture;
overall, only 1% of responses fell into this cate-
gory, although these definitions were relatively
more common in Africa (about 4% of responses)
than the other regions.
Less than 2% of responses in each region were
coded as uncodeable.
Demographic Correlates of Definitions
of Torture
Gender
Just as for definitions of war, there were a num-
ber of statistically significant gender differences
in torture responses. In Latin America and Africa,
women were significantly more likely than men
to mention the hurt/harming of an individual
when explaining their concept of torture. In
Africa and the UK/Anglo region, women were
significantly more likely than men to reference
constructive intent for torture (such as attempting
to gain something or achieve a goal). On the other
hand, men from Western Europe were significantly
more likely than women to include this same
theme. Female participants from East Asia pro-
vided significantly more responses than their
counterparts that referenced the destructive intent
of torture. Men from the Middle East scored
significantly higher than women on referencing
torture as a last resort. Finally, women from
Africa were significantly more likely than African
men to focus on methods of torture.
In terms of imparting judgments within their
definitions, male respondents from the UK/
Anglo region were significantly more likely than
women to include tolerance for torture within
their definitions. Conversely, significantly more
women than men defined torture as an immoral
act. More specifically, among UK/Anglo partici-
pants, women were significantly more likely than
men to define torture as something that is
(a) unnecessary; (b) immoral, cruel, or inhumane;
A. Trosky et al.
or (c) sadistic. However, men from the UK/
Anglo region were more likely than women to
identify torture as a violation of human rights.
Additionally, men from South/Southeast Asia
also expressed significantly more general intol-
erance for torture than South/Southeast Asian
women. Finally, in the Middle East sample, more
women than men called torture immoral, cruel,
and inhumane.
Military Experience
In regard to motivations behind torture, military
participants from Western Europe provided
significantly more responses than their counter-
parts referencing constructive intent; non-military
respondents from South and Southeast Asia more
often described its parallel category, the harmful,
destructive intent of torture than their military
counterparts. Latin Americans with previous
involvement in the military were significantly
more likely than their civilian counterparts to
focus on overall methods of torture; however,
civilians from East Asia and Africa were
significantly more likely than veterans to include
this concept as well. Veterans from Latin America
were significantly more likely than non-military
to reference both physical and psychological
methods of torture.
Military personnel from Russia/the Balkans
and Africa were significantly more likely than
non-military individuals to reference intolerance
for torture within definitions. In the UK/Anglo
region however, it was civilians who demonstrated
less tolerance for torture. Respondents from South/
Southeast Asia with no military experience also
judged that torture is (a) unnecessary and (b) a vio-
lation of human rights. Military respondents from
East Asia and the Middle East were significantly
more likely than their counterparts to express
favorable, tolerant opinions of torture.
Relatives’ Military Experience
Participants from Africa who did not have any
relatives in the military were significantly more
likely than their counterparts to mention any meth-
ods of torture, as well as specific physical and psy-
chological methods. Responses from East Asians
with no family in the military referenced the inten-
tions of torture significantly more often than their
11 Integrative Summary Definitions
counterparts. More specifically, in the Middle
East, participants without military relatives were
significantly more likely to include constructive
intent within their torture definitions, whereas in
the samples from Latin America, South/Southeast
Asia, and Africa, it was the participants with mili-
tary relatives who were significantly more likely
to provide constructive intent definitions. Given
the nonrepresentative nature of the samples, this
apparent difference, like the other group differ-
ences, should be considered very preliminary and
not be over-interpreted.
Groups differing on the basis of having or not
having a family member in the armed forces also
differed in their use definitions of torture.
Participants from the Middle East and Africa who
had military relatives provided significantly more
definitions exhibiting intolerance for torture than
their counterparts. More specifically, participants
from the Middle East with military relatives were
significantly more likely than their counterparts to
mention that torture was unnecessary. Those from
the UK/Anglo region belonging to a military fam-
ily were significantly more likely to reference tor-
ture as a violation of human rights; however, in
South/Southeast Asia it was participants with no
relatives who more often cited torture as a viola-
tion of human rights. Finally, individuals from East
Asia and Russia/the Balkans with no family in the
armed forces offered significantly more negative
judgments on torture than their counterparts.
Participation in a Protest in Favor
of Peace
Involvement in a protest in favor of peace was
positively correlated with moral judgments of tor-
ture as wrong across all regions. Protesters from
the UK/Anglo region, Russia/the Balkans, and
South/Southeast Asia all demonstrated significantly
less tolerance of torture than their counterparts in
their definitions. Surprisingly, non-protesters from
the UK/Anglo region, as compared with protesters
from that region, gave significantly more argu-
ments that torture was (a) sadistic and (b) immoral,
cruel, and inhumane. Lastly, definitions of non-
protesters from the Middle East included
significantly more tolerant opinions of torture than
did definitions from protestors; individuals from
173
South/Southeast Asia with no protest experience
also scored significantly higher than their counter-
parts on this same theme.
Country, Religion, and Socio-economic
Status
When one-way analyses of variance were run to
determine which themes were contingent upon
country, significant group differences emerged
from the countries of Latin America for the follow-
ing themes: (a) physical methods of torture, (b) the
hurt/harming processes utilized in torture, (c) gen-
eral intolerance of torture, and (d) the immoral,
cruel, and inhumane elements of torture.
Participants’ religious faith also played a role
in response patterns across regions. Christians
from East Asia emphasized physical methods of
torture more often than any other faith. Analysis of
participants from Africa also revealed significant
differences between religions, with Muslims giv-
ing significantly more examples than Christians of
the following: (a) the motivation to obtain per-
sonal gain through torture, (b) judgments intoler-
ant or condemnatory of torture, (c) opinions that
torture is unlawful/unjust, and (d) the belief that
torture is a violation of human rights. Christians
from Africa on the whole emphasized the idea of
torture as a punishment and, like Christians else-
where, the specific physical processes of torture.
There were also interesting correlations with par-
ticipants’ self-identified social class. For example,
upper-class African participants gave significantly
more constructive intent responses (torture used to
achieve an objective) than participants from the
lower class, working class, middle class, and upper
middle class. Working-class respondents from
Africa also gave significantly more examples of the
physical processes involved in torture than respon-
dents from lower and middle classes.
Definitions of Terrorism
Qualitative Analysis
In addition to being coded for the thematic cate-
gories, every response was evaluated for valence
toward terrorism. The majority of responses, on
174
average about 60%, were neutral regarding
terrorism, meaning they did not express a detect-
able judgment toward terrorism. About 35% of
responses were coded for a negative valence
toward terrorism, while about 4% indicated an
effort to understand terrorism, and less than 1%
showed a positive valence toward terrorism. The
regions with the most responses designated by a
negative valence toward terrorism were the
Middle East (48%), the Gulf States (47%), and
Western Europe (47%). Africa, East Asia, and the
USA/UK had the fewest responses coded for
negative valence toward terrorism—23%, 24%,
and 24%, respectively. The highest rates for
attempts to understand terrorism were seen in
Western Europe (7%), Africa (6%), and Latin
America (6%), while the lowest rates were found
in East Asia (1%) and the Gulf States (2%).
About a quarter of responses were concerned
with cause/motivation(s) for terrorism, with
Africa having the highest percentage of responses
(36%) in this category and the Gulf States (17%),
the Middle East (18%), and South and Southeast
Asia (19%) the lowest. Within this thematic cat-
egory, ideological motivation and political moti-
vation were the most commonly coded
sub-categories, representing about 5% and 8% of
all responses, respectively. Political motivation
was somewhat common in East Asia (17%),
Africa (14%), and Western Europe (11%) and
was quite rare in the Gulf States (2%). Ideological
motivation was most common in East Asia (9%),
Latin America (7%), Western Europe (7%), and
the USA/UK (7%), while it garnered only 2% in
both the Gulf States and South and Southeast
Asia. While only about 1% of responses on aver-
age indicated that terrorism was incongruent with
or anathema to religion, this category accounted
for 8% of responses in the Gulf States, making it
the most commonly coded category in cause/
motivations for that region. Finally, the majority
of responses in Russia and the Balkan region
(about 9% of total responses) fell into the general
cause/motivation category for responses that do
not fit within the subcategories, which is consid-
erably more than the average among all the
regions for that category, about 5%.
A. Trosky et al.
Just under a third of responses among all the
regions addressed the process/methods involved
in terrorism. This thematic category was most
common in the USA/UK (39%) and East Asia
(38%) and least common in the Middle East
(25%) and the Gulf States (26%). The vast major-
ity of these responses described terrorism with
physical methods, constituting about 22% of all
responses, while about 5% described psychologi-
cal methods, and less than 3% described methods
that were neither explicitly physical nor psycho-
logical in nature.
Approximately one out of four responses from
all regions discussed the outcomes of terrorism,
most commonly in Latin America (25%) and the
Gulf States (24%) and least commonly in Western
Europe (13%) and East Asia (11%). The most
commonly cited outcomes were emotional out-
comes and physical outcomes, representing about
7% and 6% of all responses, respectively, and
disruption of peace and stability with about 4%
of all responses. Physical outcomes were most
common in Latin America (10%), the Gulf States
(8%), the Middle East (7%), and Russia and the
Balkan region (7%) and were least common in
East Asia (2%), the USA/UK (4%), and Western
Europe (4%). Emotional outcomes were most
common in the USA/UK (10%), Latin America
(9%), the Middle East (8%), and South and
Southeast Asia (8%), while they were least com-
mon in East Asia (4%). Finally, about 8% of
responses from the Gulf States described terror-
ism as involving disruption of peace and stabil-
ity, compared to 4% across all the regions.
Twenty percent fell into the judgments cate-
gory when they expressed an opinion about the
morality or legality of terrorism. This thematic
category was most common in the Middle East
(32%) and the Gulf States (31%) and was least
common in the USA/UK (10%) and Africa (9%).
The majority of these responses were moral judg-
ments (17%) as opposed to legal judgments
(3%). The category legal judgment was, on aver-
age, fairly rare, although it did account for about
5% of all responses from the Gulf States.
The real-life reference category, which
includes responses that include references to
11 Integrative Summary Definitions
historical or current events, accounted for an
average of about 1% of responses from all the
regions but was more common in Africa (4%)
and the Middle East (3%). Less than 3% of
responses in each region were coded as uncode-
able, except for South and Southeast Asia, where
10% of responses were designated uncodeable.
Demographic Correlates of Definitions
of Terrorism
Gender
Just as for definitions of war and torture, response
patterns for definitions of terrorism were often
contingent upon participants’ gender. Among East
Asian participants, men were significantly more
likely than women to reference a cause or motiva-
tion behind terrorism. Among participants from
the UK/Anglo region, women were significantly
more likely than men to include ideological
motivation (terrorism motivated by a religion
or belief), as well as emotional causes (describ-
ing the mental state of terrorists, such as frustra-
tion). However, in the Western European region,
it was men who were significantly more likely to
reference these emotional causes. As for the pro-
cesses of terrorism, African women provided
significantly more responses than African men
referencing methods of terrorism (either physical
or mental). Finally, female participants from Latin
America were significantly more likely than Latin
men to reference physical outcomes of terrorism,
such as injury or destruction.
Military Experience
Participants from East Asia with previous experi-
ence in the military were significantly more likely
than non-military to reference causes or motiva-
tions behind terrorism. However, participants
with military experience from South/Southeast
Asia were significantly more likely than their
counterparts to include the idea that terrorism has
no rational motive. In the African case, it was
respondents with no military involvement who
more often referenced the reasons behind terrorist
acts. Military participants from Africa, on the
175
other hand, provided significantly more responses
explaining the motives of terrorism as based not
upon religion but rather a misunderstanding of
one’s faith.
Regarding the processes of terrorism, partici-
pants from both East Asia and Africa who had no
experience in the armed forces were significantly
more likely than their counterparts to mention
methods, whether physical or psychological.
More specifically, those from Africa provided
significantly more references to physical methods
and scored significantly higher on the use of
psychological methods than their counterparts.
As for judgments of terrorism within definitions,
non-military personnel from both the UK/
Anglo region and South/Southeast Asia scored
significantly higher than veterans on themes of
moral judgment. By contrast, military-affiliated
respondents from the UK/Anglo sample and non-
military respondents from Africa each scored
significantly higher on the use of legal judgment
(in which participants consider the legality of ter-
rorism, without imparting moral judgment).
Relatives’ Military Experience
Participants from Latin America and Africa with
no relatives in the military were significantly
more likely than their counterparts to reference
general causes or motives of terrorism, without
mentioning a specific ideology. Respondents from
Western Europe with military relatives provided
significantly more responses than their counter-
parts mentioning negative environmental condi-
tions (such as social or economic circumstances)
or ideological motivation (such as religion) behind
terrorism. Interestingly, respondents from Africa
without military relatives were significantly more
likely than those with military relatives to refer-
ence ideological motivations as well.
Participants from Africa with no family in
the armed forces provided significantly more
responses mentioning processes of terrorism than
their counterparts. Conversely, Africans with
military family members were significantly more
likely to mention physical methods, such as
bombing, and reference judgments on terrorism
(either legal or moral) in their responses.
176
Participation in a Protest in Favor
of Peace
As with the previous demographic analysis,
participation in a protest in favor of peace con-
tributed to themes and response patterns across a
number of regions. Protesters from Africa were
significantly more likely than their counterparts
to mention general causes or motivations behind
terrorism (such as to achieve political goals but
without mentioning any specific motivations).
Protesters from Western Europe provided
significantly more responses than non-protesters
referencing either (a) negative environmental
conditions that could lead to terrorism or (b) the
idea that terrorists often had no motivation behind
their actions. Participants from the UK/Anglo
region who had never protested in favor of peace
were significantly more likely to reference ideo-
logical motivations driving terrorism than were
non-protesters.
Regarding the possible relationship of partici-
pation in protest to judgment of terrorism, pro-
testers from the Russian/Balkan regions provided
significantly more responses containing at least
one moral judgment. Interestingly, protesters
from the UK/Anglo region, Western Europe, and
Russia/the Balkans were all significantly more
likely than non-protesters to entertain the possi-
ble cultural relativism of the concept, “terrorist.”
Country, Religion, and Socio-economic
Status
One-way analyses of variance indicated that a
number of themes were contingent upon country,
specifically for the Western European region.
Regarding reasons behind terrorism, significant
group differences emerged for (a) overall causes/
motivation, (b) ideological motivation, and (c)
negative environmental conditions that lead to
terrorism. Also among Western European coun-
tries, we found significant differences in (a) over-
all process/methods of terrorism, especially
psychological methods of terrorism, (b) overall
outcomes that could result from terrorism (either
concrete or emotional), (c) overall judgments,
including both moral and legal but especially
moral, and (d) appealing to cultural relativism,
questioning the label, “terrorist.” Finally,
significant group differences regarding physical
A. Trosky et al.
methods of terrorism were also found within the
countries of Latin America.
ANOVA results also revealed significant vari-
ations in response patterns between religions
found within the African region. Christians refer-
enced the physical and psychological methods of
terrorism more often than did Muslims, whereas
Muslims more often emphasized (a) the idea that
terrorism is not the product of a particular
religion, (b) the economic disruptions resulting
from terrorism, (c) general moral judgment,
and (d) the inclusion of current events within
definitions.
Self-defined socio-economic status also
seemed to correlate with certain response pat-
terns in the African sample. For instance, those
self-identifying as upper middle class scored
significantly higher than those identifying as
middle class on moral judgments of the acts/out-
comes of terrorism.
Demographic Correlates of Themes
Cutting Across Common Coding
Categories for War, Torture,
and Terrorism Definitions
In addition to separate analyses of war, torture,
and terrorism definitions, GIPGAP ran analyses
to determine the presence and frequency of
major themes that emerged consistently across
definitions. The next section addresses these
response patterns across all regional samples.
Gender
Men from South/Southeast Asia and the Middle
East were significantly more likely than women
to include the idea of last resorts across
definitions. According to chi-square tests, women
from Western Europe and South/Southeast Asia
were significantly more likely than men to include
methods across definitions. However, in the UK/
Anglo sample, it was men who more often men-
tioned methods across definitions.
Regarding consequences of war, torture, and
terrorism, women from South/Southeast Asia,
Western Europe, and Russia/the Balkans were
more likely than their male counterparts to refer-
ence overall outcomes within their descriptions.
11 Integrative Summary Definitions
Similarly, female participants from the Middle
East, Latin America, Western Europe, and Russia/
the Balkans were significantly more likely to
mention physical outcomes across definitions—a
subcategory within overall outcomes. Significantly,
more women than men from Western Europe and
South/Southeast Asia also referenced any abstract
outcome (such as fear, pain) across definitions. In
the UK/Anglo region, it was males who were
significantly more likely to include this theme.
These unexpected differences between the UK/
Anglo and other regions in pattern of gender dif-
ferences are difficult to account for and may be
related to sampling issues.
Military Experience
Participants from the Middle East and South/
Southeast Asia with military experience were
significantly more likely than non-military
respondents from those regions to pass judgment
on these causes or motivations for the various
forms of aggression across definitions.
Participants from the Middle East with military
experience were significantly more likely than
their counterparts to include the idea of last resort
across definitions; those from the UK/Anglo
region provided significantly more responses
making reference to political motivation.
Respondents from Russia/ the Balkans and
the Middle East with military experience were
significantly more likely than their counterparts
to make mention of the methods across
definitions. Non-military participants from South
and Southeast Asia were more likely than veter-
ans to include general outcomes, and civilians
from Russia/the Balkans were more likely than
their counterparts to highlight physical outcomes
(such as violence) across definitions. Responses
of veterans from the Middle East and the UK/
Anglo regions focused on the abstract outcomes
across definitions (such as fear or negative emo-
tions). Finally, chi-square tests indicated that
whereas military personnel from Russia/the
Balkans provided significantly more responses
than their counterparts that contained moral
judgments across definitions, in the UK/Anglo
region, it was non-military participants who
were significantly more likely than veterans to
include this same theme.
177
Relatives’ Military Experience
Participants from the UK/Anglo region with
relatives in the military were significantly more
likely than their counterparts to mention methods
across definitions. Individuals from the Middle East
with no family in the armed forces also provided
significantly more responses than their counterparts
on this same theme.
Respondents from the UK/Anglo region with
relatives in the military were significantly more
likely than their counterparts to reference abstract
outcomes across definitions (such as emotional pain
or fear). Individuals with family in the armed forces
from the Middle East and East Asia were significantly
more likely than their counterparts to include moral
judgments of torture, as were those without relatives
in the military from Russia/the Balkans.
Participation in a Protest in Favor
of Peace
Individuals with previous experience in a protest
from Russia/the Balkans were significantly more
likely than non-protesters to reference at least one
cause of war, torture, and terrorism. Protesters
from the UK/Anglo region, Western Europe, South/
Southeast Asia, and the Middle East provided
significantly more responses than non-protesters
highlighting political motivations across definitions.
Protesters from Western Europe and the UK/Anglo
region were significantly more likely than non-
protesters to mention methods across definitions.
Respondents from Western Europe who had
participated in a protest were significantly more
likely than non-protesters to reference both gen-
eral outcomes and specific physical outcomes
across definitions of war, torture, and terrorism.
Along similar lines, protesters from Western
Europe and South/Southeast Asia provided
significantly more responses including abstract
outcomes than their counterparts. Participants
with previous involvement in a protest from the
UK/Anglo region, South/Southeast Asia, Western
Europe, and Russia/the Balkans were significantly
more likely than their counterparts to include
moral judgments across definitions.
Country and Religion
ANOVA results indicated significant differences
for moral judgments across definitions among the
178
countries of the UK/Anglo region. Significant
differences were also found for religious faiths
within the Middle Eastern sample. Within this
region, Jewish participants scored significantly
higher than Christian and Muslim individuals on
abstract outcomes across definitions. Muslim
respondents scored significantly higher than their
Christian and Jewish counterparts on moral judg-
ments, methods, and the idea that war, torture,
and terrorism should be undertaken only as a last
resort.
Conclusions
Even when respondents do not expressly invoke
international law or ethics, their definitions of
war, torture, and terror are drawn from one of
three basic conceptions regarding the permissibil-
ity of political violence: (1) these acts and activi-
ties are unqualifiedly immoral and therefore
impermissible (the position of the pacifist), (2)
qualifiedly moral and permissible (the territory
that the just war tradition is meant to navigate), or
(3) amoral (the position of the foreign policy real-
ist). In the last case, an act’s permissibility is unre-
lated to its putative morality and is only related to
its legality insofar as it is enforceable—a largely
post hoc consideration in anarchic international
relations. Because the validity of desperate means
depends on the specific conditions under which
they are deployed, as in the second and third cases,
neither international law nor absolutist moral law
seems adaptable enough to be useful.
As undesirable as it is, “war” seems to admit
of exception. War may be hell, but it nonetheless
continues to strike citizens of disparate disposi-
tions as occasionally necessary, albeit for differ-
ent reasons. Not least of these are the competing
conceptions of what constitutes national security
“necessity” (as Mercurio et al. point out in their
chapter on that topic), some of which too easily
elide from stopping an imminent threat to finding
dragons to slay. Because of this short leap from
the genuine attempt to promote global justice to
governments confusing their good intention for
just cause, national interests must be kept in
check through citizens’ vigilance and participation.
A. Trosky et al.
The findings presented in this book imply that
once statesmen and women convince themselves
of their nation’s stake in a particular conflict,
public opinion is dangerously malleable. This is
especially true when media cease to be vigilant.
“Peacetime,” therefore, ought not be considered
merely the period between inevitable wars but
the time in which populaces steel themselves
against spurious official rationales for conflict,
building bridges between themselves and the
potential “other.”
Fictitious as the “War on Terror” might be in
naming an abstraction as a belligerent, the psy-
chology and sociology behind the resort to terror,
often by affluent and educated individuals, is a
pressing area of further study. While many indi-
viduals’ intuitions about political rights align
with the consensus in international ethics,
addressing the twin scourges of aggressive war
and terrorism requires continuing public educa-
tion or reeducation regarding its particular moral
and legal requirements. These intuitions can be
overpowered by socialization into either the
debilitating cultural relativism that has become
prevalent in Western higher education or the
ethnocentrism or nationalism that often charac-
terizes the less educated. Without authentic
deliberation about just reconciliation of differ-
ence, these forces threaten to undermine both the
conviction behind such international resolutions
as the Responsibility to Protect and the skepti-
cism necessary to keep individual governments
in check, in and out of wartime.
By demanding that national governments
adhere to the standards set out in the UN Charter,
conform to international humanitarian law, and
accept the jurisdiction of the International
Criminal Court and International Court of Justice,
citizens are collectively responsible for shaping
the vaunted “opinion of [hu]mankind” (Walzer
2006). Voting is too slow a mechanism to elicit
such accountability; these entities and ideas must
permeate the everyday discourse of international
relations, emerging in electoral platforms as well
as dinnertime and work conversations. Such
informed opinion includes knowing, rather than
speculating, on what others around the world
think. Thus, public opinion and survey data, such
11 Integrative Summary Definitions
as that presented in this chapter, are highly rele-
vant in evolving the debate over, for example, the
normative status of political violence.
The multivalence of concepts like “war,”
“terror,” and “torture,” in their colloquial, legal,
and official uses, further recommends survey
projects such as ours, soliciting individual
definitions for the sake of clarification—helping
us to see the other’s side. Whereas words like
“coercion” and phrases like “manipulation of sub-
jects’ environment” strike critics as euphemisms
for torture, on the other hand, equating emotional
duress (of a known enemy, say) with a “crime
against humanity” strikes proponents as hyper-
bolic and obstructionist. It is only through the
negotiation of a more precise understanding of
concepts like torture and terror, not only in their
colloquial use, but through their legal and histori-
cal meanings, that we can clarify and refine the
standards by which humanity defines humanity.
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 Section II
National Security
 Introduction to National Security
Coding System 12
Lauren Groves and Andrea Mercurio

The chapters in this section of the book explore
the diverse perspectives of individuals from
across the globe on the topic of national security.
The focus is on responses to two items from the
Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression
and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS; Malley-Morrison
et al. 2006): “National security is essential for
individual and family security” and the follow-up
item: “The best way to achieve security for indi-
viduals and families throughout the world is…”
Participants were recruited from 2002 to 2010
through convenience sampling methods that
included personal invitation and word of mouth,
and took the PAIRTAPS either online or in some
cases using paper and pencil. Responses were
collected and coded by researchers from the
Group on International Perspectives on
Governmental Aggression and Peace (GIPGAP).
The PAIRTAPS data collection effort reflects an
interdisciplinary and international effort that has
drawn on the insights and energies of scores of
affiliates contributing to the data collection,
coding methodology, and analysis processes led
by Dr. Kathleen Malley-Morrison of Boston
University.
Data Collection and Preparation
A grounded theory based coding manual for the
national security items was developed primarily
by Helena Castanheira and David Young Oh,
with the support and contributions of the GIPGAP
research team. The manual was developed using
an internationally mixed subset of responses to
identify salient qualitative themes with the goal
of faithfully representing each respondent’s voice
while capturing patterns and trends in the expres-
sion of salient ideas.
The Coding Process
GIPGAP coders were trained to begin by identi-
fying discreet ideas or codeable units within par-
ticipants’ open-ended qualitative responses.
Thematic category labels were then applied to
these codeable units for the purpose of summa-
rizing and exploring response patterns during
data analysis.
Regarding whether national security is essen-
tial to individual and family security, the first level
of coding responses entails coder identification of
the general disposition of the codeable unit—
namely whether the response communicates
agreement, disagreement, or qualified support
regarding the role of national security—or alter-
natively, does not address the question. At the
next level of analysis, the codeable units are
assigned to more specific thematic categories
indicating type of agreement, disagreement, or
qualified agreement.
In regard to the follow-up item, “The best way
to achieve security for individuals and families

K. Malley-Morrison et al. (eds.), International Handbook of War, Torture, and Terrorism, 183
Peace Psychology Book Series, DOI 10.1007/978-1-4614-1638-8_12,
© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2013
184
throughout the world is…” coders first decided to
which of two major categories each codeable unit
should be assigned. These two major categories
were: Positive/Universalistic/Pro-Social
Responses, and Negative/Protectionist/
Interventionist/Abandonment Responses. The
codeable units were then assigned to more dis-
crete positive or negative thematic categories.
Coding Category Overview for the
National Security Is Essential Item
(a) Arguments for the essentiality of national
security
Available categories for coders under the
canopy of agreement with the essential role
of national security include:
• General agreement: responses that reiter-
ated the language of the item or provided
affirmative statements without additional
information.
• Intrinsically tied: responses positing that
national security and individual and fam-
ily security are interdependent.
• Strong nation: responses that explicitly
emphasize the role of a nation’s strength
and power in achieving national security.
• To protect: responses indicating that
national security is essential because of its
ability to offer protection. This category
includes subcategories for external
threats, emphasizing threats outside of a
nation’s borders; governmental obligation
(external), emphasizing a state’s responsi-
bility/duty to protect from external or
more general threats; citizen obligation
(external) emphasizing the individual’s
responsibility/duty to protect from exter-
nal or more general threats; internal
threats, specifically referring to protection
from threats or forces within the respon-
dent’s community or national borders;
governmental obligation (internal)
emphasizing a state’s responsibility to
protect citizens from internal threats; and
citizen obligation (internal), emphasizing
the individual’s responsibility/duty to
protect themselves from internal threats.
L. Groves and A. Mercurio
• To protect values: responses referring to
the protection of social/cultural values
rather than physical dangers as a key value
of national security.
• To feel safer: responses referring to the
necessity of national security to instill a
sense of safety.
• To protect against evil: responses that
explicitly discuss the need to be protected
from evil in the world.
• Agree while recognizing consequences:
responses indicate agreement with the
statement while also mentioning
ramifications or “side effects” of concern
with national security.
• Necessary evil: responses supporting the
need for national security while also
acknowledging the negative consequences
that may result from a preoccupation with
national security.
(b) Arguments against the essentiality of national
security
Available categories for coders under the
canopy of disagreement with the essential
role of national security include:
• General disagreement: responses reject-
ing the necessity for national security
without elaboration.
• Negative consequences: responses men-
tioning the negative consequences and
dangers of focusing on national security.
• Government deception: responses dis-
cussing governmental use of the national
security concept to mislead or deceive the
public, as in pro-war propaganda and self-
serving interests at the expense of the
citizenry.
• Restricts individual and family security:
references to the possible restriction of
rights and freedoms in the name of
national security, such as wiretapping.
• National security as an illusion: assertions
that national security is unattainable,
impossible, or an illusion.
• Concept of nation states is wrong: refer-
ences to problems with the concept of
nation state—e.g., how rigid national
12 Intro to National Security Coding
borders create the need for defense or a
constant sense of insecurity. Responses
may discuss the abolition of governments
or nation states, or advocate for a focus on
international security and countries living
peaceably through a de-emphasis on
national security.
• Obsession with security/danger instills
fear: responses that disagree with the
statement and communicate the respon-
dents’ belief that people have become
obsessed with security which itself gener-
ates fear.
• Uncorrelated: responses rejecting notion
of a relationship between national secu-
rity and individual and family security.
(c) Coding Categories for Conditional Support
• General conditional agreement: responses
that generally agree with the necessity of
national security but indicate qualifications.
• Better ways, proposed alternatives:
responses communicating agreement with
the necessity of national security but pro-
pose alternative courses of action.
• It restricts individual freedoms and rights:
responses indicating that national security
is not essential if it impinges on individual
freedoms and rights.
• Needs to be monitored: arguments that the
pursuit of national security is essential as
long as there is sufficient oversight.
• Doesn’t justify certain measures: argu-
ments that national security is not essen-
tial at all costs, or arguments for limiting
the reach of national security.
• Essential but incomplete: responses that
suggest national security is essential in
theory, but in reality falls short of achiev-
ing desired ends.
• Useful but not essential: assertions that
national security is helpful in ensuring fam-
ily and individual rights, but not essential.
Coding Categories for the Best Way
to Achieve Security
The coding categories for the second national
security item (i.e., “The best way to achieve
185
security for individuals and families throughout
the world is …”) include:
(a) Positive/universalistic/pro-social: Responses
in this higher level category assert that
national security may be achieved through
the pursuit of universalistic or pro-social
practices such as human rights and equality.
This general category has a number of sub-
categories, which in some cases have further
subcategories of their own:
1. Ethical or philosophical principles for
responses emphasizing ethical or philo-
sophical principles; specific subcategories
include: tolerance, for responses discuss-
ing the importance of respect and tolerance
of other individuals, cultures, and nations
in fostering national security; golden rule,
for responses discussing the importance of
the golden rule, i.e., “do unto others…” in
achieving national security; and peace/
nonviolence, for responses discussing the
practice of nonviolence and commitment
to peace in achieving national security.
2. Recommending peace tools for responses
discussing practical steps for encouraging
peace and nonviolent reconciliation, or men-
tioning specific strategies for creating peace
as a tool for ensuring national security.
3. Diplomacy/international relations/inter-
national law for responses stating the
importance of diplomacy or international
relations in guaranteeing the security of
individual nations.
4. Human and resource development for
responses mentioning the importance of
human development or an equitable redis-
tribution of wealth for creating national
security; this category included the fol-
lowing subcategories: aid, for responses
that discuss the importance of providing
material aid to countries as a means for
creating international stability and
national security; and education, for
responses that discuss the importance of
providing educational tools and intellec-
tual empowerment as a method of guaran-
teeing national security.
186
(b) Negative/protectionist/interventionist/
abandonment responses for responses that
refer to the importance of unilateral strate-
gies for ensuring national security, or focus
primarily on individual nations taking direct
action against perceived security threats.
1. Force, for responses advocating the use of
direct military force against perceived
threats to ensure national security.
2. Denial of possibility of NS, apathy, unsure,
for responses communicating the belief
that national security is impossible, or
indications that participants are unsure of
how to respond.
Finally, the category does not address the
question was created for responses that provide
discussion of off-topic content, and does not
know for responses in which the participants
explicitly state that they do not know the answer
to the survey statement.
Variable Creation and Analysis
Regional datasets for each survey item were cre-
ated based on the participant’s home country as
indicated in the demographic portion of
PAIRTAPS. Identifying information as to the
country or region was removed from each file,
which was then assigned to a trained and super-
vised member of the GIPGAP research team for
qualitative coding. Completed files were
reviewed for coding reliability by the coding
supervisor. Regional national security inter-
coder reliability estimates were found to be
within satisfactory ranges, averaging 91% inter-
coder concordance with a standard deviation of
±6% for “National security is essential for indi-
vidual and family security” and 88% inter-coder
concordance with a standard deviation of ±6%
for the follow-up item: “The best way to achieve
security for individuals and families throughout
the world is…”
Using Microsoft Excel, coding spreadsheets
were created in which the coder would review
each response and record the presence of a given
category for each discrete idea (codeable unit)
within a participant response. For each coding
L. Groves and A. Mercurio
category, continuous count-scores were tabulated
to reflect instances in which the same coding cat-
egory was expressed multiple times in a response.
Additionally, indicator variables were created in
which a 1 was entered to reflect the presence of a
given category within a participant’s response
(regardless of frequency), or a 0 when the partici-
pant did not provide any responses within that
category. In cases where thematic category fre-
quencies were combined to form subscales, or
collapsed into a single category, cumulative
count-score frequencies were tabulated. For
example, cumulative count scores could be cre-
ated by summing all of the to protect subcatego-
ries including protect from external threats and
“protect from internal threats to generate a new
variable; similarly, the scores for all of the sub-
categories under agreement or disagreement
could be summed to generate a new aggregated
variable. These count scores could be treated as
ordinary continuous scores for purposes of t tests
and correlational analyses; in addition, they could
be converted to presence/absence scores for the
new variable created through the summing of
subcategories. Coding category entries for nonre-
sponders who did not provide any qualitative
response to an item were left blank and not
included in category frequency calculations.
To provide a brief example, the following
response contains three discrete ideas, which
constitute codeable units for purposes of analy-
sis: “We all need to open our minds and put away
our personal biases. Until we understand others,
we cannot achieve true security.” This reply con-
sists of three codeable units of meaning: (1)“We
all need to open our minds…” (2) “…and put
away our personal biases.” (3) “Until we under-
stand others, we cannot achieve true security.”
Each of these units falls into the tolerance cate-
gory. In generating count-score frequencies, the
overall response would therefore merit three
tolerance units (a tolerance score of 3) and for
presence/absence indicator coding, one tolerance
unit to reflect that the tolerance category was
present in the answer.
GIPGAP researchers subsequently used either
SPSS or Microsoft Excel for basic summarization
of coding category frequencies. SPSS was in most
12 Intro to National Security Coding
cases used for group differences testing, which
typically consists of chi-square tests of coding
category utilization differences between groups,
and t-tests or ANOVAs of rating scale differences,
and count-score differences between groups.
Chapter Structure
PAIRTAPS was designed to provide its respon-
dents with a forum to share their perspectives and
reasoning concerning some of the most complex
and pressing sociopolitical issues of the present
day. The qualitative nature of the survey items
offer the researcher, and subsequently the reader,
187
richer insight into the thoughts, feelings, and
beliefs of the respondents than might be possible
through rating scale alone. The following chapters
present sample voices from each region in the
context of selected background information; this
background information is provided in order to
contextualize the participants’ perspectives in
this place and time in human history.
Reference
Malley-Morrison K, Daskalopoulos M, You H-S (2006)
International perspectives on governmental aggres-
sion. Int Psychol Rep 10:19–20
 Views on National Security
in Western Europe 13
Michael Corgan, Helena Castanheira, Albertina Aros,
Sandra Carina Fulquez, Matt Pita, Mariana Barbosa,
Julia Koenig, Elizabeth Leembruggen-Kallberg,
Carla Machado, Silja Bara Ómarsdottir, Christine
Roland-Levy, and Mathilde Salmberg

It is 1518, events seem to show a Europe that has
come to grips with its new security issues and put
aside past internal animosities, squabbles, and
outright warfare. The Russians will always be a
potential threat but they are far enough away and
so beset with internal strife that they do not pose
a true immediate threat. The big powers in Europe
have managed to put aside petty differences and
have established a framework for peaceful reso-
lution of contentious issues. The major powers
agree that regardless of how it is dealt with, the
focus must be on the real threat of militant Islam.
They have achieved a framework of agreement
and rules for dealing with this threat, the Treaty
of London. This triumph of diplomacy was
achieved in no small part by a woman, Ferdinand
and Isabella’s daughter Catherine of Aragon.
Initially, the Treaty of London was more or
less effective for almost two and a half years.
Then dynastic politics intruded and it broke
down. Even more destructive of this brief period
of European calm were the writings of a disgrun-
tled Dominican priest, whose 95 theses would
soon be nailed to a church door, opening the way
to more conflict. The Protestant Reformation,
whatever else may be said of it, unleashed yet
another new demon into the world of European
wars and religious fervor. Once again the conti-
nent was plunged into a series of unending and
comprehensive conflicts. One hundred years after
the short-lived Treaty of London, there began, by
conventional reckoning, the Thirty Years War—
the most devastating conflict Europe had ever
seen. The resolution of this often pointless cycle
of violence in the heart of Europe came with the
Peace of Westphalia in 1648. Although the ideas
of the territorial state, and more importantly of
sovereignty, were introduced in the peace ending
this series of wars, peace was not one of the fruits
of the peace agreement. The Pope was removed
as even the nominal arbiter of disputes between
the powers of Christendom, and the absence of
any overarching authority, even in theory, led to a
condition of anarchy. The sovereign of each state
could decide when to use war as a means of
achieving the interests of that state. Even though
the publication of Grotius’s De Jure Belle ac
Pacis in 1623 had introduced the concept of
codified international law, peace was no more
prevalent than it had ever been.
The wars of Europe, what Thomas Jefferson
would later call “the exterminating havoc of a
quarter of the globe” continued unabated through-
out the so-called Age of Reason in the seventeenth
and on into the eighteenth century. Lesser states
were either dragged into the wars of the major
powers or, like Poland, once the largest state in
Europe, carved up as the major powers saw fit.
Nor was it only Europe that felt the blows of ever
more modern and lethal modes of war. The devel-
opment of ocean-going merchant and naval fleets
brought the havoc of European gunpowder-enriched

K. Malley-Morrison et al. (eds.), International Handbook of War, Torture, and Terrorism, 189
Peace Psychology Book Series, DOI 10.1007/978-1-4614-1638-8_13,
© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2013
190
warfare to the rest of the world. For a time there
was respite in major fighting on the continent
itself, but this ended with the introduction of a
new force in the course of human events that
rivaled and often replaced religion as an organiz-
ing and motivating force of social groups to do
violence to each other—nationalism.
The nationalism spawned by the French
Revolution led to nearly a quarter century of war
as fierce as the earlier Thirty Years’ War but this
warfare spread all across Europe, whereas the ear-
lier episode had not. Massive armies of citizens,
no longer just subjects, made the scale of fighting
larger than anything heretofore seen. Moreover,
the wars spilled over into the eastern lands with
Napoleon’s invasion of Russia. The earlier
Napoleonic invasions of Spain had given birth to
fighters who persisted after the official national
armies had been defeated or negotiated into qui-
escence. These new warriors were the “little sol-
diers” or guerillas as they came to be known.
These fighters would become a feature in virtu-
ally all subsequent European wars, which meant
wars everywhere, even down to the present day.
The Congress of Vienna may be regarded as
the first serious attempt to bring peace and secu-
rity to the whole continent of Europe, at least as
far as the five major powers—Russia, Prussia,
Austria, France and what is now the United
Kingdom—were concerned. The “concert sys-
tem” was to see regular meetings of the powers
for almost a dozen years and even mutual assis-
tance; for example, Russia helped Austria squelch
internal rebellion in Budapest as late as 1848.
The concert system on the whole, however, was
short-lived; British diplomats and statesmen pre-
ferred their external balancer role and their
“splendid isolation” as tensions between other
powers grew. What upset the security of Europe
most in the nineteenth century was the unification
of Italy and particularly of Germany under the
aegis of Prussian leadership. With three short,
6-week wars with Denmark, Austria, and finally
France, the “Iron Chancellor,” Otto von Bismarck,
forged an extremely powerful state in the midst
of the five-power balance achieved at the Congress
of Vienna a half century earlier. By 1871,
M. Corgan et al.
Germany was undisputedly the strongest power
on the continent and this predominance boded ill
for future security in Europe.
Other factors also contributed to the height-
ening of an atmosphere of militarism and belli-
cosity. Europe became engaged in a new round
of colonial depredations and the successes of a
country’s armies against woefully outgunned
native forces fueled popular appetites for yet
more conquest and triumphs. Growing literacy
also meant that more of the population of any
country could drink the heady brew of national-
istic glory won by arms. Britain’s poet of impe-
rialism, Rudyard Kipling, applauded the
American adventure in the Philippines by
encouraging the USA to fulfill its “social”
Darwinian role and take up “the white man’s
burden.” In return, it was an American who
touched a spark to the tinder of Europe’s warlike
inclinations by inciting an inflammatory battle-
ship building arms race between the newly pow-
erful Germany of Kaiser Wilhelm II and the
mistress of the seas, Great Britain. Alfred T.
Mahan’s Influence of Seapower Upon History
(1890) provided both these European powers
facing each other across the North Sea, and oth-
ers, too, with the rationale to challenge each
other’s technology, industrial production, and
military might. One more element in this declin-
ing spiral into warlike answers to political ques-
tions was the receding of the Ottoman Empire
and the clash between Russia and Austria–
Hungary over its remains. Perhaps diplomacy
might have resolved things peacefully as it did
on several occasions but eventually nationalism,
whose strong echoes we see today, touched off
an explosion at Sarajevo in the summer of 1914.
What followed, which we often call World Wars
I and II, was really a European civil war, the
apotheosis of insecurity in Europe.
It is 2011, events show a Western Europe that
has come to grips with its new security issues
and put aside past internal animosities, squab-
bles, and outright warfare…? Potential threats
will always exist but Europeans are working on
achieving a framework of agreement and rules
for dealing with national security issues. The big
13 Western Europe National Security
powers in Europe must manage to put aside petty
differences and establish a framework for peace-
ful resolution of contentious issues. Major pow-
ers must agree that the focus should be on the
triumph of a resilient, emotionally intelligent
people. Diplomacy can be used to achieve a con-
sensus of individual and national security from
within the core of Western Europe. In no small
part, implementing further research, programs,
and education about fostering resiliency and
emotional intelligence skills will be of great
benefit individually and nationally. According to
Flynn (2011):
Resilience cannot be imposed from above by secu-
rity and law enforcement professionals operating
behind closed doors. It must be cultivated from
below for it takes individuals, communities, and
companies, each pursuing efforts within their
respective spans of control, to build societal resil-
ience. Building resilience additionally requires an
all-hands effort that extends beyond national juris-
dictions and conventional security. Whether it is
adapting to climate change, preparing for earth-
quakes and tsunamis, or developing contingencies
to mitigate and quickly respond to and recover
from man-made disasters, the resilience imperative
is a universal one. As such, it is an agenda that has
the capacity to transcend ideological and cultural
differences within and among nations and there-
fore provides a unifying rationale for greater inter-
national cooperation (Flynn 2011, p. ii).
According to Maston et al. (1990), resiliency
is defined as the process of, capacity for, or
outcome of successful adaptation despite chal-
lenging or threatening circumstances. Resilience
is further defined as the process of adapting well
in the face of adversity, trauma, tragedy, threats,
with the presence of protective factors, such as
personal, social, familial, and institutional safety
nets that enable individuals to resist and over-
come adversity (Kaplan 1996, p. 158).
One of these safety nets is found in the social
framework of religion, which provides a network
of social and individual supports that foster the
protective factors found in high resiliency. With
regard to Europe’s diverse culture, the largest reli-
gion is Christianity. Religion in Europe has been a
major formative and historical influence on art,
culture, philosophy, and law. Regardless of past
191
havoc due to religious fervor, the present positive
psychological goal is to focus and build onto one
more of Western Europe’s strengths instead of
focusing on its past weaknesses or failures.
Consider research that has shown the importance
of religion and spirituality in positively impacting
overall performance, educational aspirations,
worldview, and optimism about the future mainly
because it fosters the protective factors found in
resiliency (Regnerus et al. 2003). Political agendas
aside, being religious or spiritual has been associ-
ated with psychological well-being, positive self-
concept, and good physical health (Donahue and
Benson 1995; Ellison 1991; Oleckno and
Blacconiere 1991). Persons who are religious and/
or spiritual are less likely to engage in risky behav-
iors such as smoking, drugs, and alcohol use,
thereby greatly improving the social stability and
familial security needed for individual and national
security (Hays et al. 1986; Rohrbaugh and Jessor
1975; Woodroof 1985). In order to find a balance
between the values of freedom, security, and fun-
damental human rights, religious freedom and
national security must be reconciled in a way that
makes it feasible to enjoy them both concurrently
and ultimately help develop the integration and
tolerance that are the foundation of a stable and
safe society (Ferrari 2004).
“The security of a family and individuals is
mirrored in their views on life.” National and
individual security issues in Western Europe
reflect much of the global crisis. Family, commu-
nity, state, and national leaders in the past and
present have shown resiliency skills by making
individual and political connections, avoiding
seeing crises as insurmountable problems, accept-
ing change as a part of living. Resiliency skills
developed around psychological emotional matu-
rity, cognitive complexity, and cultural empathy
can be instrumental in moving toward national
goals, such as taking decisive actions, looking for
opportunities of national rediscovery, nurturing a
positive view of citizens, keeping things in per-
spective, and lastly but most importantly, main-
taining a hopeful outlook. This view illustrates
the importance of a comment from a Western
European participant who wrote, “Although
192
national security is important the individual view
on security is more important.” Maintaining a
society of individuals with hopeful perspectives
and views could be more productive and in the
best interest of national security.
Western Europe’s national security issues
could most likely be inextricably tied with family
and individual security. “A country ought to pro-
tect its people, but a country by itself cannot act
completely independently.” Individual security is
vaguely defined as freedom from fear and want,
which then is directly connected to an individu-
al’s emotions. Could emotional intelligence, one
of the driving forces behind the factors that affect
personal success and everyday interactions with
others, provide a way to best practice human
security?
Emotional intelligence (EI) is defined in a
number of ways and is a concept rooted in the
theory of social intelligence (Rehfield 2002).
Since Plato’s famous quote, “All learning has an
emotional base,” Edward Thorndike (1920) con-
cept of “social intelligence,” Abraham Maslow’s
description of how people can build emotional
strength, to Daniel Goleman’s book, Emotional
Intelligence: Why It Can Matter More Than IQ,
the concept of emotional intelligence has been
popularized. It is necessary to emphasize that
emotional intelligence has conceptual and theo-
retical components that are not of recent appear-
ance, but contain concepts developed for decades
by philosophers and psychologists alike.
EI can be thought of as the combination of
factors that allow a person to feel, be motivated,
regulate mood, control impulse, persevere through
adversity, and thereby succeed in day-to-day
living (Goleman 1995). EI is a “different way of
being smart” (Goleman 1995). EI can be consid-
ered as the ability to monitor one’s own and oth-
ers’ feelings and emotions, to discriminate among
them, and to use this information to guide one’s
thoughts and actions (Salovey and Mayer 1990).
Definitively, a person’s success-oriented traits
can lead to individual security. “Then it is more
desirable with global and international peace to
avoid insecurity,” wrote a 26-year-old Swedish
male. The apotheosis of insecurity in Europe may
be redefined individually on a national scale.
M. Corgan et al.
Salovey and Mayer’s ability-based model
views emotions as useful sources of information
that help one to make sense of and navigate the
social environment. The model proposes that
individuals vary in their ability to process infor-
mation of an emotional nature and in their ability
to relate emotional processing to a wider cogni-
tion. This ability is manifested in certain adaptive
behaviors. The Mayer and Salovey (1997) model
claims that EI includes four types of abilities:
1. Perceiving emotions—the ability to detect and
decipher emotions in faces, pictures, voices,
and cultural artifacts—including the ability to
identify one’s own emotions. Perceiving emo-
tions represents a basic aspect of emotional
intelligence, as it makes all other processing
of emotional information possible.
2. Using emotions—the ability to harness emo-
tions to facilitate various cognitive activities,
such as thinking and problem solving. The
emotionally intelligent person can capitalize
fully upon his or her changing moods in order
to best fit the task at hand.
3. Understanding emotions—the ability to com-
prehend emotion language and to appreciate
complicated relationships among emotions.
For example, understanding emotions encom-
passes the ability to be sensitive to slight vari-
ations between emotions, and the ability to
recognize and describe how emotions evolve
over time.
4. Managing emotions—the ability to regulate
emotions in both ourselves and in others.
Therefore, the emotionally intelligent person
can harness emotions, even negative ones, and
manage them to achieve intended goals.
National security issues will be reflected in how
resilient and emotionally intelligent individuals,
communities, companies, and countries are in
meeting the demands of twenty-first century
threats of terrorism, disease outbreaks, natural
disasters, climate change, and periodic disrup-
tions of complex and interdependent networks
and systems. In a world with no “risk-free zones,”
the locales that demonstrate a capacity to with-
stand, nimbly respond and recover, and adapt to
disruptive risk will end up having a comparative
advantage over those that do not.
13 Western Europe National Security
Identifying what it takes to be resilient and
acting on that knowledge will be indispensable to
achieving growth, safety, and security within the
global community. While the psychological focus
on resilience and emotional intelligence contin-
ues to grow, individuals, leaders, and policy mak-
ers are finding the need to implement strategic
methods of positive psychology in order to maxi-
mize production and security. Positive psychol-
ogy will provide the tools needed to build the
factors that allow individuals, communities, soci-
eties, and nations to flourish.
As a side effect of studying positive human traits,
science will learn how to buffer against and better
prevent mental, as well as some physical, illnesses.
As a main effect, we will learn how to build the
qualities that help individuals and communities not
just endure and survive, but also flourish (Seligman
and Csikszentmihalyi 2000, p. 5).
Recently, on December 8, 2010, a report titled,
“The United States and Europe: Current Issues”
was released by the Congressional Research
Service, which works exclusively for the United
States Congress. Congressional Research Service
(CRS) is a legislative branch agency within the
Library of Congress, which is highly valued and
respected as a resource on Capitol Hill. Regardless
of party affiliation, CRS provides policy and legal
analysis to committees and members of both the
House and Senate.
The report, co-authored by Derek E. Mix, ana-
lyst in European affairs and Kristin Archick, CRS
specialist in European affairs, brings us stridently
into today’s issues of national security. Mix and
Archik (2010) begin by making reference to the
transatlantic partnership between the USA and
Europe. This transatlantic partnership between
countries originated out of the extensive collabo-
ration on a multiplicity of issues. Both sides rest
upon many areas with mutual values and interests
and have developed progressively more interde-
pendently in terms of security and prosperity.
Mix and Archick reported that the majority of
Europeans warmly welcomed President Barack
Obama to office, and his popularity suggested
opportunities for the USA and Europe to address
the common set of global challenges they face.
193
As a complicated agenda, the positive nature of
the relationship does not necessarily translate
immediately into tangible foreign policy results.
Transatlantic cooperation is very effective on
many key issues, although some apprehensions
continue to endure. New anxieties become appar-
ent about the future of the transatlantic partner-
ship as both the USA and Europe manage
changing geopolitical realities. Mix and Archik
(2010) found the following five key issues illus-
trative of the nature of transatlantic relationships
and cooperation, which are prone to have impli-
cations for both Europe and US interests during
the 112th Congress:
Despite the substantially increased commitment
of troops and resources during 2009–2010, the
likely outcome of the NATO-led mission in
Afghanistan is a subject of debate. Afghanistan
continues to pose a test of alliance cohesion, and
Europe’s commitment to maintaining its participa-
tion will be an important tone setter in transatlan-
tic relations. Europe remains both a primary target
of radical Islamist terrorists and a potential base
for those seeking to carry out attacks against the
United States. Transatlantic counterterrorism
cooperation has been strong since the terrorist
attacks of 9/11, but challenging differences exist
over issues such as data privacy that could hinder
or complicate efforts to jointly combat terrorism.
The current global financial crisis has affected the
transatlantic economic relationship and challenged
the political relationship. Promoting financial sta-
bility and restoring economic growth are major
priorities for leaders on both sides. The United
States and Europe have the largest trade and
investment relationship in the world. While some
disputes persist, most of the relationship is mutu-
ally beneficial, and efforts are ongoing to reduce
non-tariff barriers and increase regulatory conver-
gence. The United States and the European Union
(EU) continue to seek a way to halt Iran’s nuclear
program. After the approval of UNSC Resolution
1929 in June 2010, the EU applied strict new sanc-
tions against Iran. While the new measures bring
U.S. and EU sanctions into broad alignment, dif-
ferences remain over issues such as the sale of
refined petroleum products. Lastly, relations
between the West and Russia have grown increas-
ingly tense in recent years. While the Obama
Administration’s “reset” initiative appears to have
contributed to an improved atmosphere, common
approaches to Russia—among U.S. policymakers,
within Europe, and across the Atlantic—have
proven difficult to formulate (Mix and Archik
2010, p. 2).
194
These “common difficult to formulate
approaches” may carry heavy repercussions in
regard to security and prosperity for Western
Europe. As such, it is imperative to look at inter-
actions and interdependency among all countries
at present as we discuss perspectives within
Western Europe. Can identifying perspectives on
national security in Western Europe give us some
understanding of what is essential for family,
individual, and ultimately national security in the
view of people living there?
Western European where data were collected
for this chapter include Iceland, Germany, Spain,
Portugal, France, and Sweden. Data were col-
lapsed for regional analysis, though there were
significant differences between countries in some
comparisons, as noted below. To provide a con-
text for the data, brief descriptions of each of the
countries follow. More detailed historical sum-
maries can be found in State Violence and the
Right to Peace, Vol. 1 (Malley-Morrison 2006)
and the U.S. Department of State Website, http://
www.state.gov.
Iceland
Iceland, a country of about 320,000 people and
about the size of the US state of Virginia, went
from being one of the poorest countries in the
world at the beginning of the twentieth century to
one of the wealthiest by its close. Located on an
island about the same size as Ireland in the North
Atlantic, it was first settled by Vikings and Irish
monks in the ninth century. Christianity was
adopted as a national religion over 1000 years
ago at the Althing, perhaps the oldest parliament
in the world that is still functioning. Iceland
existed independently until 1262, when it formed
an alliance with Norway. In the fourteenth cen-
tury, Norway and Denmark were united under the
Danish Crown. Iceland remained a remote and
peaceful outpost of the Danish empire just below
the Arctic Circle until World War I. Although it
managed to remain neutral during both World
Wars, both the UK and USA established mili-
tary bases there. Iceland became an independent
M. Corgan et al.
parliamentary republic with its own constitution
in 1944 and was one of the founding members of
NATO in 1949. Prior to that, it had been a “sover-
eign state” under the Danish Crown since 1918.
The population, 94% of whom live in urban
areas, is fairly homogenous, mostly descended
from Norse settlers or Celts. The Icelandic lan-
guage, which has remained relatively unchanged
since the twelfth century, is close to the Old Norse
language. Most of the inhabitants also speak
English and the literacy rate is nearly 100%.
Iceland has been rated first in the world on the
UN’s Human Development Index since 2007 and
listed as the most peaceful country in the world
by the Global Peace Index (see http://www.
visionsofhumanity.org).
Sweden
During the seventh century, the Swedes (Vikings)
were merchant seaman. During the twelfth cen-
tury, Sweden became a unified Christian monar-
chy that also included Finland until the sixteenth
century. In conflict with Norway and Denmark
throughout this time, and later with Russia and
Poland, the country was considered one of the
strongest and most influential countries in the
Baltic region.
Sweden has not been involved in a formal
conflict since the Napoleonic Wars in 1814,
although the country was affected by the world
wars, during which sympathies were with
Germany, and the Cold War, when they offered
covert support to the USA. Slightly larger than the
U.S. state of California, the population is about
9.4 million people. The literacy rate is above 99%
and Sweden has an extensive social welfare sys-
tem that provides childcare, maternity and pater-
nity leave, pensions, a ceiling on health-care costs
and other benefits to assure quality of life.
Considered to have one of the highest standards
of living in the world, Sweden joined the EU in
1995 and remains one of the strongest countries,
economically, in Europe. Gender equality in
Sweden is also well established and documented.
About 78% of the population report Lutheran as
13 Western Europe National Security
their religion. Because of increased immigration,
much of it from Iraq, Bosnia, Serbia, Montenegro,
Iran, Somalia, and northern Africa, the Muslim
population is growing, accounting for about 10%
of the population at present.
Germany
Germany is a temperate, cool country about the
size of Montana with a population of about 83
million people, mostly of Germanic heritage.
Small groups of Turks and Slavics (about 2% of
the population each) also live in Germany. About
74% of the population lives in urban areas, and
the literacy rate exceeds 99%. Much of the his-
tory recounted earlier in the chapter regarding the
Protestant Reformation and Thirty Years’ War
occurred on German soil. Germany also played a
key role in both World Wars, and suffered greatly
in both. Since World War II, the USA has main-
tained a strong military presence in Germany.
In connection with the wars, the economy and
standards of living in Germany have fluctuated
greatly across the last century. Today, Germany is
part of the EU and has the largest economy in
Europe and the fifth-largest in the world. The
country has a highly skilled workforce and
exports machinery, chemicals, and other goods.
The standard of living is generally high and social
services, though heavily taxed of late due to a low
birth rate, reintegration of East Germany and an
aging population, are generally good, though not
on a par with Sweden.
France
France is the largest country in western Europe,
nearly the size of Texas. Over 90% of the
population of 64 million lives in urban areas.
The literacy rate is above 99%. According to
U.S. State Department statistics, the majority of
the population are Catholic (about 85%); 10%
are Muslim, and the remainder are Protestant or
Jewish. However, there are no official French
government statistics on religion and in a 2007
195
poll, 51% described themselves as Catholic and
another 31% described themselves as having no
religious affiliation. Since 2004, France has been
considered home to both the largest Jewish and
Muslim populations in Western Europe. This
country has been a crossroads of trade since pre-
historic times. Celtic, Latin, and Teutonic groups
blended over the centuries. Traditionally, France
has had a high rate of immigration. Most
recently, six million Muslims from Algeria and
other parts of North Africa have moved to
France.
One of the first areas to become a nation, it
was the dominant power in Europe during the
seventeenth century and a colonial power in
Africa. Financial problems during the eighteenth
century set the stage for both the French
Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars, which had
a major influence on the history of much of the
rest of the world. The country suffered heavy
losses during both World Wars but regained sta-
bility and economic prominence during the latter
part of the twentieth century. It was one of the six
founding countries of the EU and continues to
play a leading role, especially in the development
of Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP)
and the Barcelona Process. After Germany,
France has the largest economy in Western
Europe and, next to the USA, is the world’s sec-
ond-largest agricultural producer. Social services,
including health care and child care, remain
intact, though recently, taxes on overtime were
repealed and the age of eligibility for retirement
pensions was moved to later in life.
Spain
The Iberian Peninsula, where Spain is located,
has ruins of advanced cities and civilizations
dating back over 25,000 years. In the ninth cen-
tury, Phoenicians, Greeks, Carthaginians, and
Celts inhabited the region. The Romans invaded
in the second century BC, laying the ground-
work for the religion, laws and language that
still characterize the country today. By the sev-
enth century, Rome had been displaced by the
196
Visigoths; the Moors from Northern Africa
pushed the Visigoths into the mountains in 711
and continued to rule Spain until the end of the
crusades in the early sixteenth century. From
then until the eighteenth century, Spain was the
center of a world empire, with conquered colo-
nies throughout the world, great wealth and
strong political influence. The Spanish language
remains one of the most commonly spoken lan-
guages on the planet as a result of the many lands
in the Americas and elsewhere colonized by
Spain during this time. The country’s power and
prominence gradually declined over the next 200
years as wars ensued, territories were lost and
political structure continued to change.
Civil wars and various groups seeking territo-
rial autonomy made Spain a violent and repres-
sive country through much of the twentieth
century. Following the end of Franco’s dictator-
ship and the transition to democracy in 1975,
Spain made considerable progress socially and
economically. As a part of the European
Community (now EU) since 1986, Spain has
developed good public education policies and
strong social welfare programs. The literacy rate
is above 97%.
Spain is nearly as large as France, about the
size of Arizona and Utah combined.
Approximately 47 million people live in the
country. The population, about 75% Catholic, is
much less dense and less urban than in other
countries in Western Europe. Immigration is
increasing, as in the rest of Western Europe, with
many people coming from Eastern Europe, South
America, and North Africa.
Portugal
Portugal is a small country of ten million people,
about the size of Indiana, bordering on Spain and
the Atlantic Ocean. It has been an independent
country since 1143, making it one of the oldest in
Europe. By the fifteenth century, Portugal was a
vast colonial empire that included parts of Asia,
Africa, and South America. The decolonization
of this empire, beginning with Brazil and
M. Corgan et al.
Malaysia in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries and finally ending with parts of Africa
in the 1970s, was the last chapter of the European
empires’ dissolution after World War II. It was
ruled by a monarchy until 1910, when a republic
was created. The republican regime faced eco-
nomic crisis and political instability. In 1926 a
dictatorial regime was imposed that lasted for 48
years, the most prolonged authoritarian regime
in Europe. Up until 1974, Portugal was an under-
developed, rural and highly Catholic country.
Then a military revolution with a high level of
political support overthrew the dictatorial gov-
ernment. The next decade included political
instability and terrorism, supported in part by
both pro-US as well as pro-USSR forces. Portugal
then joined the European Community (EU) in
1986 and has since been stable politically, gov-
erned by Socialist and Social Democratic parties.
It remains about 92% Catholic and over 50%
rural, with a literacy rate of 93%. Economy, edu-
cation, and social services are similar to Spain
but less developed than in France, Germany,
Iceland, and Sweden.
European Perspectives on Security
Sample Demographics
The Western European sample was comprised of
participants who reside in Iceland, Sweden,
Germany, France, Spain, and Portugal. These
participants were recruited through a number of
different approaches including personal network-
ing and posting online links on various websites.
All participants completed the Personal and
Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace
Survey (PAIRTAPS; Malley-Morrison et al.
2006), either in a paper-and-pencil or electronic
version.
The entire European sample consisted of 445
participants, 439 of whom reported their gender.
Specifically, 106 participants were recruited from
Iceland (77 women, 29 men), 98 from Germany
(66 women, 31 men, 1 unidentified), 85 from
13 Western Europe National Security
Spain (42 women, 40 men, 3 unidentified), 18
from Portugal (12 women, 6 men), 56 from
France (31 women, 25 men), and 82 from Sweden
(38 women, 42 men, 2 unidentified).
This summary considers the European
responses to two items that investigate the par-
ticipants’ views on security. The first used a
7-point Likert-type scale with anchors ranging
from 1 (total disagreement) to 7 (total agree-
ment). This item asks respondents to indicate
their level of agreement with the statement,
“National security is essential for family and
individual security.” The second part of this item
asks respondents to elaborate on their quantita-
tive rating with an explanation in their own
words. For the second item respondents are asked
to respond to the statement, “The best way to
achieve security for individuals and families
throughout the world is…”
Coding manuals, described elsewhere in this
volume, were created for each of these items. To
examine perspectives on national security in the
above-mentioned Western European countries,
several qualitative and quantitative analyses were
done. Specifically, we investigated the patterns of
distribution of responses in the different coding
categories; we also did exploratory analyses of
the extent to which endorsement of national secu-
rity and proposed solutions differed across
nationality, religion, gender, participation in the
military and participation in protest.
Essentiality of National Security
Forty-seven percent of the responses expressed
agreement with the statement that national
security is essential to individual and family
security. The most common form of agreement
(34% of all the responses and 72% of the agree-
ment responses) was coded for general agree-
ment; for example, a 28-year-old woman from
Sweden wrote, “If you do not have your own
army/defense, you will quickly have someone
else’s army there…”
Out of all of the responses expressing agree-
ment with this statement, 8% specifically stated
197
that national security was inextricably tied with
family and individual security. One such example
comes from a 21-year-old woman from France.
Simply put, “insecurity of a nation necessarily
provokes the insecurity of citizens.” Table 13.1
provides additional examples of responses agree-
ing that national security is essential for family
and individual security.
In comparison, 17% of the responses
expressed the belief that national security is NOT
essential for individual and family security. Of
these, 21% implied that national security is an
illusion or an impossibility. A 37-year-old woman
from Iceland states, “Everybody has the right to
live in a secure world but that’s not our reality
and probably never will be.” Another argument
against a link between national and individual/
family security (19% of the disagreeing
responses) expressed disapproval for nation
states. “A country ought to protect its people, but
a country by itself cannot act completely inde-
pendently. Then it is more desirable with global
and international peace to avoid insecurity,”
wrote a 26-year-old Swedish man. Table 13.2
provides more examples of responses disagree-
ing with the essentiality of national security.
The last major coding category for this item
was for responses expressing partial agreement
or agreement only under specified circumstances.
In other words, the participant agreed with the
statement, but would NOT agree with the state-
ment if a standard was not met or a condition not
satisfied. Twenty-six percent of the responses
reflected this type of statement. A 28-year-old
woman from Iceland explained, “It is important
to live within secure borders but they don’t neces-
sarily provide personal security, especially not if
you are female and/or belong to a persecuted
minority group.” A German woman said,
“Fundamentally yes, as long as it is not misused
in the form of a dictatorship.”
The subgroup with the greatest percentage
(38%) of responses in this partial agreement cat-
egory included those that explained that national
security is useful but not essential. A 37-year-old
man from Iceland wrote, “Security of a family
and individuals is mirrored in their views on life.
198 M. Corgan et al.

Table 13.1 Sample responses agreeing with essentiality of national security

Category Percent Country Gender Age Response
General agreement 34 (72) Sweden M 30 “The founding reason for creating a
government is historically for the person/
people in power to promise to protect the
people”
Portugal M 67 “Because people do bad things no matter
what, we do need to have a serious level
of national security”
France F 24 “Essential for the quality of live and
personal realization”
Spain M “If we live in an insecure or dangerous
environment, it is extremely hard to feel
peace in our hearts”
Iceland M 28 “We do not want some bullies ruining
something a whole nation is working for.
National security is therefore a vital part
of domestic security”
Note: The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total
response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in that category out of all the
responses agreeing with the essentialness of national security
F female, M male

Table 13.2 Sample responses disagreeing with essentiality of national security

Category Percent Country Age Gender Response
Government deception 1 (5) Iceland 39 M “National security is used when there is a
real chance of being attacked. I do not live
in a country where there is a real chance
of being attacked. I think it is a web of
disguises to implement fear into civilians
so that they agree on warfare”
Anti nation states 3 (19) Sweden 55 F “Nation-states are becoming obsolete
because of globalization”
Note: The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total
response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in that category out of all the
responses that disagreed with the statement that national security is essential for family and individual security
F female, M male

Although national security is important the indi-
vidual view on security is more important.”
Table 13.3 provides more quotes expressive of
this viewpoint.
Achieving Security
The second item was designed to elicit the
respondents’ qualitative judgments to the stem,
“The best way to achieve security for individuals
and families throughout the world is…” The
sample produced a total of 245 codeable units
for this item. A resounding 86% indicated a belief
that national security may be achieved through
the pursuit of universalistic or pro-social prac-
tices. The ranges of responses varied greatly in
depth from brief, “World peace”(Iceland, 23-year-
old man) to elaborate suggestions such as
“Acceptance, tolerance, understanding, forgoing
violence against other schools of thought, other
colors, other religions. We can learn from each
other through travel, exchange students, scholar-
ships to study abroad, and this leads to a better
13 Western Europe National Security
Table 13.3 Examples of partial agreement with essentiality of national security
Code Percent Country
National security 10 (38) Spain
is useful but not
essential
France
Sweden
Sweden
German
Note: The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total
response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in that category out of all the
responses that provided conditional or partial agreement with the statement that national security is essential for family
and individual agreement
F female, M male
understanding and removes fear of each other”
(Germany, man). Out of these pro-social types of
responses, 25% explained that the best way to
achieve security is by invoking ethical or philo-
sophical principles of peace/nonviolence, through
international relations, or through education.
Examples are provided in Table 13.4.
The other responses either suggested unilat-
eral strategies for achieving security (4%), as in
the example of this man, “A good defense can
make an invasion expensive for the enemy” (55
years old, Sweden), or denied the validity of or
showed apathy to the essentiality statement,
“Unfortunately, no solution” (Germany, woman).
Quantitative Analysis
Only results that achieved statistical or marginal
significance are reported in this summary of our
exploratory analyses of possible demographic
group differences in responses to the national
security items. All results described as statistically
199
Age Gender Response
31 M “Without personal security there is
nothing, and once achieved it is better
than national security”
25 F “National security can partly assure
individual and family security, but other
elements come into play for the second”
24 M “Of course it is important. And security
leads to less fear and hatred. Although it
is not a deciding factor. Individual
attitudes, philosophy of life and whether
the state supports those in need is very
important”
30 M “National security is judged differently
based on interests, national security is
not necessary nor sufficient in achieving
that effect”
F “National security is important, but it
must stand in relation to international
security”
significant had p values less than or equal to 0.05;
marginally significant results had p values between
0.10 and 0.05. In regard to responses to the
PAIRTAPS item: “National security is essential
for individual and family security,” rating scale
scores ranged across the entire 7-point scale, with
an average of 5.78 for the Spanish sample and 4.82
and 4.84 for the Swedish and Icelandic samples,
respectively. Analysis of variance (ANOVA) tests
revealed significant national differences. Post hoc
pairwise comparisons indicated that participants
from Spain showed a higher level of agreement
with the importance of national security than par-
ticipants from Sweden and Iceland. No gender dif-
ferences were found; however, another one-way
analysis of variance revealed that level of agree-
ment varied with religious affiliation and religious
sect. Post hoc pairwise comparisons indicated that
Christians scored significantly higher in endorse-
ment of national security than respondents describ-
ing themselves as “Agnostic, Other or None.”
In addition, discrete analysis showed that
within the German and Swedish national samples,
200 M. Corgan et al.

Table 13.4 Samples for positive/universal/pro-social responses

Category Percent Country Age Gender Response
Provide material aid 4 (5) Iceland 37 F “Balance the distribution of valuables both
within a country and between countries”
Germany F “Non political direct aid—health and
welfare and education—helping people to
help themselves, helping to respect
themselves and others”
International relations 9 (10) Iceland 42 F “Increase communication and understand-
ing between people”
Recommend specific 4 (5) Germany M “Maintaining peace through agreements
peace tools and actions, comprehensive state agree-
ments against terrorism, political creations
with comprehensive objectives, informa-
tion in crisis situations”
Education 9(10) Iceland 43 F “Education, equalization, respect and
abolish the armies of the world. Nothing
good comes from warfare. An army cannot
be a premise for peace and security”
Spain 46 F “The best way to achieve the individual
and families security in the whole world is
for parents in each family to achieve this
security through education and good
example given to children. Our tools could
be: Love, Trust, Illusion, Effort,
Forgiveness and Faith”
General positive/ 32 (37) France 21 M “An unlimited liberty, rights extended
universal/pro-social for all”
responses
Sweden 24 M “For empathy to grow stronger in this
world than individualism and egoism. For
everyone who is able, through states and
organizations, to help those in need instead
of increasing their own anxiety with
unnecessary material possessions. A
general change in attitude throughout the
world”
Human resource 4 (5) Sweden 59 F “To use resources wisely and produce only
development what is needed, preferable according to
perma culture design. The population has
to decrease, we don’t have enough
resources because it keeps increasing”
Note: The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total
response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in that category out of all the
responses that offered suggestions on how to best to achieve national security
F female, M male

respondents who had never protested against war
showed significantly higher support for national
security than those who had protested (Table 13.5).
In regards to participation in the military and
having a relative in the military, although no dif-
ferences were found in the sample as a whole,
when the file was split by country, t tests revealed
that Spanish participants who had a relative in the
military scored marginally higher in agreement
of the importance of national security than those
who did not.
Chi square contingency analyses were run
with the presence/absence scores for each of the
major qualitative coding categories to determine
13 Western Europe National Security 201

Table 13.5 National security: means, standard deviations, and t-test results by demographic group for coding categories
Categories Group 1 Group 2 t df
German males German females
Useful but not essential 0.00 (0.00) 0.09 (0.29) 2.08* 36.00
French males French females
Positive/universalistic/ 0.62 (0.51) 0.17 (0.39) 2.73* 20.06
pro-social responses
German relative in military German no relative in military
Conditional agreement 0.27 (0.45) 0.08 (0.28) 1.90^ 32.49
Spanish relative military Spanish no relative military
Agreement 0.58 (0.50) 0.17 (0.41) 2.13^ 9.24
Protest No protest
German protest German non-protest
Rating scale 4.56 (1.65) 5.73 (1.12) 3.55*** 61.54
Swedish protest Swedish non-protest
Rating scale 4.27 (2.16) 5.52 (1.63) 2.64* 61.91
Note: Refer to the National Security Methods chapter for a more detailed description of the coding categories and the
tests done. Standard deviations appear in parentheses next to means
*
p £ 0.05; **p £ 0.01; ***p £ 0.001; ^0.05 < p < 0.1

whether type of argument varied by gender,

having a relative in the military, or participation
in protest against war. These analyses revealed
that significantly more non-protestors than pro-
testors provided arguments agreeing with the
importance of national security, and conversely
significantly more protestors than non-protestors
provided more reasons why national security is
not essential for national and family security.
Although the differences were only margin-
ally significant for the sample as a whole in
regards to gender, women from Germany made
significantly more arguments than men support-
ing the notion that national security is useful in
ensuring family and individual rights but not
essential. In addition, women from France made
significantly more arguments than men suggest-
ing positive, universalistic, and pro-social
responses. In regards to personal participation in
the military, marginally more German partici-
pants who had had a relative in the military gave
arguments indicating there are various limitations
to the importance of national security, e.g., pro-
viding conditional agreement such as “it restricts
freedoms and rights or helps but it is not
essential.”
Discussion
In response to the 7-point Likert scale item ask-
ing for level of agreement (from 1, totally dis-
agree, to 7 totally agree) “National security is
essential for family and individual security”
Western European participants averaged a score
of 5.01, indicating a relatively high rate of agree-
ment. A resounding 86% of the Western European
respondents indicated a belief that national secu-
rity may be achieved through the pursuit of uni-
versalistic or pro-social practices. The results of
this study are indicative that populations in
Western Europe could be well served by imple-
menting strategies and guidance that build on
these positive perspectives in order to foster and
strengthen security from the core of the individ-
ual to the whole of Western Europe and, by exten-
sion, the entire world.
What outcomes can we expect in relation to
individual and national security issues when it
comes to global events (e.g., trauma, disasters,
war, and disease), television/media exposure, and
societal change? In order to gain acceptance, toler-
ance, understanding, peace, and most importantly
202
security, the barriers of fear need to be considered.
Do these fears stem from individual, community,
or national security issues?
Social and behavioral sciences could play a
crucial role in building paths that lead to healthy
individuals, thriving communities, and effectu-
ally better approaches to individual and national
security. Psychology, which originated in Western
Europe, could be used to help navigate a path that
results in children who flourish into productive
citizens, work environments that support the
greatest satisfaction and production among work-
ers, policies that result in the strongest civic and
national engagement and an environment to make
all lives as fulfilling as possible. Building an
internal sense of security is likely to diminish a
fear of external threat.
One key to building this path may be through
applying the research of psychologists who have
observed how people survive, endure, and thrive
under conditions of adversity. Psychology, accord-
ing to historians, has largely been about psycho-
pathology since World War II (Herman 1995).
However, the aim of positive psychology is to
empower by focusing on building the strengths of
the individual in order to heighten well-being,
contentment, and satisfaction (past), hope and
optimism (future), and flow and happiness (pres-
ent) (Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi 2000).
Positive or negative perspectives on national
security issues may be felt at a conscious or
unconscious level by individuals, such as the case
of Carl Gustav Jung who himself had a vision of
a “monstrous flood” engulfing most of Europe
and lapping at the mountains of his native
Switzerland (Kotwal 2001). “He saw thousands
of people drowning, civilization crumbling and
water turning into blood” (Kotwal 2001). His
vision was followed, within weeks, by more vivid
and horrifying dreams of eternal winters and riv-
ers of blood, so many that Jung began to fear that
he was becoming psychotic (Kotwal 2001).
Strangely, on August 1 of that year, World War I
began (Kotwal 2001). Jung interpreted his expe-
rience as indicating that he had felt a connection,
somehow, between himself as an individual and
humanity that could not be explained (Kotwal
M. Corgan et al.
2001). Is it possible that his own knowledge of
civil and national security issues at the time were
simply manifested in a subconscious way that
sadly was distressing enough to make him feel he
was indeed becoming psychotic?
Consider the extreme pre-war national secu-
rity issues in Europe that could have affected
individuals such as Jung to the point of doubting
their own individual security and peace of mind.
In this sense, national and individual security is
one and the same. As one of our respondents
noted, “insecurity of a nation necessarily pro-
vokes the insecurity of citizens.” One cannot exist
without the other. By fostering resiliency and
emotional intelligence, we may be able to build
peace, security, and safety in our society through
building it at the individual level.
National security issues in Europe today, such
as homeland security, terrorism, transport secu-
rity, emergency preparedness and response,
chem-bio incidents, law enforcement, civil pro-
tection, domestic security, institutions and criti-
cal national infrastructure, are reasons to focus
on the strengthening of the ‘infrastructure’ of the
individuals who populate and manage Europe’s
culture. Cultures and ultimately nations can turn
their attention to virtue, creativity, and the highest
qualities in life when they are stable, prosperous,
and at peace (Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi
2000).
In our view, creating a home as a place of
safety, tranquility, and aesthetic appeal, which
requires much thought and effort, is similar to
creating effective national security. Homeland
security would do well to focus not only on pro-
tecting borders, but also on protecting what is
inside those borders and creating an environment
that fosters strength and productivity as well as
developing high human potential. There are many
challenges to be met, including crime, racial
tension, poverty, pollution, overpopulation, world
hunger, guns, shootings, gangs, trauma, disasters,
war, diseases, and societal changes (Burnham
2009). We are hopeful that in this century posi-
tive psychology will enable societies to uncover
and promote those factors that allow individuals,
communities, and societies/nations to flourish.
13 Western Europe National Security
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 Views on National Security:
the United Kingdom, Northern
Ireland, Australia, Canada,
and the United States of America
Lauren Groves, John M. Davis, James Page,
Michael Whitely, Dylan Rose, and Doe West
Introduction
This chapter explores the perspectives of ordinary
people from Great Britain, Northern Ireland,
Australia, Canada, and the USA on national secu-
rity. A convenience sample drawn from these
countries completed the Personal and Institutional
Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey
(PAIRTAPS) described elsewhere in this volume.
A grounded theory approach (see Corbin and
Strauss 1990; Glaser and Strauss 1967) was used
to explore salient themes in responses to the item
“National security is essential for family and
individual security” and the follow-up item: “The
best way to achieve security for individuals and
families throughout the world is…:”
Psychological Perspectives on the
Need for Safety and National Security
In his classic A Theory of Human Motivation,
preeminent psychologist Abraham Maslow
(1943) developed a five-level theory of human
needs from which psychologists continue to draw
inspiration. Maslow posited that both conscious
and unconscious motivation stem from individ-
ual efforts to satisfy a hierarchical progression of
basic needs. Starting with the most essential, the
needs he identified consist of: (1) physiological
K. Malley-Morrison et al. (eds.), International Handbook of War, Torture, and Terrorism,
Peace Psychology Book Series, DOI 10.1007/978-1-4614-1638-8_14,
© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2013
14
needs based on supporting the ongoing require-
ments of the human body for nutrition, hydra-
tion, and respiration to sustain life on a physical
level; (2) safety needs that include stability,
order, and freedom from threat or danger; (3) the
need for love, affection, and affiliation with other
people; (4) esteem needs, including the need or
desire for a stable, firmly rooted and typically
high regard for oneself; as well as for the esteem
of others; and (5) the need for self-actualization
and the pursuit of meaning. Fulfillment of the
higher level motivations is possible only to the
degree that their precursor needs are at least min-
imally addressed. With regard to the need for a
sense of safety, Maslow (1943, p. 373) stated:
“Practically everything looks less important than
safety.” He noted that if a lack of perceived safety
was extreme enough and chronic enough, people
could be characterized as “living almost for
safety alone.”
In elaborating on the safety need, Maslow
described the transformation of the world of
infants distressed, for example, by colic or illness,
from orderly and predictable to unsafe, unstable,
and chaotic. Feelings of anxiety and desperate
yearning for the safety and protection of caregiv-
ers resulted. Through the course of development,
many individuals achieve an adulthood wherein
their safety needs are largely satisfied. According
to Maslow (1943, p. 379), “The peaceful, smoothly
running, ‘good’ society ordinarily makes its mem-
bers feel safe enough from wild animals, extremes
205
206
of temperature, criminals, assault and murder,
tyranny, etc.” However, in our view, the world of
the early twentieth century is mired in both real
and perceived turmoil that is the diametric oppo-
site of the “smoothly running” society described
by Maslow; around the clock media coverage of
natural disasters, crime, political discord, and
scandal directly contradict Maslow’s exemplars
of a good society. As just one example of the per-
ils of modern society, America’s national threat
level has, according to the Department of
Homeland Security Advisory System, been at
“Elevated” or “Yellow” alert since 2005 (Hornick
2010). From the perspective of Maslow’s theory,
such a level of threat is cause for concern; in his
view, a pathological state of neurosis results from
the “unknown, psychological danger in a world
that is perceived to be hostile, overwhelming and
threatening” (Maslow 1943, p. 379). In such cir-
cumstances, individuals behave as though great
catastrophes are always impending.
Thus, real or perceived threats to the satisfac-
tion of one’s basic needs produce a fundamental
anxiety that must be addressed if individuals are
going to have the cognitive and emotional
resources needed for higher-order pursuits.
Terror Management Theory (TMT, Greenberg
et al. 1994) postulates a set of mechanisms that
may contribute to understanding responses to
threats to safety and security. TMT postulates
“mortality salience” as an engenderer of
“increased prejudice, nationalism, and inter-
group bias” that serve to protect individuals from
anxiety (Greenberg et al. 1994). To investigate
their theory, Greenberg et al. (1994) conducted a
set of experiments designed to induce conscious
and unconscious thoughts of mortality through
an essay writing task in which participants were
prompted to write about the emotions aroused
by their own death or the death of a loved one,
or, in a control condition, to write about watch-
ing television. Next, participants were asked to
evaluate the authors of a “pro-US essay” and an
“anti-US essay.” Greenberg et al. found that par-
ticipants provided significantly more positive
evaluations of the author of the “pro-US essay”
and more negative evaluations of the author of
the “anti-US essay” in the conditions where
L. Groves et al.
thoughts of the participant’s own mortality were
provoked by the personal mortality condition,
and to a lesser extent in the experimental condi-
tion in which the mortality of a loved one was
brought to mind.
Greenberg et al. (1994) also provided evidence
that when individuals have the opportunity to
deal with the concept of death explicitly, mortal-
ity salience is less likely to color their judgments
of others; however, in cases where mortality is
brought to mind on an unconscious level, the
unconscious anxiety aroused by subtle thoughts
of death trigger automatic tendencies to affirm
the ideas and objects associated with stability and
affiliation and reject ideas and objects that chal-
lenge these palliatives.
As seen in the Terror Management model, the
effect of perceived risk and insecurity on behav-
ior and judgment is complex and contingent upon
factors other than the mere presence of fear or
anxiety itself. Lerner et al. (2003) provided
another perspective on this topic in their study of
the effects of anger versus fear on individual esti-
mations of the probability of adverse life events,
as well as on political opinions. The authors
described the instability generated by the
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the USA
as a demonstration to the world that no nation is
invulnerable to the threat of terrorist attack. In
their view, one effect of the “prospect of sustained
conflict with a diffuse, unfamiliar enemy” (Lerner
et al. 2003, p. 3) has been the increased anger,
fear, and sadness (among other emotions) experi-
enced worldwide. The impact of such negative
emotions on risk assessment is complex. Building
on their own earlier findings that anger is associ-
ated with judgments of certainty and control,
whereas fear is associated with feelings of
uncertainty and lack of personal control, Lerner
et al. (2003) administered an online survey to a
nationally representative random sample of
Americans at two time points—just nine days
after the 9/11 attacks and again three weeks later.
In the first survey, participants responded to a
battery of psychological surveys including a
measure of anxiety and a measure for the “desire
for vengeance” (used to represent anger in the
study). On November 10, 2001, participants
14 UK Anglo National Security
responded to a second online survey in which
they were randomly assigned to one of the three
emotion inductions (fear, anger, or sadness) via
short answer prompts followed by an image and
audio clip from major media outlets matching the
induced emotion condition. All participants then
completed measures of risk perception and pub-
lic policy preferences.
Supporting their hypotheses regarding fear,
anger, and risk, Lerner et al. found significant
associations between increased fear and higher
estimates of future personal and national risk, and
conversely between increased desire for vengeance
and lower estimates of future personal and national
risk. Participants in the vengeful condition showed
significantly greater support for deportation poli-
cies than participants in the fearful condition, and
conversely, participants in the fearful condition
showed significantly greater support for diplo-
matic overtures to countries in the Muslim world
than participants in the vengeful condition.
Situating Lerner et al.’s (2003) findings within
Maslow’s hierarchy, one may conclude that the
emotional responses of fear and anger are equally
valid strategies for defending the safety need, and
that satisfying the need for safety may be achieved
through a variety of courses of action.
Neither the satisfaction of fundamental needs
nor the Terror Management Response takes place
in a vacuum. Both occur within a broader context
of feelings, thoughts, and behaviors. The balance
of this chapter considers issues relevant to per-
sonal views on national security, especially as it
relates to individual and family security, in Great
Britain and several other Western countries that
were once part of the British Empire. We focus
first on the national contexts for judgments of
national security and the role of the press in
triggering fear reactions, then on the views of
participants.
National Context and the Press:
An Overview
Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland, and the USA are
considered in this study collectively by virtue of
207
their similarities as primarily English-speaking,
democratic, industrialized nations that share a
salient commonality in their grounding in Western
cultural values and a shared history. Although
these basic commonalities provide cogent reason
to consider these countries collectively, it should
be duly noted from an ecological systems per-
spective (see Bronfenbrenner 1979) that each
respondent lives embedded in multiple spheres of
influence—that each country in this grouping
offers its own distinct context, culture, history,
and character; as does each territory, state, and
neighborhood in each country; in addition, indi-
viduals bring idiosyncratic differences resulting
from personal experiences, disposition, and time
in history to their contexts. Our sample’s views
on the issue of national security represent the
complex outcome of influences from all these
different levels.
Standard of living in these countries is gener-
ally high as defined by the United Nations
Development Program’s Human Development
Index (HDI). In providing an assessment of well-
being in each country, this index is based on a
composite calculation, including each country’s
gross national product (GNP), life expectancy,
education (measured by adult literacy and gross
enrollment in education), and general standard of
living (measured by purchasing power parity and
income) (UNDP 2009b). Based on available
figures calculated as of 2007, out of the 182
countries scored, Australia ranked second only to
Norway, with Canada ranking fourth, the USA
ranking 13th, and United Kingdom ranking 21st
(UNDP 2009a).
The GINI, an index reported by the CIA World
Factbook as a measure of family income
inequality in 134 countries, provides additional
context regarding the relative economic climate
in each of the countries (with higher rankings
indicating a more equitable distribution of
income). Australia ranks highest (most equitable)
with a GINI index of 111; Canada’s index is 100;
the UK’s is 92; and the US GINI is substantially
lower at 44 (CIA World Factbook 2009e).
In regard to the ability of citizens to access
news and information, each of these countries
was reported to feature a free press that includes
208
public broadcasting, and in all cases greater than
70% of the population were reported to have
access to the Internet annually (BBC News
2009a, d; CIA World Factbook 2009b, c).
Military and foreign affairs are important in
all of these countries and all feature a voluntary
standing army, navy, and air force with men and
women ages 17 and older generally eligible for
service (UK eligibility for voluntary service
is 16) (CIA World Factbook 2009a, b, c, d). In
regard to military expenditures, the USA ranks
28th out of 182 countries (highest of the coun-
tries in the sample) with over 4% of the country’s
GDP committed to such expenditures (CIA World
Factbook 2009d). Australia and the United
Kingdom rank 69th and 70th, respectively, with
both Australian and UK military expenditures
constituting 2.4% of their country’s GDP (CIA
World Factbook 2009a, b). Canada’s ranking of
132nd out of 182 countries places it lowest of the
countries in military expenditures, with those
expenditures constituting just 1.1% of the coun-
try’s GDP (CIA World Factbook 2009c).
With regard to international collaboration and
diplomacy, each of the countries discussed here
are founding and active members of the United
Nations, participating in activities such as council
membership, peacekeeping, nonproliferation and
disarmament negotiations, and narcotics control
(U.S. Department of State 2009a, b, c; Bureau
of International Information Programs 2005,
p. 224). Moreover, both the USA and the United
Kingdom are among the five permanent members
of the United Nations Security Council (U.S.
Department of State 2009c; Bureau of
International Information Programs 2005, p. 224),
and Canada, the USA, and the United Kingdom
are all members of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) chartered with the goal of
working together to ensure “peace and security” for
its members (U.S. Department of State 2009b, c;
Bureau of International Information Programs 2005,
p. 262; North Atlantic Treaty Organization 2010).
Current events and national security are inter-
twined in all of the countries represented. Over
the past decade, the USA has been engaged in
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. In October 2001,
L. Groves et al.
following the September 11, 2001, terrorist
attacks, the USA led a military campaign with
the goal of deposing the Taliban regime in
Afghanistan, followed in 2003 by military action
in Iraq, both of which conflicts continue (Oxford
Reference Online 2008b; BBC News 2009d) and
have proved politically contentious both domesti-
cally and internationally.
In accordance with the 1951 Australia, New
Zealand, and United States (ANZUS) security
treaty in which the three countries agreed that an
armed attack on any of them would endanger the
peace and safety of the others, Australia offered
its support to the USA following the September
11, 2001, attacks, and as a result was one of the
earliest participants in Operation Enduring
Freedom (U.S. Department of State 2009a).
Likewise, the United Kingdom offered its sup-
port to the USA as the main coalition partner in
Operation Iraqi Freedom. Both Australia and the
United Kingdom, however, began withdrawing
combat support on the Iraq front in July 2009,
while continuing to support efforts in the fight
against Taliban operations in Afghanistan. To this
end, the UK has acted as the second largest sup-
porting military presence in the Afghanistan
front, and Australia has committed approximately
1,000 troops, with both allies offering significant
development and reconstruction assistance to the
country (U.S. Department of State 2009a, c).
Although concerns about terrorism have been
present in Canada since the September 11, 2001,
terrorist attacks in the USA, Canada declined to
commit military support to the War in Iraq, opt-
ing instead to contribute financial support to Iraq
reconstruction (U.S. Department of State 2009b).
In addition, since 2002, Canada has committed
approximately 2,500 troops to Afghanistan, along
with financial aid and diplomatic assistance
(U.S. Department of State 2009b). Since the
attacks, the USA and Canada have worked closely
in the creation of antiterrorism protocols, including
the Cross Border Crime Forum (U.S. Department
of State 2009b).
Concerns about terrorism have been present in
all of these countries. Australians faced the realities
of terrorism following police reports of foiling
14 UK Anglo National Security
plans for a “large-scale terrorist attack” in 2005;
a 2004 bombing outside the Australian embassy
in Jakarta, Indonesia; and a night club bombing
in Bali, Indonesia, in 2002 in which 88 Australian
citizens were killed (BBC News 2009e). In
response to these concerns, the Australian parlia-
ment developed controversial antiterrorist legis-
lation (BBC News 2009e). In Canada, a 2006
“attempted terror plot” was foiled in Toronto and
resulted in the arrest of 17 men. Even prior to
9/11, Canada experienced terrorism firsthand
when 280 Canadians were killed in a bombing
aboard an Air India flight travelling between
Montreal and London (BBC News Timeline
2009f; U.S. Department of State 2009b). In the
UK, concerns about terrorism as well as political
and religious radicalism were brought to the fore-
front following suicide bomb attacks on London’s
transport network on July 7, 2005, and an addi-
tional attempted bombing 2 weeks later (BBC
News 2008b).
Racial and cultural tensions have also pre-
sented challenges in recent years. Australia has
faced several race riots since 2004, following the
controversial deaths of Aboriginal citizens, and
the visibility of failed policies in detention cen-
ters holding asylum seekers (BBC News 2009e).
In Canada, the efforts of a separatist contingent in
Quebec to establish an independent French-
speaking republic, which dates back to the late
1960s, led to violence in 1970 (Oxford Reference
Online 2008a; BBC News Timeline 2009f).
Following resurgence in interest in Quebec
independence in 2006, parliament passed a sym-
bolic act to recognize Quebec as a “nation” within
a united Canada (BBC News 2009b). In a gesture
reflecting a commitment to accommodate indig-
enous peoples and compensate for past injustices,
the Canadian Government in 2008 issued a formal
apology to the aboriginal population for a
previous policy of forcing aboriginal children to
attend boarding schools with the goal of assimi-
lating them (BBC News Timeline 2009f).
For the United Kingdom, recent trends in the
migration of workers from European Union
member states to the UK has fueled struggles
with issues of multiculturalism, immigration, and
209
national identity (BBC News 2009c). Furthermore,
Northern Ireland has endured its own challenges
with violence and social unrest. Following the
separation of Northern Ireland from the Republic
Ireland in 1921, the region experienced decades
of armed conflict and violence, known as “The
Troubles” (U.S. Department of State 2009c).
In 1998, following diplomatic peace building
efforts, the Good Friday agreement was signed,
calling for cooperation between Northern Ireland
and the Republic of Ireland. This agreement
included a commitment toward the disarmament
of paramilitary organizations, police and law
enforcement reforms, and a joint British–Irish
council (U.S. Department of State 2009c).
Though the Northern Ireland Assembly was rees-
tablished in 1999, democratic elections were sus-
pended in 2003 due to political unrest and a
suspected resurgence in Irish Republic Army
paramilitary activity. Four years later, Northern
Ireland finally saw the swearing in of elected rep-
resentatives in 2007 ending 5 years of direct rule
from London (U.S. Department of State 2009c;
BBC News 2009c).
Racism and immigration concerns have con-
sistently drawn public attention in the USA for
the past half-century. Beyond 9/11, events like
Hurricane Katrina in 2005, which devastated the
United States Gulf Coast, and current economic
challenges, have been pressing concerns for peo-
ple in the USA (BBC News 2009g), and often
tied to issues of racism and class. Debate over
immigration policies in the USA have also been
ongoing, especially affecting Hispanics in states
bordering Mexico (Independent Television
Service and Kentucky Educational Television
2003). Notably, the 2008 election of President
Barack Obama has been interpreted by some to
reflect an American desire for reform in both dis-
enfranchisement of minority groups from power
and in the tenor of political discourse, moving
from the acrimony of the previous administration
to increased peace and cooperation in the interna-
tional community (BBC News 2008a).
Modern news media are increasingly recog-
nized as an important mediator between the pub-
lic and the workings of the state..As an item of
210
political and social interest for much of the
developed western world, national security pol-
icy has received considerable news media cover-
age. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union,
the focus of this attention has been on political
responses to terrorism (Weimann 1994, p. 10).
However, although it is often referred to as a
“war,” it is important to distinguish the US and
U.K.’s “War on Terror” from wars in the first half
of the 20th century. These conflicts generally
involved open combat between two or more
politically distinct entities—generally referred to
as “conventional warfare” contrasted against the
“War on Terror,” which is defined by large dis-
parities in the size and strength of the military
forces involved (i.e., organizations like the
Taliban or al-Qaeda as compared to the US armed
forces). These organizations are not backed by a
single definable political entity, and their actions
are often only loosely coordinated with the direc-
tives of the group’s ideological core (Smith 2003,
p. 22). This pattern of “asymmetry” has come to
define the majority of contemporary military
conflicts, and as a result most of what constitutes
current national security policy is directed explic-
itly at managing terrorist threats.
All of the countries described here feature a
free press that includes public broadcasting and,
in all cases, greater than 70% of the population
have access to the Internet annually (BBC News
2009a, d; CIA World Factbook 2009b, c). Given
the vast proliferation of new media forms, politi-
cal perspectives, and the development of 24 hour
streaming news content, the news media are
probably the most frequently accessed source of
information used to form political judgments. As
many as 2/3 of the American public may rely on
televised news media as their primary source of
politically focused information and analysis
(Roper Center 2010).
The situation is similar in the UK. As early as
1975, television ratings emerged as an important
predictor of the election of parliamentary
candidates and party leaders (Seymour-Ure 1991,
p. 175). Television has also long been ranked as
the top source for information about the “govern-
ment,” “political parties,” and “other countries”
L. Groves et al.
in opinion polls regarding U.K. television watching
(Seymour-Ure 1991, p. 143).
The British media are unique in the western
world: its largest content provider, the British
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), is almost
entirely state-sponsored and directed. In contrast,
the British print industry is not regulated by the
state. British papers are run privately for-profit,
and unlike the BBC’s charter mandate to impar-
tiality, have no legal obligation to political or
editorial neutrality (Oates et al. 2010, p. 83).
The most widely circulated print news outlets in
the U.K are The Daily Telegraph, The Times, The
Guardian, and the Independent; the Telegraph,
Times, and Financial Times are seen as right-wing
papers, while the Guardian and Independent are
seen as more left-wing (Oates et al. 2010, p. 83).
In contrast, American news media outlets are
more numerous and do not, in most cases, receive
state funding or support comparable to that of the
BBC. Many news outlets in all media forms
receive their information from major news ser-
vices such as News World Communications (for-
merly United Press international) and the
Associated Press (Barney and Nelson 1983, p.
333). Organizations like these act as “wire-ser-
vices,” distributing news information to private
distribution outlets. American television news
programming is in nearly all cases owned and
operated privately through one of the three major
broadcasting networks: ABC, NBC, and CBS
(Barney and Nelson 1983, p. 324). The popular
news outlets CNN and Fox News are major
exceptions to this rule: they are owned by Turner
Broadcasting and News Corporation, respec-
tively. Both of these news organizations fund and
maintain their own private news gathering and
reporting staff. As these are privately owned
organizations, unlike the British model, Fox
News and CNN have no official mandate to polit-
ical or editorial neutrality. Although both net-
works claim to provide “balanced” analysis,
statistical analyses of news content and reporting
style support the notion that CNN is widely
recognized as a leftward leaning outlet, while
Fox News is generally seen as expressing right-
wing coverage of events (Oates et al. 2010, p. 46).
14 UK Anglo National Security
Because the USA and Canada share a language,
a major border, and many cultural similarities,
the Canadian news media have to a large extent
borrowed information and services from
American media outlets. As cable and Internet
access have spread in both countries, Canada’s
own publically run Canadian Broadcasting
Corporation (CBC) has been largely overshad-
owed by radio and television broadcast from the
USA (Barney and Nelson 1983, p. 318). During
the mid-1970s, Canada produced roughly 120
unique nationally circulated newspapers; this
number has since declined (Barney and Nelson
1983, p. 318).
Similarly, in Australia, public and private
news media coexist, and both US and UK news
services and programming are commonly utilized
as well. There are three national public broad-
casters: Australian Broadcasting Corporation
(ABC), Special Broadcasting Service (SBS), and
National Indigenous Television (NITV). The
Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) pro-
duces and controls most of Australia’s television
and radio programming and draws nearly all of
its funding from government sponsorships (Luter
and Richstad 1983, p. 161). Most of Australia’s
news information is disseminated to news sta-
tions either through major international news
agencies and wire services, or directly through
the Australian Associated Press (AAP) (Luter
and Richstad 1983, p. 175). Private news media
are owned by a small group of businesses includ-
ing PBL Media, Seven Media Group, Ten
Network Holdings, WIN Corporation, Macquerie
Media Group, Prime Television Limited and
Imparja Television.
Given this information regarding the news
media of each of the countries represented in our
sample, what conclusions may we draw regard-
ing the relationship between the news media and
national security policy in each of these coun-
tries? It is important to remember that most of the
current national security policies in these
countries are directed explicitly at managing
terrorist threats. Some argue that terrorism is
largely a media-targeted or even a media-driven
phenomenon (Wilkinson 1997, pp. 51–52). Media
211
studies regarding the coverage of national security
issues, including terrorism, provide support for
the notion that qualitative differences in empha-
sis and tone exist across nations.
Complicating the study of interactions among
the media, politics, and the public is the fact that
the news media may attach the label “terrorist” to
actions or groups that are not legally or politi-
cally identifiable as such. Politicians themselves
are often aware of this effect. Margaret Thatcher,
former British prime minister, allegedly referred
to media coverage of terrorist activities as the
“oxygen of publicity” that will continue to fuel
both terrorism and national security policies
around the globe.
The conclusion that news media play a crucial
role in presenting and managing the public
response to events that could be loosely identified
as “terrorism” seems inarguable. Based on the
differences in the national media systems we
have examined thus far, are national-security
issues covered differently in the countries we
examine here? If so, what effects do these differ-
ences have on attitudes of the public about
national security policy? As the UK and US
media systems differ more from each other than
the Canadian and Australian systems differ from
either, the following analysis will focus primarily
on coverage of national-security events in the
televised media of these two countries.
Differences in International
Security Policy and Media:
The Case of the US and UK
Although the pattern of media emphasis on
national security issues emerged most saliently in
the USA following the collapse of the Soviet
Union (Hess and Kalb 2003, p. 15), it occurred
previously to that event. During the 1985 TWA
flight 847 hijacking, for example, 68% of CBS’s
nightly news broadcasts were devoted either to
live coverage of the crisis or to related commentary
and analysis (Weimann 1994, p. 10). More
recently, in a qualitative analysis of US network
news coverage in 2004, Oates, Kaid, and Berry
212
determined that out of a sample of 2,726 news
stories, nearly 29% were concerned with the Iraq
War, 10% concerned “terrorism,” and 8% were
concerned with the “War on Terror.” In this same
study, statistically significant differences between
major news networks in the frequency of refer-
ence to “terrorism” were also found during the
2004 Presidential election: Fox News anchors
mentioned terrorism more frequently than did
CNN anchors on programs of comparable length
(Oates et al. 2010, p. 47).
In contrast, BBC coverage of violence related
to the Troubles between 1969 and 1998 during
which roughly 3,000 people, many civilians,
were killed was constrained by British govern-
ment policies barring representatives from 11
blacklisted “terrorist organizations” from appear-
ing on BBC supported news programs (Oates
et al. 2010, p. 7). As peace talks began in the mid-
1990s, however, this ban was lifted and those for-
merly labeled as terrorists were encouraged to
participate with the British news media as a part
of the peacemaking process (Oates et al. 2010, p.
48). Furthermore, analysis of both campaign and
non-campaign televised news during the 2005
British electoral campaign revealed that fewer
than 10% of the stories were concerned with
national security or terrorism, and less than 4%
referenced terrorism and national security (Oates
et al. 2010, p. 101).
Qualitative analysis of the language used in
reporting events connected to national security in
both countries is also suggestive. In a 2008 study,
Barnet, Reynolds, Roselle, and Oates analyzed
coverage of the 9/11 attacks and the 2005 London
Underground bombings by BBC and CNN and
found CNN’s coverage of both events to be more
“sensationalist,” while BBC’s coverage was more
“calming” (Barnet et al. 2008, p. 29). A separate
analysis of media coverage of these events found
that CNN’s coverage of 9/11 appeared to empha-
size the government’s inability to prevent the
attacks, while the BBC’s coverage of the
Underground Bombings “emphasized that British
preparation and planning for terrorist attacks over
the years had led to prompt and effective responses
from public officials” (Oates et al. 2010, p. 7).
L. Groves et al.
Based on these differences, it may be that, from
the theoretical perspectives of both Maslow’s
theory and TMT, those who watch a large amount
of coverage in or from the USA are more likely
than their counterparts to be more concerned with
a need for national security and to see it as more
essential to personal and family security.
A change to reliance on the Internet rather than
on television coverage for news may have some
effect on these relationships. Savvy consumers of
current events are now as able to gather informa-
tion from news services in Russia or China, for
example, as from the media in the USA, UK, or
Australia. They can combine perspectives to make
rational choices. This change in technology may,
in the long term, have a positive influence on pro-
viding rational and balanced information from
which the public can make decisions, rather than
the more sensational and emotion-triggering sys-
tems in place now. In any case, the types of infor-
mation to which people are exposed daily
undoubtedly influence their attitudes toward
sociopolitical issues, including national security.
Exploratory data are presented below.
Citizens’ Perspectives on National
Security: The Current Study
Data were collected between 2005 and 2010
using the PAIRTAPS, developed as an interdisci-
plinary effort by the Group on International
Perspectives on Governmental Aggression and
Peace (GIPGAP) and its collaborators. Presented
in both paper and online formats, the instrument
asks participants to provide quantitative ratings
of agreement or disagreement with statements on
a 7-point scale, and elaborate in their own words
on the rating. The sample is one of convenience
rather than a random sample, so results should be
considered accordingly. This chapter presents
participant responses to two items: “National
security is essential for family and individual
security. Explain,” and “The best way to achieve
security for individuals and families throughout
the world is…:”
14 UK Anglo National Security
Quantitative Data
A convenience sample of 1,042 Australian,
Canadian, Great British (GB), Northern Irish,
and American participants completed the survey.
The gender distribution was 54% female and
46% male, with ages ranging from 18 to 86 and a
mean age of 33 years. More than half the sample
reported a Christian religious affiliation and 13%
indicated that they had served in the military. In
addition, 33% indicated that at some point in
their lives they had “been involved in a protest
against war and in favor of peace, e.g., by signing
a petition, or participating in a march or vigil,”
and 23% reported that they had participated in a
“conflict resolution or peace education program
in a school or community setting.”
The average rating scale response to the item
“National security is essential for family and indi-
vidual security” is 5.25 (between mild and fairly
strong agreement) with a standard deviation of
1.66 points. A one-way analysis of variance
(ANOVA) and Scheffe post hoc test revealed no
significant differences in scores based on national-
ity. Similarly, t-tests showed no significant differ-
ences based on gender. However, t-tests indicated
that respondents who had participated in a conflict
resolution program showed significantly less
agreement than their counterparts. In addition,
individuals who had participated in a protest
against war showed significantly lower agreement
than those who had not. Marginally significant dif-
ferences were found based on military service.
Individuals who had been or were presently in the
military indicated a greater level of agreement
than their counterparts.
Qualitative Data
Of the 1,042 respondents in the sample, 747
(72%) provided a qualitative elaboration on one
or both of the survey items. Many responses
(1,716) addressed multiple discrete concepts that
were identified as codeable in their own right.
These responses were coded using a grounded
theory based coding system (see Corbin and
213
Conditional
Support
20%
Reject
19% Support
61%
Fig. 14.1 National security is essential for family and
individual security
Strauss 1990; Glaser and Strauss 1967) developed
by the GIPGAP research team, in which emergent
themes were tabulated to examine patterns in the
response set. What follows is a discussion of
those themes and an analysis of patterns within
the sample, with examples of responses that
typify a given theme.
Figure 14.1 illustrates the distribution of
themes expressed in participant responses that
indicated support, rejection, or conditional sup-
port for the survey statement, “National security
is essential for family and individual security.”
Table 14.1 provides further detail regarding
the proportional frequencies (as a percentage of
all thematic units identified within the sample)
for responses endorsing the essentiality of
national security.
Responses consisting of nonspecific
affirmations of the survey statement were coded
for general agreement. Responses elaborating on
the idea that national security is inseparable from
individual and family security were included in
the intrinsically tied theme: “If the family and
the individual exist within the nation then the secu-
rity of each concept is linked,” wrote a 30-year-old
Australian man. A Canadian woman, 47, said,
214
Table 14.1 National security is essential for family and
individual security: response themes as a percentage of all
thematic units
Response theme Percent
General agreement 6 (20)
Feel safer 5 (16)
Intrinsically tied 5 (16)
To protect 3 (10)
Protect against external or general threats 3 (9)
2 (6)
Protect against external or general threats:
government’s obligation
Protect against external or general threats: 1 (5)
citizen’s obligation
Protect against internal threats 1 (3)
Necessary evil 2 (8)
Agree while recognizing consequences 1 (3)
Strong nation 1 (2)
Protect values 1 (2)
Note: The first number in the percent column refers to the
percentage of responses in that category out of the total
response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to
the percent of responses in that category out of all responses
that agree with the statement that national security is essen-
tial for family and individual security. Themes representing
less than 0.5% of response sample not shown
“National security can translate to security of
citizens.” A 49-year-old man from Great Britain
observed, “No man is an island, and no individual
or family can ever be secure all the time that
international terrorists are free to operate. 9/11
and 7/7 proved this.” “There is no peace for the
family or individual if the nation lacks security,”
said a 22-year-old American woman.
Many responses emphasized the psychological
need for citizens to feel safe and the role of
national security in accomplishing and were coded
into the feel safer category: “I think you have to
have National Security (or at least a perception of
it) to ensure that you feel safe within your own
environment. If your neighborhood/country is
constantly under threat then your actions will
reflect this i.e. you will live prepared to fight or
flight,” wrote an Australian man, age 40 years.
A Canadian woman of 70 said, “No one could
possibly be safe unless their nation is, nor can they
be happy without peace of mind.” A 23-year-old
man from Great Britain stated, “National security
would help citizens to feel more safe and protect
to some extent against outside forces such as
L. Groves et al.
invading nations”; “People need to feel secure and
safe so that they can carry out their lives,” observed
a 24-year-old Northern Irish man. A 23-year-old
American woman stated, “No one wants to feel
unsafe in their own country.”
Responses emphasizing the need for protection
were coded under a protection theme with
subcategories for responses that emphasized the
need for protection from domestic threats versus
external threats; those that stressed that the
responsibility for national security falls under the
purview of the government versus individual
responsibility to protect themselves and/or take
an active role in national security: “People in
power are supposed to know more about what
goes on than your average person on the street.
They should respond accordingly if there is a
threat,” said a 28-year-old Australian woman.
A Canadian man, age 22, wrote, “Take actions
when required to protect your own rights, and
assist others with the protection of their rights
too” A 29-year-old man from Great Britain said,
“Yes, most definitely. We all desire family and
individual security but we cannot have it without
our borders being protected,” “Essential to secure
borders to prevent those with terrorist intent car-
rying out atrocities,” said a 56-year-old Northern
Irish man. An American female, 26 wrote, “Of
course I want to protect myself and my family.
And the government should help me do that.”
Some responses indicated national security is a
necessary evil due to circumstances such as the
dark side of human nature, and violence in the
world: “In today’s world security is a high need,”
said a 20-year-old Australian woman. A Canadian
man of 49 wrote, “That’s just the way things have
to be in the present-day world we live in. Very
generic answer, I know, but true, too.” “It’s some-
thing that should be there but then again it’s some-
thing we shouldn’t have to have,” suggested a
19-year-old woman from Great Britain. A Northern
Irish woman, age 61 stated, “An unfortunate truth.”
A 51-year-old American woman said, “As with all
policing, I feel national security is a necessary evil
to ensure that laws are followed. Some people do
not respect the right of others.”
Responses that agreed with the survey statement,
while discussing the trade-offs or consequences
14 UK Anglo National Security
that can result from policies designed to increase
national security, were coded as agree while rec-
ognizing consequences: “Yeah, sort of, but
National Security can run away with itself and
become the threat as well. Often National Security
issues prompt aggressors. For instance, Kiribati
has very little defenses and very few people want
to attack it,” a 26-year-old Australian male com-
mented. A man from Great Britain, age 34 stated,
“National Security is preferable, but at what cost?
Security comes from within.” “It can be impor-
tant but at the same time it is often racist,” said a
21-year-old American female.
Responses emphasizing the need for the coun-
try to be strong were coded under the strong
nation theme: “Government to be strong and to
look after its citizens,” wrote a 24-year-old
Australian male. A Canadian man of 85
commented, “Weakness invites aggression.”
A 49-year-old woman from Great Britain noted,
“If a country is weak it will be invaded. Countries
are run by bullies.” A 21-year-old American man
observed, “Wherever countries are weak or
disunified, individuals and families fall victim to
thuggery, whether motivated by greed or hatred
based on religion, race, clan or creed. Law is the
solution. Strong nations are the solution.”
Finally, responses stressing the need to protect
one’s cultural values from outside influence were
coded as protect values: “I don’t want extremist
in my country upsetting what Australia is striving
to achieve. We have enough of our own issues to
deal with,” said a 39-year-old Australian woman.
A Canadian woman of 32 responded, “Without a
government that is willing to protect a free soci-
ety’s way of life there is no way to maintain that
standard of living.” “National security is
extremely important and helps to safe guard our
values as Americans,” observed an 18-year-old
American man.
Table 14.2 provides proportional frequencies
for responses that disagreed with the notion that
national security is essential for family and indi-
vidual security as a percentage of all thematic
units identified within the sample.
Responses asserting that national security is
an illusion or impossible to achieve were coded
under the illusion/impossible theme: “Security is
an illusion,” said a 54-year-old Australian man.
215
Table 14.2 National security is not essential for family
and individual security: response themes as a percentage
of all thematic units
Response theme Percent
Is an illusion/impossible 2 (19)
Concept of nation states is wrong 2 (18)
Not correlated 2 (18)
Government deception 1 (16)
Negative consequences 1 (13)
1 (9)
General disagreement
Obsession with security/danger instills fear 1 (7)
Note: The first number in the percent column refers to the
percentage of responses in that category out of the total
response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to
the percent of responses in that category out of all
responses that did not agree with the statement that
national security is essential for family and individual
security. Themes representing less than 0.5% of response
sample not shown
A Canadian woman, age 52, wrote, “It is impos-
sible for any government to guarantee 100%
national security.” A 65-year-old man from Great
Britain commented, “No nation can be ‘totally
secure’ and if we are to interact with each other,
some risk has to be accepted.” “Again, I do not
believe this is achievable. Those who are truly
intent on causing death and destruction will suc-
ceed at least once,” stated a 56-year-old Northern
Irish man. An American man, 21, asked, “Is any
nation ever really secure, or do they just think
they are?”
Some responses pointed to the artificiality or
arbitrariness of national boundaries, or advocated
for the abolition of the nation state in favor of
global citizenry; these were coded as concept of
nation states is wrong: “National security will
never make us secure. If one nation is secure it
stands to reason that another nation must be inse-
cure. Family and individual security depends on
International Security, that is, security for all.
National security will always be challenged.
History shows that strong nations come and go,” an
Australian man of 60 commented. A 28-year-old
woman from Great Britain said, “I tend to agree,
with the proviso that traditional nation states are
not the only way to guarantee individual security.”
A 50-year-old American woman stated, “Real
security cannot be based upon national security in
the modern globalizing world.”
216
Responses pointing out that it is possible for
individuals and families to be insecure while
the nation is secure and vice versa, or that they
are unrelated were coded as not correlated: “I have
seen functional families in conflict zones. The
supply of food is more important than security to
many people,” observed an Australian woman,
age 61. A Canadian man, age 29, wrote, “The
privileged can often find security even if the
nation doesn’t have security.” A man from Great
Britain, age 51, responded, “In an ‘every man for
himself’ way, if a country is insecure it is possi-
ble to leave it for a safer one.” “I can survive fine
without it,” said a 20-year-old Northern Irish
man. An American woman, age 42, observed,
“Nation could be secure but individual and family
security may not be.”
Responses showing concern for misuse,
manipulations, or ulterior motives in the
application of national security initiatives by the
government were coded as government deception:
“National security should be about the protection
of a countries borders and citizens. However, this
term has been used to incite fear in the people to
excuse a war, horrific new laws, more power to
governments, police and other agencies,” an
Australian woman of 24 commented. A Canadian
woman, age 70, said, “Physical security is more
important than a feeling of security which can
be manipulated by politicians and media.”
A 59-year-old woman from Great Britain
responded, “It has such a bad name, I have no trust
in it”; “National security is a sham to keep us all in
line,” an American man of 22 wrote.
Responses rejecting the essentiality of national
security based on the trade-offs and consequences
of national security initiatives were coded as neg-
ative consequences: “I find the term ‘national
security’ scary. It usually entails picking on
minority groups, excluding them, locking them
up,” said a 66-year-old Australian woman.
A 48-year-old man from Great Britain wrote,
“An overvaluing of security can act as a form of
violence to the principle of freedom.” A man
from Northern Ireland, age 20, observed, “He
who sacrifices privacy for security deserves nei-
ther. A 69-year-old American man stated, “Often
things done for national security actually make
the nation less secure.”
L. Groves et al.
Table 14.3 Conditional or partial agreement with the
statement: response themes as a percentage of all thematic
units
Response theme Percent
General conditional agreement 3 (28)
Better ways/proposed alternatives 2 (21)
Doesn’t justify certain measures 2 (17)
Useful but not essential 1 (12)
Restricts individual freedoms/rights 1 (10)
1 (10)
Essential but incomplete
Note: The first number in the percent column refers to the
percentage of responses in that category out of the total
response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to
the percent of responses in that category out of all the
responses that provided conditional or partial agreement
with the statement that national security is essential for
family and individual security. Themes representing less
than 0.5% of response sample not shown
Some responses offered nonspecific rejection
of the essentiality of national security; these
responses were coded for general disagreement.
Finally, responses noting paradoxically that
national security initiatives generate obsession
and anxiety, making families and individuals feel
less secure were coded as obsession with secu-
rity/danger instills fear: “There is no such thing!
Efforts to increase awareness and do more for
national security only make people more inse-
cure!” said a 69-year-old Canadian woman.
A 20-year-old man from Great Britain suggested,
“Maybe if everyone was less concerned about
security the world would be a safer place.”
A 38-year-old American woman wrote, “When
warnings are aired that national security is at a
color red or orange, individuals become very
unstable and this anxiety spreads throughout like
wild fire.”
Table 14.3 provides proportional frequencies
for responses that provided conditional agree-
ment with the notion that national security is
essential for family and individual security as a
percentage of all thematic units identified within
the sample.
Responses indicating conditional supporting
the essentiality statement without further detail
were included under the general conditional
agreement theme; responses that indicated agree-
ment but offered alternative measures to achieve
national security were coded under the better
14 UK Anglo National Security
ways/proposed alternatives category: “But only
superficially—no one is really secure until global
security (i.e. peace) is a reality,” said a 30-year-
old (Australian woman). A Canadian woman of
20 observed, “I suppose… but really, if you
change the situation in the rest of the world, the
chance that anyone would want to harm your
country is far less.” A 67-year-old man from Great
Britain wrote, “Without it everything is at some
degree of risk. But it would be better if Defense
Secretaries were directly elected not appointed.”
“What is essential for family and individual secu-
rity is the development of community in the
world,” said a 19-year-old American man.
Responses agreeing that national security is
essential while also pointing out that there are
limits to what can be done in the name of national
security were included under the doesn’t justify
certain measures category: “As long as they
remain within the rule of the law; both national
and international,” commented a 56-year-old
Australian man. A 27-year-old man from Great
Britain wrote, “It is in the sense that if the coun-
try is under attack then I and my family would
probably not feel safe. However, this doesn’t jus-
tify many of the over the top measures being
taken at present (e.g. Guantanamo, erosion of
civil liberties, etc.).” A 60-year-old man from
Northern Ireland said, “Primary importance but
not at cost of torture, killing, etc.” “Depends what
national security means. It doesn’t mean torture
and war and invasion of other countries,” said a
59-year-old American woman.
Some responses indicated that national secu-
rity is not essential to individual and family secu-
rity but it helps; these were coded as useful but
not essential: “It’s probably not essential but it
probably does help most of the time,” wrote a
42-year-old Australian man. A 21-year-old man
from Great Britain said, “I think it is to a degree,
as without it is hard to carry out your lives in a
stable manner.” An American woman, age 25,
commented, “It helps, but does not ensure per-
sonal safety.”
Similarly, responses noting that while it is
indeed essential, it is only one among other fac-
tors also necessary for individual and family
security were coded as essential but incomplete:
217
“There are other factors needed too,” said a
22-year-old Australian man. A 40-year-old man
from Great Britain stated, “National security is
an important ingredient to the security of the
family and individual.” “Individual security is a
product of a larger environment,” commented a
70-year-old American woman.
Finally, responses withholding support for the
essentiality for national security in the cases
where freedoms and rights are restricted were
coded as restricts individual freedoms/rights: “If
national security starts to interfere with everyday
life and restricts, then there is a problem,” wrote
a 21-year-old Australian woman. A Canadian
woman, age 22, observed, “It is, but not at the
cost of individual freedoms.” A 64-year-old man
from Great Britain stated, “Up to a limit. National
Security should not impinge on the basic rights of
a person.” A Northern Irish woman, age 58,
responded, “Cannot infringe on human rights.”
A 19-year-old American man said, “Governmental
stability is often vital to provide for individual
security. However, that does NOT necessarily
mean that security outweighs individual rights.”
Many participants also offered their ideas on how
best national security may be achieved.
Figure 14.2 illustrates the distribution of themes
expressed in participant responses for the survey
statement “The best way to achieve national
security is…”
Table 14.4 provides further detail regarding
the major themes suggested by respondents as a
percentage of all thematic units identified within
the sample.
Responses that listed practical strategies to
ensure peace as a means achieve national security
such as ending wars were included under recom-
mending peace/peace tools. An Australian man, 60
years old, recommended, “Promotion of skills in
nonviolent action and other practical tools as alter-
natives to war and as means of conflict.” A 72-year-
old Canadian man answered, “Make sure everyone
has a stake in ensuring peace.” A woman from
Great Britain, 21 years old, wrote, “For leaders to
call for peace.” A man from Northern Ireland, 22
years old, said, “Eradicate causes of conflict,” while
a 19-year-old American woman suggested, “Find
other ways to solve conflicts other than warfare.”
218 L. Groves et al.

Reject woman said, “Agreement of international

Possibility
Unsure principles applicable and beneficial to all nations
2%
7% equally.” A 26-year-old man from Great Britain
recommended “Constant peace talks and recon-
Protectionist /
ciliation.” “Endeavor to have all nations join the
Defensive / United Nations and to enter into peaceful trea-
Force ties” was suggested by a Northern Irish 49-year-
15%
old man. An American man, 20 years old wrote,
“Diplomatic relations and not war.”
Responses that recommended embracing
Universalistic / peace and nonviolent philosophies were coded as
Pro-Social / peace/nonviolence. An Australian woman, 57,
Cooperative responded, “Being peace oneself, teaching and
76%
practicing peace, not supporting structures of
violence, not using any violent means (including
eating, simple living)” A Canadian woman of 44
wrote, “To practice peace every day individually
Fig. 14.2 The best way to achieve national security and collectively. Security problem solved!”
A man from Great Britain, age 54, offered “Peace
Table 14.4 Ways to achieve national security: response and fulfillment,” while a 21-year-old Northern
themes as a percentage of all thematic units Irish woman said simply, “Make peace.” “Teach
Response theme Percent and live peace and justice,” wrote an American
Recommending peace/peace tools 8 (16) man, 61 years old.
Diplomacy/international relations/international 6 (13) Responses that focused on creating opportuni-
law ties for individuals to build their human capital or
Peace/nonviolence 6 (12)
achieve comparable standards of living were
Protectionist/defensive 5 (10)
coded as human resource development: “True
Human resource development 5 (9)
non-political communism (if that is not a contra-
Tolerance 3 (7)
3 (6)
diction in terms!),” wrote a 59-year-old Australian
Invoking ethical or philosophical principles
Universalistic prosocial responses 3 (6)
man. A 65-year-old Canadian woman responded,
Force 3 (5) “Making sure their basic needs are met.” A man
Education 2 (5) from Great Britain, age 34, said, “Give them the
Aid 1 (2) means to find it within themselves.” A 39-year-old
Denial of possibility 1 (2) American man advised, “Increase the standards of
Golden rule 1 (1) living in the world and end hunger. We could do
Does not know 3 (7) this easily with what we spend on arms.”
Note: The first number in the percent column refers to the Responses stressing the importance of isola-
percentage of responses in that category out of the total tionism, law enforcement, and defense as ways to
response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to
achieve national security were coded as protec-
the percent of responses in that category out of all the
responses that offered suggestions on how best to achieve tionist/defensive. A 21-year-old Australian
national security. Themes representing less than 0.5% of woman suggested, “Limit the amount of visas
response sample not shown and citizenships given out to people who are aim-
ing to live in a country for the wrong reasons.”
Responses emphasizing international collabo- A Canadian man, 49 years old, wrote, “Everyone
ration and dialogue were included under diplo- stay on their own side of the fence.” A 19-year-
macy/international relations/international law. old woman from Great Britain said, “Through
An Australian man, 53 years old, wrote, “Security defense but not attacking other countries.”
lies in building better relationships with neigh- A Northern Irish woman, age 39, wanted nations
bors around the world.” A 29-year-old Canadian to “Look out for your own.” A 46-year-old
14 UK Anglo National Security
American woman responded, “Our nation needs
to secure itself; close the borders; stop letting
others in; start taking better care of our own.”
Responses emphasizing respect, tolerance, and
understanding between individuals were coded as
tolerance. An Australian woman, age 49, wrote,
“Reconciliation, tolerance, acceptance”; while a
20-year-old Canadian woman advised
“Understanding and tolerance.” A woman from
Great Britain, 47, said, “I don’t know but it needs to
be based on respect, tolerance and understanding of
all cultures so we need not fear each other.”
A Northern Irish female, age 34, responded,
“Respect for others shown by all.” A 33-year-old
American man said, “We all need to open our minds
and put away our personal biases. Until we under-
stand others, we cannot achieve true security.”
Responses that offered ethical or philosophi-
cal principles were coded as invoking ethical or
philosophical principles. A 24-year-old
Australian man wrote, “A true understanding of
God’s love and our status as brothers and sisters.”
A Canadian man of 29 said, “Devise systems of
government that give power to people who are
not selfish.” A man from Great Britain, age 43,
advised, “Be your true self only,” and a Northern
Irish woman of 58 recommended “Living by
example.” A 22-year-old American woman
wrote, “If everyone believed in loving each other
unconditionally.”
Responses suggesting universal recognition of
rights or other prosocial solutions were coded as
universalistic prosocial responses. A 21-year-old
Australian woman advised “Monitoring and get-
ting back to basic human rights.” A Canadian
man, age 49, wrote, “Treat one another with care,
respect and dignity. A world dream!!” A 28-year-
old woman from Great Britain responded,
“By respect for human rights.” An American
man, age 49, said, “Strong laws that protect indi-
vidual rights and freedoms applied equally.”
Some responses advocated military suprem-
acy, violence or force and were coded as force.
A 23-year-old Australian man suggested “Strong
alliances between military powers.” A Canadian
woman, 28, said, “Control those who threaten it.”
A woman of 49 from Great Britain wrote, “Support
a strong and well disciplined military.” A Northern
Irish man, 20 years old responded, “To fight for it.”
219
A 45-year-old American woman recommended
“Awareness and military prowess.”
Responses that suggested the development of
educational opportunities and the provision of
material aid internationally fell under the educa-
tion and aid themes, respectively. An Australian
man, age 40, favored “Prosperity and education,”
while a 62-year-old Canadian woman recom-
mended, “Overcome poverty.” A 24-year-old man
from Great Britain wrote, “Elimination of poverty,
and improved education.” An American man, age
50, advised, “Feed and educate the poor.”
The relatively small group of responses that
denied the possibility of achieving national secu-
rity was coded as denial of possibility, and
responses that invoked the principle of reciproc-
ity—doing unto others only as you would have
done to you—were coded as golden rule.
A 21-year-old Australian woman had two sug-
gestions: “1. Evenly distribute the world’s
monetary resources. 2. Treat everyone’s family as
if they are your own…” A Canadian man, age 85,
wrote, “Do above, do unto others what you would
have them do unto you, and refrain from injuring
others.” A 50-year-old woman from Great Britain
said, “By treating others how you would like to
be treated.” A Northern Irish man, age 53, wrote,
“Treat others as you would have them treat you,”
while a 21-year-old American male echoed,
“Loving our neighbor as ourselves.”
Finally, slightly over 3% of the thematic units
identified within the sample expressed that the
respondent felt unsure or unable to offer suggestions
on the topic and were coded as does not know.
Table 14.5 provides detail regarding Pearson
chi-square tests of independence (two-tailed)
discussed below which were performed to exam-
ine the contingencies between the demographic
variables of interest: gender; protest participation;
conflict resolution and peace education program
participation; and military service relative to the
response themes offered by the respondents.
Pearson chi-square tests by gender revealed
that women were statistically more likely to use
the feel safer theme; and the necessary evil theme
than men in supporting the survey statement.
Men were statistically more likely to use the
illusion/impossible theme and the concept of
nation states is wrong theme than women in
220 L. Groves et al.

rejecting the survey statement. Also, men were Table 14.5 Pearson chi-square tests of independence:
more likely to use the human resource develop- percentages of respondents using each coding category by
demographic variables of interest
ment theme than women as a suggested means to
achieve national security. Categories Femalea Malea c2
Pearson chi-square tests by respondent partic- Feel safer 14 6 11.91***
Necessary evil 7 2 9.80**
ipation in conflict resolution and/or peace educa- Illusion/impossible 2 5 6.33*
tion programs revealed that individuals who had Concept of nation states 2 5 8.01**
never participated in such programs were statisti- is wrong
cally more likely to use the intrinsically tied Human resource 8 13 5.37*
development
theme to support the survey statement than their
No conflict Conflict
counterparts. Individuals who had participated in resolution resolution
a conflict resolution or peace education program program program
were more likely to use the negative conse- Intrinsically tied 13 7 5.23*
quences theme; and the concept of nation states Negative consequences 1 5 9.92**
Concept of nation 2 5 3.88*
is wrong theme to reject the survey statement
states is wrong
than their counterparts. Furthermore, individuals Golden rule 0.8 3 4.21*
who had participated in a conflict resolution or Recommending 16 22 3.75*
peace education program were more likely to use peace/peace tools
the golden rule theme and the recommending No protest Protest
peace/peace tools theme as a suggested means to Intrinsically tied 13 7 6.81**
Protection against 8 4 4.08*
achieve national security than their counterparts. external threats
Pearson chi-square tests by respondent partici- Feel safer 12 7 5.23*
pation in a protest against war (including signing Negative consequences 0.4 6 22.05***
a petition, or participating in a march or vigil) Concept of nation 2 6 10.12***
states is wrong
revealed that individuals who have never partici- Obsession with 0.4 2 4.73*
pated in a protest were statistically more likely to security/danger
use the intrinsically tied theme; the protection instills fear
against external threats theme; and the feel safer General conditional 5 9 5.65*
agreement
theme to support the survey statement than those Better ways/proposed 3 8 10.90***
who have participated in a protest. Individuals alternatives
who have participated in a protest were more Doesn’t justify 2 6 6.44*
likely to use the negative consequences theme; the certain measures
Universalistic 4 11 12.10***
concept of nation states is wrong theme; and the prosocial responses
obsession with security/danger instills fear theme Recommending 13 23 10.41***
to reject the survey statement than those who peace/peace tools
had never participated in a protest. Additionally Human resource 7 17 18.48***
development
individuals who have participated in a protest Protectionist/defensive 13 7 5.58*
were statistically more likely to use the general Force 8 3 9.63*
conditional agreement theme; the better ways/ No military Military
proposed alternatives theme; and the doesn’t jus- service service
tify certain measures theme to conditionally Strong nation 1 4 6.17*
Protection against 5 11 4.66*
accept the survey statement than those who have
external threats
never participated in a protest. Furthermore, indi- Education 4 13 12.51***
viduals who have participated in a protest were * ** ***
p < 0.05; p < 0.01; p < 0.001; ^p < 0.10
more likely to use the universalistic prosocial a
The numbers in these columns are the percent of the
responses theme; the recommending peace/peace group that gave responses falling into each of the specified
tools theme; and the human resource development categories
14 UK Anglo National Security
theme as means to achieve national security than
those who have never participated in a protest.
Individuals who had never participated in a pro-
test were more likely to use the protectionist/
defensive theme; and the force theme as a sug-
gested means to achieve national security.
Finally, Pearson chi-square tests by respon-
dent military service revealed that individuals
who are or were in the military were more likely
to use the strong nation theme; and the protection
against external threats theme to support the
survey statement; and the education theme as a
suggested means to achieve national security
than those who have not served in the military.
Discussion and Conclusions
A tenuous philosophical and pragmatic balancing
act is demanded between the satisfaction of safety
needs offered via the social contact (see Hobbes;
Somerville and Santoni 1963, p. 139) and individ-
ual responsibility and capacity for securing those
needs physically and psychologically. The issue of
national security primarily turns on one’s percep-
tion of threats to be defended against; the ability
and responsibility of the government (as opposed
to individuals or communities) to take measures
that proactively or reactively defend against such
threats; and the willingness of individuals and the
nation to engage in trade-offs that may arise
between higher-order civil rights such as privacy or
political expression when weighted against the
promise of satisfying the abiding need to feel safe.
In the quest to address the safety need an individual
must reconcile themselves in some fashion with an
implicit or explicit expectation regarding the role of
the individual, community, nation and beyond in
facilitating and defending this need. Some of the
psychological mechanisms that influence the means
through which individuals accomplish this have
been considered in this chapter.
As Maslow (1943) noted, need for safety is
one of the most basic requisites for human beings
above fundamental biological needs. In this con-
text, the finding within this sample that 61%
agreed with the idea that national security is
essential for individual and family security, with
an additional 20% supporting the statement with
221
qualification is therefore in consistent with this
theory. Furthermore, when considered in a con-
text of a news media that focuses on daily threats
to personal and national security, these findings
may also be in keeping with expectations based
on TMT (Greenberg et al. 1994). Notably, what is
also reflected in the qualitative data from the fol-
low-up question that solicits participants thoughts
on the “best way to achieve national security” are
suggestions that hinge on universal access to
material support, education, opportunity and the
like; emphasis on the belief in peace as the best
route to security; and a belief in universalistic
ethical principles interpersonally and internation-
ally as the foundations of national security. Over
76% of the sample emphasized these themes. In
terms of practical application, the results of this
report and the PAIRTAPS data collection effort
lends support to the idea that ordinary people
generally consider universalistic principles of
peace and cooperation as practical and preferable
actions on the path to national security rather
than war. In countries such as those recounted
here, where government is ostensibly by the peo-
ple and for the people, a reflection of these atti-
tudes in national policy would be welcomed.
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 Views of National Security in Balkan
and Russia 15
Marko Polič, Vlado Miheljak, Nebojsa Petrović,
Sherri McCarthy, Charikleia Tsatsaroni,
and Anna Medvedeva

Maintaining the existence and interests of a nation
state and the safety1 of its citizens through differ-
ent means (e.g., economic, military, political, cul-
tural, and diplomatic) is what national security
means (Lasso and Gonzalez 1993). National
security in the Balkans and Russia has been often
jeopardized for a variety of reasons, both internal
and external to the region. At first glance, there
would appear to be little in the way of shared
national security concerns among Greece, Serbia,
Slovenia, and Russia, the countries in which the
data for this chapter were gathered, and which
spread over a great part of Europe and Asia. These
four states differ on a number of dimensions (e.g.,
size, economy, history, culture); on the other hand,
struggles over independence and borders have
made security an enduring issue in the region.
In this chapter, we consider the national secu-
rity issue as viewed by ordinary people in conve-
nience samples recruited in all four involved
countries. All participants completed the
Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression
and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS) (Malley-Morrison
2009). This survey has two items on national
security, namely “National security is essential
for family and individual security” and “The
best way to achieve security for individuals and
families throughout the world is:…” A coding
1
On the individual (and family) level, security is most
often understood as safety, as freedom from harm (Kanji,
2003).
system for coding the open-ended responses to
these items was derived through grounded the-
ory methods (Charmaz 2008, p. 82), consisting
“of systematic guidelines for gathering, synthe-
sizing, analyzing, and conceptualizing qualita-
tive data to construct theory.” The approach is
inductive, starting with individual responses and
progressively creating more abstract categories
explaining the data.
Interpretations of people’s beliefs and ways of
thinking about security are facilitated both by
understanding psychological theories regarding
security and by relevant contextual knowledge
about the countries under consideration. These
issues are addressed in the next sections.
National Security in Russia
and the Balkans: Between Nationalism
and Democracy
Our theoretical base for understanding national
security issues is derived from two psychological
theories: social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner
1986) and terror management theory (Solomon
et al. 1991). It is also derived from considerations
regarding nationalism because the nation-centric
aspect of national security concerns are often
connected to long-term intractable conflicts.
Bar-Tal (2010) has identified seven perceived
and/or real characteristics of intractable interethnic

K. Malley-Morrison et al. (eds.), International Handbook of War, Torture, and Terrorism, 223
Peace Psychology Book Series, DOI 10.1007/978-1-4614-1638-8_15,
© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2013
224
conflicts that are applicable to the Balkans/Russian
region: (1) totality; that is, the conflict is perceived
as involving essential and basic goals, needs and/or
values that are indispensable for the existence and/
or survival of society; (2) irresolvability; that is, no
peaceful solution is seen as possible; (3) violence
involving soldiers as well as civilians in wars,
small-scale military engagements, or terrorist
attacks; (4) a zero sum nature, in which parties lack
willingness to compromise; (5) centrality, occupy-
ing a core place in the lives of society members and
society as a whole; (6) a demand for extensive
investment of different factors (e.g., military, tech-
nological, and economic) to aid successful coping;
and (7) protraction, persisting for a long time. All
of these characteristics can change over time,
thereby defining the intensity of the conflict.
Besides causing negative experiences, intractable
conflicts mark collective life by continuous con-
frontation requiring mobilization and sacrifice of
society members.
Adaptation to protracted interethnic conflicts
requires coping with three challenges (Bar-Tal
2010): (1) satisfying deprived needs during
conflicts (e.g., psychological needs of knowing,
mastery, safety, positive identity); (2) coping with
stress, fears, and other negative psychological phe-
nomena; and (3) development of psychological
conditions that will be conducive to successfully
withstanding the rival group. Meeting these chal-
lenges is done through the development of sociop-
sychological repertoires that include shared beliefs,
attitudes, motivations, and emotions, all of them
contributing to a societal psychological infrastruc-
ture consisting of collective memories, ethos of
conflicts, and collective emotional orientation.
Collective memory consists of societal beliefs pre-
senting the history of a conflict to society’s mem-
bers, justifying the outbreak and the course of
conflict, presenting the positive image of the in-
group, delegitimizing the opponents, and present-
ing one’s own society as the victim. The ethos of
conflict emerges as a narrative to explain “the
configuration of shared central societal beliefs that
provide a particular dominant orientation to a soci-
ety at present and for the future” (Bar-Tal 2010, p.
186). Societies experiencing prolonged conflict
M. Polic et al.
develop an ethos of conflict that provides a general
orientation and direction to members of the soci-
ety, along with a clear picture of the conflict,
its goals, conditions, and requirements, and images
of their own society and opposing ones. These
societies are also dominated by a number of col-
lectively experienced emotions (e.g., fear, hatred,
anger, guilt, and pride).
Social Identity Theory
Threats to security enhance the social identity of
the in-group. Tajfel and Turner (1986) view social
identity as the part of an individual self-concept
deriving from membership in a social group(s).
Groups may be based on family, community, reli-
gion, or ethnic/nation identifications. Ethnic/
national2 identity determines intergroup behavior,
especially if groups are substantially different on
salient dimensions, relationships between them
are not on equal terms, or they are in conflict. As
explained by McDermott and Zimbardo (2007),
the theory addresses the human tendency to cate-
gorize people and to increase a personal feeling
of self-esteem through the sense of belonging to a
group of similar others. This in-group identification
leads to a double bias, one favorable to the in-
group and the other against out-group members.
Such biases have influenced relationships among
groups within all the countries considered in this
chapter (e.g., between Serbians and Albanians,
Russians and Chechnyans). The stronger the
conflicts between nations the greater the increase
in in-group identifications. These in-group
identifications and the biases associated with
them are enhanced through the mechanisms of
terror management. According to terror manage-
ment theory (Greenberg et al. 1992; McDermott
and Zimbardo 2007), human behavior is
significantly affected by issues reminding people
of their own mortality. Mortality awareness leads
people to perceive others who conform to their
2
While in the US the term “ethnic” identity is prevalent, in
Europe “nation” is the right term, perhaps due to nation
states in Europe, and the absence of them in the US.
15 Russia & Balkans National Security
own worldview as more attractive, and those
opposing it as less so, and even leads to increased
aggression toward those others. We can therefore
expect that intractable conflicts (historical and/or
contemporary) would be associated with a per-
ception of decreased national security, a desire
for a sense of greater security, stronger biases
toward out-groups, and increased aggressiveness
toward those groups.
Overview of the National Contexts
In what ways are Russia, Greece, Serbia, and
Slovenia different, and what do they have in com-
mon? Each country has a different language, a
different alphabet, and a different major religion.
All, however, have experiences at some point in
their histories as conquered and/or conquering
nations. Some have also experienced long-term
ethnic conflict, and all but Greece have under-
gone recent changes in forms of government.
Culturally and politically, the greatest similar-
ity is between Serbia and Slovenia, which for 70
years were parts of the same country—first the
Yugoslav monarchy and then the Federal Socialist
Republic of Yugoslavia. They nevertheless had
different traditions and different degrees of devel-
opment prior to being incorporated into the same
country. Serbia was the larger and most highly
influential entity in the old monarchy, and after
the World War II it was the most influential
republic of Federal Socialist Yugoslavia. Slovenia,
although having relatively less power in
Yugoslavia, was characterized by the highest
quality of life in the region.
The political history of Serbia and Slovenia
prior to merger into Yugoslavia was quite differ-
ent. Historical backgrounds from the point of
view of nation and state development were quite
different. Although Slovenia has been a sover-
eign state for a shorter period (Miheljak and Polič
2009) and was for a long period part of the
Austro-Hungarian monarchy, the political history
of Serbia was much more variegated. A relatively
small country (though frequently a local power),
Serbia has its national roots in the early ninth
225
century principality of Raška, which in twelfth
century evolved into the Serbian Kingdom, but
came under the Ottoman rule after the Battle of
Kosovo in 1389. The Serbian Kingdom wavered
between sovereignty and Ottoman occupation for
about 500 years and the Ottoman occupation left
a strong influence.
Neighboring Greece has a number of common
characteristics with Serbia, including many years
of Ottoman occupation and frequent battles
against occupation. Although Russia was also
dominated by an outside empire (the Mongols)
for centuries, it had a much longer history as a
unified imperial power after overthrowing the
invaders, reaching its height from the eighteenth
through the twentieth centuries. After World War
II, the Soviet Union represented one of the two
major powers in a bipolar division of the world.
In this study, Greece, Russia, Serbia, and
Slovenia are considered collectively because of
both geographical proximity and some historical
connections and similarities. They were all on the
same side in World War II. Three of them (Greece,
Russia, and Serbia) have a similar prevailing reli-
gion (Orthodox Church). Two (Greece and
Serbia) experienced centuries of rule by the
Ottoman Empire. Three (Russia, Serbia, and
Slovenia) have experienced years under a social-
ist regime led by the Communist Party. In the
case of three (Russia, Slovenia and Serbia),
socialist power lasted for most of the last century,
with a shift to capitalism at the beginning of the
1990s. Two (Serbia and Slovenia) were even part
of the same state. Two (Greece and Slovenia) are
currently members of EU and NATO. Recently,
all four countries have been confronted with
economy crises and the potential for social unrest.
Russia has experienced terrorist attacks due to its
military engagement in Chechnya.
There are many similarities among the four
countries, but differences should also be consid-
ered. Although Russia is still a global super
power (though relatively weaker than it predeces-
sor, the Soviet Union), Serbia is a local power
(weakened due to consequences of its nationalis-
tic policy). Slovenia is one of the smallest
European countries, participating in the wars in
226
Afghanistan and Iraq, while Greece is in perma-
nent low intensity conflict with Turkey. Although
all four countries have a representative democ-
racy as their current form of government, its lev-
els, according to Western standards, differ,
especially between Greece and Slovenia on the
one side and Russia and Serbia on the other
(Freedom House 2010).
In recent decades, European social scientists
have conducted comparative studies of the values
and attitudes of Europeans from several different
countries. Since 1990, former communist states
from east and central Europe have also gradually
been included in this research. Among key cycli-
cally repeating international research projects on
comparative values, there is the European Values
Study (EVS), World Value Survey (WVS), and
European Social Survey (ESS). These studies
enable empirical social scientists to examine the
influence of particular factors in shaping values
and attitudes and to make international compari-
sons with regard to values profiles. Inglehart
(1997) and Inglehart et al. (2004) found that exter-
nal indices such as economy and form of govern-
ment are correlated with personal values, which
in turn are associated with the relative well-being
of the state. Based on his research with the WVS,
he formulated a concept of post-materialism,
describing its evolution from pre-modernism,
through modernism, into postmodern value orien-
tation. In his view, the appearance of postmodern-
ism is the consequence of cultural reappraisal,
which is the consequence of achieved relatively
high level of material existence and the level of
security that accompanies this achievement.
In the 1990s, it became possible to include the
new east and central European democracies in
the analyses of cultural values, and Inglehart
undertook a cross-cultural comparison of 43
countries, which has been repeated a number of
times. Based on his analyses, he (Inglehart 1997;
Inglehart et al. 2004) created a cultural map of
values, which implied logical groupings of states
that had in common external cultural-historical
and political circumstances, as well as—at least
to a certain degree—cultural schemes (e.g., reli-
gion), that determined value orientation and even
behavioral patterns of groups.
M. Polic et al.
In Inglehart’s cultural map, countries are
located in a two-dimensional coordinate system
based on their empirically expressed values in
WVS data files. The horizontal axis is a bipolar
dimension representing a materialistic vs. post-
materialistic value orientation while the vertical
axis represents the division between traditional
and secular-rational values. The map gives the
impression that value systems, assumed to deter-
mine attitudes and judgments about a number of
public issues, is like a tidy garden. It shows for-
mer communistic states of central and east Europe
grouped together, developed western states
grouped together, Latin American countries
grouped together, and so forth. Religious orienta-
tions also influence position in the map, from far
Asian Confucian (Japan, China, Taiwan, South
Korea) to central European Catholic and
Protestant states. Protestantism and high eco-
nomic development characterize countries in the
quadrant of rational and post-modernistic values.
Catholic Europe is somewhere in the middle,
with former communist states expressing both a
high rational orientation and materialistic entrap-
ment. Africa and south Asia (India, Pakistan,
Bangladesh, etc.) are located in the traditional-
materialistic quadrant, and Latin American cath-
olic states fall into the traditional-post-materialistic
quadrant. Some countries distinctively deviate
from this location logic—for example, the highly
developed USA and Ireland, which are oriented
post-materialistically into the dimension of high
self-expression but simultaneously display tradi-
tional authority values characteristic of undevel-
oped countries rather than rational-secular values
characteristic of Europe and more developed
Asian countries.
As can be seen in Fig. 15.1, Russia and Serbia
are represented in one grouping based on cultural
values, while Greece and Slovenia are in the
other. Russia is grouped with the majority
of post-communistic and mainly religiously
orthodox countries high on the axis of secular-
rational dimension, but simultaneously entrapped
in a materialistic, survival orientation. Somewhat
lower on both dimensions but in the same region
of the map are post-communistic and orthodox
Serbia. Greece, the country of orthodox but
15 Russia & Balkans National Security
Fig. 15.1 Cultural map of values (Inglehart et al. 2004). Russia and Serbia are in one grouping, while Greece and
Slovenia in the other
non-communistic provenience, deviates from this
pattern, showing less secular-rational authority
than Slovenia, and somewhat more post-materi-
alistic, self-expression values, similar to the
Protestant European group.
Quality of Life
Greece and Slovenia are in the group of countries
with a very high human development index (HDI)
of 25th and 29th, respectively, according to rank-
227
ings from the United Nations Development
Program. The other two are in the group of coun-
tries with a high HDI, at 67th and 71st place,
respectively (UNDP 2009). Altogether 182 coun-
tries are included in HDI rankings. The HDI cat-
egories are classified into four groups based on a
value computed according to a standardized for-
mula: Low HDI (0.000–0.499), Medium HDI
(0.500–0.799), High HDI (0.800–0.899), and
Very High HDI (0.900–1.000). The HDI formula
looks beyond gross national production (GDP)
for a broader definition of well-being and provides
228
Table 15.1 Changes in HDI between 1980/1990/2000 and 2007 and GDP in four countries (UNDP 2009)
Country HDI (year) HDI 2007 Annual increase/fall
Greece 0.844 (1980) 0.942 +0.41%
Russia 0.821 (1990) 0.817 −0.03%
Serbia 0.797 (2000) 0.826 +0.51%
Slovenia 0.853 (1990) 0.929 +0.51%
a composite measure of objective indices from
the fields of economy, health, and education. HDI
is not very reflective of short-term changes in this
region, however, so it is also worthwhile to look
at recent trends of change in these four countries,
as well as at level of military expenditure (see
Table 15.1).
It is evident from Table 15.1 that HDI and
GDP do not give necessarily the same picture. If
military expenditures indicate degree of threat,
Greece and Russia feel the most threatened of the
four countries, but expenditures are relatively low
in all four.
What is the state of democracy of these
countries according to recognized international
indices such as the Freedom House Indices (see
http://www.freedomhouse.org). Freedom House is
an international nongovernmental organization
(NGO) founded in 1941 by Eleanor Roosevelt and
Wendell Willkie, based in Washington, DC. It pub-
lishes an annual report on the degree of perceived
freedom in over 200 countries around the world.
This is the most commonly accepted international
index by many, although the ratings are controver-
sial. This NGO receives most of its funding
through the US government and, according to
Herman and Chomsky (1988), it excessively criti-
cizes states opposed to US interests through its
ratings while being unduly favorable to those who
support US interests. In fact, because it relies on
“expert judgment” and the experts are generally
from the USA, systematic measurement error is a
problem (Bollen 1992). James Woolsey, a former
director of the US Central Intelligence Agency,
headed the organization for much of the past
decade and is considered overly critical of Russia,
a country indexed as “not free.” Sergie Markov, a
Duma deputy affiliated with the United Russia
M. Polic et al.
GDP per capita Military expenditure
in 2007 (PPP US$) 2007 (% of GDP)
28.517 3.5
14.690 3.5
10.248 2.6
26.753 1.5
party, called Freedom House a ‘Russophobic’
organization. “You can listen to everything they
say except when it comes to Russia,” he asserted.
“There are a lot of Russophobes in there”
(Giannonea 2010). Thus, although this is a widely
recognized instrument, assessments of particular
countries may be considered biased.
Presently, Slovenia is the only country in the
region given the status of total freedom by the
Freedom House index regarding political rights
as well as citizens’ rights according to the scale
(1 is totally free; 7 is totally not free). Until the
last decade, all four countries were rated at 7, as
“not free.” Greece and Serbia are also now labeled
free countries, as are all other Balkan nations,
despite ongoing issues with various regimes
regarding minorities’ rights. Many human rights
organizations have raised questions regarding the
rights of ethnic minorities and religious commu-
nities (Muslims) in this region, and treatment of
these groups is certainly not exemplary. The
classification of “not free” is still given to Russia,
supporting Markov’s assertions of bias.
A free press is also important in a democratic
state. Media ratings prepared by Freedom House
evaluate Slovenia and Greece as free, Serbia as
partly free and Russia as not free.
There are great differences in life expectancy
in the four countries, correlating with the mate-
rial standard of living as reflected in GDP. GDP is
the highest in Greece (79.1 years), followed by
Slovenia (78.2 years). Serbia falls behind to 73.9
years and Russia has a standard life expectancy
rate of 66.2 years. Life expectancy may also be
dependent on public expenditure on health.
Expressed in percent of total government expen-
diture, this is highest for Serbia (14.3%), fol-
lowed by Slovenia (13.5%), Greece (11.5%), and
15 Russia & Balkans National Security 229

Table 15.2 Freedom House indices for four countries

Political rights score Civil liberties score Status
Country 2005 2010 2005 2010 2005 2010
Greece 1 1 3 2 Free Free
Russia 6 6 5 5 Not free Not free
Serbiaa 3 2 2 2 Free Free
Slovenia 1 1 1 1 Free Free
a
Note: In 2005 Serbia and Montenegro

Table 15.3 Freedom House indices of the freedom of

the press 2009
Global press freedom rankings
Greece 29 Free
Russia 80 Not free
Slovenia 24 Free
Serbia 39 Partly free
Russia (10.8%). The pattern reflects just the
reverse of the amount of military expenditure.
The CIA World Factbook provides a general
index of national inequality (GINI). An index of
0 indicates total equality, while a value of 100
means total inequality. The highest inequality is
listed for Russia (41.5), followed by Greece (33),
Serbia (30), and Slovenia (24). Only Slovenia,
with a relatively low index, falls into the cate-
gory of countries with a low degree of inequality
characteristic for developed countries. It must be
taken into account that GINI is generated by a
US government intelligence organization and so
may be biased against certain countries
(Tables 15.2 and 15.3).
Violence within countries is probably an
important factor in concerns for security, just as
inequality might be. Rates of homicide on the
Balkan Peninsula are not high, contrary to stereo-
types, although reporting mechanisms are also
suspect and have changed over time. There is not
a great difference among Serbia, Slovenia, and
Greece. Russia is the highest, being close to third
world countries. Suicides have risen dramatically
recently, though this also may be due to changes
in reporting. Data from the World Health
Organization (WHO) showing suicide rates
appear in Table 15.4.
Views on National Security in Russia
and the Balkan States
The Russia/Balkan States Regional
Sample
The 609 participants from the Russia/Balkan
Peninsula region represent a nonrandom cross
section of ordinary people from all four coun-
tries. Due to translation differences and varying
methodology of the researchers gathering data in
each respective county, not all of those surveyed
completed the items related to national security.
The total sample included 97 from Greece (47
women and 45 men, aged 18–76; only 20 of these
participants, 10 females, 9 men, 1 missing answer,
received a version of the PAIRTAPS that had the
national security items), 100 from Serbia
(54 women and 46 men, with an average age of
36 years), 101 from Slovenia (56 women and 45
men, with an average age of 43 years), and 314
from Russia (206 women, 104 men, and 4 of
unknown gender, with an average age of 26
years). Though the age range across countries
was similar, the distribution was not, as is evident
from the average ages. The majority of the sam-
ple (295 participants) indicated that their current
religion was Christianity; there were substan-
tially fewer members of other religious groups,
and 58 participants indicated that they were athe-
ists or agnostics. Participants completed the
PAIRTAPS translated into their native language.
Of the 532 participants in the sample for this
chapter (taking into account missing data from
Greece), 504 (95%) showed some level of agree-
ment with the rating scale item concerning the
230
Table 15.4 Intentional homicide (suicide) rates per 100,000 population by country a,b
Country 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Greece 1.27 0.98 1.11 0.99 1.14
Russia 30 31 29 27 25
Slovenia 0.75 1.45 1.05 1.45 1.00
Serbia – – – – 1.44
a
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_homicide_rate
b
Source: Wikipedia; based on: HO website—Mental health (World Health Organization 2009)
importance of national security to individual and
family security. Only 304 participants (57%)
gave the requested explanation of the rating, and
only 295 participants (55%) answered the ques-
tion about how to achieve individual and family
security throughout the world. The information
summarized in the following sections is based on
these responses. Caution in data interpretation is
necessary due to the fact that samples are rather
small and nonrepresentative, although the answers
nevertheless have the potential for providing
insights into the worldviews of the individual
countries and the region as a whole.
The coding manual for the national security
items was prepared by Helena Castanheira and
David Young. Responses to the first statement
were organized into four major coding catego-
ries: (1) national security is essential for
individual and family security; (2) national secu-
rity is not essential for individual and family
security; (3) there are limits to the extent to which
national security is essential; and (4) does not
address the question. All but the last category
have a number of subcategories. Coding of the
statement “The best way to achieve security for
individuals and families throughout the world
is:…” was organized into two major categories:
(1) positive/universalistic/prosocial responses
and (2) negative/protectionist/interventionist/
abandonment responses, both with several
subcategories.
Is National Security Essential to
Individual and Family Security?
Ratings of the importance of national security for
family and individual security (Fig. 15.2) revealed
M. Polic et al.
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Most recent
0.98 – (2.8) – – 0.98
20 17.9 16.5 14.9 (23.1) 14.9
– – (19.8) – – 1.00
1.46 (19.5) – / – – 1.46
that in all four countries national security is rated
as highly important for people’ s feelings of
safety; the average score of approximately 6
points out of 7 indicates very high agreement that
national security is essential to individual and
family security. There were no statistically
significant differences in rating scale scores
among the countries, or as a function of gender,
social class, religion or sect, being in the military
or having a relative in the military, as revealed by
analyses of variance.
Tables 15.5, 15.7, and 15.9 provide, for all
four states and the Balkan–Russian region as a
whole, the percentages of responses coded into
the major coding categories for explanations as to
the extent to which national security is essential
for family and individual security. It must be
taken into account that less than half (47%) of the
participants gave any explanation of their
ratings.
From Table 15.5, it is evident that the majority
of responses to the item stating that national secu-
rity is essential for family and individual security
were arguments in support of this statement.
These responses were either a depends on (30%)
answer, or emphasized intrinsic ties (23%) of
national security to family and individual secu-
rity. The ability of national security to give a feel-
ing of safety (8%) to citizens was the third most
common type of explanation given in response to
the item. Some examples are given in Table 15.6.
The consistency of responses across countries
may reflect the historically and currently stressful
life conditions in the region.
Emphasizing the importance of national secu-
rity for family/individual security is understand-
able for countries with long histories of conflicts
(Greece) or wars, even recent ones (Russia,
15 Russia & Balkans National Security 231

Fig. 15.2 Ratings of national security importance for ANOVA revealed insignificant differences between coun-
family and individual security for four countries on seven- tries (F(3, 500) = 0.44948, p = 0.71778)
point scale (1 = total disagreement to 7 = total agreement).

Table 15.5 Reasons why national security is essential for family and individual security in percent of all region
responses
Category Greece Russia Slovenia Serbia Region
(A) Family and individual security depends on national 2 17 4 11 30
security
(1) They are intrinsically tied 2 8 7 8 23
(2) A strong nation is essential for individual security 0 1 0 1 2
(B) To protect 1 1 0 0 2
(1) To protect against external or more general threats: 0 0 1 0 1
state of the world
(1a) Government obligation to provide security 0 1 1 0 2
(1b) Citizens obligation to protect country 0 0 0 0 0
(2) To protect against internal threats 0 0 0 0 0
(2a) Government obligation to provide security to 0 0 1 0 1
its citizens
(2b) Citizens obligation to protect the country 0 0 0 0 0
(3) To protect values 0 0 2 0 2
(4) To feel safer 1 3 3 2 8
(5) To protect against evil 0 0 0 0 0
(C) Agree. while recognizing consequences 0 0 0 0 0
(1) It is a necessary evil—negative consequences 0 0 0 0 0
Total I 6 33 18 23 71
Note: Country percents may not add up to region percents due to rounding
232 M. Polic et al.

Table 15.6 Sample responses emphasizing importance of national security for family and individual security
Code Percent Country Age Gender Quotes
Family and individual security 34 (43) Greece M “It is the necessary link. They are
depends on national security connected”
They are intrinsically tied 25 (31) Russia 23 M “A lack of national security means that
some other country is able to harm the
nation. As individuals and families are
parts of a nation, the harm will be done to
them as well”
To feel safer 9 (11) Slovenia 85 F “It is necessary to feel secure in the state,
then you can feel secure also on other
levels”
Note: The first percentage reported refers to the percent of the total response set to this item. The percent in parenthesis
refers to the percent of responses that agreed to the item
F female, M male

Table 15.7 Reasons why national security is not essential for family and individual security in percent of all region
responses
Category Greece Russia Slovenia Serbia Region
(A) General disagreement 0 1 1 1 3
(B) Negative consequences 0 0 0 0 1
(1) Governmental deception 0 0 0 0 0
(2) It restricts individual and family security 0 0 0 0 0
(C) National security is an illusion 0 0 0 0 0
(D) Concept of Nation States is wrong 0 0 0 0 0
(E) Obsession with security/danger/instill fear 0 0 0 0 0
(F) They are not correlated 0 2 0 0 2
Total II 0 4 1 2 6
Note: Country percents may not add up to region percents due to rounding

Slovenia, Serbia). Wars and conflict always
threaten lives, not only of soldiers but of civilians
as well. During recent events in the region, nation-
alism was highly sought, but proved devastating.
Perhaps people are tired of it. Or perhaps the
wording of the items and their structure promotes
rather general responses. It is interesting that vir-
tually no responses from this region fell into cod-
ing manual categories that were derogatory
concerning the importance of national security.
Only a small minority (6%) of the qualitative
national security responses indicated that national
security is not essential for family/individual
security. General disagreement (3%) statements
indicating no connection between the different
forms of security were most common, and there
were no responses at all in several of the coding
categories used in other regions of the world (e.g.,
suggestions that national security is an illusion or
that the whole concept of nation states is wrong).
This dearth of arguments rejecting a relation
between national security and individual/family
security was expected, especially due to the fact
that during attacks on national security (e.g.,
because of war), family and individual security
are endangered, too. Moreover, in this region,
failures to make connections between national
and family/individual security are not socially
approved. Perhaps previous experiences with
“secret police,” which did not inspire trust or
feelings of safety among citizens in this region of
the world, reduces the general likelihood of
downplaying the importance of national security
(Tables 15.7, 15.8, 15.9, and 15.10).
15 Russia & Balkans National Security 233

Table 15.8 Sample responses emphasizing that national security is not essential for family and individual security
Code Percent Country Age Gender Quotes
General disagreement 3 (43) Slovenia 41 M “Against what and who should act ‘national
security’”
Negative consequences 1 (10) Russia 45 M “Sometimes it may harm”
They are not correlated 2 (38) Greece F “In my ideal world, there is no need for
security guards. Even in the reality of today,
I cannot see how it is essential for the family
and individual security....”
Note: The first percentage reported refers to the percent of the total response set to this item. The percent in parenthesis
refers to the percent of responses that agreed to the item
F female, M male

Table 15.9 Conditional or partial agreement with the statement that national security is essential for family and indi-
vidual security in percent of all region responses
Category Greece Russia Slovenia Serbia Region
(A) General conditional agreement 0 1 1 1 3
(B) Better ways, proposed alternatives 0 1 0 0 1
(C) It restricts individual freedoms/rights 0 0 0 0 0
(1) It needs to be monitored 0 0 0 0 0
(2) It does not justify certain measures 0 0 0 0 1
(D) Essential but incomplete 0 3 0 0 2
(E) National security is useful in ensuring family and 0 1 3 3 6
individual rights but not essential
Total III 0 6 4 4 13
(IV) Does not address the question 1 2 2 1 5
(V) Does not know 0 2 0 0 2
Note: Country percents may not add up to region percents due to rounding

Table 15.10 Sample responses emphasizing conditional agreement with statement about importance of national
security for family and individual security
Code Percent Country Age Gender Quotes
General conditional agreement 3 (24) Slovenia 24 F “Depending on what is considered under
national security. If this is about war
certainly threats. Not in the case when
politicians imagine some external enemies”
Essential but incomplete 3 (20) Russia 20 M “National security is very important, but it
does not influence very much on the
security of the family, it is the question of
the inner peace in the country”
National security is useful in 6 (44) Slovenia 21 M “If state is secure, this does not mean that
ensuring family and individual family is safe, but conditions for this are
rights but not essential better”
Note: The first percentage reported refers to the percent of the total response set to this item. The percent in parenthesis
refers to the percent of responses that agreed to the item
F female, M male
234 M. Polic et al.

Responses rejecting a relationship between Exploratory analyses of potential demographic

national security and individual/family security
appeared somewhat more philosophical than
the responses agreeing that national security
was essential to individual/family security—
leading us to speculate that rejecting the idea of
a relationship that is taken for granted in the
region demands not just greater courage but a
greater ability to think in a critical and reflective
way.
Responses expressing conditional or partial
agreement with the item concerning the essential
role of national security in assuring family/
individual security were infrequent (14% of
responses). We suggest that respondents who
impose qualifications on the necessity of national
security are similar in their reasoning on the issue
to those who reject an essential relationship.
Many of these respondents seem to connect fam-
ily and individual security more with internal
situations in their countries and with inner psy-
chological states than with national security.
correlates of different thematic response patterns
were consistent with the demographic analyses
of the rating scale scores: specifically, no statisti-
cally significant group differences emerged.
How Can National Security
Be Achieved?
Only about one third of the region’s respondents
answered the open-ended question, “How can
national security be achieved?” (See Tables 15.11
and 15.12 for sample responses.)
It is evident that positive/universalistic/
prosocial responses prevailed (80%) over nega-
tive responses or responses emphasizing the
impossibility of national security (5% and 9%
respectively). Optimistic responses fell into either
the general positive category (21%) or suggested
a specific means of achieving security; among

Table 15.11 Best ways of achieving security for individuals and families in percent of all region responses
Category Greece Russia Slovenia Serbia Region
(I) Positive/universalistic/prosocial responses 4 11 0 8 21
(A) Invoking of ethical and philosophical principles 1 0 0 3 4
(1) Tolerance 0 1 2 5 7
(2) Golden rule 0 0 2 1 2
(3) Peace/nonviolence 0 5 3 5 13
(B) Recommending peace/peace tools 0 1 4 2 6
(C) Diplomacy/international relations/international law 1 5 4 2 11
(D) Human and resource development 2 1 4 5 10
(1) Aid 0 0 0 1 2
(2) Education 1 1 1 0 3
Total I 11 24 21 33 77
(II) Negative/protectionist/interventionist/abandonment 1 5 0 0 5
responses
(A) Force 0 1 0 0 2
Total II 1 5 0 0 7
(III) Denial of possibility of NS, apathy, unsure 0 3 5 2 9
Total III 0 3 5 2 9
(IV) Does not address the question 0 1 2 1 3
Note: Country percents may not add up to region percents due to rounding
15 Russia & Balkans National Security 235

Table 15.12 Sample responses of suggestions how to achieve family and individual security throughout the world
Code Percent Country Age Gender Quotes
Positive/universalistic/ 24 (28) Russia 53 M “Respect of the rights and freedoms”
prosocial responses
Peace/nonviolence 15 (17) Serbia 34 F “Peace to reign in the world”
Recommending peace/peace 7 (8) Slovenia 84 F “We should take care that wars would
tools not exist any more”
Diplomacy/international 13 (15) Greece M “Peaceful means and international
relations/international law justice. The peace corps”
Human and resource 12 (13) Slovenia 50 M “To rise economic standard and
development eliminate social differences”
Negative/protectionist/ 6 (77) Russia 20 M “Good intelligence and police”
interventionist/abandonment
responses
Denial of possibility of NS, 10 (100) Slovenia 40 F “There is no. There is never possible
apathy, unsure to achieve security in the whole
world”
Note: The first percentage reported refers to the percent of the total response set to this item. The percent in parenthesis
refers to the percent of responses that agreed to the item
F female, M male

the most common suggestions were ones that
emphasized the importance of diplomacy and
international relations (11%), peace and nonvio-
lence (13%), human and resource development
(including equitable redistribution of wealth)
(11%), and recommending peace tools (6%).
Thus, suggestions ranged from quite general to
quite specific. Military solutions were not in the
forefront of respondents’ conceptualizations.
Again, exploratory analyses of possible differ-
ences among demographic groups in preferences
for particular themes did not reveal any reliable
differences.
Conclusions
Given the relative smallness of our nonrepresen-
tative regional sample, and the lack of statisti-
cally significant group differences, caution is
essential in the interpretation of our findings.
Nevertheless, we propose some ideas suggested
to us by our sample’s responses concerning
national security.
Answers to both questions about national
security revealed strong inclinations toward
peace and a secure life, as well as a relatively
high degree of optimism in spite of some recent
threats to national or inner security of Russia
and the selected Balkan Peninsula countries.
Should such results be surprising? Or stated dif-
ferently, if expectations for preference of life in
peace are self-evident, is expected optimism
self-evident too? One might think that in a region
where objectively the security situation is com-
paratively worse in regard to recent wars or
ongoing conflicts than in other regions, optimism
would be unusual. However, it is possible that
just the opposite is true, that in situations of
unrest or anxiety, a certain level of optimism is
essential.
A number of years ago, during the disintegra-
tion of East-European empires (1990–1991),
Tos and Miheljak (2002) measured optimism
potential (expectations) in six East European
countries, including former Yugoslavian repub-
lics and autonomous provinces. They found that
in those countries in which the situation was
objectively the worst, optimism was the highest.
236
In Slovenia, for instance, with the best possibili-
ties for democratic development, security, and
economic stability maintenance, pessimism was
the highest. In Kosovo, whose situation and per-
spectives regarding national and individual
security were objectively the worst, people
expressed the highest optimism in their expecta-
tions. The questions in the current study con-
cerning the relationship of individual/family
and national security and how to achieve national
security provide a more indirect approach to the
issue of optimism, and at least some of the
findings seem consistent with those of the ear-
lier study.
The findings in the current study suggest to
us that in the Russian/Balkan Peninsula coun-
tries, there is a very broad-based belief in the
importance of national security, and a belief in
the achievability of national security. We did not
see significant patterns differentiating between
the sampled countries based on Inglehart’s cul-
tural framework. It appears that in spite of enor-
mous differences between the countries in this
region regarding regional position, historical
experiences, cultural and religious situation,
current economic and political situation (state of
democracy), these differences do not express
themselves in essential differences in under-
standing national, family, and individual
security.
What perspectives for understanding and
ranking security in comparison with other val-
ues could we expect? If, at the beginning of the
downfall of the previous political systems, patri-
otic (or, one might say, pseudo-patriotic) emo-
tions and values could be sensed in some Balkan
countries and in the former Soviet Union that
emphasized sovereignty, independence, honor,
and historical and ethnic identities, it seems that
now security and peace may have reestablished
themselves as more and more dominant values.
It is difficult to evaluate the extent to which the
optimism we observed happened in spite of bad
experiences during the transition to democracy
or because of them. It may simply be that nothing
M. Polic et al.
is more important to most ordinary people than
security and the assurance of peace. Despite the
fact that Greece, Russia, Serbia, and Slovenia,
neither geographically nor by ranking and dis-
tribution of basic values, nor by state of democ-
racy, economic development and stability do not
represent a coherent region, in our study they do
not differ in regard to views on national security
and peace.
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 Views on National Security
in the Middle East 16
Lane Smith, Mohammad Bahramzadeh,
Sherri McCarthy, Tristyn Campbell, Majed Ashy,
Helena Syna Desivilya, Abdul Kareem Al-Obaidi,
Kamala Smith, Alev Yalcinkaya, William Tastle,
Feryal Turan, Dalit Yassour-Boroschowitz,
and Rouba Youssef

Unlike much of the rest of the world, government
policy toward national security in the Middle
East has generally been determined by decisions
made by countries outside of the region. The
Middle East, a term sometimes considered
“Eurocentric” (Adelson 1995; Koppes 1976), is
used to designate a region of countries at the
intersection of Africa, Asia, and Europe. The
region includes between 20 and 40 countries,
including at least the following: Afghanistan,
Algeria, Bahrain, Cyprus, Egypt, Iraq, Iran,
Israel, Jordon, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya,
Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Pakistan, Palestine,
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia,
Turkey, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen (see
www.mideastweb.org for more information). The
countries comprise a diverse mosaic of languages,
traditions, and histories and are difficult to char-
acterize as a group.
In this chapter, we offer a quick snapshot of
the views of some people living in the area of the
world known as “the Middle East” toward issues
of national security. With the current violence
and unrest, the presence of foreign militaries, and
the geopolitical as well as the geostrategic (i.e.,
access to oil) importance of the region, national
security is certainly a critical concern in this
volatile region; nevertheless, the people living in
the region may feel differently about the relative
importance of various issues than individuals
outside the region.
Fischer and Schmelzle (2009) assert that the
primary role of the nation-state is to assure sover-
eignty and protect the security of its citizens and
the integrity of its borders against outside threats
(interstate security) and the integrity of the indi-
vidual household, tribe, and community against
domestic threats (intrastate security). The Western
notion of the nation-state, however, was a foreign
concept within this region of the world until quite
recently. During past centuries, only two separate
sovereign entities—Persia (now Iran) and the
Ottoman Empire—existed in the region. Tribal
groups were primarily nomadic and moved from
region to region within specific areas of the empire.
Before 1914, there was little sign of the territorial
and religious struggles for a homeland by groups
such as the Kurds, Armenians, and Palestinians
that seem to characterize the region today.
Most of the nations in the Middle East today
were created within the last century, generally with
rather arbitrary or artificial boundaries imposed by
former colonial powers, and intrusions by other
nations external to the area. This restructuring
resulted in several ongoing border disputes, dis-
placed some groups and relocated others, changed
the dynamics of minority vs. majority cultures,
and created a sense of loss of roots and homeland
for many. The Palestinians, Armenians, and Kurds
were all left stateless by the borders imposed and
were not recognized by the newly created coun-
tries in which they found themselves.

K. Malley-Morrison et al. (eds.), International Handbook of War, Torture, and Terrorism, 239
Peace Psychology Book Series, DOI 10.1007/978-1-4614-1638-8_16,
© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2013
240
The Ottoman Empire, which loosely governed
most of the region we now call the Middle East,
covered a vast expanse of lands, including what is
now Turkey and the Balkans and much of Europe
as well as Asia and Africa. It was a diverse region,
with many languages and religions represented.
Within the Ottoman Empire, Jews, Christians,
and Muslims from many different tribal groups
or nationalities, from Armenian to Serbian to
Greek, coexisted peacefully for centuries within
the governmental framework of “millets.”
“Millet” is derived, as noted in Wikipedia, from
the Arabic word “millah,” which means “reli-
gious community.” According to the millet sys-
tem, the laws governing a particular group were
determined by the laws of their religion rather
than their geographic location. Thus, all shared a
vast physical territory and paid taxes to the same
government, but regulations and lifestyle were
determined and enforced within the framework
of the religious group to which individuals
belonged. The millets had no physical borders,
but occupied a portable space that transcended
territorial and regional boundaries. Members of a
millet could move with their group from place to
place within the Ottoman Empire or stay near
their family or tribal home, still under the specific
laws and community guidelines of their particu-
lar religion.
This system was completely disrupted at the
time of World War I. After peaking in the early
seventeenth century, the strength of the Ottoman
Empire had gradually begun to decline. By the
time of World War I, only a small portion of its
vast territories had not been conquered by Russia
or other European nations. In 1923, at the end of
the war, that small remaining portion became the
country of Turkey. The Ottoman Empire ceased
to exist. The former Ottoman territories were
occupied and governed by European countries,
primarily England and France. After World War
I, the League of Nations stepped in and formed
“mandated territories.” Oman, Aden, Egypt, Iraq,
and Palestine, later split into Jordan and Israel as
well, were occupied by the British. Libya was
occupied by the Italians. Algeria, Syria, Lebanon,
and Tunisia were occupied by the French. The
Dutch, Portuguese and British continued to exert
L. Smith et al.
influence in Kuwait. These countries were granted
independent status during the 1930s and 1940s,
primarily based on decisions made in part because
of the World Wars. Iraq was granted indepen-
dence in 1932, Syria and Lebanon in 1941, Jordan
in 1946 (becoming the Kingdom of Jordan in
1950), Palestine in 1947, and Israel in 1948.
Thus, until relatively recently, nations did not
exist in the Middle East. Correspondingly, the idea
of “national security” also did not exist. Family
and community security were issues separate from
ideas of national boundaries. Protection came from
and was granted to first, Allah, then to one’s fam-
ily, and then to one’s millet, tribe, or group.
The territorial battles and religious persecu-
tion in the region today are recent developments,
beginning in the 1940s. Artificial boundaries and
laws created new minority group/majority group
dynamics in an area that had been a peaceful
cultural mosaic for thousands of years under
Persians, Greeks, Romans, Arabs, and Turks,
where many tribal, linguistic, and religious
groups had coexisted, each with their own laws
that were respected throughout the region. Identity
became threatened; homelands were lost.
Nationalism crushed the traditional social order
within the region, turning neighbors into enemies.
Palestinians were displaced by the divisions
of territory, as were the Armenians and the Kurds.
Palestinians were expelled from much of their
traditional homeland when Israel was created in
1948. Continued efforts to redistribute the land,
most noticeably in 1968 and 1973, continue to
reverberate through the area today.
Armenians were displaced by both Turkey and
the Soviet Union. The former expelled the
Armenians and the latter annexed most of what
had formerly been the Ottoman territory of
Armenia. The six million or so displaced indi-
viduals sometimes responded violently, with acts
of terrorism against the Turkish government or
the Soviets. Around the same time, the Ottoman
territory of Kurdistan was divided among
Iran, Iraq, and Turkey, forcing the Kurds into
minority status in each of the three countries.
Approximately, ten million displaced individuals
have since been forced into living as nomads in
three countries but citizens of none. In attempts
16 Middle East National Security
to rebuild a home and create an independent
country of Kurdistan, they have been revolting
against the governments of all three countries
since the 1920s. Stateless because of artificial
borders, these three groups set the tone of national
unrest in the Mideast that continues into the
twenty-first century.
In addition to territorial and nationalistic
unrest, the rich oil reserves in the region have also
created instability. For the last century, the USA,
Russia, and Europe have continually been
involved in politics in the region, supporting some
regimes and undermining others, to support their
own economic interests and their needs for petro-
leum. The “Twin Pillars” strategy of supporting
Saudi Arabia and Iran, developed under Nixon’s
regime in the USA, still influences the region
today, albeit perhaps not as initially intended.
Thus, it is not surprising that now the artificially
created countries in the Middle East, supported by
superpowers outside the region, may represent
threats to their own citizens and that these same
countries, controlled by various outside interests
and forces, are also threats to the citizens of other
countries in the region, as noted by Nizar (2002).
Today, after decades of repression by autocratic
regimes, actual or incipient violence is being seen
throughout the Middle East from Iran and
Afghanistan to Morocco, Algeria, and Libya.
On December 16, 2010, Mohamed Al
Bouazizi, an unemployed Tunisian university
graduate scrambling to make a living, had all his
meager produce of fruits and vegetables
confiscated by the police for want of a license.
The next day, he set himself on fire in protest of
the limited economic and social opportunities
available to him. On January 4, 2011, he died
from his injuries and ten days later, Tunisian
President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali resigned and
fled to Saudi Arabia after more than 60 protesters
were killed amid substantial property damage.
The Tunisian protest seemed to unleash protests
throughout the Middle East. The regime in Egypt
changed. NATO imposed a “no fly” zone in
Libya. Saudi troops entered Bahrain to reinforce
the minority Sunni government. Yemen President
Ali Abdullah Saleh all but conceded that he must
depart after 32 years in office, and Syrian
241
President Bashar Assad struggled violently to
retain control. From Morocco in the west to Iran
in the east, all countries in the region appear to be
struggling to contain rising instability. Even
Afghanistan, coping with many other challenges,
has seen a call for its own “Days of Rage.” In
each case, protestors are mobilizing against
endemic corruption, rising inequality, feeble eco-
nomic growth, weak governance, and rule of law.
This unrest is exacerbated by a demographic
surge, with a large proportion of the population
under 25 years old, and by endemic tribal and
religious conflicts rooted in the artificial restruc-
turing of the former Ottoman Empire during the
last century. According to Nadim Houry, a Human
Rights Watch researcher responsible for Syria
and Lebanon, “There are two dynamics compet-
ing. The dynamic of violent repression of protests
leads to more protests…[and] the authorities
manage to convince people that the package of
reforms is serious. The window of opportunity
for reforms is narrowing as violence against pro-
testers continues” (quoted in Fadel 2011, p. 1).
Schneider (1999), writing in a preface to a
manual for the US military, noted: “The Middle
East is an international flashpoint, a place where
open warfare could erupt at any time. It is the
home of numerous countries possessing some
combination of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD)—nuclear, biological, or chemical weap-
ons—and is an area where states are developing
an increasing capability to deliver such WMD by
missiles and/or aircraft. The Middle East is also
the home of US friends who oppose each other as
well as rogue states who are hostile to the United
States. In short, the Middle East is a WMD war
waiting to happen” (p. v.). Obviously, this view
comes from a country with current military
involvement in the region and its own particular
set of interests, but it does demonstrate the per-
ception of many regarding the threat of violence
in and from the Middle East at present. Divisions,
perceived or actual, between Sunni–Shia,
Persian–Arab, Israeli–Palestinian, and Christian–
Muslim all have a dramatic impact on the poten-
tial for violence and instability and pose threats
to the security of countries and their internal
communities. Over the past 30–40 years, these
242
fault lines have contributed to poles of instability,
radiating outward to affect regimes and people
alike.
Founded by Osama bin Laden in the late
1980s, al-Qaeda has become a multinational ter-
rorist organization with the ability to function on
a global scale. Al-Qaeda is not guided by territo-
rial objectives but rather by the ideological,
religious, and political messages of resistance
against the influence of the United States and the
West (Bergen 2008). In 1998, bin Laden issued a
fatwa, or religious decree, calling for jihad
against the USA and, ultimately, the rest of the
non-Islamic world (Orbach 2001). As both an
organization and a movement, al-Qaeda is able
to adapt and respond dynamically to changes
within the security environment. The decentral-
ized nature of al-Qaeda’s operational framework,
comprised of interconnected networks able to
supply financial and human resources from clan-
destine locations, provides the organization with
a remarkable scope and durability (Sawyer and
Foster 2008).
Today, al-Qaeda has proven itself as a resil-
ient organization able to “withstand multiple
blows to its leadership and infrastructure”
(Bergen 2008, p. 15). The global counterterror-
ism operations launched in the aftermath of the
September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade
Center and the Pentagon have not eliminated the
threat posed by al-Qaeda. Following the American
military invasion in Afghanistan in October 2001,
al-Qaeda’s central leadership secured a new
sanctuary within the Federally Administered
Tribal Areas (FATA) of western Pakistan (Sawyer
and Foster 2008). Though al-Qaeda lost its prin-
cipal military training base in Afghanistan, the
FATA sanctuary has allowed al-Qaeda to reestab-
lish “significant control over their once-battered
worldwide terror network and…set up a band of
training camps…near the Afghan border”
(Mazzetti and Rohde 2007; Laabs and Rotella
2007; Mekhennent and Moss 2007; Abbas 2007,
as cited in Sawyer and Foster 2008, p. 205).
Al-Qaeda has not only survived “the most
significant counterterrorism efforts in the history
of modern terrorism,” the multinational terrorist
L. Smith et al.
network has grown in strength and scope and
remains as a top threat to the United States and
its allies (Sawyer and Foster 2008, p. 198). The
safe haven in Pakistan provides al-Qaeda with a
“physical location for jihadists around the world
to gather, train, perpetuate their virulent ideol-
ogy, and plan for new attacks” (Sawyer and
Foster 2008, p. 205). Members trained in these
camps become “cell-builders” who create and
train their own cells, replenishing al-Qaeda’s
ranks and retaining support for the movement,
thereby strengthening and expanding al-Qaeda’s
operational capability to function as a global
jihadist network and garner financial and mate-
rial support (Sawyer and Foster 2008). In 2004,
bin Laden identified “martyrdom operations,” or
suicide attacks as the cornerstone of al-Qaeda’s
operations against the USA and its allies
(Blanchard 2007, p. 7). Al-Qaeda-directed cells
are able to carry out attacks far from the organi-
zation’s center of operations in Pakistan as evi-
denced by the bombings in Madrid in 2004 and
the 2005 London attacks (Bergen 2008).
Although the death of bin Laden in May 2011
delivered a definite blow to the stability of the
organization, it did not signify the end of al-Qae-
da’s ability to mobilize resources for terrorist
attacks and broadcast their religious/ideological
rhetoric (Sawyer and Foster 2008). Al-Qaeda is a
modern organization that exploits up-to-date
technology and manages “a relatively advanced
propaganda operation” (Bergen 2008, p. 16).
Their list of enemies has expanded to include “all
Middle Eastern regimes; Muslims who do not
share their views; the Shia; most Western coun-
tries; Jews and Christians; the governments of
India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Russia; most
news organization; the United Nations; and inter-
national NGOs” (Bergen 2008, p. 28). Although
there is evidence that support for al-Qaeda has
declined, the conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and
Pakistan have contributed to a situation of insta-
bility in the region and the creation of insurgen-
cies in the countries which provide al-Qaeda with
the resources necessary to maintain a threat to the
security of all those who do not agree with their
principles (Bergen 2008).
16 Middle East National Security 243

While physical security remains primordial to Table 16.1 Level of risk for future instability: CIDCM
families and communities, other significant driv- risk and category scores
ers of instability and insecurity exist. Bilgin Country Risk score Risk category
(2004) notes “…basic needs such as subsistence, Afghanistan 38.9 5
health and education, and issues such as religious Iraq 19.7 5
and cultural identity, democratization and human Yemen 11.6 3
Lebanon 10.5 3
rights may rate higher on individuals’ and social
Jordan 4.7 2
groups’ security agendas than regime security
Iran 2.1 1
and military stability that have dominated the Syria 1.1 1
security agendas of the United States and its Saudi Arabia 0.8 1
regional allies….Conceiving security in the Kuwait 0.7 1
‘Middle East’ solely in terms of military stability Israel 0.6 1
helps gloss over other structurally based (eco-
nomic, political and societal) security concerns.
Dealing with the military security agenda is
always necessary, but a military-focused and at the University of Maryland has developed the
determined security agenda…has so far led to a “Peace and Conflict Instability Ledger” (Hewitt
diversion of valuable resources into arms pur- et al. 2010), which ranks states based on the esti-
chases” (p. 12). mated risk of future instability or armed conflict.
There are many lenses through which to peer It defines an “instability event” as the arrival of
into the unstable future. One is to look at broad revolutionary war, ethnic war, adverse regime
trends that affect both interstate and intrastate change, and genocides, such that the govern-
security. Benshal and Byman (2004) suggested ment’s ability to exercise authority has been dis-
the following possibilities: (a) liberalization will rupted. The CIDCM ledger is based on five risk
advance slowly and democratization will be even factors, each considered a reliable proxy: (a) insti-
more limited, (b) declining economies of many tutional consistency of a regime (democracies
countries will increase popular dissatisfaction and autocracies are consistent, anocracies are
with governments, (c) militaries will be more inconsistent), (b) openness to international trade
devoted to internal control than to external (international linkages minimize risks), (c) infant
defense, (d) new leaders may be weak and less mortality rates (a key indicator of socioeconomic
likely to cooperate with the USA, (e) communi- well-being), (d) the extent to which the country is
cations technologies may increase the demand militarized, and (e) its proximity to other coun-
for public participation in government, (f) chang- tries with armed conflict (neighborhood security).
ing patterns in the energy market will strengthen The application of these five data points results in
ties to Asia, and (g) Middle Eastern countries will a risk rating of future instability, presented in
continue to develop and acquire weapons of mass comparison with the average risk of instability for
destruction. members of the Organisation for Economic
They also predicted that external influences Co-operation and Development (OECD).
would continue to dominate and that superpow- Table 16.1 displays the CIDCM ledger risk
ers such as the United States would seek stability factors for the various countries in the Middle
over political reform and continue to strengthen East from which our data came.
“friendly” countries in the region while seeking In addition to the recent events that have
to undermine avowed enemy countries. influenced risk and the tendency to rank countries
Another way to look at security is through a traditionally considered US allies as more secure,
data-driven snapshot, which appears to have some there are other important concerns raised by this
predictive capability. The Center for International approach. One is the political transition period.
Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM) The estimated risk of a major instability event
244
climbs as a regime transitions from autocracy
toward democracy (or deteriorates in the other
direction). A second accelerator of conflict is the
occurrence or reoccurrence of a major conflict in
the neighborhood. The implication is that a conflict
occurring in one country tends to stimulate insta-
bilities “in the neighborhood” and can easily go
viral. Based on an assessment of these factors, the
security prospects in the Middle East seem some-
what bleak. Although half the countries in the
region have very low risk ratings according to the
CIDCM ledger, much of this stability was due to
the effectiveness of several autocratic regimes
(Iran, Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait).
The ledger confirms that a transition to more
democratic, pluralistic societies in the Middle
East is fraught with threats to individual and fam-
ily security. This information, however, is based
on a Western view, situated in the USA, one of
the superpowers with a history of exerting
control in the region by selectively supporting
particular regimes and suppressing others. It may
not necessarily reflect the attitudes of citizens of
the countries themselves. The purpose of the
Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression
and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS) was to explore
the attitudes of ordinary citizens in the region.
During our initial project, we gathered informa-
tion from more than 500 people in Egypt,
Israel, Pakistan, Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi
Arabia, Kuwait, Yemen, Syria, Iraq, Iran, and
Afghanistan. Not all of the responses are reflected
in this particular chapter, however. The version
of the survey distributed in Israel and Kuwait did
not include questions on national security. The
data from Turkey are included elsewhere in this
volume in the chapter about Russia and the
Balkans. The data from Pakistan is summarized
in a South and Southeast Asia chapter, and Egypt
is included in the chapter on Africa. As with the
boundaries of the countries in the region, such
divisions were somewhat arbitrary. The back-
ground recounted above applies to the entire
region. The countries from which data summa-
rized in this chapter were derived are followed by
more specific brief descriptions to better situate
the attitudes reflected in our exploratory pilot
data from the region. Following these brief country
L. Smith et al.
summaries, responses are presented from the
region to survey items on national security.
Lebanon
Lebanon is a country of about four million people
located at the eastern edge of the Mediterranean
Sea. It is north of Israel and west of Syria. Because
of the central location and easy access to trade
routes, it has been a trade center for millennia.
The Phoenicians established Lebanon’s reputa-
tion as outstanding traders and navigators as early
as 3000 B.C. (Bitar-Tastle et al. 2009). After
1,200 years of Phoenician rule, the diverse tribes
in the region came under the control of several
different groups, including the Assyrians,
Babylonians, Persians, Greeks, and Romans. As
part of the Roman province of Syria, Lebanon
enjoyed over 600 years as one of the most peace-
ful and prosperous regions in the Mediterranean,
and many Lebanese converted to Christianity.
In about 630 AD, Arabs conquered the region,
and Maronite Christians rejecting Islam isolated
themselves at Mount Lebanon. The rest of the
area became largely Muslim until the time of the
Crusades in 1100 AD. The Mamluk warriors of
Egypt ruled the area for the next 200 years until
the arrival of the Ottoman Turks in 1516 (Bitar-
Tastle et al. 2009).
The Ottomans permitted considerable self-
rule. According to Hitti (1957), the people of the
region experienced more freedom and prosperity
than the rest of the region until the late nineteenth
century. Around 1840, an alliance with Egypt
became oppressive and, with aid from England
and France, Lebanon ended the alliance. Tensions
between the Druze, an Islamic group, and the
Maronite Christians also developed during this
time, resulting in massacres and open fighting
around Mount Lebanon in 1860. In 1861, Lebanon
became an autonomous Ottoman province
divided into seven districts. Each district was led
by an Ottoman official assisted by 12 elected
members from religious communities, or millets.
The communities represented included Maronite,
Druze, Greek Orthodox, Catholic, Sunni Muslim
and Shiite Muslim. Every Lebanese individual
16 Middle East National Security
was considered equal under the law, the economy
flourished, and a general sense of security pre-
vailed (Salibi 1965). However, by 1916, World
War I was underway and the end of the Ottoman
Empire was imminent, and by 1920, the area was
occupied by France and proclaimed to be the
“State of Greater Lebanon.” Through the secret
Sykes–Picot Agreement, France endeavored to
retain political control of Lebanon and Syria,
thereby improving accessibility to trade routes
and mitigating the vacuum left by the end of the
Ottoman Empire (Bitar-Tastle et al. 2009).
France governed Lebanon, which was pre-
dominantly Maronite Christian, until 1943 and
left the country entirely by 1946. Political and
economic differences between Syria and
Lebanon after World War II created rifts in the
region. Tensions again began to mount and civil
war in which the USA intervened broke out
between the government of Lebanon and
Muslim rebels in 1958 (Bitar-Tastle et al. 2009).
Khalaf (2002) noted that during the interlude
between the 1958 Civil War and the 1970s,
Lebanon experienced both a “Golden Age of
economic prosperity and societal transforma-
tion” and “growing disparities, cleavages,
neglect…misdirected and uneven growth, bois-
terous political culture, conspicuous consump-
tion and the trappings of frivolous lifestyle
masking creeping social tensions and other
ominous symptoms of political unrest” (p. 151).
From 1975 to 1990, devastating civil wars were
ongoing, influenced by the governments of out-
side countries.
Another source of instability is the Lebanon–
Israel–Palestine nexus, where external financing
and weapons are supporting insurgent efforts by
Hamas and Hezbollah, based in southern Lebanon
and holding a major role in the Lebanese govern-
ment. Nearly 500,000 Palestinian refugees have
been forced to leave Israel, the West Bank, and
Gaza since the creation of Israel in 1948. Many
resettled in Lebanon. During the 1980s, political
exiles and refugees from Palestine and the PLO
made Lebanon a hub for orchestrating attacks on
Israel. Palestinian raids led to large-scale inva-
sions of Lebanon by Israel, and the United
Nations peacekeeping force was called on to help
245
with the withdrawal of Israeli forces. These
forces, though intended to be neutral, were per-
ceived as “taking sides.” Israeli troops cooper-
ated with the Christian militias against Palestinian
refugees. After fighting broke out between the
Shiite and Druze militias, Syrian troops entered
Lebanon in the late 1980s and began a long occu-
pation. Hezbollah, a Shiite resistance movement,
emerged from this unrest. Although Lebanon is a
very fragile state, with internal tensions and much
external interference, it provided a platform
allowing Hezbollah to push Israel out of Lebanon,
and from which it continues to launch attacks
(Bitar-Tastle et al. 2009).
Tensions with Syria, Israel, Palestine, Jordan,
and other countries have continued into the
twenty-first century. Israel and Syria have finally
withdrawn, although UN forces remain. A
national unity government was approved by the
national assembly in late 2009, and Lebanon was
granted a seat on the UN Security Council for
2010–2011. Currently, the country operates
under a constitution that carefully balances polit-
ical power among three groupings: Shias, Sunnis,
and Maronite Christians. For example, the con-
stitution dictates that the president be a Christian,
the prime minister a Sunni Muslim, and the
speaker of parliament a Shia Muslim (Bureau of
Near Eastern Affairs 2011). This careful balance
of power, dating back to the Taif agreement in
1989, was critical for Lebanon’s successful
future. It is sensitive to external influences and
interests, with Iran and Syria supporting the
Shias, Saudi Arabia supporting the Sunnis, and
other countries supporting the Christians.
However it does maintain relatively equitable
treatment of all groups.
According to the CIA World Factbook (2011),
the population of Lebanon is literate (87%), young
(median age 29), and urban (87%). Many prefer
to classify themselves as Phoenician or Canaanite
rather than Arabic, although CIA Facts lists the
population as 95% Arabic, 4% Armenian, and 1%
other. There are 17 religious sects recognized,
with about 58% of the population identified as
Muslim (Shia, Sunni, Druze, Isma’ilite, Alawite,
or Nasayri) and 40% Christian (many Orthodox,
Catholic, and Protestant sects are recognized).
246
Jordan
After World War I and the dissolution of the
Ottoman Empire, the UK governed much of the
Middle East. In the 1920s, Britain separated out a
semiautonomous part of what was then known as
Transjordan from Palestine, and that area gained its
independence in 1946, becoming known as Jordan
in 1950. The Palestine Liberation Organization
(PLO) is recognized as the governing entity for
Palestinian people and dedicated to establishing a
Palestinian state. The two major factions within the
PLO are Fatah and Hamas, with Hamas being the
more militant (CIA World Factbook 2011).
Despite instability in the area, King Hussein
(1953–1999) handled competing pressures from
a large Palestinian population, Israel, various
Arab countries, Russia, the UK, and the USA in
ways that allowed Jordan to achieve relative pros-
perity. Under his leadership, Jordan relinquished
the West Bank to Israel in 1967, relinquished
claims to the West Bank in 1988, reinstated par-
liamentary elections in 1989, legalized political
parties in 1992, and signed a peace treaty with
Israel in 1994, 5 years prior to his death. In 2003,
Jordan supported the USA in the ouster of
Saddam Hussein in Iraq and absorbed thousands
of displaced people from Iraq. Beginning in 2007,
20% of all municipal council seats in elections
were reserved for women. In the most recent
election held in 2010, independent, pro-govern-
ment candidates were elected to the majority of
positions (CIA World Factbook 2011). Although
Jordan’s economy is among the smallest in the
Middle East, and poverty rates seem relatively
high, unemployment is about on par with the
USA at present, and most citizens have their basic
needs met (CIA World Factbook 2011).
Saudi Arabia
Climate change played an important role in the
history of the Arabian Peninsula. Fifteen thou-
sand years ago, the region was moist and fertile
and home to some of the oldest known developed
urban societies, such as Mesopotamia. The climate
cooled and then, following the last ice age,
L. Smith et al.
became dry, resulting in desertification. These
changes forced the region’s human population to
adopt a tribal, nomadic lifestyle in order to sur-
vive. Before Islam, each tribe had its own God, or
idol, and conflicts between tribes were over water,
territory, herds, and religion. As Ashy and Planje
(2009) note:
environmental challenges associated with climate
change in Arabia initiated both the close social
cooperation and frequent conflict that have come
to characterize this region. Ironically, the former
wealth of plant and animal life that disappeared
translated to literal wealth with the discovery of the
world’s largest oil reserves. This has been both a
blessing and a curse in terms of national develop-
ment (p. 178).
The prophet Mohammed, founder of Islam,
was a native of Mecca, an important trade cross-
roads in what is now Saudi Arabia. It was here in
around 610 A.D. that the Muslim religion began.
A few years later, he led his growing group of fol-
lowers to another village, Yathrib (later named
Medina). The Jews and Christians living there
invited him to become a mediator in their conflicts.
The prophet’s acceptance of this invitation led to
the Hijrah, which marks the beginning of the
Islamic calendar and is still commemorated by an
annual pilgrimage. Within less than a century, the
religion had spread from Spain to parts of India,
China, Malaysia, and Indonesia. It covered the
region we now know as the Middle East (Ashy
and Planje 2009).
By 628, the prophet had unified the tribes and
Islam began to spread throughout the region. A few
years later, after his death, a schism regarding
who should lead the Muslim community resulted
in the separation into two groups—Shia and
Sunni. In the decades that followed, Sufism also
emerged. The annual pilgrimages to Medina and
Mecca from scholars throughout the Arab world
brought a wealth of cultural and academic
exchange to these towns in what is now Saudi
Arabia. Since the Quran was written in Arabic, it
became the official language of the region.
Muslim scholars who gathered here made major
contributions in many fields including mathemat-
ics, medicine, philosophy, astronomy, art, and
literature (Ashy and Planje 2009).
16 Middle East National Security
Saudi Arabia was one of the earliest indepen-
dent states in the region, breaking from the
Ottoman Empire. In the eighteenth century, a
Muslim scholar named ibn Abd al-Wahhab and
known as “the Shaikh” formed an alliance with
Muhammad ibn Saud, the ruler of a town in the
area called Diriyah. The people of the Diriyah
stopped paying taxes and pledging allegiance to
the Ottoman Empire, and in 1818, they sent a
large force to destroy the town. Six years later,
the Al Saud family had regained political control
and moved their government center to Riyadh. A
renewed campaign to reclaim the area by the
Ottomans in 1865 resulted in the Al Saud ruling
family taking refuge in Kuwait, where they
remained until the early twentieth century. In
1924, the Saud family returned to Riyadh and
also took control of Medina and Mecca. The
modern Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was formed on
September 23, 1932 with the Quran as its consti-
tution, and direct descendants of Muhammad ibn
Saud continue to rule the country (Ashy and
Planje 2009).
Saudi Arabia borders Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait,
Oman, Qatar, Yemen, and UAE. It is about one-
fifth the size of the USA, with a population of
over 26 million. About six million residents are
from other countries. Many of these nonnationals
work as maids, chauffeurs, teachers, or for inter-
national companies with offices in Saudi Arabia.
The literacy rate is approximately 80%. Median
age is 25 and about 82% of the population lives in
urban areas (CIA World Factbook 2011).
Saudi Arabia has approximately 25% of the
world’s oil reserves and a booming free-trade
economy, about 48% of which is private sector. It
was a founder of several important economic
groups in the region, including the Gulf
Cooperation Council, League of Arab States,
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC), and Organization of Islamic
Countries. It is also a member of the United
Nations, World Bank, International Monetary
Fund, and World Trade Organization. The coun-
try offers many social security benefits to its citi-
zens, including pensions, health and occupational
hazard insurance, assistance for the disabled,
elderly, orphaned, and widowed without sufficient
247
income. Bylaws introduced to the constitution in
1992 explicate the role of the state in protecting
the security and rights of all citizens. It also has a
history of cooperation with Western govern-
ments. Following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in
1990, Saudi Arabia accepted the Kuwaiti royal
family and 400,000 refugees; it also permitted
Western and Arab troops to deploy on its soil for
the liberation of Kuwait the following year. This
deployment led to considerable tension between
members of the Saudi royal family and the Saudi
public until the troops departed in 2003.The king
held elections for municipal council seats in 2005
to promote political participation and instituted
an interfaith dialogue initiative in 2008 to encour-
age tolerance (CIA World Factbook 2011).
Iraq
What is now Iraq has been populated for millen-
nia and was once Mesopotamia, the earliest city-
state known to mankind. Babylon, near the
modern city of Baghdad, was restored under
Saddam Hussein’s regime. The region has a rich
and long history despite its troubled present con-
dition. Until the fall of the Ottoman Empire, Iraq
was a land of many diverse and autonomous
political and economic centers under the “mil-
let” system described previously. It was occu-
pied by the British in 1918, and they were
granted custodianship by the League of Nations
in 1920. During the British colonial period
(1918–1932), Iraq was created from the three
Ottoman provinces of Baghdad, Mosul, and
Basra. These three regions had distinctly differ-
ent ethnic traditions, currencies, languages, and
even used different systems of weights and mea-
sures. Tribal social structures were gradually
transformed into landed feudal structures during
the beginning of the twentieth century. Egalitarian
solidarity, codes of honor, mutual assistance, and
dignity became less prominent as a market econ-
omy was nourished. Denial of collective rights
to land led to a class system of wealthy landown-
ers and impoverished farmers (AlObaidi and
Jeffrey 2009). These class disparities became
entrenched when Iraq was granted independence
248
by the UK in 1932 (Catherwood 2006). It continued
as an independent state influenced by the UK
until 1958 when a military coup established a
nationalist republic emphasizing socialist values
and a secular orientation. Private property own-
ership was again undercut and the Iraqi
Communist Party was at the height of its power
for the next decade. Another coup, backed by the
USA, brought the Ba’ath Party to power in 1968.
The worldwide rise in oil prices and dependence
on oil brought increasing wealth, and the Ba’ath
Party’s nationalization of the oil industry chan-
neled these resources into projects that benefitted
the regime’s leadership instead of improving the
standard of living for the people. When Saddam
Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990, in an attempt
to reannex it into Iraq, the USA again inter-
vened—this time against the regime they had
helped to establish. Hussein was finally deposed
in 2003 in another US-led invasion (AlObaidi
and Jeffrey 2009).
Iraq is a multiethnic nation. During the past
century, the various coups and regimes tended to
“encourage dependency while also fragmenting
society into competing identity groups based on
sect, region and tribal affiliation” (King-Irani
2007, p. 104). Failure to take into account the
complex sociopolitical terrain of Iraq and the
complex interrelationships between the Madan,
Kurds, and various Arab groups has character-
ized US involvement in Iraq since 2003 (AlObaidi
and Jeffrey 2009).
Security and safety are fundamental chal-
lenges to the over 30 million inhabitants of this
country (AlObaidi and Jeffrey 2009), which is
about twice the size of Idaho and borders Jordan,
Kuwait, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Turkey.
The literacy rate is 74%. Slightly over half the
population is urban and the median age is only 20
(CIA World Factbook 2011). Sanitation, land
mines, solid waste disposal, basic hygiene, and
safe drinking water are major concerns stemming
from breakdowns in infrastructure caused by the
extended war. In late 2007, an outbreak of chol-
era caused by these conditions is only one exam-
ple. Security and safety are certainly a concern in
Iraq today (AlObaidi and Jeffrey 2009).
L. Smith et al.
Iran
In Iran, historic Sunni–Shia and Persian–Arab
tensions are high and climbing. Iran, known as
Persia until 1935, is majority Shia Muslim, with
a substantial Kurdish minority. An aging clerical
oligarchy has continued to maintain authority in
the face of numerous attempts to reestablish the
more Westernized economic and social environ-
ment that characterized Iran under the shah, who
was deposed in 1979 and forced into exile. During
the 1980s, Iran fought an indecisive war with
Iraq. Currently, much effort is focused on increas-
ing Iranian influence in Iraq, a Shia-majority
country, now that the US-led effort has deposed
the minority Sunni regime, and the future of Iraq
is “up for grabs.” In addition, Iran is funneling
resources to support its proxies at other flash
points in the Middle East, such as Hezbollah in
Lebanon, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and
Hamas in Gaza and West Bank. Finally, Iran is
vigorously trying to establish a nuclear weapons
capability, as a way of asserting its interests and
projecting its Shia values throughout the region
and beyond. It has adroitly played off the self-
interests of China (which seeks petroleum
resources) and Russia (which is seeking to
reassert its political and economic influence
throughout the world) against the United States,
the other advanced economies, and their regional
allies such as the Saudis, Jordanians, and
Egyptians. Although Iran is subjected to eco-
nomic sanctions by the USA, EU, and UN for its
ongoing support of anti-Israeli groups, its
resources and economy seem strong enough to
weather them (CIA World Factbook 2011).
The country of 78 million is slightly smaller
than Alaska and borders the Persian Gulf, Caspian,
Sea, and Gulf of Oman, as well as Azerbaijan,
Armenia, Pakistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, and
Afghanistan. The population is diverse, including
Persian (51%), Azeri (24%), Kurd, Gilaki,
Mazandarani (about 8% each), Arab, Lur, Baloch,
Turkman, and other ethnic groups (about 2%
each). About 89% of the population is Shia
Muslim; another 9% are Sunni. Christian, Jewish,
Zoroastrian, and Baha’i faiths comprise the
16 Middle East National Security
remainder of the population. Median age is 27 and
about 70% of the population lives in urban areas.
Literacy rate is around 77%. Underemployment
among Iran’s educated youth has led to many
leaving the country, resulting in the country’s
“brain drain” (CIA World Factbook 2011).
Afghanistan
Afghanistan’s history differs from the others
recounted here. It was considered the “crossroads
to Central Asia” (Bureau of South and Central
Asian Affairs 2008), and Alexander the Great
used it for trade and invasion routes into South
and Southwest Asia. In 642, the Arab adherents
to the then-new Muslim religion took over
Afghanistan. The Arabs lost control to the
Persians, who were then conquered by the Turks
in about 1000 AD followed by a Mongol invasion
200 years later. Power struggles from various
Arab, Asian, and European groups continued
until the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan was
founded in 1747. During the nineteenth century,
the country served as a buffer between Czarist
Russia and the British Empire. The Anglo-
Afghan Wars during this century diminished
Britain’s control of the area. The Durand Line
Agreement in 1893 recognized a demarcation
line between Afghanistan and British India.
However, this line was never formally recognized
as an international border and is still a point of
dispute with Pakistan, the successor to that part
of British India. During World War I, Afghanistan
remained neutral.
Finally, in 1919, Afghanistan became free of
British control about the same time the other
countries just described fell officially under it.
During most of the twentieth century, coups and
countercoups characterized the country. The
same ruler, sympathetic to Russia and the com-
munist party, remained in power from 1933 to
1973, and the country was stable during that time.
Then a 1973 Western coup followed by a 1978
countercoup and subsequent invasion by Soviet
forces characterized the country’s status. The
Soviets withdrew in 1989 and a series of civil
249
wars followed. The Taliban, a Pakistani-sponsored
movement that began in 1994, ended the civil
wars and took control in 1996. Then, following
the terrorist attacks of September 11 in New
York, the USA invaded and toppled the Taliban
for allegedly harboring Osama bin Laden, a Saudi
activist. US involvement is ongoing and, despite
efforts to create a stable government, instability
and civil war continue (Smith et al. 2009).
Afghanistan, slightly smaller than Texas, bor-
ders China, Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. It is home to
about 30 million people. The median age is only
18 years, and less than 25% of the population
lives in urban areas. The literacy rate is below
28%, and average life expectancy is less than 45
years of age (CIA World Factbook 2011). The
country faces many challenges to national secu-
rity, health, and well-being.
Methods
The 189 respondents to the Personal and
Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace
Survey (PAIRTAPS; Malley-Morrison, Daskalo-
polous, & You, 2006) in our Middle East sample
were recruited from Iran (2 women and 4 men),
Jordan (2 women and 1 man), Lebanon
(64 women and 56 men), Saudi Arabia (10 men,
10 women, and 1 unidentified), Afghanistan
(6 women and 10 men), Iraq (12 women and 5
men), and other Middle East countries including
Yemen, Kuwait, and Syria (3 women and 3 men).
Although the sample is rather small, we consider
all these Middle East “voices” to be genuine and
valuable and to provide rather unique
information.
Participants’ ages ranged from 18 to 77, with
an average of 28. Fifty-nine percent of the
respondents identified themselves as Christians,
27% as Muslims, 1% as atheist/agnostic, and
13% did not answer the question. The partici-
pants came from several different socioeco-
nomic statuses. Fifty-five percent reported being
middle class, 14% upper middle class, 8% working
250
class, 4% lower class. Nineteen percent of the
survey respondents did not answer the national
security question. A variety of occupations and
professions were represented, including high
school students, college and postgraduate
degree students, physicians and dentists, house-
wives, engineers, writers, lawyers, and business
professionals. Five percent of respondents
reported having participated in military service,
whereas 67% of participants reported no mili-
tary experience. Twenty-six percent of the sam-
ple responded that they had a relative who had
been in the military, while 36% said they did
not. Additionally, 34% of respondents reported
having protested against war and in favor of
peace; another 35% of respondents reported
never having been involved in this form of pro-
test. All of the participants completed an elec-
tronic or paper copy of the PAIRTAPS, often
within their native lands. Participants were
recruited through various means, including per-
sonal networking and posting of the survey link
on various websites.
This section describes responses to two items
regarding national security. The first item asked
participants to describe their level of agreement
with the statement, “National security is essential
for individual and family security,” using a Likert
scale ranging from 1 (totally disagree) to 7 (totally
agree). Participants were then asked to write their
rationale for the rating. In the second item, the
participants were asked to complete the state-
ment, “The best way to achieve security for indi-
viduals and families throughout the world is:…”
We developed a coding manual to analyze the
qualitative responses to both items. The manual
was created utilizing a grounded theory approach.
Grounded theory is designed to develop con-
structs and offers rigorous measures for develop-
ing those constructs into categories with certain
characteristics and linking categories to each
other to formulate theory (Corbin and Strauss
1990). By using this methodology, we were able
to create coding categories from the responses
themselves. For a detailed explanation of the
national security coding manual, refer to the
introductory chapter in this section of the volume.
L. Smith et al.
Results
Responses to “National Security Is
Essential for Individual and Family
Security”
Sixty-two percent of all responses to the state-
ment that national security is essential for indi-
vidual and family security were arguments in
support of the statement. These responses fell
into many different coding categories; however,
only those occurring in excess of 5% of the total
response set to this item are discussed.
General agreement was the most common
response, accounting for 29% of all responses to
the prompt. Responses in this category agreed
that national security is essential for family and
individual security but often did not provide fur-
ther reasoning. For instance, a Lebanese 49-year-
old woman said, “Goes without saying.” The
second most common type of response, compris-
ing 15% of all responses, fell into the category to
feel safer. Typical responses in this category were
that national security gave people a sense of
safety. For instance, a 20-year-old Lebanese
woman said, “What is worse than not feeling
secure in your own house?” The third most com-
mon response (7% of responses) expressed the
idea that national, individual, and family security
are intrinsically tied. The response of a 36-year-
old man illustrates this category well: “Without
an effective national security, the security of indi-
viduals will always be in danger.”
Table 16.2 provides additional examples of
responses falling into these coding categories,
along with basic demographic information for
the respondents.
Eleven percent of the responses disagreed with
the assertion that national security is essential for
individual and family security. Because there
were so few arguments against the importance of
national security, and so few different types of
disagreement expressed, we report on all coding
categories into which more than 3% of all
responses were coded. Both general disagree-
ment and governmental deception accounted for
16 Middle East National Security 251

Table 16.2 Sample responses for agreement with the statement “national security is essential”
Coding category Percent Country Age Gender Quotes
General agreement 29 (47) Afghanistan 49 M “It should be top priority specially during
these bad times”
To feel safer 15 (24) Saudi Arabia 18 F “People need to feel safe, not like they’re
about to be bombed just for eating in a
famous hotel”
Intrinsically tied 7 (11) Lebanon 21 M “National security is the higher power of
laws; it can aid to reconciliation of the
relations between countries, and thus is
essential for individuals and families”
Note: The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total
response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in that category out of all the
responses that agreed with the statement that national security is essential for family and individual security
M male, F female

Table 16.3 Sample responses for disagreement with the statement “national security is essential”
Coding category Percent Country Age Gender Quotes
General disagreement 4 (38) Afghanistan 32 F “No”
Governmental deception 4 (38) Iran N/A M “Because of sep 11 they made this monster
and on the name of national security they
are spending money for nothing”
Note: The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total
response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in that category out of all the
responses that disagreed with the statement that national security is essential for family and individual security
F female, M male, N/A not applicable

4% of the total response set. Responses that were
coded for general disagreement stated that
national security is not essential for family and
individual security but failed to elaborate why.
Responses coded for governmental deception
often referred to the idea that national security
was created by the government for use as propa-
ganda, self-serving interests, etc. The response of
a 44-year-old Iranian woman captures the cate-
gory well: “A basic civil order is necessary for
family/individual security. The USA worries way
too much about national security. I have no idea
why the attacks on DC and NY have such reso-
nance for Americans thousands of miles away,
when those of us who live closer to them and
were far more affected on a day-to-day level have
tried to grieve and generally move on as much as
possible. The events have become propaganda
items and organizing principles for belligerent
ideologies instead of personal and community
experiences.”
Table 16.3 provides additional examples of
arguments expressing disagreement with the
national security statement along with basic
demographic information.
Nineteen percent of responses provided con-
ditional agreement to the assertion about the
essential nature of national security item; any
coding category into which more than 3% of the
responses fell is discussed. Eight percent of
responses showed general conditional agreement
to the prompt. For example, a 21-year-old man
said “[National security is essential] Only if it
works to secure the citizens well being.”
Accounting for 4% of responses, it needs to be
monitored was the second most frequently used
coding category. Typically, responses in this cat-
egory agreed with the prompt but also suggested
that pursuit of national security needs to be
done with some sort of supervision or caution.
A response by a 56-year-old Jordanian man
stated, “as long as they remain within the rule of
the laws both national and international.”
Table 16.4 provides more examples of condi-
tional responses, as well as basic demographic
information.
252 L. Smith et al.

Table 16.4 Sample responses for conditional or partial agreement with statement “national security is essential”
Coding category Percent Country Age Gender Quotes
General conditional 8 (43) Lebanon 25 F “In some cases national security is
agreement needed”
Needs to be monitored 4 (21) Saudi Arabia 59 M “Yes, it is. However, it must not be
misused by governing authorities to
achieve their own objectives and hidden
agenda”
Note: The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total
response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in that category out of all the
responses that provided conditional or partial agreement with the statement that national security is essential for family
and individual agreement
F female, M male

Table 16.5 Sample responses of positive, universalistic means to achieve national security
Coding category Percent Country Age Gender Quote
Recommending 30 (38) Saudi Arabia 59 M “To share, openly, equally, and honorably
peace tools across all peoples, nations and continents”
Lebanon 21 M “Through achieving world peace and stability.
And through achieving national security”
Peace/nonviolence 21 (26) Other Middle East 21 M “Let the peace prevail”
Afghanistan 24 M “Respect other peoples and faiths. Don’t try to
feel like you’re better because you are
economically superior or more colonialist”
Lebanon 28 F “Same for world peace, stop taking arms, and
stop learning how to use them”
Note: The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total
response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in that category out of all the
responses that provided positive, universalistic approaches to achieve national security
M male, F female

Responses to How to Achieve problems with words instead of fists, try to

National Security
Eighty-one percent of all responses to the item
asking for examples of how best to achieve
national security were coded as providing univer-
salistic, positive, and pro-social suggestions.
Categories accounting for more than 10% of
responses are discussed.
The most commonly cited means to achieve
peace in a pro-social manner was recommending
peace/peace tools, accounting for 30% of all
responses to this item. This category encom-
passed responses that employed the idea that the
best way to achieve peace is through practical,
nonviolent strategies. For example, a 21-year-old
Lebanese woman responded, “Spread peace.”
Additionally, a 44-year-old Iranian woman said,
“Behave yourself, treat other people with kind-
ness and justice, smile, teach children to solve
demonstrate nonviolent responses to the aggrava-
tions of daily life (i.e., traffic jams, annoying cell
phone users, etc.). Learn about peacemakers. Go
outside and look at the trees. Talk politely with
someone who disagrees with you on an important
political or cultural issue.”
The peace/nonviolence category comprised
21% of the entire response set to this prompt.
Responses in this category emphasized accepting
peace and nonviolence in order to achieve
national security. An 18-year-old Saudi Arabian
woman suggested, “End war and terrorism;
they’re more or less the same thing. What does it
solve!?” Refer to Table 16.5 for more examples
of positive universalistic responses as well as
basic demographic information.
Ten percent of all responses to this item were
coded for what were called “negativistic”
approaches to achieving national security, and
16 Middle East National Security
Table 16.6 Sample responses of negative, protectionist, and denial means to achieve national security
Coding category Percent Country
Negative/protectionist/ 6 (62) Other Middle East
interventionist
Lebanon
Iraq
Force 4 (38) Lebanon
Lebanon
Lebanon
Note: The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total
response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in that category out of all the
responses that provided negative or protectionist ways of achieving national security, or denied the ability to achieve it
M male, F female
six percent specifically recommended negative/
protectionist/interventionist/abandonment
measures as the best way to achieve national
security. For instance, a 27-year-old Lebanese
man reasoned that national security can be
achieved through “[the adoption of] fair and
restrictive laws concerning the matter.” Four
percent of responses suggested that the best
way to achieve national security is through the
use of force. Often, these responses cited
improving the police force or the military. For
instance, a 30-year-old Afghan man wrote,
“Assist the government. Contribute with
police.” Table 16.6 provides more examples of
negativistic approaches for achieving national
security, along with basic demographic
information.
Exploratory Analyses of Potential
Demographic Differences in Response
Patterns
Pearson’s chi-square tests and t-tests were run to
explore the possibility of demographic differ-
ences in the frequency of particular themes in
the national security responses. In this chapter,
as in the others, the demographics studied were
(a) gender, (b) military service, (c) relatives’
military service, and (d) participation in peace
253
Age Gender Quote
36 M “Eliminate terrorism”
22 M “Improve undercover cops”
29 F “Protect immediate and rightfully owned,
undisputed, land”
18 M “Imposing discipline and the army most
importantly, and the international
cooperation around this topic”
19 F “War”
28 M “Make war against terrorism”
protest. In an effort to inform future research,
marginally significant findings (p = 0.056–0.10)
are reported.
In regard to the item, “National security is
essential for individual and family security,”
frequency of use of only one theme varied by
gender; specifically, t-tests revealed that women
gave marginally significantly more responses
than men in the general disagreement category.
Chi-square analyses revealed that significantly
more respondents without a relative in the mili-
tary than those with a relative in the service gave
responses that provided general conditional
agreement with the essentiality of national secu-
rity for individual and family security. This dif-
ference was supported by t-tests.
Pearson’s chi-squares revealed that respon-
dents who had engaged in a protest against war
and in favor of peace were marginally more likely
to generally agree with the prompt than were
respondents who had never protested for peace.
This result was supported by t-tests of continuous
(count) scores for the same constructs. t-tests
also revealed that respondents who had protested
scored marginally higher than their counterparts
on the use of responses in the categories for need
to be monitored and governmental deception is a
possibility. Refer to Table 16.7 for means, stan-
dard deviations, and t-test results by demographic
group for this national security item.
254 L. Smith et al.

Table 16.7 Essentiality of national security: means, standard deviations, and t-test results by demographic group for
coding categories
Coding category Group 1 Group 2 t df
Male Female
General disagreement 0.00 (0.00) 0.03 (0.17) 1.75^ 100.00
Relative military No relative military
General conditional agreement 0.00 (0.00) 0.07 (0.26) 2.53** 81.00
Protest No protest
General agreement 0.17 (0.38) 0.08 (0.27) −1.75^ 138.87
Needs to be monitored 0.04 (0.19) 0.00 (0.00) −1.76^ 77.00
Governmental deception 0.04 (0.19) 0.00 (0.00) −1.76^ 77.00
Note: Standard deviations appear in parentheses next to means
**
p £ 0.01; ^0.05 < p < 0.1

Table 16.8 Best way to achieve national security: percentages of responses in coding categories by demographic
groups and chi-square values
Coding category Group 1a Group 2a X2
Male Female
Peace/nonviolence 18 9 3.29^
Military Nonmilitary
Peace/nonviolence 33 13 3.73^b
Relative military No relative military
Positive/universalistic/pro-social 12 2 4.97*b
Recommending peace/peace tools 35 16 6.96**
Protest No protest
Recommending peace/peace tools 15 32 5.76*
* ** ^
p £ 0.05; p £ 0.01; 0.05 < p < 0.1
a
The numbers in these columns are the percent of the group that gave responses falling into each of the specified
categories
b
Fisher’s p-value

Chi-square tests revealed a number of group
differences that were supported by t-test analyses.
For example, marginally more men than women
and respondents with military service than respon-
dents without recommended adoption of peace/
nonviolence as the best way to achieve national
security. In addition, respondents with a relative
with military experience were significantly more
likely than their counterparts to provide positive/
universalistic/pro-social methods and recommend
peace/peace tools. Significantly more respondents
who had not participated in a protest for peace rec-
ommended peace/peace tools than respondents
who had protested for peace. t-test results also
revealed several other group differences.
Participants who had never been involved in a
protest scored marginally higher than their
protesting counterparts on recommendations for
the use of force and education as the best way to
achieve national security. Respondents who had
protested against war and in favor of peace scored
marginally higher on the use of suggestions for
using diplomacy/international relations/interna-
tional law than respondents who had not partici-
pated in a peace protest.
Refer to Table 16.8 for the percentages of
responses in various coding categories by
demographic groups and corresponding chi-
square values. Table 16.9 displays means, stan-
dard deviations, and t-test results by demographic
groups for the best way to achieve national secu-
rity coding categories.
16 Middle East National Security
Table 16.9 Best way to achieve national security: means, standard deviations, and t-test results by demographic group
for coding categories
Coding category
Force
Diplomacy/international relations/international law
Education
Recommending peace/peace tools
Note: Standard deviations appear in parentheses next to means
*
p £ 0.05; ^0.05 < p < 0.1
Discussion
We have by no means gathered a representative
sample of views about national security from this
region, and many of the respondents may not
have answered honestly. Because of a fear of
conspiracy, government control, and a lack of
openness, based on experiences over the last cen-
tury with intrigue and outside control, the popu-
lace may be reticent about fully revealing personal
beliefs on the issue. Even if we assume that indi-
viduals who completed the survey were provid-
ing accurate information, our small sample gives
us little room to generalize. In addition, because
the region is currently undergoing such rapid
changes, the snapshot presented here has likely
already changed. The onset of tools like Twitter,
Facebook, and other instantaneous means of
electronic communication have made it more
difficult for totalitarian regimes to maintain con-
trol. The visibility of events in each country to
the world community has made the secrecy and
intrigue that formerly characterized the region
less opaque. Social mobilization, economic
improvements, and increased levels of education
have created rising expectations among the peo-
ple of the region. The relative young median
age (mid-20s), new levels of information
access, instability based on changing economic
relationships among the superpowers who have
traditionally controlled the region, and changing
demands and expectations of the people them-
selves all make it likely that rapid change in atti-
tudes, government, and basic lifestyle will
continue escalating throughout the region for
many years to come.
255
Group 1 Group 2 t df
Protest No protest
0.00 (0.00) 0.04 (0.19) 1.76^ 78.00
0.06 (0.25) 0.01 (0.11) −1.68^ 107.44
0.00 (0.00) 0.04 (0.19) 1.76^ 78.00
0.22 (0.57) 0.46 (0.73) 2.27* 147.52
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 Views on National Security in Africa
17
Mahlon Dalley, Jacqueline Akhurst, Davies Banda,
Abdelali Abdelkader, Alexandra Dick,
Helena Castanheira, and Eduardo Correia

In many ways, a vision of African national

security is difficult to conceive. Prior to 1963,
national security on the continent of Africa could
not be found. However, on September 13, 1963,
in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, a vision of African
national security emerged, with the establish-
ment of the Organization of African Unity
(OAU). This multilateral organization of 37
independent African States agreed “…to pro-
mote unity and development; defend the sover-
eignty and territorial integrity of members;
eradicate all forms of colonialism; promote inter-
national co-operation and co-ordinate members’
economic diplomatic educational, health, wel-
fare, scientific, and defense policies” (Juma
2006, p. 1). At one point in its 38 years of exis-
tence, the OAU included all 53 African states.
On July 9, 2002, in Durban, South Africa, the
Constitutive Act of the African Union (AU)
replaced the OAU and continues to be at the
forefront of the new African vision (Juma 2006).
The goal of the AU is to “integrate political and
socio-economic factors throughout the continent;
to promote and defend African common posi-
tions; to help establish peace and security
throughout Africa; and to promote democratic
institutions, good governance and human rights”
(African Union n.d.).
Demography, Geography, Languages,
and Religion
In order to appreciate the complexities and enor-
mity of what is considered national security in
Africa, one needs to understand that Africa is the
second largest and the second most populous
continent, with nearly one billion residents as of
2009 (Africa Guide 2009; Miniwatts Marketing
Group 2009; Sayre 1999). Africa includes 46 or
53 countries, depending on whether the seven
island countries off the coast (Cape Verde Islands,
Sao Tomé e Principé, Comoros, Madagascar,
Mauritius, the Seychelles, and Réunion) are
counted (Dicovick 2009).
Africa is usually divided into two major areas:
(a) Northern Africa of the Sahara Desert touching
the shores of the Mediterranean, the Atlantic, and
the Red Sea and (b) Sub-Saharan Africa, cradled
between the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. Sub-
Saharan Africa is usually divided into West,
Central, Eastern, and Southern Africa. North
African countries such as Morocco share a cul-
ture, climate, and proximity to Europe that makes
their concerns about national security quite differ-
ent from those of sub-Saharan countries such as
South Africa, Botswana, or Namibia. To add to

K. Malley-Morrison et al. (eds.), International Handbook of War, Torture, and Terrorism, 257
Peace Psychology Book Series, DOI 10.1007/978-1-4614-1638-8_17,
© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2013
258
the complexity of national security on the African
continent, the climate ranges from desert to
tropical to subarctic on its highest peaks of
Mr. Kilimanjaro. The eight African countries
included in our research represent all regions of
Africa. For Northern Africa, we have included
Egypt and Algeria; for West Africa, Ghana and
Nigeria; for East Africa, Zambia; for Central
Africa, Angola; and for Southern Africa,
Botswana and South Africa.
Not only do climate and geographical
distances divide Africa, but languages and reli-
gions create fissures among countries, cities, and
villages, providing another obstacle in establish-
ing a common vision of national security in
Africa. With over a thousand spoken languages,
Africa is the most multilingual continent in the
world, as European and Asian languages inter-
mingle with Bantu, Nilotic, Khoisan, and Pygmy
languages that persist among indigenous groups
(Childs 2003). Northern Africa’s primary lan-
guage is Arabic. Other languages in the region
include Berber, English, Italian, Greek, Nubian,
Armenian, and French. Muslim is the main reli-
gion practiced in Northern Africa, with enclaves
of Christianity and Judaism. West Africa’s pri-
mary languages are French, Portuguese, English,
Arabic, and Wolof. The main practicing religions
are Christianity (both Protestantism and
Catholicism), Islam, and many varieties of tradi-
tional beliefs such as Animism.
As each region and each country has its own
unique issues of security and peace, the AU
divides Africa into regional economic, treaty, and
defense communities. The mechanisms for peace
and security in Africa align with several other
organizations active on the continent: Arab
Maghreb Union (AMU), Common Market for
Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), East
African Community (EAC), Economic
Community of Central African States (ECCAS),
Economic Community of Central African States
(ECCAS), Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS), Intergovernmental Authority
for Development (IGAD), and the Southern
African Development Community (SADC).
Within each of these organizations, there may be
M. Dalley et al.
specific protocols and plans for defense and security
(Juma 2006).
Many converging forces have contributed to
issues of security in present-day Africa. The fol-
lowing sections provide a brief depiction of the
evolution of an African identity and identities.
The precolonial and colonial era up to the twenti-
eth and twenty-first centuries of wars, national
identities, and eventual independence are briefly
discussed, thereby providing a context for the
present-day conception of African national
security.
Precolonial
Due to many significant archaeological discov-
eries within the past 30 years, Africa has
become known as the cradle of modern human-
ity. Homo sapiens, or upright-walking hom-
inids, first appeared as early as 5–6 million
years ago, and about 2–3 million years ago,
these hominids developed larger brains. Around
this same time, hominids began to use stone
tools for various daily tasks (Stahl 2005).
Human life is believed to have begun in Eastern
Africa, now Ethiopia specifically (Davidson
1991). Throughout this period, Homo sapiens
(modern humans) and Homo neanderthalensis
migrated into the modern-day European conti-
nent; these particular humanoids coexisted
with other humanoid species that have van-
ished. Neanderthals are among the several
humanoid species to have become extinct
(Stahl 2005, p. 4).
Around 4000 BC, largely due to the Nile
River and its seasonal flooding and rainfall, peo-
ple began to sow crops in the fertile soil for the
cultivation of food resources. Even as the rain-
fall in the Sahara region began to cease, the Nile
River region remained very fertile for planting
food. This geographical region would become
the birth of modern civilizations along with the
first written words and the study of mathematics
(Davidson 1991).
Dynastic states began to prosper across the
African continent in the ninth century AD. The
17 Africa National Security
Hausa nation spanned the Sub-Saharan, Eastern
Africa region near present-day Sudan and was
largely Muslim (Davidson 1991). The Ghana,
Kanem-Bornu, and Gao empires were the most
potent. The Ghana nation was located near present-
day Nigeria and modern Ghana (West Africa).
The Ghana served as a pivotal trading culture at a
crucial crossroads between the peoples of
Northern Africa and the peoples in the south
(Davidson 1991). The Kanem-Bornu empire was
located slightly east of the Ghana empire and was
also very much tied into the trade among nations
(Davidson 1991). Also closely tied to the trade of
key items such as gold and ivory were the Gao,
who were also located in the west (Stahl 2005).
Bantu-speaking people residing in Central and
Southern Africa became part of the northern trad-
ing routes around 1000–1600 AD. Additionally,
there were Swahili coastal trading people occu-
pying East Africa (Davidson 1991).
Colonial Period
Napoleon and his French army conquered Egypt
in 1798, and the French retained control of the
area until 1800, when they were forced out by
local resistance, British naval power, incursions
from Turkey, and political pressures. Muhammad
Ali Pasha, considered the founder of modern
Egypt, was the leader who took Egypt away
from the French and cultivated a prosperous
trading economy around the Red Sea (Oliver
and Atmore 2005).
In 1876, Britain and France joined together in
a nonmilitarized takeover of Egypt after the state
went bankrupt. This agreement, known as The
Anglo-French Condominium, lasted until 1882,
when Egypt fell under British rule (Wesseling
1996). French and the British colonization poli-
cies were rather similar in that both countries
viewed their role in the area as “indirect rule” or
“associations” (Bennett 1984, p. 113), meaning
that although the area was not necessarily a part
of their empires, Britain and France exerted great
political influence over the country and enjoyed
access to its resources and territory for their own
military purposes.
259
By 1914, France possessed more territory on
the African continent than any other European
country. The majority of the French colonization
spanned the northwestern and the central-western
regions of Africa. With the French came
Catholicism, as the colonizers were dedicated to
spreading the influence of Christianity along with
their culture (Bennett 1984). The Portuguese,
who had explored the Congo as early as 1482,
had also converted many of those residents to
Christianity (Wesseling 1996).
On the southern extreme of the continent, the
Dutch began to settle in the area of current-day
South Africa around 1655 to fortify their ship-
ping routes; these Dutch settlers battled with the
indigenous people and exposed them to numer-
ous diseases that diminished the original Khoikhoi
population from approximately 200,000 to only
20,000 by 1800 (Bennett 1984). Britain gained
control over the South African region (today’s
Republic of South Africa) in the mid-1800s and
established a great number of colonies; the British
sought domain in Eastern Africa as well
(Wesseling 1996). Their treatment of the indige-
nous Africans was extremely harsh and disrupted
the local, preexisting socialization and cultural
practices (Bennett 1984).
Throughout the nineteenth century and into
the twentieth, powers engaged in a race to gain
territory and to partition the continent of Africa
along the lines that suited the French and British
trading routes and companies. Germany also
became a major player toward the end of the col-
onization era, setting up treaties and colonies in
East Africa around 1884 and coercing the estab-
lishment of a protectorate on the island of
Zanzibar in 1885. No regard was given to the
indigenous peoples who had long inhabited these
areas. By 1900, most of the African continent had
lost its independence to complete European rule
(Oliver and Atmore 2005).
Impact of World War I and II on Africa
Conflicts in the African theater spanned the
continent and the duration of the First World
War. In the North, the British sought to defend
260
the Suez Canal. Meanwhile, the Allies targeted
Germany’s ports in West and Southern Africa,
including Lome (in Togo), Douala (in
Cameroon), and Swakopmund and Luderitz Bay
(in South West Africa, now Namibia), and key
cities like Dar Es Salaam in the east (Story
2009). The Allies took German South West
Africa (now Namibia) in the first few months of
the campaign and Cameroon later (Story 2009),
while the campaign in the East persisted until
1918. There, conflicts ranged from campaigns
in the north (modern Kenya) to the south
(Mozambique), spanning some of the harshest
terrain in Eastern Africa (Anderson 2004).
Africans fighting in WWI included peasants
who joined up voluntarily for the wages as well
as many who were forced by their chiefs to par-
ticipate (Story 2009). While the British and
French both formed troops of African soldiers in
their colonies, only the French employed their
troops from French West Africa in combat in
Western Europe (Story 2009). Some estimates
suggest that over two million Africans—most of
whom were civilians—were killed during WWI
(Hyper 2009); of those 2 million, an estimated
100,000 troops from East Africa and 65,000
from French North Africa and French West
Africa died in the war (Anderson 2004).
WWI also brought food shortages to many
African colonies as a result of the disruption in
international trade, government plans to change
taxes and remove manpower from many rural
communities, and climatic difficulties. Africans
struggled with the scarcity of food and the high
prices of the food that was available. There
were also shortages of guns and powder, which
made it difficult for farmers to prevent or stop
wild pigs and elephants from coming into their
fields and eating or destroying their crops. As a
result of this turmoil, many Africans left their
families to find work in other villages. Others
protested and demanded equal rights—citing
the insufficient food supply as a main concern
(Rich 2007).
Story (2009) reports that WWI had many det-
rimental effects on Africa, especially in regard to
trade and the development of the continent,
despite the fact that some railways were built.
M. Dalley et al.
Following World War I, the price of all commodi-
ties rose in Africa, and the poverty rate reached
an all-time high. The continent’s trade relations
with countries such as Germany, which had been
a major partner in the past, were disrupted (Hyper
2009). Thus began the seeds of discontent and
eventually a push to decolonization in the 1950s.
Much like in WWI, the European allies solic-
ited African manpower during WWII. During
this war, 500,000 Africans saw combat as fighters
for the French and British. Recruitment was more
refined although pressure was applied by chiefs
and forced labor occurred within agriculture and
mining. Most people rallied to the war effort after
Mussolini’s invasion of Ethiopia (Story 2009).
Africa played an important role in filling Europe’s
gap in wartime commodity production during
WWII, increasing rubber production and tin min-
ing; however, workers were forced to work in
horrid conditions. Food prices once again
increased. When the war ended, Africans strongly
felt that the European colonial powers owed them
in return for their life-changing experiences and
sacrifices during both wars. Many men were out
of work after World War II, but they remained
under European rule (Story 2009).
Postwar South Africa experienced rapid eco-
nomic growth, as the nation’s already booming
mining industry and agricultural sector were
complemented with a new, active manufacturing
zone. After the war, South Africa developed an
active manufacturing zone and experienced a
period of economic growth (Clark 2001). Similar
changes occurred within West Africa, where
dissatisfaction with the way people were treated
by the British colonial powers during the wars
contributed to the push for change in the postwar
years (Meredith 1986).
Overview of Present Conditions
Despite its wealth of natural resources, Africa
remains the poorest and most underdeveloped
continent. The rapid spread of infectious dis-
eases, especially HIV and malaria, continues to
impede its development. Another culprit germane
to this chapter on national security is the corruption
17 Africa National Security
within African governments (Sandbrook 1985).
According to the United Nations’ Human
Development Report in 2003, the lowest-ranked
25 nations (151st to 175th) were all African
(United Nations Development Programme n.d.).
Africans in these countries are all plagued by
poverty, illiteracy, malnutrition, and inadequate
water supply and sanitation, as well as poor over-
all health. In 2008, the World Bank reported that
85 percent of the African population was living
on less than $2.50 a day in 2005. Failed economic
liberalization programs imposed by foreign com-
panies and governments have been blamed for
some of the problems fueling this crisis, but there
is also evidence that ill-devised domestic policies
and programs are more to blame than external
factors (Che 2005).
Visions of Peace and Security in Africa
In Compendium of Key Documents Relating to
Peace and Security in Africa, editor Monica Juma
(2006) argues that, between 1963 and 2005, there
were three distinct periods of peace and security.
The first period began with the launching of the
OAU in 1963 and continued throughout the Cold
War period until the collapse of the Soviet Union
in 1989. Launched during the height of the Cold
War, the OAU saw Africa caught in the geostrate-
gic interests of both the Western and Eastern Bloc
powers struggling for dominance. Each super-
power strived for influence in the new indepen-
dent African states by offering financial and
military support in exchange for support in the
competing political ideology of the day, commu-
nism versus democracy. Within many of the
newly formed African countries, this conflict
created instability. Many African countries
invested heavily in an arms race at the expense of
domestic policies needed to improve the socio-
economic welfare of their citizens. According to
Juma (2006), this Cold War instability is partly to
blame for the insecurity of the continent for
decades to follow; it affected the direction of the
OAU, which has been criticized for its emphasis
on ridding the continent of remnants of colonial-
ism and establishing a noninterference pact
261
among the African countries. During this soft-
power time of the OAU, negotiations, mediation,
and persuasion reflected the philosophy of two
structures of the OAU, the Commission for
Conciliation, Mediation & Arbitration (1964)
and subsequently the Mechanism for Conflict
Prevention, Management, and Resolution (1993).
Many viewed these structures as ineffective and
unproductive given the grave and serious inter-
and intracountry conflicts of the day (e.g., in
Uganda, Rwanda, Sierra Leone); however, there
were also occasional success such as the OAU
work when (a) civil war broke out in Nigeria
(1967–1970) following Biafa’s threat of seces-
sion, (b) Israelis occupied parts of Egypt in 1967
and declared war on mercenaries in Africa, and
(c) Israelis successfully garnered international
support in opposition of the mercenaries and
aggression in Guinea in 1970. The OAU was also
helpful in decolonization of such countries as
Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe. According
to Juma (2006), many have argued that the OAU
Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of
Africa later became the current Peace and
Security Council of the African Union (AU).
With the collapse of the Soviet Empire and the
end of the cold war, Africa suffered through the
sudden lack of attention from the new interna-
tional powers. This second phase, from 1990 to
1999, is what Juma (2006) refers to as the transi-
tion period. This was a time marked by instability
and political flux as previous interest in Africa’s
geostrategic standing during the Cold War
abruptly ended. As Juma (2006, p. 17) points out,
“Many of Africa’s worst calamities occurred
during this transitional period. Liberia imploded
in 1989, Somalia collapsed in 1991, the Derg
government in Ethiopia collapsed in 1991,
rebellion against Mobutu Sese Seko in Zaire
(now DRC) gathered momentum, and Sierra
Leone was consumed by war. The vast majority of
these were intra-state conflicts and threatened the
very existence of a number of African countries.”
The genocide in Rwanda in 1994 was perhaps the
most startling indictment of this transitional
period. Nearly a million people died and several
more millions were displaced to other countries.
Elsewhere in Africa, about 14 countries were
262
involved in armed conflict, and an additional 8
million were refugees and displaced persons.
During this decade in spite of the horrors of war,
Africa began seeing how regional structures could
address conflict within the regions. The decade
also saw the concept of security expanded to
address human security. On a more positive side,
Africa witnessed a total liberation and democrati-
zation of the continent, none more telling than the
peaceful transition of South Africa from an apart-
heid regime to a democracy.
Juma (2006) identifies the third phase of peace
and security in Africa, from 2000 to the present,
as characterized by the new vision of Africa. She
(2005) describes this period as a swell of activity
initiated and pursued by African leaders to regen-
erate the continent. In Lome, Togo, in July 2000,
at the meeting of the 36th OAU Summit, the
Constitutive Act of the African Union (AU) was
adopted, marking the dawn of a new era in Africa.
Leaders decided that they wanted an organization
more active and relevant to initiating a new
African multilateralism. The Assembly of the AU
held its inaugural meeting in Durban, South
Africa, in July 2002. The position of noninterfer-
ence that characterized the OAU shifted to the
more proactive approach of the AU; this shift can
be seen in article 4(h), which provides for inter-
vention by the AU in a member state “in the case
of grave circumstances, namely war crimes,
genocide and crimes against humanity” (African
Union, About AU).
Two important instruments developed and
implemented in 2001 were (a) the Millennium
African Recovery Plan (MAP) in which several
major African leaders worked on a set of new
continent-wide development strategies bridging
the gap between the world’s rich and poor nations
to “end the marginalization of Africa and the
global social exclusion of Africa…” (Harsch
2001) and (b) the OMEGA Plan, which was
designed to assess the needs of the continent,
bridge the gaps between African countries and
developed countries, and raise funds to help
establish Africa’s infrastructures, education,
health, and agriculture (Wade 2003). In addition,
the New Partnership for Africa’s Developmental
Heads of State and Government Implementation
M. Dalley et al.
Committee (NEAD-HSGIC) was developed to
help steer the process of clarifying Africa’s
emerging new vision, later renamed the New
Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD).
Another milestone was reached in South Africa in
July 2002 with the launching of the AU
Establishment of the Peace and Security Council,
the Common African Defense, and Security
Policy. Also created was the African Peer Review
Mechanism (APRM). To date, 26 African coun-
tries have complied with this new tool. Also, the
Peace and Security Council (PSC) took over the
Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management,
and Resolution (CPMR) and was given a mandate
for “robust action” such as intervening in situa-
tions constituting threats to peace and security,
including gross violations of human rights or
crimes against humanity. Increased willingness to
participate in direct interventions on the continent
is evidenced by numerous Africa-led peace initia-
tives and processes in conflict areas such as Cote
d’Ivoire. The commitment of the AU to respond
to conflicts in a timely and assertive fashion, in
conjunction with support from international part-
ners, has led to substantial successes in some
conflicts previously viewed as intractable, such as
those in Sudan and Somalia (ACCORD 2009).
Summary
In 1963, a vision of African national security
emerged with the Organization of African Unity
(OAU). Prior to this time, the “cradle of modern
humans,” the second largest and second most
populous continent, had never had a sense of unity
and purpose. This land of 53 nations and thou-
sands of languages is perhaps the most multilingual
continent in the world. The precolonial times saw
a slow transition from the humanoids to modern
civilizations particularly in the fertile Nile river
region. Dynastic states began to prosper all across
the African continent. The colonial period,
particularly in the eighteenth, nineteenth, and
twentieth centuries, saw foreign rule from the
European nations, especially the British, Dutch,
French, and Germans. Africa was not immune
from overseas European wars; both world wars
17 Africa National Security
came to Africa. After WWII, a vision of unity and
independence emerged as African countries
gained their independence and resisted becoming
participants in the politics of the Cold War
between the West and the Soviet Union. After the
Cold War abated, many African nations were left
poor and struggling. A new vision of peace and
security emerged in the early twenty-first century
as a new call for African unity occurred. The
African Union was launched in 2002 and remains
a viable force in Africa’s search for national and
continental security.
In order to gage how the past has influenced
the African nations and how they will now
march forward, we attempt in this chapter to
provide a window into the African soul on the
important issue of national security. The follow-
ing sections provide a brief description of the
methodology used by the Group on International
Perspectives on Governmental Aggression and
Peace (GIPGAP) to obtain a sampling of
Africans’ perspectives on national security.
Methods
Participants, Measures, and Procedures
Using the Personal and Institutional Rights to
Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS) to
assess perspectives on national security (Malley-
Morrison et al. 2006), members of the Group on
International Perspectives on Governmental
Aggression and Peace (GIPGAP) collected
responses from eight African countries (Algeria,
Angola, Botswana, Egypt, Ghana, Nigeria, South
Africa, and Zambia). However, the version of the
survey administered in Egypt did not include the
national security item, and the Nigerian sample
did not complete the qualitative national security
items, so our analyses did not include any findings
from the Egyptian and Nigerian samples. From
the remaining six countries, 153 Africans
responded to the first security item on the
PAIRTAPS, but only 111 rated the statement on a
scale of 1–7, and only 64 participants responded
to the second security statement. Within the
African sample of 153 participants who had
263
completed at least one national security item, the
largest number of participants came from South
Africa where 68 respondents completed the first
security statement, none rated the scale, and
none responded to the second security statement.
The fewest participants came from Algeria (12
respondents); the remaining countries contrib-
uted 15–68 respondents each. Participants ranged
in age from 18 to 74 and were largely Christian
and from the middle class. Most had not served in
the military, and most had not ever participated in
any sort of protest activity.
Participants were recruited through various
means to take the PAIRTAPS, including personal
networking, accessing the survey link on various
websites, and recruiting from college classes.
They could respond to the survey in one of three
languages: English, Arabic, and Ewe (in Ghana).
This chapter focuses on two items pertaining to
national security. Participants were asked to pro-
vide a rating on a 7-point Likert scale from 1 = total
disagreement to 7 = total agreement with the state-
ment, “National security is essential for individual
and family security.” They were then asked to
write an explanation for their rating. In the second
item, participants were asked to complete, in their
own words, the open-ended sentence, “The best
way to achieve security for individuals and fami-
lies throughout the world is….”
Results
Quantitative Analyses of Rating Scale
Responses
Our first set of analyses focused on the rating
scale responses to the item “National security is
essential for individual and family security” from
1, totally disagree, to 7, totally agree. A total of
111 rating responses were obtained from four
countries with 11 respondents from Algeria, 15
from Angola, 46 from Botswana, and 39 from
Ghana. Mean scores from these countries all
indicated quite high agreement with the statement
(Ms = 5.36, 6.22, 6.45, and 6.80, respectively). An
analysis of variance (set at marginally significant
0.10 alpha and 90% confidence level to inform
264
future researchers) was conducted to compare the
rating scale scores and revealed a marginally
significant difference among them. A Turkey post
hoc analysis indicated a significant difference
between the Angolan (M = 6.80) and Algerian
samples (M = 5.36), with the Angolans providing
higher support for the statement; however, there
were no other significant differences among the
countries in their rating scale scores. Moreover,
no significant differences in scores were found on
the basis of social class or religion; however, there
was a statistically significant correlation between
age and rating scale score, indicating that the
older the participants, the higher their agreement
with the statement that family and individual
security depend on national security.
Qualitative Response Patterns
Answers to the two national security items were
first broken into separate units of meaning for
coding purposes. Overall, there were 212 codable
units (“responses”) from the 153 participants
submitting explanations to the first security
statement, and there were 160 codable units
(“responses”) from the 72 participants submitting
their views on the second security statement. All
qualitative responses were coded by trained cod-
ers using a coding manual developed through a
grounded theory analysis of responses from an
international coding manual sample. The guide-
lines for coding responses to the first item were
organized into four major coding categories: (a)
national security is essential for individual and
family security, (b) national security is not essen-
tial for family and individual security, (c) national
security may be essential under some circum-
stances, and (d) does not address the question.
Within these four categories, responses were
coded into subcategories. For example, the
response “I feel safer knowing that there are
people working to remove the threat of terror-
ism” could be broken into two codable responses,
fitting into two different coding categories—“feel
safer” and “protection from a general or external
threat or force.” The guidelines for the second
item, “The best way to achieve security for indi-
viduals and families through the world is…,”
M. Dalley et al.
were organized into two major categories: (a)
positive/universalistic/pro-social responses and
(b) negative/protectionist/interventionist/aban-
donment responses.
When sample sizes permitted, we conducted,
and reported here, an exploratory analyses
designed to determine whether any of the demo-
graphic variables were predictive of scores on the
more common response categories. Because the
survey responses are from convenience samples,
all analyses are provisional, and the findings
should be viewed as a source for hypotheses
rather than as definitive results.
Views on the Potential Essentialness
of National Security
In regard to item 1, “National security is essential
for individual and family security,” the majority
of responses (68%) indicated some level of agree-
ment with the statement, 16% indicated some
level of disagreement, 13% showed conditional
or partial agreement, and 2% did not address the
question or did not know. Within the category of
responses expressing agreement, 32% were
coded for general (nonspecific) agreement with
the view that individual and family security
depend on national security. More specific argu-
ments in support of the statement fell into the fol-
lowing subcategories: individual/family security
and national security are “intrinsically tied”
(23%), national security makes people “feel
safer” (16%), national security is essential
because of its general ability “to protect” (6%),
national security is essential because it protects
against “external threats” (9%), and national
security protects against “internal threats” such
as threats within the community, national borders,
and state (4%). See Table 17.1 for sample
responses. For example, a 26-year-old South
African man indicated, “National security is
essential for all citizens.”
Of the 33 responses arguing that national
security is not essential for family and individual
security, 24% of these responses focused on the
negative consequences and dangers of focusing
on national security, 18% indicated that national
security is not correlated with individual and
17 Africa National Security 265

Table 17.1 Reasons why national security is essential for family and individual security response examples
Category Percent Country Age Sex Response
General agreement 22 (31) Botswana Adult M “No nation that lacks peace and
stability does well”
South Africa 26 F “National security is essential for all
citizens”
Zambia – – “National security is essential for
everyone in the world. People don’t
have to live in fear as a result they
are able to do a lot of things to
improve their lives”
Intrinsically tied 16 (23) Botswana 22 F “No family can be secure if the
nation is not secure”
South Africa 58 F “Nations are built from families and
individuals. Security at any level
presupposes security at all levels”
Angola 43 M “Because individuals and families
are the nucleus of society”
Ghana 18 M “Total agreement, individual and
family make up the nation”
Feel safer 11 (16) South Africa 38 F “National security is important and
if the country is peaceful and stable,
then my life will be too”
Angola 55 M “It is a public good which allows for
a community or state to live without
fear or violence”
Zambia 43 M “As an individual or family, one can
only feel secure if the nation is at
peace. One will be happy and count
on for the future but in a nation at
war you have no idea if you live to
see the next day”
Note: The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total
response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in that category out of all the pro-
national security responses
M male, F female. (–) Information not available

family security, 15% indicated that national
security is an illusion or impossibility, another
15% suggested the whole concept of nation states
is wrong because of the concern it generates for
protecting rigid national borders, 9% indicated
that obsession with security is dangerous and
instills fear, 9% stated general disagreement with
the statement but without specifics, and finally 6%
indicated that governments use national security
to mislead or deceive, including using it as part of
a propaganda strategy.
Finally, a total of 34 responses expressed con-
ditional or partial agreement with the statement
that national security is essential to individual
and family security. Of these, 26% of the responses
expressed general conditional agreement with
the statement, 18% suggested that there are better
ways or alternatives for assuring individual and
family security than worrying about national
security, 21% were statements that national secu-
rity needs to be monitored, and 15% indicated
that it is essential but incomplete.
Table 17.2 illustrates sample responses by
country, age, and gender both for reasons why
national security is not essential for family and
individual security and also for examples of
arguments reflecting conditional/partial agree-
ment with the item. For example, a 22-year-old
male from Botswana argued that “If it [national
security] means channeling all resources to
military and ignoring other social ills, then it’s
not worth it.”
266 M. Dalley et al.

Table 17.2 Reasons why national security is not essential for family and individual security and conditional/partial
agreement response examples
Category Percent Country Age Sex Response
Negative consequences 3 (24) Botswana 22 M “If it means channeling all resources to
military and ignoring other social ills, then
it’s not worth it”
National security is an illusion 2 (15) Ghana 22 M “The question is why security, who is giving
you that security, a mere man giving security
to a country or family. I think God is the best
security, who is giving security to that man
who is giving security to the nation and
family?”
General conditional agreement 4 (26) South Africa 59 M “Without national security, any country is
open to invasion, thus individuals and
families lose their inherent right to security.
However, most ‘defense’ forces are probably
used to attack other nations. South Africa
currently has no international enemies of any
significance. Thus spending on arms and an
army should be extremely limited. The
current arms deal is in my opinion, obscene”
Note. The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total
response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in that category out of all the
responses that provided conditional or partial agreement with the statement that national security is essential for family
and individual security
M male, F female

Table 17.3 National security is essential for individual and family security: percentages of responses in coding cate-
gories by demographic groups and chi-square values
Categories Demographic groupa c2
Male Female
General disagreement 3 0 3.20^b
General conditional agreement 10 2 4.20*b
No military in family (n = 20) Military in family (n = 25)
General agreement 60 32 7.97*
No military in family (n = 20) Military in family (n = 25)
Intrinsically tied 5 28 7.70^b
Never protested (n = 51) Protested (n = 11)
General agreement 41 9 4.60^
* ** *** ^
p £ 0.05; p £ 0.01; p £ 0.001; 0.051 < p < 0.10
a
Note: The numbers in these columns are the percent of the group that gave responses falling into each of the specified
categories
b
Likelihood ratio chi-square

Exploratory Analyses Related to
Whether National Security Is Essential
We conducted exploratory chi-square analyses to
assess the possibility of demographic group dif-
ferences in use of particular arguments made
about “National security is essential for individ-
ual and family security.” Table 17.3 shows that
individuals who did not have a family member in
the military were significantly more likely to
indicate general agreement with the idea that
family and individual security depends on
national security than participants who did have a
military family member. On the other hand,
respondents with a relative in the military were
more likely than respondents without such a rela-
tive to say that family and individual security are
intrinsically tied to national security. A marginally
significant difference was also found between
respondents who had been involved in antiwar
17 Africa National Security
Table 17.4 The best way to achieve security is: positive/universalistic/pro-social response examples
Category Percent Country
Peace/nonviolence 7 (9) Botswana
Ghana
Diplomacy/international 16 (19) Algeria
relations/international law
Ghana
Tolerance 17 (21) Botswana
Human and resource 8 (10) Ghana
development/education
Note: The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total
response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in that category out of all the posi-
tive/universalistic/pro-social responses
M male, F female. (–) Information not available
protests and those who had never protested, with
protesters less likely to argue that national secu-
rity is essential to family and individual security
than nonprotesters. These findings should be
regarded as very preliminary because of the small
number of protestors in the sample.
In regard to arguments disagreeing with the
essential role of national security in individual
and family security, men provided marginally
more responses than women indicating general
disagreement with the statement. In addition, men
were significantly more likely than women to pro-
vide arguments expressing conditional/partial
agreement with the statement that family and
individual security depends on national security.
Views on How to Achieve National
Security
Responses to the open-ended second statement,
“The best way to achieve security for individu-
als and families throughout the world is…,” fit
into two main overarching categories: (a) posi-
tive/universalistic/pro-social responses and (b)
negative/protectionist/interventionist/abandon-
ment responses. Of the 127 responses to this
open-ended item, 83% fell into the category of
positive/universalistic/pro-social responses and
267
Age Sex Response
20 F “Implement non violence and advocate
for peace”
52 F “To live in peace with one another
through understanding, being patient
with one another”
48 M “By respecting treaties”
59 – “Institute security commission of
United Nations organization to address
security issues in the world”
21 F “Respect diversity, other human beings,
stop RACISM, and respect and respect,
and respect for other people. We are all
equal and capable of doing good”
40 M “Informal education on the conse-
quences of war”
13% into the negative/protectionist/interven-
tionist/abandonment category; in addition, 4%
of the responses denied the possibility of achiev-
ing security or expressed apathy. Of the 105
responses in the positive/universalistic/pro-
social category, 23% indicated that the best way
to achieve national security was through peace-
ful methods (a subcategory of ethical and philo-
sophical principles); 19% referred to diplomacy,
international relations, or international law;
21% suggested tolerance; 10% focused on edu-
cation (a subcategory of human and resource
development); and another 10% invoked general
ethical and philosophical principles. Table 17.4
provides examples of responses in each of these
categories. An example of a statement coded as
positive/universalistic/pro-social response was
from a 52-year-old woman from Ghana who
wrote that the best way to achieve national secu-
rity is “to live in peace with one another through
understanding, being patient with one another.”
The smaller category of responses (13% of the
total responses) recommending interventionist/
protectionist means as the best path to national
security emphasized the importance of unilateral
strategies. Responses in this category focused on
individual nations taking direct action, such as
force, against perceived security threats. For
example, a 24-year-old woman from Botswana
268 M. Dalley et al.

Table 17.5 The best way to achieve security for individuals and families throughout the world is: percentages
of responses in coding categories demographic groups and chi-square values
Category Demographic groupa c2
Positive universality Christian Muslim Other None/agnostic 12.78**
pro-social responses (n = 53) (n = 2) (n = 1) (n = 5)
6 0 100 20
Positive universality Lower Working Middle Upper middle Upper 8.33*
pro-social responses (n = 2) (n = 18) (n = 34) (n = 7) (n = 1)
50 0 6 14 0
Diplomacy international 18–25 age 26–34 age 35–50 age 51+ age
relations international law (n = 33) (n = 12) (n = 14) (n = 9)
9 25 21 56
Diplomacy international Algeria Angola Botswana Ghana 8.51*
relations international law (n = 7) (n = 8) (n = 28) (n = 28)
43 25 4 29
Diplomacy international No military service Military service 4.66^
relations international law (n = 62) (n = 4)
18 0
Diplomacy international Never protested Protested 5.11^
relations international law (n = 49) (n = 11)
12 36
Human and resource Algeria Angola Botswana Ghana 8.91*
development (n = 7) (n = 8) (n = 28) (n = 28)
0 38 4 11
Education Algeria Angola Botswana Ghana 14.20**
(n = 7) (n = 8) (n = 28) (n = 28)
14 50 4 7
Education No military service Military service 5.69^
(n = 62) (n = 4)
10 50
*
p £ 0.05; **p £ 0.01; ***p £ 0.001; ^0.051 < p < 0.10
a
Note: The numbers in these columns are the percent of the group that gave responses falling into each of the specified
categories

said, “Punish those who commit crime severely.”
Because of the small number of responses to this
category, no statistical analyses were done.
Exploratory Analyses Related to How
to Achieve National Security
Exploratory chi-square analyses revealed some
statistically significant and some marginally
significant group differences in the major types of
responses given to the item on achieving national
security. In some cases, the numbers of partici-
pants in some of the groups were so small as to
make the findings totally suspect, so we do not
discuss those finding here. Among the findings
that we believe may be more robust are the fol-
lowing: individuals with no military experience
were more likely to recommend diplomacy, inter-
national relations, and international law than
individuals with military service. Also, those who
have participated in protests were more likely than
those who had not to suggest diplomacy, interna-
tional relations, and international law as best
ways to achieve security. Algerians made more
statements than participants from other African
nations supportive of diplomacy, international
relations, and international law as best ways to
achieve security. Angolans, more than respon-
dents from the other three countries, saw human
and resource development as well as education as
best ways to achieve security. Respondents with
military service were more likely than those with-
out military service to see education (a form of
human and resource development) as a best way
to achieve security. Table 17.5 illustrates these
differences noted above with the best way to
achieve security for individuals and families.
17 Africa National Security
Discussion
In order to understand participants’ responses to
the national security items on the PAIRTAPS, it is
important to understand the historical context
that has informed Africa’s views on national and
regional security. Prior to the 1960s, African
nations were emerging from oppressive colonial
rule and were mostly a mosaic of countries
fighting and negotiating for their independence.
On September 14, 1963, 37 independent African
nations established the Organization of African
Unity (OAU), which gave birth to the concepts of
national security within the African continent.
Significant changes regarding security both for
good and bad occurred over the next 40 years,
resulting in a new and more effective African
Union (AU) in 2002 that replaced the rather cum-
bersome and ineffective OAU (Juma 2006). One
of the AU goals pertinent to this chapter is to
establish peace and security.
Each region in Africa as well as each country
has its own issues of security and peace. Angola
is currently on the Tier 2 Watch List as reported
by the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency n.d.)
because women and children are being trafficked
internally and externally. Between each country,
within regions, and across the continent are
specific protocols and plans for defense and secu-
rity, which further widens differences in concep-
tualizing security, peace, and war throughout
Africa; therefore, in discussing responses to the
PAIRTAPS items, one must keep in mind that
findings represent a large diversity of opinions
and should be interpreted not just in the historical
and cross-cultural contexts but also within the
context of the recently formed unifying UA poli-
cies for Africa as a continent.
Because of the largeness of Africa, the difficulties
in establishing national securities are staggering.
Great variations exist in demographics, geography,
and climates, to name but just a few chasms
between nation states and the people. One of the
more profound obstacles to Africa’s ability to unite
in an effort to establish security is the multilinguis-
tic nature of the continent, which appears to be
269
home to well over 1,000 languages (Tucker 2003),
with 11 practicing languages just within the nation
of South Africa; therefore, the interpretation of the
results from the PAIRTAPS, which in Africa was
administered in only three different languages—
English, Arabic, and Ewe (for some of the Ghanian
participants)—must be also be considered in the
context of the wide assortment of languages from
which this survey was gathered and perhaps vari-
ous interpretations of the terms and concepts used
in the survey.
Given this great diversity, it may seem sur-
prising that there was as much unanimity as there
was when participants answered questions about
security using the PAIRTAPS. From the six
diverse African samples that completed at least
one of the national security items, ranging from
the predominately Christian southern tip of Africa
(e.g., South Africa and Botswana) to the Muslim
nation of Algeria in North Africa to West, East,
and Central Africa (e.g., Ghana, Zambia, and
Angola), a large majority of 68% agreed that
national security is essential for individual and
family security and another 14% indicated condi-
tional or partial agreement, whereas only 16%
disagreed with the statement that national secu-
rity is essential. The reasons given for agreement
varied, with almost a third indicating a general
agreement that individual and family security
depends on national security (e.g., “National
security is essential for all citizens”). Another
quarter of the agreement responses (e.g., “No
family can be secure if the nation is not secure”)
indicated that national security and individual/
family security are intrinsically tied together.
Interestingly, only 16% of the responses agreeing
with the statement mentioned that national secu-
rity makes people feel safer (e.g., “if the country
is peaceful and stable, then my life will be too”).
The low percentage of responses referring to
safety was surprising, especially in given that all
of these African countries, with the exception of
Botswana, have gained independence through
war, strife, or at least adversity and some pres-
ently struggle with a fragile government (e.g.,
Angola and Tanzania). Given these uncertainties,
one would think that national security would
270
more frequently be associated with safety.
However, among the six countries with partici-
pants responding to this statement, South Africa
appears to be somewhat more supportive of the
notion of feeling safer and being more protected
as compared to Ghana, a former British colony
enduring a long series of coups before establish-
ing a constitutional democracy, and Algeria, a
Spanish, French-ruled Muslim country that pres-
ently supports a presidential-parliamentary sys-
tem of government.
Among the few responses providing condi-
tional or partial agreement with the essentiality of
national security, the principal qualifications pro-
vided included the need for better ways or alter-
natives for assuring individual and family security,
the need to monitor national security agendas, and
the view that national security is essential but
incomplete. These conditional responses seemed
reasonable especially because most of these
African countries have dealt with hostile govern-
ments using “security” as a way to subjugate citi-
zens; a clear example of this was South Africa
during its history of government-sponsored apart-
heid (Meredith 1999). The statement from one
participant sums up the conditional agreement,
“Without national security, any country is open to
invasion, thus individuals and families lose their
inherent right to security. However, most ‘defense’
forces are probably used to attack other nations.
South Africa currently has no international ene-
mies of any significance. Thus spending on arms
and an army should be extremely limited. The
current arms deal is in my opinion, obscene.”
The participants who disagreed with the state-
ment that national security is essential to family
and individual security generally provided one of
the following rationales: (a) negative conse-
quences and dangers are associated with focusing
on national security, (b) national security is not
correlated with individual and family security,(c)
national security is an illusion or impossibility,
and (d) the whole concept of nation states is a
poor one because of the concern it generates for
protecting rigid borders. The participants provid-
ing these responses seemed to suspect that the
emphasis on national security may actually be
misdirected and could interfere with or usurp
M. Dalley et al.
individual and family security. One person’s
response to the statement succinctly summarizes
this disagreement, “If it means channeling all
resources to military and ignoring other social
ills then it’s not worth it.” Perhaps these respon-
dents are influenced by memories of apartheid in
South Africa or the tendency of some govern-
ments today to overlook human trafficking in
countries such as Angola, while still espousing a
concern with national security. Another source of
disagreement could be in the Muslim versus
Christian debates regarding the Islamic Shari’a
code of conduct and civil and criminal provisions,
such as in Nigeria and other African nations,
where members of these two religions may dis-
agree about how best to achieve security for all
Africans.
Quantitative analysis for the rating scale scores
on the statement, “National security is essential
for individual and family security,” showed a
significant difference between the Angolan
sample, which showed the highest level of agree-
ment with the statement, and the Algerian sam-
ple, which had the lowest level of agreement,
with no other significant differences by country.
(Unfortunately, the samples from South Africa
and Zambia did not complete this rating scale and
therefore could not be included in these analy-
ses.) There was a statistically significant positive
correlation between age and rating scale scores;
perhaps as Africans get older, many of them feel
a greater need for the security that they have
become convinced is associated with national
security.
Our exploratory analyses revealed only a few
other significant differences in the use of particu-
lar rationales based on demographic characteris-
tics. Participants without a family member with
military experience expressed more general
agreement with the statement, “individual and
family security depend on national security” as
compared to participants who did have a relative
with experience in the military; however, partici-
pants with relatives having military experience
were more likely to argue that family, individual,
and national security are intrinsically tied. It
seems that the terms depends on and intrinsically
tied have different connotations, and perhaps this
17 Africa National Security
is especially true for respondents with relatives
who have had military experience.
Although only a very small percentage of the
national security sample reported any antiwar
activism, those who reported that they had not
protested were more likely than protesters to give
a general endorsement to the statement that indi-
vidual and family security depends on national
security. It may be that protestors who question
authority and question their governments on
issues such as war and peace are more likely to
question the assurance that a “strong” national
security would be needed to establish individual
and family security. Protestors may see an over-
reaching arm of government when it comes to
national security and not see it as individual and
family security depending upon national security
as much and perhaps even the opposite that a
strong national security may interfere with indi-
vidual and family security. This speculation needs
further research.
In regard to the statement, “The best way to
achieve security for individuals and families
throughout the world is…,” most of the partici-
pants (83%) from these diverse African countries
agreed that the best way is through some type of
positive response rather than in a negative or pro-
tectionist way. Almost a quarter of the positive/
universalistic/pro-social responses indicated that
the best way to achieve national security was
through peace/nonviolence and peace tools.
About one in five suggested using diplomacy/
international relations/international law and
nearly one in five suggested tolerance as a way to
achieve security. Moreover, the older the partici-
pants were, the more likely they were to endorse
diplomatic/international relations/international
law solutions. Other preliminary findings con-
cerning positive approaches to achieving national
security that seem worthy of further investigation
are (1) the countries most strongly endorsing
diplomacy, international relations, and interna-
tional law as the best ways to achieve security
were Ghana and Algeria and (2) respondents who
had participated in protest were also more likely
than their counterparts to endorse diplomacy/
international relations/international law as the
271
best ways to achieve security for individuals and
families.
An analysis of the 13% of qualitative responses
that were in the negative/protectionist category
revealed that only about 2% indicated that
national security should be achieved by force. It
would seem that respondents from these African
countries were in near-universal agreement that
using force as a way to achieve security was not
appropriate—perhaps because of their own recent
and long-standing experience with violence and
turmoil.
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 Views on National Security in Latin
America 18
Eros DeSouza, Michael Stevens, Jorge Luna-Torres,
Ricardo Angelino, Rodrigo Barahona, Eddy Carillo,
Amanda Clinton, Luciana Karine de Souza,
and Sherri McCarthy

In the chapter on the definitions of war, torture,
and terrorism in Latin America (Chap. 8, this vol-
ume), DeSouza stated that most Latin American
residents feel unsafe due to widespread violence,
especially in urban settings. According to Buvinic
et al. (1999):
The subject of violence is foremost in the minds
of citizens. Few in the [Latin American] region
have remained unaffected by what is widely rec-
ognized as a multi-dimensional, multi-faceted
problem; nearly everyone has a story to tell, often
in graphic terms. Survey after survey consistently
underscores the gravity and prevalence of the
concern. (p. 1)
Howard et al. (2007) argued that fear and mis-
trust hinder social/economic development in the
region and weaken democratic governance—
largely due to the inability of the Latin American
nations to guarantee citizen security.
The widespread violence in Latin American
countries reflects deep societal prejudices based
on gender, sexual orientation, race/ethnicity, and
social class (DeSouza et al. 2004; DeSouza and
Cerqueira-Santos 2010). As recently as the 1940s,
a political minister illustrated this prejudice by
explaining to a visiting US anthropologist: “Our
political backwardness which has made this dicta-
torship necessary is due entirely to our high amount
of Negro blood. So we are trying to breed the
blood out, making one nation of all people and
whitening the Brazilian race” (Landes 1947, p. 6).
According to DeSouza and Stevens (2009),
Spanish and Portuguese conquest left a legacy of
gendered oppression and violence throughout
Latin America. This legacy is best exemplified by
marianismo and machismo, which reinforce the
domination of men and superiority over women
and children. The legacy also reinforces an
ongoing social myth that fair-skinned inhabitants
are of a higher class than others, that there is a
connection between poverty, class, and skin
color, and that crime is associated with the lower
classes. Thus, the upper classes must be “pro-
tected” from the masses. As reflected in the above
commentary, it seems that in order to gain a sense
of security, often at the expense of personal free-
dom, many Latin American citizens tolerate a
heavy-handed approach by their government
(DeSouza et al., Chap. 19, this volume). A long
history of war and invasion may also contribute
to this (Clinton et al., Chap. 30, this volume).
Concerning homophobia and transphobia,
Latin America is higher than much of the world in
its expression, and Brazil, the largest and most
industrialized country in Latin America, ranks first
in the world for hate crimes based on sexual orien-
tation bias (Mott 2002). Moreover, discrimination
and violence are most pronounced toward trans-
gendered individuals (Carrara and Vianna 2006).
There is a greater division of wealth in this
region than in other parts of the world, and because
of the history of the Spanish and Portuguese
conquerors in relation to slavery and subjugation
of indigenous people as well as importation of
African slaves, the wealth and class divisions
tend to fall along ethnic/racial lines despite the

K. Malley-Morrison et al. (eds.), International Handbook of War, Torture, and Terrorism, 273
Peace Psychology Book Series, DOI 10.1007/978-1-4614-1638-8_18,
© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2013
274
fact that race, per se, is often understood differ-
ently. For example, until recently it was illegal in
Brazil to ask someone to identify their race or
ethnicity, and still this is often not understood or
assessed correctly when research is done in Latin
America requesting this information (Hutz et al.
2004). In 1976, Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia
e Estatistica (IBGE—the Brazilian census orga-
nization) attempted to get data by asking respon-
dents to identify their skin color, and over 134
categories resulted (Rose 2005).
According to Vellinga (2007), Latin America
has inherited a tradition of political patrimonial-
ism, including strong presidentialism, personal-
ism, political centralization, and authoritarianism,
from its colonization by the Spanish and
Portuguese. Patrimonialism is related to caudi-
llismo (i.e., a charismatic leader who rules
autocratically) in Spanish, which has been linked
to revolutions and political challenges in Latin
America.
To understand the potential causes of violent
revolutions/rebellions (e.g., assassinations and
guerilla warfare) and nonviolent political opposi-
tion (collective protests), Schatzman (2005)
examined the contribution of nine predictors in
18 Latin American countries (Argentina, Bolivia,
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay,
Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela) between 1980
and 1993 (a period of political opening). These
predictors were (a) level of democracy (from
most autocratic to most democratic), (b) threats to
peasant subsistence, (c) unemployment, (d) eco-
nomic crisis, (e) income inequality, (f) state
efficacy (i.e., social development and state capac-
ity), (g) repression of human rights, (h) US
influence in Latin America (e.g., economic and
military aid), and (i) government corruption.
Schatzman (2005) found significant empirical
support for the role of level of democracy, social
development, state capacity, and repression in the
incidence of violent revolutions/rebellions in
Latin America during 1980–1993. In the short
term, democracy was linked to increased violent
rebellion, possibly due to the brief period that the
E. DeSouza et al.
study covered. This finding gives some support to
the notion that democratic transitions do not end
a tradition of violent political instability in Latin
America (or elsewhere as evidenced in Iraq and
Afghanistan in recent years). The findings also
supported the notion that rebellion is fueled by
government inefficiency, as measured by low
levels of social development and state capacity.
It seems that rebellions emerge when there is
insufficient governmental effort given to the wel-
fare of the population (e.g., education and health
issues), causing widespread social marginaliza-
tion in weak democracies. Not surprising, increas-
ing state repression creates a vicious circle of
increased violent rebellions. In other words, vio-
lence begets violence. The other variables did not
emerge as important factors in this model.
Democratic regime and repression played differ-
ent roles in the model of nonviolent collective
protests. In this model, democratic transitions
initially decreased protests sharply, followed by a
small increase in protest, and then another
decrease. As expected, repression decreased the
incidence of peaceful protests.
Conceptions of National Security
Security means to be free from danger or harm.
Unfortunately, most individuals have a limited
understanding of national security and perceive it
mainly as being free from external (e.g., wars) or
internal danger (e.g., guerilla warfare). Research
with children in Brazil, however, shows that ideas
of peace and security in that part of the world are
not tied so much to external threats or even
guerilla warfare but to daily issues of safety and
security. Freedom from crime, from threat of
drunk drivers, and from economic hardship are
constructs included in definitions of peace and
security (de Souza et al. 2006). Because there is a
perception that crime has been lower under strict
military regimes, some may view that form of
government as more “nationally secure.”
Environmental danger is also a potential threat
to individual and family security. Due to global-
ization and neoliberalization policies that blindly
18 Latin America National Security
emphasize economic development over social
development, most citizens may not give much
thought to the environment and may not include
unchecked deforestation, pollution of air, soil,
and water, as well as increasing desertification as
issues pertaining to their own security and well-
being (Howard et al. 2007). Yet the threat to
health and well-being inherent in the type of
environmental damage and heavy industrializa-
tion that has been common in Latin America over
the past decades is also a threat to national secu-
rity in the countries so affected.
How do the citizens in Latin American coun-
tries view issues of national security? Is it tied
primarily to external or to internal threat? Are
threats to the environment considered a threat to
national security? Are incidents of violence
against minority groups considered a threat to
national security? Are interventionist policies
from outside Latin America that support particu-
lar regimes a threat? What do the people expect of
their governments in terms of offering protection?
To what extent is national security seen as essen-
tial to individual and family security? The remain-
der of this chapter attempts to address these
questions.
Perceptions of the Need for National
Security in Latin America
Sample
The Latin American sample included 518 partici-
pants from Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Nicaragua, and Puerto Rico; they were
recruited through a number of different approaches,
including personal networking and posting of the
survey link on a number of sites. More specifically,
89 participants were recruited from Puerto Rico
(57 women, 32 men), 69 from Colombia (36
women, 32 men, 1 unidentified), 105 from Brazil
(79 women, 25 men, 1 unidentified), 51 from
Argentina (29 women, 20 men, 2 unidentified), 67
from Costa Rica (35 women, 9 men, 3 unidentified),
and 137 from Nicaragua (79 women, 57 men, and
1 unidentified). The age range of the sample was
18 to 79 with the average age being 26.68
275
(SD = 11.25) years. The total sample was 64%
women and 78% Christian. About 53% self-
identified as middle class, with an additional 26%
indicating working class identification and 9%
reporting upper middle class; 6% reported to be
of the lowest social class, and less than 1% of the
highest social class; 5% did not respond to this
item. In addition, most (92%) reported that they
had never served in the military. Only 4% had
ever served, and 4% did not respond. However,
44% had a family member in the military, about
36% indicated that they did not, and 21% did
not respond to this question.
Design
As part of a larger global investigation of war,
peace, and terrorism (Malley-Morrison 2009),
which covered 43 countries, all participants com-
pleted the Personal and Institutional Rights to
Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS),
described elsewhere in this volume, either in hard
copy format or online.
There are two items on the PAIRTAPS con-
cerned with the issue of security. The first item
asks participants to indicate their level of agree-
ment on a 7-point scale (from 1, strongly disagree,
to 7, strongly agree) with the statement: “National
security is essential for individual and family secu-
rity.” The participants are then asked to explain
their rating in their own words. The other item
asks participants to complete the following state-
ment: “The best way to achieve security for indi-
vidual and families throughout the world is…”
Written responses were analyzed through a
grounded theory approach (Corbin and Strauss
1990), which allows the creation of a taxonomy
made up of categories and subcategories. All cat-
egories and subcategories emerged from the data
without imposing a priori standards. The coding
process began by unitizing all written responses.
A unit is an independent and complete idea,
which is placed into only one category. Thus, all
categories and subcategories are mutually exclu-
sive (i.e., a unit can only be placed into only one
category or subcategory); however, a respondent
may generate more than one independent idea.
276
Analysis of Patterns in Qualitative
Responses
In order to analyze the responses, two coding
manuals were developed, one focusing on expla-
nations regarding the essentiality of national
security and the other on responses regarding the
best way to achieve security. All responses were
broken down into smaller codable units.
To understand lay perspectives on national
security, we first analyzed written responses to
the item “National security is essential for indi-
vidual and family security.” These responses
were first divided into three groups: (1) agree-
ment with the statement that national security is
essential for family and individual security, (2)
disagreement with the statement, and (3) condi-
tional support for the statement. (See Chap. 12
for an explanation of the coding system.)
Is National Security Essential?
A total of 56% of all responses to this item agreed
that national security is essential for family and
individual security. For example, a 27-year-old
Brazilian woman explained, “A nation defines
general conditions in which the individual and
family will evolve.” Among these responses,
72% showed a general agreement that family and
individual security depend on national security,
making it the most commonly coded theme in
relation to the importance of national security.
Responses reflecting the belief that national
security is essential for individual and family
security through its ability to offer protection con-
stituted 30% of agreement responses. For exam-
ple, a 24-year-old Argentinean man responded,
“It is the state’s responsibility.” This response
refers to the protection the government is expected
to give in relation to a general or external threat or
force: it is the government’s obligation to provide
security to its citizens. Table 18.1 provides addi-
tional examples of responses supporting the view
that national security is essential for family and
individual security.
E. DeSouza et al.
In contrast, a total of 10% of all responses to
this item gave reasons why national security is
not essential for family and individual security.
Among these, 50% gave responses that reflected
a general disagreement with the statement.
According to a 45-year-old Brazilian man,
“National security exists for a national insecurity
and is not essential for individual and family
security.” Thirty percent of responses disagree-
ing with the statement focus on the negative
consequences of a focus on national security and
the assumption that it is essential for family and
individual security. For example, a 23-year-old
Brazilian woman explained, “Sometimes what
threatens individual and family security is the
nation itself.” This response raises the issue of
governments using national security to mislead
or deceive, such as in propaganda for war, or act-
ing in other dishonest, corrupt ways. Moreover,
12% of responses that disagreed with the state-
ment suggest or imply that national security is an
illusion or impossibility. For example, a 25-year-
old Costa Rican man responded, “The concept of
national security is very hopeful but trying to
carry it out is a waste I feel.” Table 18.2 provides
additional responses rejecting the view that
national security is essential for family and indi-
vidual security.
Thirteen percent of the responses to the national
security statement showed partial agreement with
it. Among these, 54% generally agreed with the
statement while indicating that they would not
agree if a standard was not met or a condition was
not satisfied. For example, a 23-year-old Brazilian
man responded, “Depends on how the nation is
represented.” Moreover, responses that imply a
withdrawal of support based on the possibility of
national security impinging on individual free-
doms and rights constitute 25% of the conditional
responses. According to a 22-year-old Colombian
man, “Already they have assured human rights.”
Eleven percent of responses that partially agreed
with that statement indicated that national secu-
rity is essential for individual and family security
in theory, but in practical terms it is incomplete.
For example, a 26-year-old Brazilian woman
explained, “I would say that it’s necessary but it’s
18 Latin America National Security 277

Table 18.1 Sample responses concurring that national security is essential for family and individual security
Category Percent Country Gender Age Response
Governmental obligation 5 (10) Colombia M 23 “It gives us our confidence and
to provide security protection”
Brazil M 22 “Without national security, there is
no way to assure families’ and the
citizens’ physical integrity”
Brazil F 31 “Because the citizen’s safety needs to
be guaranteed first. The army does not
guarantee safety to a single person”
Costa Rica M 25 “The state should guarantee certain
securities to their citizens”
National, familial, and individual 1 (6) Puerto Rico F 23 “People need national security to
security are intrinsically tied have individual security”
Argentina F 23 “If there is no national security, they
do not have individual or family
security”
Costa Rica F 27 “If there is security in the country and
the individual, then it is always
secure”
Need security to feel safer 1 (2) Brazil F 22 “The safer the country, the safer the
person and its family will be”
Note: The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total
response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in that category out of all the agree-
ment responses
F female, M male, U undisclosed

Table 18.2 Sample responses disagreeing that national security is essential for family and individual security
Category Percent Country Gender Age Response
General disagreement 5 (50) Costa Rica M 37 “Normally the security is bad. It refers
to safeguarding the private property of
the elite”
Brazil F 29 “It helps, but it’s not essential, it doesn’t
guarantee security. Sometimes while the
nation protects itself from external
threats, it forgets the internal threats”
Nicaragua F U “National security is not a determinant
factor to maintain security”
National, familial, and individual 1 (6) Argentina F 24 “I cannot think to comprehend the
security are not correlated concept of national security and the
relation with individual security. I do not
think it can be reconciled”
Colombia F 24 “There is no direct relationship”
Note: The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total
response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in that category out of all the dis-
agreement responses
F female, M male, U undisclosed
278
Table 18.3 Sample responses expressing conditional or partial agreement with the essential role of national security
Category Percent Country
General conditional agreement 7 (54) Costa Rica
Costa Rica
Nicaragua
National security needs to be 1 (9) Argentina
monitored
Costa Rica
Essentiality but incompleteness 1 (11) Argentina
of national security
Costa Rica
Note: The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total
response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in that category out of all the con-
ditional responses
F female, M male, U undisclosed
not enough, besides national security, the state
needs to offer dignified living conditions.”
Responses affirming the necessity of national
security for individual and family security, but
also qualifying it through invoking alternatives,
such as international security for all, constitute
9% of conditional responses. For example, a
28-year-old Argentinean woman responded, “For
there to be individual and family security, there
has to be social security for it to work.” Table 18.3
provides additional responses demonstrating par-
tial agreement with the statement.
Twenty percent of responses to this item were
uncodable based on the manual or did not address
the question.
“What Is the Best Way to Achieve
National Security?”
The coding guidelines for responses suggesting
ways to achieve national security were organized
into three major categories: (1) positive/univer-
salistic/pro-social responses, (2) negative/
E. DeSouza et al.
Gender Age Response
F 48 “Depending on the government at the
moment. The majority of the countries
are repressed or military run”
M 37 “I agree, but also individuals and
families need to be convinced, and
should avoid double meanings”
F U “National security protects in a general
way, not the individual”
M 23 “Revising this method is the way to
start”
F 23 “They should have someone that
oversees the securities”
M 25 “Not only national, I would say
worldwide. They are not established for
the fear and hatred of our national
security and for others to justify a war.
(Bush does this with our damaged
citizens)”
F 33 “It’s limited but they each give us life”
protectionist/interventionist/abandonment
responses, and (3) denial of possibility, apathy,
unsure.
The responses were quite optimistic and
humanistic: a total of 89% of the responses
indicated a belief that national security could be
achieved through the pursuit of positive, univer-
salistic, or pro-social practices. Among these,
29% indicated an unspecified belief that national
security might be achieved through the pursuit
of universalistic or pro-social practices. For
example, a 20-year-old Brazilian woman
explained that the best way to achieve security is
by “meeting basic needs and providing them for
every citizen in the world.” Sixteen percent of the
positive, universalistic, or pro-social practices
responses emphasized the use of specific ethical
principles (tolerance, golden rule, and peace/
nonviolence). For example, a 49-year-old
Colombian woman indicated that the way to
achieve national security is through “tolerance
and respect.” Additionally, a 28-year-old Brazilian
woman said, “encourage peace, dialogue, tolerance,
and understanding of differences.” In addition,
18 Latin America National Security
Table 18.4 Sample positive/universalistic/pro-social responses
Category Percent Country
Ethical and philosophical 15 (16) Puerto Rico
principles
Tolerance 10 (11) Colombia
Peace/nonviolence 10 (11) Colombia
Education 13 (15) Puerto Rico
Colombia
Recommending peace/ 5 (5) Puerto Rico
peace tools
Brazil
Note: The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total
response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in that category out of all the posi-
tive responses
F female, M male, U undisclosed
5% of the positive responses suggest the employ-
ment of pragmatic strategies for encouraging
peace and nonviolent reconciliation or describe
specific strategies for using peace tools as a way
of ensuring national security. A 53-year-old
Argentinean woman advised, “Guarantee free-
dom of thought and respect differences.”
Responses suggesting the importance of diplo-
macy or international relations in guaranteeing
the security of individual nations constitute 3%
of responses. For example, a 41-year-old Costa
Rican man explained, “Respect the rights of men,
children, women, etc. Agree, no aggression
between nations.” A larger proportion of the
responses (24%) made reference to the impor-
tance of human development or an equitable
redistribution of wealth for creating national
security but did not identify a specific strategy for
implementing this. For example, a 48-year-old
Costa Rican woman responded, “begin for one-
self and progress to the family, community and
the world.” Additionally, a 58-year-old Costa
Rican man explained “with more and better edu-
cation and social services for the people.”
Table 18.4 provides additional examples of posi-
tive/universalistic/pro-social responses.
In contrast, only 5% of the responses to the
achieve peace item were coded as displaying neg-
ative/protectionist/interventionist/abandonment,
suggesting the importance of unilateral strategies
279
Gender Age Response
F 40 “For the welfare and respect. By
respecting human rights. For the welfare
and respect. By respecting human rights”
F 49 “Tolerance and respect”
F 18 “Going to the same goal, peace”
F 30 “Education for all people”
M 20 “Through education to acquire that
consciousness”
M 19 “First, there should be individual and
family peace by fighting criminals”
M 24 “Avoiding war and seek alternatives for
peaceful negotiation”
for ensuring national security and focusing
primarily on individual nations taking direct
action against perceived security threats.
According to a 22-year-old Brazilian woman, the
best way to achieve security is by “the govern-
ment and a strong military,” and a 31-year-old
Costa Rican man responded: “eliminate trade
between countries.”
Finally, a total of 3% of all responses describe
a belief that national security is impossible, that
they do not consider national security important
or “worth the effort,” or that they are unsure of
how to respond.
Exploratory Analyses of Group
Differences in Response Patterns
A series of exploratory analyses were conducted
with the thematic national security responses to
assess the possibility of demographic differences
in responses. For these analyses, each of the cod-
ing categories was considered as either present
(1) or not present (0). We conducted chi-square
analyses to determine whether there were
significant differences in a given coding category/
subcategory by country if there were sufficient
numbers in the cells. Then, for the entire region,
we examined the possibility of differences based
on gender as well as on whether the respondent
280
or any family member of the respondent had ever
served in the military (if there were sufficient
numbers in the cells). Only statistically significant
results are reported.
There are multiple voices in each country that
this study, or any study for that matter, cannot
address. Hence, caution is necessary when gener-
alizing since our Latin American sample is one of
convenience. In addition, most respondents are
young (mid-1920s). The majority are women
attending college, from a middle-class back-
ground, and Christian (primarily Catholic), mak-
ing generalizations problematic, especially to
older and younger groups, to more affluent and
less affluent groups, and to non-Christian groups.
In addition, a large number of participants did not
answer the question of whether they have a family
member in military service, and most respon-
dents had never served in the military. Thus,
caution is warranted in interpreting results as
well as in comparing these results to findings
from other areas of the world.
Quantitative Analysis of National
Security Essentiality Responses
The general category indicating agreement with
the essential nature of national security had
enough responses (n = 100) to permit analysis of
the data by category and by country. (Puerto
Rico is not a country but is treated as one in the
analysis due to its distinct Latin American cul-
ture, which sets it apart from mainland USA.)
Our analysis revealed significant country differ-
ences. The country with the lowest frequency of
responses in this category was Puerto Rico (5%),
and the country with the highest frequency was
Nicaragua (24%). The remaining countries
ranged from 8 to 23%. We found no significant
differences by gender and personal military ser-
vice. However, we found significant differences
based on whether or not respondents had a fam-
ily member in the military. Significantly more
respondents without a family member in the mil-
itary agreed with the essential nature of national
security than those who did have a family member
in the military.
E. DeSouza et al.
Quantitative Analysis of Best Way to
Achieve National Security Responses
Responses to the item about achieving national
security were organized into two major catego-
ries: (a) positive, universalistic, or pro-social
responses and (b) negative, protectionist, inter-
ventionist, or abandonment responses. Again,
there were few differences based on demographic
characteristics; however, we did find significant
differences by country in likelihood of recom-
mending education as a way of achieving national
security. Specifically, Brazilians (59%) cited edu-
cation the most, followed by Argentinians (15%)
and Colombians (14%), with Costa Ricans (12%)
citing it the least.
Conclusion
The data were consistent with our expectations,
as most respondents agreed that national security
is essential to families and individuals because it
offers them protection (safety) from external and/
or internal threats. These explanations closely
follow a traditional view of national security,
excluding more complex systems of social and
environmental inequalities. They also suggest a
normalization or acceptance of interpersonal vio-
lence, especially toward marginalized groups of
the population, e.g., sexual minority individuals.
Interpersonal violence in Latin America is a
developmental issue because it negatively affects
human welfare, economic growth, and social
development (Howard et al. 2007). Moreover,
there is an “undeclared civil war” in most Latin
American cities that:
… clearly engages elements of fear and rage, but it
is no longer a question of planting bombs or hiding
in the mountains to take up arms against a dictator
or corrupt government. It deals instead with a vio-
lence that resists a whole system, creating it in a
more profound way, at the heart of its social rela-
tions. As it makes victims of us all, this undeclared
civil war obliterates spaces of difference and dif-
ferentiation, making all of us experience injustice,
insecurity and inequality. (Rotker 2001, p. 18)
Interestingly, there were very few differences in
patterns of responding based on gender, nationality,
18 Latin America National Security
military service, or having a relative in military
service. These findings suggest very similar per-
spectives across groups in our sample. The sam-
ple seems to have an idealistic belief that national
security may be achieved through universalistic
principles, such as democracy and equality. Most
of the respondents appear to overlook what many
scholars have concluded concerning national
security in Latin America. For example, Lopez
(1986) stated that the national security ideology
has “served to support, if not predict, the use of
terror as a preferred ruling style in a number of
Latin American political systems” (p. 75). This
sentiment was echoed by DeSouza (this volume)
concerning the tactics that many Latin American
governments use to deal with domestic terrorism.
According to Mahoney-Norris (1998), the
difficult question that Latin American govern-
ments constantly have to address is how to recon-
cile national security ideology with democratic
practices that are truly inclusive and that respect
human rights.
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 Views on National Security in South
and Southeast Asia 19
Kalyani Raj, Nisha Raj, Sherri McCarthy,
Ma. Regina E. Estuar, Ariel Stone, Tristyn Campbell,
Telma Almieda, Darshini Shah, Ellora Puri,
Megan Reif, Haslina Muhammad, and Jas Jafaar

Demographically, Asia is the largest continent in more regionalized or localized. It is important to

the world, covering around 30% of the earth’s
total land mass and 60% of the world population.
This chapter considers attitudes toward national
security expressed by citizens from seven of the
countries in this region: India, Indonesia, Laos,
Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Sri
Lanka. Countries in this region are rising as polit-
ical and economic strongholds in today’s world;
however, they are also receiving attention for the
increasing conflicts and occurrences of terror they
have experienced. The continuing unrest in South
and Southeast Asia causes serious concern among
Asian countries as well as the rest of the world.
Since World War II, Asia has survived a series
of wars, internal conflicts, ethnic or religious
clashes, and contests for political legitimacy.
Although many of the conflicts subsided after the
Cold War, a few remained, becoming more
localized. The global economic competition,
development of military capabilities and nuclear
power, forced exertion of power, interference in
the matters of other nations, and attitudes of
dominance are emerging as new threats in the
region. The role of the United States in Asian
security issues and matters of foreign policy is
viewed with mixed feelings by various countries.
Several alliances and agreements centered on
security and peacekeeping have been terminated
or violated, creating a deep concern among the
affected countries. National security threats are
being redefined and reassessed and are becoming
understand the international pattern of security
interdependence before analyzing the national
security issues of the region as a whole.
A “region” in regard to security refers to a dis-
tinct and significant subsystem of security rela-
tions that exist in states that are in geographical
proximity to each other. These relationships
range from amicable, protective, or supportive to
suspicious, tense, and sometimes distinctly hos-
tile. The patterns of amity and enmity arise from
a variety of issues that cannot be predicted from
a simple consideration of various factors, such
as distribution of power, border disputes, ethnic
differences, ideological alignments, and long-
standing historical links or disputes and the resul-
tant foreign policies. According to Wolfers (1952,
p. 485), “security, in an objective sense, measures
the absence of threats to acquired values, in a
subjective sense, the absence of fear that such
values will be attacked.”
Commonalities in culture and ethnicity may
sometimes lead to increased security threats, pos-
sibly due to an increased and more legitimatized
interference in each other’s security affairs. For
instance, most of the military deployment of
India and Pakistan lies on the border areas
between these two countries. Similarly, Thailand
is more concerned about security threats from
Vietnam than from any of its other neighboring
countries. Domestic security and human secu-
rity also play an important role in assessing the

K. Malley-Morrison et al. (eds.), International Handbook of War, Torture, and Terrorism, 283
Peace Psychology Book Series, DOI 10.1007/978-1-4614-1638-8_19,
© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2013
284
overall aspect of security in a country. Weaker
countries with internal social or political tension
or civil unrest are naturally more vulnerable and
at a higher risk of international threat than stron-
ger countries. Stronger domestic security leaves a
country with more freedom to focus on interna-
tional security concerns.
Various schools of thought have developed
with differing opinions about levels of security.
While one school believes in limiting the issue of
security to borders, war, and military factors only,
as is the “traditional” way, others propose to
widen the definition of national security by
encompassing domestic and human security as
equally relevant factors. Internal issues, such as a
lack of confidence in the country’s political
leadership, socioeconomic issues, civil wars, and
the legitimacy of contested leadership, are also
becoming accepted as essential to the assessment
of national security. In Asia, political structures
and concerns, as well as issues of security, under-
went phenomenal changes over the centuries,
before, during, and post colonization.
Prior to colonization, countries in this region
were constantly under threat of invasion by the
reigning superpowers at the time or by surges of
Eurasian barbarians. Interdependence between
neighboring countries was based on trade or cul-
ture, and the need for security interdependence
was hardly felt. Gradually barbarism gave way to
more stabilized sociopolitical structures, and
state-like organizations started forming. Physical
distance and limited economic and technological
resources kept neighboring countries at bay, and
regional security was a more dominant concern
than threats from international powers. Numerous
small centers of regional power existed through-
out South and Southeast Asia, and rulers concen-
trated on expanding their own domains to include
neighboring states through wars or, in a number
of cases, interregional marriages.
Initially, fluctuating power and shifting sys-
tems paved the way for foreign powers to take
control of the trade routes and then of the coun-
tries. European powers had their own ideas of
administration and legitimized the boundaries
they established between countries. There was a
K. Raj et al.
gradual shift of true administrative power into the
hands of Europeans, and the local rulers remained
as mere figureheads (Mackerras 1995).
Colonization in South and Southeast Asia began
in the early sixteenth century, and by the end of the
nineteenth century, almost the entire region was
colonized except for Central Siam and Nepal. The
Philippines was first colonized by Spain and later
taken over by the United States. The Dutch invaded
Indonesia, a major part of Sumatra, Java, and sev-
eral other South Asian islands. The Portuguese
colonized Malaysia but were later displaced by the
British, who were the most powerful colonizers in
the region, having established their rule effectively
in almost all of South Asia. Colonization shifted
the pattern of Asian political units to an interna-
tional global system, ending the “autonomous
subregional interstate system.” It also led to the
rise of Japan from having semicolonial status
under various treaties to becoming almost an ally
of Britain and being considered the greatest East
Asian power (Alagappa 1998).
Countries in this region that were forced into
treaties for almost 100 years and subjected to
numerous scrambles of power among the Western
colonizers were significantly affected by Western
imperialism. The colonized regions experienced
exploitation by Western powers, a sense of inferi-
ority in their own land, and struggles for indepen-
dence. The rise, fall, and succession of precolonial
kingdoms were halted, and a new feature of colo-
nization emerged: the delineation of marked
boundaries between the states in place of natural
boundaries (viz. mountains, deserts, or seas).
With the expansion of European empires, the
global security pattern from the sixteenth century
onwards became less driven by local dynamics
and more subordinated to European rivalries.
Independent security dynamics were more or less
suppressed in the colonized part of the world.
Decolonization processes across the entire
Southeast Asian region occurred almost simulta-
neously, and by the time the countries in the
region recognized the changing balance of power
and sorted out their interrelationships, border
issues began to emerge and regional security pro-
tection dominated their foreign policy agenda.
19 S, Se Asia National Security
Most of these countries inherited some of the
colonial administrative system and tried to put an
indigenous spin on it. This was more visible in
the Philippines and to some extent Malaysia,
where independence was achieved more through
negotiation than struggle. On the other hand, in
North Vietnam, where Ho Chi Minh and his revo-
lutionary party snatched power away from the
French, the newly independent country attempted
to form its own governmental policy. Indonesia
and Cambodia tried reinstating the traditional
system that existed before colonization, with
some necessary changes. The ASEAN states,
however, recognized that rivalry among them
would undermine their fragile domestic political
structure. The smaller states thus reduced their
security threats, except of course Vietnam, with
its continued occupation of Laos and Cambodia.
At this stage, the United States intervened and
sponsored the creation of a regional alliance, the
Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO),
with the purpose of coordinating separate
military forces into a collective defense of the
member countries. It also became a collective
security arrangement that enabled noncommunist
South Asian countries to block the international
communist regime. Although the USA apparently
sponsored the SEATO treaty to save Laos,
Cambodia, Thailand, and Vietnam from Chinese
communism, these three countries could not
become members due to international agreements
made following the Indochina War. SEATO did
not achieve the desired result and was dissolved
in 1977 (Alagappa 1998, pp. 93–94).
One of the most significant results of decoloni-
zation in South Asia was the partition of India. The
religious and ethnic rivalry that began shortly
before partition in 1947 remains a major security
issue for both India and Pakistan. The internal
conflict between Hindus and Muslims that emerged
during the British Raj due to the British policy of
“divide and rule” has only grown in strength and
spread to become an international issue. The basic
bipolar structure and the defining enmity between
India and Pakistan have remained solid ever since,
surviving the partition of Pakistan in 1971 and
being reinforced by three inconclusive wars
285
(Buzan and Rizvi 1986). In fact, the India–Pakistan
situation is the main cause of military alliances
and nuclear weapons entering South Asia.
The newborn Pakistan failed to sustain demo-
cratic rule for long. After the death of the Muslim
League leader Jinnah, major differences persisted
among the successors concerning state-building
policies. The cultural differences and the distance
between East and West Pakistan were also a seri-
ous administrative hazard. After the failure of
several political leaderships, Ayub Khan brought
in military rule and entered into a military assis-
tance pact with the USA. However, in 1971 the
conflict became an open war in which India sup-
ported the cause of East Pakistan. Indian army
troops invaded East Pakistan, and the war ended
quickly with Pakistan’s withdrawal from East
Bengal and the birth of a new country named
Bangladesh.
Singapore was one of the last countries in the
region to become independent, and soon its small
size was outweighed by its economic and strategic
importance. Originally, the liberation of the coun-
try in 1963 came with the ethnic Malay Union
joining the Federation of Malaysia, but gradually
the Muslim Malay people became resentful of
Chinese domination and politics. Riots by minor-
ity Malays and political quarrels between
Singapore–Chinese and Malay politicians led to
the decision to separate from the federation and
form the independent island country of Singapore,
comprised of only 2 million people.
The mid-twentieth century was a major politi-
cal transition period for South and Southeast
Asian countries, and strategies to bring in stabil-
ity and security were considered from various
angles. ASEAN was set up in 1967 with the sole
purpose of establishing healthy international rela-
tions in postdecolonized Southeast Asia and other
member countries. Furthermore, member coun-
tries signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation
in Southeast Asia—an agreement that spelled out
the principles of the countries’ relations with one
another and specified the conduct of ASEAN’s
program for cooperation—at the first
ASEAN summit in Bali in February 1976
(ASEAN Official Website 2009).
286
The treaty envisaged these principles as the
foundation of a strong Southeast Asian commu-
nity. It stated that ASEAN “political and security
dialogue and cooperation should aim to promote
regional peace and stability by enhancing regional
resilience. And this resilience shall be achieved
by cooperation in all fields among the member
countries” (ASEAN Insurance Council 2009).
Today, ASEAN is also viewed as the most
effective tool to resolve the existing security cri-
ses and mediate peace talks. According to Agus
Wandi, in the Jakarta Post (August 13, 2010),
“I believe ASEAN has the potential to become an
effective regional body for crisis mediation and
prevention… The ASEAN Political Security
Community (APSC) blueprint provides a number
of recommendations for conflict management put
forward by the institution… Among them is a
cohesive, peaceful, stable and resilient region
with shared responsibility for a comprehensive
state of security” (Wandi 2010).
Although the Southeast Asian countries are
geared for peace talks and compromises intended
to promote a stable, secure, and nonconflictive
existence, the issue of intervention by non-
ASEAN countries in the peace process has been
controversial. ASEAN members are also con-
sidering the economic surge of a country in rela-
tion to the security threat presented by
neighboring countries. The South Asian coun-
tries have been having a continuous dialogue
among themselves as well as with other non-
South Asian countries about protection of
regional and national security. The South Asian
Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)
was established in 1985 with an objective of
“promoting peace, stability, amity and progress
in the region through strict adherence to the
principles of United Nations charter and non-
alignment” (SAARC 2009).
National and international security analyses
today have different parameters than in colonial
and precolonial eras. The superpowers are no
longer considered dominating, although their
interference exists in several regions. South and
Southeast Asian countries have joined in the race
to achieve nuclear power, albeit with an amount
of uncertainty about its use. The post-world war
K. Raj et al.
Geneva Protocol is frequently violated, as is the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
China’s growing influence in the region and in
the world is a major factor in security consider-
ations in this region. China’s security relations
with other countries have undergone significant
change over the last two decades. “Modernization”
and “reform and open door” policies were adopted
to boost economic growth. This timely reform in
policy led to China’s economic supremacy today.
China has made it clear to the world that the eco-
nomic reforms and enhancement are here to stay
irrespective of any political changes.
Another change in China’s national security
frontier is its new attitude towards international-
ism. Although this change could be the result of
economic supremacy, the Chinese leaders have
gradually started viewing the international
system as an opportunity, rather than a source
of anarchy or danger. Particularly after the
Tiananmen Square incident of 1989, China has
been actively working towards gaining support of
the ASEAN countries to resist exclusion on
human rights grounds. The reciprocation from
the ASEAN countries, acknowledging “China’s
right to handle its own internal problems” (Jie
1993, p. 162), greatly encouraged the Chinese
international system and suppressed the fear of
isolation.
Territorial security threats for China come
mainly from the two border regions of Tibet and
Xinjiang, although another concern is the ongo-
ing strained relations with Taiwan, regarding its
sovereign status. The tension in the Taiwan straits
has decreased over time, and prospects of cross
straits relations seem to be improving. Both coun-
tries signed treaties in 2008 to address issues of
direct sea links and other peacekeeping policies.
Moreover, the past decade has seen almost all
ASEAN countries signing economic treaties with
Taiwan and recognizing the country as an inde-
pendent, economically growing entity, separate
from China. A major influencing factor in the
current “status quo” being accepted by China is
the presence of a substantial Chinese community
in the ASEAN zone. China’s leaders are aware
that despite being made up of residents of differ-
ent countries, the Chinese population in Southeast
19 S, Se Asia National Security
Asia identifies itself to a large extent with the
culture and tradition of the People’s Republic of
China (PRC).
The South China Sea presents China with a
maritime threat, since this vast expanse of sea
today has almost no part left unclaimed. Given
the importance of the sea route for moving cargo
among the Western, Middle Eastern, and Asian
countries, almost all countries in the region have
taken over part of the Spratly Islands. The
resources available in the islands are plentiful
and a source of economic competition among all
ASEAN countries. Although China claims that
the Spratlys have been a part of the Han Dynasty
since 200 BC, Vietnam argues that until the six-
teenth century, China had recognized Vietnamese
sovereignty over the Spratly Islands. This matter
continues to be a major security issue between
the two countries.
Broadly, Chinese leaders have recognized the
benefits of regional and global cooperation as
well as international interdependence for the
overall development of the country and national
peace. China’s security practices are expected to
undergo further changes in the future in service
of the goal of becoming a stronger power with a
greater vested interest in international stability
(Xinbo 1998). This purpose will continue to exert
a major influence on perceptions of security for
those living in South and Southeast Asia. A brief
recent historical summary follows, describing
how national security threats are identified and
tackled by the countries whose citizens’ voices
are represented in exploratory data gathered in
this region.
India
“The dominant power in South Asia and the larg-
est democracy of 60 years standing can be con-
sidered a testing ground of the relationship
between democracy and violence, where govern-
ments are placed uncomfortably between the
promise of freedom and the threat of violence”
(Austin and Gupta 1990, p. 91). This statement
offers an important picture of ongoing national
security issues in India. The independent India
287
arrived into the international arena around the
time of the “Cold War.” Having previous experi-
ence with foreign powers taking advantage of a
situation of internal conflict, India maintained a
neutral position during that period. The wars with
its neighbor, Pakistan, confirmed its fear that the
border dispute would take time to settle.
Even after gaining independence, India
continued using the term “defense” and not
“security,” to reflect its principal concerns in the
international arena, and this concept of “defense”
remained a highly confidential matter not openly
discussed in public. The Indian defeat in the 1962
China war, followed by the wars with Pakistan,
made the government realize that although
materially Indian “defense” or security was ade-
quate, they lacked the expertise and techniques
required to plan a long-term strategy of national
security and be prepared for external threats.
Faced with two major external threats, as well as
indigenous regional disputes, Indian security
thinkers extended the concept of national
security to include stringent territory protection,
strengthened international relations, military
power improvement, and stabilized internal
unity.
Indian security threats can be classified into
two major folds: core and contemporary. The
Kashmir issue leading to India–Pakistan conflict
and the Sino–Indian border issue with China are
India’s two core territorial threats. What began as
a rift between Hindu and Muslim communities
has now shaped into a full-scale international
conflict. Although India’s stand on the issue is
that Kashmir is predominantly part of India,
Pakistan maintains that Kashmir is a disputed ter-
ritory. In fact, the issue is extended further today
to suspicions of terrorism instigated by Pakistan.
For the past decade, peace talks have taken place
between the two countries with no resolution
having been reached so far. In the meantime, the
issue is also taking shape as part of a pan-Islamic
insurgence, being fuelled by Middle Eastern and
other vested interest foreign powers.
The Sino–Indian border issue, which began
with the Aksai Chin area near Tibet, has sub-
sided since the 1962 war, and both the countries
are maintaining the line of control with only
288
occasional disputes. India also recognizes the
fact that economically, China is gaining suprem-
acy in the world, and it would be better to cooper-
ate with such a developing neighbor than to
compete. With a proactive exchange of diplo-
matic, cultural, economic, and technological
ideas, India can benefit from avoiding conflict
with China as well as building up good relations
with other ASEAN and Western countries.
Contemporary threats for India come from
internal conflicts, politicizing of religious and
ethnic issues, lack of a sufficient maritime secu-
rity system, and wavering economic policies.
India’s internal order is threatened mainly by
“separatism, illegal migration, religious conflicts
and caste tensions” (Bajpai 1998). The country
has been dealing with these internal disorders at
times by force and at times by conceding to right-
ful demands of the minorities.
India needs to recognize that it is one of the
dominant superpowers in South Asia and thus
must take a lead in economic and technology
development, first within the country and then
within the region. The economic growth that
began in the 1990s faced serious setbacks by the
end of the century, due to the unstable political
situation. The process is frequently disturbed
because of several flaws in India’s political and
economic policies. A qualitative shift in the for-
mation and implementation of the policies needs
to take place.
A major threat to the national security of India
comes from its coastline. There is a definite lack
of a system to prevent intrusion from the coastal
area, and the maritime security needs beefing up.
As quoted by Admiral Suresh Mehta in his
address in New Delhi on August 10, 2009, “Our
long and porous coastline and several island ter-
ritories, many of which are uninhabited, offer
avenues for infiltration of men and material into
our heartland, as well as safe havens for clandes-
tine activities. Intrusions via the sea are extremely
difficult to prevent with our current state of mate-
rial and organizational preparedness, as we were
rudely shocked to realize, when the perpetrators
of the Mumbai terror attacks of 26 November
2008 breached the shores of Mumbai with impu-
nity” (Mehta 2009, p. 4).
K. Raj et al.
However, India has progressed well in its
resource of nuclear energy. While it is not yet a
signatory to the CTBT, India justifies her nuclear
proliferation on the grounds that neighboring
countries are equally equipped. “India’s empha-
sis on self reliance has assigned a significant role
to the development of indigenous science and
technology of which the dual use of technology
of nuclear energy is an offshoot” (Ghosh 1997).
The Gulf War and the display of highly modern-
ized defense techniques by the USA in the region
also spurred India and Pakistan to sharpen their
nuclear strength.
On the international front, India also feels the
threat of foreign policy autonomy or political and
diplomatic threat from the US and US-led institu-
tions. While the IMF has already warned India to
reduce its military cost, the UN could have an
interfering role in the Kashmir issue. While eco-
nomic power in the world today is distributed
mostly within the Asian region, the Indian fear
factor lies in the fact that the USA still leads the
military and international coalition powers. To
combat this fear, India has developed interna-
tional relations with almost all Pacific, African,
EU, and Asian countries. A member of ARF and
APEC, India is seeking a permanent seat in the
UN Security Council. India’s emergence as a
super economic power in South Asia is also help-
ing the overall feeling of regional security.
Kanti Bajpai describes India’s security prac-
tices in Stephen Krasner’s terms of “modified
structuralism” (Bajpai 1998, p. 157). Though
external security is being given sufficient attention,
there is a need to come up with a country-specific
module. To manage such a huge democracy, India
needs to build highly intelligent think tanks to cope
with external as well as internal security issues.
Stabilizing internal conflicts needs to be the top-
most priority for Indian national security, followed
by sustainable economic development.
Indonesia
Indonesia is one of the countries that fought a
revolutionary war against the colonial powers
and is therefore protective about its sovereignty
19 S, Se Asia National Security
and independence. During the Cold War, the
Indonesian government, like India, did not enter
into any alliance for fear of domination by super-
powers. Indonesian sentiments were similar to
India’s with respect to nonalignment. The postin-
dependence concept of national security as “com-
plete independence from outside forces” has
lately been replaced with “healthy relations with
the neighboring countries.”
However, while Indonesia’s external relation-
ships improved with the ASEAN countries and
India, its regional outlook remained the same, as
did its attitude towards the West.
Nonalignment was maintained with the USA
and its allies. NAM (nonalignment movement)
was the brainchild of Indonesia and India, and
Indonesia played a comparatively more active role
in NAM than in ASEAN. Maintaining harmony in
the ASEAN group was essential for preventing
any external threat to the country from neighbor-
ing ASEAN countries, specifically Malaysia.
The apprehension of external influence in internal
disputes has never left the Indonesian conscious-
ness, and this fact is what most likely makes the
country strongly committed to the Zone of Peace,
Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) treaty.
Relations with China have improved since
1990. Political relations are warmer, and trade
links between the two countries have developed
at a rapid pace (Anwar 1993). However, fear of
communism still persists marginally. Moreover,
the Spratly Islands issue, though not directly
affecting Indonesia, is a matter that the country
would like to see settled peacefully, since it is
also a beneficiary of the resources from the SEA
islands in the South China Sea.
East Timor issues have been a major cause of
concern for Indonesia’s internal resistance as
well as for external human rights critiques. This
is an area where the government’s economic
strategy has not been able to win loyalists. Anti-
integration protests, more recently by students
and academic groups, have made the government
recognize that political situations cannot always
be resolved by the use of force. The country faced
major threats from the USA on humanitarian
grounds on this issue, and the United States
289
Department of State’s Human Rights Report for
2003 rated the Indonesian government’s human
rights record as “poor” and noted that Indonesia
has “continued to commit serious abuses” (U.S.
Department of State et al. 2004).
The Indonesian government has been main-
taining very stringent control over the media, as
well as over social, political, and economic orga-
nizations, justifying this in the name of develop-
ment. Since the pace of development in the
country has not slackened, there has not been any
resistance from the general public except for a
small number of intellectuals. According to
Anwar, “the government’s socio-political control
over the population has been strengthened further
by the military’s so-called ‘dual function role’
which gives the military socio-political rights and
responsibilities alongside its purely defense role”
(Anwar 1998, p. 502). Since the primary national
security threat for the country comes from within,
this approach of the government seems to be
more relevant.
Laos
Like many South and Southeast Asian countries,
the area once known as French Indochina endured
colonial domination by the French for nearly a
century (1859–1954). From 1957 to 1975, Laos
was involved in the Second Indochina War (later
known as the Vietnam War) between communist
North Vietnam and the government of South
Vietnam, along with the USA and members of
the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO).
During that war, America recruited nearly 15,000
Hmong men to serve as soldiers on the Ho Chi
Minh Trail, to rescue downed pilots, guard sup-
ply trails, capture supplies heading to the Viet
Cong, gather intelligence for the army, and guard
radar sites (Jones 2009). During that war, America
recruited Hmong men to fight against the North
Vietnamese army, block the Ho Chi Minh Trail
and capture supplies heading to the Viet Cong
(Ooi 2004).
According to a United Nations Security
Council report (United Nations Security
290
Council 2007), Laos (the “Lao People’s
Democratic Republic”) has established cordial
relations with neighboring countries, including
China, Myanmar, Vietnam, Thailand, and
Cambodia, although its relations with these
countries have not always been without conflict
in the post-Vietnam War era. There are agree-
ments among these nations to respect each oth-
er’s borders and cooperate in the fight against
terrorism. The primary human rights concern in
Laos appears to be the treatment of Hmong res-
idents (considered to belong to no country),
particularly the Hmong refugees forcibly
returned to Laos from Thailand (Amnesty
International 2011).
Malaysia
The concept of national security in Malaysia has
gone through different levels of policy changes
for internal as well as external security. The pres-
ent-day concept includes factors pertaining to
political, military, economic, social, and cultural
dimensions. To keep national security intact, the
federal government keeps a tight control over
policy matters of finance, foreign policy, and
state territorial issues, and profederal state gov-
ernments are duly supported. The multiethnic
population of Malaysia sets it apart, because it is
a country where the local Malay comprise only
around half (53%) of the total population, fol-
lowed by Chinese, Indian, Sri Lankan, and other
nationalities making up the 47% balance.
One significant impact of the Cold War on the
national security of Malaysia was the shift of
importance to “interest of the state” rather than
the “interest of political regime”, which was the
situation earlier. Internal security occupies prime
importance for the Malaysian government, keep-
ing in mind the ethnic security threats. The con-
cept of “Bumiputera” (sons of the soil) has been
incorporated in the constitution of the country to
provide special rights and privileges to indige-
nous Malay people and to quell their insecurity.
Malaysian security was often equated with Malay
security until around 1990. In view of the social
K. Raj et al.
influence of the non-Malay population, new
political and economic policies have mended the
gap to some extent. To quote one Malaysian
political activist, “the classification of Malaysians
into Bumiputeras and non-Bumiputeras has long
been an issue of contention in our political arena.
Perhaps no other issue divides our people as
much as this one” (Nathan 1998, p. 520). Along
with the Bumiputera concept, the Malaysian gov-
ernment also propagates a secular form of
“Islam,” and Islam is the “official religion” as per
the constitution.
The regional security vicinity of Malaysia is
comprised of territorial waters, airspace, the
exclusive economic zone (EEZ), the straits
of Malacca and its approaches, the straits of
Singapore, and the sea and air lines of
communication connecting Peninsular Malaysia
and Sabah and Sarawak (GlobalSecurity.org
2009). Like other ASEAN countries, Malaysia
shares sea and land boundaries with other coun-
tries in the South China Sea, and territorial pro-
tection is a priority for the country. However,
growing trade links with the world, foreign-
funded projects, and international interdepen-
dence have widened the regional security concept
of Malaysia. Since the separation of Singapore
from the federation of Malaysia, relations between
the two countries have significantly improved,
specifically through ASEAN. Both countries
adopted measures to build better relations, includ-
ing frequent visits by dignitaries and agreements
for interdependence and cooperation. The result
has been encouraging over the past two decades.
Development of military strength and defense
mechanisms has been prioritized to keep
pace with the changing security patterns. Both
Malaysia and Singapore are members of the Five
Power Defense Arrangement (FPDA), consisting
of the UK, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia,
and Singapore, which provides defense, coopera-
tion, and support against any external attack with
a continuous presence of British military in the
region. Malaysia is also committed to the UN
Charter and believes in adopting policies and sys-
tems to deter hostility and conflict arising inter-
nally as well as outside the Malaysian territory.
19 S, Se Asia National Security
Future national security challenges for
Malaysia include maintaining the progress made
thus far towards national unity by keeping proper
balance in the regional policies catering to its
multicultural population, while simultaneously
going ahead with a successful economic prosper-
ity agenda with required support from the neigh-
boring and international world.
Pakistan
Over the past 63 years, independent Pakistan has
gone through democratic as well as military rule
and sustained several internal crises in addition to
external pressures. While the basic issues continue
relating to the borders with India and Kashmir,
internal law and order and political disruptions are
another deterrent to security measures, despite the
country’s strong military strength and efficient
security apparatus. The presence of a large popu-
lation of Afghans in Pakistan has created an inter-
national belief that Pakistan is providing a
sanctuary for rebel Afghans. In addition to the
security threat, this is also an economic burden.
Religion has been politicized several times by the
ruling authority to gain domestic support. Even in
the case of the major external threat from India,
religious leaders are exploiting local sentiments.
“Though there is indeed a deep distrust in Pakistan
of its more powerful and ambitious neighbor, the
Indian ‘threat’ has also been used by unrepresen-
tative regimes as an expedient tool to attain
domestic ascendancy, to control the state’s
resources and to defuse internal opposition”
(Ahmed 1998, p.342).
The ample availability of arms and weapons
among civilians is another major threat that the
country faces. Both USA and China have been
regular arms suppliers to Pakistan. In 2004,
Pakistan signed a treaty with the USA that pro-
vides for US military equipment and cooperation
(see globalsecurity.org). Internal threats for
Pakistan also come from the conflict between the
two Islamic groups, “Shia” and “Sunni,” espe-
cially in the provinces of Punjab and Sind.
291
Pakistan’s stance is that its nuclear develop-
ment is a defense mechanism against India’s
nuclear proliferation. In recent years, however,
after the nuclear and counter nuclear prolifera-
tion of India and Pakistan in 1998 and the war-
like situation between the countries, Pakistan has
reassured the international world about its new
nuclear security program, and US officials have
also vouched for it. However, in view of a series
of unstable governments, the threat of the take-
over and use of nuclear weapons by radical
extremists continues to be a cause for concern.
The US Central Command testified on March 31,
2009, that “Pakistani state failure would provide
transnational terrorist groups and other extremist
organizations an opportunity to acquire nuclear
weapons and a safe haven from which to plan
and launch attack” (Kerr and Nikitin 2011).
However, President Obama in his 100th-day
briefing report reassured the world about
Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, hoping the country
and its army would recognize the hazards of the
weapons falling into wrong hands (Cooper and
Zeleny 2009).
There is also a strong belief among the inter-
national world that Pakistan is providing a safe
haven to the Taliban, Al Qaeda, and other
extremist insurgents. During his speech in July
2007, then US President Bush brought interna-
tional attention to this fact when he said, “the
country’s sixteen Intelligence agencies agree
that the main reason for the Al Queda’s renewed
ability to strike the American homeland is its
safe haven in Pakistan” (National Security
Network 2007).
In view of the diminishing economic situation
of the country, continuous internal conflicts, and
the apprehensive attitudes of the international
community, Pakistan needs to reassess its national
security concepts. In his book entitled Rethinking
National Security of Pakistan, Dr. Ahmed Faruqi
has analyzed Pakistan’s military, economic, and
societal data in detail and stressed the need for
Pakistan to come up with a revised, integrated,
and homogenous national security concept
(Faruqi 2003).
292
Philippines
The primary national security threat for the
Philippines comes from within rather than from
outside. The primary issue has always been the
question of administrative strategies or policies
adopted by the government in the interests of
society and individuals. The pattern of feudal
land grants established by Spanish colonization
had its effect, both during and after American
colonization. National security aligned with secu-
rity of landed interests for quite some time.
The Philippines faces internal threats mainly
from the Moro National Liberation Front
(MNLF), Communist Party of the Philippines
(CPP), and the New People’s Army (NPP).
Over the years, all the political parties in
power have attempted to settle the issue in differ-
ent ways, but no significant progress has yet been
made.
Various attempts by the government and Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to create any kind
of stability with the use of force have resulted in
serious criticism by the UN Human Rights
Commission. The Department of National
Defense (DND) along with the AFP has estab-
lished goals and action plans for national security,
including the development and improvement of
institutional and military strength. However,
important aspects relating to the welfare of sol-
diers, professional training, promoting peace
talks, and prevention of terrorism have not been
effective, and the desired results have not yet been
achieved.
During the last decade, the CPP and MILF
insurgency has waned substantially, but internal
security is still threatened in the Philippines. The
government seems more focused on the external
symptoms of the unrest rather than the root cause.
Unfortunately, the military, which was given
substantial power and expanded to defend the
country, became a threat to the public and society
there. Moreover, it is not sufficiently equipped to
match the strength of militaries in neighboring
countries. The goals set by the DND in the
Philippines, however, are definitely not impossi-
ble and may be achieved with a better action
K. Raj et al.
plan. The ruling party can encourage more
public participation and seek support from neigh-
boring countries to reach the goal of providing
security.
Sri Lanka
There are variations in the concept of national
security between what the ruling government
perceives and what it means to Sri Lankan citi-
zens. While the security concept initially
remained limited to securing the territory’s mari-
time border from external forces in general, and
India in particular, the insurgence of ethnic Tamil
separatists enlarged the concept to cover internal
security. Since 1980, when the Tamil military
strength emerged as a serious threat combined
with the fear of India supporting the cause of
minority Tamil, the ruling government began
redefining the concept of national security.
The Tamil minority comprises around 13% of
the Sri Lankan population. This group has always
believed that the ruling government fails to con-
sider their requirements. A demand for a separate
state gave rise to the Tamil military and the ensu-
ing aggression. Since the Tamil militancy has
been centered on a certain part of the country,
the government adopted differing security
approaches to safeguard different areas of the
country. The southern part was protected from
terrorists, and the northern part from Tamil guer-
rilla military insurgence. Boundaries were pro-
tected from external threat (Wickramasinghe
1998, p. 376). However, there has recently been a
shift in the concept of national security. During a
press briefing in early 2010, the government
defense spokesperson Minister Kikila admitted
that a postwar review of the defense plan had
exposed security issues that needed urgent atten-
tion (Banyan News Reporters 2010). A more
recent declaration on August 9, 2010, by the
Minister of Media and Mass Communication
Keheliya Rambukwella that “the national secu-
rity would not be compromised” also gives an
indication of the direction the government is tak-
ing. His further remark that “instead of a separate
homeland, they [Tamil separatists] now want to
19 S, Se Asia National Security
support the Government to develop the country
to ensure a future for the Tamils” raises hopes of
future stability in the island (Sriyananda 2010).
Perspectives on National Security
in the South and Southeast Asian
Sample
The Sample
The South and Southeast Asian national security
sample included 750 participants composed of
relatively equal numbers of males (51%) and
females (45%). The most common participant
nationalities were India (31%), Philippines
(34%), and Malaysia (20%). In addition, there
were 55 participants from Pakistan (7%), 26 from
Indonesia (4%), 24 from Laos (3%), and 10 from
Sri Lanka (1%).
Most of the sample indicated that their child-
hood religion was either Christianity (40%),
Islam (29%), or Hinduism (24%). In addition,
seven participants reported that they were raised
as Buddhists (1%), 6 in “other” or unspecified
faiths, and two as agnostics or atheists. One indi-
vidual reported having been raised in Judaism.
Most of those who described their childhood
religion as Christian indicated either that they
were Roman Catholics (32%) or members of
unspecified Protestant denominations (4%). Most
of those raised as Muslim either indicated that
they were Sunni (7%) or did not specify.
In regard to their current religion, 39% of the
sample indicated that they were Christians, 146
that they were Hindus (19%), and 87 that they
were Muslims (12%). Four participants described
themselves as currently Buddhist (1%), 2 as
members of unspecified “other” religions (1%),
and 16 as atheists, agnostics, or otherwise
nonreligious (2%). Of those who noted that their
current religion was Christianity, most either
identified themselves as Roman Catholics (28%)
or as members of unspecified Protestant denomi-
nations (4%). Of those who reported that they
were Muslims, most either identified themselves
as Sunni (7%) or did not specify. Thus, overall,
the number of respondents identifying themselves
293
as Muslims declined somewhat from childhood
to adulthood, whereas the number of respondents
identifying as Christian increased from childhood
to adulthood.
With regard to socioeconomic class, most par-
ticipants were self-described members of the
middle class (46%), with 97 participants identify-
ing as working class (13%), and 185 identifying
as upper-middle class (25%). Thirty-two described
themselves as “upper class” (4%) and 39 identified
themselves as “lower class” (5%). Fifty partici-
pants did not specify their socioeconomic status.
A majority of the sample (86%) noted that
they had not served in the military. Thirty-three
participants (4%) had a military service record.
Seventy-three (10%) failed to specify whether
they had a history of military service. Sixty-one
percent had no family members currently in mili-
tary service. However, a larger number of indi-
viduals reported having relatives who had served
in the military (21%); 135 respondents did not
specify whether or not they had relatives in the
military.
Participants completed the PAIRTAPS
survey, described earlier in this volume (Malley-
Morrison et al. 2006). They were recruited
through a variety of nonprobability sampling
methods, including snowballing, convenience
samples, and posting a survey link on a number of
websites. The two items considered for analysis
in this chapter were “National security is essential
for individual and family security” (ranked on a
scale from 1 = total disagreement to 7 = total
agreement) and “The best way to achieve security
for individuals and families throughout the world
is….” To analyze the qualitative responses, a cod-
ing manual was developed using grounded theory
techniques. All responses were broken into code-
able units to identify specific social-cognitive
themes. Additional information about this process
appears throughout the volume.
Southeast Asian Perspectives: Is
National Security Necessary?
Sixty-nine percent of the responses affirmed the
view that national security is necessary for family
294 K. Raj et al.

and individual security. Thirty-six percent of the
total set of responses expressed a nonspecific
belief in the value of national security for protect-
ing individuals and families. A further 17% of the
total responses indicated a belief that national
security and family and individual security
were intrinsically linked. Among the responses
endorsing the dependence of individual and
family security on national security, 16% of the
total responses referred to specific threats to
security and the need for protection; these
included both internal and external types of
threats. See Table 19.1 for examples of responses
in national security coding categories.
In contrast, 8% of the total responses
suggested that national security was not
important for family and individual security. A
few responses (approximately 1% of the total)
indicated that national security was not desirable
because it led to negative consequences, includ-
ing the potential for deception by the government
which accounted for 10% of responses disagree-
ing with national security. Responses coded for
negative consequences generally made reference
to the role of political authority in limiting personal
freedom. Finally, 3% of all responses indicated
that national security was not important for family
and individual security because the concept of
national security was illusory. (See Table 19.2 for
additional examples of arguments against the
essentiality of national security).
Thirteen percent of the responses expressed
contingent or partial agreement with the neces-
sity of national security. These responses differ
from the general “agreement” and “disagreement”
categories in that they expressed mixed opinions
regarding national security. Approximately 5%
of these responses indicated that although national
security could be useful, better alternatives
existed. Approximately 1% of all responses
mentioned the potential of a focus on national
security for infringing on individual rights and
freedoms. One percent of all responses indicated
that national security was useful, but did not jus-
tify or warrant certain measures, or was not
enough to guarantee individual and family
security, or was not necessary for protecting
family and individual security. (See Table 19.3 for
additional examples of contingent agreement.)
Table 19.4 lists both the total number of
responses in each category and the percent of the
total responses in each coding category.

Table 19.1 Sample “agree” responses for “National Security is Essential for Family and Individual Security”
Age Gender Nationality Category Response
53 M India General agreement “If the nation is not secure, the
individual cannot feel secure”
32 F Pakistan Intrinsically tied “If national security is not there,
none of the individuals can be
secure”
21 – Indonesia To protect against external or general “guard country from invasion
threats/to protect against internal and slavery”
threats
Note: M male, F female, (–) information not available

Table 19.2 Sample “disagree” responses for “National Security is Essential for Family and Individual Security”
Age Gender Nationality Category Response
28 M India General disagreement “Peace is essential for that”
20 F Philippines Government deception “themselves cause the removal
of security”
53 M Pakistan Is an illusion/impossible “National security is defined by
select interest groups, nothing to
do with vast majority of people”
Note: M male, F female
19 S, Se Asia National Security 295

Table 19.3 Sample “conditional agreement” responses for “National Security is Essential for Family and Individual
Security”
Age Gender Nationality Category Response
29 M India General conditional “Only if there’s not enough trust so
agreement that people actually need security”
27 F India Better ways/proposed “if you got rid of weapons!”
alternatives
21 F Philippines Restricts individual “yes, but when it is abused, it
freedoms/rights threatens the safety of the family. It
should be used to strike the balance”
Note: M male, F female

Table 19.4 Percentages of themes for “National Security is Essential for Family
and Individual Security” (total responses)
Category n Percent
Agree 271 69
General agreement 139 36 (51)
Intrinsically tied 68 17 (25)
To protect against internal and external threats 46 16 (23)
Disagree 31 8
Government deception 3 <1 (10)
Is an illusion/impossible 12 3 (39)
Conditional agreement 51 13
General conditional agreement 14 4 (27)
Better alternatives 19 5 (37)
Restricts individual freedoms/rights 3 <1 (6)
Does not justify certain measures/unnecessary 7 1 (8)
Note: The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in
that category out of the total response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers
to the percent of responses in that category out of all the responses in the pronational
security, antinational security, and conditional agreement categories, respectively

Means for Achieving National Security
A large percentage of participants who answered
the question regarding the implementation of
national security believed that national security
was achievable through positive, prosocial, or
universalistic strategies: 79% of the responses
fell into one of these coding categories. Within
this set of responses, 26% invoked general
ethical or philosophical principles as essential to
achieving national security. These ethical or phil-
osophical principles included specific references
to responses indicating that the key principle for
achieving national security was (a) tolerance (7%
of the positive, prosocial, or universalistic strate-
gies); (b) some form of the “golden rule” (12% of
the positive, prosocial, or universalistic strategies);
or (c) “peace” (15% of the positive, prosocial, or
universalistic strategies).
By contrast, 15% of the responses regarding
the implementation of national security indicated
that national security was best achieved through
negative, protectionist, or interventionist poli-
cies. Over half of these responses (9% of all
responses, 59% of the negative, protectionist, or
interventionist policies) indicated that the best
course of action for ensuring national security is
through the use of force. For example, a 23-year-
old Malaysian man indicated that to achieve
national security it was necessary to “strengthen
the army system.” These findings are summarized
in Table 19.5.
296 K. Raj et al.

Table 19.5 Means for Category n Percent

achieving national security
Positive/universalistic/prosocial 362 79
(total responses)
Philosophical and ethical principles 93 20 (26)
Tolerance 27 6 (7)
Golden rule 42 9 (12)
Peace/nonviolence 55 12 (15)
Negative/protectionist/interventionist 28 6 (41)
Force 40 9 (59)
Note: The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses
in that category out of the total response set. The second number (in parentheses)
refers to the percent of responses in that category out of all the responses that
offered suggestions on how best to achieve national security

Table 19.6 National security is essential for individual and family security: percentages of responses in coding cate-
gories by demographic groups and chi-square values
Group 1a Group 2a
Categories Male Female c2
Family and individual security depends on national security 26 36 4.77*
Negative consequences 2 0 3.71^,b

Military Nonmilitary
Obsession with security/danger/instill fear 6 0.3 9.60^,b
*
p £ 0.05, 0.051 < p < 0.10
a
The numbers in these columns are the percent of the group that gave responses falling into each of the specified
categories
b
Fischer’s exact test

Southeast Asian Perspectives on “National Security is essential for family and

National Security: Exploratory
Demographic Analyses
In addition to determining the frequency of use for
particular response types, Pearson chi-square tests
for significance (two tailed) were also conducted
in order to examine the possibility of group differ-
ences based on participants’ demographic charac-
teristics (specifically gender and a record of
military service) in the frequency of use for par-
ticular response themes. These demographic char-
acteristics were selected to tap a wide range of
responses and to avoid forming premature conclu-
sions about participants’ religions, national identi-
ties, and socioeconomic status.
Gender and Military Service
Several statistically significant gender differences
were observed in the responses to the statement
individual security.” Specifically, chi-squares
revealed that women were significantly more
likely than men to give responses emphasizing
that family and individual security depends on
national security. Men were marginally more
likely than women to cite negative consequences
of national security. In response to this item, mar-
ginal differences were also found in the response
patterns of participants who had been in the mili-
tary as compared to participants who had not.
Respondents with military experience were mar-
ginally more likely than those without such expe-
rience to reject a concern with national security,
viewing such a concern as contributing to an
obsession with security and danger. Responses to
this item in coding categories by demographic
groups and chi-square values can be found in
Table 19.6.
Statistically significant differences between
men and women were also observed in the types
of responses to the statement “I believe that
19 S, Se Asia National Security
Table 19.7 Best way to achieve individual and family security right to invasion: percentages of responses in coding
categories by demographic groups and chi-square values
Categories
Recommending peace/peace tools
Force
Military
Recommending peace/peace tools 25
*
p £ 0.05, **p £ 0.01
a
The numbers in these columns are the percent of the group that gave responses falling into each of the specified
categories
b
Fischer’s exact test
national security is best achieved by….”
Chi-squares revealed that women were
significantly more likely than men to recommend
peace and peace tools, while men were
significantly more likely than women to empha-
size the use of force as a way to achieve national
security. In regard to military involvement, chi-
squares revealed that veterans were significantly
more likely than nonveterans to recommend
peace and peace tools. Responses to this item in
coding categories by demographic groups and
chi-square values can be found in Table 19.7.
Discussion
This chapter considers the views of ordinary
South and Southeast Asians regarding national,
individual, and family security, given the histori-
cal and political context of the region.
The data reported here did not come from a
representative probability sample of the region,
so results need to be considered cautiously; how-
ever, they give us a provocative sample of the
“voices” of ordinary citizens regarding issues of
national as well as individual security.
It appears that a significant majority of citi-
zens surveyed within South and Southeast Asia
consider national security important to defend
against both internal and external threats, and
interestingly, most of the respondents stressed
prosocial, tolerant, and peaceful means for reach-
ing security goals rather than forceful methods.
This perspective seems to reflect the objectives
of the SAARC treaty and ASEAN principles of
297
Group 1a Group 2a
Male Female c2
6 13 6.36*
13 6 6.87**
Nonmilitary
8 6.45*,b
promoting peace and healthy relations among the
countries in the region. All the countries consid-
ered in this chapter are considered to be develop-
ing economies, which could be a factor
influencing the opinions of the people surveyed.
The requirements and limitations of a developing
economy must be considered in regard to its
national security policy and its implementation.
In this regard, the smaller ASEAN nations may
consider it more economically viable to come to
amicable settlements over issues, instead of
resorting to force or oppression, particularly in
the face of more powerful neighbors like China
and India.
More than a third of the respondents expressed
their agreement with the notion that national
security was essential for individual and family
security without specifying how or why, while a
large number of respondents stated that individ-
ual security and national security are inextricably
related. Most of the responses that suggested pos-
itive methods for implementing national security
invoked ethical or philosophical principles as
important pathways towards achieving security.
As in other parts of Asia, gender appears to play
a role in views on national security and whether it is
important for family and individual security.
Responses suggesting that family and individual
security depends on national security were more
frequent among female respondents. This trend
reflects the strong sense of community in this
region, as well as the fact that women play an
important role in maintaining the sociocultural val-
ues. More male than female respondents focused
on the negative consequences of considering
298
national security as essential to individual and fam-
ily security. Regarding the best means for achieving
security, more male than female respondents sug-
gested that the use of direct military force against
perceived threats is the only way to ensure national
security. Although such a gender difference is open
to interpretation, it is worth further investigation,
because of the implications of such a difference for
issues of national security and policy.
Although the difference was only margin-
ally significant, respondents with a record of
military service more frequently suggested that
national security is not essential for family and
individual security and that there is too much
unnecessary focus on this issue, leading to an
obsession with danger. It is interesting to specu-
late on these findings. Perhaps individuals
who have served in the military view the
whole national security issue as interfering
with the progress towards peace that seems to be
an elusive goal for many people in the region,
and perhaps they see it as a governmental tool to
maintain anxiety and thereby gain support for
war efforts. Consistent with both of those inter-
pretations is the finding that significantly more
respondents with military experience than those
without experience recommended peace, and the
tools of peace, as the best ways to achieve national
security.
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 Views on National Security
in East Asia 20
Hillary Mi-Sung Kim, Hwan Ho Lee, Nari Yoo,
Dong Youn Cho, Bryan Bonseok Koo, Alice Murata,
Andrea Jones-Rooy, and Michelle Murata

In modern times, state-centered and nationalistic
ideas on security have become dominant in many
parts of East Asia as several governments have
pursued autocratic and repressive policies in the
pursuit of securing regime and economic devel-
opment. This state-centered security orientation
follows the Machiavellian edict that the end
justifies the means, and orders the relations
between state and society (Alagappa 2003).
Concerns with national security and related ideas
concerning the relations between the state and
the outside world were lacking in East Asia dur-
ing the premodern period and emerged as a reac-
tion to imperialistic violence imposed by Chinese
dynasties, Japanese colonialism, and competitions
within East Asia among Western imperialistic
powers (Duara 2006). In order to provide a con-
text for the thinking of East Asians concerning
national, family, and individual security, this
chapter first addresses East Asia’s historical,
sociocultural, and economic backgrounds. Then,
current issues in this region are addressed.
State-Centered Culture in Historical
Context
Before East Asia became involved in imperialis-
tic competitions, security in the region was rein-
forced by the Chinese ideology of the “Mandate
of Heaven,” which imposed an order that origi-
nated with the Chinese Qin dynasty (221–206
BC) and lasted for more than 2,000 years, right
up to the mid-nineteenth century (Jun 2007). The
Mandate of Heaven is a concept concerning the
legitimacy of rulers; it legitimizes the rule of a
single centralized state, postulating that heaven
would bless the authority of one just ruler. There
is only one heaven; therefore, there could be only
one ruler. This China-centered East Asian politi-
cal order involved military alliances among the
different states, including the Chinese, Korean,
and Japanese dynasties. It also had a strong eco-
nomic base, in that Chinese dynasties provided
their advanced products and technologies (e.g.,
paper and Confucianism) to other East Asian
states in exchange for tribute and sometimes in
acknowledgement of submission. Sometimes, the
exchange was made bilaterally.
With regard to culture, the ruling classes of the
states under the feudal system imported
Confucianism, which had developed in China,
and then built their political cultures based on the
philosophy. They were also friendly with China,
a fact which could have contributed to the China-
centered regional order (Bhu 1991). States that
continue to be influenced by Confucianism
include China, Taiwan, Japan, North Korea,
South Korea, Singapore, and Vietnam. Among
the shared values of the East Asian states is the
Confucian moral tradition of familism, in which
a person’s concern for his or her own needs and
rights is always considered secondary to the good
of the family. Within this tradition, individual
rights are not deemed essential for human well-
being (Park and Shin 2006). Traditionally, this

K. Malley-Morrison et al. (eds.), International Handbook of War, Torture, and Terrorism, 301
Peace Psychology Book Series, DOI 10.1007/978-1-4614-1638-8_20,
© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2013
302
collectivistic familism has not only affected rela-
tions within families but has also worked to
define structures and functions of society in gen-
eral. The Confucian ideology has been one of the
important contributors to the expansion of collec-
tivistic familism beyond the family to the level of
the state. Confucianism claims that a state is an
enlarged form of family, which means that the
moral principles of father’s authority inherent in
the father–child relationship apply to the ruler–
citizen relationship in the same way (Yao 2000).
The expansion to the state level of Confucian fam-
ily virtues of filial piety, deference to the father
(O’Dwyer 2003), and family honor (Park and Shin
2003) requires citizens to be loyal to the ruler.
Adherence to these cultural values meant that
modernization in East Asian states followed a
different course than the one occurring in Western
states (Fox 1997), where the modernization
process has been driven by the philosophical
ideal of equality of individual rights (O’Dwyer
2003). The different East Asian states have also
differed among themselves in the process of mod-
ernizing; however, one commonality across the
states is the lack of citizen power and the domina-
tion of the state rather than civil society in eco-
nomic development (Kim 1997). At the same time,
as these state-centered economic policies com-
bined with Confucian collectivistic familism, the
interests of the state as a whole received more
emphasis than individual rights. The combination
of Confucian ideology with centralized economic
power was accompanied by the expectation that
citizens would play a passive political role in deci-
sion-making (O’Dwyer 2003) and would define
their interests in terms of the interest of the state to
which they belonged (Park and Shin 2006).
Confucianism has had both positive and nega-
tive influences on modern East Asian states. It is
widely agreed that the ideology puts an emphasis
on collectivism and encourages devotion to col-
lective values (Yang 2005). Accordingly, leaders
in East Asia believe that enforcing security at the
level of the state can engender environments in
which individuals can live safely (Lee 1999). In
their view, expanding individual rights—such as
by extending concealed weapons permits—can
bring about social problems, including violence.
H. Mi-Sung Kim et al.
This belief can lead to policies overriding human
rights. Additionally, East Asians, who have seen
the fracturing of countries (e.g., North and South
Korea, China and Taiwan) over differing ideolo-
gies and have no modern experience of regional
security collaboration, tend to see any emphasis
on individual security over national security as a
potential threat to security.
Emergence of Nationalistic Ideas in the
Context of Imperialistic Competitions
Along with Confucianism, another major factor
influencing the evolution of the East Asian states
is nationalism. According to Park (2005), nation-
alism has an exclusivist nature and tends to be
apparent when sovereignty is threatened or when
territorial disputes are stimulated by another
state’s policy. The exclusivity of the nationalism
in East Asian states is closely related to their
experiences of imperialistic violence executed by
Western imperialistic powers, the United States,
Russia, and Japan. It is also related to the strong
national and cultural identity of each state.
China has a long, proud history as the world’s
oldest major world civilization, and Sinocentrism
was popular among Chinese elites up to the Qing
dynasty. In contemporary China, the old orienta-
tion towards Sinocentrism may be taking the
form of asserting Chinese significance and
supremacy at the expense of other nations
(Townsend 1992; Zhao 2004). The 2008 Tibetan
unrest, to be discussed further in a later section,
was partially attributed to Sinocentrism. Korea,
for its part, has a strong sense of national and cul-
tural identity based on its long history, extending
from the era of Three Kingdoms of Korea (57
BC–668 CE) until today, as well as pride in its
economic recovery from the ruins of the Korean
War (1950–1953) and its struggle for democracy
against an autocratic military regime (1961–
1993). Nationalism in Korea first developed as a
form of resistance against Japanese colonialism
and has since been exploited by political and eco-
nomic leaders whenever the state has been faced
with internal or external crises. Sometimes, it has
also arisen spontaneously from the citizens. For
20 East Asia National Security
example, during the 1997 Asian financial crisis
(the so-called International Monetary Fund cri-
sis), South Korean citizens voluntarily donated
their own funds to the state in order to pay the
foreign debt. More than 21 billion dollars was
amassed through individual donations from about
349 million citizens.
The early China-centered East Asian national
security order ended as Western imperialism was
imposed on East Asian states by the mid-nineteenth
century. Moreover, in contrast to other East Asian
states, Japan created its own colonies throughout
the Pacific at the end of the nineteenth century, jus-
tifying its expansion under the propaganda of “Asia
for the Asians” (against Western imperialism)
(Page et al. 2009). The East Asian situation dur-
ing the period from the mid-nineteenth to the
mid-twentieth century can be defined by the com-
petition and conflicts among imperialistic states,
including Britain and other European powers, the
USA, Russia, and Japan.
As had been feared by Western imperialistic
powers, Japan made advances in winning colo-
nies during this age of imperialism (Murata et al.
2009). Their advances were possible because
Japan had modernized its state and adapted the
latest military and technological developments
from foreign countries during the Meiji period
(1868–1912), while other East Asian states
remained in the feudal system, fearing the spread
of Christianity and keeping a closed-door policy
toward the West (Jones-Rooy and Wu 2009).
Eventually, Qing dynasty in China was disman-
tled, going through the Opium Wars (1839–1860)
and the Sino–Japanese War (1894–1895), with
Britain gaining control over Hong Kong and the
New Territories under a 99-year lease and Meiji
Japan taking control over Korea and Formosa.
Japan also took control over the southern half of
Sakhalin Island after the Russo–Japanese War
(1904–1905) and further expanded its imperial-
ism over the Pacific, Hong Kong, Burma,
Thailand, Indonesia, and Philippines (Jones-Rooy
and Wu 2009; Lee 2009; Murata et al. 2009).
Until the end of World War II (1939–1945),
national and regional security in East Asia was
frequently influenced by the alliances and some-
times the competitions among European powers,
303
the USA, and Japan. Pervasive imperialism then
brought about World War II, ending with the
American dropping of atomic bombs on
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan, as a response to
Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor. During the subse-
quent Cold War (1947–1991), East Asian states
continued to feel the impact on their national
security of competitions between the powers of
the Western world and the Soviet Union. These
experiences made it difficult for East Asian states
to strike a balance between national security and
individual security on the one hand and human
rights on the other (Kim 2004).
Awareness of Individual Security
in the Context of Democracy
and Economic Growth
In recent decades, economic progress in East
Asian states has led to pressures for democratic
decision-making procedures, respect for human
rights, redistribution of wealth, and social welfare.
At an early stage of modernization, citizens of
East Asian countries observed the tendency of
their governments to emphasize the state’s secu-
rity over individual rights or security (Duara
2006). This tendency resulted from the conjunc-
tion of the collectivistic familism and Confucian
heritage defining the dynamics between ruler and
citizens, as well as the state-dominated economic
development policies enacted for the good of the
state. However, the growth of civil society and
the integration of East Asian states into the global
system through personal and material exchanges
increased the pressure to respect human rights
and democratic procedures both inside and out-
side of the states. The examples of three East
Asian countries—Japan, South Korea, and
China—are addressed below.
Japan adopted Western democracy in 1947
(Murata et al. 2009), earlier than other East Asian
states. Following its successful state-led indus-
trial policies, which achieved $15,000 per capita
GDP in the 1970s, various forms of activities led
by student and labor activists led to citizens’
requests for improvements in individual liberties
and rights. Indeed, these activities resulted in
304
amendments of Japan’s Labor Union Act, which
prevents abusive dismissal and protects employ-
ment security (Tsuneki and Matsunaka 2008). On
the other hand, Japan’s slow economic growth in
the period starting in the late 1990s contributed to
momentum supporting the need for the country
to foster the good of the state over individual
desires (Rozman 2002).
Somewhat similarly to Japan, South Korea also
achieved rapid economic growth through state-
oriented economic policies (Jang and Kim 2004).
While prioritizing economic growth, the military
dictatorship ignored basic human rights, such as
workers’ rights, and democratic procedures were
not practiced well into the late 1980s (Kim et al.
2009). In reaction to state violations against human
rights and democratic principles, many democra-
tization movements occurred, such as the Kwangju
democratization movement. Nevertheless, South
Korea has successfully demonstrated its ability to
secure democracy by transferring power peace-
fully three times (CIA 2010). Under these circum-
stances, its active civil society may improve the
quality of democracy.
In contrast to Japan and South Korea, China
adopted a socialist system after World War II,
and its civil society barely had any autonomy
(Cohen 1987). China has experienced several
democratization movements, none of which have
resulted in dramatic social changes, but seem to
have led to increased citizen awareness concern-
ing democratic systems. Also in contrast to Japan
and South Korea, the ruling communist regime
rejected the tradition of patriarchy, viewing it as a
remnant of feudalism. This policy has allowed
China to achieve relatively greater equality
between men and women faster than has hap-
pened in other East Asian states, despite an abid-
ing preference for boys in the country, related in
part to the one-child policy.
According to the World Economic Forum’s
2009 Global Gender Gap Index, China had the
highest rank in East Asia; overall, it was ranked
60th out of 134 countries, as compared, for exam-
ple, with Japan, which ranked 101st and South
Korea with a 115th ranking. Regarding Western
countries, the report ranks Iceland 1st, Sweden
4th, Germany 9th, Canada 12th, France 17th, and
the United States 18th.
H. Mi-Sung Kim et al.
China is the world’s fastest-growing major
economy and at present is the second largest econ-
omy after the United States. Modernization theo-
rist, Seymour Martin Lipset (1959, as cited in
Cossa and Khanna 1997) argued that countries
with more advanced economies are more capable
of practicing democracy than developing countries.
Fukuyama (1996) has confirmed this correlation,
noting that the first democratic presidential elec-
tion in South Korea in 1992, and the first presiden-
tial election in Taiwan in 1996, coincided with
economic growth. Similarly, the emergence of edu-
cated, middle-class Chinese proponents of democ-
ratization accompanied its period of rapid economic
growth. Given that relationship between advanced
economy and democracy, both internal and exter-
nal pressures for human rights and democracy may
push the Chinese government to make meaningful
changes in the direction of greater sensitivity
towards human rights and democratic decision-
making procedures (Pevehouse 2002).
In the aftermath of the Cold War, expanded
globalization has offered opportunities to view
international relations from new perspectives.
However, earlier Western conceptions of national
security are still dominant, and the USA continues
to play a significant role in East Asian countries’
policy making; moreover, East Asian states main-
tain a balance of power with each other through
their relationships with the USA. These old meth-
ods of operation put a greater emphasis on power
than on principles, which engenders temporary
relationships and conflicts among East Asian states
instead of stable, long-term collaboration. On the
other hand, the present situation has seen the
emergence of alliances involving a greater num-
ber of states within an institutional framework for
international security, such as the six-party talks
with North Korea over nuclear weapons.
At present, the process of globalization is
driven by the integration of economic, political,
and technological factors worldwide, as well as
by the spread of Internet online usage, which
increases cross-cultural communication and
international collaboration. This trend may
undermine the emphasis on strict nationalism and
autocratic state power in East Asia (Lee 2006).
On the other hand, given that the state can alle-
viate the stresses placed on individuals by
20 East Asia National Security
economic globalization, there is some basis for
emphasizing the importance of the state as the
source for security (Gough 2004).
In sum, because of the Confucian collectivis-
tic familism and the Confucian governance heri-
tage, the good of the state in East Asian countries
was considered the center of all activities, includ-
ing politics, the economy, security, and culture.
The autocratic state-led economic development
policies observed in East Asian states have con-
tributed to a rapid economic growth during the
last few decades. While this growth was consid-
ered a priority, individual security and well-being
were deemed to be minor issues in comparison to
the good of the state (Alagappa 2003). At the
same time, rapid economic growth led to an
increasing disparity in wealth among citizens of
these nations, which in turn sparked pressures for
more democratic procedures, respect for human
rights, and attention to individual well-being. The
previously dominant East Asian political model,
in which the good of the state comes at the
expense of individual sacrifice, is in trouble, and
some transformation can be seen in East Asia,
which is adjusting its views towards national
security and individual security. Recently, the
concept of individual security began being con-
sidered in some areas of East Asia, although it is
still vague and cannot be distinguished from
national security (Alagappa 2003).
Current Conflicts Between National
Security and Individual Security
As addressed earlier, East Asia is a region where
interest in individual security has historically been
relatively low, while state-centered, nationalistic
ideas were widespread. However, as the economy
and the social recognition of civil rights continue
to develop, East Asia is now in a period of transi-
tion from state-centered ideas to more liberal
models of individual rights (Kowner et al. 1999;
Park and Shin 2006). Thus, in order to understand
lay perspectives of East Asians toward both
national security and individual security, it is
important to look at current issues in which these
two forms of security can conflict. Such conflicts
305
include North Korea’s nuclear weapons program,
the revision of Article 9 of the Constitution of
Japan, and disputes with ethnic minorities in
China.
North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons
Program
North Korea has used its nuclear weapons policy
as a means of leverage within the international
community (Choo 2006; Snyder 1999). However,
its already poor economy has suffered further due
to this policy and indeed threatens the very sur-
vival of its citizens. In this situation, state-cen-
tered policy directly conflicts with individual
security. As discussed in the International
Conference on North Korean Human Rights held
in Seoul in 2009, individual security in North
Korea cannot be improved without breaking the
vicious cycle of North Korea’s nuclear weapons
development and its defiance of international
economic sanctions.
Meanwhile, the poor quality of life of North
Koreans has impacted neighbor states. Since
1990, about 10 million North Koreans have
crossed the border; these refugees are a concern
for all East Asia, even beyond South Korea and
China (Choo 2006). Under these circumstances,
individual security might be deemed subordi-
nated to national security.
The Revision of Article 9
of the Constitution of Japan
In the aftermath of World War II, the Allies were
determined to ensure that Japan would never
again pose a threat to peace and security. This
resolution led to Article 9 of the 1947 Constitution
of Japan (Chinen 2006), also known as the
Postwar Constitution or the Peace Constitution.
The controversies arising from Article 9 have
continued ever since it took effect, and now
Japan’s political parties are considering a draft
amendment that would legitimate the expansion
of its military force in both strength and reach.
For example, US–Japan Defense Guidelines
306
issued in 1997 stated that Japan will give rear-
guard support for US military activities both in
the region surrounding Japan and further abroad.
In a survey conducted by the Mainichi Daily
News in April 2004, 59% of Japanese agreed
with the proposed amendment, 31% disagreed,
and 10% did not respond. The amendment was
considered in terms of the following issues
(Chinen 2006; Ryu 2007): the threat to Japan
posed by North Korea’s development of nuclear
weapons; competition with China, then emerging
as an economic and military power; and a poten-
tial impediment to Japan’s ability to play a greater
role in the United Nations. Some argue that
Article 9 makes it unclear whether Japan would
be able to meet its responsibilities as a permanent
member. On the other hand, some Japanese peo-
ple, including the Social Democratic Party, criti-
cized the amendment, arguing that Article 9 is
renowned for representing a progressive and
peaceful Constitution and constitutes a model for
all states that have the goal of democracy (Park
2004). Moreover, the proposed amendment pro-
duced tension in East Asian nations that had
experienced Japanese militarism from the end of
nineteenth century to the end of World War II, a
policy that left unforgettable pain in this region
(Page et al. 2009).
Disputes with Ethnic Minorities in China
China has become one of the most powerful
economies in the world and is trying to expand its
influence globally. On the road to becoming the
most powerful state, China’s Achilles heel is nei-
ther competition with the USA nor internal eco-
nomic policies but the rather complicated issues
related to its ethnic minorities. In China, there are
56 official ethnic groups1 defined by the People’s
Republic of China. The majority Han makes up
91.5%, and it is the elements of Han civilization
that are considered “Chinese culture.” Other
nationalities make up 8.5% of the Chinese popu-
lation, according to the 2000 census (CIA 2010).
Although the proportion of minorities is small,
they occupy 64% of the territory and inhabit most
of the border territories, which together abut
H. Mi-Sung Kim et al.
fourteen countries. Thus, in order to secure its
power, territory, and natural materials, China’s
leaders believe they cannot disregard the ethnic
minority groups. Although the government has
tried to administer policies of appeasement, such
as preferential affirmative action, in order to
incorporate the minority groups into one China, it
has often prioritized national security and cracked
down on movements toward ethnic independence,
as with the Tibetan unrest of 2008. The Chinese
government also used armed forces to settle a
dispute between the Han and the Uighurs in June
2009, proclaiming that armed force was neces-
sary to protect the interests of citizens and to pre-
vent violence (Goo 2009; Lee 2009).
East Asian Perspectives on National
Security
In this chapter, we consider East Asian responses
to two items concerned with the issues of national,
individual, and family security. The first item
asks participants to indicate on a scale from 1
(total disagreement) to 7 (total agreement) the
extent to which they agree with the statement
“National security is essential for individual and
family security.” The participants are then asked
to explain the reasoning behind their rating in
their own words. The other item asks participants
to complete the open-ended statement “The best
way to achieve security for individuals and fami-
lies throughout the world is:….”
To analyze the qualitative responses, a coding
manual was developed using grounded theory
techniques. All responses were broken down into
smaller codeable units to better identify and
account for specific themes within the responses.
To determine the relative frequency of each
theme in the total set of codeable units, we calcu-
lated the percentage of the codeable units assigned
to each coding category in relation to the total
number of all coding units that appeared in the
responses.
1
The 56 official ethnic groups include Taiwan as one
group, not counting ethnic groups in Hong Kong and
Macao.
20 East Asia National Security
Participants
The East Asian sample includes 409 participants
who were born in China, Hong Kong, Taiwan,
Japan, and South Korea. They were recruited
through a number of nonprobability sampling
methods, including convenience sampling,
snowball sampling, and posting of the survey
link on a number of sites. All participants com-
pleted the Personal and Institutional Rights to
Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS:
Malley-Morrison et al. 2006), either in hard-
copy format or online.
The religious affiliations most commonly
reported by the East Asian participants were
Christianity and Buddhism; a third of the partici-
pants were not affiliated with any religion. In
regard to socioeconomic status, most participants
self-reported as belonging to the middle (50%) or
upper-middle (20%) class. The majority of the
sample (67%) was single. Only 22% indicated
that they had participated in military service
although 47% had relatives who had served in
military. Finally, 20% had participated in protests
against war and in favor of peace; 19% did not
respond to this item.
Regarding the items concerning national, indi-
vidual, and family security, 69 of the Korean
respondents completed an earlier version of the
PAIRTAPS that did not include the national secu-
rity items. In addition, 14 Korean, 33 Japanese,
and 20 Chinese participants did not respond to
any of those items. Of the original East Asian
sample, 276 participants provided answers to the
items concerning national, individual, and family
security.
In regard to the quantitative rating scale
responses concerning the extent to which national
security is considered essential to individual and
family security, the vast majority of the respondents
agreed that it was, with 39% of the respondents
indicating total support for the statement, 30%
expressing strong support, and 16% indicating mild
agreement. Only 6% of the respondents neither
agreed nor disagreed, and only 9% indicated some
level of disagreement.
307
Qualitative Response Patterns
National Security Is Essential for
Individual and Family Security
The majority (65%) of the rationales provided
in support of the rating scale responses were
reasons why national security was seen as essen-
tial for individual and family security. Reasons
given for rejection of the idea were found in 7%
of the qualitative responses, and conditional
approval was found in 21%. The percentages
discussed in the next section are based on the
number of responses in each major group (i.e.,
responses in the agreements group, those in the
disagreements group, and those in the condi-
tional agreements group) rather than in the total
set of responses.
Among the reasons given for the essentiality
of national security, a substantial percentage of
the responses (48%) were very general, basically
just agreeing that family and individual security
depends on national security. For example,
“Always better to have strong national security”
(23 years old, Japan); “If a country as a whole is
not secure, it’s hard to ensure security for indi-
vidual families because there are situations that a
single family can’t handle” (21 years old, China);
“Looking back at the past, individual security
cannot be achieved if national security would not
be kept” (27 years old, South Korea); and “If a
country is at war, then you would get damage
because of bombing” (19 years old, Japan). Some
responses (20%) affirmed that national security
and individual and family security are intrinsi-
cally tied: “If the state is safe, then it is also easy
for individuals to live. In turn, if individuals are
safe, then the community is safe, and it becomes
bigger and the state is safe” (19 years old, Japan);
“It is essential. So the family and individual will
be confident in the country so that they will invest
and continue on with their life” (19 years old,
China); and “Because individuals are a state’s
citizens who are parts of the state” (South Korea).
In a similar vein, some responses (14%) con-
nected national security with feeling safe: “Even
308
if you say that you live in a house that protects
you from rain and wind, if you don’t know if a
bomb will come down one day, you can’t say you
are in a safe place” (20 years old, Japan); “Have
to keep the borders strong so we can feel safe in
our own community” (27 years old, China); and
“I like knowing that I’m safe in my own country,
yes” (18 years old, China).
On the other hand, several of the responses
supporting the importance of national security
(10%) emphasized protecting nations against
external or general threats, reflecting the belief
that national security is essential through its abil-
ity to offer protection. Examples of such responses
include “because it protects innocent civilians
from being attacked by other nations” (19 years
old, China); “As long as there exists the outside
power that wishes to invade a country that is
made up of individuals, a country will need secu-
rity” (South Korea); and “The necessity is more
important if the situation is like our country
where the north and the south are confronting
each other” (26 years old, South Korea). None of
the responses suggested that citizens have a
responsibility to contribute to the security of the
state, but several mentioned the government’s
obligation to protect its citizens’ security: “We
must have a dependable government that ensures
a safe society” (68 years old, Japan) and “The
state is supposed to protect all its citizens” (58
years old, China).
Although several arguments rejected the idea
that national security is essential to individual and
family security—for example, “The interests of
state and individual do not coincide” (50 years
old, Japan) and “Hard to protect all of the family
and individual” (18 years old, China)—none of
them directly denounced nation states. A general
disagreement with national security’s essentiality
was found in 36% of the disagreement responses.
For example, “The interests of state and individual
do not coincide” (50 years old, Japan); “Hard to
protect all of the family and individual” (18 years
old, China); and “When individuals and families
are safe, the state can also exist” (40 years old,
South Korea). Other responses (36%) revealed
fear of governmental deception in the use of the
term “national security”: “That is just a word that
creates propaganda” (21 years old, China);
H. Mi-Sung Kim et al.
“National security is needed, but at the same time,
I think it becomes the front/cover for war or
oppression” (35 years old, Japan); and “The notion
is meaningless when the subject of national secu-
rity is taken up for discourse in pursuit of certain
groups’ interests” (22 years old, South Korea).
Responses coded for conditional agreement
with the essentiality of national security typically
qualified their agreement by specifying general
conditions under which national security became
essential (26%): “Depends on the geography
(expansiveness) and demographics of a country.
Isolated communities who are self reliant manage
to survive regardless of government mediation
over time” (61 years old, Japan) and “Depends
on how much you need for family security” (19
years old, China). Among the reasons given for
conditional agreement, some responses (21%)
referred to better ways of implementing national
security—for example, “We must seek a way that
some kind of community other than a state should
secure individual and national security” (45 years
old, Japan); “The security doesn’t have to come
in the form of military power but security can be
economical, educational, medical, or any other
form of human support” (50 years old, Japan);
and “It becomes weird because you think at the
level of states. Shouldn’t we think at the level of
world peace?” (45 years old, Japan). Some
responses (18%) indicated that national security
needs to be monitored and showed concerns for
its misuse as a justification for state aggression
such as “torture” (44 years old, Japan) or “…
harming innocent people in other countries or
invading other countries in the name of state
security” (20 years old, Japan). Similarly, other
responses (15%) suggested, at least implicitly,
that national security is essential but incomplete:
“Just maintain security within the state, but do
not go out and intervene in other countries” (19
years old, Japan) and “Although some are misus-
ing some aspects of security, national security is
an absolutely necessary value in the modern soci-
ety” (21 years old, South Korea). Finally, a few
responses (12%) expressly stated concern with
the possibility of a focus on national security
restricting individual freedoms and rights: “Since
there are times when national security violates
individual security, it is a part that should be
20 East Asia National Security
taken into account” (26 years old, South Korea);
“‘National security’ should not be used as an
excuse for violating the security of certain indi-
viduals” (43 years old, Japan); and “As long as
the national security does not put the family/indi-
vidual at risk in terms of invading on their space”
(20 years old, China). Taken together, although
some of the explanations adopted a similar rheto-
ric indicating disagreement or conditional agree-
ment with the necessity of national security,
responses disagreeing with its essentiality seem
to reflect a more pessimistic view of the possibil-
ity of a legitimate state concern with national
security, whereas those expressing conditional
agreement seem to indicate some optimism con-
cerning the ability of people to prevent state mal-
feasance in pursuing national security.
Best Way to Achieve Security
for Individuals and Families
Throughout the World
Regarding the best way to achieve security for
individuals and families throughout the world,
the vast majority (77%) of the qualitative
responses involved themes reflecting the pursuit
of universalistic, prosocial practices. By con-
trast, 12% of the responses recommended inter-
ventionist or protectionist approaches as a way to
achieve security. Additionally, denial of the very
possibility of national security appeared in 9% of
the responses. The percentages reported below
were based on the number of responses in each
subgroup (i.e., responses in universalistic, proso-
cial approaches and those in interventionist or
protectionist approaches).
In regard to universalistic, prosocial themes, a
considerable number of responses (53%) appealed
to ethical and philosophical principles for foster-
ing national security. Specifically, 27% cited the
importance of peace or the practice of nonvio-
lence—for example, “Stop war” (19 years old,
Japan); “Only through peace” (24 years old,
China); “Peace without war” (21 years old, South
Korea); “Resolving conflicts in a peaceful way”
(21 years old, South Korea); and “without harm-
ing others” (22 years old, South Korea). Several
(7%) recommended specific principles such as
309
tolerance. For example, “Through a common
understanding” (24 years old, China); “Respect
each other’s social and political rights” (26 years
old, China); “We should accept differences and
should not interfere with another person. I think it
is a way to secure safety without making any
conflict” (South Korea); and “Maintain their
means to a livelihood and respect cultural differ-
ences: it is a preferred process of resolving
conflict” (61 years old, Japan). A few responses
(2%) emphasized the importance of following the
Golden Rule, such as “Don’t do things you don’t
want others to do to you” (19 years old, Japan).
Along with the broader themes advocating the
pursuit of universalistic, prosocial practices, sev-
eral responses (14%) also suggested more specific
pragmatic strategies, coded for recommending
peace—for example, “I believe that military
power should not be used for war or violence, but
it should be used to save and help others during
hard times such as natural disasters. Therefore,
the larger the country’s military force, the more
that country should be helping others” (25 years
old, Japan); “We will always have war, so to
abolish violence, limit it only to psychological
war, such as debate” (19 years old, Japan);
“Abolishment of nuclear weapons and other
weapons” (20 years old, Japan); and “Stop crimes
from happening” (19 years old, China).
In addition, the importance of diplomacy in
fostering national security was emphasized in
several responses (9%), including the following:
“Try and achieve good relations with other coun-
tries in the world” (19 years old, China); “Protect
international law” (25 years old, South Korea);
“Treaties against war” (43 years old, South
Korea); “The UN and countries secure security”
(20 years old, Japan); and “A new UN in the cen-
ter and achieve world peace. We must change the
current system of UN security council” (79 years
old, Japan). Along with these themes, there were
a few references to the importance of human and
resource development, including education and
the need for material aid to poor countries: “There
is no best way. There’s a lot of things we have to
do before we achieve security for individuals and
families throughout the world. Ending war, feed-
ing the poor, giving medical aid to those who
need it might be a start” (19 years old, China);
310
“By creating a society where a state does not
pursue solely its citizen’s or its own interests that
are masked by the cloak of globalization” (51
years old, South Korea); and “Less poverty and
more understanding and better education for all
the people” (68 years old, Japan).
Within the group of interventionist or protec-
tionist recommendations, the following responses
(64%) suggested the importance of unilateral
strategies against security threats: “Self-
safekeeping” (21 years old, South Korea); “Tough
border security, screening of immigrants, tough
penalties for crimes, national education about
criminal behavior” (18 years old, Japan); and “To
support national security first and to put it before
family security, everyone” (21 years old, China).
Along with the protectionist themes, the use of
direct military force against threats was specified
in the responses (36%): “Through the balance of
power between nations” (South Korea) and
“Strong defense force” (27 years old, China).
Finally, responses denying the possibility of
security or expressing uncertainty about it were
very rare, as in “No idea” (20 years old, China);
“Does not exist in the present world” (18 years
old, Japan); and “I have doubts that it is achiev-
able” (65 years old, South Korea).
Demographic Correlates of Response
Themes
A number of exploratory analyses were con-
ducted to determine the extent to which there
were demographic differences in the use and fre-
quency of the major response categories. All
results described as “statistical significant” had a
p-value equal to or less than 0.05. All results
described as “marginally significant” had p-values
less than 0.1 and greater than 0.055. Nonsignificant
results are not included in the discussion.
National Security Is Essential for
Individual and Family Security
Regarding the respondents’ rating scale responses
indicating level of agreement with the statement
“National security is essential for individual and
H. Mi-Sung Kim et al.
Table 20.1 National security is essential for individual
and family security: percentages of responses in coding
categories by demographic groups and chi-square values
Categories Group 1a Group 2a c2
Male Female
To protect nations 9 0 7.20**
against external threats
To feel safe 5 16 4.74*
College age Older age
To feel safe 15 6 3.23^
* ** ^
p £ 0.05, p £ 0.01, 0.051 < p < 0.10
a
The numbers in these columns are the percent of the
group that gave responses falling into each of the specified
categories
family security,” the overall mean was 5.74
(SD = 1.45, range = 1–7, N = 247), which indicates
an average level of agreement in the mild-to-
strong range. Exploratory analyses of variance
(ANOVAs) on rating scale scores revealed no
significant differences in level of agreement based
on any of the following variables: age (18–21
years old vs. 22 years old and up), gender, SES
(lower/working vs. middle vs. upper-middle/
upper class), marital status (married vs. unmar-
ried), childhood religion (Christian vs. Buddhist
vs. none/agnostic/atheist), current religion, par-
ticipant’s military experience, family members’
military experience, and participant’s participa-
tion in protest against war.
A series of chi-square tests of independence
were conducted to explore the possibility of
within-region group differences in the themes that
emerged from the qualitative analysis. For these
analyses, the scores on each thematic variable
were either 1 (presence of a given theme) or 0
(absence of a given theme). These chi-square
analyses revealed some gender and age differences
in the use of particular arguments regarding
whether national security is essential for individual
and family security; for example, significantly
more males than females emphasized the impor-
tance of protecting nations against external
threats. On the other hand, females and the col-
lege-age group were more likely to mention the
importance of national security to feeling safe, as
compared to males and the older age group, respec-
tively. Table 20.1 contains percentages of responses
in coding categories by demographic group and
chi-square values in response to this item.
20 East Asia National Security 311

Table 20.2 Best way to achieve individual and family security right to invasion: percentages of responses in coding
categories by demographic groups and chi-square values
Categories Group 1a Group 2a c2
Male Female
Universalistic/prosocial practices, unspecified 22 8 6.10*
Ethical and philosophical practices, overallb 10 21 3.07^
Peace/nonviolence 17 31 3.66*
Use of direct military force 9 2 3.30^
Relative military No relative military
Universalistic/prosocial practices, unspecified 10 23 4.17*
Peace/nonviolence 13 36 9.48**
Military No military
Universalistic/prosocial practices, unspecified 9 35 12.69***
Ethical and philosophical principles, overallb 3 20 4.46*
*
p £ 0.05, **p £ 0.01, ***p £ 0.001, ^0.051 < p < 0.10
a
The numbers in these columns are the percent of the group that gave responses falling into each of the specified
categories
b
This category was created by adding the category and the subcategories, tolerance, golden rules, and peace/
nonviolence

The Best Way to Achieve Security Discussion

for Individuals and Families
Throughout the World
Chi-square tests of independence revealed
significant differences based on gender, military
service, and family member’s military service in
the likelihood of appealing to the ethical principle
of peace or nonviolence in discussing the best
way to achieve security throughout the world.
Specifically, significantly more females and
respondents with family members who had
served in the military recommended the ethical
principle of peace or nonviolence than their
counterparts. Regarding interventionist or pro-
tectionist approaches, males were marginally
significantly more likely than females to mention
interventionist or protectionist approaches as a
way to achieve security. Significantly more of the
participants who had not served in the military
themselves and who did not have any relatives
who had served in the military recommended
universalistic/prosocial practices as the best
way to achieve national security. Table 20.2
contains percentages in coding categories by
demographic group and chi-square values in
response to this item.
This chapter considers the views of ordinary
East Asians (including Chinese, Taiwanese,
Japanese, and South Koreans) concerning
national security and individual and family secu-
rity in the context of historical and political
events in the region. Consideration has been
given both to state-centered ideas derived from
Confucian collectivistic values and to the exclu-
sivist nature of nationalism that arose from these
nations’ experiences of imperialistic violence
during the period between the mid-nineteenth
and mid-twentieth centuries. This region is cur-
rently witnessing tensions between national
security and individual security exacerbated by
such issues as the North Korean nuclear weap-
ons program, armed conflicts within the Korean
peninsula, tensions surrounding the proposed
amendment of Article 9 of the Constitution of
Japan, and Chinese disputes with national minor-
ities, such as with Tibet and Xinjiang. At the
same time, as the social recognition of civil
rights continues to develop, East Asia is now in a
period of transition from state-centered ideas to
liberal models of individual rights—even though
East Asia has historically been a region where
312
interest in individual security was relatively low
and state-centered and nationalistic ideas have
been widespread.
Although the voices shared in this chapter
were not derived from a representative probabil-
ity sample of this region, the qualitative responses
provide unique insights into the ways in which a
diverse group of ordinary East Asians think about
national and individual security. Also, this explor-
atory investigation of intraregional group differ-
ences in those ways of thinking provides a basis
for hypotheses concerning the way that gender
and military experience may contribute to views
regarding national and individual security.
The findings from our participants indicate a
level of agreement in the mild-to-strong range,
on average, with the idea that “National security
is essential for individual and family security.”
Not surprisingly, respondents most commonly
justified their agreement simply by restating the
proposition that national security is essential for
individual and family security or by stating that
the two are inextricably related. In addition, sev-
eral responses emphasized the importance of pro-
tecting nations from external or general threats,
although despite the strong collectivistic values
in the region, no response expressed concern
about threats to sociocultural values. Given the
experience of on-site war and imperialistic com-
petition in this region in modern history, as well
as the current armed tension in the Korean penin-
sula, many East Asians seem to have developed
an implicit belief that national security and indi-
vidual security are endangered more by a direct
external or general threat than by a threat to social
and cultural values.
Although not very numerous, some responses
indicated either disagreement or conditional
agreement with the idea that national security is
essential for individual and family security.
Interestingly, no respondent denounced the nation-
state outright. Rather, their responses reflected a
concern with individual security in specific oppo-
sition to state-centered ideas that have historically
been used to protect the interest of the ruling par-
ties, as well as by managerial elites in order to
enforce conformity (Befu 1993). Examples of the
responses from our participants include such
H. Mi-Sung Kim et al.
statements as “The interests of state and individual
do not coincide”; “National security becomes the
front/cover for war or oppression”; and “the sub-
ject of national security is taken up for discourse
in pursuit of certain groups’ interests.” Befu’s
(1993) description of state-centered ideas in Japan
may also be applied to the way China has dealt
with its disputes with national minorities.
Also noteworthy is the fact that many of our
respondents revealed concerns about security at
a general level, involving such issues as eco-
nomic, educational, medical, and other forms of
humanitarian support, and general world peace.
This level of security may be particularly critical
for North Korean refugees who leave the state
partly because of starvation and for the states that
accept refugees.
Voices expressing disapproval, or conditional
approval, of the essentiality of national security
were also represented in the findings of a survey
conducted by a Korean broadcasting service,
SBS, in 2010. According to the survey, 9 out of
10 Korean participants thought that individual
and family are more important than the state. The
report also highlighted changes in values over
time, comparing the 2010 statistics with data
from 30 years ago, when over half of Koreans
thought that the state was more important (Kwon
2010). Although the current PAIRTAPS results
cannot be generalized to all East Asians, they
support the idea that East Asia is now in a period
of transition from state-centered ideas to liberal
models of individual rights (Kowner et al. 1999;
Park and Shin 2006). Moreover, Silver (2002)
noted that although data collected in 1995 showed
that Japanese were willing to give priority to
work over family obligations, there is evidence
that such priorities may be changing now.
When asked to state the best way to achieve
security for individuals and families throughout
the world, the vast majority of respondents advo-
cated the pursuit of universalistic, prosocial prac-
tices (such as nonviolence, tolerance, an
egalitarian golden rule, diplomacy, and humani-
tarian aids); a much smaller portion of the respon-
dents endorsed interventionist or protectionist
approaches. Such disparities among views are not
surprising; there are similar strong discrepancies
20 East Asia National Security
in Japanese views regarding the proposed amend-
ment of Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan.
One of the interesting findings from our
exploratory analyses was that significantly more
of the respondents whose family members had
served in the military than their counterparts
referred to the ethical principle of peace or non-
violence. A speculative explanation for this
finding may be that individuals with relatives in
the military may feel anxiety about the unknown,
uncontrollable future of those family members or
their experience of having dead or wounded
family members from military service. A recent
US study revealed that military families losing
the active presence of a parent through deploy-
ment are vulnerable to stress and anxiety
(American Academy of Child and Adolescent
Psychiatry 2010).
Another provocative finding from our explor-
atory analyses was that the major factor contrib-
uting to support for interventionist or protectionist
approaches to security was not military experi-
ence but gender: Significantly more male than
female participants recommended interventionist
or protectionist approaches as the best way to
achieve security. This finding is in line with
gender-related differences in the justification
given for the essentiality of national security:
Significantly more male than female participants
emphasized the importance of protecting nations
against external threats; military experience did
not make a significant difference. On the other
hand, significantly more female than male par-
ticipants emphasized the importance of feeling
safe as a justification for the essentiality of
national security. It remains as open question
whether these gender differences are unique to
East Asia or are a more general phenomenon.
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 National Security: An Integration
21
Andrea Mercurio and Madeleine Logan

The concept of national security is a relatively
new one (Neocleous 2006). In 1934, the
Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, published
by Macmillan, had no entry for the term “national
security.” By 1968, however, when the title of this
same work was known as the International
Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, there was
not only an entry for this term but also the sug-
gestion that the concept had “long been used” by
politicians and military leaders (Neocleous 2006,
p. 364).
Despite ambiguity in the term, one might
argue that the one of the foremost goals of
national security efforts is to ensure security for
individual members of a particular nation.
National security is viewed by some as a basic
responsibility of a government, and without
achieving it, individual members of society can-
not live productive lives (e.g., Watson 2008).
From this perspective, national security is con-
sidered a necessary precursor to security at the
individual and family level. However, this view is
not shared by everyone. Some scholars have
questioned the assumption that individual security
is ensured by achieving security at the national
level (e.g., Messari 2002).
An interesting and relatively unexplored
question concerns how everyday people see the
role of national security in their lives. Do ordi-
nary citizens from around the world view the
role of national security as necessary and impor-
tant for individuals and their families to feel
safe? How do people believe “security” is best
achieved for members of society? The preceding
chapters offer a unique opportunity to explore
the answers to these questions in eight diverse
regions around the world. From Russia and the
Balkans to Africa, to the UK/Anglo countries,
and to the other major regions studied, partici-
pants were surveyed on their perspectives toward
the issue of national security. What follows here
is an overview of the themes and patterns across
regions that emerged from analysis of two items
to the Personal and Institutional Rights to
Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS).
Although described in previous chapters, a brief
overview of the items of interest and coding of
responses is presented first.
Using the Personal and Institutional Rights to
Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS) mem-
bers of the Group on International Perspectives
on Governmental Aggression and Peace
(GIPGAP) asked individuals from around the
world to rate on a seven-point scale their level of
agreement with the statement, “National security
is essential for family and individual security.”
As part of this item, respondents were also asked
to elaborate on their rating scale response, pro-
viding an explanation for the rating in their own
words. Responses were categorized into one of
four major coding categories: (1) national secu-
rity is essential for family and individual secu-
rity; (2) national security is not essential for
family and individual security; (3) national secu-
rity may be essential under some circumstances;
and (4) does not address the question.

K. Malley-Morrison et al. (eds.), International Handbook of War, Torture, and Terrorism, 315
Peace Psychology Book Series, DOI 10.1007/978-1-4614-1638-8_21,
© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2013
316
Subcategories of these major categories were
identified and used to further classify a response.
The coded qualitative responses to this item are
examined across regions and represent the first
major focus of this chapter.
Participants were also asked to complete the
following statement: “The best way to achieve
security for individuals and families throughout
the world is….” For this second item, responses
were organized into two major categories:
(1) positive/universalistic/prosocial responses and
(2) negative/protectionist/interventionist/abandon-
ment responses. The second major focus of this
chapter is an analysis of the coded qualitative
answers to this item across regions. The individ-
ual chapter authors also conducted Pearson chi-
square tests of independence (two-tailed) to
examine the relationship between specific social
and demographic variables (e.g., gender, protest
participation, conflict resolution and peace edu-
cation program participation, and military ser-
vice) and response themes identified in the
samples. Relevant findings from these analyses
are also considered.
An integrative summary of the varied perspec-
tives on national security examined in this vol-
ume is challenging on a number of levels. Chapter
authors did not always report the same informa-
tion or analyze the data in a uniform way, which
admittedly hampers the ability to compare
findings across regions and draw strong, definitive
conclusions. Adding to this notable limitation are
the common shortcomings found in many studies
that have limited resources to recruit probability
samples. Many of the regions considered in this
volume were not adequately represented, the
sample sizes between countries and among
regions varied greatly, participants were recruited
through convenience sampling, and in many
cases, the samples were overrepresentative of
certain demographic characteristics (e.g., middle
class). Consequently, the reader is cautioned to
interpret patterns and draw conclusions carefully
and to consider seriously the context in which the
data were collected.
This is not to say, however, that the data pre-
sented in this volume and the integration of the
findings are not useful, interesting, or important.
A. Mercurio and M. Logan
In fact, we would argue just the opposite. The
information provided is unique in many ways.
The views of ordinary citizens from vastly differ-
ent nations and regions of the world were com-
piled, juxtaposed, and then used to guide our
understanding of cross-national perspectives on
the issue of security in the lives of individuals
and their families. And while these findings are
preliminary and tentative, they still offer an inter-
esting look and possible greater understanding of
how lay people view and understand the role of
national security in their lives.
“National Security Is Essential for
Family and Individual Security”
As previously mentioned, responses to the item
“National security is essential for individual and
family security” were categorized into four major
groups. Responses in most regions were classified
into the first major category, which represented
support for the statement. With the exception of
Western Europe, where the figure was close to
50%, over half of the responses in every region
were classified into a subcategory that repre-
sented a reason why national security was impor-
tant and essential for individual and family
security. In fact, in regions such as East Asia,
Russia and the Balkans, South and Southeast
Asian, and Africa, 65% or more of valid responses
were classified as supportive of the necessity of
national security.
With respect to subcategories of this major
grouping, the majority of responses in all regions
offered either general agreement with the state-
ment or suggested that national security and indi-
vidual/family security are linked in such a way
that it would be impossible to have one without
the other. In essence, many of these responses
reflected the idea that individual and family secu-
rity can only be realized if national security has
been established. Other themes that emerged but
were much less prominent included the impor-
tance of national security for ensuring protection
to individuals and families, for ensuring protec-
tion against general external threats or forces, to
protect against evil, and the importance of
21 National Security Integration
national security for feeling safer. Interestingly,
the notion of needing national security for
general protection and to protect against evil
appeared in all regions, to some extent, except for
Western Europe. Although the Middle East region
was comprised of a relatively small sample com-
pared with other regions, it is still worth noting
that the theme of national security being essential
in order to feel safer was more prominent than in
other regions.
While many participants expressed a clear
rationale for why national security is essential for
individual and family security, other participants
qualified their endorsement in some way.
Responses indicating partial or qualified agree-
ment were coded into a separate category from
responses indicating solid agreement with the
importance of national security. Responses
expressing partial agreement were found in sam-
ples from all regions. However, responses
reflecting conditional or partial agreement consti-
tuted 15% or more of the responses from regions
such as Africa, the UK/Anglo region, East Asia,
Western Europe, and the Middle East but were
less common in participants from other regions;
South and Southeast Asia, Latin America, and
Russia and the Balkans region had the lowest per-
centage of total codable responses falling into the
conditional/partial agreement category. Responses
falling into various subcategories within the major
partial agreement/qualified category varied across
regions. Some of the specific themes that emerged
in the partial agreement/qualified category
included a general qualification of agreement
with the statement, the suggestion that there may
be better ways or other alternatives for securing
individual/family security than focusing on
national security, that national security efforts
may result in restricting individual freedoms/
rights, that national security may be important
but does not justify certain measures, and that it
may be useful for establishing individual/family
security but not necessarily essential. The view
that national security may be useful but essential
was a stronger theme in responses from Western
Europe compared with other regions.
Although most responses reflected agreement
in some respect with the view that national secu-
317
rity is essential for individual and family security,
a noteworthy minority in various regions provided
rationales for why it was not essential. Over 15%
of responses represented disagreement in both
the former British Empire and Western Europe
regions. Disagreement was a little lower in
African, Latin American, and Middle Eastern
responses, although still at or over 10%. Rationales
for why national security was not essential were
wide-ranging. Along with general disagreement
with the statement, responses from various regions
mentioned the possible negative consequences
and dangers of focusing on national security
under the assumption that it is essential for the
individual and family, the fact that governments
can use national security in self-serving and cor-
rupt ways, the idea that national security is an illu-
sion, and the view that national security and
individual/family security are not related to one
another.
It is interesting to observe that individuals in
regions with very different social and political
histories possess a shared perspective on the role
that national security plays in individual and fam-
ily life. Some regions have been embroiled in a
long history of wars and social unrest (e.g., the
Middle East), whereas other regions have had
comparatively little internal instability, at least
since the end of World War II (e.g., many of the
countries in Western Europe and East Asia).
Nevertheless, most participants supported the
idea that national security is essential for indi-
vidual and family security, suggesting that par-
ticipants see national security as necessary,
important, and vital for the security of individual
members of society, despite very different histo-
ries. The overwhelming support for the view that
national security is necessary for individual and
family security may reflect the idea that people
believe nations are at least partly responsible for
ensuring the security of individual members of
society.
Although the percentage of codable units fall-
ing into a number of categories were too small to
test for, or to detect differences in demographic
characteristics, some authors were able to explore
the extent to which the frequency of the more
common themes varied as a function of gender,
318
age, religion, affiliation with the military, and
involvement in protest. Overall, across regions,
there were generally few differences in the fre-
quency of themes based on either age or religion.
For two of the most common supportive arguments
provided for why national security is essential for
individual and family security (e.g., the idea that
individual/family security depends on national
security and the idea that individual/family secu-
rity and nationally security are intrinsically tied),
differences did emerge in some regions with
respect to gender, involvement in protest, religion,
and affiliation with the military. For example, in
the Middle East men were more likely than
women to make general supportive statements
that individual/family security depends on national
security, while the opposite finding was reported
in the South and Southeast Asian region. In the
former British Empire/Anglo region, the propor-
tion of responses that reflected the theme of
national and individual/family security being
intrinsically tied was higher for those with mili-
tary experience than for those without military
experience. In both Western Europe and the for-
mer British Empire/Anglo region, responses from
those who never participated in protests against
war were more likely to represent support for the
importance of national security for individual/
family security than responses from those who
had participated in such protests.
With respect to arguments as to why national
security is not essential for individual and family
security, some differences in the frequency of cer-
tain rationales as a function of gender, military
experience, involvement in protest, and participa-
tion in conflict resolution/peace programs were
reported across regions. It is particularly interest-
ing that in the former British Empire/Anglo
region, there were a number of significant differ-
ences in themes based on involvement in protests
against war. Those who reported engaging in
some form of protests against war were more
likely than those who did not to focus on the neg-
ative consequences and dangers of focusing on
national security as essential for individual/fam-
ily security, to suggest that the whole idea of
nation-states is misguided, and to argue that
nations are obsessed with national security.
A. Mercurio and M. Logan
Protestors from the former British Empire/Anglo
region more likely to offer responses of general
conditional agreement to the statement, to recog-
nize the importance of national security but to
qualify that recognition by the suggestion that
there may be better or alternative ways to achieve
individual/family security, and to argue that while
national security may be essential, it does not jus-
tify certain actions or measures (e.g., restricting
individual freedoms). Individuals from this region
who reported participating in conflict resolution
or peace programs also more frequently proposed
that there were negative consequences or dangers
to focusing on national security in order to ensure
individual/family security and to suggest that the
concept of nation-states is wrong.
Gender differences observed for categories
reflecting themes against or conditionally agree-
ing with the national security statement tended to
show a higher frequency of responses for those
categories from men than from women. For
example, among respondents from the former
British Empire/Anglo region, men were more
likely than women to suggest that national secu-
rity is an illusion or impossibility or that the
whole idea of nation-states is a mistake. In addi-
tion, among South and Southeast Asia partici-
pants, men were more likely than women to
mention the negative consequences or dangers of
focusing on national security in order to ensure
individual/family security and to suggest that
there may be better or alternate ways of achiev-
ing individual/family security. However, when
offering qualifying statements concerning the
essentiality of national security for individual
and family level security, women from this same
region were more likely than men to propose that
national security is needed but under the condi-
tion that it is monitored with proper oversight.
“The Best Way to Achieve Security for
Individuals and Families Throughout
the World”
Across regions, the overwhelming majority of
responses to the item “The best way to achieve
security for individuals and families throughout
21 National Security Integration
the world is…” tended to describe positive or
prosocial practices (e.g., tolerance or peace tools
like negotiation). In fact, over 75% of codable
responses in all regions reflected prosocial strate-
gies for achieving security for individuals and their
families. Further classification of these responses
into subcategories showed varied suggestions on
how security could best be achieved. A relatively
common theme across regions included nonspecific
propositions about the use of prosocial practices
for achieving security. It is interesting that in com-
parison to most other regions, South and Southeast
Asian responses more frequently invoked ethical
or philosophical principles (e.g., tolerance and
nonviolent practices) in describing how security
could be realized, while this theme was least com-
mon in regions like the former British Empire/
Anglo and Western Europe. It is also interesting
that, although the Middle East sample was small,
the majority of coded responses to this item refer-
enced either the importance of peace and nonvio-
lence or described the importance of nonviolent
tools for promoting security; perhaps because
peace has been very elusive for many people in the
region, keeping both peace and security is very
much on their minds. A focus on the importance of
peace and nonviolence was also a prominent
theme in East Asian responses. An emphasis on
diplomatic strategies and positive international
relations as necessary for achieving security
emerged in all regions but was higher in African
and South and Southeast Asian responses and
lower in those of Latin American, Middle Eastern,
and East Asian responses. Mention of providing
aid to other countries and providing resources like
education as a means of achieving security was a
less prominent theme across regions relative to
other themes.
Interestingly, only a small percentage of
responses across regions offered support for strat-
egies that involved aggression or direct action
against perceived security threats. In fact, there
appeared to very little mention of the need for an
aggressive stance to ensure security for members
of society. Negative/protectionist strategies (e.g.,
recommendations for the use of force) as a means
for achieving security appeared to account for
15% or less of total codable units in all regions
319
and was actually 5% or less in responses from
Latin America, Western Europe, and Russia and
the Balkans. Although we cannot generalize
regarding these findings, it is noteworthy that par-
ticipants generally did not propose solutions that
involved aggressive governmental action. Even in
regions plagued by a great deal of political and
social strife like the Middle East and Africa, where
one might expect acceptance of and support for
more aggressive strategies, these themes were
surprisingly less frequent than mention of nonvio-
lent and prosocial approaches. Equally significant
was the low percentage of responses describing
national security as impossible or reflecting apa-
thy towards the issue. The general absence of
aggressive and defeatist themes relative to more
positive, active, and prosocial responses suggests
not only that the issue of security is important to
ordinary citizens but that they also believe it is
possible without the use violence.
Examination of the frequency of common
themes as function of various social and demo-
graphic characteristics for this item revealed dif-
ferences primarily based on military experience,
involvement in both protests against war and
conflict resolution/peace programs, and gender,
although some differences based on age, religion,
and socioeconomic status were noted in certain
regions. In the former British Empire/Anglo
region, participating in protests against war or
involvement in conflict resolution/peace pro-
grams was associated with providing more
responses that invoked various types of prosocial
means to achieving national security. For exam-
ple, a greater frequency of responses in protestors
than non-protestors were found in the following
themes: general unspecified statements about
achieving national security through the pursuit of
prosocial practices, recommendations of practi-
cal or pragmatic strategies for achieving national
security (e.g., talking), and emphasis on human
or resource development (e.g., a more equitable
distribution of wealth) for creating national secu-
rity. Participants from this region who reported
taking part in conflict resolution/peace programs
were also more likely to offer responses that
could be coded for the idea of promoting practi-
cal or pragmatic strategies for achieving national
320
security and for ideas that stressed the ethical
principle of “Do unto others as you would have
them do unto you” (i.e., the Golden Rule) as the
best way to achieve national security. In contrast,
in the former British Empire/Anglo region, a
greater proportion of responses from those who
never participated in protests against war
described negative or protectionist strategies as
the best way of achieving security, including the
use of force, compared with responses from peo-
ple who had participated in protests against war.
Interestingly, in this same region, having experi-
ence with being in the military was associated
with providing arguments concerning education
and intellectual empowerment as the best way to
create stability within a nation. African respon-
dents who had previously engaged in protests
against war were more likely to underscore the
importance of diplomacy and international rela-
tions, compared with those who had not. In East
Asia, having experience with the military (e.g.,
having a relative in the military) was associated
with emphasizing the need for peace and the
practice of nonviolence in achieving security. In
the Middle East region, contrary to the finding
for the former British Empire/Anglo region, a
greater frequency of responses for the theme of
promoting practical or pragmatic strategies as
the best strategy for achieving national security
was found among those who indicated never par-
ticipating in protests against war compared with
those who indicated participation in such pro-
tests. Thus, with the exception of some findings
reported in the Middle East region, in general,
participation in protests against war and military
experience of some kind was related to responses
that reflected positive, prosocial strategies to
achieving national security.
Significant gender patterns were observed in
some regions (e.g., South and Southeast Asia)
but were noticeably absent in other regions
(e.g., Africa and Western Europe). In South and
Southeast Asia, women were more likely than
men to provide responses promoting tolerance,
the “Golden Rule,” and the need for practical or
pragmatic tools to create national security.
However, interestingly and perhaps surprisingly,
women in this region were also more likely than
A. Mercurio and M. Logan
men to mention the use of general negative or
protectionist strategies for achieving national
security. More predictably, perhaps, men from
South and Southeast Asia were more likely than
women to provide responses that could be coded
for the use of force as a way to generate security.
In East Asia, a greater proportion of responses
from women were found to reflect the importance
of peace and nonviolent strategies for promoting
national security, while a greater proportion of
responses from men were found to emphasize
negative or protectionist strategies. Finally,
although the sample size was relatively small
from the Middle East region, more responses
from men used ethical language or referred to
ethical principles when describing the need to
pursue prosocial practices in order to achieve
national security.
Conclusion
This chapter offers a brief overview and compari-
son of perspectives on national security in eight
different regions across the world. In their own
words, participants provided their thoughts on
the relevance of national security for security in
their individual lives and how best national secu-
rity could be achieved, if at all. Across regions,
the responses provided by participants suggested
a belief in the idea that national security is indeed
essential for the security of individuals and their
families. In fact, there were remarkably similar
views on the essentiality of national security, sug-
gesting that it is a meaningful concept and an
important issue to everyday people from very dif-
ferent areas of the world. One might think that
regions with histories of greater social and politi-
cal discord might differ significantly in their
views on national security from regions with
comparatively little unrest in the recent past.
However, we see many more similarities in the
views of people from various regions than we see
differences.
Nation-states arguably do have to be con-
cerned with establishing and maintaining secu-
rity in the face of real threats (e.g., terrorists).
However, governments, through propaganda and
21 National Security Integration
information control, may imply to their citizens
that an aggressive tactic is the best and only via-
ble option for defending national interests and
safeguarding the public (Corgan et al. 2009),
even when there may be little basis for these
actions. The tenuous connection established by
the Bush administration between al Qaeda and
Iraq, which was used to justify military action,
serves as perhaps one of the best contemporary
examples of how governments can foster misper-
ceptions and play on the fears of the public.
However, ordinary citizens do not necessarily
prefer the use of force and do not unilaterally
support war if it does not appear to have a
justifiable cause (Fisher 2002). It is interesting to
note that in the individuals from our samples,
responses tended to lack themes reflective of the
need for aggression or the use of force for achiev-
ing national security. While people may support
the use of violence in certain circumstances,
based on these data, we can see that participants
are more inclined to encourage peaceful, nonan-
tagonistic practices.
In our opinion, it is encouraging that responses
concerning how national security could be best
achieved emphasized positive and prosocial
practices as opposed to aggressive actions and
nonpeaceful approaches. A logical assumption
that follows is that individuals likely favor order
and stability achieved as an outgrowth of peace-
ful relations between and among nations and not
321
through aggressive actions. Of course, we cannot
draw any strong conclusions and do not know if
and how the perspectives voiced here would
change under different social, economic, and
political circumstances. The views presented in
this volume are clearly a rudimentary snapshot in
place and time of how national security is per-
ceived in particular regions. Nevertheless, a case
could made for the idea that many of the regions
we sampled from are facing both real and imag-
ined national security threats, and yet, we still see
a preference for nonviolent approaches to achiev-
ing security. National security is clearly an impor-
tant issue and desired by many, but in the minds
of our participants, this does not preclude the
possibility of a peaceful means to this goal.
References
Corgan M, Oh DY, Malley-Morrison K (2009) Integrative
conclusion for series. In: Malley-Morrison K (ed)
State violence and the right to peace: an international
survey of the views of ordinary people, vol IV. Praeger
Security International, Westport
Fisher L (2002) Deciding on war against Iraq: institutional
failures. Polit Sci Q 118:389–410
Messari N (2002) The state and dilemmas of security: the
Middle East and the Balkans. Secur Dialog
33:415–427
Neocleous M (2006) From social to national security: on the
fabrication of economic order. Secur Dialog 37:363–384
Watson CA (2008) U.S. national security: a reference
handbook. ABC-CLIO, Santa Barbara
Section III
Invasion
 Methods for Coding Perspectives
on a State Right to Invasion
and Bombing Scenarios
Tristyn Campbell
The Group on International Perspectives on
Governmental Aggression and Peace (GIPGAP)
developed the Personal and Institutional Rights
to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS;
Malley-Morrison, Daskalopolous and You, 2006)
to study ordinary people’s viewpoints on peace
and several forms of governmental aggression.
Respondents to this multimethod quantitative/
qualitative survey were recruited through a num-
ber of different approaches, including personal
networking and posting of the survey link on a
number of sites. They completed either a paper
copy of the survey or an online version. The
resulting sample, which forms the basis for our
exploratory analyses, was a nonrepresentative
convenience sample; consequently, results have
been interpreted cautiously and should not be
assumed to be generalizable to the populations of
all the regions. The sample was drawn from nine
different regions from around the world: (a)
Africa, (b) East Asia, (c) the Gulf States, (d) Latin
America, (e) the Middle East, (f) Russia and the
Balkans, (g) South and Southeast Asia, (h) the
UK/Anglo region, and (i) Western Europe. The
following nine chapters address issues of inva-
sion in each of those regions, with detailed
descriptions of each sample appearing in the indi-
vidual chapters.
For this chapter and the subsequent invasion
chapters, up to five prompts pertaining to perspec-
tives on a state’s right to invasion and hypothetical
indiscriminate bombing situations are discussed.
When responding to the first item, “Sometimes a
K. Malley-Morrison et al. (eds.), International Handbook of War, Torture, and Terrorism,
Peace Psychology Book Series, DOI 10.1007/978-1-4614-1638-8_22,
© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2013
22
country has the right to invade another country,”
participants first indicated their level of agreement
on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly
disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). They then explained
their rating in their own words. The other four
prompts asked participants to describe how they
would feel and what they would want to do if
exposed to bombing in a direct and immediate
way. The first scenario is “Another country is
indiscriminately bombing a major city in your
country, and women and children, the elderly, and
civilian men are running around bloody and
screaming. “From this scenario, the two prompts
are: (a) “What would you feel;” and (b) “What
would you want to do?” The final two prompts
are “Your country is indiscriminately bombing a
major city in another country, and women and
children, the elderly, and civilian men are running
around bloody and screaming”. The two resulting
prompts are: (a) “What would you feel?” and (b)
“What would you want to do?”
A coding manual was developed to analyze
participant responses to the right-to-invade item
and the two bombing scenarios. This manual had
two main parts: the first focusing on a country’s
right to invade another country and the second
focusing on the hypothetical bombing scenarios’
emotion and motivation responses. The manual
was developed using both deductive qualitative
analysis and grounded theory. Both approaches
are useful when analyzing and codifying qualita-
tive survey responses (Gilgun 2005; Glaser and
Strauss 1967). When using deductive qualitative
325
326
analysis, researchers begin with a conceptual
framework that is then applied to responses
(Gilgun 2005). The model that is used can then
be adapted to improve its fit with the data. For the
purpose of codifying the responses to the inva-
sion items, Albert Bandura’s theory of moral dis-
engagement became the starting point for the
major categories in the coding manual. In con-
trast, a grounded theory approach requires allow-
ing the themes to emerge from the data without
being forced into prior categories (Glaser and
Strauss 1967). Incorporation of grounded theory
techniques into our evaluation of responses
proved useful in refining Bandura’s mechanisms
for the coding manual.
Albert Bandura’s Theory
Bandura’s (1999) theory of moral disengagement
helps to explain why people behave in a manner
that is contradictory to their moral standards.
Bandura (1999) argued that moral standards are
learned through socialization during childhood.
Once adopted, these moral standards act as self-
regulatory guides for behavior. However, he pos-
tulated that moral guidelines must be consciously
activated and, as such, can be selectively disen-
gaged in the process of justifying immoral
actions. When people act in accordance to their
morals, they gain a feeling of self-worth. In con-
trast, when people behave in a manner contradic-
tory to their morals, they are subject to unwanted
feelings of self-condemnation. By disengaging
from their moral standards, people can avoid
feelings of self-condemnation they would other-
wise feel when acting in an injurious manner.
Bandura (2002) identified four main sociocogni-
tive processes that people utilize when they dis-
engage from detrimental behavior: (a) cognitive
reconstruction of injurious acts; (b) removing/
obscuring personal agency; (c) misrepresenting,
minimizing, or disregarding consequences of
inhumane behavior; and (d) devaluing or dehu-
manizing the victim. A brief description of each
of the processes and constructs identified by
Bandura follows.
T. Campbell
Cognitive reconstruction, the first major pro-
cess of disengagement, occurs through the use of
moral justification, euphemistic labeling, and/or
advantageous comparison (Bandura 1999). When
a person engages in this form of moral disengage-
ment, he or she restructures the harmful behavior
into one that can be seen as serving socially or
morally worthy purposes (Osofsky et al. 2005).
In this way, the behavior is no longer viewed as
detrimental but instead as a behavior that serves a
higher purpose. For instance, euphemistic label-
ing works by removing the negative connotation
of a word, such as sneak attack, and replacing it
with a neutral or socially accepted term, such as
preemptive strike.
In the process of removing/obscuring personal
agency, a feeling of personal responsibility for an
action is reduced, thereby making it easier to per-
petrate atrocious acts (Bandura 2002). Lessening
personal responsibility is achieved by displacing
responsibility for the action onto another party or
diffusing responsibility for a harmful action
among a group of individuals. Through both of
these mechanisms, personal agency is lessened
by diminishing one’s role or completely remov-
ing oneself from the action.
Misrepresenting/minimizing/disregarding
consequences is the third major process of moral
disengagement (Bandura 1999). When using this
process, a person disconnects the consequences
of a negative action from the action. Therefore,
the impact of the consequences is reduced, mak-
ing the behavior appear more acceptable. We saw
no examples of this sociocognitive process in our
participants’ responses, and so we do not discuss
this set of mechanisms further.
The final major sociocognitive process of
moral disengagement is devaluing the victim
(Bandura 1999). Devaluing the victim can occur
in two ways: dehumanization or attribution of
blame. Dehumanizing others makes it easier to
behave inhumanely toward them as they are not
seen as a human but as something with animalis-
tic or demonic qualities. Similarly, by attributing
blame onto another person, one can easily transgress
against that person because he or she is seen as
deserving it. Both of these processes work to
22 Invasion Introduction
weaken one’s moral standards, thereby making
the behavior perpetrated against the victim seem
less inhumane.
Bandura’s counterpart to moral disengagement,
moral engagement, is much less developed.
Although he did not identify specific sociocogni-
tive mechanisms, he did, however, link moral
engagement to moral agency (Bandura 1999).
Thorkildsen (2007) wrote, “Moral engagement
concerns questions of justice, ethical conduct, and
reactions to interpersonal circumstances. [Moral
engagement regulates] humane behavior and the
inhibition of inhumane behavior because it repre-
sents a vision of how the world ought to function.”
Moral agency has two forms: inhibitive and proac-
tive (Bandura 2002). Inhibitive moral agency is
expressed through the refusal to act in an immoral
manner. The proactive form of moral agency is
exhibited by behaving morally, even under pres-
sure to act immorally. “As mentioned earlier, one’s
sense of self is ingrained in one’s moral guidelines
and when acting in accordance to one’s moral
standards, a feeling of self-worth is generated.
When an individual fails “to do what is right [one
incurs] self-devaluation costs. [In proactive moral
agency,] people do good things as well as refrain
from doing bad things” (Bandura , 1999, p. 194).
When manifesting proactive moral agency, one
feels responsible for others and acts accordingly.
The Invasion Manual: Coding
a State’s Right to Invasion for Moral
Disengagement and Engagement
Processes
The invasion coding manual has three levels. The
first level of the manual was developed using the
theories of moral disengagement and moral
engagement to codify responses concerning a
state right to invasion. The second level was our
extension of Bandura’s notions of moral engage-
ment, and more specifically proactive moral
agency, and moral disengagement by utilizing what
we termed personal engagement and personal
disengagement. This level of the manual was
used to code responses to the two hypothetical
bombing scenarios. Finally, the third level was
327
created to capture responses that did not fit with
Bandura’s theory; responses to all of the items
could be coded using this level. Because the sur-
vey was not designed specifically to assess moral
disengagement and engagement, and because the
regional samples are available samples that can-
not be assumed to be representative, it is impor-
tant not to characterize people or regions as
morally disengaged or engaged, although many
of the responses provided by respondents show
reasoning indicative of the constructs in Bandura’s
theory. Therefore, we refer to pro-invasion and
anti-invasion in the discussion of the categories
and results, not moral disengagement and moral
engagement.
Coding Guidelines Regarding a State
Right to Aggression
Informed by Bandura’s theory, we identified four
major coding categories representing four major
sociocognitive processes identified by Bandura as
mechanisms of moral disengagement. We also cre-
ated a general invasion-tolerant category (also
called general pro-invasion category) to code
responses that generally agreed with the right of one
country to invade another country but failed to
expand upon the rationale for agreeing to this right.
The first category, displacement of responsibil-
ity, applied to responses displacing the responsibil-
ity of invading onto another entity, such as “if they
think that it would be better for their country to
invade another then I have no choice.” This category
is reflective of Bandura’s sociocognitive mechanism
of removing/obscuring personal agency. Specifically,
this category captured responses that displaced
responsibility to invade onto an undisclosed author-
ity. Two subcategories of displacement of responsi-
bility were created: deferral to government and
deferral to the international community/UN. Within
these categories, responses displaced responsibility
for the decision to invade onto the government or
the international community, such as the United
Nations, respectively.
The second coding category for justifying
a state’s right to invasion is advantageous
comparison/positive consequences; according to
328
Bandura’s theory, reasoning of this type draws
from the cognitive reconstruction of injurious
behaviors and tends to be a very practical, cost–
benefit mode of thinking. In our manual, the cat-
egory of advantageous comparison/positive
consequences incorporated several of Bandura’s
main sociocognitive processes. This mechanism
works by first deeming nonviolent options as
ineffective and second judging the actions to
bring about more good than harm (Bandura
1999). Responses coded for this category may
also rationalize that a state has the right to invade
when done as a last resort.
Attribution of blame, the third major category,
is reflective of the process of devaluing the victim
because it places blame onto the invaded country
for prior acts of aggression, thereby justifying the
act of invasion. Responses coded into this cate-
gory focus on getting even with the other country
through revenge or punishment; thus, invasion is
portrayed as justified because it is done in retalia-
tion to a previous act of aggression.
The final coding category, pseudo-moral
justification, reflects the reasoning of cognitive
reconstruction of injurious behaviors (e.g., “It
has if there are certain reasons.”). Its subcatego-
ries, self-defense/preemptive strike and pseudo-
assistance, redefine invasion in morally worthy
terms of saving one’s own country and citizens of
other countries. Responses coded for the first
subcategory, self-defense/preemptive strike,
emphasize the need to eliminate threats posed by
the invaded country as a rationale for a preemp-
tive attack and are usually used to justify the
respondent’s agreement with the right to inva-
sion. Responses coded for reasoning characteris-
tic of pseudo-assistance justify the act of invasion
on behalf of citizens of another country, such as
victims of genocide.
Refer to Table 22.1 for examples of the pro-
invasion categories.
To code responses that disagreed with a state’s
right to invasion, we adapted Bandura’s theory
of moral engagement by identifying a set of
sociocognitive mechanisms of moral engage-
ment that paralleled his mechanisms of moral
disengagement. In regard to the prompt,
“Sometimes a country has the right to invade
T. Campbell
another country,” we considered responses that
rejected the right of one country to invade
another country to be consistent with and poten-
tially reflective of inhibitive moral agency as
described by Bandura. Additionally, we catego-
rized responses that generally disagreed with a
state’s right to invasion and did not expand upon
their rationale as general invasion intolerance or
anti-invasion.
A major issue that the GIPGAP coding team
had to address in developing the invasion and
bombing coding guidelines was the fact that the
international community has identified particular
circumstances viewed as justifying invasion.
According to the just war doctrine, a war is just if
it is: (a) a last resort, (b) waged with the right
authority, (c) conducted in a way insuring that
harm and benefit are proportional, and (d) done
for a just cause, with good intentions, and fought
with discrimination (Brook and Epstein, 2006).
These principles were taken into consideration
when we coded for moral engagement processes:
if a response mentioned two or more of these cri-
teria, it was coded for the invasion intolerance.
For example, “Sometimes invading a country is
the only reasonable way to accomplish goals
there, but there needs to be a very well thought
out plan and international consensus. The inva-
sion should be done for legitimate humanitarian
reasons.” This response shows two of the just war
theory criteria: (a) waged with the right authority
(“international consensus”) and (b) done for a
just cause (“legitimate humanitarian reasons”);
consequently, it was not scored for invasion tol-
erance even though it presented rationales for
invasion.
Responsibility, the first anti-invasion coding
category, captures responses that express the idea
that nations must accept responsibility for their
behavior. Responses coded for the first responsi-
bility subcategory, respect for government/sover-
eignty, refer to the obligation of the government
to adhere to established national borders and
national sovereignty. Similarly, honor interna-
tional mandates, the second subcategory of
responsibility, includes responses that emphasize
the need to abide by international law regarding
the right to invade.
22 Invasion Introduction 329

Table 22.1 Categories and examples for invasion-tolerant sociocognitive processes

Major category
Displacement of responsibility
Examples:
“If a country has an obligation to enter
into war and the if the majority of citizens
agree with this”
“Don’t care”
Advantageous comparison/positive
consequences
Examples: “As a last resort when all
diplomatic actions have failed…”
“In the event that this is the best strategy
for saving a majority of lives…”
Attribution of blame
Examples: “Do the same thing (invasion)
to their women and children”
“Depends on how the country provokes
the other countries”
Pseudo-moral justification
Examples: “There are certainly justifiable
reasons for invasion”
“If that country is doing something wrong”
Note. Examples of the categories appear underneath the category names. Responses may have more than one codable
unit; the codable unit that has been coded for the mechanism being illustrated appears in italics
Subcategory
Deferral to government
Example: “I think that each country must make its own decisions. If any
country is threatening people from another country, it can be necessary
to invade”
Deferral to the international community/UN
Examples: “Sure, if the UN says we can”
“Only when they are doing so to intervene, along with other countries,
for the protection and well being of people”
None
None
Self-defense/preemptive strike
Examples: “Only when that country is a clear and definite threat to the
other country. So like self-defense”
“To prevent invasion or to protect oneself”
Pseudoassistance
Examples: “If the other country is truly a danger to the rest of the world”
“If the invasion is done to stop atrocities or genocide”

Appreciating consequences is the counterpart
of advantageous comparison/positive conse-
quences. Responses coded for this category dem-
onstrate a general appreciation for consequences
that may result from invasion. Responses that
recognized negative outcomes of invasion were
coded for negative consequences, a subcategory
of appreciating consequences. The other subcat-
egory, better alternatives/violence as unneces-
sary, encompasses responses that referred to the
availability of other options besides invasion
when dealing with conflict.
Our last invasion intolerant coding category,
principled moral justification, includes argu-
ments that deny a state’s right to invasion by
comparing invasion unfavorably to morally
worthy concepts. Responses coded in the first
subcategory, nonviolence/concern with peace,
emphasize the need to act peacefully, not aggres-
sively. The second subcategory, human rights/
concern for others, captures responses that
express unease for the effects invasion might
have on others and stresses shared humanity;
this category has subcategories for responses
focusing on equality and freedom. Responses
coded into these categories encompass varia-
tions of the Golden Rule and the notion that
freedom must be upheld, respectively
(Table 22.2).
The items concerning the hypothetical bomb-
ing scenarios relate to the emotive and the proac-
tive form of moral engagement. Evidence of
personal disengagement and engagement appear-
ing in the responses to these prompts provided an
opportunity to assess moral agency, which is,
according to Bandura, at the core of moral
engagement. Both personal disengagement and
engagement have agency categories, which were
created to capture a person’s desired or intended
actions in response to these scenarios. In our
efforts to create categories of personal disengage-
ment and engagement, we again tried to account for
330 T. Campbell

Table 22.2 Categories and examples for moral engagement processes

Major category
Responsibility
Examples: “Countries should keep
to their own business, no country
should be doing anything to their
citizens that would want another
country to go in and change
something, if they are need support
from a collective, it is not one
countries right to do this”
“No, if the governing government
wants war than they themselves
should go to war but not send
innocent soldiers to war”
Appreciating consequences
Examples: “There is no point
on engaging war against other
country.”
“Even in really dire circumstances-
it is better in the long run to leave
them alone”
Principled moral justification
Examples:
“Ungodly, in human, loss of
innocent lives”
“It’s really unethical to invade
other countries”
Note. When a response contains multiple codable units, the italicized unit is the section illustrating the category under
which it appears; a response without italics has only one codable unit
Category Subcategory
Respect for government/sovereignty
Examples: “Every country has the right
to be sovereign”
“The states should solve their problems
by themselves”
Honor international mandates
“it’s a question of international policy, but
not a right, unfortunately it is often so”
“All disagreements must be resolved
peacefully under the auspices of the UN”
Negative consequences
Examples: “so people can come, in power
and pursuing personal goals. Regular people
do not want war”
“There is a risk of war. Even small countries
are defended by large”
Better alternatives/violence as unnecessary
Examples: “But nevertheless in modern time
conflicts should be solved with the peace
method”
“The countries should have friendly
relations. Conflict is a war and the war is
millions deaths”
Nonviolence/concern with peace Equality
Examples: “Peace!” Examples: “No country is
“I do not agree with this use of force” culturally above any other
Human rights/concern for others country”
Examples: “Nobody has the right to decide “How would that same country
about the lives of others” feel if invaded?”
“Every country is the asylum of its citizens” Freedom
Examples: “One should respect
each other’s freedom”
“Every country has its own
identity and the citizens have the
right to live freely. Invading even
on the name of assistance for
development is not right”

similarities to the categories in our pro-invasion
and anti-invasion coding systems.
Responses that indicated uncertainty concern-
ing what to do in these situations or said that any
sort of action would depend on the circumstances
were coded for general personal disengagement.
The first category of personal disengagement,
denial of responsibility, captures responses
apathetic to the plights of others being bombed.
Reliance on the government/military, its subcat-
egory, includes responses that express support for
the government or military, thereby sanctioning
the bombing of other countries.
Anti-social agency is the other major category
of personal disengagement. Responses coded for
anti-social agency demonstrate agentic inten-
tions through proposing harmful actions.
Responses that referenced a desire to get revenge
22 Invasion Introduction 331

Table 22.3 Categories and examples for personal disen- Table 22.4 Categories for personal engagement
gagement processes
Major category Subcategory
Major category Subcategory General responsibility Call for the international
Denial of responsibility Reliance on government/ Examples: “Stop the community
Examples: “I would want military bombing. Understand Examples: “to make conflict
to turn off whatever gives Examples: “Patriotic” why the country feels it between the countries been
me information about “To support my government” is necessary to bomb” solved in a peaceful way”
this, such as a TV” “Try by every mean to “To make reparation with all
“Nothing” achieve peace” my fellow nation. Even if
Anti-social agency Vengeful agency reparation is so much that it is
Examples: “Aim better Examples: “To kill those who impossible to make”
next time” are in charge” Pro-social agency Self-referenced agency
“To be one of the “To take revenge” Examples: “To change Examples: “I would organize
bombers” Harming emotions the government” agitations against our
Examples: “Extremely angry “Take our leader out of government and try to
and hate that country” control” pressure the government to
“Fear & hate” stop this activity”
“Petition Congress to stop”
Helping emotions
“I would be ashamed”
“Guilty”
upon the bombing country or to punish them
Humanizing agency Genuine assistance
were coded for vengeful agency, a subcategory of Examples: “Stop my Examples: “to protect and
anti-social agency. Feelings, such as anger, that country and tell them help”
interfere with proactive moral agency were coded what they are doing is “to help as they are innocent”
for harming emotions, the other subcategory of dehumanizing” “to give shelter to refugees”
“Show the government
antisocial agency (Table 22.3). that what they are doing
Responses expressing a desire to understand is wrong”
the bombings or generally called for peace were Note. When a response contains multiple codable units,
coded for general personal engagement. General the italicized unit is the section illustrating the category
responsibility, the first personal engagement cat- under which it appears; a response without italics indi-
cates only one codable unit
egory, is very broad and includes responses with
a general wish to stop the bombing, although they
do not specify how to end it. Its subcategory,
appeal to the international community, encom- empathy that are aroused in morally engaged
passes responses that recognize the need for the behavior, were coded as helping emotions.
use of diplomacy, including taking legal actions The final type of personal engagement is
and making reparations, in dealing with these humanizing agency. Responses coded into this
bombing situations. These categories are the category both demonstrated agency and human-
antithesis of the personal disengagement respon- ized the victims of the bombings. Genuine assis-
sibility categories. tance, its subcategory, includes responses that
A second category, pro-social agency, was cre- expressed a desire to help the victims of the
ated to capture responses that demonstrated proac- bombings, such as through medical assistance
tive moral agency. Responses coded into this (Table 22.4) or aid.
category demonstrate a willingness to take personal While developing the manual, we found that
responsibility for ending the acts of aggression. some responses did not fit Bandura’s theory of
Within this category are two subcategories: (a) self- moral disengagement. Consequently, we created
referenced agency and (b) helping emotions. Self- additional categories that we labeled reality,
referenced agency is characterized by responses undecided, and uncodable. Responses coded for
that show readiness to stand up to one’s own gov- reality stated a fact regarding invasion—e.g.,
ernment in response to its indiscriminate bombing “The US invaded Vietnam.” Responses in the
of another country. Feelings, such as shame or undecided category expressed an uncertainty
332
Table 22.5 Categories not fitting Bandura’s theory
Major category Examples
Reality “Even God-chosen Israel people
invaded other country”
Undecided “Depends on the condition”
Uncodable “I have my limits. There is a
greater need to respond to it
because of information”
about the right of a government to invade another
country. Uncodable was used to capture responses
that could not be coded into any of the thematic
(Table 22.5) coding categories.
Coding Responses to a State’s Right to
Invasion and Hypothetical Bombing
Scenarios
For each participant, responses on up to five of
the previously described items were available for
coding. Some participants completed surveys
that did not have all of the items and consequently
were missing some responses. Additionally, not
all participants responded to every item, even if it
was on the survey. Each response to the questions
was broken down into codable units and coded
individually. Codable units, which coders were
trained to recognize, are distinct sentences or
themes to which separate codes were applied.
Some responses were complex and contained
multiple codable units. Each codable unit received
only one code. For example, the response, “first
help the people and try to minimize the suffering,
then find a way to stop the bombing” contains
three codable units. The first, “help the people,”
was coded as genuine assistance. The second,
“try to minimize the suffering,” was also coded as
genuine assistance, and “find a way to stop the
bombing” was coded as general responsibility.
When discussing the results in the different
regional chapters in this book, we refer to cod-
able units as “responses.” Coders were told that
in analyzing and coding the responses, they were
not passing judgment on the respondents them-
selves but rather identifying themes in the
responses that were given to the items.
T. Campbell
Country files were created in Excel with
demographic information unavailable during the
coding process. First, a state’s right to invade
item was coded. Coders first had to decide if a
response was tolerant or intolerant of invasion
based on the rationale the respondent provided to
justify his or her rating scale response to the item.
If the response did not fit any of the tolerant or
intolerant themes, it was coded for the categories
not fitting Bandura’s theory. As stated earlier,
responses that agreed with the right to invade
were generally coded for the proinvasion catego-
ries. Responses that disagreed with the right to
invade were generally coded for the anti-invasion
categories. However, if responses had at least
two of the rationales of just war theory, they were
coded into the anti-invasion category.
Also, it was possible that a response with
several codable units could be coded for both
pro- and anti-right to invasion themes. For
instance, “If a humanitarian crisis is taking place
within a certain country, the citizens of the world
have a responsibility to stop it. All other reasons
for invasion, for example, to gain resources, to
change the political system or religion, etc, are
unacceptable because they only cause the loss of
life and are rooted in greed and pride.” This
explanation was coded for pseudo-assistance (“If
a humanitarian crisis is taking place within a cer-
tain country, the citizens of the world have a
responsibility to stop it.”), which is a pro-invasion
argument, as it focuses on invading a country that
is experiencing a humanitarian crisis. The expla-
nation was also coded for negative consequences
(“All other reasons for invasion, for example, to
gain resources, to change the political system or
religion, etc, are unacceptable because they only
cause the loss of life and are rooted in greed and
pride.”), which is an anti-invasion category,
because of the emphasis on the loss of life that
happens as a result of invasion.
In general, responses to the “what would you
feel?” question were coded for either helping or
harming emotions, whereas responses to the
“what would you do?” question were coded for
the responsibility or agency categories. Similarly
to the invasion responses, a response to the hypo-
thetical situation prompts could be coded for
22 Invasion Introduction
examples of both personal disengagement and
personal engagement.
In order to reduce potential biases, the files
were blindly coded by a trained coder. The com-
pleted files were then coded and checked by the
team leader to establish coding reliability. For
the item regarding a state’s right to invasion, we
had an intercoder reliability range between 77
and 87%. There was an 82–88% intercoder
reliability range for the hypothetical bombing
scenarios.
Analysis
Once the coding for each region was completed,
analysis on the responses began. Percentages
were calculated on the frequency of each code
using Excel. In the first portion of the results sec-
tion for each chapter, we describe the percentages
of responses coded into each of the major catego-
ries and subcategories.
On an exploratory basis, Statistical Package
for Social Science (SPSS) analyses were then run
to examine the possibility that demographic
groups differed in their likelihood of providing
responses in the different coding categories for
invasion tolerance, invasion intolerance, personal
disengagement, and personal engagement. The
demographic variables that were studied were:
(a) gender, (b) participation in a peace protest, (c)
participation in the military, (d) having a relative
who has been in the military, (e) current religion,
(f) social class, and (g) country.
We created presence/absence scores for every
coding category and subcategory, so that every
codable unit could receive a score for every cod-
ing category indicating whether or not the unit
(“response”) fell into that category; for example,
if a participant’s response was coded as anti-
invasion, that response received a 1 (“present”)
for anti-invasion. If a participant’s response was
not coded as anti-invasion, the response received
a 0 (“absent”) for anti-invasion. The presence/
absence scores allowed us to compute chi-square
tests to determine whether, for example, women
females gave different responses to the invasion
item than the men did. Additionally, scores for
333
the subcategories for the major categories, along
with the general scores for the major categories,
were added together to create superordinate cat-
egories that were also scored for presence or
absence. For example, helping emotions, self-
referenced agency, and pro-social agency were
added together to create the pro-social presence
category. If a response was coded into at least one
of those three coding categories, the pro-social
presence category received a 1.
Count scores were also computed by summing
the number of times a particular theme or argu-
ment appeared in a reply; for instance, if a respon-
dent provided an answer in which he or she listed
two forms of advantageous comparison/positive
consequences (e.g., (“[the government has a right
to invasion] so that it can maintain national secu-
rity and protect our borders”), the count score for
advantageous comparison/positive consequences
would be 2 (and the presence/absence score for
advantageous comparison/positive consequences
would be 1). Again, subcategories were summed
in order to create total scores for superordinate
sum categories in much the same way as for the
presence/absence scores; for example, negative
consequences, better alternatives/violence as
unnecessary, and appreciating consequences
were summed to create the appreciating conse-
quences sum scores category. To illustrate this
summation, the response, “War never success-
fully resolves a conflict. One cannot claim tri-
umph if orphans are created, if children starve, if
the weak perish, if the sick are deprived of treat-
ment…this will always occur in modern warfare.
Humans have the capacity to communicate and
reflect, they should use their capacities when
resolving a conflict,” was coded for five examples
of negative consequences (“War never success-
fully resolves a conflict. One cannot claim tri-
umph if orphans are created, if children starve, if
the weak perish, if the sick are deprived of treat-
ment…this will always occur in modern war-
fare.”) and for three examples of better
alternatives/violence as unnecessary (“Humans
have the capacity to communicate and reflect,
they should use their capacities when resolving a
conflict.”). When summed together, the total
appreciating consequences sum score was 8
334
because there were a total of 8 codable responses
within its subcategories. Furthermore, these cat-
egories are subcategories of anti-invasion, so the
anti-invasion sum score also had a total score of
8. Count scores allowed us to run t-tests and anal-
ysis of variances (ANOVAs).
Chapter Structure
As mentioned previously, each of the following
nine chapters focuses on a region from around
the world. Each chapter starts with an introduc-
tion to the region, which provides a brief history
of invasion for that region and the individual
countries within the region. The history can
include the country’s stance on invasion, its his-
tory as an invading country, and/or its history as
an invaded country.
Following a brief recap of coding categories
and a discussion of the sample from that region,
the chapter focuses on the results to the five inva-
sion items in that region. Authors were given
some leeway to choose which results and items to
discuss and so the chapters differ somewhat from
one another. All of the invasion chapters, except
for the Gulf States, discuss results pertaining to a
state’s right to invasion. Due to the fact that the
majority of the countries in the Gulf States were
administered a survey that did not have this item,
discussion of those results was not included for
the Gulf States. Furthermore, some authors chose
to discuss responses to all four of the hypotheti-
cal scenario prompts. Other authors chose to
focus on responses to the “what would you do”
items for both of the hypothetical bombing sce-
narios. Still other authors chose to discuss the
“what would you do items” together, not differ-
entiating if a response was in regard to another
T. Campbell
country bombing your country or your country
bombing another country. Finally, some authors
chose to do a combination of both.
In the discussion of the quantitative results,
some authors chose not to run all of the statistical
tests on the demographics available for study. For
instance, several chapters describe only chi-
square results. Additionally, some authors
believed that it would be inappropriate to discuss
religion and country differences for certain
regions as the sample was not representative and
they not want to inadvertently draw erroneous
conclusions.
The chapters end with a discussion of the
results. Authors highlighted any interesting or
major findings. They then carefully interpreted
the results and tried to connect the results with
literature on the region, if possible.
References
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Bandura A (2002) Selective moral disengagement in the exer-
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Brook Y, Epstein A (2006) “Just war theory” vs. American
self-defense. Object Stand: J Cult Polit 1(1). Retrieved
from http://www.theobjectivestandard.com/issues/2006-
spring/just-war-theory.asp. Accessed July 2010
Glaser B, Strauss A (1967) The discovery of grounded
theory. Aldine, Chicago
Gilgun JF (2005) Qualitative research and family psy-
chology. J Fam Psychol 19(1):40–50
Malley-Morrison K, Daskalopoulos M, You HS (2006)
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sion. Int Psychol Rep 10(1):19–20
Osofsky M, Bandura A, Zimbardo P (2005) The role of
moral disengagement in the execution process. Law
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 Perspectives on Invasion in Western
Europe 23
Carla Machado, Julia Koenig, Mariana Barbosa,
Mathilde Salmberg, Jaime Lam, Ariel Stone,
Sophie Cox, Tristyn Campbell, Telma Almieda,
Elizabeth Leembruggen-Kallberg, Michael Corgan,
Silja Bara Ómarsdottir, and Christine Roland-Levy

In order to understand the perspectives on
invasion of Western Europeans today, it is impor-
tant to consider the background of these
perspectives. In the ancient Greek tradition, war
was generally seen as the normal state of things,
with peace describing transitory quiet periods
within an ongoing state of conflict (Haspel 2010).
Similarly, in ancient Rome, peace was perceived
as the result of a victorious war and as requiring
military strength to achieve and keep. Haspel
(2010) notes that in both traditions, some thinkers
were opposed to war, such as Plato on the Greek
side and Cicero on the Roman side; both of these
men viewed war as a legitimate political means
but argued that it should be avoided.
In the New Testament, especially the Sermon
on the Mount, peace refers to the coming of the
Kingdom of God as well as having social dimen-
sions (Haspel 2010). “This program of a radical
peace ethic contains such political explosive
force, especially because of the programmatic
nonviolence, that it has been repeatedly blunted by
reinterpretation in Christian reception history”
(Haspel 2010, p. 518). For the first Christian com-
munities, renouncement of violence and the
accompanying refusal to serve in the military were
unproblematic. This changed with the Constantinian
shift (391 ad) when Christianity became the state
religion of the Roman Empire. In the context of
this change, it became necessary to find a political
ethic that synthesized Christianity with loyalty
toward the Roman state. Augustine of Hippo,
while maintaining that peace was a state’s highest
goal, nevertheless assumed that it was impossible
not to engage in war. He developed a concept of a
just war, similar to Plato’s, suggesting that a war is
just if it has a just cause, a just intention (viz., to
establish peace), and is conducted by a legitimate
authority. Other authors, among them Thomas
Aquinas, introduced variations in the concept, but
in general, the concept of a just war entails a com-
promise between the idea that war is inevitable and
that peace should be a state’s highest objective.
From this early thinking, two different devel-
opmental lines can be discerned (Haspel 2010).
One emerges from Martin Luther’s peace ethic,
which denounced wars of aggression and stated
that the only legitimate war was in self-defense.
Luther also maintained that in the case of an
unjust war, individuals had the right to refuse
military service, and he introduced the concept of
nonviolent active resistance against authorities.
Immanuel Kant went even further with his pro-
posals for ensuring everlasting peace.
At the time of the reformation, other authors
furthered the rehabilitation of warfare from a last
resort to a legitimate tool of politics (Haspel
2010). Among these was Machiavelli, who saw
power as the only purpose of a state, implying
that peace could be sacrificed if it helped gain
power. Haspel (2010, p. 526) comments, “From
Hobbes’ state philosophy to the glorification of
war in German romanticism and idealism, from
the war euphoria during the so-called wars of

K. Malley-Morrison et al. (eds.), International Handbook of War, Torture, and Terrorism, 335
Peace Psychology Book Series, DOI 10.1007/978-1-4614-1638-8_23,
© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2013
336
liberation to the war theory of General Carl von
Clausewitz (1780–1831), there’s a line of tradi-
tion that can be called the politicization of war.”
As a result of the devastating consequences of
war, a pacifist movement, with roots in small
groups in the nineteenth century, gained
momentum in Europe (Haspel 2010). This move-
ment was espoused by such leaders of nonviolent
activism as Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi and
Martin Luther King, Jr. Today, Western Europe
can be considered a peaceful area of the world,
since there not only is no current armed conflict
among the states in the area but there is also coop-
eration within the European Union. However,
conflicts in other countries, which lead to discus-
sions of “humanitarian intervention,” pose a great
challenge; it is likely that the thinking of Western
Europeans on invasion is influenced by such con-
siderations. A dramatic example in mid-2011 was
the decision to enforce a no-fly zone over the ter-
ritory of Libya. The question of whether or not a
military intervention in a foreign country can be
defendable or even regarded as an obligation is a
difficult one with ethical, legal, political, and mil-
itary implications. Meyer (2010) argues although
there are important arguments against military
interventions on all levels, emergency assistance
in the face of massive breaches of human and
minority rights remains a duty of the UN, and
each such case must be addressed individually.
Within this broad context, the Western
European countries considered within this book
have somewhat different histories regarding inva-
sion, and we provide a brief overview of each of
these in the next section.
Western European Countries’
Experiences with Invasion
Sweden
Although contemporary Sweden is considered a
strongly peace-oriented country, Swedes (origi-
nally known as Svear), like most peoples, have a
long history of involvement in armed conflict
(Nordstrom 2002). Over the centuries, in order to
C. Machado et al.
enlarge its territory through the Baltic, the
Swedish kings involved the country in several
wars, mainly, against Denmark, Norway, Russia,
Poland, Finland, and Germany. A major change
came to Northern Europe when Sweden, along
with German Protestant princes, France, Denmark,
England, and the United Provinces engaged in the
Thirty Years’ War (1618–1648) against the Holy
Roman Empire. It was this war that established
the enduring belief in nation-states with territorial
integrity and the right of citizens in different
states to worship as they pleased.
In the Great Northern War (1700–1720), the
rulers of Russia, Denmark, and Saxony-Poland
decided to form an offensive against Sweden
(Nordstrom 2002). The war ended with a series of
treaties in 1720 (Treaty of Stockholm) and 1721
(Treaty of Nystad), depriving Sweden of all its
possessions except Finland and part of Pomerania.
In the eighteenth century, Sweden and its king,
Gustavus IV, engaged in war, first with Napoleon
I and then with Russia, with the result that the
Swedish army was defeated, Finland was lost, and
the king was deposed. In 1809, a constitutional
monarchy was established in Sweden, which
lasted until January 1, 1975. In 1813, Sweden,
along with its allies, once again fought against
Napoleon; this is the last war in which Sweden
ever participated. In the two World Wars, Sweden
remained neutral. Throughout the twentieth cen-
tury, Sweden has maintained a policy of neutrality
during all conflict and unalignment in peacetime.
In 1995, Sweden joined the European Union and
is actively involved in international peace efforts,
especially through the United Nations.
Iceland
Iceland was discovered by the Irish before 800 ad
but was settled by Norsemen, mostly emigrants
from Norway, in the period from 874 to 930 ad
(Karlsson 2000). At the end of the tenth century,
led by Erik the Red, Icelanders discovered and
colonized Greenland; around the year 1000, with
the leadership of Leif Ericson, Icelanders were the
first Europeans to land on the American continent.
23 Western Europe Invasion
In the twelfth century, a civil war (1220–1262)
broke out in Iceland, and in 1262, the country
submitted to the rule of the king of Norway.
In 1397, Iceland came under the control of
Denmark. Complete independence was estab-
lished in 1918 by the Treaty of Union with
Denmark; however, both countries shared the
same monarch, Christian X.
Iceland remained neutral in World War I, like
the rest of Scandinavia, and also stayed neutral at
the beginning of the World War II. Nevertheless, in
1940 it was occupied by British forces and in 1941,
by US troops, which remained there until the end
of the war. In June 1944, Iceland became an inde-
pendent republic. In 1946, the Republic of Iceland
was admitted to the United Nations and 3 years
later became one of the founding members of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In
1951, Iceland signed a bilateral defense agreement
with the United States, which was ended by the
USA in 2006. In order to extend its national fishing
limits, Iceland was involved in several disputes
known as “Cod Wars” (in 1958, 1972 and 1975)
with the United Kingdom. Since then, Iceland has
avoided involvement in armed conflict.
France
The region now called France was first settled by
tribes of Celts in ancient times (Haine 2000).
Gallia (Gaul), as it was called by the Romans,
was conquered by Clovis, the king of the Salian
Franks (ad 400s), who adopted Christianity. In
768, Charlemagne became king of the Franks and
later was crowned emperor of the Romans (800).
During his reign, he conquered much of Western
Europe, far beyond the borders of modern-day
France, and united it into one great empire. When
Charles IV died without a male heir (1328), King
Edward III of England, a nephew of Charles IV,
claimed the throne and in 1337 invaded Normandy.
This invasion started a series of wars between
France and England known as the Hundred Years’
War (1337–1453).
During the 1500s, the disagreements between
French Roman Catholics and Protestant
337
Huguenots became worse and triggered a series
of civil wars called the “Religious Wars” (Haines
2000). In 1635, France openly entered the Thirty
Years’ War (a general European war fought
mainly in Germany, 1618–1648), joining the
Protestant allies against the Hapsburg powers,
Austria and Spain. The war ended with the sign-
ing of the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) and the
Treaty of the Pyrenees (1659). From the 1500s to
the 1700s, France became a strong nation, and
during the reign of Louis XIV (1643–1715),
France was the dominant power in Europe.
Due to the constant quest of Louis XIV and his
successors to conquer new territories, France was
embroiled in numerous conflicts and wars such
as the War of Devolution (1667–1668) against
Spain, the Dutch War (1672–1678), the War of
the Grand Alliance (1688–1697), and the War of
the Spanish Succession (1701–1714), which
marked the end of French expansion in Europe.
On May 5, 1789, the events of the French
Revolution began peacefully with the convoca-
tion of the first Estates-General since 1614;
however, the Revolution quickly escalated into
violence as the non-noble and nonreligious peo-
ple of France became more and more frustrated
with the abysmal economic conditions and
oppressive class system (Haine 2000). The same
year, people of the lower class declared them-
selves a national assembly and drafted a new con-
stitution that made France a constitutional
monarchy. In April 1792, after the war against
Prussia and Austria, France was declared a repub-
lic. The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries wit-
nessed several internal French revolutions, the
rise and fall of Napoleon Bonaparte, the Franco-
Prussian War (1870), and, finally, the establish-
ment of the Third Republic.
During the twentieth century, France was
embroiled in and suffered through the two World
Wars. After the second World War, France played
an important part in the Cold War between
Communist countries and Western nations; the
Communist party became one of the biggest and
most influential parties in the country until 1949,
when France became a member of the anti-
Communist North Atlantic Treaty Organization
338
(NATO). Since the September 11 terrorist attacks
in the USA, France has contributed forces
to Operation Enduring Freedom and the
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
in Afghanistan. Currently, France plays a highly
influential role in the EU, especially in the devel-
opment of a Common Security and Defense
Policy (CSDP).
Germany
The roots of the German nation date from
Charlemagne’s reign in the eighth century (Turk
1999). Otto the Great was elected king by the
German nobles in 936, Holy Roman Emperor in
962. The following centuries were marked by
conflict between emperors and popes and years
of political conflicts between Catholics and
Protestants that culminated in the Thirty Years’
War (1618–1648), which left Germany economi-
cally devastated and politically fragmented.
Germany continued to be involved in armed
conflicts throughout the following centuries, usu-
ally with other European nations. In the 1860s,
Otto von Bismarck secured the unification of the
German states after three successive wars, culmi-
nating in the establishment of the second German
Empire (1871).
During the twentieth century, Germany was
involved in the two World Wars, each of which
first led to a substantial increase in the territory
controlled by its military but ultimately led to a
considerable reduction in the size of its territory
(Turk 1999). After its defeat in World War II,
Germany was initially under foreign occupation
and military rule, and for the four decades fol-
lowing the war, two very different Germanys
existed side-by-side—the Federal Republic of
Germany to the west, which developed into a
Western style capitalist democracy, and the
German Democratic Republic to the east, under
the sphere of the USSR. In May 1990, the legisla-
tive bodies of East and West Germany signed a
treaty establishing a monetary, economic, and
social union. The unification of the two German
states was formally established on October 3,
1990, a day on which it was also officially
C. Machado et al.
declared that the united Germany would be a
full member of NATO. On December 2, 1990,
the first all-German elections since 1933
were held.
Spain
Between the second and the first centuries bc,
Spain was under full control by the Roman
Empire (Pierson 1999). The Roman government
brought economic prosperity, political unity, and
the foundations of Spain’s present language, reli-
gion, and laws. The North African Moors crossed
the Strait of Gibraltar into Spain in 711 and within
a few years had conquered the entire peninsula
except for Asturias and the Basque Country.
From the eighth century until 1942, there were
many efforts to force the Moors out of the Iberian
Peninsula. Rival kingdoms fought among them-
selves for many centuries, with many efforts to
unify them, including the notorious Spanish
Inquisition established in 1478, but Spain did not
emerge as a unified nation until 1512.
The sixteenth century has come to be known
as the golden century in Spain, due to the influx
of material wealth from its American colonies, its
status as the most powerful nation in Europe, and
the extensive cultural, artistic, and intellectual
environment (Pierson 1999). Between 1494 and
1559, Spain was involved in the Italian Wars, tri-
umphing over France and adding Naples and the
duchy of Milan to its territories. Charles I, grand-
son of Maximilian I, was elected Holy Roman
Emperor in 1519 and became the most powerful
sovereign in Europe. As Charles V, he ruled
Spain, Naples, Sicily, Austria, the Hapsburg land
in the Low Countries, Belgium, the Netherlands,
and the Spanish colonies in the New World.
Charles V resigned in 1551 and most of his realms
passed to his son, Phillip II. Under Phillip II,
Spain developed into the champion of Catholicism
in Europe; however, involvement in a series of
long, costly wars and revolts, such as the French
religious wars and the rivalry with England on
the seas (which led to the English defeat of the
“Invincible Spanish Armada” in 1588), began to
weaken Spain’s power in Europe.
23 Western Europe Invasion
During the seventeenth century, Spain entered
in the Thirty Years’ War (1618–1648) as well as
several other wars that cost it further territories
and military prestige (Pierson 1999). By 1648,
there was a general peace, even though Spain
continued to fight France until 1659. During the
eighteenth century, the country was consumed by
the controversy over succession to the throne. In
1701, under Phillip V, the War of the Spanish
Succession (1701–1714) broke out, in which
France and Spain opposed England, the
Netherlands, and the Holy Roman Emperor. In
his reign, Phillip lost the southern Netherlands,
Gibraltar, Milan, Naples, Sardinia, Sicily, and
Minorca. After that, Spain was drawn into the
Seven Years’ War (1756–1763), the French
Revolutionary War (1792–1802), and the
Napoleonic Wars (1799–1815). During the
Napoleonic era, Spain was occupied by France.
After the fall of Napoleon in the Peninsular War
(1808–1814), Ferdinand VII was recognized as
king of Spain, and a constitution was drawn up in
1812 at Cádiz.
Much of the nineteenth century was marked
by a series of armed conflicts. Most of Spain’s
colonies in the Western Hemisphere gained inde-
pendence, three wars were fought concerning the
succession to the throne, the First Republic was
established (1873–1874), and the Spanish-
American War (1898) was fought against the
United States, whose victory enabled it to take
Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines out of
Spanish hands.
Spain remained neutral in the First World War,
but a military rebellion led to the outbreak of the
Spanish Civil War in July 1936. General Francisco
Franco’s nationalist forces triumphed, and in
1939, Franco gained control over the nation.
During the Second World War, Spain assumed a
neutral position but followed a pro-Axis policy.
This resulted in Spain’s isolation by the Allies
until Spain signed the Mutual Defense Assistance
Agreement with the USA in 1953 and then joined
the United Nations in 1955. In 1959, the Basque
Fatherland and Liberty (ETA), a terrorist organi-
zation dedicated to promoting Basque indepen-
dence, was founded and still to this day poses a
threat to the Spanish government.
339
After the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United
States, Spain became a key ally in the US-led
fight against terrorism. On March 11, 2004,
Madrid experienced a horrifying terrorist attack
on its commuter rail lines that left 191 people
dead and over 1,400 people wounded. In 2004,
José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero won election for
prime minister, and Spanish forces were immedi-
ately withdrawn from Iraq; however, the Zapatero
administration continued to support operations in
Afghanistan and to cooperate with US govern-
ment on counterterrorism issues.
Portugal
The part of Iberia that is now Portugal has been
independent since 1143 and was the center of a
colonial empire that lasted from the fifteenth cen-
tury to the third quarter of the twentieth century.
In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, during
Europe’s Age of Discovery, the Portuguese
empire spread throughout a vast number of ter-
ritories in Africa, Latin America, India, and the
Far East. In the nineteenth century, Portugal’s
empire was reduced to its colonies on the African
coastline, East Timor, and enclaves in India and
Macau. Occasional conflicts with the Spanish
and French threatened the country’s autonomy,
but the Portuguese always managed to preserve
their independence, often with the support of the
British. The monarchy was overthrown in 1910
by republican forces.
During World War I, Portugal supported the
Allied Powers. The war heightened the disturbing
economic crises the republic was facing. As a
reaction to this turbulence, in 1926 a dictatorial
regime was imposed, lasting for 48 years and con-
stituting the most prolonged authoritarian regime
in Western Europe during the twentieth century.
Portugal, like Spain, stayed neutral during World
War II but followed a pro-Axis policy. After World
War II, Portugal’s leader, António Salazar,
attempted to keep what remained of the old empire
intact at a time when other European countries
were beginning to withdraw from their colonies.
The fight for independence in the African col-
onies began in 1961; the colonial war ended with
340
the political revolution of 1974, a peaceful upris-
ing led by elements of the army that put an end to
the fascist regime and brought democracy to the
country. Although there were strong communist
influences in the government and in the political
measures taken in the first postrevolutionary
years, the country soon progressed into a demo-
cratic regime similar to the ones in most West
European countries. Portugal joined the European
Union (EU) in 1986 and lives today under con-
siderable political stability. Portugal participates
in the EU foreign policy agenda, particularly in
relation to its former colonies in Africa, Latin
America, and Asia (East Timor and Macau).
Portugal is a founding member of NATO and
places a high priority on a strong transatlantic
relationship. The United States has an air force
base at Terceira in the Azores islands, and NATO
has a command center near Lisbon. The former
colony of East Timor remains an important for-
eign policy focus for Portugal. Portugal did not
recognize the 1975 annexation of East Timor by
Indonesia, pursued the cause of East Timorese
independence in international forums for many
years, engaged in helping East Timor in its transition
to independence, and has participated in UN
Security Council-endorsed activities in East
Timor. In 2011, it deployed around 146 paramili-
tary police plus three military officials to the UN
peacekeeping operation in East Timor. Portugal
is a major contributor to peacekeeping operations
in Africa and as of mid-2011 had troops deployed
in Afghanistan, Lebanon, Kosovo, and Bosnia. In
per capita terms, Portugal is one of the most
significant European contributors to international
peacekeeping operations around the world.
Perceptions on Invasion in Western
Europe
The Western European Sample
The Western European sample consisted of 1,008
respondents, 56% male and 44% female.
Participants were volunteers recruited via a vari-
ety of methods, including personal networking
C. Machado et al.
and web links to an online survey, from Germany,
Sweden, Spain, France, Iceland, and Portugal.
Participant age ranged from 18 to 76, with an
average of 34. The majority of respondents (82%)
identified themselves as members of either the
middle or upper-middle class, while 14%
identified as working class, 1% as lower class,
and 2% as upper class. Although only 10% of the
Western European sample reported a history of
military service, 64% of participants reported
having veterans or active military personnel as
family members. Participation in propeace pro-
tests exceeded military experience, with 36% of
respondents reporting experience participating in
antiwar protests.
Measures and Procedures
Participants’ attitudes toward invasion were
assessed via the Personal and Institutional Rights
to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS;
Malley-Morrison et al. 2006). This chapter
focuses on the items within the PAIRTAPS related
to invasion and indiscriminate bombardment.
Participants expressed the extent to which they
agreed with the statement “sometimes one
country has the right to invade another” (from 1,
signifying strong disagreement, to 7, signifying
strong agreement). Participants then provided a
short explanation for their rating scale response.
They also responded to two scenario items ask-
ing what they would want to do if dramatically
confronted with bombing of innocent civilians
either in their country or by their government. As
explained in the introductory chapter to this sec-
tion, the Group on International Perspectives on
Governmental Aggression and Peace (GIPGAP)
developed coding manuals to analyze participant
responses, using both grounded theory and
qualitative deductive analysis based on Albert
Bandura’s theory of moral disengagement
(Bandura 1999) as an analytical and theoretical
foundation. As participants’ stances on a state
right to invasion were often complex, responses
were divided into smaller “codable units” in order
to identify multiple themes within responses.
23 Western Europe Invasion
Moral Disengagement and Invasion-
Tolerant Responses
Albert Bandura’s theory of moral disengagement
identifies mechanisms by which individuals
deviate from personal and social ethical stan-
dards while simultaneously shielding their sense
of self-worth from the negative cognitive conse-
quences of behavior perceived to be immoral
(Bandura 1999). With regard to the item “some-
times one country has the right to invade another,”
participants’ justifications for and/or rejections
of governmental aggression were given codes
classified under four main categories: displace-
ment of responsibility, advantageous compari-
son /positive consequences, attribution of blame,
and pseudomoral justification. Invasion-tolerant
reasoning that involved the displacement of
responsibility was divided into two subcatego-
ries: deferral to government and deferral to the
international community. Responses that sup-
ported invasion if it was condoned by the partici-
pant’s government or indicated general
acceptance of invasion as a self-evident state
right were given the deferral to government code.
Support for UN-sanctioned invasion or acts of
governmental aggression that enjoy support from
an international collective was given the deferral
to the international community code.
Advantageous comparison or positive conse-
quences of governmental aggression focused on
invasion as a legitimate means toward achieving
a perceived beneficial end. Arguments in favor of
invasion that emphasized the perceived ineffec-
tiveness of other alternatives or characterized the
outcomes of invasion as preferable to the status
quo were given the code advantageous
comparison/positive consequences.
Responses that supported state-sponsored
invasion as a means of retaliation against specific
acts of aggression, or as a means to reclaim land
and resources forfeited in previous conflicts, were
coded as attribution of blame.
General mention of using invasion to uphold
an ethical principle, such as peace, justice, or
democracy, was coded pseudomoral justification.
These responses involve the characterization of
invasion as a way to promote peace, freedom,
341
democracy, or other abstract moral virtues.
Pseudomoral justification had two subcategories:
(1) self-defense/preemptive strike and (2) pseudo-
assistance. Support for preemptive strikes against
states seen as posing a regional or international
threat was coded as self-defense/preemptive strike
forms of pseudomoral justifications for invasion.
Unlike responses given the revenge/punishment
code, responses coded as self-defense make no
mention of a specific injustice committed against
the state considering invasion. The self-
defense/preemptive strike proinvasion category is
therefore not an argument for invasion that cen-
ters around retribution for a concrete event; it
instead indicates a definition of “self-defense”
that includes preemptive invasion of nations that
pose a perceived immediate or future threat to
national or international security. Threats often
cited as sufficient cause for invasion include the
harboring of terrorists, indicators of future mili-
tary action, and the development of weapons of
mass destruction. Finally, pseudomoral
justifications for invasion that involve cognitively
restructuring an act of governmental aggression
as a humanitarian or altruistic act were coded as
pseudoassistance. This mechanism of invasion
tolerance involves characterizing invasion as a
means of defending other nations from internal
or external threats. Examples include supporting
the use of invasion to intervene in civil wars, oust
dictators and oppressive regimes, defend other
nations from aggressive powers, or stabilize
regions.
Moral Engagement and Invasion-
Intolerant Responses
Building on Bandura’s work on moral disengage-
ment, the GIPGAP coding team identified a recip-
rocal set of cognitive themes supporting individual
efforts to adhere to personal or social ethical stan-
dards. Apart from responses that rejected the idea
of nations having the right to invade other coun-
tries with little to no further elaboration, which
were given a general anti-invasion code, argu-
ments against a state right to invasion (invasion-
intolerant responses) could be grouped into
three general coding categories: responsibility,
342
appreciating consequences, and principled moral
justification.
Just as individuals can displace or distort
responsibility for governmental aggression in
order to justify or enable morally objectionable
behavior, individuals can remain cognizant of
personal and national responsibilities with regard
to invasion and denounce immoral behavior. The
code responsibility was given to responses dem-
onstrating an insistence on individuals taking
personal responsibility for resisting acts of gov-
ernmental aggression. Responses coded into the
respect for government/sovereignty subcategory
of invasion-intolerant responses emphasized the
importance of state sovereignty, citing the right
and/or responsibility of all states to govern them-
selves and manage internal affairs. The honor
international mandates form of invasion intoler-
ance involves an emphasis on upholding interna-
tional treaties and observing mandates handed
down by the international community.
Arguments that emphasize appreciating con-
sequences of invasion highlight the costs of inva-
sion. The simplest of these arguments against
invasion included statements that characterize
invasion as ineffectual or cited other pragmatic
considerations, such as a lack of resources.
Responses highlighting the negative repercussions
of warfare were given the code negative conse-
quences. Prototypical examples cite death,
regional instability, human displacement, or
human suffering as reasons for rejecting a state
right to invasion. The better alternatives/violence
as unnecessary subcategory is for responses that
recognize or present alternatives to governmental
aggression. Responses included in this subcate-
gory range from simple declarative statements
regarding the existence of alternatives to invasion
to specific examples of options for resolving
international conflict without resorting to govern-
mental aggression.
Just as invasion can be cognitively restruc-
tured as a means of fulfilling moral obligations,
individuals are capable of recognizing the incon-
sistencies between certain moral principles and
acts of governmental aggression, resulting in
principled moral justifications for rejecting inva-
sion. General mention of ethical principles in a
C. Machado et al.
participant response was coded as principled
moral justification. Responses placing a high
value on peace were given the code
nonviolence/concern with peace. Concern for
human rights as an argument against a state right
to invasion was coded as human rights/concern
for others, and rejection of invasion for its role in
creating or perpetuating international inequalities
was coded equality. Views of invasion as an
encroachment upon individual or state freedom
were coded as freedom.
Personal Engagement
and Disengagement
In addition to assessing anti-invasion and proin-
vasion forms of reasoning regarding a state right
to invasion, the research team also evaluated the
degree to which respondents anticipated becom-
ing personally engaged if they ever had to deal
with a specific situation where their country was
bombing another country or being bombed.
Specifically, participants were given the ques-
tions, “another country is indiscriminately bomb-
ing a major city in your country. What would you
feel? What would you want to do?” and “your
country is indiscriminately bombing a major city
in another country. What would you feel? What
would you want to do?”
As with the item concerning invasion, the
GIPGAP team developed a coding manual based
on Albert Bandura’s theory of moral disengage-
ment using deductive qualitative analysis to eval-
uate participant responses. Complex responses
were again divided into smaller codable units in
order to obtain a comprehensive profile of par-
ticipant reactions to hypothetical situations
involving indiscriminate bombing.
Personal Engagement
Responses coded for personal engagement with
regard to the indiscriminate bombardment indicated
a desire to take some kind of action in response to
bombing being carried out either in one’s own
country or by one’s government in another country.
Nonspecific responses such as “help” and “pray”
or responses that demonstrated a desire to uncover
23 Western Europe Invasion
the motivation behind the bombardment (“find
out why”) were labeled as unspecified personal
engagement.
Responses that exhibited personal initiative
such as “stop the bombardment” or “join the mil-
itary” (in the case of the victim scenario) without
any mention of revenge were labeled as general
responsibility. Subcategories of the general
responsibility code included the appeal to the
international community code, in which partici-
pants specifically mention using negotiation or
international pressure to terminate the
bombardment.
The prosocial agency code was given to
responses that showed a willingness to take per-
sonal responsibility for acts of bombardment.
This subcategory also had two subordinate
codes—self-referenced agency and helping emo-
tions. Personal engagement emotion indicated
the presence of feelings such as guilt and shame
in a participant response, while personal engage-
ment action was given to responses that men-
tioned taking specific actions against the offending
government. Mention of attempts to stop bom-
bardment through moral appeals was given the
code humanizing agency, which had a further
subcategory for genuine assistance, used to code
responses mentioning a desire to help victims of
the bombing scenario.
Personal Disengagement
The converse of personal engagement, personal
disengagement, applied to responses indicating a
desire to separate oneself physically or cogni-
tively from the hypothetical bombardment sce-
narios. Attempts to minimize personal
involvement or displace the burden of responsi-
bility from the self to nonspecified others were
given the code denial of responsibility. In the sce-
nario describing bombing of one’s own country,
these responses often focused on a desire to flee,
whereas in response to the scenario where one’s
own country was the one doing the bombing,
these responses often involved an act of cognitive
distancing, such as turning off the news.
More specific codes related to the denial of
responsibility were given to responses in which
participants attempted to place the burden of
343
responsibility on specific parties. Responses that
deferred to the authority of the nation-state were
coded as reliance on the government/military.
Personal disengagement can also manifest in
the form of utilitarian arguments. By reducing
acts of aggression to calculations of gains and
losses, an individual may be able to divert his or
her focus from the scope of human suffering
inherent in events such as bombardment. Attempts
to restructure the scenarios presented in the indis-
criminate bombardment items in such a manner
(i.e., assertions that the use of bombardment
results in or indicates a strong nation) were
assigned the code antisocial agency.
Responses that mentioned the desire to com-
mit acts of retribution in response to bombard-
ment were given the code vengeful agency.
Strong feelings of hatred or anger were inter-
preted as the emotional precursors to revenge and
acts of retribution and were consequently coded
as harming emotions.
Major Themes in Qualitative Responses
Perspectives on a State Right
to Invasion
In response to the 7-point rating scale item stat-
ing that “Sometimes one country has the right to
invade another,” only 45% of Western European
respondents strongly disagreed—that is, they
gave a score of 1. The remainder of the sample
responded with a score of 2 or more, indicating
that they had at least some tolerance for the view
that states have such a right.
With regard to the qualitative responses given
to justify the rating scale answers, 51% of the
responses supported a state right to invasion.
Conversely, 49% of the responses were argu-
ments against such a right.
Arguments in Favor of a State Right
to Invasion
The cognitive restructuring of invasion into an
act of altruism was the most commonly observed
justification for a state right to invasion in the
Western European sample. (See Table 23.1 for
344 C. Machado et al.

Table 23.1 Examples of arguments supporting a government’s right to invasion

Code Percent Country Gender Age Response
International 5 (9) Germany Male N/G If an international consensus has been reached
community/UN France 38 If it is justified in full agreement with international laws
Spain Male 36 Only if the UN agrees
Iceland 34 Not in the hands of one nation, if it is done with the
permission of several countries in a union such as the
UN it is ok
Portugal Female 37 Any invasion must depend on the agreement of a
community of countries and the UN
Advantageous 7 (14) Sweden 38 If a country executes such strong pressure against
comparison/ another nation that an invasion would lessen the total
positive suffering. Utilitarian praxis
consequences Germany Female N/G In the utmost in cases in order to prevent a greater
catastrophe (e.g. nuclear war)
Portugal Male 27 In cases in which the countries’ safety is in danger
Revenge/ 6 (11) Sweden 40 A country has the right to defend itself, for example if
punishment another country invades us, we can hit back
Germany Male Only if attacked and or a direct threat. or if a govern-
ment of another country attacks but not just a minority
Iceland 28 A state should have the right to invade another state to
reclaim stolen land from a previous war as the land in
question is rightfully theirs
Pseudomoral 3 (5) Iceland 40 Only to preserve peace
justification Portugal Male 53 If this country is violating international treaties
Self-defense/ 9 (19) Spain Male 40 In cases of the intention of some group to bring down a
preemptive strike government
Germany Female If the country is also preparing for an attack and builds
up arms, but does not react to attempts at negotiation, it
can possibly be justified to prevent the build-up of arms
with a military attack, apart from that an attack is not
justified
Iceland 26 If it can be proven that a nation is going to use weapons
of mass destruction
Sweden 70 According to the Charter of the UN, a state should only
have the right to use violence if the existence of one’s
own state is being threatened
Portugal Female 36 Invasion is acceptable when the country’s safety is
proven to be seriously jeopardized and all negotiation
opportunities have run out
Pseudoassistance 19 (37) France 22 It is necessary to define the word invade because if a
country needs outside help because of civil war then
another country can serve as mediator
Sweden 38 If the purpose is to preserve the wish of a population to
change its country’s government, an invasion could be
justified
Spain Female 40 If a dictatorship makes the citizens live poorly it will be
necessary that other countries take charge
Germany Male Yes, if that country endangers the safety and peace of
another country
Iceland 42 Every country has the responsibility to fight against
another country that is doing damage to the world
Portugal Female 40 If the invaded country isn’t respecting human rights I
totally agree with invasion to improve the situation for
those who need help
Note: The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total response
set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of the responses out of all the proinvasion responses
23 Western Europe Invasion
percentages and examples of responses indicat-
ing support for a state right to invasion.) Almost
20% of all their responses (and 37% of the
justifications for invasion) invoked forms of
pseudoassistance on behalf of liberating, defend-
ing, or otherwise “assisting” other nations as a
justification for invasion. Legitimate targets of
invasion included nations that request aid and
nations deemed incapable of or unwilling to deal
independently with internal or external threats. A
response from a German citizen suggests that
characterizing an act of governmental aggression
as altruistic may not only minimize negative feel-
ings associated with immoral behaviors but may
also conceptualize invasion as a fulfillment of
moral obligation:
In [a] few cases, another state has the right to inter-
vene in another state’s affairs. This is the case
when the real subject of the state, the people, is
being seriously threatened by a group from their
own state, e.g. the military… Here, another state, if
there’s a chance of success of an intervention, has
a humanitarian duty to intervene.
The second most prominent invasion-tolerant
argument (19% of proinvasion arguments and 9%
of all the invasion responses) used by Western
European respondents justified invasion on the
basis of self-defense or preemptive strike. For
example, a 31-year-old man from Spain stated,
“no one has the right to invade others, however
we have the right and the obligation to defend
what is ours.”
Proinvasion responses coded for advanta-
geous comparisons and positive consequences
comprised 7% of participant responses. Many
of the responses coded as advantageous
comparison/positive consequences centered
around the expectation that invasion, when con-
ducted “properly,” would mitigate human suffer-
ing. For example, a 30-year-old Icelandic
participant stated that invasion is legitimate
“If the country that invades is fair and works
interactively with the country to reach a peace
settlement that everyone can agree on.”
Six percent of participant responses (11% of
all invasion-tolerant responses) fell into the attri-
bution of blame (revenge/punishment) subcate-
gory; these responses generally rationalized
345
invasion as a legitimate means of exacting
revenge for belligerent actions of enemy nations
or repossessing occupied territories or resources.
A somewhat related theme was found in the 9%
of responses displacing blame or responsibility
for invasion onto the international community
(deferral to the international community).
Interestingly, responses given the deferral to the
international community code often accompa-
nied criticism of unilateral state aggression; an
Icelandic participant was very clear in his
response that invasion should “not be in the
hands of one nation” and should instead be an
action that is sanctioned by an international
collective.
Generic pseudomoral justifications for inva-
sion—responses involving unelaborated charac-
terizations of invasion as a means of defending
abstract moral principles—accounted for 5% of
responses coded as proinvasion and 3% of all
responses. Finally, 5% of all proinvasion
responses (2% of all responses) were unspecified
proinvasion.
Arguments Against a State Right
to Invasion
Although a clear majority of the Western
European responses could be viewed as restruc-
turing invasion as an altruistic act, there was also
a wide range of anti-invasion arguments—the
most common of which was an appeal to alterna-
tives. Twenty percent of arguments against a state
right to invasion (10% of all the Western European
responses to this item) were coded for endorsing
better alternatives/violence as unnecessary.
Some of these responses simply stated that alter-
natives to governmental aggression exist; for
example, a 63-year-old French respondent
asserted, “conflicts need to be solved differently.”
Others were more nuanced, citing specific exam-
ples of alternatives to invasion, such as economic
sanctions, negotiation, and international political
pressure.
Other common arguments rejecting a state
right to invasion included appeals to a govern-
mental right to sovereignty (19% of all invasion-
intolerant arguments and 9% of all participant
responses) and principled moral engagement
346
(16% of all anti-invasion responses and 8% of all
responses) and concerns with honoring interna-
tional mandates (13% of anti-invasion responses
and 6% of all responses). Somewhat less com-
mon were arguments expressing a strong concern
with peace and nonviolence and responses
acknowledging the negative consequences of
governmental aggression (10% and 5%, respec-
tively of all the responses to the invasion item).
Even more rare were anti-invasion responses
coded for human rights and concern for others
(4%), equality (2%), principled moral justification
(1%), freedom (1%), appreciating consequences
(1%), and responsibility (0.4%).
For a comprehensive breakdown of participant
responses and prototypical examples of the inva-
sion-intolerant mechanism observed in the
Western European sample, see Table 23.2.
Reactions to Indiscriminate
Bombardment
In contrast to the relatively balanced occurrence
of pro- and anti-invasion responses within the
Western European sample, Western Europeans
showed very little evidence of personal disen-
gagement when faced with indiscriminate bom-
bardment scenarios. Only 11% of participant
responses exhibited personal disengagement,
whereas 89% demonstrated some form of
personal engagement. In the presentation that
follows, the percentages are generally of the
responses from both scenarios combined.
Themes of Personal Engagement
Participants from Western Europe were most
likely to give responses indicating general respon-
sibility in response to the bombing scenarios.
These general statements, reflecting a willing-
ness to take personal action if faced with indis-
criminate bombing, were generally pithy. For
example, a 54-year-old Frenchman said he would
“stop everything.” This type of response
accounted for 26% of all responses exhibiting
personal engagement and 23% of all responses
to this item. (See Table 23.3 for percentages and
examples.)
C. Machado et al.
Responses that reflected genuine assistance
accounted for almost as much of the response
pool, making up 24% of personal engagement
responses and 22% of all responses. The nature of
the projected helping behavior differed somewhat
based on whether the scenario described bomb-
ing of one’s country or by one’s country: Material
aid was often offered when the participant’s
nation was doing the bombing, while immediate
physical aid was more common when the partici-
pant’s nation was the victim of the bombing.
Sixteen percent of all responses (18% of the per-
sonal engagement responses) showed self-refer-
enced agency, characterized by a willingness to
oppose their government, either for committing
acts of aggression or creating the conditions
under which the country came under attack.
Helping emotions, such as guilt and shame
concerning the aggressive acts of one’s home
country, accounted for 13% of all observed per-
sonal engagement responses and was evident in
12% of all participant responses to the bombard-
ment item. These responses tended to be one-
word responses, or did not contain much
elaboration. Nonspecific responses to the bom-
bardment items that expressed unspecified per-
sonal engagement, such as “I would pray” and
“find out why,” comprised 7% of all responses to
the bombardment items and 8% of the responses
showing personal engagement.
Among the less commonly occurring responses
to the bombing items were (1) appeal to the
international community (6% of personal
engagement responses), prosocial agency (4% of
personal engagement responses), and humaniz-
ing agency (1%).
Themes of Personal Disengagement
The relatively small number of scenario responses
coded for personal disengagement fell primarily
into three coding categories: vengeful agency,
harming emotions, and denial of responsibility.
Responses focusing on revenge and harming
emotions accounted for the vast majority (76%)
of personally disengaged responses, with 46% of
the personal disengagement responses character-
ized by vengeful agency and 31% by references
to harming emotions, such as extreme anger or
Table 23.2 Examples of arguments against a state right to invasion
23

Code Percent Country Gender Age Response

Moral 8 (16) France 25 It’s inadmissible
engagement Iceland 15 It can never be justified
Responsibility 0.2 (0.4) Germany Female No, if the governing government wants war than they themselves should go to war but not send innocent
soldiers to war.
Government/ 9 (19) France 24 I don’t see why a country should have the right to invade another under the pretext that it is more powerful.
sovereignty If this country wants reinforcements, it asks for help. If it doesn’t ask for anything, leave it alone and stop
this interference. The real problem is that all conflicts “automatically” become world problems. And that
Western Europe Invasion

certain countries believe themselves to be more powerful than others because their demographic change is
finished and they have a referential currency…
Sweden 25 A country’s sovereignty is one of the most fundamental principle in international law, to open doors for
allow countries to one-sidedly walk in and violate this international rights would be to open doors for abuse
that could result in catastrophic consequences
Spain Male 29 Each country must have its own identity and its own sovereign government
Germany Female People must solve the conflicts in their own lands. It is very difficult to do so from the outside. It’s also
incapacitating
Iceland 40 No every country should have the right to control their internal affairs
Portugal Male 33 Each county is sovereign. It’s the people, only the people that have the right to choose and decide which
future they want to have. No country has the right to consider itself as the owner of the “whole truth” and
force other countries to do anything…
International 6 (13) France 27 The right to interfere should be limited to diplomacy (eventual economic sanctions decided at the UN) and
community/ in no case should a country invade another
UN mandate Spain Male 28 Nowadays there are organizations such as the UN who should mediate international situations
Portugal Male 47 If there are communities such as the EU and consequently there are political agreements towards economy
and peace, why engage in wars?
Iceland 24 By international law, no right to invade another country exists. Only self-defence under strict conditions can
be legal and justifiable. If international law is not adhered to, we can forget about peace and stability
Utilitarian 0.4 (1) France 24 We are building Europe it’s no time for invasion
Negative 5 (10) France 20 War only solves short term problems while creating way too many long term ones
consequences Sweden 34 Violence leads to violence, it never contributes anything good
Portugal Female 36 Invasion sometimes creates new problems, which can be very complicated to solve and bring worldwide
imbalance…
Germany Male Because an attack on another country could mean the death of many innocent people, thus I believe that this
attack is not just. Invaders commit the same criminal acts as terrorists, they breach the rule of human rights
(continued)
347
 348

Table 23.2 (continued)

Code Percent Country Gender Age Response
Better 10 (20) Sweden 30 I do not believe in the principle of sovereignty and oppose military intervention. However, I do believe that
alternatives/ can be completely legitimate to implement restrictions and other pressures against a state that violates
violence as human rights or in other ways oppresses its people
unnecessary Spain Male 49 Conflict should be resolved with dialogue and negotiation
Germany Female Is an infraction on human rights for me, but if a country breaches human rights, I would try to intervene in
other ways, but not with the military
Portugal Female 28 It should be other ways to solve conflicts without the invasion of other countries…
Iceland 28 States should not conduct a violent foreign policy, they have many other sharp foreign policy tools than
military force
Moral 0.4 (1) Spain Male 18 Is not ethic (but it’s clear that the fastest way that a country can enrich is by conquering another)
justification
Nonviolence/ 5 (10) Sweden 30 An attack is unacceptable in a quest for peace and I assume we are aspiring towards peace as opposed to war
concern with Spain Female 60 I do not support war, regardless of the reason
peace Germany Male Seneca Peace that is unjust is better than a just war
Portugal Female 55 Peace is everyone’s right
Iceland 35 No it is not a solution. Peace will be more feasible if invasions are stopped
Human rights/ 3 (6) Portugal Male 43 I believe invasion is an act that violates human rights
concern for
others
Equality 2 (4) Iceland 35 The U.S. have weapons of mass destruction and that’s why it’s unfair of the U.S. to invade countries that
have those weapons
Freedom 0.4 (1) France 23 To invade is to destroy all forms of respect and freedom towards a people
Portugal Male 25 The freedom of each country should not be disturbed
Note: The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the
percent of the responses out of all the anti-invasion responses
C. Machado et al.
Table 23.3 Examples of personally engaged responses to a bombing scenario
23

Code Percent Country Gender Age Response

Personal 7 (8) France 21 Do whatever it takes for peace to come back
engagement Portugal Male 41 “Pray” to find out a solution
Sweden 30 Help and get involved
Personal 23 (26) Sweden 24 Join the closest military group that works against aggressors
responsibility Portugal Female 30 Stop the situation and repair the damages
Germany Female Stop the additional bombing
International 5 (6) Sweden 28 Contact an organization in the country being bombed to initiate a dialogue
Western Europe Invasion

community Spain Female 40 To persuade them into using other ways to solve conflicts
Iceland 50 Call to the outside world for intervention
Portugal Female 28 Appeal to my country citizen’s conscience and try to show them how wrong they are, cause there’s not like
that they accomplish something…
Iceland 25 Find those who started the fighting and see to that they are penalized for breaking international treaties and
laws
Prosocial 4 (4) France 52 Contact my representative and express my view
agency Portugal Male 46 Contribute in any way so that my country would stop the aggression
Sweden 34 Make sure my country does not respond in the same way—with violence
Iceland 28 Make sure that my state would pay for reparations
Germany Male I would end the war by means of my contacts to influential politicians
Iceland 25 Ask for a re-election. Make the wrongdoers pay. Vote for new political groups that are against attacks like
these and against those who support the attacks
Helping 12 (13) France 21 Shame, disgust towards my country and pain and compassion for the bombed country
emotions Germany Female 70 Answerable, guilty
Portugal Male 34 Completely ashamed
Iceland 35 Humiliated and ashamed of what I stand for.
Self- 16 (18) France 56 Communicate in any manner possible with the representatives of my government that this action is immoral,
referenced doesn’t represent my opinion. Organize the largest possible group for protest. Change the government that
agency doesn’t represent my values
Portugal Female 47 Gather a great amount of people to protest in front of the Government facilities until they ceased fire
Sweden 40 Protest against war without use of violence
Germany Male Seek everything possible that will stop the bombing, for example, blockade the runway of the airplanes
Iceland 62 Protest and work against the aggressor.
(continued)
349
 350

Table 23.3 (continued)

Code Percent Country Gender Age Response
Moral 0.6 France 21 Show my country that what it’s doing isn’t humane. Do it in a way that peace returns
justification (0.6) Portugal Female 26 Promote peace
Genuine 22 (24) France 19 Succeed in calming people, proposing actions that restore order and calm, and help the people in trouble
assistance Sweden 29 If I had the opportunity I would actively help wounded otherwise I would donate to organizations that have
the possibility to actively help
Portugal Female 54 I would help those who are suffering
Spain Female 43 To contact humanitarian organizations to see how I could help the traumatized
Germany Female Solve the conflict in a peaceful way so that, no matter which side, no more civilians will have to suffer
Iceland 15 Start a help foundation and get the people involved who lost their loved ones. That is a hard task since they
are all grieving
Note: This table contains personal disengagement and engagement responses to both bombing scenario items combined. The first number in the percent column refers to the percent-
age of responses in that category out of the total response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of the responses out of all the personal engagement
responses
C. Machado et al.
23 Western Europe Invasion 351

Table 23.4 Examples of personally disengaged responses to a bombing scenario

Code Percent Country Gender Age Response
Denial of 2 (21) Sweden 33 [I’d feel] nervous—don’t watch the news anymore
responsibility Portugal Leave the country
Germany Male Run far away with the family to avoid the revenge.
In no case play the hero
Government/ 0.1 (1) France 26 Protect myself and my family and my friends. Let
military my government take over the rest
International 0.1 (1) Germany Male Hope that the UN could stop the whole thing and
community bring the responsible to justice
Utilitarian 0.1 (1) Sweden 31 Aim better next time
Revenge/ 5 (46) France 21 Kill the heads of the army of the aggressing country
punishment and equally kill all the members of its government
Sweden 24 Find the people responsible and cut their throats off
(which I of course should not have the right to do)
Portugal Beat my country’s politicians
Strangle the Prime Minister
Spain Male 25 To kill and get revenge for my own people
Germany Female Do the same back to the other country, only a
hundred times worse, then take all their land for
ourselves
Iceland 37 Want to punish those who did it although that is
wrong too
Hurting 3 (31) France 34 Hate
emotions Sweden 31 Badly and despise for those who are doing this
Germany Male Alarmed, outraged, confused, depressed, aggressive
Note: This table contains personal disengagement and engagement responses to both bombing scenario items com-
bined. The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total
response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of the responses out of all the personal disengage-
ment responses

hatred. Most of the other personally disengaged
responses to the scenario items (21%) were coded
for denial of responsibility. Responses coded for
reliance on the government and military and
antisocial agency were quite rare. A more detailed
geographic and demographic breakdown of
examples of personally disengaged responses can
be found in Table 23.4.
Exploratory Demographic Analyses
Exploratory chi-square analyses were conducted
to explore the possibility of demographic differ-
ences (based on gender, whether the participant
had ever been in the military, whether the partici-
pant had a relative that had served in the military,
and whether the participant had ever taken part in
a protest) in participants’ reasoning about a state
right to invasion and their answers regarding
what they would want to do if faced with another
country bombing innocent civilians in their own
country or their country bombing civilians in
another country. All group differences identified
as statistically significant had p-values of 0.05 or
smaller, and group differences identified as mar-
ginally significant had p-values between 0.056
and 0.10. Because the sample was a convenience
sample, all differences should be considered to
be tentative and hypothesis-generating rather
than final.
352
State’s Right to Invasion
Chi-squares revealed significant gender differ-
ences in both pro- and anti-invasion response
patterns. In regard to proinvasion responses, chi-
square analyses indicated that significantly more
men than women gave at least one of the proinva-
sion responses, attributed blame to the victim,
and gave pseudomoral justifications. In regard to
anti-invasion arguments, chi-square analyses
revealed that significantly more women than men
used at least one of the anti-invasion arguments
and at least one of the appreciating consequences
arguments and cited better alternatives and vio-
lence as unnecessary.
Chi-square analyses also revealed significant
differences in the use of pro- and anti-invasion
responses based on whether or not respondents
had ever been involved in the military. Specifically,
marginally more military than nonmilitary
respondents gave at least one of the proinvasion
arguments, and significantly more of them
showed displacement of responsibility, deferral
to the international community, and attribution of
blame in their responses. Compared to respon-
dents with no experience in the military,
significantly more respondents with military
experience gave at least one of the responsibility
arguments and cited respect for international
mandates. Overall, respondents with military
experience seem to make more arguments, pro
and con, regarding a state right to invasion than
their counterparts.
Chi-square analyses also revealed several dif-
ferences in the anti- and proinvasion response
patterns based on whether or not respondents had
relatives in the military. Chi-square analyses
indicated that respondents with relatives in the
military were marginally more likely than their
counterparts to give at least one pseudomoral
justification for war and to reference self-defense
and preemptive strike. Moreover, in relation to
anti-invasion responses, chi-square analyses
revealed that significantly more respondents
without relatives in the military than their coun-
terparts gave anti-invasion arguments referenc-
ing nonviolence and concern with peace.
C. Machado et al.
Finally, chi-squares revealed multiple
significant differences in pro- and anti-invasion
response patterns contingent on whether or not
respondents had participated in antiwar protests.
In regard to proinvasion responses, chi-square
analyses revealed that significantly more protest-
ers than nonprotesters used at least one of the dis-
placement of responsibility arguments and
indicated that they would defer responsibility to
the international community; they were also mar-
ginally more likely than their counterparts to cite
self-defense and preemptive strike as justifications
for invasion. Nonprotesters were marginally
more likely than protesters to give responses
demonstrating the use of advantageous compari-
son and positive consequences to justify inva-
sion. Regarding anti-invasion responses,
chi-square tests showed that significantly more
protesters than nonprotesters gave at least one of
the anti-invasion responses and at least one of the
appreciation of consequences responses as well
as showing respect for international mandates
and respect for nonviolence and concern with
peace. Protesters were marginally more likely
than nonprotesters to use principled moral
justification arguments.
Percentages of responses in pro- and anti-
invasion coding categories by demographic
groups and chi-square values can be found in
Table 23.5.
Another Country Bombing
Your Country
In responses to a scenario where one’s country
was being bombed by another country, chi-
squares revealed significant differences in both
personally engaged and personally disengaged
response patterns based on the gender of the
respondent. Chi-squares revealed that significantly
more men than women gave responses indicating
at least one of the antisocial agency themes as
well as citing harming emotions. Significantly
more women than men gave at least one personal
engagement response as well as responses indi-
cating prosocial agency. Military respondents
23 Western Europe Invasion 353

Table 23.5 A state’s right to invade: percentages of responses in coding categories by demographic groups and chi-
square values
Group 1a Group 2a
Categories Male Female c2
Proinvasion presence 26 20 4.36*
Attribution of blame 4 2 4.63*
Pseudomoral justification 2 0.4 7.47**
Anti-invasion presence 25 33 7.93**
Appreciating consequences presence 7 12 8.33**
Unspecified anti-invasion 3 5 3.48^
Better alternatives/violence as unnecessary 5 8 5.37*
Military Nonmilitary
Proinvasion presence 31 22 3.93^
Displacement of responsibility presence 7 2 7.52*,b
Deferral to international community 7 2 7.52*,b
Attribution of blame 7 3 5.22*,b
Responsibility presence 21 12 5.89*
Respect international mandates 8 3 6.07*
Relative military No relative military
Pseudomoral justification presence 17 12 3.57^
Self-defense/preemptive strike 6 3 3.61^
Nonviolence/concern with peace 1 6 16.62***
Protest No protest
Displacement of responsibility presence 4 2 6.14*
Deferral to international community 4 2 6.14*
Advantageous comparison/positive consequences 2 5 3.23^
Self-defense/preemptive strike 7 4 3.97^
Anti-invasion presence 34 27 4.17*
Appreciating consequences presence 13 8 4.10*
Principled moral justification 9 5 3.89^
Respect for international mandates 6 2 7.24**
Nonviolence/concern with peace 5 2 8.29**
Note: “Presence” at the end of a variable name indicates that the participant provided at least one example of a response
that was coded into that category and/or one of its subcategories
PI proinvasion, AI anti-invasion
*
p £ 0.05; **p £ 0.01; ***p £ 0.001; ^0.05 < p < 0.10
a
The numbers in these columns are the percent of the group that gave responses falling into each of the specified
categories
b
Fisher’s p-value

were marginally more likely than nonmilitary
respondents to give responses indicating at least
one antisocial agency argument.
Chi-squares revealed differences in the use of
both personally disengaged and personally
engaged responses depending on whether or not
the respondent had relatives in the military.
Significantly more participants with relatives in
the military than their counterparts gave at least
one example of personal disengagement and at
least one example of denying responsibility; they
were also more likely to give responses indicat-
ing harming emotions. For personally engaged
responses, chi-squares revealed that respondents
without relatives in the military were marginally
more likely than their counterparts to demon-
strate unspecified personal engagement and to
give responses indicating that they would appeal
354 C. Machado et al.

Table 23.6 Another country bombing your country: percentages of responses in coding categories by demographic
groups and chi-square values
Group 1a Group 2a
Categories Male Female c2
Antisocial agency presence 10 7 4.00*
Harming emotions 5 3 4.24*
Personal engagement presence 45 52 4.59*
Unspecified personal engagement 5 8 5.66*
Prosocial agency 0.4 2 5.94*
Military Nonmilitary
Antisocial agency presence 13 8 3.92^
Relative military No relative military
Personal disengagement presence 12 7 6.16*
Denial of responsibility presence 2 0.3 4.59*,b
Harming emotions 5 1 8.16**
Denial of responsibility 2 0.3 4.13*,b
Unspecified personal engagement 6 9 3.40^
Call for international community 4 7 3.72*
Protest No protest
Personal disengagement presence 13 8 4.10*
Antisocial agency presence 11 7 5.61*
Harming emotions 6 3 6.40*
Personal engagement presence 56 46 8.11**
Humanizing agency presence 25 19 4.62*
Unspecified personal engagement 9 5 7.07**
Call for international community 8 4 6.22*
Genuine assistance 24 19 3.82^
Note: “Presence” at the end of a variable name indicates that the participant provided at least one example of a response
that was coded into that category and/or one of its subcategories
*
p £ 0.05; **p £ 0.01; ***p £ 0.001; ^0.05 < p < 0.10
a
The numbers in these columns are the percent of the group that gave responses falling into each of the specified
categories
b
Fisher’s p-value

to the international community if their country
was being bombed.
Finally, chi-square analyses revealed significant
differences in personally engaged and disengaged
response patterns contingent on whether or not
respondents had ever participated in protests.
Significantly more protesters than nonprotesters
gave responses with at least one of the personal
disengagement themes and at least one of the
antisocial agency themes, as well as being more
likely to reference harming emotions. Chi-square
analyses also indicated that significantly more
protesters than nonprotesters gave at least one
personal engagement response and responses in
at least one of the antisocial agency categories.
Protesters also gave significantly more responses
than their counterparts calling for the interna-
tional community. Protesters were marginally
more likely than nonprotesters to give responses
indicating genuine assistance.
Percentages of responses in personally
engaged and disengaged coding categories by
demographic groups and chi-square values can
be found in Table 23.6.
23 Western Europe Invasion
Your Country Bombing Another
Country
Chi-squares revealed significant gender differ-
ences in personally engaged and disengaged
response patterns to a scenario in which one’s
own country is bombing another. Significantly
more men than women gave responses using at
least one of the personal disengagement catego-
ries in their responses and marginally more
responses reporting harming emotions. In addi-
tion, significantly more women than men pro-
vided at least one of the humanizing agency
responses as well as helping emotions and genu-
ine assistance.
Chi-squares also revealed significant differ-
ences in personally disengaged and marginal
differences in personally engaged responses
contingent on whether or not the respondent had
experience in the military. Respondents with
military involvement gave significantly more
responses than those without indicating at least
one of the personal disengagement and at least
one of the antisocial agency categories.
Respondents without military experience were
marginally more likely than their counterparts
to demonstrate helping emotions in their
responses. Chi-squares indicated only marginal
differences in personal engagement response
patterns based on whether or not respondents
had a relative in the military. Specifically, chi-
tests revealed that respondents with relatives in
the military were marginally more likely than
their counterparts to give responses indicating
personal engagement.
Chi-squares did not reveal any significant dif-
ferences in the use of personal disengagement
responses contingent on whether or not the par-
ticipant had ever been involved in protests but
did reveal significant differences in personal
engagement themes. Chi-squares revealed that
significantly more nonprotesters than protesters
gave responses in at least one of the responsibil-
ity categories; protesters, on the other hand, gave
significantly more responses than nonprotesters
in at least one of the prosocial agency categories,
self-referenced agency, and humanizing agency.
355
In addition, protesters were marginally more
likely than their counterparts to call for the inter-
national community and demonstrate helping
emotions in their responses.
Percentages of responses in personally
engaged and disengaged coding categories by
demographic groups and chi-square values can
be found in Table 23.7.
Summary and Conclusions
In this chapter, we provided a very brief history
of invasion and war in Western Europe and then
provided some context for the experiences with
war and invasion of six countries: France,
Germany, Iceland, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden.
These are all countries with some experience of
violence and invasion in the past, but they differ
in respect to how recently the countries have been
subject to or have perpetrated invasion. We then
reported on the patterns we found in PAIRTAPS
responses in a convenience sample from 1,008
Western Europeans from these six countries. The
responses were divided evenly between the
unconditional rejection of a state’s right to invade
another country (49%) and reasons to justify such
an invasion (51%). Among responses indicating
tolerance for invasion in certain circumstances,
the most frequently used justification focused on
intervention for the humanitarian purpose of
helping others (20% of all responses). The sec-
ond most frequent justification for invasion was
for the purpose of self-defense (9% of all
responses).
Arguments against a state right to invasion
most frequently referred to the availability of
better alternatives or indicated that invasions
are unnecessary (10% of all responses). Other
arguments highlighted the principles of govern-
ment responsibility and sovereignty (9%), or
emphasized international treaties and the respon-
sibility to intervene nonviolently (6%).
In addition to the more general question con-
cerning a potential state right to invasion, the
PAIRTAPS also asked for emotional and behav-
ioral reactions to scenarios of one’s country
356 C. Machado et al.

Table 23.7 Your country bombing another country: percentages of responses in coding categories by demographic
groups and chi-square values
Group 1a Group 2a
Categories Male Female c2
Personal disengagement presence 6 3 4.67*
Harming emotions 2 0.4 4.21^
Humanizing agency presence 9 15 7.94**
Helping emotions 11 20 13.27***
Genuine assistance 9 15 7.32**
Military Nonmilitary
Personal disengagement presence 10 4 6.42*,b
Antisocial agency presence 7 2 7.52*,b
Helping emotions 10 17 3.47^
Relative military No relative military
Personal engagement presence 63 56 3.59^
Protest No protest
Responsibility presence 18 26 9.13**
Prosocial agency presence 40 29 11.56***
Helping emotions 19 14 3.80^
General responsibility 14 24 13.90***
Call for the international community 4 2 2.99^
Prosocial agency 7 3 6.65*
Self-referenced agency 25 17 10.72***
Humanizing agency 1 0 6.49*,b
Note: “Presence” at the end of a variable name indicates that the participant provided at least one example of a response
that was coded into that category and/or one of its subcategories
*
p £ 0.05; **p £ 0.01; ***p £ 0.001; ^0.05 < p < 0.10
a
The numbers in these columns are the percent of the group that gave responses falling into each of the specified
categories
b
Fisher’s p-value

bombing another and one’s country being
bombed by another. In these scenarios, Western
Europeans showed very little evidence of per-
sonal disengagement with 89% of responses
exhibiting some form of personal engagement.
Most of these responses (23% of all personal
engagement responses) reflected an unspecific
willingness to take personal responsibility, or
reflected a desire to help others (22% of all per-
sonally engaged responses). The few personally
disengaged responses mostly fell into the venge-
ful agency category.
One of the most remarkable things about these
findings is not in the data themselves but the
European context in which they were adduced.
For nearly two millennia, from the first barbarian
incursions of the Roman Empire until the end of
World War II, no other part of the planet had seen
such constant warfare as the area that came to be
called Europe. So expert had these peoples
become in killing their fellow humans in large
numbers that European arms more than European
ideas came to dominate the entire globe.
One early American president, Thomas
Jefferson, in his first inaugural address, could
congratulate his countrymen, as escapees from
this slaughter, on the fact that “a wide ocean”
separated them from the “exterminating havoc of
a quarter of a globe.” Yet a little over 200 years
later, it was the outgoing American Secretary of
Defense, Gates (2011), in unusually blunt and
undiplomatic language, who castigated Europeans
for not doing nearly enough in terms of spending
on arms and in conducting the bombing cam-
paign then underway against Libya. Clearly, this
was a vastly different Europe from the one that
23 Western Europe Invasion
had laid waste to so much of the world with its
incessant wars. What had changed?
The data show that ordinary people had largely
lost what appetite they had for warfare in the past
100 years since a perversion of the scientific
findings of Charles Darwin, so-called social
Darwinism, had convinced so many that fighting
was a proper thing to do. Europe had even engen-
dered popular political movements, namely, fas-
cism, whose very premise was based on the
superiority of peoples as demonstrated by their
ability to wage war more successfully than their
neighbors (Paxton 2004).
Not only had ordinary people lost their taste for
war and warfare but national leaders had also
begun, slowly to be sure, to look for ways to achieve
peaceful or at least nonviolent reconciliations of
difference. Surely, the effects of two world wars, or
perhaps one long European civil war, had much to
do with this growing mood. Immediately after the
Second World War was over, there was the obvious
divide between the two avowedly hostile camps of
socialist east and capitalist west. But for all the talk
of iron curtains and inevitable violent conflict, there
were differences from the binding pre-World War I
alliances that automatically put countries at war
when their alliance partners went to war.
Take the still extant NATO alliance. Often cred-
ited as the most successful and enduring military
alliance, it was, in theory, more of an alliance of
like-minded democracies with compatible systems
than a military pact. Not until Article 5 is there a
mention of the military aspect to the alliance and
then it is carefully spelled out that each participant
will act according to its national procedures. Early
on Churchill was reportedly “staggered” when he
realized that Iceland, with no military whatever,
might hold the chairmanship of the Atlantic
Council (Truman 1952). At any rate, Article 5 was
never formally invoked until the attack on the
United States on September 11, 2001. Peace, out-
side the Balkans at any rate, had come to Europe.
Even while the two opposing camps were
hardening their military postures toward each
other, a new spirit had taken hold among two of
the most virulent of former adversaries. France
and Germany forged a coal and steel community
that eventually became the European Union of
357
today. Although there was and still is a good deal
of sideways and sometimes even backward
momentum, the overall success of the project is
undeniable. Borders are open, economies are, for
better or worse, inextricably linked by a common
currency among other things, and it is not now
conceivable that any members of the Union
would go to war with one another. Even the out-
lier and would-be member, Turkey (withal a
founding member of the Council of Europe in
1949), has moderated its conflict with Greece of
Cyprus to the nonmilitary sphere.
We are left with the happy irony that when we
speak of the deterioration of the alliance of
European states today being in serious jeopardy,
it is the military and not the peaceful alliance that
we mean.
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 Perspectives on Invasion: Great
Britain, Northern Ireland, United 24
States, Canada, and Australia

James Page, John M. Davis, Michael Whitely,

Ariel Stone, Tessa Schaaf, and Doe West

Great Britain, Northern Ireland, the United States
of America (USA), Canada, and Australia share
many commonalities. One of the more obvious
ones is that all four nations share English as a
common language, which is an indication that all
four nations share a common British colonial or
imperial heritage. Interestingly, all four nations
are developed nations, and all four share a high
standard of living. All four are also to some extent
geostrategically linked, with the United Kingdom,
the USA, and Canada linked through the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); and the
USA, Australia, and New Zealand, linked
through the Australian, New Zealand, and the
United States (ANZUS) Treaty Alliance. All four
nations, with occasional exceptions, share a com-
mon record of involvement in military conflict,
including the two World Wars, the Korean War,
the Vietnam War, the Gulf War, the invasion of
Iraq, and the Afghanistan War. The common
background and strategic orientation of these
Anglophone countries therefore suggests a com-
bined analysis.
The USA, Canada, and Australia are also set-
tler countries, where European settlers and their
descendants now represent the dominant popula-
tion group, vastly outnumbering the remnants of
the indigenous populations. It is interesting to
enquire exactly how Europeans came to domi-
nate the above three countries. Crosby (1986) has
argued that what he calls Neo-Europe has devel-
oped in regions which are temperate and thus
have the most potential to be food-producing
areas. It is logical that Europeans should seek to
settle these areas. Diamond (1998) argues that
specific advantages, such as the possession of
domesticable animals and advanced weapons,
have led to European dominance within Neo-
European countries.
Imperialism, War, Peace, and Invasion
The description of the above countries as settler
countries introduces the vexing issue of imperial-
ism and the relationship of the above countries to
the question of invasion. Does settlement of a
country equal invasion? This is a complex issue,
not the least because at the time of settlement, the
areas under settlement did not have formal status
as nation-states. It could be argued, therefore, that
the above nation-states have never been invaded.
Yet the reluctance to recognize the invasion of
colonized countries by the colonizer reflects a
tendency to see the indigenous inhabitants of the
above countries as being less than the norm, or,
worse still, fails to see them as being historically
significant at all. They are, as it were, nonpersons.
This is why it is appropriate that we should be
examining the issue of invasion with regard to the
above countries in the context of imperialism and
specifically British imperialism.
John Darwin, in his global history of imperial-
ism (2007), describes both World Wars of the
twentieth century as the culmination of empire-
building. What complicates this theory ethically

K. Malley-Morrison et al. (eds.), International Handbook of War, Torture, and Terrorism, 359
Peace Psychology Book Series, DOI 10.1007/978-1-4614-1638-8_24,
© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2013
360
is that these attempts at empire-building were
attempts that mimicked the imperialism of previ-
ously established empires. The aggressor nations
in the World Wars were, according to Darwin,
engaged in an attempt to build empires, to some
extent in different geographical realms, but
empires not entirely different from those that had
already been established by imperial powers such
as France and Britain. What caused the World
Wars was, in effect, a breakdown in interimperial
relations between the major imperial powers.
There is, however, the strange paradox that
although empires are established by conquest,
they nevertheless can create a form of peace.
Indeed, Aron (1967, p. 151) writes of the “impe-
rial peace” established by conquest. It is thus
conventional to refer to Pax Romana, the peace
of the Roman Empire; Pax Britannica, the peace
of the British empire; and Pax Americana, the
peace of the US empire. Some even refer to Pax
Sovietica-Americana, to denote the period of
relative calm during the Cold War period between
the two superpowers. However, the concept of
peace by conquest and domination can be criti-
cized as being an empty peace. Parchami (2009)
suggests that this hegemonic peace is ambiguous,
in that it is only achieved by fierce warfare and
once achieved, often presents a paradox of exter-
nal stability and internal violence.
What happens to empires? Kennedy (1987)
has suggested that it is imperial overstretch or
imperial overreach, the imperative towards
ongoing conquest, that ultimately destroys
empires. It simply becomes too expensive to be
waging wars on the peripheries of empires. This
is paradoxical, given that it is conquest that ini-
tially establishes empires. It can be argued that
imperial overreach is precisely what is currently
happening with the USA, with its vastly expen-
sive military structure to support and its military
engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan.
English Imperialism and the
British Isles
A useful starting point for defining British impe-
rialism is the establishment of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain, incorporating at one
J. Page et al.
stage England, Wales, Scotland, and Ireland
(Welsh 2003).
During the Roman occupation of England,
most of Wales was occupied by the Romans,
although with the end of Roman rule, the sepa-
rate kingdoms of Wales were gradually reestab-
lished. The Welsh resisted incursions by the
Anglo-Saxons during this period. However, with
the accession of Norman kings, there were new
pressures on Wales. Gradually, the English con-
quered most of southern Wales, and the defeat of
the Welsh Prince Llewelyn the Last in 1282
marked the end of Welsh independence and the
commencement of English occupation. Welsh
antagonism to English rule subsided somewhat
with the accession of Henry Tutor (Henry VII) in
1485, due to his Welsh ancestry. Under the Laws
of Wales Acts, 1535 and 1542, the single entity of
England and Wales was formed.
There were scattered attempts by the Romans to
colonize what is now known as Scotland, although
these were never successful. Eventually, the
Romans resorted to a series of linked forts as an
attempt to secure the frontier border, the best known
portion being Hadrian’s Wall. After the decline of
Roman England, Scotland was united under a Celtic
monarchy. The successful incorporation of Scotland
into the English realm, like that of Wales, was ulti-
mately established through an accident of monar-
chical history. When Queen Elizabeth I of England
died without heirs, the crown passed to James VI of
Scotland, who was crowned James I of England. At
an official level, this resulted in the union of the two
hitherto separate kingdoms, although the real power
remained with England, as was reflected in both
Scottish and English parliaments passing the Act of
Union in 1707, dissolving the Scottish Parliament
creating the Kingdom of Great Britain.
The conquest and colonization of Ireland was
similar to that of Scotland and Wales, in that the
official pattern was one of integration, although
Ireland’s history was far more brutal. This was due
in no small part to the deliberate policy of planta-
tion, which was a euphemism for the disposses-
sion of large sections of the native Irish population
by large numbers of English and Scottish settlers.
As Jane Ohlmeyer (2006) points out, the coloniza-
tion of Ireland constituted an imperial program
that was followed by English colonists in North
24 Perspectives on Invasion: Great Britain, Northern Ireland¼
America; in both cases there was a systematic
denigration of the local indigenous population as
ignorant Barbarians, as if to justify the disposses-
sion and genocide that took place. In 1801, the
United Kingdom of England and Ireland was
officially declared, although this was understand-
ably not popular in Ireland, even among Irish
Protestants.
The subjugation of the native Irish population
extended to economic and social matters. Food
was exported to England, even at times of severe
native food shortages. During the potato famine
of 1846–1851, millions died of hunger and chol-
era, and millions more were forced to emigrate, at
a time when much of the land was producing
export crops. The Irish were also routinely
excluded from education, thus reinforcing the
imperial stereotype of the indigenous Irish as
being, by nature, comically stupid dullards.
Individual writers of conscience, such as Burke
(1978), protested against the oppression of the
Irish, although these protests were largely ignored.
Confronted with rebellion in Ireland in 1916,
the British Prime Minister, Lloyd George, was
sufficiently worried about the continuing loyalty
of Ireland during World War I to promise self-
rule after the war. This was accomplished in a
fashion with the Government of Ireland Act of
1920, although this was clearly a flawed compro-
mise: the nation was divided, with the indepen-
dent Republic of Ireland in the south and center
and the remnant Northern Ireland still part of the
United Kingdom. One could argue that the full
decolonization of Ireland is yet to be accom-
plished. In our study, based on this complicated
history between Great Britain and Ireland, the
survey responses of participants from Northern
Ireland were analyzed separately from the
responses from Great Britain.
One of the remarkable ironies of World War I
is that, despite a long history of subjugation by
the English, hundreds of thousands of Welsh,
Irish, and Scots volunteered to serve with the
British Expeditionary Force, in what was sub-
stantially an imperialist war. The reason for this
paradox was, at least in part, that service in the
British Army offered an escape from the relent-
less poverty suffered by the common people. Yet
361
the British Empire also cleverly co-opted nation-
alist sentiment, creating special Welsh, Scottish,
and Irish regiments. Local allegiance to Scotland,
Ireland, and Wales was translated into allegiance
to the empire.
With all three of the regions comprising
Scotland, Wales, and Ireland, the remarkable
aspect of recent history has been the resurgence of
nationalism. All three countries have witnessed a
revival of local languages. The Republic of Ireland
is now an independent country, and Scotland and
Wales now have their own parliaments.
The British Empire and North America
There were many European arrivals in North
America, in what is now known as Canada and the
USA. The Vikings briefly established settlements
in coastal regions such as Newfoundland, although
the European invasion of North America as such
was led by the Spanish, with the settlement of what
is now Mexico and the southern United States; the
French, with settlement in the Mississippi Valley,
the Gulf of St. Lawrence, Arcadia (Nova Scotia),
and New France (Quebec); and the English, with
settlements on what is now the east coast of the
United States (Haines and Steckel 2000).
The English settlement of the North American
continent was a relatively late phenomenon.
One of the key factors was the Protestant
Reformation and a desire by Queen Elizabeth in
particular to encourage a balance to the Catholic
influence, especially with the Iberian colonization
of South and Central America. The first surviving
English colony was at Jamestown in Virginia, with
numerous others following. Some were established
for commercial reasons and others as a means for
escaping religious persecution. Following the
exploration of what became known as Hudson Bay
by Henry Hudson in 1610, the English also estab-
lished trading settlements in this area.
One of the differences of English coloniza-
tion, at least in what became the Thirteen
Colonies, was, as Mancall (2001) points out, an
interest in producing export goods for Europe, in
particular tobacco. This led to a greater demand
for land for agricultural use and a declining
362
interest in trade with the indigenous American
Indian peoples. By contrast, the French tended to
concentrate on local trade. The relationship
between Europeans and American Indians was at
times cooperative and harmonious, with each
side benefiting from trade. The American Indians
gained steel goods and the Europeans gained
food. The demand for land, however, contributed
to a gradual deterioration of relations between
the indigenous and settler populations, with so-
called Indian Wars becoming more frequent.
The European superiority in firepower was a
devasting key factor in the subjugation of Native
American Indian populations in North America
(Thornton 1987). Other factors included the dis-
ruption of traditional structures due to European
incursion, which meant that some tribes would
seek alliances with the Europeans for reasons of
individual or tribal advantage, with a subsequent
increase in internecine warfare. However, the
most devastating factor was disease. Smallpox,
measles, scarlet fever, and diphtheria, transmit-
ted by Europeans, who had developed consider-
able immunity, decimated American Indian
populations.
As is often the case in history, the dominance of
the English in the colonization of North America
occurred mainly through accident. The War of
Spanish Succession ended in 1713 with the Treaty
of Utrecht, and as a result of this, Nova Scotia and
Newfoundland were ceded by the French to the
British. At the end of the Seven Years’ War in
1763, France ceased to have any official presence
on the North American continent, with France sur-
rendering control over New France. This now
became Quebec, although through a generous
peace, the Francophone population was allowed to
retain their language and customs.
The history of how the Thirteen Colonies of
North American rebelled against British rule in
the American War of Independence (1775–1783)
is well known. What is not so well known is that
the issue of dispossession of indigenous American
tribes was one factor in the causation of the war.
In 1763 George III issued a proclamation forbid-
ding the taking of further native lands by
American colonists. One may well argue that the
J. Page et al.
motivation of this was not altruistic but rather an
attempt to prevent additional Indian Wars that
would lead to financial demands upon Britain.
Yet the issue of dispossession of the native popu-
lation was already an important one.
One of the results of the War of Independence
is that the nature of the struggle and its success
underscored a sense of national exceptionalism in
America, a sense that has subsequently provided
a rationale for American expansion. The citizens
of the Thirteen Colonies, which came to consti-
tute the USA, saw themselves as members of a
nation that had pioneered democratic republican-
ism. Thus, it is quite logical for Abraham Lincoln
to make reference to the USA as the “last best
hope on earth” (Lincoln 1953, p. 537). If one
believes that one’s own nation is uniquely demo-
cratic, one can see this special status as justifying
interference in the affairs of other nations, a set of
beliefs sometimes referred to as liberal imperial-
ism. Hoffmann (2005) writes of the recent predi-
lection of the USA to use military intervention as
a new version of exceptionalism, believing that
the supposed moral and even religious superiority
of the nation implies not merely a right but an
obligation for foreign military intervention.
It would be unfair to describe this sense of
awe at the seeming success of democratic
republicanism in North America as only a nation-
alistic sentiment. The French aristocrat De
Tocqueville (1990) wrote admiringly in the nine-
teenth century of American democracy and cited
the American Constitution as a model to be emu-
lated. Indeed, many leaders would later invoke
the ideals of the American Revolution and
American democracy in their struggle for self-
determination. The American Revolution pro-
vided an important impetus for the French
revolution. More recently, on September 2, 1945,
the Vietnamese nationalist leader Ho Chi Minh
pointedly borrowed the opening words of the
Vietnamese Declaration of Independence from
the American Declaration of Independence
(Duiker 2000, p. 323).
The writing of De Tocqueville (1990) reveals
the ambiguous nature of British and American
colonization and imperialism. De Tocqueville
24 Perspectives on Invasion: Great Britain, Northern Ireland¼
eulogized the extension of the idea of the sover-
eignty of the people throughout the United States,
the sense of personal enterprise and individual-
ism, local and community involvement, and the
element of social mobility, all to a degree at that
time unknown in Europe. He identified many of
these virtues as being peculiarly Anglo-American
in nature. Yet these virtues are limited in scope.
De Tocqueville also wrote of the three races in
the United States, two of which, the indigenous
American Indians and the Afro-Americans, were
subjected to tyranny and humiliation by European
settlers. De Tocqueville described the disposses-
sion suffered by the indigenous inhabitants of
America and the loss of a sense of cultural self-
identity by the Afro-American slave population,
separated from their native African culture and
subordinated and enslaved by the dominant
European culture.
Canada
By 1848 the British had established self-govern-
ment for the Canadian colonies, perhaps mindful
of the lessons of the American Revolution
(Conrad 2012). In 1867, the Dominion of Canada
was proclaimed, through the British North
American Act. After federation, the westward
expansion of Canada continued, with a familiar
pattern of dispossession of the indigenous peo-
ples. As with other settler nations, it has only
been in recent years that the prior occupation and
rights of the indigenous peoples have been for-
mally recognized by Canada.
Canada has been relatively successful in accom-
modating cultural differences, especially in that
Anglophone and Francophone communities coex-
ist in relative peace (Conrad 2012). The
Francophone community is centered on Quebec, in
what is sometimes known as a bilingual belt.
Bilingualism was recognized in the 1867 legisla-
tion establishing Canada, and the right of French-
Canadians to use their own language was confirmed
in the 1982 Constitution Act. Canada recognizes
both French and English as official languages, with
both recognized as languages for parliament, and
363
indeed, the multilingual nature of Canada is some-
times held up as an example for the resolution of
conflicts in other parts of the world, where there are
competing ethnic groups with different languages.
Canada has traditionally been prowestern in
foreign and military policy, having volunteered to
assist England in both World War I and World
War II. Strictly speaking, it is difficult to identify
the strategic interest of Canada in such commit-
ments, and it is difficult to see the involvement of
Canada in the World Wars as not being a reflection
of colonial loyalty. Since 1945, Canada has been
involved in the Korean War, in the Gulf War,
and as a coalition partner in the invasion of
Afghanistan. Significantly, however, Canada was
not a direct participant in the American-Vietnam
War nor in the 2003 invasion of Iraq.
It has been suggested that, in comparison with
similar settler countries and indeed in compari-
son to former British colonies, Canada has been a
decidedly pacific or propeace nation, with exten-
sive commitments to peace-keeping and to the
United Nations and with well-established com-
mitments to peace research and education (Page
2006). There may be many reasons for this,
including the proximity to the USA as a global
superpower and a resultant trepidation regarding
the prospects of global war, the Canadian
experience of multiculturalism, and even the
numbers of Vietnam war-resisters from the USA
who settled in Canada.
American Imperialism
and Neoimperialism
It is difficult to separate imperialism and neoim-
perialism when discussing the USA.
Neoimperialism is often used to designate covert
imperialism during the era of decolonization after
1945 (Ferguson 2004). However, the develop-
ment of the USA as an empire builder in its own
right arguably runs as a continuum from the
American Revolution, and as argued above, much
of the impetus for American expansion came
from a mixture of strong national religious belief
and a belief in the uniqueness and superiority of
364
American representative democracy. Porter
(2006, p. 113) writes of an “ideological certainty”
that has underpinned US imperial policies. This
belief in the inevitability and divinely ordained
role of the USA to expand its border was articu-
lated in the nineteenth century, with the assump-
tion that the USA had a manifest destiny to annex
lands, such as Texas and New Mexico and west-
ward to the Pacific Ocean. As was often the pat-
tern with imperialism, the expansion of the USA
westward was also associated with the removal of
indigenous American peoples to reservations,
generally on land not wanted by incoming
European settlers.
The discourse of imperialism and neoimperi-
alism with regard to American foreign policy is a
contested one, especially with regard to the post-
1945 era. Writers such as Keohane (1991) prefer
to refer to American hegemony, although others
such as Bacevich (2004) are more direct in refer-
ring to American imperialism. Ignatief refers to
“empire lite” (2003). It is true that references to
American imperialism and American neoimperi-
alism are generally critical, although it is note-
worthy that some writers, such as Ferguson
(2004, 2007), embrace the idea of American
imperialism, arguing that the benefits outweigh
the disadvantages. Rieff (1999) refers to the will-
ingness of American-led powers to engage in
war-making for allegedly humanitarian aims as a
form of liberal imperialism, although in the wake
of American-led invasions in Afghanistan and
Iraq, the enthusiasm of Rieff for such interven-
tionist policy has changed (2005).
What have been the alleged arenas of American
imperialism in the twentieth century? There have
been numerous US-led interventions within
Central and South America, based to some extent
on the Monroe Doctrine, which stated that Central
and South America ought to be under the influence
of no power other than the USA (Meiertöns
2010). The USA now has the largest military
force in the world, and US military bases are
located around the globe. Some would argue that
the US-led invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq
represent the apogee of American imperialism.
Some would argue that the massive military aid
to the Israeli state, without which the Israeli state
J. Page et al.
and its policies could not continue, means that in
effect Israel functions as part of a greater
American empire.
It is instructive to examine the 9/11 attacks on
the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, and
the resulting War on Terror, in the context of
imperialist theory. It is conventional to argue that
the 9/11 attacks inaugurated a new political era.
However, writers such as Janowski assert that
“Contrary to popular political rhetoric, the terror-
ist attacks on the World Trade Center did not
usher in a new geo-strategic reality. Rather, the
attacks ended a false and simplistic notion that
somehow the United States—unlike any other
nation—could involve itself in ever-expanding
external acts without producing negative or retal-
iatory response on US territory” (Janowski 2004,
p. 14). In other words, the attacks on the World
Trade Center and the Pentagon in 2001 can be
viewed as violent resistance to the empire-build-
ing of the USA.
One of the major themes of US foreign policy
has been the importance of maintaining freedom
throughout the world. This includes free trade.
However, it is important to note that in an
unequal power relationship, freedom can simply
denote domination. Petras (2005) writes of
American neomercantilist imperialism, that is,
protectionism at home and monopolies abroad,
all aimed at strengthening American power and
wealth. Another consistent critic of American
neoimperialism, Chomsky (2005), suggests that
the freedom that US foreign policy works to pre-
serve usually means the freedom of corporations
to exploit markets and the developing world.
For Chomsky (1993), American foreign policy
is a continuation of the empire-building that
commenced with the European conquest of the
New World.
British Imperialism and Australasia
The colony of New South Wales (Australia) was
originally founded as a repository for unwanted
felons from Britain, a destination made necessary
by the untimely loss of the American colonies
(Macintyre 2004). Interestingly, Hughes (1987)
24 Perspectives on Invasion: Great Britain, Northern Ireland¼
has argued that the convict origins of the colony
of New South Wales are still reflected in the
nature of the contemporary nation-state of
Australia. What is not so well recognized is the
prior occupation of the continent of Australia by
indigenous inhabitants for at least 40,000 years
prior to European settlement. Gradually, as
European settlers moved onto fertile plains inland
from the original settlement at Sydney Cove, the
colony flourished, and further European settle-
ments were established around the continent.
The interaction of the European settlers and
the indigenous Australian Aboriginals did not
completely follow the usual pattern of British
colonialism, due to the relatively late nature of
European settlement and the infusion of
Enlightenment ideals into much of British soci-
ety. There were attempts by the colonists to
establish peaceful coexistence with the Australian
Aboriginals. These attempts were, however,
subsumed in the larger frontier wars between
European settlers and Aboriginals. In addition to
massacres and killings, the local Aboriginal
population was also decimated by European dis-
eases (Reynolds 1981).
In 1901, the various British colonies on the
Australian subcontinent united to form the
Commonwealth of Australia, a nation-state that
still retains links to the home country, most
notably in that Australia is still a constitutional
monarchy, with the British monarch as nominal
head of state. In dealing with the indigenous pop-
ulations, Australia adopted a policy of moving
Aboriginal Australians onto reserves, ostensibly
for purposes of protecting them from abuses by
Europeans. In the nineteenth century, a policy of
assimilation was adopted, whereby it was
assumed that Aboriginal Australians were a dying
race, and it was therefore humane to remove,
forcibly in many cases, Aboriginal children from
their natural parents, in order for these children to
be brought up in state or mission run institutions,
or adopted out to European parents.
The European invasion and settlement of New
Zealand followed a different path to that of
Australia, in that New Zealand was never a
convict colony as such and due also to the fact
that the indigenous Maori population was
365
proportionally larger than the Aboriginal
Australian population (Smith 2005). The Maori
people had migrated to New Zealand around 280
CE and soon established themselves in both
islands of Aotearoa (New Zealand). The arrival
of Europeans, in the form of settlers, traders and
missionaries, impacted the indigenous peoples
deeply, through the introduction of the potato,
disease, and muskets. The appearance of muskets
encouraged the spread of deadly warfare between
tribes.
New Zealand was originally part of the colony
of New South Wales, although through the New
Zealand Constitution Act 1852 passed by the
British parliament, the colony became self-
governing, with its own bicameral parliament.
New Zealand became a British dominion in 1907
and is effectively an independent nation, although
the head of state, as with Australia, is still the
British monarch.
What makes New Zealand different from
Australia was an important agreement between
the indigenous peoples and the European settlers
(Smith 2005). The Treaty of Waitangi of 1840
recognized British sovereignty over the two
islands but also recognized Maoris as British citi-
zens and acknowledged Maori property, forestry,
and fishery rights. The application of the treaty
was problematical, especially over land owner-
ship, and between 1845 and 1872, a series of
Land Wars was fought over this issue between
the European settlers and Maori tribes. Yet the
treaty marked an important recognition of the
prior ownership of New Zealand, a recognition
that came much later for Australia.
Both Australia and New Zealand have fol-
lowed what might be called a foreign policy of
imperial loyalty for most of the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries, willingly participating in
wars that Britain was engaged in, wars that often
had little or no relevance to the defense or secu-
rity of either country (Millar 1965, p.183). These
conflicts notably included the Boer War, World
War I, and World War II (Page 2010). The ratio-
nale behind this support for participation in wars
relevant to Britain was arguably a sense of inse-
curity in the local region by Australia and to a
lesser extent New Zealand—a view that, as
366
fundamentally European settler countries, each
needed to rely on the founding European impe-
rial country for strategic support; the cost of this
support was that both Australia and New Zealand
needed, or perceived that they needed, to lend
unquestioning support to Britain.
World War II constituted a turning point in the
strategic orientation for Australia and New
Zealand, in that both countries came to look to the
USA as the major western nation with whom they
sought alliance (Hughes 1987). The 1951 ANZUS
Treaty committed Australia, New Zealand, and
the USA to consult with each other in the event of
aggression on any nation. The ANZUS alliance
was not as binding as the NATO treaty nor did it
create a military structure or combined forces as
such. However, both Australia and New Zealand
were military participants in both the Korean and
Vietnam Wars, eager to be seen as supporters of
US foreign policy. Significantly, ANZUS Treaty
obligations were cited in supporting the Australian
decision to join the War on Terror.
One of the interesting aspects of what we
might call Australasian foreign policy has been
that New Zealand has been, in comparative terms,
more willing to engage in a more independent
foreign policy (Page 2006). In 1984 the New
Zealand Prime Minister, David Lange, announced
that he was not prepared to allow nuclear-pow-
ered or nuclear-armed ships to enter New Zealand,
a view that was subsequently enshrined in the
New Zealand Nuclear-Free Zone, Disarmament
and Arms Control Act 1987. This led to a break in
the strategic relationship between Australia and
New Zealand, with the USA indicating that it was
suspending its treaty obligations to New Zealand
until such time as US nuclear-powered and
nuclear-armed ships were allowed into New
Zealand ports.
Overview of the British Empire
and Imperialism
The current world order is largely an artifact of
the British empire. This is reflected in obvious
factors such as the recognition as English as a
J. Page et al.
global language. However, it is also reflected in
less obvious factors such as the dominance of
free-market capitalism, the importance of national
identity, the belief in representative democracy,
and the importance of military power. In most
cases, these beliefs and practices were not taught
as such. Rather, they became acculturated and
accepted as a part of the means whereby power
was exercised. Ferguson (2007) sums the
influence of the British empire in the striking
phrase “how Britain made the modern world.”
It is difficult to make an accurate calculation
regarding the advantages and disadvantages of
empire-building, and indeed, there is much ongo-
ing debate on this issue (Layne and Thayer 2007).
What makes this assessment so difficult is the
fact that the world in which we live is the artifact
of imperialism. Popular culture may provide
guidance here. In the film Monty Python’s Life of
Brian (Goldstone and Jones 1979), a fictitious
Judean revolutionary leader asks a crowd of
young revolutionaries, “What have the Romans
ever done for us?” The exasperated leader of the
Judean revolutionary group is forced to concede
that the Romans did in fact provide the local con-
quered population with a range of improvements
to everyday life, including aqueducts, sanitation,
roads, medicine, education, health, wine, baths,
public order, and peace. Of course, balancing the
ledger in any discussion of imperialism is the
reality that this peace is an enforced peace,
ultimately through force of arms.
Thus, for the inheritors of British imperialism
and indeed American imperialism, there are
doubtless many benefits. Global capitalism,
which has been very much an artifact of the tri-
umph of British imperialism, has produced a high
standard of living, at least in material terms and
at least within the Neo-European countries, as
well as encouraging functioning representative
democracy. Under this absolute rule, there has
been peace and order. However, counter to this,
the Pax Britannica and Pax Americana were
imposed ultimately by conquest, and thus, vio-
lence has been legitimated as a means of achiev-
ing political aims. When fascist powers attempted
to establish their own empires in Europe Asia, it
24 Perspectives on Invasion: Great Britain, Northern Ireland¼
can be argued that they were imitating the behav-
ior of imperial models.
It can also be argued that, within imperial
peace, violence is merely exported to the periph-
ery of the empire. Orwell (2003) foresaw this in
his novel Nineteen Eighty-Four, where there is
constant warfare between the world empires of
Oceania, Eurasia, and East Asia but where the
actual fighting takes place in the margins or periph-
ery of the world empires. Since 1945, we have
seen warfare substantially exported to the nonde-
veloped world, in Southeast Asia, Africa, the
Middle East, and Central Asia. The Neo-European
countries themselves have not been invaded.
Perspectives on Invasion
in the UK/Anglo Sample
The Sample
The UK/Anglo (or Anglophone) sample was
composed of participants from the United
Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Northern Ireland
(for survey purposes collated separately from
other parts of the United Kingdom), and the
United States. There were a total of 1,041 partici-
pants in this sample (559 females, 481 males, 1
undisclosed gender). Of these respondents, 268
(141 females, 127 males) were from Australia,
118 (79 females, 39 males) from Canada, 102
(54 females, 47 males, 1 undisclosed gender)
from Northern Ireland, 93 (39 females, 54 males)
from Great Britain, and 460 from the USA (246
females, 214 males).
Ages of the respondents ranged from 18 to
86 years. The majority of participants (77%)
reported Christianity as their primary childhood
religion; 50% of the total sample indicated that
they were currently Christians, and 33% indicated
that they currently subscribed to no faith or were
agnostics or atheists. When asked if they had ever
served in the military, 27% of the respondents
from Australia, 7% of the Canadian respondents,
9% of the UK respondents, 6% of the Northern
Ireland respondents, and 9% of the American
sample said yes. In addition, 65% of the
367
Australians, 48% of the Canadians, 48% of the
UK participants, 27% of Northern Ireland partici-
pants, and 73% of the US sample reported that
they had a family who was or had been in the mili-
tary. Within the samples from each of the UK/
Anglo countries, there were participants who
reported that they had engaged in antiwar protests:
43% of the Australians, 30% of the Canadians,
19% of the Northern Irish, 45% of the Great
Britain sample, and 30% of the US sample.
All participants completed the Personal and
Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace
Scale (PAIRTAPS), which had three items related
to invasion (Malley-Morrison et al. 2006). The
rights to invasion item asked participants to
respond on a 7-point scale (from 1, totally dis-
agree to 7, totally agree) to indicate the extent to
which they agreed with the item “Sometimes one
country has the right to invade another country”
and then to explain their rating in their own
words. The other two items asked participants to
describe (1) what they would feel and what they
would want to do if another country was bomb-
ing their country and women, children, and old
people were running around screaming and (2)
what they would feel and what they would want
to do if their country was bombing another coun-
try and women, children, and old people were
running around screaming. Responses to all items
were coded based on coding manuals derived in
part from Albert Bandura’s constructs of moral
disengagement and engagement.
Thematic Patterns in Response
to Invasion Items
A State Right to Invade?
In response to the item, “Sometimes one country
has the right to invade another country,” 62% of
all responses provided arguments supporting the
view that invasion was sometimes necessary. The
most common invasion-tolerant responses were
coded for pseudomoral justifications. Specifically,
37% of the proinvasion responses indicated a
belief that a government has the right to invade
another country in order to help others, reflecting
368
the pseudoassistance argument. Sample responses
include the following: “Intervention rarely helps,
but sometimes there is no alternative if genocide
or rampant abuse of life and liberty is rampant”;
“Only to protect the citizens from serious harm
and injustices”; “I believe one country should
intervene if something like mass genocide is
going on, but not just for cultural differences”;
and “Countries have an obligation to act when
they become aware of a country committing
atrocities and they are unable to intervene by
peaceful negotiations.”
Slightly over one-third of the invasion-tolerant
responses consisted of arguments that invasion is
sometimes necessary for self-defense or as a pre-
emptive strike: “Occasionally it’s necessary for
safety, but it is not a right”; “Compelling national
security interest (defense)”; and “A country has
the right to retaliate against attack or defend its
self.” “When their own country/way of life has
been directly threatened.” Approximately 11% of
the proinvasion responses took the position that
the government has the right to undertake an
invasion if doing so is better than not doing so
(i.e., making an argument based on advantageous
comparison) or if there are positive consequences
to the invasion: “Only if it is for the greater good”;
“I don’t like it, but it’s ok to prevent greater
harm”; “When used as a last resort aggression is
sometimes the only means of resolving a conflict”;
and “If a country is a threat to the citizens of
another country, invading it may be the only
option but I do not think an unprovoked invasion
is ok.” Nine percent of the responses that showed
a tolerance for invasion based on attribution of
blame, indicating an inclination to argue that
revenge and punishment are just causes for state-
sponsored invasion. Examples of these responses
include the following: “If the invaded country has
somehow inflicted great harm to the citizens of
the other country, then perhaps it’s okay”;
“Invasion is ok only in response to invasion”; and
“It all depends on the circumstances. If a country
has terrorized another then possibly I might
agree.”
Other types of arguments supportive of inva-
sion occurred much less frequently than did the
types of reasoning just described. For example,
J. Page et al.
5% of the invasion-tolerant responses indicated
that decisions concerning invasion ought to be
deferred to the international community: “Again,
only if there is a REAL, PROVEN imminent
threat to the invading country’s citizens. In the
case of intervening in a genocide or civil war,
that’s the UN’s prerogative”; “Without UN
approval no nation should invade another”; “If
there is a consensus by the UN for a need to
invade a particular country based on its threat to
its own citizens and/or the citizens of the coun-
tries in consensus, then yes”; and “I think a union
of countries like the UN has a right to invade a
country under given circumstances.” Fewer than
1% of the invasion-tolerant arguments displaced
responsibility for decisions concerning invasion
onto the government (e.g., “We should trust
authority”).
By contrast, 38% of all the responses to the
question of whether one country ever has the
right to invade another country were coded as
arguments against such a right. The most com-
mon arguments against invasion (28%) were
those that emphasized the need to respect a coun-
try’s government and sovereignty. Examples of
such responses include the following: “We don’t
have the right to control another country. We can
help them, but not in a way of killing and bring-
ing harm to many. That is not helping”; “Within
the flimsy context of borders, cultures, and
nations, one nation definitely does not have the
right to invade to steal land or to enforce what
they believe to be a correct system of governance
and way to exist”; “It is nice to want to help peo-
ple, and we should help people, but the reason
that there are different countries and cultures is
because people have different beliefs and life-
styles- and we should not impose on that.
Difference is a good thing”; and “Every State has
the right to unimpeded sovereignty.”
Approximately 18% of the responses against
the right to invade indicated that there were better
alternatives to invasion or that violence is unnec-
essary: “War is not the answer”; “There is no cir-
cumstance in which conflict resolution cannot be
mediated. World wide opposition to South
African apartheid in a prime example”; “I think
we can resolve conflicts in other ways”; and
24 Perspectives on Invasion: Great Britain, Northern Ireland¼
“We shouldn’t have to invade each other…we
should live in collaboration with each other.”
Fourteen percent of the invasion-intolerant
responses mentioned negative consequences of
invasion: “I disagree with this because inevitably
the citizens of both the invading and invaded
countries are the ones who suffer, yet it is the
governments who are making the decisions. War
is never the answer to problems and only causes
more problems”; “I do not consider invasion as
ever having positive effects”; “In the name of
helping other countries I believe there have been
huge mistakes that have created a bigger prob-
lem”; and “No, I believe invasion into another
country only causes more problems.”
Eleven percent of the anti-invasion responses
emphasized honoring international mandates
when denying a country’s right to invade another
country: “This (invasion) should be rare and
should be sanctioned by the UN for strong
humanitarian reasons”; “This line of thinking
totally disregards the United Nations which I
believe to be necessary in world politics”; and
“As much as governments deny it, invasion is
only acted out for personal gain. To keep peace in
times of civil conflict its places like the UN you
should be able to turn to.” A similar percentage of
the invasion-intolerant responses (10%) revealed
concerns for human rights and concerns for other
people: “If there’s a genuine case where invasion
is necessary for humanitarian intervention, then
so be it, but this is rarely the case”; “This is lim-
ited to humanitarian intervention for documented
reasons, typically limited to genocide. The deci-
sion to intervene must be multilateral and taken
by a legitimate international body”; and “If
invited. If there is dissent in the country and ter-
rorists or other parties are causing issues that can-
not be resolved by the government in power and
a call for help is placed, then an invasion with the
intent to assist with peace should be
undertaken.”
Six percent of the responses rejecting a state’s
right to invade referred to concerns for peace and
support for nonviolence: “Problems can be solved
without violence”; “Disputes between nation
states should be resolved with dialogue. This is
the only way to solve them. Violence creates
369
more destruction and will always give way to dia-
logue sooner or later. Therefore we must resist
the urge to use violence or force”; “Invading
seems violent to me”; and “I support use of non-
violent action as an alternative to violence.”
Bombing Civilians Scenario
Responses to the item “Another country is indis-
criminately bombing a major city in your coun-
try, and women, children, the elderly, and civilian
men are running around bloody and screaming.
What you would feel? What you would want to
do?” were also of interest. The responses to this
item were coded based on the emotions and moti-
vations expressed, with a particular focus on per-
sonal engagement and personal disengagement,
which we view as reflective of Bandura’s con-
struct of personal agency. From the 40% of
responses categorized as showing some form of
personal disengagement, the most common
responses were those that expressed vengeful
agency, a desire for revenge or punishment.
Approximately 51% of the personal disengage-
ment responses fell into this category: “Seek
revenge,” “Hit back,” “Get even—I am only
human,” and “KILL THE BASTARDS WHO
DID THE BOMBING.” Another 44% of the per-
sonal disengagement responses expressed harm-
ing emotions such as “hatred” or “intense anger”:
“Absolute anger!!!” “Outraged,” “Sick and
angry,” and “Anger.” Approximately 3% of the
personal disengagement responses expressed the
denial of responsibility for any action. Examples
of this kind of response to the question “What
would you want to do (regarding the bombing)”
were as follows: “Probably not much”; “Not a
lot. I would probably seek the justification and
turn a blind eye”; “Sad when I see the news, but
removed from it otherwise”; and “Protect and
save my loved ones and myself, by getting the
hell out of there.”
Of the 60% of responses that were coded as
showing personal engagement, 38% indicated a
readiness to take general responsibility and try to
“stop it” without specifying how to do this: “Tell
them to stop,” “Find out the reasons and put a
stop to it,” “Stop the bombing,” and “Draw atten-
tion and try to stop it happening.” Approximately
370
36% of the personal engagement answers indi-
cated genuine assistance and that the respondent
would try to help others: “Find ways to protect
people in own country”; “Protect the women and
children…. If it was not clear which country was
responsible I would want to track down the per-
petrators and bring them to justice”; “Help the
people”; and “I would want to help those
affected.” About 5% of personally engaged
responses expressed self-referenced agency and a
willingness to take action by standing up to the
government: “PROTEST”; “Send money to a
charity helping the people, protest to the govern-
ment”; “Write to congress, officials; make it
known that it’s not okay”; and “I would want to
help those affected; I would want to forcefully
protest to the government.”
In addition, among the personally engaged
responses, nearly 10% indicated the intent to call
for the international community for aid, includ-
ing legal actions against invaders and reparations
for the invaded: “Have the UN step in to stop this
country”; “Raise money for victims, write blatant
articles/petitions to the government for approach-
ing the UN and taking proper action against the
offending country”; “Take some type of recon-
ciliation step against the country that did the
bombing”; and “Try to get the governments to sit
down and resolve the issue of why it started in the
first place.” Approximately 2% of the personally
engaged responses indicated prosocial agency
and demonstrated a willingness to take personal
responsibility for acts of aggression: “Change the
government allowing such acts,” “Hold those
responsible to account,” “Yell at the government,”
and “Stop things immediately by applying
pressure on the Government of the day.”
Analyses of Demographic Correlates
of Response Types
Chi-square tests were used to analyze the extent
to which significant demographic differences in
the use of the invasion and bombing themes were
present among the UK/Anglo qualitative
responses to the invasion items. The demographic
J. Page et al.
variables assessed were gender, participation in
the military, relatives’ participation in the mili-
tary, and personal involvement in a protest in
favor of peace. In regard to the arguments for and
against a state right to invasion, we focus on the
particular pro and con arguments that appear to
be representative of or conceptually similar to the
sociocognitive mechanisms identified by Bandura
in his theory of moral disengagement and
expanded on by our team to represent morally
engaged types of thinking. In regard to the bomb-
ing scenario responses, we focus on particular
forms of personal engagement and disengage-
ment as expressions of a personal sense of agency
(i.e., need to act) or no such sense of agency. All
results described as “significant” had a p-value of
less than 0.05, and all results described as “mar-
ginally significant” had a p-value of greater than
or equal to 0.05 and less than 0.1. Results that
achieved marginal or statistical significance are
discussed; nonsignificant results are not.
Demographic Differences in Right
to Invasion Themes
As can be seen in Table 24.1, chi-square analyses
revealed several significant group differences in
the kinds of arguments presented in support of or
against a state right to invasion. Chi-square analy-
ses yielded many significant differences between
men and women in the types of argument they
made. In regard to arguments supporting a state
right to invasion, significantly more men than
women gave responses demonstrating at least one
of the proinvasion arguments and at least one of
the pseudomoral justification categories. While
significantly more men than women emphasized
self-defense and preemptive strike, significantly
more women gave responses than men using
pseudoassistance as a justification of a state right
to invade. In arguments against the right of a state
to invade, chi-squares revealed that significantly
more women than men gave at least one response
in the following coding categories: anti-invasion,
responsibility response, appreciating conse-
quences, human rights and concern for others, and
24 Perspectives on Invasion: Great Britain, Northern Ireland¼ 371

Table 24.1 Right to invasion: percentages of responses in coding categories by demographic groups and
chi-square values
Group 1a Group 2a c2
Categories Male Female
Proinvasion presence 69 47 10.67***
Pseudomoral justification presence 48 40 5.33*
Self-defense/preemptive strike 29 14 27.70***
Pseudoassistance 20 27 5.16*
Anti-invasion presence 25 39 18.26***
Responsibility presence 12 17 4.94*
Appreciating consequences presence 8 15 9.48**
Human rights/concern for others presence 3 6 5.80*
Principled moral justification presence 6 11 8.30**
Respect for government/sovereignty 8 14 8.23**
Negative consequences 3 7 7.13**
Better alternatives/violence as unnecessary 5 9 3.75^
Nonviolence/concern with peace 1 3 4.62*
Military Nonmilitary
Proinvasion presence 61 51 3.33^
Displacement of responsibility presence 8 3 5.84*,b
Deferral to the international community/UN 7 3 4.81*,b
Pseudomoral justification 0 3 3.15^,b
Self-defense/preemptive strike 31 19 7.34**
Anti-invasion presence 19 35 10.56***
Appreciating consequences presence 4 13 7.58**
Principled moral justification presence 4 10 3.85^
Respect for government/sovereignty 6 12 3.76^
Better alternatives/violence as unnecessary 2 8 5.44*
Relative military No relative military
Proinvasion presence 55 47 3.98*
Pseudomoral justification presence 46 38 3.87^
Pseudomoral justification 1 5 9.67**
Self-defense/preemptive strike 23 16 5.18*
Anti-invasion presence 29 40 8.96**
Responsibility presence 13 20 6.59*
Principled moral justification presence 8 12 3.55^
Respect for government/sovereignty 9 16 9.73**
Principled moral justification 1 4 6.55*
Protest No protest
Proinvasion presence 44 58 14.55***
Pseudomoral justification presence 36 48 11.75***
Self-defense/preemptive strike 15 25 12.53***
Responsibility presence 18 13 4.43*
Appreciating consequences presence 14 10 3.42^
Human rights/concern for others presence 7 3 6.75*
Principled moral justification presence 14 6 13.00***
Unspecified anti-invasion 3 1 3.22^
Honor international mandates 8 3 10.78***
(continued)
372
Table 24.1 (continued)
Negative consequences
Nonviolence/concern with peace
Human rights/concern for others
Note: Presence indicates that the participant provided a response that was coded for that category and/or
one of its subcategories
*
p £ 0.05; **p £ 0.01; ***p £ 0.001; ^0.051 < p < 0.10
a
The numbers in these columns are the percent of the group that gave responses falling into each of the
specified categories
b
Indicates that Fischer values were used to determine the significance of responses
principled moral justification. Significantly more
women than men also gave responses demonstrat-
ing respect for the government and sovereignty
and citing negative consequences of invasion, and
they were marginally more likely to argue that
there are better alternatives to invasion and that
violence is unnecessary. Finally, significantly
more women than men gave responses indicating
nonviolence and concern with peace as arguments
against a state right to invade.
Chi-square tests also revealed multiple
significant differences in response patterns for
the use of proinvasion arguments contingent on
military experience. Participants with military
experience were marginally more likely than
their counterparts to make at least one proinva-
sion response. Significantly more respondents
with military experience than those without
such experience gave responses that deferred to
the international community and UN, rational-
ized states had a right to invade if it was done as
self-defense or preemptive strike, and demon-
strated at least one type of displacement of
responsibility and defer to the international
community and UN. In contrast, respondents
without military experience were marginally
more likely to give responses indicating pseudo-
moral justification.
There were also differences between military
and nonmilitary respondents in the use of anti-
invasion arguments. Significantly more respon-
dents without military involvement gave at least
one of the anti-invasion arguments and at least
one of the appreciating consequences arguments,
J. Page et al.
Protest No protest
8 4 7.88**
4 1 4.20*
6 3 6.51*
as well as marginally more responses reflecting at
least one principled moral justification.
Participants without military experience were
also marginally more likely than their counter-
parts to give responses indicating respect for gov-
ernment and sovereignty and significantly more
likely to argue that there are better alternatives
and that violence is unnecessary.
Some of the proinvasion and anti-invasion
responses were contingent on whether or not
respondents had relatives in the military. Chi-
square analyses revealed that significantly more
participants with relatives in the military than
their counterparts used at least one of the proin-
vasion arguments and specifically to make a self-
defense/preemptive strike argument. They were
also marginally more likely to use at least one of
the pseudomoral justification arguments. By con-
trast, significantly more respondents without rel-
atives in the military made pseudomoral
justification arguments. Chi-square analyses also
revealed significant differences in the use of par-
ticular anti-invasion arguments by respondents
with and without relatives in the military.
Significantly more respondents without relatives
in the military than their counterparts used (1) at
least one principled moral justification, (2)
respect for government and sovereignty, and (3)
at least one of the anti-invasion and responsibility
arguments.
Chi-square tests revealed that several of the
proinvasion arguments were contingent on the
respondents’ participation in peace protests.
Significantly more nonprotesters than protesters
24 Perspectives on Invasion: Great Britain, Northern Ireland¼ 373

used at least one of the proinvasion and pseudo-
moral justification arguments, as well as self-
defense and preemptive strike responses.
Chi-square analyses revealed many differences in
the anti-invasion responses based on respondents’
involvement in antiwar protests. Significantly
more of the protesters made responses in the cat-
egories of honoring international mandates, neg-
ative consequences, nonviolence and concern
with peace, and human rights and concern for
others. More of the protesters also used at least
one of the anti-invasion, responsibility, human
rights and concern for others, and principled
moral justification arguments. Protesters were
marginally more likely than their counterparts to
give at least one of the appreciating consequences
and unspecified anti-invasion themes.
Percentages of anti-invasion and proinvasion
responses in the coding categories by demo-
graphic groups and chi-square values are pre-
sented in Table 24.1.
Responses to Another Country
Indiscriminately Bombing Your Own
Country
As can be seen in Table 24.2, chi-square analysis
showed significant group differences in the ways
participants expected to react if faced with a situ-
ation where their country was being bombed.
Group differences were found for gender, mili-
tary experience, having relatives in the military,
and participation in protests.
Chi-square analyses revealed gender differ-
ences in both personal disengagement and per-
sonal engagement categories. Specifically,
significantly more men than women gave a
response in at least one of the personal disen-
gagement and antisocial agency categories,
as well as an example of vengeful agency. In
regard to personally engaged responses,
significantly more women than men gave genu-
ine assistance arguments and used at least one

Table 24.2 Responses to another country bombing: percentages of responses in coding categories by
demographic groups and chi-square values
Group 1a Group 2a c2
Categories Male Female
Personal disengagement presence 44 22 43.12***
Antisocial agency presence 42 20 45.82***
Vengeful agency 36 17 35.40***
Personal engagement presence 60 81 38.90***
Humanizing agency presence 19 41 44.55***
Humanizing agency 1 2 3.65^
Genuine assistance 19 40 38.62***
Military Nonmilitary
Personal disengagement presence 44 30 9.42**
Antisocial agency presence 42 28 8.66**
Vengeful agency 35 24 5.27*
Personal engagement presence 56 73 13.35***
Prosocial agency presence 2 7 4.75*
Humanizing agency presence 14 34 18.82***
General responsibility 40 29 4.85*
Call for the international community 4 9 3.85^
Genuine assistance 14 33 15.83***
(continued)
374 J. Page et al.

Table 24.2 (continued)

Relative military No relative military
Personal disengagement presence 35 28 3.39^
Antisocial agency presence 33 25 4.53*
Vengeful agency 28 21 4.10*
Personal engagement presence 68 75 3.08^
Responsibility presence 35 43 4.01*
Personal engagement 3 9 9.42**
Call for the international community 6 12 5.91*
Self-referenced agency 4 7 3.28^
Protest No protest
Personal disengagement presence 26 36 7.53**
Antisocial agency presence 25 34 5.72*
Vengeful agency 18 30 11.94***
Personal engagement presence 79 66 13.94***
Responsibility presence 44 35 5.00*
Prosocial agency presence 10 4 9.56**
Humanizing agency presence 38 27 8.65**
Call for the international community 11 7 4.26*
Self-referenced agency 8 2 12.70***
Genuine assistance 36 27 7.78**
Note: Presence indicates that the participant provided a response that was coded for that category and/or
one of its subcategories
*
p £ 0.05; **p £ 0.01; ***p £ 0.001; ^0.051 < p < 0.10
a
The numbers in these columns are the percent of the group that gave responses falling into each of the
specified categories
b
Indicates that Fischer values were used to determine the significance of responses

of the personal engagement and humanizing
agency arguments.
Chi-square analyses also revealed differences
in responses to this scenario contingent on mili-
tary experience. Significantly more respondents
with military experience than respondents with-
out such experience used at least one of the per-
sonally disengaged and antisocial agency themes,
as well as responses indicating vengeful agency
and general responsibility. Significantly more
nonmilitary than military participants gave
responses indicating at least one type of personal
engagement, prosocial agency, and humanizing
agency. Participants without military experience
were marginally more likely than their counter-
parts to give responses calling for the interna-
tional community and were significantly more
likely to give responses referencing genuine
assistance.
Regarding differences in responses from par-
ticipants with and without relatives in the mili-
tary, chi-square analyses yielded significant
results for both personal disengagement and per-
sonal engagement responses. Respondents with
relatives in the military were marginally more
likely than their counterparts to use at least one
of the personal disengagement categories and
significantly more likely to use at least one of the
antisocial agency categories, as well as vengeful
agency specifically. By contrast, significantly
more respondents without relatives in the mili-
tary gave responses coded for unspecified
personal engagement and calling for the inter-
national community and at least one example of
24 Perspectives on Invasion: Great Britain, Northern Ireland¼
a responsibility argument; they were also mar-
ginally more likely than their counterparts to
give at least one example of a personal engage-
ment response and to include self-referenced
agency in a response.
Finally, chi-square analyses revealed differ-
ences based on respondents’ involvement in pro-
tests. Significantly more nonprotesters than
protesters used at least one of the personal disen-
gagement and antisocial agency themes as well as
vengeful agency. Significantly more protesters
than nonprotesters called for the international
community, demonstrated self-referenced agency,
wanted to provide genuine assistance, and used at
least one of the personal engagement, responsi-
bility, prosocial agency, and humanizing agency
themes. Table 24.2 provides percentages of
responses by demographic group in the personal
engagement and personal disengagement coding
categories for the scenario concerning another
country bombing one’s own country; it also pro-
vides chi-square values for the group differences.
Responses to Participants’ Country
Indiscriminately Bombing Another
Chi-square analyses revealed significant group
differences in the use of probombing and anti-
bombing themes, as can be seen in Table 24.3.
When responding to the third invasion item “Your
country is indiscriminately bombing a major city
in another country…what would you want to
do?” significantly more men than women refer-
enced harming emotions and denial of responsi-
bility as well as providing at least one of the
personal disengagement, denial of responsibility,
and antisocial agency arguments in their
responses. Men were marginally more likely than
women to give responses characterized by
vengeful agency. Although significantly more
men than women gave responses characterized
by unspecified personal engagement, significantly
more women than men cited helping emotions
and genuine assistance and used at least one of
the personal engagement, responsibility, and
humanizing agency themes.
375
In response to their own country bombing
another, chi-square analyses also revealed that
those with military experience were marginally
more likely than those without military experi-
ence to use at least one of the antisocial agency
rationales and significantly more likely to refer-
ence harming emotions. In regard to personal
engagement categories, respondents without mil-
itary experience gave significantly more refer-
ences to at least one of the responsibility and
humanizing agency themes, as well as helping
emotions. While significantly more respondents
with military experience than their counterparts
used unspecified personal engagement, those
without military experience gave marginally
more responses emphasizing general responsi-
bility and genuine assistance. Chi-square analy-
ses also revealed that respondents with relatives
in the military gave marginally more responses
indicating prosocial agency than did their
counterparts.
Finally, chi-squares revealed that personal
engagement and disengagement responses were
contingent on the respondents’ participation in
protests. Specifically, significantly more nonpro-
testers than protesters showed at least one form
of personal disengagement and were marginally
more likely to give at least one of denial of
responsibility response. Although significantly
more nonprotesters than protesters made state-
ments indicating unspecified personal engage-
ment, significantly more protesters than
nonprotesters gave at least one personal engage-
ment response, at least one responsibility
response, and at least one prosocial agency
response, as well as responses coded for general
responsibility and self-referenced agency. The
findings for our analyses of responses to the sce-
nario concerning one’s own country bombing
another country are presented in Table 24.3.
Conclusions
In the Anglophone (UK/Anglo) sample, the
majority view, that there is a qualified right to
invade another country, reflects very much the
376 J. Page et al.

Table 24.3 Responses to participants’ country bombing: percentages of responses in coding categories
by demographic groups and chi-square values
Group 1a Group 2a c2
Categories Male Female
Personal disengagement presence 14 5 20.70***
Denial of responsibility presence 9 4 8.02**
Antisocial agency presence 4 0.2 15.13***
Harming emotions 11 0 13.51***,b
General denial of responsibility 9 4 9.00**
Vengeful agency 2 0.3 4.41^,b
Personal engagement presence 87 94 11.35***
Responsibility presence 33 39 3.23^
Humanizing agency presence 11 22 15.94***
Helping emotions 82 97 12.43***
Unspecified personal engagement 17 8 11.93***
Genuine assistance 10 21 16.91***
Military Nonmilitary
Antisocial presence 5 2 3.94^,b
Harming emotions 16 3 8.30*,b
Responsibility presence 26 38 6.49*
Humanizing agency presence 10 18 4.28*
Helping emotions 72 93 10.67**,b
Unspecified personal engagement 18 11 4.52*
General responsibility 24 34 4.06^
Genuine assistance 10 17 3.58^
Relative military No relative military
Prosocial agency 10 6 3.89^
Protest No protest
Personal disengagement presence 6 10 4.72*
Denial of responsibility presence 4 7 3.90^
Denial of responsibility 4 7 3.56^
Personal engagement presence 94 89 5.89*
Responsibility presence 44 33 10.24**
Prosocial agency presence 54 42 11.48***
Unspecified personal engagement 4 17 25.82***
General responsibility 39 30 5.55*
Self-referenced agency 33 21 12.30***
Note: Presence indicates that the participant provided a response that was coded for that category and/or
one of its subcategories
*
p £ 0.05; **p £ 0.01; ***p £ 0.001; ^0.051 < p < 0.10
a
The numbers in these columns are the percent of the group that gave responses falling into each of the
specified categories
b
Indicates that Fischer values were used to determine the significance of responses

western just war tradition, which indicates that
war-making (and invasion is perhaps the most
obvious example of war-making) is permissible
under specific conditions. These conditions
include the necessity for the action to be a last
resort and for it to be in response to actual or
threatened loss of civilian life. Given that the
Anglophone sample reflects a western heritage
with a long history of warfare, the emphasis on
justifications for invasion is not surprising.
24 Perspectives on Invasion: Great Britain, Northern Ireland¼
What was surprising was the strength of the
minority who rejected the idea of a state right to
invade another country. These respondents tended
to reveal a sentiment of nonviolence or at least a
sentiment that there are always alternatives to
invasion. An embracing of nonviolence runs
counter to the just war tradition and has been
growing in popularity in recent years, as illus-
trated by the efforts of such leaders as Ghandi,
Martin Luther King, and Nelson Mandela.
Another surprising result was the number of
respondents who identified the importance of the
role of the United Nations in addressing issues
related to the possibility of an invasion. Many
respondents indicated that the authorization for
any invasion should come from the United
Nations. Perhaps the responses invoking a role
for the United Nations was the result of the inva-
sions of Afghanistan and Iraq, which have figured
prominently in debates over foreign policy in
Anglophone countries and neither of which was
authorized by the United Nations prior to the
event. In any case, the reliance upon the United
Nations as an agency that supplies legitimacy is
not a traditional understanding within Anglophone
countries, and many who look for an enhanced
role for international organizations may see this
as a hopeful sign.
In regard to the issue of personal engagement
and disengagement, it is difficult to draw con-
clusions, in part because of the ethical complex-
ity involves in the issues. What we can say is
that many of the response indicated a high
degree of emotional outrage at the scenarios
focusing on the bombing of innocent civilians—
either by or on their own countries. The issue is
what can be done about aggression. Many of the
responses again suggested that some form of
extranational authority might intervene to ensure
that justice would prevail, although not many
were specific about what this extranational
authority would comprise. Some saw the United
Nations in this role.
The gendered nature of many themes was
interesting. The responses tended to reinforce the
femo-pacifist argument that women, in general,
tend to be more peace oriented than men.
Significantly more women than men made
377
anti-invasion arguments, and significantly more
men than women indicated that they would want
guilty parties punished for war crimes. The ethics
of care argues that men tend to take a judicial
approach to issues, whereas women tend to take a
more individual approach. This is not to make a
value judgment about either approach. However,
the results tended also to confirm what leading
feminist ethicists, such as Gilligan (1982), have
argued that women tend to see ethics in terms of
caring and men tend to see ethics in terms of
justice.
The perspectives of respondents with military
experience and with relatives who had military
experience showed a greater willingness to coun-
tenance the prospects of one country invading
another. This is to be expected, given that the mili-
tary in western countries, and arguably many other
places throughout the world, is expected to oper-
ate on the basis of just war principles. Conversely,
respondents who had participated in protests
tended to argue against the prospect of one coun-
try invading another and tended to be more will-
ing to take responsibility in a situation involving
governmental aggression. This orientation can be
seen as an instance of a personal or professional
commitment being reflected in a world view.
There a surprising gap in the responses from
the Anglophone world. None of the responses
seemed to grapple with the issue that the
Anglophone world is very much the result of
invasion and conquest. Obviously, the past cannot
be undone. Yet if we are to think about invasion,
then it seems that we ought to be honest about the
extent to which the world we inhabit has been
formed by invasion. One positive direction for
thinking in this regard is that in many Anglophone
countries, there is now a greater willingness to
own the truth about this history, in order to seek
reconciliation with indigenous peoples.
The Future
What then can we say in overview about
Anglophone countries? Hobsbawm (1995, pp.
558–559), who has been one of the foremost his-
torians of imperialism, concludes his history of
378
what he calls the short twentieth century suggest-
ing that we, as global citizens, are working our
way through a “global fog,” aware that an era of
history has ended but knowing very little else.
Hobsbawm (p. 559) then gives an indication of
what there is to know by suggesting that for the
first time in two centuries, the world lacks any
international system or structure. The seeming
exception to this situation is that the USA remains
the dominating superpower of the world, at least
for the time being, with the largest military in his-
tory. Yet the evidence of recent history, of the
effectiveness of struggle against imperialism, and
more recently the effectiveness of terrorism, indi-
cates that the possession of a huge military struc-
ture does not make an imperial power invulnerable.
Significantly, Hobsbawm (pp. 560, 561) refers to
the “democratization and privatization of the
means of destruction” to describe the extent to
the technologies of destruction now enable minor
powers and even individuals and groups to chal-
lenge imperial powers.
It would seem therefore that the challenge is
to develop an appropriate international system or
structure that is fair and just. Whether such a sys-
tem will involve the United Nations or not is a
debatable point. However, as the Seville
Statement on Violence (UNESCO 1986) reminds
us, war is an invention of humankind. If human-
kind can invent warfare, it is logical that we can
invent just international systems and structures,
systems and structures that transcend imperial
models of invasion, expropriation, and domina-
tion. The element of hope in all this is the sense
of consciousness regarding the need for peace
that is so prevalent today. Just how prevalent this
sense of the need for peace and justice has and
will become is a worthwhile topic for interna-
tional research such as the current study.
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 Perspectives on Invasion in Russia
and the Balkans 25
Sherri McCarthy, Anna Medvedeva, Tristyn
Campbell, Nebojsa Petrović, Vlado Miheljak,
Marko Polič, and Charikleia Tsatsaroni

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
adopted on December10, 1948 by the General
Assembly of the United Nations (United Nations
Department of Public Information 2007) elo-
quently describes rights to which all people are
entitled. These include, among others, a right to
education; a right to social security and a standard
of living adequate for health and well-being;
freedom from slavery; freedom from arbitrary
arrest, detention, exile, torture, degrading treat-
ment, or punishment; freedom from arbitrary
interference with privacy, home, family, and cor-
respondence; and freedom of movement within
and between countries. Article 28 states that
“Everyone is entitled to a social and international
order in which the rights and freedoms set forth
in this Declaration can be fully realized.”
Ideally, in the generations since the devasta-
tion of the World Wars, nations and communities
would have guaranteed these rights within their
borders in order to comply. Sadly, even among
member nations, this has not entirely been the
case. This of course creates a dilemma. In order
to ensure that the rights of life, liberty, and secu-
rity of person are available to all of humanity,
does this imply a right on the part of a nation or
group of nations to intervene if it appears such
rights are being violated? Or is the invasion itself
required by such a policing action a violation of
these human rights? As Wu and Lethem (2010)
note, both history and current events testify to the
devastation invasion can create, yet in contrast to
torture, invasion is not generally officially con-
demned by the international community. Under
certain circumstances, invasion is considered
useful, indeed essential, for the protection of
cherished world values. When an act of invasion
is perpetrated with the right authority, as the last
resort, with care for the proportionality of harm
versus benefit, and for a just cause, can it then be
considered a just war? Do we value certain rights
over others as such decisions are made? Conflicts
between actions and values may seem necessary
at some points in time and may lead people to
elaborate justifications for doing harmful things
such as “bombing for peace” when they want to
achieve goals of high value (Dorner 1996).
According to Article 21 (3) of the Declaration
of Human Rights (2007): “The will of the people
shall be the basis of the authority of government.”
The will of the people is rooted in their experi-
ences, values, and motivations, which, in turn,
influence their views on the behaviors of their
governments. This chapter explores the will of
the people living in Russia and the Balkan
Peninsula regarding a state right to invade, based
on an analysis of survey responses to the Personal
and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace
Survey (PAIRTAPS).
A description of the region, along with brief
descriptions of each of the four countries in which
data was collected, their respective histories, and
how the citizens of each defined war, torture, and
terrorism, appeared in Chapter 4. Greece, Serbia,

K. Malley-Morrison et al. (eds.), International Handbook of War, Torture, and Terrorism, 381
Peace Psychology Book Series, DOI 10.1007/978-1-4614-1638-8_25,
© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2013
382
Slovenia, and Russia, the countries from which
the data for this chapter was gathered, extend
over a great part of Europe and Asia. Terrain,
size, and economy differ greatly among the four
countries. Each has a different language and a
different alphabet. What do these countries have
in common?
All are currently experiencing economic
stress, ethnic conflict, and social change. More
importantly for our purposes, at some point in
their histories, each of these countries has been a
conquering nation. Also, each of these countries
has been a conquered nation, ruled by another
empire for a long period of history. They coex-
isted as allies under a socialist regime when many
of the countries in the Balkan region were a part
of Yugoslavia. The recent Bosnian conflict,
including the bombings by NATO and relatively
more successful interventions by UNPROFOR,
also had the effect of solidifying former emo-
tional ties to Russia among many people in this
region (Baev 1998) further supporting the combining
of Russia and the Balkans for purposes of our
data analysis here.
Another compelling reason to consider these
countries as a single region based on their geo-
graphic proximity is the potential influence of
pathogen prevalence toward influencing worldwide
cultural variability in personality styles and cultural
values (Schaller and Murray 2011; Schmitt et al.
2007; Tooby and Cosmides 1992). This region is
similar in terms of weather, migration patterns, and
disease incidence. Strong tribal ties characterize
the region. Most importantly, all of these countries
tend to fall into the “horizontal-collectivist” values
category as explained by Triandis (1995) and his
colleagues (Singelis et al. 1995; Triandis et al.
1998; Triandis and Gelfand 1998; Triandis and Suh
2002). This has implications for attitudes toward
invasion, as protection from outsiders is seen as
paramount.
Legitimate use of power is regarded differ-
ently by members of cultures with different ori-
entations toward the dimension of individualism
versus collectivism. Invasion by force is certainly
a use of power. Members of cultures that are rated
high on vertical individualism (VI), such as the
S. McCarthy et al.
USA and Great Britain, view the use of power
(i.e., invasion) as a legitimate way to improve
their individual (i.e., economic) status and make
their group more competitive with others (Nelson
and Shavitt 2002). Countries such as these may
be likely to invade to protect and enhance their
own economic resources and well-being. On the
other hand, countries or groups with an orienta-
tion high on horizontal collectivism (HC), such
as Russia and the Balkans, would not be likely to
endorse the use of power (or invasion) to improve
the standing of their own groups relative to oth-
ers, but would be likely to endorse its use for the
protection of their own group against others and
also for the protection of other groups who were
perceived as being treated unfairly. Exercising
social power to help others, protect the environ-
ment, and protect one’s own group would be seen
as legitimate uses of invasion among HC groups
(Frieze and Boneva 2001).
Russia and the Balkan region can be catego-
rized as predominantly oriented toward horizontal
collectivism. Such an orientation, which focuses
on an egalitarian framework, sociability, and
interdependence (Erez and Earley 1987), would
make forms of economic philosophy and gov-
ernment such as communism and socialism more
attractive, as has been demonstrated in this
region. The preferred social interaction is inter-
dependent relationships structured in an egalitar-
ian manner. Power is interpreted in socialized
terms and legitimately used only for benefiting
or helping others. In empirical studies, an HC
orientation seems to be negatively correlated
with beliefs in inequality, tendencies to abuse
power, and self-reported willingness to dominate
others, while being positively correlated with a
desire to use power to help others (Torelli and
Shavitt 2012).
Additional information on similarities and dif-
ferences among Serbia, Slovenia, Greece, and
Russia appears in Chapter 4 and the chapter
regarding national security in Russia and the
Balkans. Because of both geographic proximity
and the social, cultural, and historical similarities
already mentioned, responses from the countries in
this region were combined for overall analysis.
25 Russia Balkan Invasion
Methods
The data described here comes from three items
on the PAIRTAPS (Malley-Morrison et al. 2006):
(a) Sometimes one country has the right to invade
another country; (b) Another country is indis-
criminately bombing a major city in your coun-
try, and women, children, the elderly, and civilian
men are running around bloody and screaming.
What you would feel? What you would want to
do?; and (c) Your country is indiscriminately
bombing a major city in another country, and
women, children, the elderly, and civilian men
are running around bloody and screaming. What
would you feel? What would you want to do?
Participants responded to the first item on a scale
of 1 (total disagreement) to 7 (total agreement)
and then explained the reasoning behind their rat-
ing scale response. The second and third items
were free-response prompts.
Over 600 individuals from four countries
completed the survey. Ninety-seven participants
were from Greece, 101 from Slovenia, 97 from
Serbia, and 313 from Russia. There were 353
women and 231 men, and 23 respondents did
not disclose their gender. A majority of the sam-
ple self-reported as Christian, while the next
highest percentage did not identify with a reli-
gion or were atheists or agnostics. Fifty-six
percent of the sample reported as being in the
middle class; each of the remaining socioeco-
nomic statuses was represented at decreasing
frequencies. Sixty-two percent of the sample
had never been in the military. Fifty-one percent
of the sample had a relative with military ser-
vice. Finally, 63% of the sample reported hav-
ing been involved in a peace protest. These
individuals were contacted in several ways,
including polling at universities and shopping
centers, networking, and posting the survey on
websites. It is important to stress, however, that
the sample was not a random or representative
sample.
To code the responses to the invasion items, a
coding manual was developed using both
383
grounded theory and deductive qualitative
reasoning based on Albert Bandura’s theory of
moral disengagement. Although moral standards
usually serve to regulate one’s behavior, there
exist many scenarios where reprehensible acts
are perpetrated against standards of morality.
How is that possible? According to Bandura,
there exist four social cognitive processes by
which one’s moral sanctions can be disengaged
(Bandura 1999). Removal/obstruction of per-
sonal responsibility corresponds to the element
of authority; misrepresentation of consequences
targets the elements of last resort and proportion-
ality, while cognitive reconstruction and devalu-
ation of victims combine to provide just cause. In
contrast, one exhibits moral engagement when
one’s actions conform to one’s moral standards
despite situational influences that may dictate
otherwise. Activation of moral engagement is
usually accompanied by feelings of empathy,
perceived similarity, and recognition of social or
moral obligations. In practice, moral engagement
is demonstrated through either actively engaging
in humane behavior or refraining from partici-
pating in inhumane activities. In the samples
recruited for this book, the kinds of reasoning
that Bandura described as reflecting mechanisms
of moral disengagement were seen most readily
in participant responses that argued for a state
right to invasion; the kinds of reasoning that were
the inverse of those mechanisms of moral disen-
gagement were found most readily in the argu-
ments against a state right to invasion. In our
analysis of responses from the Russia/Balkans
sample, we refer to pro- and anti-invasion
responses; we do not assume that these responses
mean that the participants are morally disen-
gaged or morally engaged, only that the argu-
ments are consistent with the theoretical
mechanisms in Bandura’s theory. For a more
detailed overview of Bandura’s theory and the
coding manual, refer to Chap. 23 in this volume.
Although all of the anti-invasion coding catego-
ries were used in the analysis of responses, only
those that accounted for more than 5% of all
responses are discussed here.
384
Qualitative Patterns in Responses
to a State’s Right to Invasion
Support for a State’s Right to Invade
When asked to respond to a prompt regarding the
right of a government to invade another country,
34% of participant responses from Russia and the
Balkans were coded for some form of tolerance
for a state’s right to invade another country. Self-
defense/preemptive strike was the most frequently
used proinvasion theme, accounting for 14% of
all responses and 41% of invasion-tolerant
responses. Typically, responses in this category
justified invasion of a country needing to defend
itself from an attack already made, threatened, or
perceived. For example, a 26-year-old Slovenian
man wrote, “if one state is disturbing somebody,
he could attack, e.g., in the case of defending
the territory.” This response exemplifies the feel-
ing that a country could attack another if it was
a matter of self-defense. Other responses indi-
cated a type of internal struggle with the notion
of invading another country, such as this response
from a 21-year-old woman from Greece: “If this
country thinks that it’s going to be attacked in the
future, it should exercise it’s right of self defense.
This country should make very clear to its
citizens it’s decision and of course the country
should be democratic for checks and balances to
exist.” This response encompasses the idea that
invasion can be used as a preemptive strike.
However, this response also highlights the idea
that the country should have checks and balances
in place and inform its citizens of its decision
to invade, not just invade another country
unilaterally.
The second most commonly found process of
support for invasion was advantageous compari-
son/positive consequences, accounting for 6% of
all responses and 19% of invasion-tolerant
responses. Many of these responses first judged
nonviolent options as unlikely to be successful
and then stated that invasion would bring about
more good than harm. In general, these responses
recommended using invasion as a last resort.
This mode of thinking can be seen in the reply of
S. McCarthy et al.
a 19-year-old Russian woman: “Not all conflicts
are possible to regulate by peace methods.
Sometimes we have to defend our opinion with
war. But that is not desirable.” This response
illustrates Bandura’s definition of advantageous
comparison as it deems peaceful methods of
resolving conflict to be ineffective. A 45-year-old
Greek woman wrote that invasion was a right
“Only when there is a provocation and to prevent
worse things from happening.” In this case, inva-
sion is justifiable if it prevents worse atrocities
from happening. In addition, perceived positive
consequences of invasion, such as monetary gain,
were also found in participant responses. For
instance, a 35-year-old Greek man wrote, “It
depends on the economic interests.” Additional
examples of arguments supportive of a state right
to invasion can be found in Table 25.1, along with
basic demographic information.
Opposition to a State’s Right to Invade
Sixty-six percent of participant responses were
coded for some process of invasion intolerance.
The most common anti-invasion theme was
respect for government/sovereignty, which
accounted for 23% of all invasion responses and
35% of the anti-invasion responses. There were
two main types of responses in this category. The
first type stated that invasion is not a right. For
example, a 51-year-old Slovenian woman wrote,
“No state must attack the other.” The second type
of responses referenced a country’s sovereignty,
often indicating that a country’s borders were not
to be violated. According to a 26-year-old Greek
woman, “Every country should recognize its own
borders and continue to have good relationships
with other countries. The invasion of one country
towards another will certainly create war.”
Assertions that there are better alternatives
and violence is unnecessary were the second
most commonly used anti-invasion argument,
comprising 12% of the total response set and
18% of the anti-invasion responses. One 18-year-
old Greek man wrote, “I believe that expansion-
ary wars belong to the past. Today everything can
be settled with debate and good faith.”
25 Russia Balkan Invasion
Table 25.1 Sample responses justifying a right to invade
Category Percent Country
Advantageous 6 (19) Greece
comparison/positive
consequences
Russia
Slovenia
Serbia
Self-defense/preemptive 14 (41) Greece
strike
Russia
Slovenia
Serbia
Note: The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total
response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in that category out of all the pro-
invasion responses
F female, M male
Furthermore, a 21-year-old Slovenian woman
responded, “Nobody deserves that others would
be violent toward him, besides violence is the
sign of emotional immaturity, and people do not
have only emotions but also thinking with the
help of which we could reflect about our emo-
tional outbursts.”
The third most frequently coded type of anti-
invasion response focused on nonviolence/concern
with peace. Nine percent of responses regarding
invasion and 14% of anti-invasion responses fell
into this category. A 19-year-old Russian woman
stated very simply, “I am against war, I am for
peace.” Negative consequences, the fourth most
common anti-invasion argument, comprised 7%
of all invasion responses and 11% of the anti-inva-
sion responses. The answers in this category rec-
ognized that there can be undesirable consequences
to invading another country. A 25-year-old Greek
woman wrote, “This would automatically cause a
long-term war.” Other responses commented that
leaders of countries often invade another country
for selfish interests. These ulterior motives were
exemplified in the response of a 56-year-old
385
Gender Age Response
M 46 “War is the last resort for dealing with
political problems, but sometimes it is
beneficial for the country who wants war”
M 20 “If there is no other way”
F 19 “In the case that there is not possible
peaceful way of solving the conflict, and
the other state is threatening (with death)
its citizens”
M 27 “…when majority of citizens in one
country are seriously endangered by some
political system”
F 25 “I don’t agree with invading another
country but it must defend itself if another
country attacks or trespasses its borders”
F 21 “In order to defend native country”
M 84 “In self-defense”
M 40 “Unless it is undertaken in self-defense”
Russian woman who wrote, “so people can come
in power and pursuing goals. Regular people do
not want war.” Additional examples of these pro-
cesses can be found in Table 25.2 along with basic
demographic information.
Qualitative Patterns in Responses to
Another Country Bombing Your Own
Personal Disengagement Responses
In response to a question concerning the indis-
criminant bombing of one’s own country by
another country, 40% of all responses were coded
for personal disengagement. The most common
personal disengagement theme was vengeful
agency, which accounted for 18% of all responses
to this item. For example, a 54-year-old Russian
man stated he would want “to take revenge.” All
responses coded in this category made reference
to either “revenge” or “hatred.” Additional exam-
ples of vengeful agency can be found in Table 25.3
along with basic demographic information.
386 S. McCarthy et al.

Table 25.2 Sample responses denying a right to invade

Category Percent Country Gender Age Response
Respect for government/ 23 (35) Greece F 55 “No country has the right to invade another
sovereignty country. Treaties and courts exist to resolve
differences”
Russia M 60 “The sovereignty of the country shouldn’t be
ignored.”
Slovenia F 20 “Each state is by itself! Each state acts
according to its system and must not interfere
into another and attack”
Serbia M 38 “It is not right for one country to invade
another”
Negative consequences 7 (11) Greece F 40 “Invasions happen by governments that are
moved by different self-interests, without taking
into account the interests of the people, and the
repercussions thereafter”
Russia M 18 “War is death of people who should live”
Slovenia M 34 “Then all states could attack each other”
Serbia F 36 “Strong countries attack small and poor ones”
Better alternatives/ 12 (18) Greece M 23 “No, never. There are thousands of ways to
violence as unnecessary resolve problems”
Russia F 20 “But nevertheless in modern time conflicts
should be solved with the peace method”
Slovenia M 55 “All conflicts should be solved with talks”
Serbia F 35 “All disagreements between countries can be
solved with negotiations”
Nonviolence/concern 9 (14) Greece F 21 “No one has the right to practice violence on
with peace anyone”
Russia F 20 “I don’t want wars”
Slovenia M 76 “Peace!”
Serbia F 32 “Never!”
Note: The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total
response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in that category out of all the anti-
invasion responses
F female, M male

Table 25.3 Personal disengagement responses regarding another country bombing your country
Category Percent Country Gender Age Response
Vengeful agency 18 (45) Greece M 67 “Reciprocate what
they’re doing”
Russia F 27 “To punish the
enemy”
Slovenia F 21 “Revenge still
worse”
Serbia M 49 “To kill the enemy”
Note: The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total
response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in that category out of the personal
disengagement responses to this item
F female, M male
25 Russia Balkan Invasion 387

Table 25.4 Examples of personal engagement regarding another country bombing your country
Category Percent Country Gender Age Response
Unspecified 16 (27) Greece F 28 “Help them”
personal Russia M 44 “To help”
engagement Slovenia M 76 “To help”
Serbia F 27 “To save whoever possible”
General 24 (41) Greece M 62 “Stop it with any means possible”
responsibility Russia F 54 “To stop this violence immediately”
Slovenia F 45 “To stop this doing”
Serbia M 26 “Stop it”
Genuine 14 (23) Greece F 55 “Stop the attack and help the injured”
assistance Russia M 29 “To stop it, to save people”
Slovenia M 25 “To help civilians”
Serbia F 33 “Help the suffering people”
Note: The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total
response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in that category out of the personal
engagement responses to this item
F female, M male

Personal Engagement Responses
Sixty percent of responses to the item concerning
another country bombing your country were
coded for personal engagement. The most com-
mon personal engagement response expressed
general responsibility. This theme accounted for
24% of the total response set for this item and
for 41% of the personally engaged responses.
These responses demonstrated a general level of
agency, without specifying a specific form of
action. For example, a 41-year-old Slovenian
woman stated that she would want “To prevent,
to stop [the bombing].” Unspecified personal
engagement was the second most frequent
engagement code, representing 27% of the per-
sonally engaged responses. This category cap-
tures a general sense of wanting to help one’s
own country if it was being bombed, but again
the form of helping was left unspecified.
The third most common form of personal
engagement was genuine assistance. Within this
category, responses recognized a need to help the
victims of bombing through various means. For
instance, a 20-year-old Slovenian man responded
that he would “Want to help through humanitar-
ian organizations.” Additional examples of these
processes can be found in Table 25.4 along with
basic demographic information.
Qualitative Patterns in Responses
to Your Country Bombing Another
Country
Personal Disengagement Responses
Nineteen percent of responses to the item con-
cerning your country indiscriminately bombing
another country were coded for some theme of
personal disengagement. Denial of responsibility
was the most common form of personal disen-
gagement response. A lack of any sense of per-
sonal responsibility to do anything in regard to
one’s country bombing another country was typi-
cal of the answers in this category; for example, a
22-year-old Greek man said his response to such
bombing would be to “Open up a beer from the
refrigerator.”
Harming emotions was the second most com-
mon theme in response to this bombing item.
Responses coded in this category expressed a
desire to punish one’s own government or feel-
ings of hatred toward one’s government.
388
Table 25.5 Sample personal disengagement responses regarding your country being bombed
Category Percent Country
Denial of 7 (38) Greece
Responsibility Russia
Slovenia
Serbia
Vengeful agency 6 (34) Greece
Russia
Slovenia
Note: The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total
response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in that category out of the personal
disengagement responses to this item
F female, M male
Personal Engagement Responses
Eighty-one percent of responses to the scenario
were coded for personal engagement. The most
common personal engagement response was
general responsibility. These responses demon-
strated a general level of agency, without specify-
ing the type of agency. For example, a 41-year-old
Slovenian woman stated, “To prevent, to stop.”
Helping emotions were the second most common
form of personal engagement. These responses
describe the kinds of emotional reactions a wit-
ness to bombing might have that would move
him or her to try to do something helpful in the
situation; feelings such as pity or horror were
captured here.
Responses characteristic of self-referenced
agency, the third most common personal engage-
ment construct, demonstrated a readiness to
address one’s own government as a result of the
bombing of another country. A 23-year-old
Russian woman’s response was typical of this
category, writing, “to stage protests and demon-
strations.” Additional examples of these responses
can be found below in Table 25.6 along with
basic demographic information.
Exploratory Analyses of Demographic
Correlates of Response Types
In order to study the extent to which there might
be differences in responses based on demographic
characteristics, chi-square tests, t-tests, and
S. McCarthy et al.
Gender Age Response
M 28 “Indifference”
F 19 “Nothing”
M 84 “To hide himself, come back to own state”
M 27 “Nothing”
F 72 “Hatred”
F 27 “To punish the enemy”
F 21 “Revenge still worse”
analysis of variances (ANOVAs) were run. For
Pearson’s chi-square tests, when the expected
count was less than five, Fisher’s exact test was
used. Additionally, independent sample t-test
results were used to support chi-square results. If
the t-tests produced different results, they were
reported as well. The sociodemographic variables
that were analyzed were (a) gender, (b) participa-
tion in protest, (c) military service, (d) relatives’
military service, (e) current religion, (f) class,
and (g) country. As there were so few participants
who identified as Buddhist, Jewish, Muslim, or
having an “other” religion, only Christians and
atheists, agnostics, and other nonreligious respon-
dents were studied. Only the results that achieved
statistical or marginal significance are reported.
All significant results have a p-value less than
0.05. All marginally significant results have a
p-value of less than 0.1 and greater than 0.05.
State’s Right to Invasion
There were many gender differences in the use of
both proinvasion and anti-invasion responses.
Chi-square tests revealed that significantly more
men than women gave responses coded for at
least one of the proinvasion arguments, such as
government and displacement of responsibility
themes and deferral to the international commu-
nity/UN. Men were marginally more likely than
women to provide responses agreeing with a
state’s right to invasion as a form of self-defense/
preemptive strike or responses using pseudomoral
25 Russia Balkan Invasion 389

Table 25.6 Sample personal engagement responses regarding your country bombing another country
Category Percent Country Gender Age Response
General 26 (32) Greece M 62 “Stop it with any means possible”
responsibility Russia F 54 “To stop this violence immediately”
Slovenia F 45 “To stop this doing”
Serbia F 26 “Stop it.”
Helping 21 (25) Greece M 21 “Disgust”
emotions Russia F 18 “Shame”
Slovenia F 43 “Sorrow”
Serbia M 32 “Regret”
Self-referenced 17 (21) Greece F 36 “Mobilize myself with other citizens and pressure
agency the government so as to make it stop”
Russia M 31 “It depends on the country. To change a nationality,
to protest, to start a revolution”
Slovenia M 24 “I would protest against government.”
Serbia F 57 “Don’t vote for this government”
Note: The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total
response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in that category out of the personal
engagement responses to this item
F female, M male

justification rationales. t-Tests supported all of
these findings.
Significantly more men than women denied a
state’s right to invade by citing the need to honor
international mandates forbidding invasion. In
contrast, marginally more women than men
offered better alternatives to invasion in their
responses. Women gave significantly more
responses than men opposing a state’s right to
invasion by demonstrating appreciation of the
consequences of invasion, using at least one of
the anti-invasion arguments and at least one of
the principled moral justification themes, such as
nonviolence/concern with peace. Women were
marginally more likely than men to provide
responses citing human rights/concern for others
in opposition of a state’s right to invade. t-Tests
supported all of these findings and also revealed
that women scored significantly higher than men
on the use of equality themes when denying a
government’s right to invade. Additionally, men
scored marginally higher than women on the use
of self-defense or preemptive strike as a rationale
for state-sponsored invasion.
Military service also produced differences in
the use of the invasion-tolerant arguments.
Significantly more respondents with experience
in the military than their counterparts gave
responses supporting a state’s right to invasion
through a deferral to the international commu-
nity/UN, and marginally more supported a state’s
right to invasion by attributing blame to the other
nation. Respondents with military service were
marginally more likely than their counterparts to
provide responses coded for displacement of
responsibility. t-Tests supported these results and
also revealed that respondents not in the military
scored marginally higher than their counterparts
in references to the government when supporting
invasion.
In regard to the invasion-intolerant constructs,
significantly more respondents with military ser-
vice used general anti-invasion arguments in
response to this item than respondents without
military service. Similarly, marginally more
respondents with military experience denied the
right to invade on the basis of honoring interna-
tional mandates than their counterparts. In con-
trast, significantly more respondents who had
never been in the military cited the need to be
concerned with peace as a reason a state does not
have the right to invade another country. t-Tests
390
supported the findings in regard to general anti-
invasion use and nonviolence/concern with peace.
Additionally, t-tests revealed that respondents
who had never been in the military scored
significantly higher than their counterparts on the
use of equality themes and on principled moral
sum scores when denying the right to invade.
Respondents with a relative in the military
were marginally more likely than their counter-
parts to justify one country’s right to invade
another country as a form of self-defense/pre-
emptive strike. Respondents with relatives in the
military were also marginally more likely than
their counterparts to use at least one of the dis-
placement of responsibility arguments. t-Tests
supported the findings regarding the use of self-
defense/preemptive strike as a justification to
invade. Chi-square tests revealed that respondents
without relatives in the military were marginally
more likely than their counterparts to give at least
one of the anti-invasion responses as well as at
least one of the responses indicating the appreci-
ation of consequences. t-Tests supported these
results as well.
Respondents who had participated in a peace
protest gave significantly more responses than
nonprotestors indicating at least one displace-
ment of responsibility mechanism and, more
specifically, deferral of responsibility to the
international community/UN for invading.
Nonprotestors gave significantly more responses
than protestors using at least one of the proinva-
sion rationales and at least one of the pseudo-
moral justifications mechanisms. t-Tests supported
all of these results. t-Tests also revealed that
respondents who had never participated in a pro-
test scored significantly higher than those who
had participated on references to advantageous
comparisons and positive consequences and
scored marginally higher than protestors on ref-
erences to self-defense and preemptive strike as
justification for an invasion.
Protestors gave significantly more responses
than nonprotestors to referencing respect for gov-
ernment/sovereignty and were marginally more
likely than nonprotestors to reference human
rights/concern for others when denying a state’s
S. McCarthy et al.
right to invade. Respondents who had protested
were marginally more likely than their counter-
parts to use at least one anti-invasion response, at
least one responsibility response, and at least one
response demonstrating a human rights/concern
for others theme. t-Tests supported all of these
results except for the human rights/concern for
others result.
In regard to religion, t-tests were used to
examine differences between the responses from
Christians and the responses from participants
who identified as agnostic, atheist, or “none.”
t-Tests revealed that Christians scored significantly
higher on the use of what we identified as prin-
cipled moral justification in their responses than
did atheists, agnostics, and none. t-Tests also
revealed that Christians scored significantly
higher than atheists, agnostics, and none on the
references to freedom when arguing against a
state right to invasion.
There were no differences between socioeco-
nomic groups in the use of the proinvasion items;
however, anti-invasion item themes did vary in
relation to social class. One-way ANOVAs
showed a significant main effect for socioeco-
nomic status on the use of principled moral
justification and appreciating consequences and
made a marginally significant contribution to
honoring international mandates and nonvio-
lence/concern with peace scores. Scheffe tests
revealed that upper-class respondents scored
significantly higher on the use of appreciating
the consequences than respondents in the lower,
working, middle, and upper middle classes. Post
hoc analysis failed to reveal a specific class dif-
ference for the use of the other invasion-intolerant
mechanisms.
There were some differences in the use of sev-
eral of the proinvasion arguments based on
nationality. The use of advantageous comparison/
positive consequences, pseudomoral justification,
and pseudoassistance all varied significantly by
country, and there was a marginally significant
main effect for nationality in the use of the attri-
bution of blame theme. Scheffe tests revealed that
participants from Serbia scored significantly
higher than participants from Russia on the use of
25 Russia Balkan Invasion
pseudoassistance as a justification for a state
right to invasion. Post hoc analysis failed to reveal
a specific country difference for the other inva-
sion-tolerant mechanisms.
Many of the invasion-intolerant themes also
varied by nationality. Anti-invasion sum scores,
responsibility sum scores, the appreciating the
consequences sum scores, and human rights/con-
cern for others sum scores all varied significantly
by country. Nationality also had a main effect on
the use of honoring international mandates,
respect for government/sovereignty, appreciating
the consequences, better alternatives, human
rights/concern for others, and equality themes.
Scheffe tests revealed that respondents from
Slovenia scored significantly higher than respon-
dents from Russia on anti-invasion sum scores.
Respondents from Serbia scored significantly
higher than their Russian counterparts on respon-
sibility sum scores and, more specifically, on
respect for government and sovereignty.
Respondents from Greece scored significantly
higher than their Russian counterparts on human
rights/concern for others sum scores as well as
human rights/concern for others. Respondents
from Serbia scored significantly higher than
respondents from Russia and Slovenia on the use
of appreciating consequences in their responses.
Respondents from Slovenia scored significantly
higher than respondents from Greece, Russia,
and Serbia on the use of better alternatives/
violence as unnecessary. Respondents from
Serbia scored significantly higher than respon-
dents from Russia on the use of equality in their
responses when opposing a state’s right to inva-
sion. Finally, post hoc analysis failed to reveal a
specific country difference in appreciating the
consequence sum scores and honoring interna-
tional mandates. As with all the other exploratory
analyses done for this study, given the nonrepre-
sentative nature of our samples, these results
should not be overinterpreted.
Table 25.7 presents percentages of responses
for coding categories by demographic group and
chi-square values for the item concerning a state’s
right to invasion.
391
Table 25.8 presents means, standard deviations,
and t-test results by demographic group for the
coding categories pertaining to a state’s right to
invasion.
Another Country Indiscriminately
Bombing Your Country
In regard to the item asking participants what
they would want to do if another country was
bombing civilians in their country, a number of
gender differences were found in the use of sev-
eral personal disengagement mechanisms.
Significantly more men than women gave
responses indicating at least one type of personal
disengagement and at least one type of antisocial
agency. Marginally more men than women gave
responses coded for harming emotions, such as
feelings of revenge. t-Tests supported these
findings and also revealed that women gave mar-
ginally more personally engaged responses and
marginally more responses demonstrating
humanizing agency than men.
In regard to military service and the use of the
personal disengagement and personal engagement
arguments, significantly more respondents who
had been in the military than their counterparts
gave responses indicating harming emotions.
Respondents with military experience were mar-
ginally more likely than their counterparts to pro-
vide responses coded for at least one of the
personal engagement mechanisms. t-Tests did not
reveal any significant differences between respon-
dents with military experience and respondents
without military experience in their use of personal
engagement and disengagement mechanisms.
Marginally more respondents with a relative
in the military referenced a denial of responsibil-
ity when responding to this bombing item than
did respondents without a relative in the military.
t-Tests found that respondents with a relative in
the military scored marginally higher on human-
izing agency sum scores than their counterparts.
In regard to participation in protest, chi-
squares revealed several significant differences in
392 S. McCarthy et al.

Table 25.7 State right to invasion: percentages of responses in coding categories by demographic groups
and chi-square values
Group 1a Group 2a X2
Categories Male Female
Proinvasion presence 39 29 5.015
Displacement of responsibility presence 6 0 12.68***,b
Pseudomoral justification presence 27 19 3.93^
Deferral to the international community/UN 4 0 11.41***,b
Self-defense/preemptive strike 19 13 3.40^
Anti-invasion presence 55 66 5.72*
Appreciating consequences presence 17 27 7.49**
Human rights/concern for others presence 4 8 3.89^
Principled moral justification presence 11 21 8.82**
Honor international mandates 5 1 5.27*
Better alternatives/violence as unnecessary 10 16 3.65^
Nonviolence/concern with peace 4 14 12.99***
Military Nonmilitary
Displacement of responsibility presence 6 2 4.35^,b
Deferral to the international community/UN 5 1 6.37*,b
Attribution of blame 9 4 4.78^,b
Anti-invasion 8 2 8.35**,b
Honor international mandates 6 2 3.40^,b
Nonviolence/concern with peace 4 12 5.37*
Relative military No relative military
Displacement of responsibility presence 2 7 3.51^,b
Self-defense/preemptive strike 18 8 3.88^
Anti-invasion presence 56 69 3.45^
Appreciating consequences presence 17 31 3.56^
Protest No protest
Proinvasion presence 22 35 5.10*
Displacement of responsibility presence 9 1 14.83***,b
Pseudomoral justification presence 12 24 6.18*
Deferral to the international community/UN 7 0 13.74**,b
Anti-invasion presence 74 60 6.07*
Responsibility presence 43 28 7.20**
Human rights/concern for others presence 13 6 4.92*
Respect for government/sovereignty 41 26 7.44**
Human rights/concern for others 8 3 4.02^,b
Note: Presence indicates that the participant provided a response that was coded for that category and/or
one of its subcategories. Refer to the coding Methods chapter 22 for a more detailed description
*
p £ 0.05; **p £ 0.01; ***p £ 0.001; ^0.051 < p < 0.10
a
The numbers in these columns are the percent of the group that gave responses falling into each of the
specified categories
b
Fisher’s p-value

themes. Protestors gave significantly more agency. All of these findings were supported by
responses than nonprotestors coded for at least t-tests. In addition, t-tests revealed that respon-
one of the prosocial agency constructs, call for dents who had protested scored significantly
the international community, and self-referenced higher than nonprotestors on personal engage-
25 Russia Balkan Invasion 393

Table 25.8 State right to invasion: means, standard deviations, and t-test results by demographic group for coding
categories
Group 1 Group 2 t df
Categories Male Female
Pseudoassistance 0.19 (0.39) 0.13 (0.34) −1.80^ 383.08
Equality 0.00 (0.00) 0.01 (0.12) 2.01* 278.00
Military Nonmilitary
Government 0.00 (0.00) 0.01 (0.10) 1.74^ 304.00
Principled moral justification sum 0.12 (0.33) 0.22 (0.46) 2.25* 235.24
Equality 0.00 (0.00) 0.01 (0.11) 2.01* 304.00
Protest No protest
Advantageous comparison/positive 0.02 (0.15) 0.07 (0.25) 2.03* 226.58
consequences
Self-defense/preemptive strike 0.09 (0.29) 0.17 (0.37) 1.94^ 169.33
Christian None/agnostic/atheist
Principled moral justification 0.02 (0.15) 0.00 (0.00) 2.67** 308.00
Freedom 0.02 (0.15) 0.00 (0.00) 2.67** 308.00
Note: Sums of categories were created by adding the category and its subcategories together. Refer to the coding
Methods chapter 22 for a more detailed description. Standard deviations appear in parentheses next to means
*
p £ 0.05; **p £ 0.01; ***p £ 0.001; ^0.05 < p < 0.1

Table 25.9 Another country bombing your country: percentages of responses in coding categories by demographic
groups and chi-square values
Group 1a Group 2a X2
Categories Male Female
Personal disengagement presence 47 38 4.82*
Antisocial agency presence 44 34 5.12*
Harming emotions 73 62 2.91^

Relative military No relative military

Denial of responsibility 0.8 5 4.56^,b

Protest No protest
Prosocial agency presence 11 3 8.23**,b
Call for the international community 10 3 7.10*,b
Self-referenced agency 10 3 8.27**,b
Note: Presence indicates that the participant provided a response that was coded for that category and/or one of its sub-
categories. Refer to the coding Methods chapter 22 for a more detailed description
*
p £ 0.05; **p £ 0.01; ***p £ 0.001; ^0.05 < p < 0.1
a
The numbers in these columns are the percent of the group that gave responses falling into each of the specified
categories
b
Fisher’s p-value

ment sum scores. There were no significant dif-
ferences in the use of personal engagement and
disengagement themes based on current religion
and only marginally significant differences based
on social class.
Table 25.9 presents percentages of responses
in coding categories by demographic group and
chi-square values.
Table 25.10 presents means, standard devia-
tions, and t-test results by demographic group for
394
Table 25.10 Another country bombing your own: means, standard deviations, and t-test results by demographic group
for coding categories
Group 1
Categories Male
Unspecified personal engagement 0.18 (0.38)
Humanizing agency 0.00 (0.00)
Relative military
Humanizing agency sum 0.26 (0.46)
Protest
Personal engagement sum 0.95 (0.60)
Note: Sums of categories were created by adding the category and its subcategories together. Refer to the Invasion
Methods chapter for a more detailed description. Standard deviations appear in parentheses next to means
*
p £ 0.05; **p £ 0.01; ***p £ 0.001; ^0.05 < p < 0.1
the personal disengagement and personal engage-
ment categories for this item.
Many of the personal disengagement response
categories varied significantly by country.
Personal disengagement sum scores, denial of
responsibility sum scores, and antisocial agency
sum scores differed significantly contingent upon
country. There were also significant national dif-
ferences in the use of themes showing harming
emotions, denial of responsibility, and vengeful
agency. Post hoc analysis showed that respon-
dents from Greece scored lower than respondents
from Russia on personal disengagement sum
scores. Furthermore, respondents from Serbia
scored significantly higher than respondents from
all of the other countries in this region on the
same scores. Respondents from Serbia scored
significantly higher than respondents from
Greece, Russia, and Slovenia on denial of respon-
sibility sum scores as well as general denial of
responsibility. Respondents from Russia and
Serbia scored significantly higher on antisocial
agency sum scores than respondents from
Slovenia. Greek and Russian respondents scored
significantly higher than Serbian respondents on
the use of harming emotions. Finally, respondents
from Russia scored significantly higher than
respondents from Slovenia on the use of vengeful
agency in their responses to another country
bombing their country.
S. McCarthy et al.
Group 2 t df
Female
0.24 (0.43) 1.66^ 459.52
0.01 (0.10) 1.74^ 287.00
No relative military
0.17 (0.38) −1.69 122.63^
No protest
0.80 (0.54) −2.29* 400.00
Nationality also contributed to scores on many
of the personal engagement scores. ANOVAs
revealed that participant country made a
significant contribution to personal engagement
sum scores, prosocial agency sum scores, and
humanizing agency sum scores. Scheffe tests
revealed that respondents from Greece and
Slovenia scored significantly higher on personal
engagement sum scores and humanizing agency
sum scores than respondents from Russia. In
regard to the prosocial agency categories, Greeks
scored significantly higher on the use of this form
of personal engagement than respondents from
all of the other countries in this region. ANOVAs
also indicated that the use of unspecified personal
engagement, general responsibility, call for the
international community, self-referenced agency,
and genuine assistance all varied significantly by
country, and there was a marginally significant
difference among countries in the use of human-
izing agency. Post hoc tests showed that respon-
dents from Slovenia scored significantly higher
on the use of unspecified personal engagement
than respondents from Greece. Similarly, respon-
dents from Serbia scored significantly higher on
references to unspecified personal engagement
than respondents from Greece and Russia.
Russian respondents scored significantly higher
than Slovenian respondents on references to gen-
eral responsibility Respondents from Serbia
25 Russia Balkan Invasion
scored significantly higher than respondents from
Greece and Russia on calls to the international
community. Greek respondents scored signi
ficantly higher than Russian, Serbian, and
Slovenian respondents on the use of self-refer-
enced agency. Additionally, respondents from
Greece scored significantly higher than respon-
dents from Russia on the use of genuine assis-
tance; respondents from Slovenia also scored
significantly higher on the use of genuine assis-
tance than respondents from Russia and Serbia.
Post hoc tests failed to reveal a specific country
difference on the use of humanizing agency
references.
Your Country Indiscriminately Bombing
Another Country
When responding to the prompt regarding their
country bombing another country, men were
marginally more likely to respond with harming
emotions than were women. Significantly more
men than women responded that they would want
to take action against the bombing, reflecting the
use of self-referenced agency. Marginally more
women than men wanted to genuinely assist oth-
ers in response to their country bombing another.
t-Tests supported all of these findings. t-Tests
also revealed that men scored significantly higher
than women on prosocial agency sum scores and
that women scored marginally higher than men
on humanizing agency sum scores.
Significantly more respondents with military
experience than those without such experience
gave responses indicating at least one type of
prosocial agency as well as self-referenced
agency. These findings were supported by t-tests.
t-Tests also indicated that respondents who had
never been in the military scored marginally
higher than respondents who had been in the mil-
itary on personal disengagement sum scores,
antisocial agency sum scores, vengeful agency,
calling for the international community, and
genuine assistance. Respondents who had a
relative in the military were marginally more
likely than their counterparts to give responses
395
coded for at least one of the personal engagement
themes and gave significantly more responses using
at least one of the prosocial agency themes.
Chi-square tests revealed that respondents
who had never participated in a protest were
marginally more likely than protestors to give
responses demonstrating vengeful agency. t-Tests
supported this result. Chi-square tests revealed
that significantly more nonprotestors than pro-
testors gave at least one type of personally
engaged response when considering the scenario
in which their country was bombing innocent
civilians in another country. Significantly more
protestors than nonprotestors gave at least one
type of prosocial agency and self-referenced
agency response. These results were supported
by t-tests. t-Tests also revealed that nonprotes-
tors scored significantly higher than protestors
on antisocial agency sum scores. However,
t-tests revealed that respondents who had not
protested scored significantly higher than their
counterparts on the use of unspecified personal
engagement.
t-tests were used to examine whether any per-
sonal disengagement or engagement themes were
contingent on the respondents’ current religion.
t-Tests revealed that atheists, agnostics, and
“none” scored marginally higher than Christians
on antisocial agency sum scores and vengeful
agency sum scores categories. Christians scored
significantly higher than agnostics, atheists, and
“none” on responsibility sum scores as well as on
general responsibility. Self-reported agnostics,
atheists, and “none” scored significantly higher
than Christians on prosocial agency sum scores
and on the use of self-referenced agency.
Christians scored significantly higher on the use
of calling for the international community than
did atheists, agnostics, and “none.”
Table 25.11 presents the percentage of
responses in the coding categories by demo-
graphic group and chi-square values.
Table 25.12 presents means, standard devia-
tions, and t-test results for coding categories by
demographic group and chi-square values.
ANOVAs revealed that only two personal
disengagement scores (antisocial agency sum
396 S. McCarthy et al.

Table 25.11 Your country bombing another country: percentages of

responses in coding categories by demographic groups and chi-square
values
Group 1a Group 2a X2
Categories Male Female
Harming emotions 28 17 3.95^
Self-referenced agency 30 20 5.68*
Genuine assistance 6 10 3.11^
Military Nonmilitary
Prosocial agency presence 62 43 10.44***
Self-referenced agency 41 24 9.17**
Protest No protest
Vengeful agency 0 4 3.47^,b
Prosocial agency presence 64 45 10.03**
Unspecified personal 2 10 5.57*
engagement
Self-referenced agency 45 25 13.76***
Note: Presence indicates that the participant provided a response that
was coded for that category and/or one of its subcategories. Refer to the
coding Methods chapter 22 for a more detailed description
*
p £ 0.05; **p £ 0.01; ***p £ 0.001; ^0.05 < p < 0.1
a
The numbers in these columns are the percent of the group that gave
responses falling into each of the specified categories
b
Fisher’s p value.

scores and the use of vengeful agency) varied in
relation to social class. Scheffe post hoc analyses
revealed that respondents from the lower class
scored significantly higher on the use of those
themes than respondents from the middle class.
In regard to participant country, personal dis-
engagement sum scores, denial of responsibility
sum scores, and denial of responsibility all varied
significantly by nationality. Scheffe tests showed
that respondents from Russia and Greece scored
significantly higher than respondents from
Slovenia on personal disengagement sum scores
and denial of responsibility sum scores and
Russian respondents scored significantly higher
than Greek respondents on the use of denial of
responsibility. ANOVAs also indicated that per-
sonal engagement sum scores, prosocial agency
sum scores, and humanizing agency sum scores
varied significantly by country. Additionally, the
uses of unspecified personal engagement, gen-
eral responsibility, prosocial agency, self-refer-
enced agency, and genuine assistance were all
significantly contingent on country. Post hoc tests
revealed that Greek and Serbian respondents
scored significantly higher on personal engage-
ment sum scores than Russian respondents,
whereas Greek, Slovenian, and Serbian respon-
dents scored significantly higher than Russian
respondents on prosocial agency sum scores.
Additionally, respondents from Greece scored
significantly higher than respondents from Russia
on humanizing agency sum scores. Respondents
from Russia and Serbia scored significantly
higher than respondents from Greece on the use
of unspecified personal engagement, whereas
Slovenian respondents scored significantly higher
on the use of prosocial agency than Russian and
Serbian respondents. Respondents from Greece,
Serbia, and Slovenia scored significantly higher
than respondents from Russia on the use of self-
referenced agency in their responses, whereas
respondents form Greece scored significantly
higher than respondents from Russia and Serbia
on the use of genuine assistance.
25 Russia Balkan Invasion 397

Table 25.12 Your country bombing another country: means, standard deviations, and t-test results by demographic
group for coding categories
Group 1 Group 2 t df
Categories Male Female
Prosocial agency sum 0.33 (0.48) 0.24 (0.44) −2.09* 387.07
Humanizing agency sum 0.07 (0.25) 0.11 (0.31) 1.69^ 475.16
Military Nonmilitary
Personal disengagement sum 0.08 (0.27) 0.14 (0.34) 1.80^ 188.63
Antisocial agency sum 0.01 (0.10) 0.04 (0.20) 1.91^ 290.58
Vengeful agency (PD) 0.01 (0.10) 0.04 (0.20) 1.95^ 289.43
Call for the international community (PE) 0.01 (0.10) 0.04 (0.20) 1.78^ 277.61
Genuine assistance 0.05 (0.23) 0.11 (0.31) 1.72^ 194.86
Protest No protest
Antisocial agency sum 0.00 (0.00) 0.04 (0.19) 3.53*** 323.00
Unspecified personal engagement 0.02 (0.15) 0.10 (0.31) 3.39*** 286.26
Christian None/agnostic/atheist
Antisocial agency sum 0.02 (0.14) 0.08 (0.28) −1.77^ 63.43
Vengeful agency sum 0.02 (0.14) 0.08 (0.28) −1.75^ 63.43
Responsibility sum 0.43 (0.50) 0.24 (0.43) 3.12** 88.93
Prosocial agency sum 0.28 (0.45) 0.47 (0.50) −2.82** 76.32
General responsibility 0.42 (0.49) 0.24 (0.43) 2.91** 89.92
Call for the international community 0.03 (0.17) 0.00 (0.00) 3.04** 309.00
Self-referenced agency 0.25 (0.43) 0.42 (0.50) −2.48* 75.71
Note: Sums of categories were created by adding the category and its subcategories together. Refer to the Invasion
Methods chapter for a more detailed description. Standard deviations appear in parentheses next to means
*
p £ 0.05; **p £ 0.01; ***p £ 0.001; ^0.05 < p < 0.1

Conclusions agree (McCarthy 2010), as would be expected

As expected, various forms of engagement were
more common than disengagement in the
responses from this region. The level of agree-
ment regarding the right to invade was similar
across countries, as were the justifications and
mechanisms utilized. Other analyses of the
responses from the same sample indicated that
compared to other regions of the world with a
vertical collectivist orientation (Triandis et al.
1985) such as Asia, where agreement rates with
the right to invade were generally below 20%
(McCarthy 2010), participants in Russia and the
Balkans were more likely to agree with and jus-
tify a right to invade, as was predicted by the
horizontal-collectivist orientation (Triandis 1995)
discussed earlier in this chapter. Compared to the
USA, UK, Canada, much of Western Europe, and
Australia, however, they were much less likely to
due to the vertical individualist orientation of
those countries.
It is worth noting, however, that definitions of
concepts like dictatorial regimes, humanitarian
reasons, defense, and fundamental good are likely
to be interpreted differently by those on opposite
sides of a disagreement. Perhaps reflecting this
region’s recent role on both sides of NATO peace-
keeping activities, some comments included
justification of or disagreement with a right to
invade based on the approval of other countries or
of international organizations such as the UN or
NATO. Overall, it seems that the majority of peo-
ple in this region resolved the moral dilemma
concerning invasion by determining that invasion
is a violation of human rights—except when it is
necessary to uphold other rights.
The region’s actively changing political envi-
ronment over the last century, moving through
398
many divisions resulting from the World Wars to
military dictatorship to, finally, its current status
as a modern democracy, may account in part for
some of the conflicting themes in the data. From
military pacts with Bulgaria and Armenia to pro-
tect each other from the potential of Turkish inva-
sion (Allison and Bluth 1998) to pacts with the
Soviet Union and to pacts with the USA to pro-
tect against communist invasion to its current sta-
tus, the region has veered from one political pole
to another—but the threat of invasion has gener-
ally been a salient factor in this course, explain-
ing why there is general support for a right to
invade in order to defend if necessary.
However, the majority of respondents in the
region do not support invasion as a right in any
circumstances, arguing that better alternatives
exist. Some respondents disagree with invasion
on the basis of principles, noting that invasion
violates the sovereignty of a state or that territory
is inviolate and should not be infringed upon.
This is likely based on their own recent experi-
ences of invasion or threat of invasion. Some dis-
agreed with the right based upon a belief in
pacifism. Religious orientation (Orthodox
Christian as well as Islam), history, and current
events may help explain disagreement with the
right to invade. Respondents from this region of
the world were somewhat polarized, overall,
regarding a right to invade. About half oppose it
in all circumstances; the rest support it in most
circumstances, with protection of homeland, of
human rights, or of allies being the most common
reasons for support.
Many of the respondents who rejected the
right to invade gave explanations indicating they
were pacifists and that all conflicts could be
solved through peaceful negotiation. Many expla-
nations questioning the motives of invaders were
also provided. Some saw invasion as an attempt
to exploit resources, echoing the tribal, protective
origins of a horizontal-collectivist culture that
has developed in an area of relatively high patho-
gen prevalence (see Schaller and Murray 2011).
Many argued that invasions are undertaken
because of the interests of individuals affiliated
S. McCarthy et al.
with the government of the invading country.
Motives for invasion are seen as tied to material
interests without regard for victims. Such
responses may reflect criticism of the US inva-
sion of Iraq as well as direct experience with
invasion during the bombing of Serbia by NATO
forces. Other chapters about Russia and the
Balkans in this volume expand on the influence
of these events.
Among respondents who indicated some tol-
erance for a right to invasion, there was agree-
ment that it should be undertaken with the aim of
self-defense or to protect people in the country. If
the invaded country somehow jeopardizes or
threatens the homeland, the invasion is accept-
able. Some respondents indicated approval for a
government’s right to invade by saying invasion
is justified for improvement of living conditions
in either the invading or the invaded country. This
view may be reflective of the recent conflict in
Serbia and the invasion by NATO forces.
It is apparent from their responses that the
people in this region of the world have witnessed
dictatorships, invasion, and bloodshed firsthand.
It is also apparent that most give careful thought
to whether or not, and in what circumstances,
invasion is justified. Perhaps this is in part because
recent changes in the political systems in this
area have focused attention on democracy and
decision-making. This, in turn, has led to a
heightened sense of personal responsibility.
Nevertheless, the relatively high number of citi-
zens who agree that invasion is sometimes a right
shows a cynicism toward peaceful resolution,
perhaps also rooted in both recent and historical
experience. The remnants of rule by the Mongol
Empire and the Ottoman Empire have had a long-
lasting influence, and the experiences in World
War 1 and World War 2 are still relatively fresh.
Peace is valued and hoped for by the citizens of
Russia and the Balkans, but hope is tempered
with a realistic dose of distrust. A horizontal-col-
lectivist orientation makes it unlikely that citizens
from this region would accept or justify invasion
of or by others for personal gain, but very likely
that they would sanction invasion if it were
25 Russia Balkan Invasion
viewed as necessary to protect or defend them-
selves or their allies from others seeking personal
gain at their expense.
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 Perspectives on Invasion
in the Middle East 26
Majed Ashy, Rouba Youssef, Tristyn Campbell,
Alev Yalcinkaya, Abdul Kareem Al-Obaidi,
Dalit Yassour-Boroschowitz, Helena Syna Desivilya,
Feryal Turan, Kamala Smith, Lane Smith,
and William Tastle

The Middle East is the birthplace of several
civilizations that have greatly influenced the
growth of human knowledge in various scientific,
philosophical, and artistic fields (Black 2003).
In addition, the Middle East is the cradle of the
three major world religions: Judaism, Christianity,
and Islam. The term “Middle East” itself was con-
ceived in 1902 for military purpose by Alfred
Mahan, a flag officer in the United States Navy
(Adelson 1995). The contemporary region of the
Middle East is generally considered to consist of
sixteen countries: Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel,
Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Palestine, Qatar,
Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, United Arab Emirates,
and Yemen (CIA World Factbook 2011).1
In this chapter, we consider various factors
that contributed to the development of the mod-
ern attitudes toward invasion in the Middle East
within the framework of the ecological model.
This model, developed by Bronfenbrenner (1979)
and later refined by Belsky (1993), takes into
account variables influencing behavior on four
levels of analysis. The individual/developmental
level includes biological/genetic factors, gender,
age, personality, cognition, and emotional charac-
teristics. These variables exist within the micro-
system level, which includes the individual’s
proximal social environment, such as family
1
In the current volume, we have separate chapters to
discuss the Persian Gulf countries of Bahrain, Kuwait,
Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates; Egypt is also
considered in chapters on Africa.
members. The microsystem variables are located
within the exosystem level variables, which
include experiences within the community. In
turn, the exosystem level variables function within
the macrosystem level variables that include broad
national, historical, and cultural forces. From the
ecological model perspective, these variables
interact in multidirectional ways to influence
human behavior (Ashy and Malley-Morrison
2007). Understanding modern attitudes in the
Middle East toward invasion requires an examina-
tion of historical, cultural, community, family, and
individual factors and how they interact. We will
start by discussing the broader macrosystem vari-
ables and end with the microsystem ones.
In the sixth and seventh centuries AD, the
Persian, Roman, and Macedonian empires ruled
various parts of the Middle East. However, vari-
ous invasions, wars, and sometimes atrocities
accompanied the rise, expansion, and fall of each
of these civilizations. Some of these wars have
been kept in the collective awareness through
being recorded in the arts, such as drawings in
caves, literature, poetry, history books, folk sto-
ries, and even mentioned in the holy books.
Physical signs of the destructions left by these
wars and invasions, through thousands of years,
are still around us. One can see partially destroyed
castles, abandoned towns and villages, and even
abandoned weapons and mines from more recent
wars. Many towns in the Middle East were
designed with high walls surrounding them as
protection from possible invasions.

K. Malley-Morrison et al. (eds.), International Handbook of War, Torture, and Terrorism, 401
Peace Psychology Book Series, DOI 10.1007/978-1-4614-1638-8_26,
© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2013
402
The Middle East consists of various tribes,
ethnicities, religious sects, social classes, and
races (Black 2003). There are Jews, Christians,
and Muslims, among other religions, each with
its own variations. For example, there are
Orthodox and Reform Jews; Orthodox, Copt,
and Maroni Christians; and Sunni and Shiite
Muslims. In addition, there are numerous eth-
nicities and races in the Middle East, such as
Jews, Arabs, Turks, Persians, Kurds, Turkmen,
and Africans. Throughout their history, they had
various types of relations, and each had its own
culture and individual development. However,
tribalism has been a major force in the history of
the Middle East. Most countries of the Middle
East have tribes that extend beyond the modern
borders. These tribes, their conflicts, loyalties,
and traditions, predate the establishment of
modern states and even existed before the
appearance of the major religions in the region.
The Middle East also had a long history of class
structure and conflicts. These classes included
farmers, working class, military class, religious
class, middle class, and upper class, among oth-
ers. As in many other nations, the groups had
various types of alliances and conflicts (Fisher
1978).
After the birth of Islam in the seventh century
AD, war and invasions took on a new definition
(Black 2003). Islam forbade war for the sake of
tribalism, worldly goods, nationalism, or under
any other flag. It allowed war only as a form of
self-defense, which was called “Jihad,” an Arabic
word meaning “struggle”. The Qur’an cites Jihad
as a means of resisting oppression and for self-
defense against tyranny. However, there has been
a debate among Islamic scholars and historians
on the definition of Jihad and when it should be
declared. The understanding of Jihad had, and
still has, major consequences on the attitudes of
people in the Middle East towards war and inva-
sions and the relations between Muslims and
other nations in the world.
Muslim Arabs formed empires that lasted for
several centuries, but later fell to Muslim Turks,
who took over the region and formed the Ottoman
Empire, invading lands and nations in the East
M. Ashy et al.
and the West (Black 2003). Some of the invasions
continued for centuries, such as Arab efforts to
invade Nubia in Africa, which continued for
about 900 years and failed. Other invasions
resulted in what is known as conquests. Such
invasions and conquests included that of Iraq and
Persia in 633–651 AD; Transoxiana in Central
Asia in 662–709 AD; Sindh in India in 664–712
AD; Hispania, which included modern Spain and
Portugal, in 711–718 AD; Caucasus, south of
Russia, in 711–750 AD; Nubia in Africa in 700–
1606 AD; Southern Italy in 831–902 AD; Anatolia
in 1060–1360 AD; and Byzantine in 1299–1453
AD and the invasion of southern Spain and the
formation of Al-Andalus between 711 AD and
1492 AD, among many other invasions and con-
quests in Africa, Asia, and Europe. The Ottoman
Empire endured until the end of WWI and the
defeat of the Turks and their ally, Germany
(Goffman 2002). These invasions contributed to
the shaping of some of the current policies, atti-
tudes, stereotypes, and possibly underlying fears
and suspicions, of Europeans, Indians, Africans,
and others toward the people of the Middle East.
Thus, this history of Arab/Muslim invasions has
had long-term effects on the relations of the
Middle East to the rest of the world.
Following WWI, the British and French gov-
ernments signed a secret 1918 treaty named the
Sykes-Picot Agreement, which signaled the start
of colonization in the Middle East and created
the foundation for current national boundaries in
the region (Fieldhouse 2006; Weinberg 2005).
This treaty and colonization also provoked the
start of various independence movements in the
Middle East. Some nations won independence
peacefully, such as the independence of the Gulf
states from Britain, while others fought bloody
wars that resulted in many deaths and tremen-
dous destruction, such as Algeria’s battle for
independence from France.
During the Cold War, newly formed Middle
East countries were forced to take sides in the
conflict between the United States and the Soviet
Union. Many, especially the oil-rich states, were
under threats of invasion by various powers in
the region. In their efforts to protect themselves,
26 Perspectives on Invasion in the Middle East
Egypt, Syria, and South Yemen became allies of
the Soviet Union, whereas the Gulf States, Iran,
Pakistan, Turkey, Jordan, and Israel became
aligned with the United States. These alliances
have contributed to many of the cultural, eco-
nomic, and sociopolitical realities confronting
the Middle East today (Owen 2004). As part of
the alignment processes, some countries adopted
the communist, nationalist, or socialist ideologies
held by their allies, while others adopted more
religious or secular beliefs. Each of these ideolo-
gies has its own philosophy regarding human
rights, the use of violence in wars and invasions,
and their understanding of what constitutes a
“just war or invasion.” For example, during the
Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s, Saddam Hussein, a
secular Arab nationalist supported by Western
and Arab countries, evoked Arab nationalism as a
motive behind his war against the threat of
Persian Iran, while the revolutionary Islamic
government of Iran, which had just overthrown
the West-supported Shah of Iran, evoked the con-
cepts of Islamic Jihad and anti-imperialism as the
motives behind its war. The wars and invasions in
the Middle East had many different motives,
ranging from power or ideological struggles
among various empires, desires for expansion
and colonization, strategic objectives of control-
ling waterways between the East and the West,
religious conflicts, ethnic and tribal conflicts,
disputes over natural resources (Black 2003),
and, more recently, over the establishment of
democracy in the Middle East.
Middle Eastern history is full of these
attempts by invaders to impose their cultures,
religions, political systems, languages, or their
versions of historical narratives on the invaded
nations. Furthermore, invaders attempted to
“divide and conquer” or to mobilize one ethnic
or religious group against another, which con-
tributed to internal conflicts within communities
in the Middle East. In some cases, minorities in
the Middle East genuinely needed protection or
support for their rights. The continuous worries
and fears of invasions and wars, however,
intensified radicalism, xenophobia, nationalism,
dictatorship, and patriarchy. Under the constant
403
threats of invasions, these tendencies might
become stable cultural aspects and continue
during times of peace. In turn, these cultural
aspects can lead to further conflicts. Thus, we
would suggest that invasions contribute to vari-
ous changes that in turn contribute to further
wars and conflicts.
This history contributed to fear, suspicion, and
anger towards foreigners, especially among
nations that suffered exploitation and occupation.
In addition, in some countries it created feelings
of hardened nationalism and isolationism.
Furthermore, many Middle Eastern nations suf-
fered for decades under the rule of dictators who
claimed legitimacy by providing real or imagined
protection against various enemies or invaders.
Thus, invasions contributed to the strengthening
of dictators and allowed them to restrict certain
freedoms in the name of national security. The
attitudes of people in the Middle East toward
invasion are woven into these political realities.
Not the least important are the consequences of
invasions on women and their status in the Middle
East. As in any other part of the world, women
tend to be targets of wars in many ways. They
also suffer the destruction and loss of their fami-
lies, in addition to enduring the social and eco-
nomic consequences of invasions and wars.
During war, the power gap between men and
women tends to increase. Thus, the attitudes of
women in the Middle East towards invasion can-
not be completely understood without taking into
account how invasions specifically affect them.
This long history of wars and invasions not
only shaped the current maps of the region but
also shaped its politics and the relations of its
nations to each other and to other nations in the
world. It also contributed to resentments that
were passed down from generation to genera-
tion, in history books, media, and folk tradi-
tions, and to psychological and cultural trauma.
Some aspects of the cultural evolutions in the
Middle East might have been influenced by the
tragedies of wars and invasions. Invasions inter-
rupt the natural course of development of
nations. In addition to the physical, social, eco-
nomic, psychological, and cultural destructions
404
they cause, they divert resources and focus away
from development and toward self-preservation
and survival.
Methods
Demographics
The sample from the Middle East was comprised
of participants from Afghanistan, Iraq, Israel,
Jordan, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia. Participants
were found through several channels, such as
personal networking and through a survey link
posted on various websites. All participants in the
study completed the Personal and Institutional
Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey
(PAIRTAPS; Malley-Morrison et al. 2006).
This sample included 320 adult participants
(131 male and 189 female), with an average age
of 29 years. The most common religious affiliation
was Islam at 48% of the sample, with about 17%
of participants practicing Christianity, and the
rest identified as agnostic or unspecified. A major-
ity of the respondents reported being in the mid-
dle class, with every other social class being
represented at a lesser frequency. Forty-two per-
cent of the sample had not served in the military,
while 28% of the sample had. Roughly 27% of
the sample had a relative with military service, in
contrast to the 16% who did not. Finally, a little
over half of the sample identified as having never
participated in a peace protest, while 30%
responded that they had.
Procedure
This chapter discusses the responses of partici-
pants from the Middle East to five items pertain-
ing to state-sponsored invasion. The first item
asks participants to rate their level of agreement
with the statement, “Sometimes one country has
the right to invade another country.” Participants
are asked to use their own words to explain their
rating. The next four items are open-ended ques-
tions that ask participants how they would
respond to various circumstances involving
M. Ashy et al.
bombings. The first scenario is “Another country
is indiscriminately bombing a major city in your
country, and women and children, the elderly,
and civilian men are running around bloody and
screaming. What would you feel? What would
you want to do?” The second scenario is “Your
country is indiscriminately bombing a major city
in another country, and women and children, the
elderly and civilian men are running around
bloody and screaming. What would you feel?
What would you want to do?”
For coding purposes, all items were broken
down into smaller codeable units, which served
the purpose of identifying more specific social-
cognitive themes derived from Bandura’s (1999)
theory of moral disengagement. According to this
theory, one is considered morally engaged when
one’s actions are aligned with one’s moral stan-
dards despite environmental influences that may
sway one to behave otherwise. Moral engage-
ment is driven by empathy, by similarities one
perceives in another, and by recognition of moral
and social responsibilities. To practice moral
engagement, one must either engage in proactive
behavior or inhibit participation in inhumane
activities. Those who act in a morally disengaged
manner, or in a manner incongruent to their moral
beliefs, use certain cognitive mechanisms to
relieve themselves of the dissonance between
their behavior and their beliefs about morality.
Examples of these mechanisms include diminish-
ing or removing personal accountability, distorted
perception of consequences, unrealistic compari-
son to other people and situations, and moral
justification. These sociocognitive mechanisms
formed the basis for our coding categories. We
further refined Bandura’s theory, creating
categories for moral engagement, and what we
termed personal engagement and disengagement.
Because our sample was a non-representative
convenience sample and we do not want to draw
false conclusions on morality, we refer to pro-
invasion and anti-invasion responses, rather than
morally disengaged and morally engaged
responses. Additionally, it is important not to
overgeneralize the findings in our study. For more
information, refer to Chap. 22, the invasion meth-
ods chapter.
26 Perspectives on Invasion in the Middle East
Results
State’s Right to Invade
In response to the statement that one country has
the right to invade another, 62% of the responses
rejected such a right. Approximately 25% of all
responses provided reasons against a state right to
invade that pertained to respect for government and
sovereignty. These responses emphasized the role
of national borders in serving as boundaries between
independent states. For example, a 22-year-old
woman from Lebanon said, “Just as every person or
family will not allow anyone to rob or take over
their house, no country should have the right to rob
or take over or invade another country.” Over 14%
of the responses disagreeing with a state right to
invasion identified the negative consequences of
invasion, and 9% proposed better alternatives to
violence. For instance, the response of an 18-year-
old woman from Saudi Arabia incorporates both of
these anti-invasion forms of reasoning: “The loss of
innocent life is something that nothing can justify.
And the kind of bombs, weaponry, etc. used in this
day and age has long lasting effects.” Seventeen
percent of the anti-invasion responses referred to
ideas of human rights, equality, and freedom. As a
34-year-old Israeli man asserted, “Every person is
born free and there is no right for another person to
rob him of his freedom.”
Responses supportive of a country’s right to
invade presented various rationales. Thirty-eight
percent of the invasion-tolerant responses indi-
cated that a country is entitled to invade another
in order to defend itself, and 16% of invasion sup-
portive responses made advantageous compari-
sons, arguing that invasion could be the best
solution under certain circumstances. For exam-
ple, a 23-year-old woman from Israel suggested,
“Sometimes occupation can be beneficial in
failed states and in states in which the govern-
ment hurts its citizens.” Finally, 10% of the inva-
sion-tolerant responses said invasion gave themes
of pseudo-assistance, construing invasion as the
only way to help others. This reasoning is
identified in the response of a 50-year-old man
from Israel who stated, “There is no right to
405
occupy another state unless the other state is
endangering its citizens and its existence. In this
case as well the occupation must be limited in
time in order to reach another solution.”
Emotion/Motivation: Indiscriminate
Bombing
In regard to responses to both of the scenarios per-
taining to situations of indiscriminate bombing,
74% of responses were coded for forms of per-
sonal engagement. Of these personally engaged
responses, 36% demonstrated unspecified per-
sonal engagement, such as “stop the bombings,”
“help,” or “pray.” Another 23% of personally
engaged responses were proposals for genuine
assistance for the citizens of the country that was
being bombed. For example, a 30-year-old Israeli
woman said she would “assist the injured and
transfer them to a safe shelter” if her country was
being bombed. Additionally, a 20-year-old
Lebanese woman said in response to her country
bombing another country that she would help the
bombing victims by sending monetary aid that
ideally would “help people get into hospitals.”
Another 11% of personally engaged responses
demonstrated self-referenced agency and ways in
which people could take action to stand up to the
government. For instance, a 56-year-old man
from Jordan said he would want to “stand up and
mobilize the people to pressure the government to
stop such actions. Connect with the people of the
other country and form solidarity with them.”
Only 2% of the bombing scenario responses dem-
onstrated helping emotions, such as feelings of
guilt or sadness over the bombings.
The remaining 26% of responses to the hypo-
thetical scenarios provided examples of personal
disengagement in regard to likely behaviors and
emotions in situations of indiscriminate bomb-
ing. Almost 50% of these personally disengaged
responses expressed a preference for vengeful
agency against the attacking country. This is
clearly seen in the response of a 20-year-old
woman from Jordan who stated: “hurt those who
are hurting my people.” Twenty-three percent of
responses were coded as personally disengaged
406
because they denied the possibility of opportuni-
ties to take responsibility. A typical example of
such a response is, “I cannot do anything.” A
20-year-old woman from Lebanon professed that
she would “turn off the TV.” Another 9% of per-
sonally disengaged responses showed denial of
personal responsibility in warfare situations by
citing reliance on the government and military in
taking action. In response to the scenario where
her country was bombing another, a 28-year-old
Israeli woman said, “I would do nothing. I
assume that there is a moral and justified reason
for it. My country is too moral to bombard
another country with no justified reason.”
Exploratory Analyses of Demographic
Correlates of Response Types
In order to examine the effects of several demo-
graphic characteristics on the use of the invasion-
tolerant, invasion-intolerant, personal
disengagement, and personal engagement con-
structs, a series of Pearson’s chi-squares, inde-
pendent samples t-tests, and analysis of variances
(ANOVAs) were run. The demographic variables
that were studied are (a) gender, (b) participant’s
military service, (c) relative’s military service,
(d) participation in a propeace protest, and (e)
socioeconomic status. Due to the fact that the
sample is not representative and the sensitive
nature of Bandura’s theory, we chose not to
explore potential differences by country and reli-
gion in the use of the coding categories derived
from Bandura’s theory. All of the results pre-
sented in this chapter are significant, with a
p-value less than or equal to 0.05. For further
information, refer to Chap. 23 of this volume.
State’s Right to Invasion
There were no significant gender differences in
the use of any of the pro-invasion arguments,
although there were several significant gender
differences in the use of anti-invasion themes.
Chi-squares revealed that significantly more
M. Ashy et al.
women than men gave at least one human rights
and concern for others argument against a state
right to invade. Whereas significantly more
women than men highlighted the importance of
freedom in their responses, significantly more
men than women gave responses emphasizing
honor for international mandates as an anti-inva-
sion rationale. t-Tests supported all of these
results.
Chi-squares revealed a variety of pro-invasion
and anti-invasion arguments contingent on mili-
tary experience. Significantly more respondents
with military involvement than those without such
experience gave at least one pro-invasion argu-
ment and at least one pseudo-moral justification
for war, as well as mentioning advantageous com-
parison and positive consequences and self-defense
and preemptive strike rationales in their invasion-
tolerant responses. t-Tests supported these results
and also indicated that in arguments supporting the
state right to invade, participants with military
experience scored significantly higher than those
without military experience on displacement of
responsibility sum scores and on themes displac-
ing responsibility onto the government.
Chi-square analyses also revealed that respon-
dents without military experience were
significantly more likely than their counterparts
to make at least one anti-invasion argument, at
least one appeal to responsibility, at least one ref-
erence to appreciating the consequences of war,
and at least one example of a principled moral
justification against war and use the theme of
respect for government and sovereignty. t-Tests
supported these results and also indicated that
nonmilitary respondents, as compared with mili-
tary respondents, gave significantly more
responses emphasizing negative consequences of
war and nonviolence and concern for peace in
opposing a state right to invasion. Neither chi-
squares nor t-tests revealed any significant differ-
ences in pro- and anti-invasion responses based
on whether or not the respondent had a relative in
the military.
Chi-square analyses revealed multiple dif-
ferences in responses based on the respondents’
previous participation in protests. Significantly
26 Perspectives on Invasion in the Middle East 407

Table 26.1 State right to invasion: percentages of responses in coding categories by demographic groups and chi-
square values
Group 1a Group 2a
Categories Male Female c2
Human rights/concern for others presence 3 20 8.97**
Honor international mandates 6 0 4.90*,b
Freedom 0 13 9.06**,b
Military Nonmilitary
Pro-invasion presence 60 19 23.37***
Pseudo-moral justification presence 39 14 10.43***
Advantageous comparison/positive consequences 17 2 9.63**,b
Self-defense/preemptive strike 25 6 10.15***
Anti-invasion presence 40 76 17.57***
Responsibility presence 19 44 8.75**
Appreciating consequences presence 10 24 4.31*
Principled moral justification presence 12 26 4.22*
Respect for government/sovereignty 15 43 11.08***
Protest No protest
Pro-invasion presence 25 45 5.48*
Pseudomoral justification presence 13 35 8.75**
Self-defense/preemptive strike 8 20 4.08*
Anti-invasion presence 71 52 5.15*
Responsibility presence 46 25 6.64**
Human rights/concern for others presence 19 6 5.43*
Respect for government/sovereignty 43 23 5.80*
Note: “Presence” at the end of a variable name indicates that the participant provided at least one example of a response
that was coded into that category and/or one of its subcategories. Refer to the Invasion Methods chapter for a more
detailed description
*
p £ 0.05; **p £ 0.01; ***p £ 0.001
a
The numbers in these columns are the percent of the group that gave responses falling into each of the specified
categories
b
Fisher’s p-value

more nonprotestors than protestors gave at least
one pro-invasion response and at least one
example of a pseudo-moral justification; they
were also more likely to cite the need for self-
defense and preemptive strike than were protes-
tors. t-Tests supported these results. Chi-square
analyses also revealed that significantly more
protestors than nonprotestors gave at least on
response using one of the anti-invasion themes,
at least one plea for responsibility, at least one
response appealing to human rights and concern
for others, and placed an emphasis on respect for
governments and sovereignty. t-Tests supported
these results and also indicated that protestors
scored significantly higher than nonprotestors
on principled moral justification sum scores
categories and on references to freedom.
Table 26.1 presents percentages of responses
in the invasion coding categories by demographic
groups and chi-square values. Table 26.2 presents
means, standard deviations, and t-test results by
demographic group for the invasion coding
categories.
ANOVAs revealed that the frequency of
equality themes varied in relation to participants’
socioeconomic status. Scheffe post hoc analysis
showed that lower class respondents scored
significantly higher than working, middle, and
upper middle class respondents in frequency of
equality themes in arguments against invasion.
408 M. Ashy et al.

Table 26.2 State right to invasion: means, standard deviations, and t-test results by demographic group for coding
categories
Group 1 Group 2
Categories Military Nonmilitary t df
Displacement of responsibility sum 0.06 (0.24) 0.00 (0.00) −2.29* 82.00
Displace to government 0.06 (0.24) 0.00 (0.00) −2.29* 82.00
Negative consequences 0.04 (0.19) 0.13 (0.33) 2.40* 177.76
Nonviolence/concern with peace 0.02 (0.15) 0.11 (0.31) 2.48** 167.38
Protest No protest
Principled moral justification sum 0.30 (0.51) 0.15 (0.36) −2.29* 143.97
Freedom 0.11 (0.31) 0.03 (0.17) −2.05* 122.64
Note: Sum scores were created by adding together all responses coded into the category and its subcategories. Refer to
the Invasion Methods chapter for a more detailed description. Standard deviations appear in parentheses next to means
*
p £ 0.05; **p £ 0.01

Another Country Indiscriminately indicated that participants without military expe-

Bombing Your Country
For the scenario of one’s country being bombed
by another country, chi-square analyses revealed
significant differences between genders only on
personally engaged responses. Significantly
more women referenced helping emotions and
gave an example of at least one of the personal
engagement response than did men. t-Tests did
not find any significant gender differences in
responses to this item.
Chi-square analyses revealed several signi
ficant differences in both personally disengaged
and personally engaged responses on the basis
of military experience. As compared to their
nonmilitary counterparts, significantly more
respondents with military experience gave
responses coded for at least one of the personal
disengagement and at least one of the anti-social
agency categories, as well as being more likely
to show vengeful agency as an anticipated
response to being bombed. t-Tests supported
these results. For personal engagement, chi-
square analyses showed that significantly more
participants with no military experience than
those with such experience gave at least one per-
sonal engagement argument and at least one
humanizing agency response, as well as being
more likely to give an example of genuine assis-
tance. t-Tests supported these results and also
rience scored significantly higher than those
with military experience on pro-social agency
sum scores.
t-Tests also revealed that respondents with
relatives in the military scored significantly
higher than those without relatives in the military
on the use of harming emotions. In addition,
t-tests indicated that protestors scored significantly
higher than nonprotestors on personal engage-
ment sum scores. Chi-squares did not yield
significant results for either of these demographic
groups.
Table 26.3 presents percentages of responses
in the personal engagement and disengagement
coding categories by demographic groups and
chi-square values for the scenario concerning
another country bombing your country. Table 26.4
presents means, standard deviations, and t-test
results by demographic group for the personal
engagement and disengagement coding
categories.
In regard to class, ANOVAs revealed no
significant results.
Your Country Bombing Another Country
Chi-square analyses revealed that there were sev-
eral gender differences in responses to the sce-
nario in which the participant’s country was
26 Perspectives on Invasion in the Middle East 409

Table 26.3 Another country indiscriminately bombing your country: percentages of responses in coding categories by
demographic groups and chi-square values
Group 1a Group 2a
Categories Male Female c2
Personal engagement presence 63 76 4.64*
Helping emotions 4 34 7.15**
Military Nonmilitary
Personal disengagement presence 46 31 5.88*
Anti-social agency presence 43 27 7.38**
Vengeful agency 37 13 18.81***
Personal engagement presence 58 80 14.02***
Humanizing agency presence 16 37 12.22***
Genuine assistance 14 36 14.67***
Note: “Presence” at the end of a variable name indicates that the participant provided at least one example of a response
that was coded into that category and/or one of its subcategories
*
p £ 0.05; **p £ 0.01; ***p £ 0.001
a
The numbers in these columns are the percent of the group that gave responses falling into each of the specified
categories

Table 26.4 Another country indiscriminately bombing your country: means, standard deviations, and t-test results by
demographic group for coding categories
Group 1 Group 2
Categories Military Nonmilitary t df
Prosocial agency sum 0.01 (0.10) 0.06 (0.23) 2.18* 195.24
Relative military No relative military
Harming emotions 1.00 (0.00) 0.75 (0.45) −2.24* 15.00
Protest No protest
Personal engagement sum 0.86 (0.58) 0.68 (0.53) −2.51** 203.20
Note: Sum scores were created by adding together all responses coded into the category and its subcategories. Standard
deviations appear in parentheses next to means
*
p £ 0.05; **p £ 0.01

bombing another country. Significantly more
women than men referenced harming emotions
in their responses. Whereas significantly more
men than women gave at least one example of
pro-social agency in their responses, significantly
more women than men gave at least one example
of a humanizing agency response as well as a
genuine assistance response. t-Tests supported
these results and also indicated that women
scored significantly higher than men on personal
disengagement sum scores.
In regard to military experience, chi-squares
revealed that significantly more respondents with
military involvement than those without military
involvement gave at least one example of a denial
of responsibility response, as well as being more
likely to give a response demonstrating reliance
on the government and military. t-Tests supported
these results. Significantly more nonmilitary than
military respondents gave an example of at least
one type of personal engagement and at least one
type of pro-social agency, as well as being more
likely to show self-referenced agency in a
response. t-Tests supported these results for pro-
social agency and self-referenced agency but not
for personal engagement.
410 M. Ashy et al.

Table 26.5 Your country indiscriminately bombing another country: percentages of responses in coding categories by
demographic groups and chi-square values
Group 1a Group 2a
Categories Male Female c2
Harming emotions 4 34 7.15**
Pro-social agency presence 46 32 4.70*
Humanizing agency presence 9 19 3.99*
Genuine assistance 4 14 5.91*
Military Nonmilitary
Denial of responsibility presence 18 6 8.74**
Reliance on government/military 7 0 9.86**,b
Personal engagement presence 70 86 8.19**
Pro-social agency presence 30 44 5.01*
Self-referenced agency 14 31 9.63**
Protest No protest
Personal engagement presence 87 74 6.14**
General responsibility 30 17 4.79*
Note: “Presence” at the end of a variable name indicates that the participant provided at least one example of a response
that was coded into that category and/or one of its subcategories
*
p £ 0.05; **p £ 0.01; ***p £ 0.001
a
The numbers in these columns are the percent of the group that gave responses falling into each of the specified
categories
b
Fisher’s p-value

Table 26.6 Your country indiscriminately bombing another country: means, standard deviations, and t-test results by
demographic group for coding categories
Group 1 Group 2
Categories Male Female t df
Personal disengagement sum 0.14 (0.38) 0.25 (0.48) 1.98* 226.88
Protest No protest
Personal engagement sum 1.08 (0.60) 0.90 (0.64) −2.24* 217
General responsibility 0.30 (0.46) 0.17 (0.38) −2.15* 178.32
Note: Sum scores were created by adding together all responses coded into the category and its subcategories. Standard
deviations appear in parentheses next to means
*
p £ 0.05; **p £ 0.01

A final set of chi-squares revealed that protes-
tors were significantly more likely than nonprotes-
tors to give responses that reflected personal
engagement and recommendations for assuming
general responsibility for ending the bombing situ-
ation. t-Tests supported both of these results. Table
26.5 presents percentages of responses in the per-
sonal engagement and disengagement coding cat-
egories by demographic groups and chi-square
values for your country indiscriminately bombing
another country. Table 26.6 presents the percentages
of responses in coding categories by demographic
groups and chi-square values for responses to your
country bombing another country.
ANOVAs revealed that for this hypothetical
bombing scenario, the use of general personal
disengagement varied significantly by social
class. Post hoc analysis showed that lower class
respondents scored significantly higher than
working, middle, and upper middle class respon-
dents on the frequency of general personal dis-
engagement responses.
26 Perspectives on Invasion in the Middle East
Discussion
The results of this study support the utilization of
the ecological model in examining attitudes
toward invasion in the Middle East. On the indi-
vidual level, there were gender differences on
definitions of invasion such as the finding that
significantly more women than men used the per-
sonal engagement and personal engagement
moral justification themes in response to a hypo-
thetical situation concerning the participant’s
country bombing a major city in another country.
However, on the microsystem level, having
served in the military or having a family member
in the military was a significant predictor of sev-
eral types of response. For example, as compared
with respondents who had never seen military
service, significantly more respondents who had
been in the military used the personal disengage-
ment and displacement/denial of responsibility
arguments. In addition, on the exosystem level,
social class and participating in pro-peace pro-
tests appeared to be significant contributors to
perspectives on invasion in this Middle East sam-
ple. For example, significantly more antiwar pro-
testors than nonprotestors responded to this
hypothetical bombing situation by using personal
engagement and personal responsibility types of
responses.
The qualitative analyses of the data revealed,
among the Middle East participants, common
human concerns, moral considerations, shared
pain, and willingness to help victims on “the other
side” of a conflict regardless of religion, race, or
nationality. Despite differences among the nations
of the Middle East, there are various cultural, his-
torical, economical, and political similarities that
might have contributed to these common themes
and beliefs. The painful experiences of war and
of being victims of various invasions through
history might also have contributed to the general
opposition to invasions.
Furthermore, military service is mandatory for
men in most countries in the Middle East and for
women in some. Military training might be con-
tributing to moral and psychological reasoning
that is more favorable towards invasions. This
411
finding underlines the importance of addressing
the role of militarism in pro-invasion and prowar
perspectives and developing forms of military
education focused more on peace and justice and
human service and less on nationalism, xenopho-
bia, and the glorification of war and violence.
Finally, social class has been an important fac-
tor in the history of the Middle East. We can see
similarities in reasoning about invasion across
nations by social class. In many countries, it is
members of the lower social class who fight wars
and suffer the consequences of invasions. In addi-
tion, people of the working class might see more
commonalities with the struggles of the working
classes in other nations than with the agenda of
the upper classes in their own societies. Invasion
and war emphasize class differences and priori-
ties as well as increase the gap of wealth between
classes and genders.
The invasions of the Middle East contribute to
the continuation of gender inequality due to the
emphasis put on masculinity during wars, in
addition to the economic and social suffering
women experience during wars and invasions.
Such suffering might be contributing to less sup-
portive attitudes of women in the Middle East
towards invasions.
The findings of this study point out that there is
hope in the Middle East for a world that has fewer
wars and invasions. They suggest also that national
differences may be of less significance than other
variables in the prediction and understanding of
perspectives on war; future research should con-
sider more global variables such as class or gen-
der. Finally, the qualitative analyses revealed that
people in the Middle East have learned from their
shared history of wars and invasions and that there
is a movement in the Middle East toward interna-
tional law, peace, and human rights.
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 Gulf States’ Perspectives
on Invasion
Raja Tayeh, Heyem Mohammed, Tristyn Campbell,
and Gregory Malley
Within the extended Middle Eastern area, the Gulf
States, often referred to as the Persian Gulf or the
Arab Gulf, have helped nourish Middle Eastern
civilizations for thousands of years (Potter 2009).
The Islamic countries currently established on the
shores of the gulf have come to be known as the
“Gulf countries” or the “Gulf region.” Its eastern
coast consists of the following countries listed
from south to north: Sultanate of Oman, United
Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, Bahrain, Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait. The western coast of
the region belongs solely to Iran. Iraq, which con-
trols a little bay area entry at the top of the gulf, is
not considered a Gulf country. In addition to a
common border, these nations share a predomi-
nantly Islamic heritage, the Arabic language, simi-
lar tribal cultures and traditions, and some Christian
and Jewish minority communities. This chapter
focuses on perspectives on a state right to invasion
in these Arab League countries, excluding Iran,
which is discussed in the Middle East chapter.
Given that the Gulf States are predominantly
Islamic, it makes sense to ask, “What does it
mean to be a Muslim?” A Muslim, by definition,
is one who submits his soul, faith, and beliefs to
God (Allah). Not all Arabs are Muslims, and not
all Muslims are Arabs. In fact, Arabs represent
only 18% of the Islamic population (Islamic
Community Center 2007). Just as the Christian
Bible tells the history of Jesus Christ and the
establishment of the Christian faith, the Qur’an
K. Malley-Morrison et al. (eds.), International Handbook of War, Torture, and Terrorism,
Peace Psychology Book Series, DOI 10.1007/978-1-4614-1638-8_27,
© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2013
27
relates the story of Allah’s prophet Muhammad
ibn ‘Abd Allah and his journey to spread the word
of God. The Islamic religion was conceived in
what is now Saudi Arabia around 2000 years ago.
Born in the Saudi holy city of Mecca, Mohammed
eventually led his people to Medina. When he
died, his body was returned to Mecca for burial.
As Saudi Arabia is both the cradle of the Islamic
religion and Mohamed’s final resting place, it
remains very important to today’s Muslims.
To comprehend current perspectives on a gov-
ernment’s right to invasion in the Gulf States, one
must first examine the recent military conflicts of
this area and understand the concept of Jihad. The
August 2, 1990, Iraqi invasion of Kuwait led to
what is now known in the USA as the First Persian
Gulf War. The United States and 31 other nations
formed a coalition against Iraq and began a trade
embargo to try to end the Iraqi occupation peace-
fully. When this was unsuccessful, the United
States launched Operation Desert Storm, which
had devastating effects on both the Iraqi military
forces and the country’s civil infrastructure.
Although there is little evidence of a direct
link between Saddam Hussein and the terrorist
attack of September 11, 2001, in the United
States those attacks have been linked to the notion
of an Islamic Jihad, the sixth pillar of Islam. This
pillar is important in the psychology of war for
Muslims. According to Radwan Masmoudi
(2001), president at the Center for the Study of
413
414
Islam and Democracy, the word Jihad has been
frequently misused due to a misunderstanding of
its true meaning. The word “Jihad” is derived
from the Arabic word “Jhd” which means to
strive. Other words derived from this root include
“effort,” “labor,” and “fatigue.” Essentially, Jihad
is an effort to practice religion in the face of
oppression and persecution (Morgan 2010).
A “mujahid” is someone who struggles for the
cause of Allah to the point of fatigue. The word
Jihad, therefore, means to put forth effort to attain
a certain positive goal or to prevent a negative
outcome, and for some Muslim extremists, the
United States is a worthy object for a Jihad.
Following the 9/11 attacks, the United States,
under the leadership of George Bush and to the
dismay of many of its allies, formed another coali-
tion in 2003, this time with the intention of launch-
ing a full-scale invasion of Iraq. In many ways,
the lack of tangible evidence tying Iraq to the ter-
rorist acts of 9/11 indicates that this invasion was
merely a delayed continuation of the First Persian
Gulf War. Regardless, the call for Jihad has
created a persistently unidentifiable enemy.
Jihad can be observed through any means and
in any area, whether material or moral. Jihad may
include an individual’s fight against several
forces of evil, such as a person’s baser desires,
Satan, disease, poverty, and illiteracy; addition-
ally, it can include the defense of life, property,
and honor. Muslims who die while performing
acts of Jihad are regarded as martyrs (Morgan
2010). Jihad is also used to avert aggression from
home countries, to protect all that is held sacred,
or to confront those who try to hinder Islam.
Fighting to elevate the cause of Allah may also
be considered Jihad, and methods for doing so can
include arming one’s self as well as preparing for
financing and developing strategies for conflicts.
This type of Jihad was the major concern of all
Muslims when the Islamic community was first
being formed, and many verses in the Quran advo-
cated and encouraged it. For example, “March
forth, whether you are light [being healthy, young
and wealthy] or heavy [being ill, old and poor]
and strive with your wealth and your lives in the
Cause of Allah” (Qur’an 9:41).
R. Tayeh et al.
In cases of invasion or attack by an enemy,
Jihad is a duty that every able-bodied Muslim
must perform. In cases when there is no threat,
Jihad is considered a collective duty. If a leader
or president calls for Jihad, all citizens must
respond. This is evidenced in the Qur’an: “O you
who believe! What is the matter with you, that
when you are asked to March forth in the Cause
of Allah (i.e., Jihad) you cling heavily on the
earth?” (Qur’an 9:38). On the other hand, the
Qur’an tells Muslims: “The recompense for an
injury is an injury equal thereto: but if a person
forgets and makes reconciliation, his reward is
due from Allah” (Qur’an 62:40).
As is true of Christianity, there are debates
among Muslims concerning the meaning of their
holy book. In 2010, following a fatwa confer-
ence—a religious interpretive or advisory confer-
ence—in Mardin, Turkey, Islamic scholars issued
a statement proclaiming that Ibn Taimeya’s Jihad
fatwa issued centuries ago at the time of the Tatar
and Mongol invasions is wrong and cannot legiti-
mately be used to justify terrorism. A statement
issued following this event said that civilian state
systems must maintain the rights of religious and
ethnic nationalism and should proclaim the whole
world a house of peace and tolerance and coexis-
tence (Hurriyet 2010).
Peace is an important issue for Muslims. The
root of the word Islam in the Arabic language is
Salam, which is the origin of the words peace
and submission, peace to all humanity, and sub-
mission to God. It is no wonder that the Islamic
greeting is “Al-Salamu Alaikum,” which means
“peace be upon you.” Prophet Muhammad
ordered his fellow Muslims to address both
Muslims and non-Muslims peacefully, saying
“peace before speech.” The prophet is reported
to have once said, “Mankind are the dependents,
or family of God, and the most beloved of them
to God are those who are the most excellent to
His dependents… Not one of you believes until
he loves for his brother what he loves for him-
self” (Shih Muslim, Hadith 1946). Also, it is a
rule in Islam that during wartime, an enemy war-
rior who pronounces the word peace should not
be harmed.
27 Gulf States’ Perspectives on Invasion
Methods
The Sample
The Gulf States regional sample was recruited
from Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, and Qatar. There
were 179 respondents for this region (72 females,
107 males), with 13 females and 35 males from
Bahrain, 38 females and 35 males from Kuwait,
13 females and 24 males from Oman, and 8
females and 13 males from Qatar. Ages ranged
from 18 to 86 with an average age of 33 years
old. Approximately 78% of the sample identified
as Muslim; 1% as agnostic, atheist, or none; and
the rest of the sample did not identify a religious
affiliation. A majority of the sample reported
being from the middle class, with all of the other
classes represented at lesser frequencies. In regard
to military service, 69% of the sample had never
served in the military. Forty percent of respon-
dents did not have a relative with military service.
Finally, only a little over 3% of the sample had
protested against war and in favor of peace.
Measures
All respondents completed the Personal and
Institutional Rights to Governmental Aggression
and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS; Malley-Morrison,
Daskolopolous, & You 2006). There were five
items on the survey pertaining to a state’s right to
invade and hypothetical bombing scenarios.
However, only the Kuwaiti sample responded to
the item regarding a state’s right to invasion and,
therefore, responses to that item are not included
in this chapter. The four prompts included hypo-
thetical bombing situations that asked respon-
dents to describe how they would feel and what
they would want to do in response to another
country bombing their country and their country
bombing another country.
In order to code the scenario responses, a cod-
ing manual was developed incorporating ideas
from Albert Bandura’s theory of moral disen-
gagement. Bandura’s theory (2002) posits that
415
people can selectively separate themselves from
their morals and perpetrate or condone hideous
acts through moral disengagement. The converse
to moral disengagement, moral engagement, was
largely undeveloped in comparison, particularly
in regard to the identification of sociocognitive
mechanisms underlying reasoning about inhu-
mane behavior.
Bandura (2002) postulated that there are two
forms of moral engagement: (a) the inhibitive form
and (b) the proactive form. When people engage in
the inhibitive form of moral engagement, they act
in accordance with their moral standards and
refuse to act in ways contrary to them—for exam-
ple, not condoning the use of force against others.
When individuals exhibit proactive moral agency,
they take positive action in accordance to their
moral standards, such as protesting unfair treat-
ment. The coding manual for the bombing sce-
narios focuses particularly on the kinds of
responses that exhibit the proactive form of moral
agency—or at least an intent to demonstrate pro-
active moral agency if faced with a situation where
innocent civilians are being bombed.
The coding manual for the bombing situations
was divided into personal disengagement coding
categories and personal engagement coding cat-
egories. In general, responses that were coded
for personal disengagement expressed apathy
towards the situation, support for the govern-
ment, or vengeful feelings and actions. In con-
trast, responses that were coded for personal
engagement demonstrated a desire to stop the
bombings or help others; some personal engage-
ment responses focused on feelings of sadness
over the situation. For a more thorough explana-
tion of the coding manual, refer to the introduc-
tory methods chapter for invasion, Chap. 22 of
this volume.
Results
Responses were first coded and then analyzed in
Excel in order to identify patterns. The responses
and demographic variables were then analyzed
using the Statistical Package for the Social
416
Sciences (SPSS) to identify possible differences
based on demographic characteristics in the use
of particular response themes. The demographic
variables analyzed for this chapter were: (a) gen-
der, (b) military service, (c) relative’s military
service, and (d) socioeconomic status. All results
described as significant had a p-value of equal to
or less than or equal to 0.05, and all results
described as marginally significant had a p-value
of greater than 0.05 and less than 0.1. Results that
achieved marginal or statistical significance are
discussed; nonsignificant results are not. Finally,
as this sample is a convenience sample and is not
representative of the region as a whole, results
should be interpreted cautiously.
Patterns in Personally Disengaged
and Engaged Responses: Another
Country Bombing Your Country
In response to the prompt, “Another country is
indiscriminately bombing a major city in your
country, and women and children, the elderly,
and civilian men are running around bloody and
screaming. What would you feel? What would
you want to do?”, 20% of all responses were
coded for personal disengagement.
The most frequently coded form of personal
disengagement was vengeful agency, which
accounted for 43% of personally disengaged
responses. Some of the responses coded into this
category emphasized the importance of seeking
revenge on behalf of the victims of the bombings.
For instance, a 37-year-old man from Bahrain
said that he would seek “revenge for these women
and children and old people and men.” Other
responses appealed to an eye-for-an-eye mental-
ity: a 32-year-old Kuwaiti man responded that he
would want to do the “same as what happened to
us, drop bombs on them and protest.” Other
responses invoked revenge specifically against
the leaders of the attacking country. For instance,
a 26-year-old Kuwaiti woman responded that she
would want “to kill the oppressing leaders.” This
response suggests that the responsibility for the
bombing is not placed on the other country as a
whole but rather on the decision-makers. This
R. Tayeh et al.
response advocates revenge only against those
who are responsible.
The second most common example of
personal disengagement was harming emotions,
such as anger or vengeance. This category differs
from the previous revenge category in that this
category encompasses emotions related to the
bombing, not actions taken in response to the
bombing. Approximately 32% of personally dis-
engaged responses were coded for harming emo-
tions, the kinds of emotions that can lead to the
doing of harm and the continuance of violence.
Many of the responses used words like “resent-
ment” and “hate.” For instance, a 43-year-old
Kuwaiti woman reported that she would feel
“resentment and a desire to get revenge from this
country because older people and women have
no guilt.” Again, this response appeals to the idea
of certain citizens’ innocence, highlighting
women and the elderly as examples of innocent
victims. Anger often accompanied projected feel-
ings of resentment and retaliation in responses.
For instance, a 30-year-old Saudi man said he
would feel “anger, resentment, and revenge.”
Central to many of these responses was a sense of
injustice. A 25-year-old woman from Oman said
she would feel “injustice, frustration and hatred.”
This sense of injustice may spring from the fact
that the country is theoretically attacking without
provocation. It also may be related to the fact that
innocent citizens, especially the women, chil-
dren, and elderly whom many of the respondents
have mentioned, are suffering because of the
bombing.
Denial of responsibility was the third most
frequently provided personal disengagement
theme, accounting for 24% of the personal disen-
gagement responses. Many responses in this cat-
egory predicted personal apathy in response to
the bombing of one’s country. For instance, a
22-year-old-man from Qatar stated that he would
feel “fine.” A 47-year-old man from Bahrain said
that he would want to do “nothing” in response to
his country being bombed.
In regard to demographic differences,
chi-square tests revealed that the use of several
personal disengagement categories varied
significantly in relation to military service.
27 Gulf States’ Perspectives on Invasion 417

Table 27.1 Another country bombing your country: percentages of personal disengagement and engagement responses
in coding categories by demographic variables and chi-square values
Group 1a Group 2a
Categories Male Female c2
General responsibility presence 50 35 2.95^
Military Nonmilitary
Personal disengagement presence 47 11 14.27***,b
Anti-social agency presence 41 7 15.07***,b
Vengeful agency 35 6 12.66**,b
Personal engagement presence 71 90 4.43^,b
Relative military No relative military
Humanizing agency presence 46 24 3.89*
Genuine assistance 42 22 3.43^
Note: “Presence” at the end of a variable name indicates that the participant provided at least one example of a response
that was coded into that category and/or one of its subcategories
*
p £ 0.05; **p £ 0.01; ***p £ 0.001; ^0.051 < p < 0.1
a
The numbers in these columns are the percent of the group that gave responses falling into each of the specified
categories
b
Fisher’s p-value

Significantly, more respondents who had been in
the military than nonmilitary respondents gave at
least one personal disengagement response and
at least one example of anti-social agency as well
as being more likely to give an example of venge-
ful agency. For percentages of responses by
demographic group and chi-square values, refer
to Table 27.1.
Eighty percent of all responses to this bomb-
ing scenario were coded for personal engage-
ment. Although many of the personal engagement
constructs were coded for, only those appearing
at a frequency greater than 20% of all responses
are discussed.
The most common personal engagement
theme was general responsibility, which
accounted for 45% of personally engaged
responses. Responses in this category often
showed a desire to stop the bombings but did not
specify how to do it. For instance, a 20-year-old
man from Oman said “stop it.” Still, other
responses referenced having to defend one’s
country against the bombings. This idea is high-
lighted in the response of a 39-year-old Kuwaiti
man who said, “defend the children of my country
(the people) and work hard to make my situation
reach the international community.” A 24-year-old
woman from Qatar said she would defend her
country in a specific way: “volunteer in the
army.”
Accounting for 27% of personally engaged
responses was genuine assistance. Typically,
responses coded for genuine assistance demon-
strated a willingness to help people affected by
the bombing. A 27-year-old woman from Bahrain
responded that she would “help the injured and
wounded.” Additionally, a 45-year-old woman
from Kuwait said she would “help them with
money and to seek refuge in other countries where
there is no war.” Finally, a 21-year-old man from
Oman stated that he would “help with everything
I have and can do and pray to God for them.”
Chi-square analyses revealed several demo-
graphic differences in the use of the personal
engagement constructs. Men were marginally
more likely than women to give responses coded
for at least one of the general responsibility cate-
gories. Marginally more nonmilitary than military
respondents provided responses that had at least
one of the personal engagement themes in them.
Respondents with a relative in the military were
significantly more likely than their counterparts
to give responses coded for at least one of the
humanizing agency mechanisms and marginally
more likely to respond with genuine assistance
than their counterparts. Table 27.1 provides the
418
percentages of personally disengaged and engaged
responses by demographic group and chi-square
values.
Patterns in Personally Disengaged
and Engaged Responses: Your Country
Bombing Another Country
Thirteen percent of responses to the prompt,
“Your country is indiscriminately bombing a
major city in another country, and women and
children, the elderly, and civilian men are running
around bloody and screaming. What would you
feel? What would you want to do?” were coded
for personal disengagement. Combined, the con-
structs of responsibility and harming emotions
totaled 95% of personally disengaged responses.
A denial of responsibility in response to one’s
own country bombing another accounted for 75%
of the personally disengaged responses. Similar
to responses to the other bombing scenario,
responses coded for this category expressed apa-
thy toward the situation. A great majority of these
respondents said they would do nothing in regard
to the bombing. Typifying this type of response
was a 22-year-old man from Qatar who said,
“change the TV channel (don’t care).” Other
responses coded for denial of responsibility
expressed support for the action of their govern-
ment in bombing another country. A 26-year-old
woman from Kuwait said that she would “dance
out of happiness” in this situation. Finally, sev-
eral responses demonstrated the feeling that they
were helpless to do anything in regard to the
bombing. For instance, a 44-year-old woman
from Oman said, “I cannot do anything.”
Responses coded for harming emotions
accounted for 20% of the personally disengaged
replies. A 40-year-old woman from Kuwait said
that she would feel “extreme disrespect and hate”
for her government. Similar thinking is seen in
the response of a 22-year-old man from Bahrain
who said, “I hate this government.” Several
responses demonstrated an absence of feeling,
such as the response of a 31-year-old woman
from Bahrain: “nothing.” Chi-square analyses
and ANOVAs failed to reveal any demographic
R. Tayeh et al.
differences on the use of the personal disengage-
ment themes.
Eighty-eight percent of responses indicated an
element of personal engagement in response to
this hypothetical bombing scenario. Categories
that were coded with a frequency higher than
25% of all responses are discussed here.
Self-referenced agency was the most fre-
quently coded form of personal engagement,
with 35% of personally engaged responses coded
for self-referenced agency. Responses coded into
this category demonstrated an intent to take some
type of specific personal action to end the bomb-
ings. Many responses referenced protesting the
government’s actions or boycotting as a result of
the actions. A 19-year-old man from Oman
responded that he would “invite people to peace-
ful demonstration” against the bombing.
Additionally, a 52-year-old man from Kuwait
said, “I will boycott what my country is doing in
any way.” Still, others would make their disdain
for the action known through the media. For
example, a 40-year-old woman from Oman stated
that she would make a “declaration of personal
opinion and rejecting what happening, published
in the media.” Finally, the theme of innocence
appeared in several of these responses, such as
this 19-year-old woman’s response: “appeal the
government to stop killing the innocent.”
Twenty-nine percent of personally engaged
responses indicated some type of general respon-
sibility to end the bombings. These answers were
similar to the responses to the hypothetical situa-
tion concerning another country bombing one’s
own country. For instance, a 21-year-old Kuwaiti
woman said that she would “try to intervene and
defend the truth.” A 31-year-old man from
Bahrain simply stated, “oppose this action.”
Many of the other responses coded for this cate-
gory referenced stopping their country’s actions.
There were several demographic group differ-
ences in the use of personal engagement themes in
response to the scenario describing bombing of
another country. In regard to gender, men were
marginally more likely than women to call for the
international community to help with the situation.
Significantly more respondents in the military than
respondents not in the military provided responses
27 Gulf States’ Perspectives on Invasion 419

Table 27.2 Your country bombing another country: percentages of personal engagement responses in coding categories
by demographic variables and chi-square values
Group 1a Group 2a
Categories Male Female c2
Call for the international community 6 0 3.60^,b
Military Nonmilitary
General responsibility presence 14 40 3.42^
Pro-social agency presence 71 31 8.51**
Self-referenced agency 69 29 8.22**,b
Relative military No relative military
General responsibility presence 12 40 6.35**
Pro-social agency presence 46 27 2.74^
General responsibility 12 38 5.59*
Note: “Presence” at the end of a variable name indicates that the participant provided at least one example of a response
that was coded into that category and/or one of its subcategories
*
p £ 0.05; **p £ 0.01; ^0.05 £ p < 0.1
a
The numbers in these columns are the percent of the group that gave responses falling into each of the specified
categories
b
Fisher’s p-value

that demonstrated self-referenced agency and at
least one of the pro-social agency mechanisms.
Nonmilitary respondents were marginally more
likely than military respondents to give responses
coded for at least one of the general responsibility
categories. Respondents who had a relative in the
military were marginally more likely than respon-
dents without such a relative to make at least one
statement coded for pro-social agency. In contrast,
significantly, more respondents without a relative
in the military than their counterparts suggested
they would assume some sort of general responsi-
bility to end the bombings.
Table 27.2 provides percentages of personally
engaged responses by demographic group and
chi-square values.
Discussion
As previously discussed, the Muslim concept of
“Jihad” has greatly influenced the people of the
Gulf region’s perspectives on war and invasion.
The coded responses gathered in this study sup-
port our argument that Muslims feel personally
responsible for the defense of their religion and
people. That is, the high percentage of partici-
pants who gave personally engaged responses is
consistent with the Muslim concept of Jihad,
which is considered to be the exertion of effort to
achieve a desired outcome or prevent an undesired
one. Also, the recent delegitimizing of the concept
of Jihad fatwa, which strictly separates all people
into two categories, Muslim and non-Muslim, is
supported by the participants’ desire to protect not
only their own countrymen but also the innocent
civilians of other lands; however, potentially the
most important conclusion that can be made from
these data is that abuse and misuse of admirable
characteristics such as a strong sense of national-
ism and personal responsibility for the well-being
of one’s countrymen leave many of these Gulf
region citizens susceptible to the propaganda of
violent, nationalistic terrorist organizations that
preach extreme jihadist views.
One participant’s response to the prompt
“Another country is indiscriminately bombing a
major city in your country, and women and chil-
dren, the elderly, and civilian men are running
around bloody and screaming. What would you
feel? What would you want to do?” was especially
indicative of the personal responsibility shared by
many Muslims. In response to the bombings, this
39-year-old Kuwaiti man said he would “defend
the children of my country (the people) and will
work hard to make my situation reach the interna-
tional community.” Although the comment dem-
onstrated the modern-day applicability of one part
420
of the concept of Jihad, it also demonstrated that
the concept of Muslims being separate from the
international community was outdated and false.
The Islamic scholars who issued the statement
called “Mardin fatwa” after their conference in
March 2010 in Mardin, Turkey, proclaiming the
falseness of “jihad fatwa” were echoing this par-
ticipant’s sentiments of a truly global community.
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 African Perspectives on Invasion
28
Laura Johnson, Grace Kibanja, Abdelali Abdelkader,
Mahlon Dalley, Ting Wu, Jacqui Akhurst, Davies
Banda, Natoschia Scruggs, Eduardo Correia,
and Helena Castanheira

Africa, the cradle of humankind, is the second
largest continent with abundant diversity, rich-
ness, and beauty in its natural and anthropogenic
landscape. Despite vast resources, humanity’s
birthplace is characterized with human conflict
and suffering, arguably making it one of the least
hospitable places. According to a number of
indicators Africa suffers from “a debilitating cri-
sis of low human development” (Bangura and
McCandless 2007; McCandless and Bangura
2007; United Nations Human Development
Report (United Nations, 2010a; 2010b) and is the
least peaceful continent in the world (Vision of
Humanity, Global Peace Index (GPI) 2010). Its
rates of abject poverty, hunger and malnutrition,
illness and disease, low literacy, premature death
and disability, and human rights concerns are
among the highest in the world (United Nations,
2010a; 2010b). Military invasions from outside
the continent and from within have been
ubiquitous.
Historically, Africa suffered numerous inva-
sions and “interventions” during the great
“scramble for Africa” and subsequent colonial
rule. After independence came decades of civil
wars and coup d’états that were often orches-
trated by external entities (Tidy and Leeming
1980; Kyagaba and Musiitwa 2010). Today the
region is characterized by ongoing militarism,
religious fundamentalism, conflicts, and civil
wars. The current wars and nature of conflict in
Africa have largely shifted to identity-based
politics that target citizens with debilitating
effects across the continent (Kaldor 2001;
Gettleman 2010). With high rates of poverty,
fierce competition for resources is created and
social group membership has become the basis
for allocating or denying resources and decisions
about who shall or shall not be killed (Elbadawi
and Sambanis 2000).
Presently, Africa is “on fire,” suffering more
violent conflict than any other continent. Africa
witnessed 20 major wars since 1960. Nearly half
of its countries have current or recently ended
conflicts (Global Security 2011). In 2009
alone, four major conflicts took place in Africa
(SIPRI 2009). From the beginning of 2011 until
2012, several countries in Africa (Tunisia, Egypt,
Ivory Coast, and Libya) have experienced funda-
mental uprisings that, in most instances, are lead-
ing to change of government. Following Ivory
Coast’s Laurent Gbagbo’s refusal to relinquish
power after losing the presidential elections in
November 2010, he was forcefully ousted from
office by Alassane Quattara, following heavy
fighting in the country’s capital city Adidjan. This
civil war left thousands of people dead and mil-
lions displaced. There were epic uprisings of the
Tunisia people, which led to the riddance of Ben
Ali’s 23-year dictatorial rule. Similar uprisings
engulfed Egypt for 18 days and ended Hosni
Mubarak’s regime. During the writing of this
chapter, citizens in Libya acted to put an end to
Gadaffi’s 41-year autocratic rule.

K. Malley-Morrison et al. (eds.), International Handbook of War, Torture, and Terrorism, 421
Peace Psychology Book Series, DOI 10.1007/978-1-4614-1638-8_28,
© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2013
422
In each case, when citizens have acted, police
violence and human rights crackdowns followed.
Nonetheless, the force for change is momentous;
peoples’ voices have been heard, and transitions
of one kind or another are underway. Whether or
not that change is in the direction of human rights
and peace or ongoing oppression and war is of
obvious importance for civil society within the
region and in the world, and necessitates our
attention to civic participation and societal atti-
tudes about war and peace. In this chapter, we
discuss contextual aspects of conflicts in the
region and highlight attitudes about invasion and
personal engagement expressed among 425 citi-
zens from eight African countries, including
Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Ghana, Egypt,
Nigeria, South Africa, and Zambia. First, we out-
line historical and current contextual factors to
lay a broad framework for understanding African
perspectives, including historical events and cur-
rent indicators of human development and civic
participation. Next, we report qualitative data
regarding ordinary citizens’ beliefs about a coun-
try’s right to invade another country, emotional
reactions to invasion scenarios, and participants’
desire to become personally engaged in peace
efforts. Results are discussed in relation to creat-
ing a context for peace and civic participation in
the region.
Invasions in Pre-colonial Societies
Before colonialism, Africa had two distinct cate-
gories of societies, centralized and segmentary
(Kyagaba and Musiitwa 2010). The former had a
well-defined system of administration where
absolute powers lay in the hands of a king.
Examples included the Luyia kingdom in Kenya;
Buganda, Bunyoro, Toro, Ankole, and Busoga in
Uganda; the Kingdom of Benin, the Mandika
empire in West Africa; Zulu from South Africa,
Ndebele from Zimbabwe. The Asante found
in present day Ghana, and some parts of the
Ivory Coast and Togo; and Dahomey, found in
between present day Nigeria and Togo (Kyagaba
and Musiitwa 2010). Unlike the kingdoms,
L. Johnson et al.
segmentary societies lacked a centralized system
of governance and had no king but instead tradi-
tional chiefs. Such states varied greatly depend-
ing on the environment and historical forces
behind them. For example some were hunters
(i.e., the San of the Kalahari and the Batwa of
Congo); others were pastoralists (i.e., the Nubians
of Sudan, Masai of Kenya, and Karamajong of
Uganda); some were agriculturists (i.e., the
Kikuyu of Kenya, and the Ibo of Eastern Nigeria);
and others practiced mixed farming (i.e., the
Kamba of Kenya).
Most centralized societies had standing armies
responsible for a myriad of activities that included
defending against aggressions, gaining new ter-
ritories, carrying out raids/invasions in neighbor-
ing societies, and importantly, defending the
societies against imperialist and colonial forces
(Kyagaba and Musiitwa 2010). In the end, the
strength of the army determined how long
the society would survive invasions; some were
able to withstand imperialism as late as 1900, as
was the case for Bunyoro, Hehe, Mandika, and
Asante kingdoms. Declining military strength
preceded the colonization of these states; e.g., the
Zulu kingdom became a British protectorate in
1887; Ndebele in 1896; and Asante in 1900, while
Dahomey became a French protectorate in 1892.
Consolidation and Conflict Precede
European Invasions
Many kingdoms underwent major political con-
solidations preceding the European invasion of
the 1880s. The Zulu Kingdom was involved in
numerous conflicts with Angola (1879 and 1883),
a civil war that prompted the British declaration
of a protectorate in 1887, and a fight against the
British (Bambatha Rebellion) in 1896. The
Ndebele Kingdom fought in the Anglo-Ndebele
war (1893–1894), in which they were defeated
and lost over 1,000 soldiers. Internal revolts by
the Sotho, Koronos, Tswana, and Shona ensued
from 1896 to 1897, which weakened the military
position of the kingdom, eventually led to col-
lapse. The Asante kingdom faced years of wars,
28 African Invasion
starting in 1806 with the Fante, who were assisted
by the British. The Asante consistently defeated
the Fante until 1896, when British allies assisted
with the invasion and occupation of Kumasi,
forcing the Asante leaders to flee. In 1901, Asante
was annexed to the British colony of the Gold
Cost. The Kingdom of Dahomey was invaded by
the French in 1892 and territory was surrendered
(Tidy and Leeming 1980).
Major revolutions breaking out in the nine-
teenth century affected the political, social, and
economic status of the continent. The Mfecane/
Defecane Revolution in South, Central, and South
Eastern Africa, and the Nguni Invasion are two
examples. The Zulu expansion in the early nine-
teenth century led to the Nguni invasion. The
Nguni were Bantu-speaking people who came to
central and East Africa from South East Africa.
They displaced many people in East and Central
Africa and their invasion led to the decline of
many kingdoms such as Yao in Malawi,
Mwenemotapa, the Thongo, the Sango, and the
Hehe in East Africa (Tidy and Leeming 1980).
The Mfecane/Defecane conflict started in 1870
with its impact spreading until 1880. Possible
causes included population growth, personal
initiatives of the leaders, and early contacts of
African leaders with Europeans. Whichever
might be the key factor, Mfecane led to positive
and negative effects in the regions. For instance,
it led to the creation of bigger centralized states
and new political and military leaders (Kyagaba
and Musiitwa 2010). It also had far reaching
negative consequences, such as instituting dicta-
torships, creating anarchy and displacement, dis-
rupting trade and agriculture, and giving rise to
social bandits. This led to massive destruction of
human lives and paved the way for the conquest
of Africa (Kyagaba and Musiitwa 2010).
Invasions and Conquest Are Justified
on Moral Grounds
Conquests and division of territory proceeded
slowly with Europeans establishing small, infor-
mal territories along the coasts. What is widely
423
known as “the scramble for Africa” became
increasingly rapid and hectic in the 1880s due to
economic, political, humanitarian, strategic, and
nationalistic factors (Kyagaba and Musiitwa
2010). Mercenaries and missionaries, businesses,
and European powers raced to grab land and
resources, including rubber, diamonds, gold,
minerals, oil, and slaves. The struggle for colo-
nies and increasing concerns about the slave trade
led to the 1884–1885 Berlin Conference in which
Africa was divided among the European powers.
The partition took place between 1800 and 1885,
starting from the Zulu Kingdom to Egypt and
across the Ethiopian highlands to the Mandinka
forests (Sempebwa 1978).
At the same time that concerns about the slave
trade were surfacing in Europe, racist ideologies
rooted in eugenics persisted. Africans were put on
display at the World’s Fair, and in one case (Ota
Benga) exhibited in the Bronx Zoo to promote and
accentuate phenotypic and lifestyle differences
between Europeans and Africans (Bradford and
Blume 1992). Invasion into Africa and the damage
to her people were thus permitted and encouraged
through a process of moral disengagement, in which
“helping others” (i.e., by civilizing them) was the
imagined outcome (Bandura 1999). Emphasizing
ethnic and religious differences facilitated moral
disengagement, giving persons and states a means
to justify invasion. It is through this process that
imperialist forces in the “dark continent” were for-
given their many sins: stealing land and resources,
stealing people, forcing labor, killing, maiming and
attacking villages and kingdoms.
The Berlin Conference was designed to bring
law and order into the process of partitioning
Africa, thus averting potential wars among the
European countries. It was also presented as a
humanitarian initiative, with imperial powers sug-
gesting that dividing and colonizing Africa would
accelerate the abolition of the slave trade. Thus the
invasion, occupation, and partitioning of Africa
were also justified on moral grounds. According to
Bandura’s (1999) mechanisms of moral disen-
gagement, the operating mechanisms here were
“advantageous comparison” and “helping others.”
That is, the Berlin Conference civilized the process
424
Table 28.1 The partitioning of Africa by Europe
Some of the African countries
Colonizing country colonized
France Niger, Mauritania, Mali, Morocco,
Algeria, Tunisia, Madagascar,
Ivory Coast, Senegal, Benin, Chad
Britain South Africa, Swaziland, Lesotho,
Zambia, Zimbabwe, Kenya,
Uganda, Sudan, Egypt, Nigeria,
Sierra Leon, Liberia, Malawi,
Botswana, Ghana, Gambia
Germany Tanzania, Cameroon, Togo,
Namibia
Spain Rio de Oro
Italy Somalia, Libya, Eritrea
Belgium Democratic Republic of Congo,
Rwanda
Portugal Mozambique, Angola
of invasion by reducing fighting among European
countries and also legitimized the process of inva-
sion and colonization as a humanitarian endeavor.
Table 28.1 indicates various imperial powers and
the countries they colonized.
Creation of Borders and Manipulation
of Ethnic Groups
If we borrow the term “social capital,” Africa is
rich in cultural diversity, with a multiplicity of
religions, ethnicities, tribes, and languages
(Fearon 2003). It is important to distinguish
between North Africa, which contains five Arabic
states (Morroco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and
Egypt) and Mauritania, and the rest of Africa,
sub-Saharan Africa. Afro-Asiatic languages such
as Arabic, Amharic, Hausa, Hebrew, and Tigrinya
are spoken in the north, which has heavy Islamic
and Arabic influences. The Niger-Congo language
family, spoken throughout most of sub-Saharan
region, contains over 1,500 languages (Swahili,
Yoruba, and Zulu among them). Ethnic groups
vary in distribution and size. There may be a dom-
inant ethnic group (e.g., Shona in South Africa),
two major ethnic groups (more common in the
North), or a multitude of smaller tribes, such as in
L. Johnson et al.
the sub-Saharan region which accounts for 43%
of the world’s ethnic groups (Fearon 2003).
Partitioning of land into colonial territories
was accomplished without regard to the estab-
lished territories of local communities, tribes, and
societies. Some groups were divided. For exam-
ple, the Masai, established in the Serengeti and
Mara regions of East Africa, found their home-
land divided into Kenya, under British rule, and
Tanzania, under the Germans. Other tribes with
prior conflict histories, such as the Ibo, Hausa,
and Yoruba of Nigeria, were combined under one
colonial entity. The colonialists then emphasized,
manipulated, and in some instances created dis-
tinct ethnic groups (e.g., the Tusti, Hutu, and Twa
in Rwanda, Rusesabagina 2006) to their advan-
tage. A “divide and rule policy” was used; hence
tribal identity became an important element for
obtaining power and control (Deng 1996; Kibanja,
Kajumba and Johnson 2012).
In some cases political parties were formed on
the basis of ethnic construction and fragmenta-
tion, leading states like Nigeria, Ethiopia, and
South Africa to form federal constitutions to
establish compromises between political and
military elites from principal regional and ethnic
groups (Osaghae 2004). The rest of the states
chose unitarian forms of state (presidential model
of government) but without real meaning and
therefore fell into practices that were authoritar-
ian, dictatorial, or involving military rule. The
Democratic Republic of the Congo under Mobuto
(1965–1997), Central African Republic under
Bokassa (1966–1979), and Libya under Muammar
al Gaddafi (from 1969–2011) are examples
(Golder and Wantchekon 2004). Another
significant divide concerned religious affiliations,
traced back to the arrival of Islam, Protestantism,
and Catholicism. Religious groups engaged in a
ferocious competition for dominance in some
countries, and some religious groups came to
dominate top positions in the civil service (Ellis
and Ter Haar 2007; Kibanja et al., 2012). This
structural inequality was maintained after the
colonial era and, as with ethnicity, religious
beliefs, and political party affiliations became
entangled (Maathai 2009; Otunnu 2002).
28 African Invasion
It is important to point out that although tribal-
ism was once implicated in the high rates of
conflict on the continent, contemporary views
refute that idea (Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000;
Kaldor 2001). Research implicates poverty, high
dependence on natural resources, and ineffective
governments as the main roots of violence.
A recent World Bank report indicated that pov-
erty and politics, not ethnic diversity, are at the
heart of conflict in Africa (Mason and King
2001). In fact, ethnic diversity can promote the
development of healthy nations (Elbadawi and
Sambanis 2000) providing means for cultural and
resource exchange. The manipulation of ethnic
and tribal differences, while not a cause per se,
does have a long history in Africa that persisted
throughout the postcolonial period and persists
today as a means to divide the citizenry, secure
power and resources, and justify invasion on
moral and social grounds.
Postcolonial Coups and Civil Wars
With weak institutions inherited by the Colonial
period, African political regimes failed to estab-
lish stable political institutions. Military inter-
vention in civil affairs by coup d‘état spread in all
African countries except South Africa after
WWII. This led to the overthrow of many politi-
cal regimes such as Libya and Rwanda. Under
the cold war era the superpowers played an
important role in destabilizing opponent regimes
by inciting rival ethnic groups to wage conflicts.
Many states aligned with the USA and estab-
lished close relations with France, as well
(e.g., Moboto, Hassan II), while others aligned
with the Soviet Union and chose communist or
socialist ideologies (e.g., Sikorory, Lomamba in
Liberia). Coup d’état was encouraged, with
France and the USA becoming principle actors in
military intervention and the establishment of
military bases from West to East Africa. These
policies influenced military presence and caused
internal wars between and within states, known
as the “proxy wars” (e.g., Angola from 1975 to
1976) (Aluko 1981).
425
Civil wars ravaged many countries, indicating
the failure of political and military elites to build
peace and establish security and order. In sub-
Saharan Africa, 20 countries have experienced at
least one civil war since their independence
(Yartey 2004). Regimes in power have identified
with and favored particular ethnic groups.
Regional and ethnic enclaves inside each country
and its borders intensified the severity and trag-
edy of the conflicts, resulting in human casual-
ties and mass migrations of refugees. One of the
great tragic events in the twentieth century was
the genocidal war in Rwanda and Burundi in
which the Hutu regime organized a plan to exter-
minate all Tutsi people in the region, resulting in
over 800,000 deaths (Gourevitch 1998;
Rusesabagina 2006).
As with the partitioning, there was complete
disregard for how military intervention would
impact the populace and the process of nation
building (Gettleman 2010). The impact of the
Cold War is still being felt in Africa. The prolif-
eration of small arms after the Cold War
intensified and fueled many conflicts, with devas-
tating consequences (Austin 1999; Kaldor 2001).
The war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(Zaire under Mobutu) was the largest in Africa,
including numerous African nations and foreign
players from within the region and far beyond
(Horowitz 2000; Global Security 2011). The
multistate involvement complicated the conflict
and made the work of finding a peaceful resolu-
tion much more elusive. In the end, millions were
displaced or killed. Between 1998 and 2004, the
International Rescue Committee estimated that
3.8 million people died from violence and from
collateral effects of starvation and disease (Global
Security 2011).
Rebel Movements, New Conflicts,
and Africa’s “Un-wars”
The rebellion movement has been a common
phenomenon in most sub-Saharan states. Some
rebels try to overthrow their own state regimes,
and others try to establish new states. Some have
426
succeeded, such as Eritrea and south Sudan, who
won their own independence and cessation from
the main states of Ethiopia and Sudan, respec-
tively. The military opposition represented a gen-
eral pattern of nation states failing to establish
equal development between regions and ethnic
groups within a country (Maathai 2009; Peninou
1998). The Lord’s Resistance Army of Uganda is
another example, wherein rebel movements ini-
tially arose due to a lack of equity in distribution
of resources and unmet needs (e.g., basic ser-
vices, infrastructure, lack of security) among the
Acholi in the north (Kibanja et al. 2012). For
decades, violence and invasions were written off
as an “Acholi problem,” again indicating a
process of moral disengagement by avoiding
responsibility for addressing concerns. In these
scenarios, regional and peripheral marginaliza-
tion of groups eventually increases and military
opposition against the state comes from the
periphery in order to achieve goals, such as
establishing a new regime or a separate state
(Badal 1976).
The context, type, and quality of civil
conflicts have changed over the last decades in
ways that complicate solutions and are more
brutal for ordinary citizens. Mary Kaldor has
used the term “new wars” to describe conflicts
in the Horn of Africa, West Africa, and Central
Africa, where conflicts can be ill-defined and
messy, with political players destroying econo-
mies, damaging the environment, and taking a
disproportionate toll on civilians, particularly
women and children (Kaldor 2001). Wars
between nations with organized troops and con-
ventional weapons have given way to atrocities
and violence among a range of different militia
groups (e.g., remnants from state armies, para-
military groups, self-defense units, mercenaries,
and international troops) that engage in new
forms of violence, including ethnic cleansing,
genocide, and extreme disregard for the habit-
ability of various regions (Kaldor 2001; Global
Security 2011).
The nature of conflict has shifted from soldier-
to-soldier combat, to soldier-to-civilian, and
worse, civilian-to-civilian, as gruesomely dem-
onstrated in the Rwandan genocide when neigh-
L. Johnson et al.
bors attacked neighbors with machetes imported
from China by the genocidaires at a cost of US $1
each (Rusesabagina 2006). Civilians suffer the
worst effects, while the elite powers benefit from
war time economics and opportunities for illegal
trade and the vast degradation and selling off of
natural resources (Maathai 2009).
Today’s rebels and military oppositions are
also more loosely organized and undisciplined.
They are decreasingly focused on government
takeover and regime change, and increasingly
focused on identity politics and ideologies
(Gettleman 2010). Becoming more common are
what Gettleman (2010) calls the “un-wars” of
Africa, characterized by small-scale invasions
into villages and refugee camps to attack civil-
ians and steal children. There is often no focused
goal, such as regime change or capturing gov-
ernments, but instead the utilization of the pro-
cess of war (i.e., stealing/recruiting new rebels,
burning/attacking villages and civilians, and
stealing money, arms or other resources). Notable
examples include the rebel/bandits in the Niger
Delta and the LRA who after invading villages
and stealing children in Northern Uganda for
23 years have recently crossed into the Central
African Republic to wreak havoc in rural
villages.
Consequences of Conflict on Human
Development
Regardless of the type or cause of conflict,
Africa arguably suffers more from wars than any
other continent, resulting in widespread social,
economic, cultural, psychological, and
environmental damage. Twenty-nine of the
world’s 32 low human development countries
are in sub-Saharan Africa. Loss of arable land
and an inability to grow and produce food in
conflict areas result in famine and condemn
many African children and adults to lives of mis-
ery (Global Security 2011; UNDP 2010). In war
zones, rates of disability (e.g., from maiming),
posttraumatic distress, and other socio-emo-
tional problems including depression, substance
abuse, risky sexual behavior, conduct problems,
28 African Invasion
and adjustment disorders are especially high
(Vinck et al. 2007).
According to the 2010 United Nations Program
Development report, African countries as a whole
did make steady gains on several of the United
Nations Millennium Developmental Goals. On
the other hand, the report indicates that actions
related to poverty eradication and most health
goals are lagging way behind. For instance, in a
2005 UNDP study of 50 African countries
(2005:221–222), it was found that: (a) less than
60% of sub-Saharan Africa’s adult population is
literate, and in seven countries, less than 40%;
(b) ratios for primary education are below 50% in
some countries; (c) sub-Saharan Africa accounts
for a rising number of child deaths: 20% of births
worldwide and 44% of child deaths; (d) chances
of survival in sub-Saharan Africa are similar to
England in 1840s, with life expectancy 33 years
fewer than a person in a rich country; and (e) sub-
Saharan Africa had almost 100 million more
people living on less than US $1 per day in 2001
than in 1990. Average incomes are lower today
than in 1990.
School attendance is one of the primary indi-
cators of human development, and in Africa there
has been a drastic increase in drop-out rates due
to increased costs and armed conflict (UNDP
2010). Participation is especially low among
girls, children in remote areas, refugees, and
children with disabilities or diseases such as
AIDS, and minority ethnic groups (Olukoshi and
Nyamnjoh 2005). Table 28.2 shows several
human development indicators for countries
included in this study, denoting diversity among
the regions represented (e.g., ranging from
Algeria classified as High Development Index, to
Zambia among the lowest).
Although much of the world experienced a
period of sustained economic growth during the
1990s, the opposite was true in Africa, with rever-
sals occurring in many countries (McCandless
and Bangura 2007). African countries have made
weak contributions to international trade and the
international economy despite their rich natural
resources. The economic infrastructure has
remained weak, largely based on primary agricul-
ture production where exportation activities are
427
restricted by limited natural resources. Nearly all
African states (except South Africa) struggle with
debts and face deep economic crises that affect
political instability. This situation reflects the lim-
ited utility of economic reforms based on foreign
investment and development aid. To date, Africans
have benefitted little from the international trade
agreements and “economic intervention” policies
that, rather than deliver aid, have arguably exac-
erbated the problem by aggressively opening up
African countries for international business. As
Africa focused efforts on food production and
extraction of resources for export, there were del-
eterious effects on health, education, and public
services (Maathai 2009). Increased poverty in
sub-Saharan Africa and the immense burden of
debt have further crippled development efforts.
Sub-Saharan countries also suffer negative
effects related to climate change, such as defores-
tation, loss of biodiversity, human–animal habitat
conflict, and loss of arable land. Both scarcity of
land and abundance of resources are ecological
dimensions associated with conflicts in the region
(United Nations, IRIN 2009). Natural resources
are a source of vulnerability in emerging nations,
as seen in the Congo, where diamonds, gold, and
coltan led to illegal trade, forced labor, human
rights abuses, and ultimately war (Fairhead
2000). Ecological scarcity was a main source of
conflict in the Rwandan genocide, which has
been inaccurately portrayed as primarily an eth-
nic problem. Environmental dimensions to
conflicts associated with the climate change such
as changing weather patterns, population mobil-
ity, influx of refugees, movement across borders,
and ongoing struggles over natural resources
(United Nations, IRIN 2009) are expected to
continue as the climate crisis unfolds.
On the other hand, African countries have
made steady gains on several of the Millennium
Developmental Goals up until the global eco-
nomic crisis, and fuel and food crises (UNDP
2010). Specific gains were reported in the areas
of primary school education, gender empower-
ment, childhood immunizations, decreased HIV/
AIDS, and tuberculosis. Access to safe drinking
water has increased and infant mortality has
decreased in some countries. On the economic
 428

Table 28.2 Human development indicators in African sample countries

HDI rank Life expectancy Mean years Gross national income % (PPPS Gender
Country or region HDI category HDI index at birth of school per capita (US$) 1.25 per day) inequality index
Algeria High 84 72.9 7.2 8,320 70
0.677
Botswana Medium 98 55.5 8.9 13,204 91
0.633
Egypt Medium 101 70.5 6.5 5,889 <2 108
0.620
South Africa Medium 110 52.0 8.2 9,812 26.2 82
0.597
Ghana Low 130 57.1 7.1 1,385 30 114
0.467
Nigeria Low 142 48.4 5.0 2,156 –
0.423
Angola Low 146 48.1 4.4 4,941 54.3 –
0.403
Zambia Low 150 47.3 6.5 1,359 64.3 120
0.395
Sub-Saharan Least 0.389 52.7 4.5
World 0.624
Note. HDI rank is based on 169 countries; for more information on the HDI and Gender Inequality Index, see data source notes. Data were obtained from http://hdr.undp.org/en/
statistics
L. Johnson et al.
28 African Invasion
front, growth has begun to pick up after the global
economic and financial crises. There has also
been great improvement in the status of women
in the last half of the twentieth century in most
developing countries (Mason and King 2001).
For instance, there has been improvement in the
female education levels, increase in women’s life
expectancy, and participation in the labor force.
Context for Peace and Participation
in Civil Society
Developing a foundation for peace is extremely
difficult, at best, in a region that lacks infrastruc-
ture, basic human rights, and is frequently in a
state of conflict. With extreme poverty, high
demands for infrastructure, health crises, and
environmental degradation, the challenges facing
governments and societies in Africa are espe-
cially immense. Moreover, much of Africa is
characterized as having a “youth bulge,” with a
large percentage of its population under 25 years
of age (CIA World Factbook 2009). Nations with
youth bulges are thought to be particularly
influential in shaping their communities, and this
factor may propel them either toward peace and
cohesion or toward ethnic divisions, extremism,
and violence (Fuller 1995).
With a few exceptions (e.g., Botswana,
Tanzania) African nations and their regimes have
failed to cultivate a sense of national unity, com-
mitment to intercultural harmony, and sustainable
development (Englebert 1997). Rural to urban
migration and rapid sociocultural changes present
additional challenges, such as increased intercul-
tural contact and new strains on education,
employment, family structures, and daily life
(Kibanja et al. 2012). An equitable system of allo-
cating power and distributing resources is needed
that does not pit tribes against one another or
against the central governments. Despite the rag-
ing conflicts, there is regional diversity with
respect to the potential for peace and citizen par-
ticipation in political processes. According to the
2010 Global Peace Index compiled from several
indicators, such as satisfaction with freedom of
429
choice, democratic processes, freedom from fear,
empowerment, and human rights violations, among
others, Somalia ranked the least peaceful and most
corrupt, while Botswana ranked the most peaceful
and least corrupt among African nations. Botswana
was followed by Tunisia and Mozambique as
most peaceful, while four war-torn countries in
Africa (Somalia, Sudan, Chad, and the DRC) rank
among the lowest in the world. Angola’s GPI
score has improved due to greater human rights,
while in North Africa, Egypt made improvements
due to reduced military spending (GPI 2010).
Table 28.3 indicates UNDP statistics on factors
associated with civic participation and peace to
reflect the diversity within our African sample.
Engagement indicates percent who voiced
their opinion to a political official in 2008. For
more information on calculations and details, see
data source.
Current Study
With recent events unfolding in Algeria, Egypt,
Liberia, Tunisia, Ivory Coast, and South Sudan,
examination of citizens’ attitudes about war and
peace and their sense of personal engagement in
such processes is timely. In this chapter, we con-
sider African participants’ views about the rights
of one nation to invade another and the rationale
or justification for this view. In addition, we asked
participants what they expected to feel and what
they would want to do if directly exposed to a
bombing of their own country or to the bombing
of another country by their country. We were
interested in the extent to which they would want
to become personally involved in doing some-
thing about the bombing in either situation.
Socio-demographic factors including gender,
religion, military associations, and history of
engagement were explored in relation to attitudes
about invasion.
Participants responded to five items. The first
item asks participants to indicate their level of
agreement with the statement, “Sometimes one
country has the right to invade another country.”
The participants are then asked to explain their
 430

Table 28.3 Scores on factors associated with peace, civic engagement, and conflict
Satisfaction War casualties Refugees (from
Global Peace w/freedom of Human rights Freedom Political (average per year per country in
Country Index (GPI) choice (%) Democracy violations of press engagement million 1990–2008) thousands 2008)
Algeria 50 1 3 49.6 16 134.8 9.1
Botswana 84 1 – 15.5 18 – 0.0
Egypt 60 1 4 51.4 12 2.2 6.8
South Africa 73 1 3 8.5 24 – 0.5
Ghana 74 2 2 6.0 19 – 14.2
Nigeria 51 2 4 46.0 30 1 171.4
Angola 69 0 3 36.5 39 313.7 0.2
Zambia 71 1 – 26.8 16 – 1.4
Note. Data were obtained from http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/. For democracy, 0 is nondemocratic, 1 is democratic with no alternation, and 3 is democratic. For human rights
violations, 1 = fewest violations and 5 = most. For freedom of the press, lower scores indicate more freedom; political
L. Johnson et al.
28 African Invasion
rating in their own words. The other four items ask
participants to describe how they would feel and
what they would want to do if exposed to a num-
ber of invasion-related events in a very direct and
immediate way. The first scenario is: “Another
country is indiscriminately bombing a major city
in your country, and women and children, the
elderly, and civilian men are running around
bloody and screaming.” The participants are then
asked two questions: “What would you feel? What
would you want to do?” The second scenario is:
“Your country is indiscriminately bombing a
major city in another country, and women and
children, the elderly and civilian men are running
around bloody and screaming.” Again, partici-
pants are asked to respond to two questions: “What
would you feel? What would you want to do?”
Participants
Our African sample included 425 participants from
various regions of the continent, recruited through
different approaches, including personal network-
ing and posting of the survey link on several web
sites. Specifically, the sample included 12 partici-
pants from Algeria (7 women, 5 men), 15 from
Angola (5 women, 10 men), 68 from Botswana
(40 women, 28 men), 66 from Egypt (26 women,
40 men), 45 from Ghana (8 women, 36 men, 1
unidentified), 50 from Nigeria (28 women and 22
men), 139 from South Africa (67 women, 42 men,
30 unidentified), and finally 30 from Zambia (16
women, 13 men and 1 unidentified). All partici-
pants completed the Personal and Institutional
Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey
(PAIRTAPS), either in hard copy format or online
(Malley-Morrison et al. 2006).
The ages of our participants ranged from 18 to
79 with an average of 39 years. The predominant
religions were Christianity and Islam, with 31%
of the sample identifying as Christians and 19%
as Muslims. In regard to social class, 28% self-
reported as middle class, 12% as working class,
and 11% as lower class. Although only 5% had
personally participated in military service, 17%
indicated that they had a relative in one of the
military services. Finally, only 4% reported
431
having participated in protests against war and in
favor of peace.
Socio-cognitive Coding Procedures
In order to analyze the responses, two coding
manuals were developed, one focusing on expla-
nations for the “right to invade” item and the
other on responses to the personal engagement
items (“What would you feel” and “What would
you want to do”). All responses were broken
down into codable units. Units were coded based
on a coding system informed by Bandura’s (1999)
eight mechanisms by which one’s moral sanc-
tions can be disengaged. Among these, removal
or obstruction of a sense of personal responsibil-
ity, misrepresentation of consequences, advanta-
geous comparison, and moral justification are
especially relevant to discussions on invasion
(Malley-Morrison et al. 2009). In contrast, one
exhibits moral engagement when one’s actions
conform to one’s moral standards despite situa-
tional influences that push for disengagement.
Activation of moral engagement is usually
accompanied by feelings of empathy, perceived
similarity to the object of aggression, and recog-
nition of social or moral obligations to behave
well. In the manual addressing the invasion sce-
nario, items are analyzed for the presence
of mechanisms of moral disengagement (per-
sonal disengagement) and moral engagement
(personal engagement). Emphasis is placed on
the distribution of responsibility for behavior
related to war, whether it is the governments’, the
international communitys’, or one’s own. Coding
was based on themes that correspond to Bandura’s
mechanisms of engagement. A description of the
coding procedures and system can be found in
the methods section in Chap. 23 of this volume.
Views on a Right to Invade:
Major Patterns
Regarding the right of one country to invade
another, arguments favoring governmental
aggression were found in 21% of all responses.
432 L. Johnson et al.

The acceptability of invasion when used for
pseudo-assistance appeared in 44% of the
pro-invasion responses, making it the most com-
mon justification for invasion. For example a
26-year-old Zambian woman lecturer responded,
“Depending on circumstances, any country
which is a security threat to international peace
should be put under scrutiny and, as a LAST
RESORT, be subjected to military intervention,
for the good of everyone.” Pseudo-moral
justifications in the name of self-defense and
helping others were also provided. Within our
sample, 27% of the pro-invasion responses indi-
cated that invasion is acceptable when used for
self-defense. For example, a 26-year-old South
African man, explained, “You only have the right
to invade if you find yourself fighting on foreign
soil, you’re in the wrong. But there’s no sense in
being stupid: if you can see conflict coming
there’s nothing wrong with a sensible, pre-
emptive strike.”
The argument that invasion is acceptable when
used “to prevent a worse outcome” is described
by a 23-year-old male student from Ghana, illus-
trating the mechanism of advantageous compari-
son, where aggression is justified for utilitarian
purposes. Table 28.4 provides additional quotes
reflective of tolerance for invasion from men and
women from several of the different African
countries.

Table 28.4 Examples of arguments supportive of a state right to invasion

Code % Country Age Gender Quotes
Pseudo- 9 (44) Angola 56 F When civilians are oppressed for the
assistance best interest of invaded country
Botswana 22 F
Ghana 50 M Where the citizens are being oppressed
under a dictatorial rule, they need to be
liberated. Where the liberation cannot
be obtained internally, an external
source could be a relief
South African 59 M Generally it should not be done.
However if there is a clear and present
danger the situation is different. It may
need a pre-emptive strike
Advantageous 3 (13) Zambia 26 F Depending on circumstances, any
comparison/ country which posses a security threat
positive to international peace should be put
consequences under scrutiny and, as a LAST
RESORT, be subjected to military
intervention, for the good of everyone
to prevent a worse outcome
Ghana 23 M
South African 50 F It is in the natural order of things that a
stronger nation will invade and take
over a weaker one. They would then
impart their more advanced knowledge
and skills to the invaded country, but
hopefully also absorb some of the
existing culture. I do not agree with
America “invading” Iraq and causing
havoc and then withdrawing
Note. The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total
response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in that category out of all pro-
invasion responses
M male, F female
28 African Invasion 433

In contrast, 78% of the responses were argu-
ments against the right to invade. Twenty-nine
percent of these anti-invasion responses focused
on respect for a government’s sovereignty.
According to a 27-year-old Angolan man, “Each
country has their own problems which should be
solved internally and without the intervention of
other countries.” A 56-year-old male worker gave
a similar argument: “The territorial integrity of
each nation must be respected--in all cases.”
Nineteen percent of the anti-invasion responses
expressed appreciation for the negative conse-
quences, while 16% rejected the right to invade
due to the availability of better alternatives. For
example, a 51-year-old Zambian woman office
manager explained, “No country has the right to
invade another country. Whatever reasons, issues,
or problems should be resolved at a round table.
In the event of an attack, it is the innocent souls
like babies, small children, women, and other
vulnerable that get killed. The people responsi-
ble for the attacks do so by remote control.
They don’t get involved directly and their fami-
lies are always secured.” Table 28.5 provides
additional examples of the arguments against a
right to invasion.
Principled moral justifications, including
concerns for peace, nonviolence, and human

Table 28.5 Arguments against a state right to invasion

Code % Country Age Gender Quote
Respect for 23 (29) Angola 27 M Each country has their own problems
government/ which should be solved internally and
sovereignty without the intervention of other countries
Botswana 22 F We have to respect the sovereignty of other
countries and international organizations
that deal with conflicts
Ghana 56 M The territorial integrity of each nations
must be respected- all cases
Zambia 21 F Each country is a nation state on its own
and needs no external country overpower-
ing it
South African 26 F As people have the right to privacy, I
believe each country does have the right to
“privacy”: the right to govern itself, to
choose to do what is right for the citizens.
Where people’s rights are violated by their
governments, then organizations such as
the UN and Eu must follow right proce-
dures to assist. Invasion is just unaccept-
able, it’s aggressive, unpleasant, and wrong
Negative 15 (19) Algeria 20 F War never successfully resolves a conflict.
consequences One cannot claim triumph if orphans are
created, if children starve, if the weak
perish, if the sick are deprived of treat-
ment…this will always occur in modern
warfare. Humans have the capacity to
communicate and reflect, they should use
their capacities when resolving a conflict
Ghana 30 M It [invasion] usually brings misunderstand-
ing between the countries
South African 66 M If there are open gates, the countries would
be extremely vulnerable and the invaders
would think nothing of human rights, and a
policy of greed and interference would be
the order of the day
(continued)
434
Table 28.5 (continued)
Code % Country Age
Human rights/ 8 (11) Angola 22
concern for others
South African 23
Note. The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total
response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in that category out of all anti-
invasion responses
M male, F female
rights, appeared in 17% of the responses. A few
elaborate and complex responses gave a qualified
approval of invasion that incorporated just war
principles. For example, a 26-year-old white
woman researcher in South Africa responded,
“No country has a right to invade another country
unless the country in concern has violated human
rights to an extreme and people in that country
have been severely disempowered by the govern-
ing party and have asked for help from outside
powers. In this case, the invasion should not
adversely affect ordinary civilians; by this I mean
that no civilian should be subject to any violence
on the part of the invading country.” Such
responses demonstrate reasoning similar to the
jus in bello standard of just wars, which include
the dictum that noncombatants should not be
attacked at any time. Important also is the recog-
nition that while stopping inhumanities may be
considered an acceptable justification of inva-
sion, the right of invasion can be granted only by
citizens of the invaded country.
Emotion/Motivation and Personal
Engagement
Examples of personal disengagement appeared
in a minority (28%) of the responses. Among
these, 14% emphasized vengeful agency, charac-
terized by an interest in punishment and revenge.
L. Johnson et al.
Gender Quote
F No one has the right to kill, cause physical
or emotional harm, or disturb the lives of
millions of people for the sake of their own
benefits
F Unless the other country is PROVEN to be
hideously violating human rights and/or is
proven to be significantly endangering the
residents of other countries I can’t imagine
that invasion is a right. (And I mean proven
to…not guessed to, or hypothesized to, or
perhaps even hoped to)
For example, in response to the question “What
would you want to do if your country was being
bombed,” a 26-year-old woman from Botswana
said she would want to “…destroy the person
who is bombing.” Another said, “I would not do
anything because maybe my country was right to
do this; maybe the other country did something
to deserve the bombing.”
Seventy-two percent of the personal disen-
gagement responses indicated that the respon-
dents denied responsibility to do anything in
response to either of the bombing scenarios. This
was most clearly demonstrated in the Egyptian
sample where 89% of the personally disengaged
responses described the participants’ denial of
responsibility for responding to bombing being
conducted by or against their country. For
example, when asked how he would feel if his
country was bombing another, a 20-year-old
Egyptian man said, “Nothing; this is their prob-
lem, not mine.” Table 28.6 provides additional
quotes demonstrating expectations of personal
disengagement.
In contrast, a majority of the responses (67%)
exemplified personal engagement, and 30% of
these personally engaged responses indicated
that the respondent would want to assume gen-
eral responsibility to do something about the
aggression. When asked what she would want to
do if being bombed, a 32-year-old Egyptian
woman responded, “I would join the military and
28 African Invasion 435

Table 28.6 Examples of personal disengagement responses

Code % Country Age Gender Quote
Vengeful agency 4 (14) Ghana 27 M To retaliate in any means possible whether in a
short or long run
Botswana 25 F Fight back
Egypt 40 F I would want to take out revenge against my
government
Egypt 30 F I would take revenge and bomb that country
back
Botswana 21 F Retaliate to their citizens, make them feel pain
Harming emotions 3 (9) Botswana 22 M Anger
Ghana 29 F Hatred towards the country invading my country
Botswana 25 F Vengeful
Denial of 21 (72) Egypt 30 F Nothing
responsibility
Egypt 32 F There would be nothing I could do
Note. The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total
response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in that category out of all personal
disengagement responses
M male, F female

help fight against the people bombing, even Perspectives on Invasion:

though I am a woman.” In 3% of the personally
engaged responses, participants indicated pro-
social agency if his or her country were bombing
another and expressed interest in protests and
official movements against the aggressive gov-
ernment. For example: “I would participate in
peace protests” and “I would want to stand up
against my government.” Fifteen percent of per-
sonally engaged responses called for help from
the international community. For example, a
34-year-old male worker from Ghana wanted to
“appeal to my government through civil society
and other appropriate authority to cease fire so
that the problem is mediated.” Finally, 16% of
the personally engaged responses indicated a
desire to offer genuine assistance to the bombing
victims. For instance, a 23-year-old male social
worker from Botswana wanted to “help those in
need of help especially children, women, and the
elderly, and fight if I have to” if his country was
being bombed. A 27-year-old man from Ghana
would “help the other country” if his country was
bombing another. Table 28.7 provides additional
quotes demonstrating expectations of personal
engagement in the event of bombing by or against
one’s country.
Demographic Analyses
Chi-square tests were run to explore the extent to
which there were significant demographic differ-
ences in participant responses. Specifically, group
differences were examined using gender, current
religion, service in the military, family member
in military, and involvement in protest for against
war as potential predictors of response prefer-
ences. Only the results that achieved statistical or
marginal significance are reported. All significant
results have a p-value less than 0.05. Marginally
significant results all had p-values less than or
equal to 0.1 and greater than 0.05.
When asked to consider how they would
respond to another country indiscriminately
bombing their country, women were marginally
more likely than men to focus on genuine assis-
tance. Significantly more women than men indi-
cated that they would demonstrate personal
engagement in this situation. Men, on the other
hand, were marginally more likely than women
to call for the international community to help. In
addition, significantly more participants with
experience in protests against war than partici-
pants without experience in protests against war
 436

Table 28.7 Examples of personal engagement responses

Code % Country Age Gender Quote
Pro-social agency 2 (3) Botswana 22 F Seek peace making strategies
Ghana 34 M Seek mediation to bring warring
factions to settle the situation
Self-referenced agency 13 (19) Algeria 25 F Say that all the citizens don’t support
this decision; demonstrate our support
for the murdered populations
Botswana 22 F I have no power to stop them alone
but can protest in a group
Ghana 35 M Organize the youth to demonstrate
against the gov’t and callon the UN
and UNHCR to help evaluate the
vulnerable caught in the cross fire
Genuine assistance 12 (16) Botswana 20 M Defend/save the victims
Egypt 24 M “I would leave the country and try to
work with the Red Cross to try and
help the victims”
Note. The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the
percent of responses in that category out of all personal engagement responses
M male, F female
L. Johnson et al.
28 African Invasion 437

Table 28.8 Another country bombing your country: percentages of responses in coding categories by demographic
groups and chi-square values
Group 1a Group 2a
Categories Male Female c2
Unspecified personal engagement (PE) 6 0 4.68*,b
Genuine assistance (PE) 11 23 4.32^
Call for the international community (PE) 13 4 4.22^

Military Nonmilitary
Denial of responsibility (PD) 25 9 4.03^,b
General responsibility (PE) 50 27 3.61^,b

Relative military No relative military

Denial of responsibility (PD) 18 7 3.99^

Protest No protest
Genuine assistance (PE) 39 10 8.86*,b

Christians Muslims
Denial of responsibility (PD) 1 23 16.89***
Unspecified personal engagement (PE) 6 0 4.64^,b
General responsibility (PE) 18 40 8.83**
Genuine assistance (PE) 27 3 16.28***
Note. PD personal disengagement, PE personal engagement
*
p £ 0.05; **p £ 0.01; ***p £ 0.001; ^0.05 £ p £ 0.1
a
The numbers in these columns are the percent of the group that gave responses falling into each of the specified
categories
b
Fisher’s Exact Test

focused on genuine assistance. While partici-
pants with prior or current military involvement
were marginally more likely than those who had
never been in the military to give responses indi-
cating general responsibility, they were also mar-
ginally more likely than their counterparts to
indicate denial of responsibility. Similarly, par-
ticipants with relatives in the military were mar-
ginally more likely than their counterparts to
indicate that they would feel denial of responsi-
bility. In regard to religion, significantly more
Christians than Muslims indicated that they
would genuinely assist others. Christians were
marginally more likely than Muslims to express
unspecified personal engagement. Significantly
more Muslims than Christians gave responses
reflecting the denial of responsibility, but they
also gave significantly more responses than
Christians indicating feelings of general respon-
sibility. Percentages of responses in coding
categories by demographic groups and chi-square
values are presented in Table 28.8.
Correspondingly, when asked to consider the
scenario of one’s own country indiscriminately
bombing another country, significant group dif-
ferences were found for military service, having
a relative in the military, current religion, and
involvement in protest activity. Significantly
more participants who have served in the mili-
tary, participants with relatives in the military,
and participants who have not participated in pro-
tests against war than their counterparts indicated
in their responses the likelihood that they would
deny responsibility to act (most of them said they
would want to do “nothing”). In regard to current
religion, significantly more Muslims than
Christians gave responses indicating that they
would deny responsibility to act. Christians were
marginally more likely than Muslims to
give responses indicating unspecified personal
engagement. In addition, significantly more
Christians than Muslims gave responses indicat-
ing feelings of general responsibility as well as
responses predicting that they would call for the
438 L. Johnson et al.

Table 28.9 Your country bombing another country: percentages of responses in coding categories by demographic
groups and chi-square values
Group 1a Group 2a
Categories Military Nonmilitary c2
Denial of responsibility (PD) 81 23 24.34***,b

Relative military No relative military

Denial of responsibility (PD) 44 21 7.69**

Protest No protest
Denial of responsibility (PD) 0 33 5.65*,b

Christian Muslim
Denial of responsibility (PD) 1 63 62.65***
Unspecified personal engagement (PE) 7 0 4.97^,b
General responsibility (PE) 19 4 7.57**
Call for the international community (PE) 19 1 11.99***
Note. PD personal disengagement, PE personal engagement
*
p £ 0.05; **p £ 0.01; ***p £ 0.001; ^0.05 £ p £ 0.1
a
The numbers in these columns are the percent of the group that gave responses falling into each of the specified
categories
b
Fisher’s Exact Test

international community to help. Percentages of access communications, and thus a lack of

responses in coding categories by demographic
groups and chi-square values can be found in
Table 28.9.
Discussion
The large majority of participants (78%) do not
support a state’s right to invade. Reasons cited
included negative consequences, better alterna-
tives, and a state’s right to sovereignty. The major-
ity views here may reflect a reaction to invasion on
a continent whose people have suffered from innu-
merable invasions of one kind or another. Women
reported more negative consequences of invasions
than men, which is consistent with the fact that
they are thought to suffer more, especially in recent
conflicts where rape and sexual slavery have
become staple tools of war and intimidation.
Of the pro-invasion responses, moral
justifications were largely provided in the name of
pseudo-assistance, such as maintaining peace, help-
ing others, and self-defense, or attributing blame.
Punishment and revenge were justifications more
commonly provided by working class individu-
als, which may reflect the lack of education or
understanding of the complexity of the situation,
and/or a lack of perspective taking or critical
thinking skills.
A majority of our participants (67%) indicated
personal engagement in the event of indiscrimi-
nate bombing, with a third citing they would want
to assume some personal responsibility, such as
helping others or taking part in protests, while
some mentioned that the international commu-
nity should take responsibility. This stands in
contrast to only 4% reporting a history of social
protest. The fact that there is interest in taking
personal responsibility and engaging in civic
action is of course heartening news and points to
the possibilities of full participation by civilians
in social and government institutions, decisions,
and actions. Scholars and activists, including
Nobel Peace prize winner, Wangari Maathai (the
late) of Kenya, advocate for increased participa-
tion by African citizens to create their own solu-
tions by advancing social cohesion and creating a
culture of peace based on shared identities that
transcend ethnic, linguistic, and national borders
(Maathai 2008, 2009). It is interesting that among
the engaged participants, those with protest
experience were more likely to indicate shame
28 African Invasion
and guilt for the actions of their country. This is
consistent with Bandura’s (1999) processes and
also with research and theory in civic engage-
ment linking moral engagement, affective
engagement, and civic and social action (Lerner
2004; Lerner et al. 2000).
In responding to bombing in their own coun-
try, men were slightly more likely to seek interna-
tional support, while women were more likely to
reference helping others, as were those who had
participated in antiwar protests. Research shows
that due to patriarchy, African women are social-
ized into being helpful, cooperative, empathic,
and generally into being pillars of social support
in the community. They therefore rate higher than
the men on the values of egalitarianism and
embeddedness (Munene et al. 2000) and thus
more likely to respond to any calamity by helping.
Women’s desire to help and become involved may
also be related to women’s initiatives in Africa
that have worked to empower women across the
continent. However, the gender gap remains with
respect to social, economic, and legal rights, espe-
cially in sub-Saharan Africa (Mason and King
2001). For instance, efforts to enhance women’s
participation in politics and international affairs
have yielded slow response (Beleke 2000). Thus,
women’s influence in national decision making is
still comparatively low.
Seventy-two percent of responses were coded
for no personal engagement, indicating a lack of
a sense of personal responsibility to do anything
in either bombing scenario. Interestingly,
Egyptians were most likely to report a lack of
personal engagement, which could have stemmed
from 30 years of oppressive rule and is further
reflected in the scores for Egypt (Table 28.3),
indicating low freedom of choice, high human
rights abuses, and the least political engagement
among our countries. Times change, however,
and this finding stands in contrast to ongoing
civic participation in the unfolding revolution in
Egypt. Recent events in Egypt were anticipated
by Scruggs (2009) when she argued that the
country’s future is uncertain and hard to predict.
It is characterized by high unemployment among
the youth. This has led to rise in religiosity due to
frustration leading many of them into radicalized
religious thinking. Scruggs predicted that the
439
dissatisfaction among the youth in Egypt was
likely to become manifest in riots, increase in
crimes, or the staging of a coup d’état—all of
which occurred early in 2011.
When the target of bombing was outside the
country, those with a military history or associa-
tion were more likely to refrain from accepting
personal responsibility, as were those with no
history of protest. The response seems logical,
given that military personnel would likely defer
responsibility and authority to government insti-
tutions for decisions and actions. Christians
were more likely than Muslims to seek interna-
tional support, which may speak to the overall
sense of marginalization and hostility felt by
Muslims on the global stage. This result points
to the importance of including diverse stake-
holders from all groups in the approaches to
social and political development and to
peacemaking.
Implications and Conclusion
Despite the fact that Africa is ranked as the least
peaceful region, there remains an optimism and
resiliency on the continent. A recent survey study
(Pew Research Center 2010) reported that a major-
ity (76%) of individuals in sub-Saharan Africa
(where Human Development is lowest) believed
their life would improve in 5 years. The study also
showed that this optimism is stronger compared to
other regions of the world. The 2010 UNDP
regional report suggests that optimism about the
future is related to a growing prevalence of peace
in the region. In fact, Africa recorded the best rate
of progress from 2007 to 2010 on the 2010 GPI
Index. In developing a comprehensive action plan
for peace in the region, several principles have
been advocated (Cheru 2002) which are as fol-
lows: (a) seek political solutions by nonmilitary
means, involve all stakeholders in political dia-
logue; (b) empower civil society at all levels; (c)
redress gender disparities among women and
girls, especially because of their prominent roles
in rebuilding war-torn societies; (d) rehabilitate
the economy, offer humane and sustainable alter-
natives for ex-combatants; (e) improve standards
of education, health, housing, and food security;
440
(f) improve the quality of governance which is
linked to civil and political liberties; (g) reduce
corruption; (h) gain civilian control of the mili-
tary; and (i) build local knowledge and capacity
for conflict prevention and resolution that includes
local leaders (Cheru 2002:205–208).
As indicated in our study, African citizens are
largely against state invasion and supportive of
personal engagement to protest war or promote
peace. Given the contextual challenges in the
region, scholars, researchers, organizations, and
activists must establish a clear agenda for pro-
moting new research on conflict resolution and
peace that is culturally and contextually relevant
(ACCORD 2006). While peace research is
nascent in Africa, there are approximately 24
Peace Research Institutes and 800 universities
that should be supported in developing research
and curricula that move beyond old fashioned
strategies and are applicable in light of the new
conflict and “un-wars” in Africa. Future studies
should pay attention to the changing nature of
conflicts, shifting identities, and different types
of civic participation, such as individual versus
collective engagement and activism.
In conclusion, although there is reason for
hope in Africa, no effort to promote peace and
civic engagement can flourish when there are
ongoing wars and urgent unmet needs for daily,
basic living. There is a need for social protection
programs, reductions in social, income, and edu-
cation disparities, and improvements in health
care for all. Achieving peace thus means redou-
bling efforts to achieve the Millennium
Development Goals. Only then can the full poten-
tial of African civic society be realized.
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 Latin American Perspectives
on the Right to Invasion 29
Amanda Clinton, José Anazagasty, Michael Stevens,
Eros DeSouza, Bailey Pescatore, Laura Marcucci,
Ricardo Angelino, Rodrigo Barahona,
Luciana Karine de Souza, Eddy Carillo,
and Sherri McCarthy

How do Latin Americans conceptualize and rep-
resent invasions? Do they think their governments
have a right to initiate invasions of other coun-
tries? Do they believe that there are occasions
when invasions are justified? And if they do, what
kinds of rationale do they provide to justify inva-
sions? Answering these questions is of great
importance, especially in Latin America, where
wars and military invasions have frequently
occurred. In fact, this subject is one of the most
persistent themes in the history of Latin America,
from pre-Columbian times to the present.
This chapter explores perspectives on inva-
sion from a Latin American perspective. This
chapter begins with an introduction in which a
brief historical account of war and invasion in the
region is discussed. Subsequent sections present
an analysis of the views of Latin Americans and
the extent to which they believe governments
have a right to initiate war, as well as their feel-
ings and thoughts if their own country were either
directly involved in attacking another or were to
suffer an attack.
A Brief History of War and Invasion
in Latin America
The entire history of Latin America is marked by
invasion and war. This introductory section pro-
vides a concise historical account of military
invasions in Latin America during three epochs,
the precolonial, colonial, and postcolonial, a time
period spanning thousands of years.
The Precolonial Era
Invasions and war were not absent in pre-Colum-
bian Latin America. An increase in warfare
attended the creation of states and empires by early
Americans. Rulers tried to gain control of important
resources and to build their power at the expense
of other states (Martin and Wasserman 2005).
Wars and invasions were not only common in pre-
colonial Latin America but also deeply affected
the lives of indigenous peoples in the region. For
instance, warfare consumed resources, including
the vast human resources in the Aztec empire,
which like all other empires in the world and
throughout history was built upon the invasions
of other states and communities. In fact, by the
sixteenth century, the Aztecs controlled a popula-
tion of millions of individuals, a feat achieved
through military expansion. Ultimately, the Aztecs
conquered all of central Mexico, from coast to
coast, as well as southern Mexico (Fox 2003).
Another illustrative example is the Incan
Empire. The territorial conquests of the Incas
were relatively modest until 1438, when they
initiated a period of military expansion in
the Andean region. By the time the Spanish
conquerors arrived in 1532, the Incas had power
over a large portion of the western part of South

K. Malley-Morrison et al. (eds.), International Handbook of War, Torture, and Terrorism, 443
Peace Psychology Book Series, DOI 10.1007/978-1-4614-1638-8_29,
© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2013
444
America, including the region that is now south-
ern Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, western
Argentina, and the northern part of Chile. Like
the Aztecs, the Incas controlled the lives of mil-
lions of individuals (Fox 2003).
The Colonial Era
Even though wars and invasions were frequent and
life changing for early indigenous Americans, the
arrival of the Europeans in 1492 marked a radical
change. Indeed, the docking of the Europeans on
the inhabitants’ shores launched the beginning of a
lengthy era of barbarous and extensive wars and
invasions. Martin and Wasserman (2005) describe
well the European conquest of Latin America and
its impact on early Americans. Isolated from
Europe, Africa, and Asia for thousands of years,
the native Americans now became part of the
emerging empires that spanned the globe. They
not only had to swear allegiance to new sovereigns
and accept a new religion, they also had to contend
with the grandiose plans of thousands of Spaniards
and Portuguese who followed Columbus westward
across the Atlantic. These settlers saw the “Indians”
as a source of labor for building and exploiting the
natural resources of their conquest, thus serving
the newcomers’ needs and desires. When Indians
resisted their political, religious, or economic
demands, the Europeans resorted to war, killing
thousands and enslaving many more. Countless
others died of smallpox, measles, and other “old-
world” diseases to which they had no previous
exposure (Martin and Wasserman 2005, p. 69).
These events profoundly shaped and still shape
the history and societies of Latin America. For
centuries following the initial conquests, Spain,
Portugal, and other European powers ruled their
American empires with few challenges, either
from indigenous people or from the conquerors’
descendants1 living in the colonies. This relative
security for the colonizers changed when Haiti
proclaimed its independence from France in 1804.
Soon after this, other Latin American countries
followed the Caribbean nation in seeking freedom
1
Refers to a Spanish American of pure European stock
(usually Spanish).
A. Clinton et al.
from European rule. Within less than two decades,
between 1808 and 1824, most of Spanish America
won independence, leaving Spain with just two
islands, Cuba and Puerto Rico Martin and
Wasserman 2005).
The Postcolonial Era
In most of Latin America, the wars of indepen-
dence from Spain were long, extensive, savage
contests that often involved numerous military
expeditions and invasions of various territories, the
most renowned by Simón Bolivar and José de San
Martin. From Mexico to Argentina, the new nations
of Spanish America emerged from lengthy, hard-
fought wars, costly both in human lives and dam-
age to the economic infrastructure (Fox 2003;
Martin and Wasserman 2005). Comparatively
speaking, Brazil’s independence from Portugal in
1822 was achieved somewhat less violently than
in other cases. However, in the rest of Latin
America, major areas were ruined and thousands
died as a consequence of these wars. It took Latin
America a century to recover economically and
politically from the wars of independence, which
continue to have an impact today (Fox 2003;
Martin and Wasserman 2005).
The Nineteenth Century
Shortly after the wars of independence, warfare
continued to be a major contributor to political
instability and an obstacle to economic develop-
ment in the region. Indeed, the nineteenth cen-
tury was a period characterized by war. As noted
by Martin and Wasserman (2005, p. 272), “Hardly
a year went by when there was not a war or some
kind of military action somewhere in Latin
America.” These wars and invasions inflicted
enormous damage, including adverse economic
effects and disrupted communications and trans-
portation systems. Additionally, massive financial
and human resources were necessary to help
overcome the losses sustained from endemic
unrest.
Table 29.1 (Martin and Wasserman 2005) lists
a total of 54 international wars and foreign
29 Latin America Invasion 445

Table 29.1 International wars and foreign invasions in Table 29.1 (continued)
Latin America during the nineteenth century 1876–1885 Central America
Year Wars/invasions 1879–1884 War of the Pacific: Chile vs. Peru and Bolivia
1823 Mexico vs. Central America 1885 United States lands forces in Panama
1825–1828 Cisplatine War: Brazil vs. Buenos Aires 1888 United States lands forces in Haiti
1828–1830 Gran Colombia vs. Peru 1890 United States lands forces in Argentina
1829 Spain vs. Mexico 1891 United States lands forces in Haiti
1833 Great Britain takes Falkland Islands 1891 United States lands forces in Chile
1833 United States lands forces in Buenos Aires 1894 United States lands forces in Brazil
1836–1839 Chile vs. Peru-Bolivia Confederation 1895 United States lands forces in Colombia
1836 Mexico vs. Texas 1896 United States lands forces in Nicaragua
1838 Pastry War: Mexico vs. France 1898 United States lands forces in Nicaragua
1838–1840 France blockades Río de la Plata 1894–1895 Great Britain influences Central America
1838–1851 La Guerra Grande: United Provinces vs. 1898–1899 United States vs. Spain (Cuba, Puerto Rico)
Uruguay Adapted from Martin and Wasserman (2005)
1838–1865 Central American wars
1840–1841 Panama vs. New Granada
1840–1845 France and Great Britain blockade Río de
la Plata invasions in Latin America from 1800 to 1900,
1840 Peru vs. Bolivia demonstrating how often wars occurred in the
1843–1850 Great Britain occupies parts of Central
nineteenth century Latin America. Although the
America
table shows various wars between Latin American
1846–1848 Mexico vs. United States
1851 Brazil, Río de la Plata, and Uruguay vs.
nations, the most frequent uninvited guests were
Buenos Aires from European countries and the United States.
1852–1853 United States lands forces in Argentina Although a relatively new foreign player, the
1853 United States lands forces in Nicaragua United States was the most frequent invader of
1854 United States lands forces in Nicaragua Latin American nations in the nineteenth century.
1853–1854 William Walker filibusters in Baja, In fact, of the 54 events listed by Martin and
California, and Sonora, Mexico Wasserman (2005), over 50% were by the United
1855 United States lands forces in Uruguay
States. Only 12 of those reported by Martin and
1855–1856 William Walker conquers Nicaragua
Wasserman involved other core nations,2
1856 United States lands forces in Panama
specifically Spain, France, and Great Britain. The
1857 United States lands forces in Nicaragua
rest were conflicts between Latin American
1858 United States lands forces in Uruguay
1859 United States displays force in Paraguay
nations.
1859 United States lands forces in Panama A report by Grimmett (2002) for the
1860 William Walker filibusters in Honduras Congressional Research Service documents all
1861 Tripartite (Great Britain, France, Spain) instances of use of US Armed Forces around the
intervention in Mexico world and confirms that the United States was the
1861–1865 Reoccupation of Santo Domingo by Spain nation that used military force most often in Latin
1862 Great Britain invades Central America America during the nineteenth century. Grimmett
1862–1867 French Intervention in Mexico
1863 Guatemala vs. El Salvador
1864–1866 Peru, Chile, Bolivia, and Ecuador vs. Spain 2
In world systems theory, developed by Immanuel
1864–1870 War of Triple Alliance: Paraguayan War Wallerstein, the core countries are the industrialized capi-
1865 United States lands forces in Panama talist countries on which periphery countries like Haiti,
1864–1871 Guatemala and Honduras vs. El Salvador and semiperiphery countries like Brazil, often called
developing nations, depend. In the current world system,
1868 United States lands forces in Uruguay
the USA is the key core country, although other important
1868 United States lands forces in Colombia cores are Japan and the European Union and, increasingly
(continued) China and Russian.
446
reported 44 instances of US Armed Forces in
Latin America between 1806, when military force
was utilized in Mexico, and 1899, when it was
used in Nicaragua. Based on data provided by
Grimmett (2002), Table 29.2 shows the employ-
ment of American armed forces in that region
since the nineteenth century.3
One of the most important consequences for
Latin America was the insertion of the USA into
the field of imperial nations. During the nine-
teenth century, Americans were mostly concerned
with continental expansion and colonization on
the North American continent. However, such
goals did not prevent the use of armed forces
abroad, including military interventions in
Spanish territory and later in sovereign Latin
American nations.
Early in the nineteenth century, the USA
openly proclaimed its imperial interests in Latin
America. In 1823, President James Monroe
asserted those interests in a policy that became
known as the Monroe Doctrine. This policy
indicated that further efforts by European gov-
ernments to interfere, occupy, or colonize Latin
America would be viewed by the USA as acts
of aggression requiring a response. The USA
thus reasserted the primacy of its interest in
Latin America and reinforced its international
image as an emerging empire poised to break
3
Included in the figure are only interventions in Spanish
territories that later became independent sovereign nations
and Puerto Rico (still a colony). Military intervention in
Florida and Spanish territory later incorporated into the
USA are excluded. Figure 1 lists only instances of the use
of US Armed Forces reported by Grimmett (2002).
However, I included an instance of the use of armed forces
in Colombia in 2003. The USA sent special forces to back
up the Colombian army and protect an oil pipeline in a
known rebel zone. The list reviews hundreds of instances
in which the USA has utilized military forces abroad in
situations of conflict or potential conflict to protect US
citizens or promote US interests. The list does not include
covert actions or numerous instances in which US forces
have been stationed abroad since World War II in occupa-
tion forces or for participation in mutual security organi-
zations, base agreements, or routine military assistance or
training operations.
A. Clinton et al.
with its isolationist past (Cabán 2000). In accord
with the Monroe Doctrine, the USA proceeded
to intervene in Cuba, Puerto Rico, Argentina,
Peru, Mexico, Haiti, Brazil, Nicaragua,
Uruguay, Panama, Paraguay, and Colombia.
Despite those interventions, the USA was more
concerned with continental expansion than with
overseas expansion (Maingot 2005; Mann
2008). Most of these interventions were moti-
vated by the fight against pirates and the protec-
tion of American interests during periods of
political turmoil in Latin America (Grimmett
2002). The majority of the military activities
carried out by the US Armed Forces occurred in
Central America and the Caribbean, although
some occurred in Argentina, Peru, Uruguay,
Paraguay, Colombia, Brazil, and Chile (see
Table 29.2).
Only two instances of U.S. use of armed
forces were largely intended to conquer new
territories in Latin America, the war with
Mexico (1846 to 1848) and the Spanish-
American War (1898). Through its war with
Mexico, the USA gained half of its territory.
Earlier, the US Armed Forces carried out actions
in Mexico in 1806 when the country was still a
Spanish territory as well as in 1836, 1842, and
1844 (see Table 29.2).
Although the Monroe Doctrine made an early
claim for hemispheric dominance, it became a
full reality only when the British Empire moved
away from Latin America to expand its focus on
Asia and Africa. Furthermore, to assert the
Monroe Doctrine, the USA needed further indus-
trial development and a substantial navy. All of
this was not under way until the 1890s, which
meant that it was not until the end of the century
that the USA could finally fulfill the Monroe
Doctrine’s goals and seek profit and security
throughout the Americas.
Seeking profit and security were the factors
behind the US war with Spain in 1898, the sec-
ond occasion for using military force to conquer
territories. As a result of the Spanish-American
War, the USA acquired its first overseas colonies:
Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines, plus a
group of small islands in the Pacific. However,
29 Latin America Invasion 447

Table 29.2 Instances of use of US Armed Forces in Latin America

Nineteenth century Twentieth century Twenty-first century
Year Country Year Country Year Country
1806 Mexico 1901 Colombia 2003 Colombia
1814–1825 Caribbean 1902 Colombia
1822 Cuba 1903 Honduras
1823 Cuba 1903 Dominican Republic
1824 Cuba 1903–1914 Panama
1824 Puerto Rico 1904 Dominican Republic
1825 Cuba 1904 Panama
1833 Argentina 1906–1909 Cuba
1835–1836 Peru 1907 Honduras
1836 Mexico 1910 Nicaragua
1842 Mexico 1911 Honduras
1844 Mexico 1912 Honduras
1846–1848 War with Mexico 1912 Panama
1852–1853 Argentina 1912 Cuba
1853 Nicaragua 1912–1925 Nicaragua
1854 Nicaragua 1913 Mexico
1855 Uruguay 1914 Haiti
1856 Panama 1914 Dominican Republic
1857 Nicaragua 1914–1917 Mexico
1858 Uruguay 1915–1934 Haiti
1859 Paraguay 1616–1624 Dominican Republic
1860 Colombia 1917–1922 Cuba
1865 Panama 1918–1929 Mexico
1866 Mexico 1918–1920 Panama
1867 Nicaragua 1919 Honduras
1868 Uruguay 1920 Guatemala
1868 Colombia 1921 Panama and Costa Rica
1870 Mexico 1924 Honduras
1873 Colombia 1925 Honduras
1873–1896 Mexico 1925 Panama
1876 Mexico 1926–1933 Nicaragua
1885 Panama 1933 Cuba
1888 Haiti 1940 Newfoundland, Bermuda,
St. Lucia, Bahamas, Jamaica,
Antigua, Trinidad, and British
Guiana
1890 Argentina 1959–1960 The Caribbean
1891 Haiti 1962 Cuba
1891 Chile 1965 Dominican Republic
1894 Brazil 1981 El Salvador
1894 Nicaragua 1983–1989 Honduras
1895 Colombia 1983 Grenada
1896 Nicaragua 1986 Bolivia
1898 Nicaragua 1988 Panama
1898 The Spanish– 1989 Panama
American War
(continued)
448
Table 29.2 (continued)
Nineteenth century Twentieth century
Year Country Year
1899 Nicaragua 1989
1989–1990
1993
1994
1994
1995
1995
1996
Source: Grimmett (2002)
this direct empire4 did not last long and soon
became an indirect empire.5 Of the two Latin
American islands, Cuba became an independent
protectorate in 1902, while Puerto Rico remained
a colony with a restricted autonomy. The United
States’ “island empire” was an atypical one when
compared with other empires, a fact that led
McCoy et al. (2009, p. 3) to state:
Among the colonial empires that once ruled the
globe, the U.S. was an elusive, even paradoxical
power. All the usual imperial labels that attach so
readily to Great Britain or France seem to require
qualification when applied to America. By 1900,
Britain’s empire covered a quarter of the earth’s
entire surface; America’s empire skipped along a
string of small islands dotting the Tropic of Cancer
from the Caribbean to the Western Pacific. Europe’s
zempire expanded relentlessly for five centuries to
rule a full third of humanity; the U.S. held most of
its larger colonies for just a few decades and gov-
erned only a few million people. Yet the empire
left an indelible imprint on the United States.
Besides transnational wars of political consoli-
dation, international wars between Latin American
4
Direct empires occur when conquered territories are
politically incorporated into the dominion of the core or
metropolis (Mann 2008).
5
Indirect empires occur when the core claims political
sovereignty over a territory but allows the rulers of the
periphery and/or colonies to retain some autonomy. It
involves negotiations between peripheral and core gov-
ernments (Mann 2008).
A. Clinton et al.
Twenty-first century
Country Year Country
Andean Initiative in War on
Drugs: Colombia, Bolivia, Peru
Panama
Haiti
Haiti
Haiti
Haiti
Haiti
Haiti
nations, and wars against foreign military inter-
vention, a few civil wars also took place in Latin
America during the nineteenth century. Martin and
Wasserman (2005) reported civil wars in Central
America (1826–1829 and 1837–1840), Chile
(1828–1830 and 1890–1891), Colombia (1839–
1842 and 1899–1902), Mexico (1854–1867), the
Argentine Confederation (1851–1861), Venezuela
(1859–1863), and Brazil (1893–1894).
In Latin America, the nineteenth century was
indeed a century impacted by wars that inflicted
great physical, economic, and psychological
damage, while disrupting economic development
and draining important human and financial
resources from the region. Unfortunately, the
entire twentieth century continued to bring inva-
sion and war to Latin America.
The Twentieth Century
The United States’ interest in Latin America only
grew after the Spanish-American War. In addition
to Cuba and Puerto Rico, the USA intruded on
many other Latin American nations. Throughout
the twentieth century, war and military invasions
continued to be an important factor in Latin
America, with the region remaining a key target
of US imperialism. There were many instances of
the employment of US Armed Forces, mostly
occurring in Panama, Nicaragua, and Honduras.
Grimmett (2002) reported 50 instances in which
29 Latin America Invasion
the US Armed Forces used force in Latin America
between 1900 and 1999, beginning with Colombia
in 1901 and ending with the use of force in Haiti
in 1996 (see Table 29.2).
For most of the first half of the twentieth cen-
tury prior to the Second World War, US military
actions in Latin America consisted of an eclectic
dosage of insular and isthmian imperialism—a
formal infrastructure on which an informal
empire6 could later be built (McCormick 2009).7
The major use of American military forces in
Latin America before World War II, a total of 33
occasions, occurred in Central America and the
Caribbean (see Table 29.2). Strategic consider-
ations and commercial needs motivated most of
those military actions (Mann 2008), and the
Monroe Doctrine was reformulated to justify a
US prerogative to intervene in regional affairs
(Carmagnani 2004). Meanwhile, the USA began
building a striking informal empire, shaping the
activities of Latin American states by means of
its superior economic and military might (Mann
2008). As McCormick (2009) explains:
After 1903, semiformal empire became the
main mode that filled in any remaining infra-
structural gaps, especially in the Caribbean
Basin—that is, arrangements commonly termed
protectorates, satellites, puppets, client states,
and the like. Stung by the experience of colonial
war in the Philippines and still concerned about
public opinion, US leaders embraced a safe house
6
For Mann (2008), informal empires come about when
peripheral leaders retain sovereignty but have their auton-
omy constrained by pressure, and even coercion, from the
imperial core. Mann distinguished between three types of
coercion used in informal empires: gunboats (military
interventions, show of force), proxies (support of authori-
tarian governments and dictatorships), and structural
adjustment (economic coercion).
7
It was in the first years of the twentieth century that the
USA built and administered its first overseas colonies, a
group of islands (Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines,
plus a group of small pacific islands), creating the insular
character of American imperialism. But the USA was also
interested on gaining access to Asian markets, hence the
American interest on an Isthmian Canal, later realized in
the Panama Canal. The uses of American military force in
Central America were associated with the canal.
449
halfway between colonialism and independence,
though closer to the former. The targeted coun-
tries retained nominal, legal independence but
one fatally compromised by limitations imposed
through military coercion (“gunboat diplomacy”)
or financial pressure (“dollar diplomacy”). Those
limitations were both financial and political-
military in nature (p. 74).
Besides gunboat and dollar diplomacy, the
USA made use of proxies, supporting authoritar-
ian governments in Latin America, including
those of Rafael Trujillo in the Dominican Republic,
Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua, Juan Vicente
and, later, Marcos Pérez in Venezuela, Juan Batista
in Cuba, and François Duvalier in Haiti.
The end of the Second World War set the stage
for the making of the American global hegemonic
empire8 (Mann 2008). The war’s conclusion had
important consequences for Latin America,
which from then on faced less aggression on the
part of the United States. There were only 17
instances of military force in Latin America, with
most occurrences still taking place in Central
America and the Caribbean (see Table 29.2).
Haiti was the most affected, as the USA invaded
that nation six times after the Second World War
(see Table 29.2).
The empire turned to free trade combined with
democracy where possible. The dominance of the
USA was backed by a myriad of global collective
security institutions controlled mainly by the
United States. This era was called “capitalism’s
great leap forward” by Beaud (2001). The recon-
struction of Europe after World War II, the age of
prosperity that followed, decolonization, the
internationalization of capital, and new industri-
alization in the third world all confirmed capital-
ism’s new drive on a global scale (Beaud 2001).
Hegemony was fundamental in the building of
the global empire, even though the degree to
which American leadership was accepted as
legitimate varied across the globe (Mann 2008).
8
Hegemonic empires arise when the leadership of the core
over the peripheral sovereign states is accepted as normal
and depends more on persuasion than coercion, although
the latter is used by the core if necessary (Mann 2008).
450
In the period immediately following the
Second World War, the part of Latin America
pertaining to the informal empire built earlier by
the USA remained largely unchanged, with the
exception of its expansion southward (Mann
2008). However, the region was now considered
of less strategic and economic value than other
parts of the globe and thus attracted reduced eco-
nomic and military attention from the United
States. The larger Latin American countries, like
Chile, Argentina, Mexico and Brazil, even pur-
sued their own development programs and poli-
cies, while the USA was satisfied with influencing
smaller countries through what some critics often
call comprador9 regimes sympathetic to the
United States. Whenever and wherever Latin
American populists gained power, they negoti-
ated with US corporations and financial interests.
Nevertheless, that state of affairs changed as con-
cern grew in the USA regarding the potential
spread of socialism and communism in the region.
Cuba presented specific concerns. As a result,
American interventions quickly spread through-
out the region. There were some indications of a
“less interventionist USA” during the Kennedy
and Carter administrations, but these policies did
not endure long (Mann 2008). The Cold War
period ended with the USA sponsoring Contra
proxies in Nicaragua.
Generally, the USA launched fewer open
military interventions in Latin America than
before the Second World War (see Table 29.2).
However, it did engage in far more covert or
proxy activities, as noted by Mann (2008):
It saw an informal Empire, mixing gunboats with
proxies, but without colonies. It was sometimes
justified as the spread of democracy, because com-
munism was seen as democracy’s enemy. But this
Mission statement was undercut by the U.S. prefer-
ence for authoritarian allies. In the 1980s the United
States adapted to the spread of democracy across
the hemisphere, conducting a policy of “democracy
9 10
A comprador, literally a buyer, refers to a native agent or
intermediary of a foreign enterprise. It also refers to a
social class, the comprador class, whose political orienta-
tion and actions facilitate the perpetuation of colonialism
and economic dependency.
A. Clinton et al.
by applause” from the sidelines, as Latin Americans
made their own democratic gains. Hardly a Mission,
but at least a decline in paranoia (p. 26).
By the 1970s, the US interventions seemed to
be in relative decline, a consequence of the eco-
nomic crisis of that decade (Beaud 2001). Yet,
the crisis was in some ways the means by which
the expansion of capital, “capitalism’s great leap
forward,” was carried out (Beaud 2001). The cri-
sis and the relative decline of the USA coincided
with the fact that there were no American uses of
military force in Latin America during that
decade (see Table 29.2).
During the eighties, the USA promoted devel-
opment policies founded on the “Washington
Consensus.” This resulted in neoliberal and struc-
tural adjustment programs that deeply affected
economic development in Latin America and
other developing regions of the world (Harvey
2003, 2007; Beaud 2001; Mann 2008; Panitch
and Gindin 2003). These programs and policies,
besides having tremendous social and political
consequences in Latin America and the world,
also led to a shift of power toward private, trans-
national finance capital (Beaud 2001; Panitch
and Gindin 2003; Mann 2008). The informal
empire was now a hegemonic empire. During
this decade, the USA engaged in military action
in Latin America, with instances of military force
in El Salvador, Honduras, Grenada, Bolivia,
Panama, Peru, and Colombia. The most memo-
rable of these was the invasion of Panama
between 1989 and 1990 and subsequently the
Andean Initiative on the War on Drugs that began
in 1989.
With the end of the Cold War and the decline
of “real socialism” in the nineties, democratic
capitalism expanded and left the USA with great
military power and resources.10 However, the
more the USA expanded, the more strategically
Real socialism was a term introduced in the seventies,
and of frequent use in world systems theory and depen-
dency theory, to refer to the de facto socialism, to really
existing socialist countries, and differentiate it from ideal
socialism.
29 Latin America Invasion
vulnerable and at risk it became. America’s global
empire brought tremendous anxieties, and
military preponderance led to the temptation of
preemptive attacks and interventions throughout
the world, especially in the Middle East (Rogers
2003; Mann 2008). Most Americans became
increasingly fearful of the proliferation of weap-
ons of mass destruction. It was commonly thought
that even poorer nations that possessed very few
of such weapons could deter US imperial inter-
ventions and interests while simultaneously
threatening national security. Americans also
feared losing their precarious hold on the Middle
East and certainly feared terrorism.
This meant that Latin America was of little
concern for the United States, although there was
some apprehension regarding Cuba; even though
the War on Drugs persisted in the region, it did
not represent a serious threat to US interests.
Hence, there were almost no instances of
American military force in Latin America during
the 1990s. Besides the invasion of Panama that
ended in 1990 and the War on Drugs in Colombia,
Bolivia, and Peru, only Haiti was invaded by
American troops six times between 1993 and
1996. Haiti, a small, very poor country, was the
nation most often subjected to military interven-
tion during the nineties. Moreover, most of these
interventions were carried out as part of United
Nations’ missions that involved numerous other
countries, including Brazil. Generally, the global
phase of the US empire involved fewer military
interventions in Latin America than during previ-
ous times, a pattern even more noticeable in the
early twenty-first century, with only one use of
US military force in the region remaining,
Colombia.
However, US domination over Latin America
has been a multifaceted process with military,
economic, technological, financial, cultural, and
intellectual dimensions. Depending on the
moment in history, the USA has employed par-
ticular aspects of its power through a mutually
reinforcing pattern of persuasion and coercion,
generosity and extortion, benevolence and vio-
lence, and justice and paternalism. Although the
USA has been the strongest imperial force in the
451
last century, it is not the only nation that inter-
vened militarily in Latin America during the
postcolonial era. However, military actions on
the part of European countries involved in the
nineteenth century wars were rare in the twenti-
eth century. For instance, in 1982, Argentina and
Great Britain went to war over the Falklands or
Malvinas Islands, and German officers assisted
the Bolivian Army during the Chaco War (http://
www.andrewclem.com/LatinAmerica/LatAmer_
wars.html). Other than these two occasions, there
were no incidents or wars between Latin American
nations and European nations. Although the
influence over Latin America of other core nations
has also been a many-sided process, instances of
uses of military force in the region by these coun-
tries are quantitatively insignificant compared
with instances of US military force in the region.
Yet, the USA has been joined by other nations,
including Europe and Latin America, in some of
their interventions, such as in Haiti. Nevertheless,
especially since the end of the nineteenth century,
the USA remains the most interventionist foreign
power in the region.
During the postcolonial era, armed engage-
ments between Latin American nations have also
occurred, but the region has suffered very few
large-scale conflicts involving only Latin
American nations. In the twentieth century, these
were the Chaco War (1932–1935) between
Bolivia and Paraguay, the Peru-Ecuador War
(1941), and the Soccer War (1969) between El
Salvador and Honduras. These, of course,
involved invasions and incursions into enemy
territory. Revolutionary movements and violent
revolutions in Cuba (1959), Nicaragua (1979), El
Salvador (1979–1992), Guatemala (1960–1996),
Peru (1960–1992), and Colombia (1950s to
present) are also part of the Latin American post-
colonial history (Martin and Wasserman 2005).
To sum up, the long history of foreign inva-
sions, wars, and conflicts in Latin America has
profoundly shaped both the history of the region
and its societies and peoples. This history begs an
important question: What do Latin Americans
think of invasions? That is the question to which
we now turn.
452
Methods
The Latin American Sample
The present study of Latin American views
regarding the potential right to invasion by a for-
eign state included participants from all areas of
the region, including the Caribbean, Central
America, and South America. Responses to the
Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression
and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS) were collected
from residents of Puerto Rico, Costa Rica,
Nicaragua, Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, and
Peru.
Sample sizes ranged from approximately 50
in Argentina to 70 in Costa Rica and Colombia
and reached a high of 288 in Peru. Each sample
included both male and female respondents, with
the dominant percentage of completed question-
naires being received from women across all
countries. The average age of the participants
ranged from the low 20s to the mid-30s for all
participants from Latin America, with the eldest
respondent indicating an age of 78 years and the
youngest, 18 years. The preponderance of ques-
tionnaires was administered to individuals whose
socioeconomic status placed them within the
middle class. The majority of participants
reported Christian or Catholic faith. (See
Table 29.3 for detailed demographic data.)
The Project Measures and Procedures
All participants completed an unabridged paper-
and-pencil version of the PAIRTAPS. These
responses were later entered into a database
designed by the Group on International
Perspectives on Government Aggression and
Peace (GIPGAP) specifically for analysis of the
PAIRTAPS data.
On the PAIRTAPS questionnaire, an initial sec-
tion requests demographic data, such as country of
birth, religious affiliation, socioeconomic status,
and educational level. It also requests information
concerning prior participation in protests, peace
education programs, and experience in the armed
A. Clinton et al.
forces. The survey then focuses on questions
regarding politically sponsored acts of aggression,
human rights, and peace. Among these items, a
specific inquiry is made regarding one’s thoughts
on the right of one country to invade another.
Participants first respond on a 7-point Likert scale
with scores ranging from 1, indicating absolute
disagreement, to 7, indicating absolute agreement.
Each of these items further allows space for quali-
tative explanations of each response so as to allow
a better understanding of the reasoning behind the
quantitative rating scale score.
Responses were analyzed through a coding
manual developed by GIPGAP. The manual is
derived in part from Albert Bandura’s theory of
moral disengagement, which claims that an indi-
vidual, in order to protect his or her self-worth,
will reason that moral standards do not apply in
certain contexts. Major mechanisms of moral dis-
engagement described by Bandura and reflected
in coding categories in our manual include dis-
placement of responsibility, advantageous com-
parison, attribution of blame, and pseudomoral
justification (including pseudoassistance). The
coding manual also builds on Bandura’s theory of
moral engagement, the process that occurs when
individuals adhere to their moral and ethical stan-
dards despite situational influences. Major mech-
anisms of moral engagement, created to be the
inverse of the mechanisms of moral disengage-
ment, include responsibility, appreciating conse-
quences, and principled moral justifications.
Participants also provided qualitative responses
to two scenarios: (1) “Another country is indis-
criminately bombing a major city in your country,
and women and children, the elderly, and civilian
men are running around bloody and screaming.
What would you feel? What would you want to
do?” and (2) “Your country is indiscriminately
bombing a major city in another country, and
women and children, the elderly and civilian men
are running around bloody and screaming. What
would you feel? What would you want to do?”
Participants’ responses were again analyzed
through a coding manual informed in part by
Bandura’s theory of moral disengagement with
codes for personal disengagement and engagement
created by GIPGAP. Personal disengagement
 29
Latin America Invasion

Table 29.3 Demographic characteristics of the sample

Latin Average
American region Sample size age (range) Gender SES Religion
Puerto Rico Caribbean 89 33 (18–61) 36% male; 64% female 3% lower; 97% middle 73% Catholic or Christian; 27% other
Costa Rica Central America 66 35 (18–76) 45% male; 55% female 17 % lower; 53% middle; 30% upper 64% Catholic; 21% unidentified
Nicaragua Central America 137 27 (18–70) 40% male; 60% female 16% lower; 74% middle; 11% upper 61% Christian; 27% other
Argentina South America 50 –(18–54) – 5% lower; 85% middle; 10% high –
Brazil South America 105 26 (19–69) 25% male; 75% female 26% lower; 53% middle; 16% upper 73% Catholic
Colombia South America 70 30 (18–78) 46% male; 54% female – 67% Christian; 18% other
Peru South America 288 22 (17–54) 38% male; 62% female 55% middle; 25% upper 93% Catholic
Note: SES socioeconomic status – indicates the data was unavailable
453
454
responses demonstrated a desire to remove one-
self (physically or mentally) from the scenario or
to respond aggressively to the offending govern-
ment. There were two major types of personal
disengagement: denial of responsibility and anti-
social agency (which in turn included subcatego-
ries for vengeful agency and harming emotions).
Personal engagement responses, or responses in
which participants demonstrated proactive
agency, indicated a desire to stop the bombing in
both scenarios. Personal engagement had two
subcategories: general responsibility and human-
izing agency. For a more detailed description of
Bandura’s theory of moral disengagement and
the invasion coding manual, refer to Chapter 23
in this volume.
Patterns of Response
Justification for a Right to Invasion
Analyses of the responses indicated that 24% of
the total responses from the six countries in the
Latin American sample supported the right of one
state to invade another; inversely, 75% of the
respondents did not support the right to invade.
The 24% of responses supporting a right to
invasion included justifications for invasion, such
as pseudoassistance, self-defense, attribution of
blame, and the possible positive consequences of
invasion. Of the altruistic explanations for invasion
offered by Latin Americans as valid for invading
sovereign territory, pseudoassistance dominated.
This was the most frequent response in support of
invasion, totaling 36% of the invasion-tolerant
responses. Overall, pseudoassistance, framing
invasion as a means to help others, accounted for
9% of all responses related to invasion, making it
the second most frequent response to this item in
the entire sample.
Of course, not all invasions occur for selfless
reasons and even in the best possible circum-
stances, they may be complicated and bloody.
Some Latin Americans indicated more lukewarm
perceptions of invasion. Argentina, for example,
was the only individual country in which helping
others (coded for “pseudoassistance”) did
A. Clinton et al.
not fall within the top three justifications for
invasion.
Appeals to the need for self-defense and pre-
emptive strike totaled 21% of the invasion-tolerant
responses. A specific example came from a
19-year-old man who stated that invasion is
justifiable when “an immediate threat exists.”
The other most common type of proinvasion
response was attribution of blame—that is, indi-
cating that invasion might be needed to retaliate
or defend against a threat from another country.
One 21-year-old man explained that invasion is
necessary if “the other country has taken over
everything” in his detail of this item. Participants
from Peru and Nicaragua were the only ones who
indicated attribution of blame among their top
three invasion-tolerant responses.
Arguments Against the Right to Invasion
In all of the sample countries from Latin
America, a majority of the responses (75%)
opposed the right of one country to invade
another. Within the responses opposing the right
to invasion, many could be incorporated into gen-
eral themes such as “there does not exist a situa-
tion that justifies an invasion…” or straightforward
disagreement such as “never.” The most common
argument against invasion of another country
(44% of the invasion-intolerant responses)
emphasized the need for respect for government
and sovereignty. For example, a 25-year-old man
asserted that “each country should have an inde-
pendent economic, political, and social basis,”
and a 41-year-old woman stated that “each coun-
try has their particular situations.” In all but one
of the countries in the Latin American sample,
responses using respect for government and sov-
ereignty as a reason for not invading character-
ized at least 50% of all war-intolerant responses;
in the Costa Rican sample, none of the responses
fell into this category.
Other types of invasion-intolerant responses
included references to the existence of better
alternatives (8% of all responses), the negative
consequences of invasion (7% of all responses),
and concerns with peace (5% of all responses).
Arguments that there are better alternatives to
invasion often cited diplomacy as one such
29 Latin America Invasion 455

Table 29.4 Arguments supportive of a right to invasion in Latin America

Code % Country Age Sex Response
Pseudoassistance 9 (36) Nicaragua – F Only if the invaded government damages the rights
of its citizens
Colombia 49 – When a town is a victim and abused by one
Brazil 28 F I would absolutely disagree at first, but, supposing
that the country in question is living under a
dictatorship, a genocide, a civil war etc., maybe an
intervention from other countries may be welcome
Argentina 28 M If a country has a progressed democracy, more
popular, possibly revolutionary, innovative, and
trying to replace a dictatorship by cutting the
progress of a neighboring country
Puerto Rico 25 M Only in order to validate human rights
Costa Rica 34 – If it’s necessary and it is to help I agree
Peru 19 – They should not intervene without distress, if in
some country, the state treats their citizens
inhumane, I think that another country could invade
Self-defense/ 5 (21) Nicaragua – F Only if it benefits the security of the country
preemptive strike
Colombia 26 – If the country is a power and there are threats from
other countries, it is good they invade it to prevent
these bands (terrorists) outside of the law
Brazil 20 F Self-defense!
Argentina 23 M Invasions exist for proper defense
Puerto Rico 19 M If an immediate threat exists
Costa Rica 35 – If it is to defend their territory or their citizens it
could be
Peru 45 – Only if it is to defend oneself
Nicaragua – M To defend themselves when attacked
Attribution of blame 4 (15) Brazil 21 F When a country is invaded, it needs to defend
itself. Many times, such a defense cannot be done
only internally
Argentina 33 M Only in the case that a country is correct about
another country violating them and that they are
armed
Peru 21 – Yes, if its security and sovereignty has been
violated
Note: The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total
response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in that category out of all the pro-
invasion responses
F female, M male—indicates the data was unavailable

alternative. For instance, a 24-year-old woman
stated, “we must seek internal cooperation and
dialogue between nations,” and another 37-year-
old woman asserted that “…what is important is
to generate better discussions....” Among the
responses coded in the negative consequences
category are a 24-year-old man’s statement that
“wars of invasion provoke unjustifiable pain and
death” and an 18-year-old woman’s response
that “[Invasion] brings war, deaths, and unneces-
sary destruction.” Responses categorized as indi-
cating a concern with peace and nonviolence
include statements such as a 27-year-old man’s
saying that he “do[es] not support violence in
any of its forms” and a 47-year-old woman’s
response that she “agree[s] with peace.” For fur-
ther examples of anti-invasion responses, see
Table 29.5.
456 A. Clinton et al.

Table 29.5 Arguments against a right to invasion in Latin America

Code % Country Age Sex Response
Government/ 44 (58) Nicaragua – F Because every country is sovereign in regards to
sovereignty its territory
Colombia 27 – They do not have the right, each has a different
culture and each country is independent
Brazil 26 F Invasion of a country by another country is
disrespectful to the principle of sovereignty.
Argentina 37 F Each country should have their sovereignty,
autonomy, and established priorities
Puerto Rico 28 F They are not gods to invade countries far from
them
Costa Rica 48 – We are citizens of the world but we have to respect
the neighbor besides we don’t like their way of
thinking or acting
Peru 21 – No one has to invade another’s territory because it
does not belong to them
Better alternatives/ 8 (11) Nicaragua – F Talking amongst persons
violence as
unnecessary
Colombia 29 – They can offer economic and capacitating support
Brazil 24 M Human beings are given language to communi-
cate, although many times this may be quite
difficult
Argentina 54 F Each country should resolve their problems and
use diplomacy and negotiation to have a relation-
ship with others
Puerto Rico 38 F Dialogue is a better option
Costa Rica 37 – I believe in dialogue and on avoidance measures
but not on invasion
Peru 24 – First we must seek internal cooperation and dialog
between nations
Negative 7 (9) Nicaragua – M No, because this situation destroys culture and too
consequences many people die
Brazil 26 F Growth of a country implies force and unjust
deaths
Argentina 24 M Wars of invasions provoke unjustifiable pain and
death as a function for an economic plan
Puerto Rico 34 F To have a tendency to abuse
Peru – – Just for the ambition of power it is not just that
innocent people lose their lives. Let the ambitious
kill themselves
Note: The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total
response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in that category out of all the pro-
invasion responses
F female, M male
—indicates the data was unavailable

Personal Engagement bombed theirs. This item allows respondents to

Latin Americans who completed the PAIRTAPS
addressed the question of how they would feel and
what they would want to do if their country
bombed another country or another country
consider the degree to which they would expect to
become personally engaged (or, conversely, dis-
engaged) in the case of such a scenario occurring.
Eighty-nine percent of the Latin American
participants provided responses to the two
29 Latin America Invasion 457

Table 29.6 Personal engagement responses from Latin America

Code % Country Age Sex Response
Self-referenced 28 (32) Nicaragua – M Protest so everything stops
agency
Colombia 26 – Protest against who is causing this
Brazil 20 F Protest against the war. Maybe change my nationality
Argentina 26 F Start to protest for their abuse
Puerto Rico 22 F To make campaigns, protest
Costa Rica 19 – Stop the violence with protests
Peru 19 – Protest, civilians don’t have to pay for the errors of bad
governments
Genuine assistance 22 (25) Nicaragua – F Defend kids and help
Colombia 22 – Help the bombed if possible
Brazil 69 M Find a way to help the wounded and minimize their pain
Argentina 37 M Try to help them, salvage the hurt and salvage the
damaged
Puerto Rico 46 F Try and save the people
Costa Rica 22 – Defend them and their families
Peru 21 – Would help everyone I could
Responsibility 13 (14) Nicaragua – M Stop bombing
Colombia 20 – Stop this war and stop screaming
Brazil 22 F Stop the attack in some way
Argentina 37 F Stop the situation
Puerto Rico 34 F Which is in my power to stop it
Costa Rica 36 – Stop the situation
Peru 23 – I would do whatever is possible
Note: The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total
response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in that category out of all the
proinvasion responses
F female, M male
–indicates the data was unavailable

scenario items indicative of a sense of personal
engagement. Each of the countries surveyed in
the Latin American analyses provided person-
ally engaged responses more frequently than
any other type of response. The top six responses
were all personally engaged responses. Twenty-
eight percent of all responses, and 31% of those
specifically expressing personal engagement,
demonstrated the willingness of Latin American
participants to use self-referenced agency, for
instance, protesting against their own govern-
ment’s actions should it bomb another country.
A 23-year-old woman’s response that she would
“organize and live to protest against my govern-
ment and their acts” would fall into this
category.
The desire to genuinely assist others should
their country be under attack or should it attack
another was endorsed by 22% of all responses to
the two bombing scenarios. A good example is a
22-year-old woman’s assertion that “I want to help,
come to those in need,” and a 33-year-old man’s
response that he would “protect as much as I can.”
The third most frequent overall response to
these items was an expression of general respon-
sibility—for example, “stop it,” without specify-
ing how, and “fight them,” or “join the army.”
These responses made up 13% of all responses
and 14% of personally engaged responses.
Further examples of personally engaged responses
can be found in Table 29.6.
Personal Disengagement
Not all individuals feel a personal sense of con-
nection or responsibility in relation to political
decisions such as bombing or invasion. This
458 A. Clinton et al.

Table 29.7 Sample disengagement responses from Latin America

Code % Country Age Sex Response
Denial of responsibility 4 (34) Nicaragua – M Nothing
Brazil 24 M Sleep in tranquility
Argentina 24 M They are not in this country
Puerto Rico 20 M Change of channel
Costa Rica 18 – Nothing
Peru 21 – I would help and protect myself
Vengeful agency 3 (29) Nicaragua – M Destroy leaders
Colombia 30 – Capture the bomber
Brazil 24 M Want to get revenge, even if I don’t do it
Argentina 28 F Kill the invaders/bombers
Puerto Rico 24 M Avenge myself
Costa Rica 24 – Kill those responsible in my country
Peru 18 – Kill the oppressor
Harming emotions 3 (26) Nicaragua – M Kill the government?
Colombia 30 – Angry and pissed off
Brazil 26 F Rage and fury
Argentina 27 F With much anger, indignation, fury
Puerto Rico 24 M Rage, fear
Costa Rica 53 – With hate and desperation
Peru 18 – With rage
Note: The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total
response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in that category out of all the pro-
invasion responses
F female, M male
–indicates the data was unavailable

disconnect has been termed “psychological dis-
engagement” in the literature. In the present
study, only a small portion (11%) of the respon-
dents provided responses to the PAIRTAPS that
could be classified as demonstrative of personal
disengagement. The most common personally
disengaged response, which contributed 4% of
total responses and 35% of all disengaged
responses, was a denial of responsibility and
included a 31-year-old woman’s statement that
she “would escape from this place” and a 22-year-
old woman’s statement that she would “avoid the
problem.”
Of the personally disengaged explanations
against invasion, the second most common (com-
prising 3% of all responses and 29% of person-
ally disengaged responses) consisted of vengeful
agency. A 28-year-old woman’s response that she
would want to “kill invaders/bombers” and a
37-year-old man’s desire to “put my aggressive
countrymen at the mercy of invading citizens”
would be included in this category. Responses
indicating harming emotions were the third most
common personally disengaged response,
accounting for 3% of all responses and 26% of
personally disengaged responses. Table 29.7 pro-
vides additional examples of personally disen-
gaged responses.
Every country had responses that demon-
strated self-referenced agency as one of their top
three responses. Moreover, in all the countries,
the top three most common response categories
included genuine assistance, unspecified per-
sonal engagement, a call for help from the inter-
national community, or helping emotions. No
single personally disengaged category of
responses (e.g., attribution of blame) could
account for more than 10% of responses to the
“What would you want to do?” item in any of the
countries.
29 Latin America Invasion
Exploratory Analyses of Demographic
Differences in Thematic Categories
On an exploratory basis, chi-square tests, t-tests,
and ANOVAs were run to analyze the extent to
which there were significant differences among
demographic groups in the use of particular types
of responses. The demographic variables assessed
were gender, participation in the military, rela-
tives’ participation in the military, involvement in
a protest in favor of peace, participant country,
religion, and social economic status. Only the
results that achieved statistical or marginal
significance are reported. Nonsignificant results
are not reported. All results identified as statisti-
cally significant have a p-value of less than
0.05. All results described as marginally
significant have a p-value of less than 0.1 and
greater than 0.05.
Right to Invasion
In response to the item, “Sometimes one country
has the right to invade another country,” significant
gender differences were found in use of both anti-
and proinvasion responses. Specifically, chi-
square analyses revealed that significantly more
men than women gave general proinvasion
responses and that significantly more women than
men gave at least one anti-invasion response and
at least one responsibility response. In contrast,
significantly more men than women gave general
anti-invasion responses and responses emphasiz-
ing honoring international mandates. All of these
results were supported by t-tests. Although chi-
squares indicated that significantly more women
than men gave responses emphasizing respect for
government and sovereignty, t-tests did not
confirm this difference. t-Tests revealed that
women scored marginally higher than men on the
use of principled moral justification and on
human rights and concern for others.
Chi-square tests also showed marginal differ-
ences in anti-invasion mechanisms contingent
on respondents’ experience in the military.
Participants with experience in the military were
marginally more likely to reference honoring
459
international mandates and freedom in their
responses. t-Tests did not support these results
but indicated that nonmilitary participants scored
significantly higher than military participants on
pseudomoral justification as well as pseudoassis-
tance in arguments for a state right to invasion.
Chi-square analyses revealed differences in
pro- and anti-invasion response patterns contin-
gent on whether or not respondents had relatives
in the military. Specifically, respondents with-
out relatives in the military were marginally
more likely than those with military relatives to
reference self-defense and preemptive strike as
a proinvasion argument. t-Tests did not support
this finding. Chi-square tests also indicated that
participants with relatives in the military were
significantly more likely than their counterparts
to give responses emphasizing the negative con-
sequences of invasion. t-Tests supported this
result.
Only marginal differences were found in the
use of proinvasion arguments contingent on
whether or not respondents had participated in
protests. Chi-square analyses revealed that non-
protesters were marginally more likely than pro-
testers to use self-defense and preemptive strike
as a justification for a right to invasion. t-Tests
supported this finding. Although chi-square anal-
yses indicated that protesters were marginally
more likely than nonprotesters to reference
pseudoassistance in support of a right to inva-
sion, t-tests did not support this finding. Refer to
Table 29.8 for percentages of responses in coding
categories by demographic groups and chi-square
values.
Refer to Table 29.9 for means, standard devia-
tions, and t-test results by demographic group for
coding categories.
Analyses of variance (ANOVAs) followed by
Scheffe tests revealed that cumulative scores for
several proinvasion and anti-invasion arguments
were contingent on nationality. For example,
Scheffe tests indicated that respondents from
Brazil scored significantly higher than respon-
dents from Nicaragua on the use of all proinva-
sion mechanisms and significantly higher than
respondents from Nicaragua and Peru on pseudo-
moral justification. Respondents from Puerto
Rico scored marginally higher than Nicaraguans
460 A. Clinton et al.

Table 29.8 A state’s right to invasion: percentages of responses in coding categories by demographic groups and
chi-square values
Group 1a Group 2a
Categories Male Female c2
General proinvasion 2 0 7.10*,b
Anti-invasion presence 68 77 5.37*
Responsibility presence 42 52 5.03*
General anti-invasion 10 5 4.77*
Honor international mandates 4 1 4.90*
Respect for government/sovereignty 38 50 7.98**
Military Nonmilitary
Honor international mandates 13 2 7.25^,b
Freedom 13 2 7.25^,b
Relative military No relative military
Self-defense/preemptive strike 3 6 2.78^
Negative consequences 10 4 5.81*
Protest No protest
Self-defense/preemptive strike 1 5 3.59^,b
Pseudoassistance 14 8 3.57^
Note: Presence indicates that the participant provided an example that was coded for that category and/or one of its
subcategories. Refer to the “Invasion Methods” chapter for a more detailed description
*
p £ 0.05; **p £ 0.01; ^0.05 < p < 0.10
a
The numbers in these columns are the percent of the group that gave responses falling into each of the specified
categories
b
Fisher’s exact test

Table 29.9 A state’s right to invasion: means, standard deviations, and t-test by demographic groups for coding
categories
Group 1 Group 2
Categories Male Female t df
Respect for government/sovereignty 0.38 (0.49) 0.50 (0.50) 2.86** 437.95
Principled moral justification 0.00 (0.00) 0.01 (0.09) 1.74^ 364.00
Human rights/concern for others 0.00 (0.07) 0.02 (0.15) 1.88^ 555.51
Military Nonmilitary
Pseudomoral justification sum 0.00 (0.00) 0.17 (0.39) 10.19*** 535.00
Pseudoassistance 0.00 (0.00) 0.10 (0.30) 7.66*** 535.00
Note: Sum scores for categories were created by adding all scores for responses in the category and its subcategories
together. Standard deviations appear in parentheses next to means
**
p £ 0.01; ***p £ 0.001; ^0.05 < p < 0.10

on pseudomoral justifications. Respondents from In regard to anti-invasion arguments, ANOVAs

Brazil scored significantly higher than respon-
dents from Nicaragua and Peru and marginally
higher than respondents from Argentina on
pseudoassistance, and participants from Puerto
Rico scored marginally higher than those from
Nicaragua on pseudoassistance.
followed by Scheffe tests revealed that respon-
dents from Peru scored significantly higher than
those from Brazil on anti-invasion, whereas
respondents from Argentina scored marginally
higher than those from Brazil on unspecified
moral engagement.
29 Latin America Invasion
Participants’ Responses to Another
Country Bombing Their Own
In response to the scenario, “Another country is
indiscriminately bombing a major city in your
country, what would you feel/want to do?” group
differences were again found based on gender,
military participation, relatives of the military,
protest participation, country, religion, and social
class. Significantly more men than women gave at
least one example of personal disengagement,
denial of responsibility, and antisocial agency.
Significantly more men than women referenced
harming emotions, denial of responsibility, and
vengeful agency. t-Tests supported all of these
results. Chi-squares revealed that women were
significantly more likely than men to make at least
one personal engagement response and at least
one humanizing agency response and marginally
more likely to reference unspecified personal
engagement. Significantly more women than men
referenced helping emotions. t-Tests supported all
of these results. In addition, t-tests revealed that
women scored marginally higher than men on the
use of responses calling for the international com-
munity for help and significantly higher on proso-
cial agency and genuine assistance.
Chi-square analyses and t-tests revealed
significant differences in the use of personally
engaged and disengaged themes contingent on
whether or not respondents had ever been in the
military. In regard to personally disengaged
responses, chi-square analyses indicated that par-
ticipants with military experience were
significantly more likely than their counterparts
to give at least one example of antisocial agency
and marginally more likely to reference vengeful
agency. t-Tests did not support these findings but
did indicate that nonmilitary respondents scored
significantly higher than military respondents on
two measures of denial of responsibility.
Respondents with military experience scored
significantly higher than nonmilitary participants
on harming emotions, and nonmilitary partici-
pants scored significantly higher on humanizing
agency and genuine assistance.
Chi-square analyses also revealed significant
differences in personally engaged response
461
patterns based on whether or not respondents had
relatives in the military. Specifically, participants
without relatives in the military were significantly
more likely than participants with relatives in the
military to give at least one example of prosocial
agency and to give an example specifically of
self-referenced agency. t-Tests supported both of
these results.
Finally, chi-square tests and t-tests revealed
significant differences in the use of personally
engaged and disengaged themes contingent on
whether or not respondents had ever participated
in protests. Chi-square analyses indicated that
nonprotesters were significantly more likely than
protesters to give at least one example of denial
of responsibility, including general denial of
responsibility. t-Tests supported these results and
also indicated that nonprotesters scored
significantly higher than protesters on scores rep-
resenting reliance on government and military.
t-Tests also revealed that protesters scored
significantly higher than nonprotesters on the use
of harming emotions, whereas nonprotesters
scored significantly higher than protesters on the
use of helping emotions and prosocial agency.
Refer to Table 29.10 for percentages of
responses in coding categories by demographic
groups and chi-square values.
Refer to Table 29.11 for means, standard devi-
ations, and t-test results by demographic group
for coding categories.
Scheffe tests revealed significant differences
in personally disengaged and personally engaged
responses to this item based on the country of the
respondent. Respondents from Peru scored
significantly higher than respondents from
Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, and Puerto Rico
and marginally higher than respondents from
Costa Rica on the use of any of the denial of
responsibility categories. Participants from Brazil
scored significantly higher than those from Peru
and marginally higher than those from Nicaragua
on the use of any of the antisocial agency mecha-
nisms. Respondents from Peru also scored
significantly higher than those from Brazil and
Puerto Rico on the use of general denial of
responsibility. Participants from Brazil scored
marginally higher, and respondents from Puerto
462 A. Clinton et al.

Table 29.10 Responses to another country bombing: percentages of responses in coding categories by demographic
groups and chi-square values
Group 1a Group 2a
Categories Male Female c2
Personal disengagement presence 24 7 26.76***
Denial of responsibility presence 12 4 11.13***
Antisocial agency presence 12 3 13.73***
Harming emotions 86 42 5.54*,b
Denial of responsibility 10 3 8.90**
Vengeful agency 10 2 13.05***
Personal engagement presence 78 93 24.15***
Humanizing agency presence 23 34 6.20**
Helping emotions 0 42 7.22**,b
General personal engagement 22 30 3.68^
Military Nonmilitary
Antisocial agency 24 6 7.55**
Vengeful agency 18 5 4.72^,b
Relative military No relative military
Prosocial agency 10 16 3.86*
Self-referenced agency 7 14 4.85*
Protest No protest
Denial of responsibility 0 9 8.36**
Denial of responsibility 0 7 6.21**,b
Note: Presence indicates that the participant provided at least one example of a response that was coded into that cate-
gory and/or one of its subcategories
*
p £ 0.05; **p £ 0.01; ***p £ 0.001; ^0.05 <p < 0.10
a
The numbers in these columns are the percent of the group that gave responses falling into each of the specified
categories
b
Fisher’s exact test

Table 29.11 Responses to another country bombing: means, standard deviations, and t-test results by demographic
group for coding categories
Group 1 Group 2
Categories Male Female t df
Call for the international community 0.05 (0.21) 0.09 (0.30) 1.79^ 470.49
Prosocial agency 0.00 (0.00) 0.01 (0.12) 2.01* 288.00
Genuine assistance 0.22 (0.41) 0.34 (0.47) 2.86** 435.51
Military Nonmilitary
Denial of responsibility sum 0.00 (0.00) 0.07 (0.26) 5.87*** 444.00
Harming emotions 1.00 (0.00) 0.61 (0.50) −3.76*** 22.00
Denial of responsibility 0.00 (0.00) 0.06 (0.24) 5.25*** 444.00
Humanizing agency sum 0.12 (0.33) 0.30 (0.46) 2.23* 18.43
Genuine assistance 0.06 (0.24) 0.30 (0.46) 3.80*** 20.68
Protest No protest
Harming emotions 1.00 (0.00) 0.56 (.51) −3.42** 15.00
Reliance on government/military 0.00 (0.00) 0.02 (0.14) 2.47** 301.00
Helping emotions 0.00 (0.00) 0.31 (0.48) 2.61* 15.00
Prosocial agency 0.00 (0.00) 0.01 (0.11) 2.01* 301.00
Note: Sum scores for categories were created by adding all scores for responses in the category and its subcategories
together. Standard deviations appear in parentheses next to means
*
p £ 0.05; **p £ 0.01; ***p £ 0.001; ^0.05 < p < 0.10
29 Latin America Invasion
Rico scored significantly higher than respondents
from Peru on the use of any of the personal
engagement mechanisms. Respondents from
Costa Rica, Peru, and Puerto Rico scored
significantly higher, and respondents from
Nicaragua scored marginally higher than those
from Brazil on the use of unspecified personal
engagement. Respondents from Argentina,
Brazil, Colombia, and Puerto Rico all scored
significantly higher than those from Peru on the
use of any of the responsibility categories.
Participants from Brazil, Colombia, and
Nicaragua scored significantly higher than par-
ticipants from Peru on the use of general respon-
sibility. Respondents from Puerto Rico scored
marginally higher than respondents from Peru on
the use of general responsibility.
ANOVAs followed by Scheffe tests revealed
some significant differences in personal disen-
gagement scores contingent on religion.
Respondents identifying their religion as “other”
scored significantly higher than Christians and
respondents identifying their religion as “none,
atheist, and agnostic” on denial of responsibility
categories, as well as on general denial of respon-
sibility. “None, agnostic, and atheist” respon-
dents scored significantly higher than Christians
and other respondents on antisocial agency and
on vengeful agency.
Lastly, the sum scores for some personally
engaged responses differed significantly by social
class. Scheffe tests revealed that respondents in
the upper middle class scored significantly higher
than lower, middle, and working class respon-
dents on prosocial agency and self-referenced
agency.
Participants’ Responses to Their
Country Bombing Another
The last invasion item posed the question, “Your
country is indiscriminately bombing a major city
in another country. What would you feel/want to
do?” Significant differences in personally
engaged and disengaged response patterns were
463
found based on gender, having a relative in the
military, having participated in protests, and on
country, class, and religion. Specifically, in
regard to personally disengaged responses, chi-
square analyses revealed that significantly more
men than women said that they would rely on the
government or military, and significantly more
women than men gave at least one personal
engagement response. t-Tests supported both of
these findings.
Chi-square analyses and t-tests also revealed
significant and marginal differences in person-
ally engaged responses based on whether or not
respondents had relatives in the military. Chi-
square analyses revealed that participants with
relatives in the military were marginally more
likely than their counterparts to give at least one
response coded for responsibility. By contrast,
significantly, more respondents without military
relatives gave an example of self-referenced
agency. t-Tests supported these results and also
indicated that respondents with relatives in the
military scored marginally higher than their
counterparts on personal engagement.
Chi-square tests and t-tests showed significant
differences in types of personal disengagement
responses contingent on whether or not respon-
dents had participated in protests. Chi-squares
revealed that nonprotesters were significantly
more likely than protesters to give responses
indicating denial of responsibility, including gen-
eral denial of responsibility. t-Tests supported
these results and also revealed that nonprotesters
scored marginally higher than protesters on per-
sonal disengagement.
Refer to Table 29.12 for percentages of
responses in coding categories by demographic
groups and chi-square values.
ANOVAs followed by Scheffe tests revealed
significant differences in the use of personal
engagement themes contingent on the participants’
country. For example, participants from Puerto
Rico scored significantly higher than participants
from Costa Rica, and respondents from Peru
scored marginally higher than participants from
Colombia on personal disengagement scores.
464 A. Clinton et al.

Table 29.12 Responses to participants’ country bombing: percentages of responses in coding categories by
demographic groups and chi-square values
Group 1a Group 2a
Categories Male Female c2
Reliance on government/military 2 0 7.26*,b
Personal engagement presence 86 92 4.53*
Relative military No relative military
General responsibility presence 24 16 3.55^
Self-referenced agency 30 43 7.48**
Protest No protest
Denial of responsibility presence 2 8 4.67*
Denial of responsibility 1 8 6.07**
Note: “Presence” at the end of a variable name indicates that the participant provided at least one example of a response
that was coded into that category and/or one of its subcategories
*
p £ 0.05; **p £ 0.01; ^0.05 < p < 0.10
a
The numbers in these columns are the percent of the group that gave responses falling into each of the specified
categories
b
Fisher’s exact test

In regard to the personal engagement coding
categories, respondents from Brazil scored
significantly higher than respondents from Costa
Rica and Nicaragua on personal engagement,
and respondents from Puerto Rico scored
significantly higher than those from Brazil on
unspecified personal engagement. Respondents
from Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica,
and Puerto Rico scored significantly higher than
those from Peru on responsibility scores, includ-
ing general responsibility. Regarding various
forms of agency, respondents from Brazil scored
significantly higher than respondents from
Colombia, Costa Rica, and Nicaragua and mar-
ginally higher than respondents from Argentina
and Puerto Rico on prosocial agency; Peruvians
scored significantly higher than Costa Ricans and
marginally higher than Colombians on prosocial
agency; Brazilians and Peruvians scored
significantly higher than Puerto Ricans on self-
referenced agency; Brazilians scored marginally
higher, and Peruvians scored significantly higher
than Costa Ricans on self-referenced agency, and
participants from Nicaragua scored significantly
higher than participants from Argentina, Brazil,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Peru, and Puerto Rico on
humanizing agency. Finally, Brazilians scored
marginally higher than Peruvians on calls to the
international community.
ANOVAs followed by Scheffe tests also
revealed significant differences in personal
engagement responses based on religion.
Respondents reporting as none, atheist, or agnos-
tic scored significantly higher than Christians on
personal engagement, significantly higher than
members of “other” religions, and marginally
higher than Christians on responsibility.
Participants describing their religion as “other”
scored significantly higher than Christians on
prosocial agency and marginally higher than
Christians on self-referenced agency. None,
agnostic, and atheist respondents scored mar-
ginally higher than “others” on general
responsibility.
Finally, ANOVAs followed by Scheffe tests
revealed significant differences in both personally
engaged and disengaged responses contingent on
social class. Specifically, upper middle class
respondents scored significantly higher than work-
ing and middle class respondents on reliance on
the government or military and marginally higher
than middle class respondents on self-referenced
agency. Working and middle class respondents
both scored marginally higher than the upper mid-
dle class on responsibility. Finally, lower class
respondents scored significantly higher than work-
ing class and marginally higher than middle class
respondents on humanizing agency.
29 Latin America Invasion
Discussion
How do Latin Americans feel about invasion of
their own territory and the sovereign lands of oth-
ers? This question has been explored throughout
this chapter within the context of a lengthy his-
tory of occupation of Latin Americans in all parts
of the region, from the Caribbean and Puerto
Rico to Nicaragua and Costa Rica in Central
America and Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, and
Peru in South America. The politics and peoples
of Latin America have been molded by centuries
of influence from European and, most recently,
United States involvement.
Given extended and repeated experiences with
invasion, one might think that Latin Americans
would have developed a tolerance for this action.
However, results of the current research indicate
that the majority of respondents in the surveyed
countries express intolerance for invasion. It is
possible that their familiarity with the realities of
engaging in battle on one’s own soil or the costs
related to sending a country’s soldiers to fight on
distant territory are too great for the rewards. It
might be, as one can interpret in the present study,
that Latin Americans feel a personal sense of
responsibility toward not just their countrymen
and women but also toward their brothers and sis-
ters in the broader region and the world at large.
465
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 Perspectives on Invasion in South
and Southeast Asia 30
Ma. Regina E. Estuar, Nico A. Canoy, Sherri McCarthy,
Ariel Stone, Tristyn Campbell, Megan Reif,
Emily Mulloy, Ellora Puri, and Jas Jaafar

No one has a right to invade another country. [Laotian participant]

Invasion is ok to protect itself, its interest, and its people. [Pakistani participant]
If [invasion is ok], then any powerful country would invade poor countries.
[Indian participant]
Why do we accept being invaded if it would be the root cause of war?
[Filipino participant]
Sovereign status should not be interfered with. [Sri Lankan participant]
Each country has its own sovereignty which must be respected by others.
[Malaysian participant]

Asia, commonly called the region of the rising
sun, is the world’s largest continent and home to
half of the word’s population (Zaide and Zaide
2006). Much of its history speaks of early civili-
zation prior to Western invasion and coloniza-
tion. For one, Asia is often considered a cradle of
mankind because of the discovery of the Homo
erectus fossil remains in Indonesia. Islam,
Buddhism, Hinduism, and Christianity are among
the many religions with Asian lineage spread
across neighboring regions. Various forms of art
and culture were also present prior to Western
invasion, providing evidence of thriving nations
with unique traditions, culture, language, and
forms of government. However, Western
historical accounts often define the starting point
of civilization in Asia as occurring after Western
colonization because they emphasize Western
contributions to the modernity of the colonized
regions. These contributions included the estab-
lishment of accepted forms of trading, govern-
ment, and educational systems. Nonetheless,
experts note that the while the West was still in
the dark ages, the East was bursting with culture
and material prosperity (Mason 2005; Zaide and
Zaide 2006).
Europe’s domination of Asia from the six-
teenth century until the early twentieth century
marks the onset of invasion, colonization, strug-
gle for independence, and rise of nationalism of
most Asian nations (Zaide and Zaide 2006). The
desire for territorial expansion and the opportu-
nity to enter the spice trade led other European
nations to view the East as a place of great poten-
tial for spreading culture, education, and religion.
In the early 1500s, Portugal instituted voyages to
India (1498) and other nearby regions such as Sri
Lanka (1505) and Malaysia (1511) to establish
trade between Asia and Europe. Spain’s voyages
to Asia for God, gold, and glory began in the
Philippines in 1521 and continued until 1898. In
1602, the Dutch East India Company was estab-
lished in East India and soon began to monopo-
lize Asian trading (Zaide and Zaide 2006). French
and British trading posts held sway in countries
that included India (1503), Pakistan (eighteenth
century to 1947), Sri Lanka (1656, 1796–1947),
Indonesia (1602–1798), Malaysia (1641, 1786),

K. Malley-Morrison et al. (eds.), International Handbook of War, Torture, and Terrorism, 467
Peace Psychology Book Series, DOI 10.1007/978-1-4614-1638-8_30,
© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2013
468
and Laos (nineteenth century to 1949). The
Philippines, on the other hand, was an American
colony between 1896 and 1940, followed by
Japanese control from 1941 to 1945.
The goals of invasion and eventually coloni-
zation included both expansion and defining
boundaries (Mason 2005), which sent traders,
missionaries, and colonizers to set foot on Asian
soil. The primary reason for expansion was the
need to monopolize the spice trade, which was
mostly found in the Eastern regions. When trad-
ing expanded, a need arose for a market for
Western products. Part of expansion also included
the introduction and spread of religion, disguised
as a civilizing agent to noncivilized regions.
Other contributions included new forms of gov-
ernment, new forms of education, new modes of
transportation, and provision for public health
and sanitation. Meanwhile, Western powers were
exploiting their influence over the Asians by
“looting their wealth, [and] imposing rule and
civilization” (Zaide and Zaide 2006). As a conse-
quence, Asian colonies provided Western powers
with much-needed raw materials and, at the same
time, a profitable market for their products. The
expansion of territories also brought more power
and prestige to Europe and other Western nations,
thereby giving them full rights to meddle in local
affairs. This exposure to social and political doc-
trines awakened a sense of nationalism within the
Asian nations.
Nationalism and Independence
of Asian Nations
European colonizers maintained considerable
control over much of the East until the successful
rise of nationalism in Asia (Zaide and Zaide
2006). There were numerous efforts to eject
Western powers, such as the Sepoy Mutiny of
1857 in India; Independence Riots of 1915 in Sri
Lanka; the Java War (1825–1830), the Aceh
War (1873–1908), and the 1908 Bali Revolt in
Indonesia; and a total of 100 revolts against
Spanish rule from 1574 to 1872 in the Philippines.
Stephen Senanayake led the struggle for freedom
M.R.E. Estuar et al.
and independence, giving rise to Sri Lankan inde-
pendence in 1948. Mohammed Ali Jinnah became
the father of Pakistan independence as he led the
cause for making Pakistan an independent
Muslim state, eventually resulting in the Islamic
Republic in 1956. The Japanese occupation and
its surrender post-World War II also led to the
eventual independence of Indonesia under the
leadership of Achmed Sukarno in 1945, the fed-
eration of Malaysia in 1948, and the indepen-
dence of Laos under the monarchy of King
Sisavang Vong in 1949 (Mason 2005).
The struggle for independence has led to civil
wars over issues of territory, religion, class, race,
and politics (Zaide and Zaide 2006) since the col-
lapse of Japan in 1945 (Isaacs 1967; Leano et al.
2007; Mason 2005; Zaide and Zaide 2006).
Amidst bloody revolts against colonial power, the
battle for freedom among the Asian nations also
gave rise to nonviolent resistance to colonial
powers, dictatorship, and corruption. In the early
nineteenth century, Filipino intellectuals like
Fathers Gomez, Burgos, and Zamora crusaded
for reforms against the Spanish rule (Zaide and
Zaide 2006). In 1896, Dr. Jose P. Rizal was exe-
cuted for stirring nationalism among Filipinos
through his writings. Indian nationalism was
brought about by hatred of British colonial bond-
age. In 1920, Mohandas K. Gandhi was at the
forefront of civil disobedience.
At present, South and Southeast Asian coun-
tries are the products of centuries of Western
exploitation blended with Eastern tradition.
Nations in Asia continue to struggle with territo-
rial disputes, civil wars, poverty, environmental
problems, overpopulation, terrorism, and the
struggle for democracy over dictatorship (Zaide
and Zaide 2006).
South and Southeast Asian Sample
Asia is geographically divided into five subre-
gions: North Asia, South Asia, West Asia, East
Asia, and Southeast Asia. Two of these subre-
gions (South Asia and Southeast Asia) were the
source of participants who completed a survey in
30 S, SE Asia Invasion
which they shared their perceptions on a state
right to invasion. This sample includes partici-
pants from a total of seven countries: India,
Pakistan, and Sri Lanka representing South Asia
and Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, and the Philippines
representing Southeast Asia.
In total, there were 751 participants, 45%
women and 51% men. The Indian sample con-
tributed 241 participants. A total of 150 came
from Malaysia, 26 from Indonesia, 55 from
Pakistan, 263 from the Philippines, 10 from Sri
Lanka, and 21 from Laos.
The average age of the participants was 29
and ranged from 18 to 75 years old. The three
most prevalent religions were Christianity
(39%), Hinduism (19%), and Islam (12%). In
terms of socioeconomic status, 18% were mem-
bers of the lower/working class, 71% belonged
to the middle class, and 4% were upper class.
The majority (96%) of the participants had never
been in the military; however, 21% reported
having a relative in the military, and 15%
reported that they had participated in some form
of antiwar protest.
Emerging Constructs on Perceptions
on Invasion
Self-regulatory mechanisms govern a person’s
exercise of moral agency (Bandura 2002). A per-
son’s capacity to do what is humane and to refrain
from acting inhumanely hinges on a set of
selective mechanisms for moral decision making.
Bandura’s theory of moral disengagement pres-
ents ways that people distance themselves from
standards of morality (Bandura 1999). People
disengage from morality by restructuring repre-
hensible acts, distorting consequences, and
downplaying the role of the victim. Moral
justification is one form of disengagement that
legitimizes the immoral act by finding a moral
reason for the act. This set of mechanisms anchors
on restructuring the perception of reprehensible
moral conduct through various means. A com-
mon example would be reframing killing in the
military as an act of protecting one’s country to
469
pursue peace. The use of language or euphemis-
tic labeling can also shape patterns of thought
that guide one’s actions. For instance, victims of
war are labeled as part of collateral damage.
Another form of moral justification using utilitar-
ian reasons is through advantageous compari-
sons. Violence is used as a form of preemptive
strike on the grounds of escalating projection of
events. Moral control can also operate by provi-
sion of displacing or diffusing the responsibility
to another or an authority figure. Displacement of
responsibility generally happens when soldiers
rationalize their actions by pointing to their supe-
rior as accountable for killings, whereas diffusion
of responsibility entails diminishing personal
agency in replace of collective decision making.
Another set of mechanisms involves disre-
garding or distorting consequences of one’s
actions. By doing so, it is easier to harm others
when they are far from or not visible to the actor.
Lastly, dehumanization of the victim is a com-
mon disengagement strategy to degrade the status
and worth of the person to justify one’s experience.
Although these are ways that people disengage
from morality, Bandura asserts that there are peo-
ple who are more conscious of their agency and
lean toward moral engagement rather than disen-
gagement and that both cognition and affect
influence one’s preference toward humane versus
inhumane acts (Bandura 2002).
Bandura’s theory of moral disengagement,
combined with a grounded theory analysis
(Strauss and Corbin 1998), guided the
development of a manual for coding qualitative
responses to an item concerning the right to inva-
sion and right of one nation to invade another.
Survey
All participants were asked to respond to the
Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression
and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS; Malley-Morrison
et al. 2006), which included questions regarding
support for a nation’s right to invade another
nation and how participants felt they would
respond to two hypothetical bombing scenarios.
470
The items are the following: (1) “Sometimes one
country has the right to invade another country”;
(2) “Another country is indiscriminately bomb-
ing a major city in your country. What would you
feel? What would you want to do?”; and (3)
“Your country is bombing a major city in another
country. What would you feel? What would you
want to do?”
A State’s Right to Invasion
For the first question, the participants were asked
to gauge their level of agreement with the state-
ment “Sometimes one country has the right to
invade another country.” Each response was
divided into codable units; for example, a
response such as “Invasion is never OK because
it violates sovereign boundaries and violates
principles like the Golden Rule” has two codable
units—one regarding the need to respect govern-
mental sovereignty and one constituting an appeal
to moral principles, such as equality. Using the
manual developed with an international coding
sample, each codable unit was first placed into
one of two main categories: pro-invasion (inva-
sion tolerant) and anti-invasion (invasion intoler-
ant). Invasion-tolerant responses fell primarily
into four main subcategories: (1) displacement of
responsibility (justifying invasion by placing the
responsibility to invade onto the government or
the international community), (2) advantageous
comparisons/positive consequences, (3) attribu-
tion of blame, and (4) pseudo-moral justifications
(portraying invasion as a form of self-defense, or
pseudo-assistance). The anti-invasion category
included subcategories for reciprocal forms of:
(1) responsibility (emphasis on respecting the
government or sovereignty or honoring interna-
tional mandates), (2) appreciation of conse-
quences (arguments focused on the negative
consequences of war and better alternatives), and
(3) principled moral justifications (appeals to the
concern for peace or nonviolence and human
rights or concern for others). A fuller discussion
of the coding categories and procedures for vari-
able formation can be found in the introductory
M.R.E. Estuar et al.
chapter for this section. Examples of responses
falling into each of the coding categories can also
be found in the tables illustrating our results.
Responses to a State’s Right to Invade
When questioned about the right of countries to
invade another country, 23% of the codable units
(hereafter called “responses”) endorsed a state’s
right to invasion, whereas 77% of the responses
rejected such a right. Among the reasons given in
opposition to a state’s right to invade, 44% of the
responses cited the respect for government and
sovereignty, arguing, for example, that each
country’s borders existed so that other countries
could not interfere with their neighbor’s activities
or independence. A 40-year-old Indian man
argued, for example, “Each country has its own
set of rules, which maintains the even tempo of
life in that country. No country has the right to
invade another country and destroy their individ-
ual identity.” In addition to emphasizing the
importance of borders enclosing the property of
each country, this respondent also mentioned an
intangible property (identity) of countries as
important.
The second most common argument against a
state’s right to invasion (16% of the anti-invasion
responses) argued that invasion is unacceptable
because of its negative consequences. Reflective
of accepting consequences, these responses indi-
cated that the outcomes of invasions are often too
detrimental to justify the means. For example, a
24-year-old female student from Indonesia
argued, “Countries should not be invaded as it
will only lead to more undesired bloodshed.”
Another form of negative consequence found in
the responses emphasized that invasion has last-
ing repercussions that interfere with the achieve-
ment of peace. As one 23-year-old graduate
student from Pakistan said, “It’s hard to find solu-
tions to problems or bring peace by invading
another country because of the anger and resent-
ment that will be harbored by the citizens.”
Additional supporting quotes for each of these
subcategories can be found in Table 30.1, along
30 S, SE Asia Invasion 471

Table 30.1 Examples of arguments against a state’s right to invasion

Category % Country Age Sex Response
Respect for 34 (44) India 40 Male “Each country has its own set of rules, which
government/ maintains the even tempo of life in that country. No
sovereignty country has the right to invade another country and
destroy their individual identity”
Sri Lanka 49 Male “Countries have been formed by International
covenants and their sovereign status should not be
interfered with”
Malaysia 20 Female “Each country has its own sovereignty/laws which
must be respected by other countries”
Pakistan 30 Female “If the first country is strong enough to invade the
second country, then an invasion actually becomes an
abuse of power, in my opinion”
Laos – Unknown “No one has that right”
Philippines 26 Male “I beg to disagree! We don’t have the right to do so.
In fact, let just have more concern to our country. Our
country needs us. So lets help and support one another”
Negative 12 (16) India 45 Male “If it’s so than any powerful country would invade a
consequences poor country”
Indonesia 24 Female “Countries should not be invaded as it will only lead
to more undesired bloodshed”
Malaysia 23 Female “It invites disaster and disturbance to the citizens”
Pakistan 23 Unknown “It’s hard to find solutions to problems or bring peace
by invading another country because of the anger and
resentment that will be harbored by the citizens”
Philippines 18 Female “Why do we accept being invaded if it would be the
root cause of war?”
Note: The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total
response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of the responses out of all the anti-invasion
responses
F female, M male

with the home country, age, and gender of the
participant providing that quote.
Among the responses providing arguments in
favor of a state right to invasion, 13% provided
pseudo-moral justifications to portray invasion as
a moral act. For example, a 23-year-old Malaysian
man with military experience said that invasion
can “save the country from itself.” More
specifically, many participants saw invasion as a
means of pseudo-assistance by helping those
who must live under oppression. One Laotian
participant said that invasion is justified “in cases
where communism is taking control of the greater
population and the invasion is to help the greater
population.” These responses also included
appeals to a higher moral code that conceptualized
invasion as a means to protect humanity. These
participants claimed that if invasion could be
used to prevent or stop attacks among the invaded
country’s people, it was just. These participants
viewed invasion as justifiable if undertaken with
the goal of helping one’s own people or other
people—using arguments with strong echoes of
Bandura’s mechanisms of moral disengagement.
Among the responses indicating some support
for a country’s right to invade, a substantial por-
tion (26% of pro-invasion responses) indicated
that invasion was acceptable as a means of self-
defense or preemptive strike. A 25-year-old
Pakistani man with a college degree described
invasion as a means of defending one’s home-
land, stating that a country has a right “[t]o protect
472 M.R.E. Estuar et al.

Table 30.2 Arguments in support of a state’s right to invasion

Category % Country Age Sex Response
Pseudo- 7 (31) India 52 Female “To protect the law abiding citizens from torturous
assistance dictatorship”
Philippines 43 Female “If the purpose is to help the country progress or reach its
potential”
Malaysia 23 Male “Can save the country from itself”
Pakistan 26 Male “On grounds of ‘true’ humanitarianism, if the people of the
country clearly request intervention, or if there is a clear,
proven and imminent threat to the belligerent country”
Laos – Unknown “In cases where communism is taking control of the greater
population and the invasion is to help the greater
population”
Indonesia 20 Male “If invasions are meant to help the other countries then their
invasions might be reasonable. But most countries should
allow each country to deal with their domestic troubles
while they’re still able to do so”
Self-defense/ 6 (26) India 25 Male “When the country is threatened by other country or arising
preemptive security problem from that country”
strike Sri Lanka 59 Male “As pre-emptive action and/or towards liberation”
Malaysia 20 Female “Each country has the right to protect itself”
Philippines 60 Female “This [invasion] is needed if your own country is endan-
gered of being invaded also”
Pakistan 25 Male “To protect itself, its interests, and its people”
Laos – Unknown “Country may be a threat, showing signs of major violence
such as persecution”
Note: The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total
response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of the responses out of all the pro-invasion
responses
F female, M male

itself, its interests, and its people.” Additionally,
other respondents chose to accept invasion not
directly as self-defense, but as a means of pre-
venting a future attack on their country. A 60-year-
old middle-class Filipino woman argued, “This
[invasion] is needed if your own country is in
danger of being invaded also.” Additional sup-
porting quotes for these subcategories can be
found in Table 30.2, along with the home coun-
try, age, and gender of participants providing
responses that supported one nation’s right to
invade another.
Emotional and Motivational Responses
to Both Bombing Items
Participants also responded to open-ended ques-
tions regarding two hypothetical situations in
which: (1) the participant’s country was bombed
and (2) the participant’s country bombed another
country. For the purposes of this chapter, the two
items have been combined. For each situation,
participants described in their own words how
they would feel in such a situation and what they
would do. Each codable unit was broadly catego-
rized as either personal disengagement, indicat-
ing a lack of personal involvement regarding the
situation (e.g., “I would do nothing”), or per-
sonal engagement, indicating the presence of
personal involvement (e.g., “I would try to help
people”). Both categories were then divided into
more specific subcategories. For personal disen-
gagement, the subcategories were (1) denial of
responsibility (by generally refusing to take any
action against the bombings or relying on the
government/military in the situation) and (2)
antisocial agency (through vengeful agency, or a
desire to punish the offenders, or harming
30 S, SE Asia Invasion
emotions, such as anger). For personal engage-
ment, the subcategories were assumption of (1)
general responsibility (generally wanting to end
the bombings or calling for the international
community), (2) prosocial agency (through self-
referenced agency of standing up to one’s gov-
ernment or helping emotions, such as shame or
guilt), and (3) humanizing agency (a commit-
ment to assist people affected by the bombing
situation).
In regard to the emotions and predicted actions
resulting from hypothetical indiscriminate bomb-
ing, 83% of all responses contained themes of
personal engagement, whereas 17% of all
responses contained themes of personal disen-
gagement. Of the personally engaged responses,
the most common response (22% of personally
engaged responses) indicated an acceptance of
general responsibility to end the bombings. There
were two main types of responses coded for this
category. The first type included responses indi-
cating a willingness to take part in the battle but
without expressing feelings of hatred. For exam-
ple, a 22-year-old Pakistani male student said that
if his country were being bombed, he would
“want to join the citizens’ army and fight the
invading forces.” The second kind of response
indicated a willingness to be proactive in a
broader way. For example, when questioned
about her potential actions, a 45-year-old woman
from Sri Lanka wrote that she would “call for an
immediate stop. Create awareness that this must
not happen again.”
The second most common theme found in per-
sonally engaged responses (21% of the person-
ally engaged responses) was characterized by a
willingness to engage in a specific peaceful
action, or self-referenced agency, toward the
conflict’s resolution. An important element of
these responses was the participants’ willingness
to stand up to their government, despite the per-
sonal cost. The most common responses included
promises to take part in a protest or to write let-
ters to the government. Other responses were
more original, such as one from a 31-year-old
Filipino woman with a master’s degree, who
wrote that she would “plead with government
473
officials to stop the bombing. Organize a prayer
rally for peace.” Additional supporting quotes
from participants can be found in Table 30.3,
along with home country, age and gender.
In contrast, 16% of participants’ responses to
the hypothetical bombing scenarios were coded
for personal disengagement. Among the responses
characterized by themes of personal disengage-
ment, 41% showed predictions of participant
actions directed toward vengeful agency. In this
category, respondents demonstrated an “eye for
an eye” form of reasoning, which can be seen in
a quote from a 33-year-old woman from Pakistan
who claimed that if her country was being
bombed, she would “[d]o the same to the aggres-
sor.” Many of these personal disengagement
responses recommended retaliation toward the
offending country’s government or its entire pop-
ulation. One 20-year-old male student from
Malaysia said that if given the power, he would
“command all the territories to be punished. More
importantly, punishment should be given to the
leaders.”
Finally, 36% of the personally disengaged
responses included harming emotions, or decla-
rations of hatred toward the offending country.
For example, a 38-year-old Indian man said that
if his country was bombed, he would feel “hatred
against the threatening country.” Though not as
common, some responses also included strong
threats of violence either toward a whole country
or a specific population of the country. Additional
supporting quotes from participants can be found
in Table 30.4, along with their home country, age
and gender.
Analyses of Demographic Correlates
of Thematic Categories
A set of exploratory chi-squares, t-tests, and
ANOVAs were performed to analyze the extent
to which demographic variables contributed to
the use of invasion-tolerant and invasion-intoler-
ant and personal disengagement and engagement
themes in the qualitative responses given to the
invasion items. In particular, chi-square analyses
474 M.R.E. Estuar et al.

Table 30.3 Examples of personally engaged responses to an indiscriminate bombing scenario

Category % Country Age Sex Response
General 18 (22) Pakistan 22 Male “Want to join the citizens’ army and fight the
responsibility invading forces”
Sri Lanka 45 Female “Call for an immediate stop. Create awareness that
this must not happen again”
India 47 Male “Put an end to the bombing”
Indonesia 20 Female “Prepare my army to defend my country”
Malaysia 20 Female “Request the government to stop it”
Philippines 31 Female “To stop the war and take pity, help the peace process”
Self-referenced 17 (20) Philippines 31 Female “Plea government officials to stop the bombing.
agency Organize a prayer rally for peace”
India 20 Female “March a protest, try and explain to the government
the futility of it by organizing like-minded people
doing something about it”
Indonesia 37 Male “Make domestic campaign for stopping the violence”
Malaysia 20 Female “Present a complaint to the government to stop the
bloodshed”
Pakistan 22 Male “Demonstrate against criminal behavior of my own
country, act to enact regime change at home”
Sri Lanka 59 Male “Overthrow my government by civil non-cooperation,
especially financial”
Note: The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total
response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of the responses out of all the personally engaged
responses
F female, M male

Table 30.4 Examples of personally disengaged responses

Category % Country Age Sex Response
Vengeful agency 7 (41) India 23 Female “We also take revenge as everything is fair in war”
Philippines 37 Male “I want to take part in any way possible to do the
same thing to them”
Malaysia 20 Male “Command all the territories to be punished. More
importantly, punishment should be given to the
leaders”
Pakistan 33 Female “Do the same to the aggressor”
Sri Lanka 59 Male “Support my country’s efforts to neutralize the
enemy’s ability to do so”
Indonesia 22 Male “I’ll kill everyone involved in that situation with my
own hand”
Harming emotions 6 (36) India 38 Male “Hatred against the threatening country”
Philippines 29 Male “Celebrate the bombing date”
Malaysia 27 Male “Hating quietly”
Pakistan 62 Female “Enraged”
Note: The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total
response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of the responses out of all the personally disen-
gaged responses
F female, M male
30 S, SE Asia Invasion
were performed to determine whether the likeli-
hood of giving particular thematic responses
varied as a function of: (1) gender, (2) participa-
tion in the military, (3) relatives’ participation in
the military, and (4) involvement in an antiwar
protest; t-tests were performed to confirm and
extend those chi-square analyses with cumula-
tive scores for the different thematic categories.
In addition, ANOVAs were performed to deter-
mine the extent to which thematic scores varied
as a function of: (1) respondents’ country, (2)
religion, and (3) socioeconomic status. Only the
results that achieved statistical or marginal
significance are reported. Nonsignificant results
are not reported. All significant results have a
p-value less than 0.05. All marginally significant
results have a p-value of less than 0.1 and greater
than 0.05.
A State’s Right to Invasion
Arguments Supportive of a State’s Right
to Invasion
In regard to pro-invasion arguments, group dif-
ferences were found based on whether or not the
respondent had ever participated in a peace or
antiwar protest.
Both chi-squares and t-tests failed to reveal
any marginally or statistically significant differ-
ences in the use of the invasion-tolerant argu-
ments on the basis of gender, military service,
and relative’s military service.
Respondents who had been involved in a pro-
test against war and in favor of peace gave
significantly more responses than respondents
who had never engaged in this form of protest
stating that a country had the right to invade
another country if it was done as a form of self-
defense or preemptive strike. t-Tests found that
nonprotesters scored significantly higher on dis-
placement of responsibility sum scores than their
counterparts.
For percentages of pro-invasion responses in
coding categories by demographic groups and chi-
square values, see Table 30.5. For means, standard
deviations, and t-test results of pro-invasion
475
responses by demographic group for coding cate-
gories, see Table 30.6.
In further exploratory analyses of the possible
contribution of demographic variables to particu-
lar categories of responses, we conducted several
ANOVAs. One-way ANOVAs revealed multiple
differences in the use of pro-invasion themes
contingent upon country: (1) government respon-
sibility to invade, (2) attribution of blame sum
scores, (3) general attribution of blame, (4) self-
defense and preemptive strike, and (5) pro-inva-
sion sum scores when giving responses that
supported a state right to invasion. Scheffe post
hoc multiple comparisons revealed that respon-
dents from Pakistan scored significantly higher
on pro-invasion sum scores than respondents
from Malaysia, significantly higher on attribu-
tion of blame sum scores and general attribution
of blame than respondents from all of the other
countries, and significantly higher than respon-
dents from Malaysia and the Philippines on the
use of self-defense and preemptive strike.
Additionally, post hoc tests revealed that respon-
dents from Laos scored significantly higher than
participants from India, Indonesia, Malaysia,
Pakistan, and the Philippines and marginally
higher than respondents from Sri Lanka on the
use of government arguments.
Additional one-way ANOVAs revealed
significant differences as a function of religious
affiliation in the types of arguments used in
defense of a state right to invasion. Specifically,
differences were found in attribution of blame
sum scores as well as general attribution of blame,
and deferral to the international community and
UN. Scheffe post hoc multiple comparisons
revealed that agnostic, atheist, and “none” respon-
dents scored marginally higher on displacement
of responsibility sum scores than Hindus and
scored significantly higher on the use of deferral
of responsibility to the international community
than Christians, Muslims, and Hindus. Finally,
Muslim respondents scored significantly higher
on attribution of blame sum scores and general
attribution of blame than Christians and Hindus.
ANOVAs also revealed significant differences
in arguments supportive of a state right to invade
476 M.R.E. Estuar et al.

Table 30.5 Government’s right to invasion: percentages of responses in coding categories by demographic groups and
chi-square values
Group 1a Group 2a
Categories Male Female c2
Responsibility presence 33 42 4.49*
General anti-invasion 10 6 3.85*
Respect for government/sovereignty 30 39 5.09*
Military Nonmilitary
Freedom 14 3 7.95*,b
Relative military No relative military
Anti-invasion presence 65 75 4.29*
Protest No protest
Self-defense/preemptive strike 10 4 4.43*,b
Principled moral justification presence 30 13 14.86***
Human rights/concern for others presence 21 9 10.51***
Human rights/concern for others 14 4 13.18***,b
Note: Presence indicates that the participant provided a response that was coded for that category and/or one of its sub-
categories. Refer to the survey method section for a more detailed description
*
p £ 0.05; **p £ 0.01; ***p £ 0.001; ^0.05 < p < 0.10
a
The numbers in these columns are the percent of the group that gave responses falling into each of the specified
categories
b
Fisher’s exact test

Table 30.6 A government’s right to invasion: means, standard deviations, and t-test results by demographic group for
coding categories
Group 1 Group 2
Categories Military Nonmilitary t df
Honor international mandates 0.00 (0.00) 0.04 (0.20) 4.56*** 480.00
Human rights/concern for others 0.00 (0.00) 0.06 (0.24) 5.55*** 480.00
Protest No protest
Displacement of responsibility sum 0.00 (0.00) 0.02 (0.14) 2.86** 375.00
Anti-invasion sum 0.98 (0.70) 0.80 (0.57) −2.42* 458
Note: Sums of categories were created by adding the category and its subcategories together. Refer to the “Invasion
Methods” chapter for a more detailed description. Standard deviations appear in parentheses next to means
*
p £ 0.05; **p £ 0.01; ***p £ 0.001; ^0.05 < p < 0.1

as a function of social class. ANOVAs indicated respondents. Working-class respondents scored

significant class differences in the use of general
pro-invasion, displacement of responsibility, and
attribution of blame. Scheffe post hoc multiple
comparisons revealed that responses from lower-
class respondents scored significantly higher on
the use of general pro-invasion themes than
working-, middle-, and upper middle-class
significantly higher on the use of displacement of
responsibility than did middle- and upper middle-
class respondents. While ANOVAs indicated
significant differences between classes in the use
of attribution of blame, post hocs did not reveal
significant differences between specific classes in
the use of this coding category.
30 S, SE Asia Invasion
Arguments Opposed to a State Right
to Invasion
In regard to arguments opposing a state right to
invasion, significant group differences were
found based on gender, participation in the mili-
tary, relatives’ participation in the military, and
involvement in an antiwar protest.
For gender, chi-square tests revealed that
significantly more women than men provided
responses that were coded for at least one of the
responsibility categories as well as respect for
government/sovereignty. Conversely, significantly
more men than women demonstrated a general
invasion-intolerant stance in their responses.
t-Tests supported all of these results.
Chi-square tests also revealed that veterans
gave significantly more responses than respon-
dents who had never served in the military refer-
ring to freedom as the reason to oppose a state
right to invasion. Although t-tests did not support
that result, they did reveal that respondents who
had never participated in the military scored
significantly higher on the use of honoring inter-
national mandates and the importance of human
rights or concern for others than respondents
who had participated in the military.
Chi-square analyses revealed that respondents
who did not have relatives in the military gave
significantly more responses than respondents
with relatives in the military citing at least one of
the anti-invasion categories.
Finally, chi-square analyses revealed that pro-
testers gave significantly more responses than
nonprotesters using reasoning consistent with at
least one of the principled moral justification and
at least one of the human rights/concern for oth-
ers themes, as well as generally mentioning
human rights when denying states a right to
invade. t-Tests confirmed these findings and
found that protesters scored significantly higher
than nonprotesters on anti-invasion sum scores to
oppose a state right to invasion.
For percentages of anti-invasion responses in
coding categories by demographic groups and
chi-square values, see Table 30.5. For means,
standard deviations, and t-test results of anti-
invasion responses by demographic group for
coding categories, see Table 30.6.
477
One-way ANOVAs revealed significant
national differences in the frequency scores of
responses emphasizing anti-invasion themes.
Specifically, ANOVAs revealed significant dif-
ferences in responsibility sum scores, human
rights and concern for others sum scores, and
respect for government and sovereignty. Scheffe
post hoc multiple comparisons revealed that
Malaysians scored significantly higher on the
use of respect for the government and sover-
eignty and on responsibility sum scores than did
respondents from the Philippines. Post hoc anal-
yses did not reveal any significant differences
among the countries in responses focusing on the
importance of human rights and concern for oth-
ers in arguments opposing a state’s right to
invasion.
One-way ANOVAs also revealed significant
differences in the use of anti-invasion themes
contingent on the religion of the respondent.
In the analysis of respondents’ religious faith and
anti-invasion arguments, ANOVAs revealed
differences among respondents’ religion in
emphasizing appreciating consequences, better
alternatives and violence as unnecessary, and
freedom as the reasons to oppose a state’s right to
invasion. Scheffe post hoc multiple comparisons
revealed that for freedom, agnostic, atheist, and
nonspecified respondents scored significantly
higher than Muslim and Hindu respondents and
marginally higher than Christian respondents on
the use of this mechanism. Agnostics, atheists,
and those who responded “none” in religion
respondents were marginally more likely than
Christian, Muslim, and Hindu respondents to
score significantly higher on the use of appreciat-
ing consequences in their responses. Although
ANOVAs indicated significant differences in the
use of better alternatives and violence as unnec-
essary contingent on religion, post hocs did not
reveal any specific differences between religious
groups on the use of this mechanism.
Finally, in the analysis of respondents’ socio-
economic status and anti-invasion arguments, a
one-way ANOVAs revealed significant differ-
ences among respondents’ socioeconomic sta-
tuses in appreciating consequences sum scores,
negative consequences, and equality in opposition
478 M.R.E. Estuar et al.

Table 30.7 Another country bombing your own: percentages of responses in coding categories by demographic groups
and chi-square values
Group 1a Group 2b
Male Female
Categories Military Nonmilitary c2
Personal disengagement presence 20 15 2.77^
Vengeful agency 13 9 3.12^
General responsibility presence 30 23 6.62^
Unspecified personal engagement 11 17 5.46*
Prosocial agency presence 23 12 3.64^,b
Self-referenced agency 24 8 8.13**,b
Genuine assistance 14 30 3.32^
Relative military No relative military
Vengeful agency 15 9 3.70^
Prosocial agency presence 8 13 3.55^
Protest No protest
Personal engagement presence 80 69 4.85*
General responsibility presence 35 23 5.52*
Prosocial agency presence 24 10 15.25***
Helping emotions 2 0 5.23^,b
General responsibility 23 16 2.80^
Self-referenced agency 21 7 16.59***
Note: Presence indicates that the participant provided a response that was coded for that category and/or one of its
subcategories. Refer to the “Invasion Methods” chapter for a more detailed description
*
p £ 0.05; **p £ 0.01; ***p £ 0.001; ^0.05 < p < 0.10
a
The numbers in these columns are the percent of the group that gave responses falling into each of the specified
categories
b
Fisher’s exact test

to a state’s right to invade. Post hoc multiple
comparisons revealed that the lower class scored
marginally higher than the middle class on the
use of negative consequences. Upper-class
respondents scored significantly higher than
working- and upper middle-class respondents
and marginally higher than lower- and middle-
class respondents on the use of equality. For
appreciating consequences, however, post hoc
results did not specify a class difference.
Participants’ Responses to Another
Country Bombing Their Own
Personal Disengagement Responses
Demographic differences were found for gender
and relative’s military service and the use of the
personal disengagement categories.
Men were marginally more likely than women
to respond to this prompt using reasoning consis-
tent with at least one of the personally disengaged
themes and vengeful agency. t-Tests supported
these results and also found that men scored mar-
ginally higher than women on antisocial agency
sum scores in their responses.
In regard to relative’s military service, respon-
dents with a relative in the military were margin-
ally more likely than respondents without a relative
in the military to demonstrate vengeful agency in
their responses. t-Tests supported this result.
For percentages of disengaged responses in
coding categories by demographic groups and
chi-square values, see Table 30.7.
ANOVAs revealed significant differences in
the use of personally disengaged responses and
participants’ country. Specifically, personal dis-
engagement sum scores, antisocial agency sum
30 S, SE Asia Invasion
scores, and the use of harming emotions were
affected by country. Scheffe post hoc multiple
comparisons revealed that for harming emotions,
respondents from Laos scored significantly higher
than respondents from India and Malaysia and
marginally higher than respondents from the
Philippines on the use of this theme, while respon-
dents from Pakistan scored significantly higher
than respondents from Malaysia on this same per-
sonal disengagement theme. Although ANOVA
results indicated significant differences between
countries in personal disengagement sum scores
and antisocial agency sum scores, post hoc tests
did not reveal specific country differences.
One-way ANOVAs also revealed significant
differences in the use of personal disengagement
responses contingent on religion. Specifically,
ANOVAs indicated significant religious differ-
ences on the use of harming emotions. Scheffe
post hoc analysis showed that Muslims scored
marginally higher than Christians on the use of
harming emotions.
ANOVAs revealed significant differences in
the use of personal disengagement coding cate-
gories contingent on the social class of respon-
dents. Specifically, ANOVAs indicated significant
class differences in personal disengagement sum
scores, antisocial agency sum scores, and on the
use of harming emotions. Scheffe post hocs
revealed that upper middle-class respondents
scored marginally higher than middle-class
respondents on antisocial agency sum scores.
Although ANOVAs revealed significant group
differences in personal disengagement sum
scores and on the use of harming emotions, post
hoc tests did not find significant differences
between specific classes.
Personal Engagement Responses
Chi-square and t-test analyses of the use of the
personal engagement categories and the demo-
graphic variables showed group differences based
on gender, participation in military, relatives’
participation in military, and involvement in a
protest in favor of peace.
Marginally more men than women gave
responses coded for at least one of the general
responsibility themes. Conversely, a significant
479
number of more women than men demonstrated
unspecified personal engagement in their
responses to this prompt. t-Tests supported both
of these results.
For participation in military, chi-square tests
revealed that veterans were marginally more
likely to use at least one of the prosocial agency
categories, and significantly more veterans gave
responses emphasizing self-referenced agency
against the bombings than respondents who had
never participated in military. Respondents who
had never participated in military were margin-
ally more likely than veterans to give responses
demonstrating genuine assistance, in which they
emphasized the importance of helping others.
t-Tests supported these findings.
Chi-square tests revealed that those without
relatives in the military were marginally more
likely to reference at least one of the prosocial
agency themes. t-Tests supported this finding.
Finally, for involvement in a pro-peace pro-
test, chi-square tests revealed that significantly
more protesters gave responses demonstrating at
least one of the personal engagement, general
responsibility, and prosocial agency categories
than nonprotesters. These same protest respon-
dents were significantly more likely to demon-
strate self-referenced agency than were
nonprotesters in their responses. Chi-square tests
also found that protesters were marginally more
likely than nonprotesters to give responses
emphasizing helping emotions and general
responsibility. t-Tests supported all of these
results except the marginal result regarding gen-
eral responsibility.
For percentages of personally engaged
responses in coding categories by demographic
groups and chi-square values, see Table 30.7.
ANOVAs revealed significant differences in
the use of personal engagement arguments con-
tingent upon participants’ country. A one-way
ANOVA revealed significant differences between
countries in general responsibility sum scores
and humanizing agency sum scores categories as
well as unspecified personal engagement, help-
ing emotions, and genuine assistance. Scheffe
post hoc multiple comparisons revealed that for
helping emotions, respondents from Sri Lanka
480
scored significantly higher than respondents from
India, Malaysia, and the Philippines. Respondents
from India and Pakistan scored significantly
higher than respondents from Malaysia on gen-
eral responsibility sum scores as well as
unspecified general responsibility. Respondents
from Pakistan also scored significantly higher
than those from the Philippines on the use of
these themes. While ANOVAs indicated
significant differences in humanizing agency sum
scores, genuine assistance, and unspecified per-
sonal engagement, Scheffe tests did not find
significant differences between responses from
respondents in specific countries.
ANOVAs also revealed significant differences
in the use of personally engaged responses
to this item contingent on religious affiliation.
Specifically, one-way ANOVAs indicated
significant group differences in general responsi-
bility sum scores, humanizing agency sum scores,
and the use of genuine assistance. Scheffe post
hocs revealed that Muslims scored marginally
higher than Christians on general responsibility
sum scores. Hindus scored significantly higher
than Muslims on humanizing agency sum scores
and scored marginally higher than Muslims and
Christians on the use of genuine assistance.
Finally, ANOVAs indicated significant differ-
ences in the use of personally engaged responses
to this item based on the social class of the
respondent. Specifically, ANOVAs revealed
significant group differences in the use of general
personal engagement. Scheffe post hocs revealed
that working-class respondents scored margin-
ally higher than upper middle-class respondents
on the use of general personal engagement.
Participants’ Responses to Their
Country Bombing Another
Personal Disengagement Responses
Group differences were found among gender,
military service, relatives’ participation in mili-
tary, involvement in a protest in favor of peace,
and the use of personal disengagement themes.
For gender, chi-square tests revealed that
significantly more men than women emphasized
M.R.E. Estuar et al.
harming emotions and at least one of the personal
disengagement categories in their responses. Men
were marginally more likely than women to
emphasize antisocial agency in their responses.
t-Tests supported all of these results.
Marginally more respondents who had been in
the military used at least one of the antisocial
agency themes in their responses than their non-
military counterparts. However, t-Tests did not
support these results.
For relatives’ participation in military, chi-
square tests revealed that respondents without
relatives in military were marginally more likely
to use at least one of the denial of responsibility
categories than respondents with relatives in mil-
itary. t-Tests supported this result and revealed
that respondents without a relative in the military
scored significantly higher than their counterparts
on reliance on the government and military in the
bombings.
Finally, for involvement in a protest in favor of
peace, chi-squares revealed that significantly
more nonprotesters than protesters used at least
one of the personal disengagement responses and
the denial of responsibility categories, as well as
at least one of the antisocial agency categories.
t-Tests supported these results and also revealed
that nonprotesters were significantly more likely
than protesters to demonstrate harming emotions,
denial of responsibility, reliance on the govern-
ment and military, and vengeful agency in their
responses.
In response to one’s own country bombing
another country, ANOVAs revealed significant
differences in personal disengagement response
patterns contingent on country. Specifically,
ANOVAs indicated significant group differences
in personal disengagement sum scores, antisocial
agency sum scores, harming emotions, and gen-
eral antisocial agency. Post hocs revealed that
participants from Laos scored significantly higher
than respondents from any of the other countries
on the use of general antisocial agency. While
ANOVAs revealed significant country differences
in personal disengagement sum scores, antisocial
agency sum scores, and harming emotions,
Scheffe tests did not indicate significant differ-
ences between specific countries.
30 S, SE Asia Invasion
Table 30.8 Another country bombing your own: means, standard deviations, and t-test results by demographic group
for coding categories
Group 1
Categories Male
Personal disengagement sum 0.26 (0.57)
Antisocial agency sum 0.24 (0.55)
Vengeful agency 0.13 (0.34)
General responsibility sum 0.30 (0.47)
Unspecified personal engagement 0.11 (0.31)
Relative military
Vengeful agency 0.14 (0.36)
Note: Sums of categories were created by adding the category and its subcategories together. Refer to the “Invasion
Methods” chapter for a more detailed description. Standard deviations appear in parentheses next to means
*
p £ 0.05; **p £ 0.01; ***p £ 0.001; ^0.05 < p < 0.1
Finally, one-way ANOVAs revealed significant
differences in the use of personal disengagement
categories contingent on social class. Specifically,
ANOVAs found significant group differences in
the use of denial of responsibility. Scheffe tests
revealed that upper-class participants scored mar-
ginally higher than upper middle-class partici-
pants on the use of denial of responsibility.
Personal Engagement Responses
Military service and participation in a protest
against war and in favor of peace affected the use
of the personal engagement themes. t-Tests
revealed that respondents who had never been in
the military scored significantly higher on the
general responsibility categories or predicted that
they would call for the international community
to help in the bombing situation more often than
respondents who had been in the military.
Chi-square tests revealed that significantly
more protesters than nonprotesters demonstrated
at least one of the personal engagement themes,
prosocial agency, and self-referenced agency in
their responses and were marginally more likely
than nonprotesters to call for the international
community to help the situation. t-Tests supported
the results for personal engagement sum score
and self-referenced agency. Additionally, t-tests
revealed that protesters scored significantly
higher than nonprotesters on prosocial agency
sum scores.
For percentages of both personal engagement
and disengagement responses in coding categories
481
Group 2
Female t df
0.19 (0.47) −1.88^ 548.49
0.17 (0.45) −1.85^ 544.34
0.09 (0.28) −1.74^ 514.86
0.23 (0.43) −1.87^ 545.23
0.17 (0.38) 2.39* 587.93
No relative military
0.09 (0.28) −1.73^ 199.56
by demographic groups and chi-square values, see
Tables 30.8 and 30.9. For means, standard devia-
tions, and t-test results of both pro- and anti-inva-
sion responses by demographic group for coding
categories, see Table 30.10.
One-way ANOVAs revealed multiple
significant differences in personally engaged
responses to a scenario in which one’s own coun-
try is bombing another contingent on the country
of the respondent. Specifically, ANOVAs indi-
cated significant group differences in the use of
helping emotions, personal engagement sum
scores, general responsibility sum scores, proso-
cial agency sum scores, general responsibility,
calling for the international community, and self-
referenced agency. Scheffe post hocs revealed
that respondents from Laos scored significantly
higher than those from all of the other countries
on the use of harming emotions and scored
significantly higher than respondents from India,
Malaysia, and the Philippines and marginally
higher than those from Indonesia and Sri Lanka
on prosocial agency sum scores. Respondents
from Pakistan scored significantly higher than
those from Malaysia and marginally higher than
those from the Philippines on the use of harming
emotions, significantly higher than respondents
from Malaysia and the Philippines on personal
engagement sum scores, and significantly higher
than respondents from the Philippines on proso-
cial agency sum scores. Indian respondents
scored significantly higher than respondents from
the Philippines on personal engagement sum
482 M.R.E. Estuar et al.

Table 30.9 Your country is bombing another country: percentages of responses in coding categories by demographic
groups and chi-square values
Group 1a Group 2a
Categories Male Female c2
Personal disengagement presence 14 9 3.72*
Antisocial agency presence 8 5 2.78^
Harming emotions 5 2 5.06*
Military Nonmilitary
Antisocial agency presence 13 6 3.15^,b
Relative military No relative military
Denial of responsibility presence 1 5 3.25^
Protest No protest
Personal disengagement presence 1 13 11.20***
Denial of responsibility presence 0 5 5.04*,b
Antisocial agency presence 1 8 5.11*
Personal engagement presence 96 80 12.76***
Prosocial agency 52 39 4.71*
Call for the international community 8 3 3.50^,b
Self-referenced agency 40 26 6.72**
Note: Presence indicates that the participant provided a response that was coded for that category and/or one of its sub-
categories. Refer to the “Invasion Methods” chapter for a more detailed description
*
p £ 0.05; **p £.01 ***p £ 0.001; ^0.05 < p < 0.10
a
The numbers in these columns are the percent of the group that gave responses falling into each of the specified
categories
b
Fisher’s exact test

Table 30.10 Your country is bombing another country: means, standard deviations, and t-test results by demographic
group for coding categories
Group 1 Group 2
Categories Military Nonmilitary t df
General responsibility sum 0.13 (35) 0.23 (0.43) 2.13* 35.07
Call for the international community 0.00 (0.00) 0.05 (0.21) 5.01*** 528.00
Relative military No relative military
Reliance on government/military 0.00 (0.00) 0.02 (0.13) 2.47** 365.00
Protest No protest
Harming emotions 0.01 (0.11) 0.04 (0.20) 2.04* 249.78
Denial of responsibility 0.00 (0.00) 0.04 (0.19) 4.07*** 414.00
Reliance on government/military 0.00 (0.00) 0.01 (0.12) 2.46** 414.00
Vengeful agency 0.01 (0.10) 0.05 (0.23) 2.51** 306.46
Prosocial agency sum 0.56 (0.58) 0.44 (0.59) −1.72^ 504
Note: Sums of categories were created by adding the category and its subcategories together. Refer to the “Invasion
Methods” chapter for a more detailed description. Standard deviations appear in parentheses next to means
*
p £ 0.05; **p £ .01; ***p £ 0.001; ^0.05 < p < 0.1
30 S, SE Asia Invasion
scores and scored significantly higher than
Malaysia on both general responsibility sum
scores and general responsibility. Participants
from Laos scored significantly higher than those
from India, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the
Philippines and marginally higher than those
from Sri Lanka on personal engagement sum
scores. Respondents from the Philippines scored
marginally higher than Malaysians and
significantly higher than Malaysians on general
responsibility sum scores and general responsi-
bility, respectively, while Malaysians scored
significantly higher than respondents from the
Philippines on the use of self-referenced agency.
While ANOVAs indicated significant country
differences in the use of call to the international
community, Scheffe tests did not reveal significant
differences between specific countries.
One-way ANOVAs also revealed significant
differences in the use of personally engaged
responses to this item contingent on religious
affiliation. Significant group differences were
found in personal engagement sum scores, proso-
cial agency sum scores, and the use of self-
referenced agency. Scheffe post hocs revealed
that Muslims scored significantly higher than
Christians on personal engagement sum scores
and on prosocial agency sum scores. Muslims
also scored marginally higher than Christians on
the use of self-referenced agency.
Finally, one-way ANOVAs found significant
differences in personal engagement response pat-
terns contingent on the social class of the respon-
dent. Specifically, ANOVAs indicated significant
group differences in the use of helping emotions,
personal engagement sum scores, prosocial
agency sum scores, unspecified personal engage-
ment, self-referenced agency, and humanizing
agency. Scheffe tests revealed that the upper mid-
dle-class respondents scored significantly higher
than working-class respondents and marginally
higher than lower-class respondents on the use of
helping emotions. The upper middle-class also
scored marginally higher than the working class
on personal engagement sum scores. Both the
middle-class and the upper middle-class respon-
dents scored significantly higher than the working
class on prosocial agency sum scores. Lower-
483
class respondents scored significantly higher than
middle-, upper middle-, and upper-class respon-
dents on the use of unspecified personal engage-
ment. Middle-class respondents scored
significantly higher than working-class respon-
dents on the use of self-referenced agency. While
ANOVAs indicated significant group differences
between classes on the use of humanizing agency,
Scheffe results did not reveal significant differ-
ences between any two specific classes.
Reflections on South and Southeast
Asian Perspectives on Invasion
For countries in South and Southeast Asia, inva-
sion, colonialism, and imperialism are words that
unlock a long history of struggle toward indepen-
dence. Prior to colonial invasion, most of these
countries were thriving on local material resources
with cultures rich in tradition and living relatively
prosperous lives (Zaide and Zaide 2006).
However, historical accounts on the invasion of
South and Southeast Asian countries have shown
that much has been taken away from them, and a
restoration to better lives and the desire for iden-
tity and true independence is a continuing strug-
gle. Though Western invasion and colonialism
has been justified as helping poor nations against
their enemies, improving their economies, edu-
cating their populations, and helping them to
eventually gain independence, this assistance and
aid has also led to lost lives in the struggle for
true independence and the struggle against severe
poverty, weak economies, and unstable govern-
ments. As a result, it is not surprising that the
general perception on invasion among ordinary
South and Southeast Asian citizens remains neg-
ative. There is low tolerance for invasion because
of the need to respect the boundaries and sover-
eignty of nations. Invasion is also pictured as
resulting in negative consequences, as reflected
by experiences of internal disunity, bloodshed,
war, destruction, and loss of lives. On the other
hand, there is also a perception that invasion is
acceptable when it is used to help one’s nation
against another invader, serving as a form of self-
defense.
484
Demographic differences in responses reflect
the passing on of responsibility for invasion to
another entity. For example, those with relatives
in the military and those who serve the military
emphasize the responsibility of the international
community to intervene and make decisions con-
cerning invasion. The most significant
justifications for invasion for antiwar protesters is
self-defense and if it was to be used as an act of
punishment against the aggressor. Invasion is
seen as harmful to one’s country and, therefore,
retaliation is justified.
On Engagement and Disengagement
All South and Southeast Asian countries sampled
in this chapter have stories of being victims of
colonial rule. Needless to say, a bombing by one’s
country or being bombed by another country is
perceived as engaging a citizen’s personal respon-
sibility to protest. Moreover, the response to the
act is the preference for a more peaceful negotia-
tion rather than to support a war against the
invader. Suggested forms of negotiation include
protest movements and prayer movements.
However, centuries of colonization and struggle
for independence may eventually result in feel-
ings of hatred and the desire for punishment and
revenge against invaders. Clearly, a repeat of past
acts of aggression will not be tolerated.
Differences in perspectives on moral engage-
ment and disengagement show stereotypical
results. In response to another country bombing
one’s country, protesters and those who had rela-
tives in the military preferred revenge and pun-
ishment as a form of disengagement; on the other
hand, more women than men prefer peaceful
means of engagement. At the same time, those
who have never participated in the military prefer
helping to harming others. Similar responses
were obtained from nonprotesters.
In regard to one’s country bombing another,
there is a concentration of responses on diffusion
of responsibility among males, those without rela-
tives in the military, and nonprotesters. One’s reli-
gion, socioeconomic status, and country of origin
M.R.E. Estuar et al.
also affect one’s perspectives on engagement and
disengagement as shown in this study.
Some Thoughts and Challenges About
Social Class, Social Distance, Gender,
and Social Identity
Statistical analyses employed may still yield
inconclusive results. However, overall results
suggest possible trends and challenges regarding
other variables such as social class, social dis-
tance, gender, and social identity in altering one’s
mechanisms of moral engagement or disengage-
ment. Trends and directions presented here may
further be elucidated by excavating the richness
of local histories (Montiel 2009). Future studies
using a macroscopic lens of accounting for lay-
ered analytical dynamics of geographical poli-
tics, colonial histories, and culture can reveal
perspectives on state’s rights to invasion as
grounded in Asian subjectivities.
In general, a person’s decision to support the
state’s rights to invasion varied across social
class. The lower class and working class gave
more reference to the global responsibility of
one’s country to initiate invasion than most peo-
ple from middle and upper class. Results also
indicate that there exists intergenerational conti-
nuity of a person’s desire to support the state’s
rights to invasion, especially among those who
have relatives in the military. On the other hand,
gender differences were not apparent, but men
tend to be more aggressive in their stand to sup-
port invasion than women. However, it must be
reminded that the invisibility of gendered experi-
ences in perceptions of invasion may hinder a
sensitive construction of social policies toward
greater moral agency. Lastly, qualitative responses
indicate the saliency of one’s identity in the deci-
sion to support the state’s right to invasion.
It was found that one’s perception of one’s in-
group, specifically in-group glorification, can
lead to activate moral disengagement strategies
such as dehumanizing victims (Castano 2008).
Protecting humanity as referred to by some partici-
pants may only relate to one’s people or in-group.
30 S, SE Asia Invasion
Other invading countries or the out-group may be
seen as not part of humanity, intensifying
identification with one’s in-group. It could be
hypothesized that identity may moderate the use
of moral disengagement strategies. Moreover, the
higher identification toward the in-group may
yield to greater negative emotions such as shame,
hatred, and guilt. Social class differences and
intergenerational continuity may emerge from
spiraling negative emotions such as hatred as
exhibited by some participants in their support to
bomb other countries or to initiate preemptive
strikes. Understanding local histories of invasion
can illuminate class struggles that fuel negative
emotions within and between countries.
The unique psychological landscape of South
and Southeast Asia prompted a critical platform
regarding future studies on moral disengagement
to counter terrorism. Perceptions on invasion
may suggest a mediating relationship between
self-regulatory mechanisms of moral disengage-
ment. Identification process toward one’s in-
group may moderate relationship between
experience of negative emotions and moral dis-
engagement strategies. Strategies to enhance
prosocialness to make perceptions of humanity
inclusive of the out-group may help decrease
negative emotions such as hatred.
Collectivist cultures in South and Southeast
Asia espoused different relational values between
groups. Promoting common humanity within
these areas may anchor on values of interpersonal
relations. Hence, a person’s decision to support
rights to invade other countries may also be
reflective of different bases of morality and not
necessarily an activated moral disengagement
strategy. Strengthening moral engagement may
indicate greater acceptance of personal responsi-
bility and willingness to engage in specific peace-
ful action toward conflict resolution. However,
among participants who indicated personally
engaged responses, the succeeding crucial step is
to translate perceived collective engagement to
collective action. Implications to fortify and create
social policies as venues to support collective
dialogue between the state and its people are
suggested. Moreover, moral disengagement and
485
prosocialness affected transgressiveness through
mediating influence of negative emotions
(Bandura et al. 2001). Encouraging proactive
moral agency among the younger generation may
also dissipate intergenerational continuity of
hatred.
Toward the South and Southeast Asian
Moral Agency
Zaide and Zaide (2006) describe Asians as hav-
ing several peculiar traits. They are deeply spiri-
tual and believe that there is an unseen force
greater than the self. Asians believe that there is a
connection between the self and the forces of
nature that results in goodness being rewarded
with a better life and wrongdoing begetting pun-
ishment from nature. To engage in invasion, an
act of aggression against another country, is atyp-
ical. Instead, what we find are strong military
forces ready to defend one’s country from being
attacked. As such, “nations that perceive them-
selves to be under siege from the forces of global-
ization may well respond with a defensive
nationalism” (Starrs 2002).
With constant exposure to poverty, natural
calamities, and political upheavals, Asians are
believed to have developed a stoic attitude to life
(Zaide and Zaide 2006), which leads to submis-
sion and resilience to sufferings. However, Asians
are also greatly influenced by family, society, and
religion. Familial ties extend beyond immediate
family and over several generations, culminating
in a strong sense of respect and obedience for
elders and obedience toward leaders. This collec-
tivist attitude has led to a life of acceptance of
destiny, constant indecision, and belief in the
relativity of truth.
At present, Asia is home to half of the world’s
population and at the same time home to half of
the world’s poor (Zaide and Zaide 2006). The
2010 World Bank Report indicates that South
Asia, on the one hand, has a future that is steadily
growing because of global integration and, on the
other hand, is still experiencing high poverty and
suffering from many internal conflicts brought
486
about by diverse cultures and religions (World
Bank 2010). Poverty and diversity continue to
attract indirect forms of invasion.
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 Perspectives on Invasion in East Asia
31
Etsuko Hoshino-Browne, Alba N. Villamil, Ting Wu,
Hillary Mi-Sung Kim, Ariel Stone, Alice Murata,
Michelle Murata, and Andrea Jones-Rooy

Countries have invaded countries throughout
history—even before there were nation states—
and Asian countries are no exception. Behind
each invasion, there are motives such as the desire
for natural resources, economic expansion, and
increased political power. It is unlikely that
invasions ever occur in a peaceful manner. They
are almost without exception accompanied by
war and death, as well as destruction of society
and human life. How do people justify it? Is
attainment of natural resources, economic expan-
sion, or political ideology worth killing and injur-
ing humans? How do today’s East Asians consider
invasions? How do they think of invasions from a
moral perspective?
In this chapter, we focus on Japan, China, and
North and South Korea. First, we briefly review
the historical background of militarism and
invasion in each of these countries. Later, we
present survey data collected from East Asians
in Japan, China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, South
Korea, and the USA, and then provide analysis
of these data.
Brief Review of East Asian History
of Militarism and Invasion
Japan
After the Tokugawa Shogunate was overthrown
in 1867, the Meiji Restoration brought the begin-
ning of Japanese imperialism and militarism,
along with modernization and industrialization
(Ebrey et al. 2009). The nationwide moderniza-
tion project permeated every aspect of the coun-
try, including its social, economic, cultural, and
political systems.
Japanese imperialism could be considered a
by-product of the historical and geographical
circumstances surrounding the archipelago in the
mid-nineteenth century (Peattie 1984). Because
of its 400-year-long national isolation policy
under the Tokugawa Shogunate, Japan made itself
economically and politically vulnerable to impe-
rialist Western powers. Its subjugation and diplo-
matic inferiority necessitated the modernization
of the economy and the military. To rescue the
nation from its precarious position, Japan began
its imperialist foreign policy. The impending
threat of Western powers prompted Japan to
acquire nearby territories in East Asia and the
South Pacific. The geographic proximity of these
territories served as buffer zones to the Western
powers and also provided an economic benefit
with reduced transportation costs and ease of
communication.
Japanese imperialism had several character-
istics that were relatively unique to its form of
colonization (Jansen 1984). First, Japanese
imperialism was mainly a response to domestic
and international conditions, rather than a search
for opportunities. Second, the geography of Asia
provided Japan with colonies that were racially
and culturally similar. Japan believed that its
role was to “civilize” its colonies with Japanese

K. Malley-Morrison et al. (eds.), International Handbook of War, Torture, and Terrorism, 487
Peace Psychology Book Series, DOI 10.1007/978-1-4614-1638-8_31,
© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2013
488
culture and modernization while maintaining
“fraternal” relationships with them as fellow
Asians. Nevertheless, expansion of territory,
political power, and economic influence were all
goals of Japanese invasions. Japan’s expansion
of its territory abroad and modernization of its
economy and culture not only transformed its
citizens’ lives but also enhanced the nation’s
reputation among Western countries (Ebrey et al.
2009). Obtaining colonies not only would com-
pensate for historical humiliations but would
also place Japan in the powerful position of
spreading “civilization” to other Asian nations
(Jansen 1984).
During the late 1800s, Korea became one of
Japan’s primary targets for expansion (Ebrey
et al. 2009). Because of its location in East Asia,
Korea could have become a threat to Japan’s
plans of expansion in the Pacific, especially if the
peninsula was targeted by another Western
power. Using “gunboat diplomacy” (Gordon
2003, p. 115), Japan forced Korea to sign the
Kanghwa Treaty in 1876. The treaty opened sev-
eral Korean ports to Japan and provided extrater-
ritorial jurisdiction to Japan. Japan used this new
relationship to its economic advantage. Because
Korea provided a buffer zone to Japan’s sover-
eignty, the government also used the treaty to
forge a close relationship with Korea that was
independent of China and Russia. By 1905, the
Japanese authorities decided to maintain Korea’s
“independence and territorial security” (Duus
1984, p. 140) by turning it into a protectorate.
Officially, Japan would take over concerns of
defense, foreign relations, and finances. However,
it also acquired major Korean railroads, the
postal service, and telegraph and telephone lines,
dominating Korea’s transportation and commu-
nication systems.
Japan’s growing presence in Korea created a
great deal of friction and conflict with China,
which also regarded Korea as its protectorate
(Gordon 2003). Their power struggle led to the
Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895), triggered by
the social unrest of Korean farmers’ Tonghak
Rebellion during the spring of 1894. Japan made
use of its recently strengthened navy and won
E. Hoshino-Browne et al.
the war by April of 1895, gaining control of
Taiwan, the Liaodong Peninsula, and railroad
building rights in southern Manchuria. However,
Russia, along with France and Germany, forced
Japan to return the Liaodong Peninsula in 1898.
This not only confirmed Japan’s belief in the
continued threat of Western powers but also
evoked strong hostility against Russia, which
eventually led to the Russo-Japanese War
(1904–1905).
To solidify its presence in Korea, Japan grew
closer to Britain and ultimately signed an agree-
ment in 1902, stipulating that Britain would rec-
ognize Japan’s interest in Korea and that each
country would aid the other if attacked by Russia
(Gordon 2003). Japan also offered to allow
Russia’s presence in Manchuria if Russia allowed
Japan’s presence in Korea. Japan declared war on
Russia in February 1904 and secretly sought US
assistance to mediate a negotiation in May 1905.
Although the resulting treaty did not give Japan
any land or financial compensation, it did recog-
nize Japan’s exclusive rights to Korea and several
special claims to parts of Manchuria.
Although Western presence in China was
weakened due to World War I, Japan solidified its
presence in Manchuria and strengthened its
influence in China (Gordon 2003). By the early
1930s, the Japanese military was strong enough to
control the Japanese government, invade
Manchuria, and advance further into China.
In 1937, Japan moved south from Beijing and
occupied the Shandong Peninsula and part of
the Yellow River, starting the Chino-Japanese War
(the second Sino-Japanese War, 1937–1945). It
then occupied Nanjing by December. As the
Japanese military entered Nanjing, they carried
out a massacre that has been referred to as the
Rape of Nanjing.
In order to continue its aggression toward
China, Japan needed oil and other essential
resources. However, during this time, tensions
between the USA and Japan worsened (Ienaga
1978), and in an attempt to protect its interests in
Asia, the USA prohibited the export of metal to
Japan, imposed an embargo on oil, and froze
Japan’s assets. In 1939, the USA also began
31 East Asia Invasion
economic sanctions against Japan with the
termination of the 1911 Treaty of Commerce and
Navigation. In response to the trade embargos,
Japan announced that the military would be
expanding southward into the French territory of
northern Indochina in June 1940 and indeed suc-
cessfully occupied southern Indochina in late
July of 1941.
After failed negotiations with the USA to lift
the trade embargos, Japan declared war against
the USA, Britain, and the Netherlands and entered
World War II (Gordon 2003). Following the attack
on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, Japan quickly
and successfully attacked and occupied the Malay
Peninsula, Hong Kong, Manila, Singapore, and
other South Asian territories. However, as the war
in the Pacific continued between Japan and the
Allies, Japan was defeated by the USA’s superior
military power in the Pacific. After the USA
dropped two atomic bombs on Hiroshima and
Nagasaki and the Soviet Union invaded Manchuria
in August of 1945, Japan ended the war by sur-
rendering to the Allies.
China
Perhaps one of the most notable cases of inva-
sion in China was a series of invasions by the
Mongols during the thirteenth and fourteenth
centuries. After Chinggis became the Great
Khan in 1206 and united numerous tribes, he
began to subjugate villages in northern China,
Persia, and Afghanistan (Ebrey et al. 2009).
After his death, his grandson, Khubilai, con-
quered China and Korea. The Mongols had
captured and controlled north China by the
1230s. Alternating between killing the local
population and enslaving it, the Mongols seized
land and distributed it among the army’s gener-
als. In response, some Chinese people refused to
work under Mongol forces, and many felt they
would be better off if they could govern their
own society and protected themselves from the
Mongol’s occupation.
After conquering the north, the Mongols set
their sights on southern China. Because of the
489
large number of streams and canals in the south,
the Mongols realized they needed a navy and
forced Chinese shipbuilders to begin work on a
fleet while sending envoys to the Song Dynasty,
asking for surrender (Ebrey et al. 2009). By the
1260s, the southern Chinese considered the
Mongols the greatest threat to Chinese civiliza-
tion. Despite the Song generals’ willingness to
fight the Mongols, they were too disorganized to
win the battle against them. Mongol rule in
China lasted about 100 years until the mid-four-
teenth century when the Yuan Dynasty (the
Chinese name for the Mongol state) fell into
civil war. In the 1360s, the Mongols returned to
Mongolia.
Another notable interference from foreign
countries in China originated from a trade conflict
with Britain over opium in the nineteenth century
(Ebrey et al. 2009). Originally used for medicinal
purposes in China, the sale of pure opium sap as
a recreational drug led to widespread addiction,
even among high officials and members of the
imperial clan. In response to the growing epi-
demic, the Chinese government banned the pro-
duction, importation, and smoking of opium.
Despite this prohibition, Britain’s East India
Company continued the trade by licensing private
American and British traders and using Chinese
smugglers. Because the competition among
smugglers dropped the price, the addictive drug
became more affordable and the epidemic even
more widespread.
In order to stop Britain’s opium trading, the
Qing government switched tactics and pursued
the sellers rather than the consumers of opium
(Ebrey et al. 2009). In 1838, the government
arrested 1,700 Chinese dealers and appealed to
British firms to exchange their opium stock for
tea. When they refused, the Chinese government
stopped all trade. Britain, interpreting this strat-
egy as a provocation for war, shut down the major
ports of Ningbo and Tianjin and forced China to
negotiate. Under the 1842 Treaty of Nanjing and
subsequent amendments, China was forced to
cede Hong Kong to Britain as payment. In addi-
tion to other penalties and impositions that
opened China to Western exploitation, China was
490
also forced to comply with a most favored nation
clause, which allowed Britain to receive the same
economic privileges as other nations in China.
As described in the above section on Japan,
China experienced interference from Japan, as
well. In the late 1800s, the Sino-Japanese War
(1894–1895) occurred due to the occupation of
Korea (Ebrey et al. 2009). In the 1930s, Japan
invaded Manchuria and advanced to Inner
Mongolia, Beijing, and further south. The
Japanese invasion led to the Chino-Japanese War
(the second Sino-Japanese War, 1937–1945),
which lasted until the end of World War II.
China not only has been the victim of invasion
by the Mongols, the Western imperialists, and
Japan but has also been the invader of Tibet and
Korea. Because of its location between China and
India, Tibet has been of continual interest to
European and Asian powers (Shakya 1999). In
particular, Britain was interested in obtaining
Tibet as a means for protecting British interests
in India. China, on the other hand, wanted to con-
trol Tibet in order to suppress the Western
influences entering the country.
In the first half of the twentieth century, the
Tibetan government actively resisted the Chinese
Nationalist Party’s attempts to establish its pres-
ence, and all Chinese were expelled (Shakya
1999). When the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP) defeated the Nationalist Party in 1949, the
CCP announced a foreign policy that would
restore to China its former territories of Tibet,
Formosa, the Pescadores, and Hainan Island.
However, many religious Tibetans resisted the
Chinese government’s political and social ideol-
ogy. To appease their religious concerns and to
counteract anti-Communist propaganda spread
by the Nationalist Party, the CCP involved Tibetan
monks in translating and disseminating their pro-
paganda. They also reassured Tibet that its way
of life would not be threatened and that Tibetans
would be treated as equals.
While continuing its resistance against China,
Tibet faced internal turmoil, such as a civil war,
conflicts among the various sects, and various
reactions to a new leader, the young Dalai Lama,
E. Hoshino-Browne et al.
who had no political authority (Shakya 1999).
To prepare for a potential Chinese attack, the
Tibetan government tried to modernize its mili-
tary and weaponry but was still far from a match
for China. Tibet also sought intervention by for-
eign powers such as the United Nations, Britain,
the USA, Nepal, and India, but none were willing
to render help. Although India recognized the
importance of protecting Tibet for its own safety,
it was still not ready to confront China. Thus,
lacking assistance from foreign powers, Tibet
finally engaged in direct communication with
China in 1950 and made several diplomatic
attempts to reinstate its independence and regain
previously annexed land. However, the Indian
and British governments hindered these efforts,
and the Chinese government refused to recognize
Tibetan independence, claiming responsibility
for the territory’s defense, trade, and international
relations (Norbu 2001).
During Tibet’s diplomatic attempts, Tibetan
and Chinese armies were engaging in several
conflicts at their contested border (Shakya 1999).
The Chinese government sent informal emissar-
ies and peace proposals to the Tibetan govern-
ment, while it also sent more troops to strengthen
its presence in the Kham region. Tibet, on the
other hand, was stalling in a hope that the grow-
ing conflict in Korea would distract the Chinese
army. China interpreted Tibet’s lack of response
to its peace attempts as interference from for-
eign powers attempting to liberate Tibet and
protect Chinese borders. As a result, China
invaded Tibet in October, 1950. The size and
quantity of the Chinese troops as well as their
strategic superiority overwhelmed the Tibetan
army, and within 2 weeks Tibet surrendered. The
Dalai Lama’s government fled to India after the
1959 Tibetan Rebellion, and since then, there
has been continuous unrest in Tibet regarding
Chinese occupation and international concern
over the 200,000 to 1 million Tibetans who died
from starvation during China’s Great Leap
Forward program and the over 6,000 monaster-
ies that were destroyed during the Cultural
Revolution.
31 East Asia Invasion
Korea
Because of its geographical location between
China and Japan, Korea has historically attracted
foreign countries’ desires to exploit its location
and agricultural wealth (Lee 1984). For instance,
in the 1210s, the Mongols became interested in
taking over Korea as a bridge into Japan and
southern China and launched the first of six inva-
sions of Koryŏ in 1231. It was not until the Ming
Dynasty’s King Kongmin came to the throne in
the 1360s that the Mongols were driven out of
China and Koryŏ recovered its former govern-
ment structure and territory.
As described in the section on Japan, Hideyoshi
Toyotomi of Japan attempted to invade Korea
twice in the late sixteenth century (Cumings
2005). Although both attempts failed, Korea was
increasingly ravaged with each retreat, and fam-
ine and disease spread while the class hierarchy
collapsed. After the Hideyoshi invasions, Korea
generally ignored Japan and maintained a rela-
tionship with China until the fall of the Ming
Dynasty. Although the invasions tended to cut off
trade between Japan and Korea, both countries,
nevertheless, had a highly regularized trade
agreement until the 1870s.
In the seventeenth century, Korea faced
another invasion, this time by Manchuria.
Propelled by Confucian scholars, Korea saw
itself as a representative of Ming civilization
(Cumings 2005). For instance, King Injo of the
Chosŏn court was decidedly pro-Ming and anti-
Manchu (Lee 1984). Thus, the Manchus, consid-
ering Korea a potential threat to its governing of
China and neighboring regions, invaded in 1627.
After Korea promised to comply with Manchuria,
the Manchus withdrew their army from the pen-
insula. However, when the Manchu emperor T’ai
Tsung changed the name of the state to Qing and
demanded that Korea acknowledge his power,
Korea rejected the demand, thereby causing the
Manchus to engage in a second invasion in 1636.
After two major fortresses fell to the Manchus,
King Injo decided to surrender, which forced the
Chosŏn court to end all ties with the Ming, pay
homage to the Qing, and dispatch troops to help
491
the Manchus fight the Ming. Although the damage
sustained by the Manchu invasion was small in
comparison to the earlier Japanese invasion, the
violence and pillaging of northwest Korea
aroused animosity towards the Qing among many
Koreans (Lee 1984).
During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries,
Korea resisted modernization and Western cul-
tural influences from Japan as well as from Russia
and the USA. For instance, the Korean govern-
ment persecuted missionaries and Korean con-
verts to Christianity in the name of security
(Cumings 2005). In 1866, a mixed crew of
American, British, and Chinese sailors on a mer-
chant schooner attempted an advancement in
Korea by sailing up the Taedong River toward
P’yŏngyang. Despite a warning that Korea did not
allow missionaries or foreign commerce, the ship
continued. Korean troops destroyed the ship and
killed the crew. Angered, the USA decided to
open Korean ports by force in 1871. However, it
was not until several more failed attempts by
other foreign powers (including Japan, which
sought to establish a tributary relationship with
its neighbor) that the USA was able to “open”
Korea with a treaty in 1882.
Although Korea willingly continued trading
with Japan until the 1870s, it also began to turn
away Japanese envoys because of their claims of
advancement and modernity (Cumings 2005).
Korea was disturbed by Japan’s use of Western
dress and technology, practices that were at odds
with the two nations’ traditional roots. However,
despite the attempts by Korean scholars and lead-
ers to exclude Japan, King Kojong embraced
Japan in order to stave off war, much to the detri-
ment of the nation’s future independence. In
1876, Kojong signed the Kanghwa Treaty, which
was the first of several unequal treaties between
Korea and Japan (e.g., Japan had the right to
search for new ports in five Korean provinces,
conduct business and trade without interference,
and protect Japanese merchants in Korean ports).
Following the direction of several foreign
advisors, Korea signed additional unequal trea-
ties with countries that had not previously shown
interest in it (e.g., the USA) in order to protect
492
itself from Japan and later, Russia. However, as
in other treaties, the USA, Britain, and Germany
received many benefits (e.g., extraterritorial
rights for citizens, fixed tariffs), while Korea
merely received a “use of good offices” clause,
which would later be misinterpreted as the USA’s
obligation to protect Korea from Japan.
Japan began to make its presence in Korea
permanent after the Tonghak Rebellion by Korean
farmers in 1894 (Cumings 2005). During the
1860s, the Korean peasant class had faced high
taxation due to the relative weakness of the state
in comparison to the aristocracy. Rebel Ch’oe
Che-u proposed a doctrine for the laboring class
called Tonghak, which was a combination of
Confucian, Buddhist, Taoist, Catholic, and
Korean folk ideas. It promoted the concept that
Tonghak would correct the inequality in Korean
society by protecting Korea from Western
influence and unifying man with heaven. Even
after Ch’oe was executed in 1863 for inciting a
rebellion, its insurrection continued through the
1870s due to the opening of the country and a
drought. In response to these protests, King
Kojong requested support from China.
Meanwhile, Japan recognized the rebellion as an
opportunity to expand. As a result, both countries
invaded Korea to suppress the rebellion. After it
ended, however, Japan not only refused to with-
draw from Korea but also occupied its royal pal-
ace. Two days later, it attacked Chinese ships off
the Korean coast, starting the Sino-Japanese War
(1894–1895). The war left China humiliated and
Korea under Japanese control.
During the process of colonizing Korea, Japan
faced interference from Western imperialists
with interests in Korea (Ebrey et al. 2009). When
Russia began its development of Siberia, it
gained a small boundary with northeastern
Korea. Moreover, its acquirement of Port Arthur
from Japan in 1895 and its construction of a rail-
road from Manchuria and Harbin continuously
frustrated Japan. Recognizing a potential ally,
King Kojong fled to the Russian legation after
the Japanese takeover of the Korean palace.
Russia and Japan eventually signed two agree-
ments that virtually divided Korea into two
spheres of influence. However, in a surprise
E. Hoshino-Browne et al.
attack, Japan launched an assault against a
Russian fleet at Port Arthur. When the subse-
quent Russo-Japanese War began in February
1904, Japanese troops invaded Seoul and
appointed advisors to the Korean ministries.
After surrendering in 1905, Russia withdrew
from Korea, and Great Britain formed an alli-
ance with Japan, acknowledging Japan’s free-
dom to control Korea. This alliance was similar
to the Taft-Katsura agreement that Japan had
made with the USA earlier, which stipulated that
the USA would not challenge Japanese presence
in Korea as long as Japan did not challenge
American presence in the Philippines or British
colonies. Moreover, Japan’s quick and efficient
industrialization could modernize Korea, bring-
ing Western civilization to Korea. Consequently,
Japan established a protectorate, overruling dis-
sent from King Kojong and several Korean min-
isters. Japan jolted all of Asia by becoming the
first non-Western country to conquer the power-
ful nation (Cumings 2005).
Japan instituted numerous reforms, including
elimination of class distinctions, slavery, the
exam system, and traditional Korean clothing;
creation of a new state council based on the
Japanese model; circulation of new and stable
coinage; implementation of new tax laws; and
discontinuation of the practice of punishing
whole families for the transgressions of criminals
(Ebrey et al. 2009). Despite these reforms, the
Japanese government regularly used the police
and army units to maintain order. Outraged over
the takeover, many Koreans appealed to other
foreign powers. However, due to Japan’s public
relations campaign, which portrayed Korea as a
protectorate, Korea was not deemed capable of
self-rule.
Some scholars (e.g., Cumings 2005) have
noted that the results of Japan’s colonial rule over
Korea are ambiguous. While modernizing its
colonies, Japan also made deals for its own
benefit and often in a violent manner.
Industrialization and the establishment of a mid-
dle class existed alongside exploitation of the
economy. The abolition of a major class and
gender barriers led to the eradication of Korean
culture and citizenship.
31 East Asia Invasion
Between the years 1910 and 1945, Korea’s
colonization by Japan took on an ambiguous
nature that may be divided into three phases, each
representative of varying levels of repression and
reform (Ebrey et al. 2009). The first, between
1910 and 1919, was a police state, namely, the
Government-General (GG) of Chosŏn. The GG
was a violent and repressive regime. In addition
to the power granted to police and officials, the
GG eliminated Korean political participation,
restricted Korean business, and increased rice
exports to Japan. Despite this oppression, Korean
nationalist movements continued, which led to
the March First Movement and the public mass
execution of rebels in 1919. Eventually, due to
outside pressure from Western powers, the
Japanese government agreed to a “cultural gov-
ernment” policy during the 1920s, which resulted
in Korea’s eventual independence.
This “cultural government” policy constituted
the second phase of Japanese colonial policy
(Ebrey et al. 2009). This phase was more tolerant
than the first: it permitted some degree of free-
dom of speech and assembly. The government
also permitted the establishment of Korean busi-
nesses and expanded primary education. Women
became major players in social movements, pro-
moting new standards of hygiene and sanitation
in rural areas. They also established new educa-
tion centers to educate the illiterate and began to
fill new job positions. Although women were still
victims of discrimination in Korean society, they
were given the right to petition for divorce in
cases of adultery and polygamy.
This reform-conscious phase ended in 1931
with the Manchurian Incident (Ebrey et al. 2009).
Interested in taking over China, the Japanese
army launched a coup d’état against the Chinese
governor in Manchuria and established the pup-
pet state of Manchukuo. To help finance and sup-
port its war in Manchuria, Japan began to invest
in Korea’s heavy industry and infrastructure,
starting with a land registration program in 1911
to raise tax revenue. Japan also constructed rail-
road lines, harbors, and bridges that transported
goods from Japan and Korea to Manchuria and
eventually to China after the outbreak of the
Chino-Japanese War (the second Sino-Japanese
493
War) in 1937. Japan also reversed many of the
freedoms that it had been implemented during
the 1920s. Not only did Japan establish a military
conscription and forced labor but it also created a
campaign to eradicate Korean identity. Schools
began to teach Japanese, and shrines were dedi-
cated to worshipping the Japanese emperor. Most
Korean small businesses aligned with the
Japanese in order to survive and prosper.
To some nationalists, Japan’s presence in
Korea exemplified the latter’s historical subservi-
ence to other Asian nations, particularly China
(Ebrey et al. 2009). Nationalist activists attempted
to bring a new awareness to the historical subor-
dination of Korea to China and began to empha-
size past acts of military resistance. Between
1919 and 1924, more militant anarchists had
formed terrorist groups and carried out over 300
acts of violence.
In contrast, cultural nationalists believed that
Korea needed to be reconstructed before engag-
ing in a successful nationalist movement
(Cumings 2005). Cultural nationalism was seen
as collaboration between communist and radical
noncommunist nationalists. Unlike the cultural
nationalists, the communists had a strong social
base in Korea and were leading the Korean resis-
tance movement by the 1920s. This communist
group had formed after the Russian Revolution in
1917, when activists created the first Korean
Communist Party in Siberia and later in Korea in
1925. Many were attracted to the applicability of
Marxist–Leninist theory to the economic devel-
opment of Korea. Korean communists believed
that by overthrowing Japan, they would be van-
quishing capitalism as well as achieving national
liberation. Moreover, among the foreign powers
that surrounded Korea, the new Soviet Union was
the only country that appeared willing to provide
support for Korea’s independence goals. When
Manchuria fell to Japan in 1931, Chinese and
Korean groups banded together with the Soviet
Union, which led to the rise of Kim II Sung as the
commander of a small guerrilla unit in northern
Manchuria. Concluding that a Chinese Communist
victory would be strategic and beneficial to North
Korea, Kim II Sung sent tens of thousands of
Koreans to fight with Mao Zedong in early 1947.
494
Mao would later return the favor in 1950 during
the Korean War.
After World War II ended, the Allies pro-
ceeded to divide Korea (Ebrey et al. 2009).
A week before Japan surrendered, the Soviet
Union had declared war on Japan and invaded
Japanese-controlled Korea. The USA had also
invaded Korea and with the agreement of the
Soviet Union, divided Korea at the 38th parallel.
The USA, like Japan, had shown interest in fos-
tering a multilateral tutelary relationship between
Korea, Britain, and the Soviet Union that would
gradually prepare the country for independence
(Cumings 2005). However, although the Soviet
Union and the USA agreed to a trusteeship in
controlling Korea, the Soviet Union had already
supported Kim II Sung and People’s Committees
in North Korea, whereas the USA had backed
Syngman Rhee in South Korea.
The USA’s presence in South Korea insured
the prominence of the Korean Democratic Party
(Cumings 2005). American officials in Seoul
turned to the more conservative minority elite
to begin establishing official organizations. The
USA supported the Korean National Police as
their main political weapon in the south. The
USA also established an English-language
school for potential officers as well as a Korean
military academy to challenge the growing
communist groups, rural committees, labor
unions, and lower class associations. After sev-
eral violent protests, strikes, and mass demon-
strations among those dissenting parties in late
1945 and 1946, US leaders blamed the commu-
nists, disbanded the People’s Committees, and
declared martial law. As a result, South Korean
communists fled to North Korea, while North
Korean landlords, businessmen, and Christians
escaped to South Korea. The Republic of Korea
(ROK) was proclaimed in the south on August
15, 1948, but many Koreans, resentful of the
involvement of pro-Japanese collaborators,
turned to the Leftist Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea, which was proclaimed in
North Korea on September 9.
Unlike the Soviet Union, which pulled out of
North Korea in late 1948, the USA did not easily
withdraw from South Korea. The USA worried
E. Hoshino-Browne et al.
about the viability of the regime as well as the
American global effort to contain communism.
It also focused on the revival of the Japanese
economy (and by extension a revival of the world
economy) by reestablishing Japan’s old relation-
ship with Korea as a provider of raw materials
and markets. Before the American army with-
drew, it also formed the ROK Army and helped
Rhee formulate a cabinet filled with either
Americans or Koreans who had spent many years
in the USA. Rhee also formed counterinsurgency
organizations to fight the Left in rural parts of
South Korea where skirmishes between Leftists
and Rightists had been erupting each day (e.g.,
Cheju Island). He even set up concentration
camps, under the name “National Guidance
Alliance,” for political prisoners suspected of
Leftist activity. By late 1949, the high death
toll of Leftist forces, as well as a harsh winter,
helped stamp out the communist movement in
South Korea.
The tension between the two Koreas soon led
to the Korean War (1950–1953), despite the threats
of both the Soviet Union and the USA to pull out if
either side invaded in an unprovoked manner
(Cumings 2005). North Korea prepared for a war
by buying equipment and weapons from the Soviet
Union, while South Korea was repeatedly reas-
sured that the USA would assist it if it were
attacked first. Once the war started, US President
Harry Truman, supported by the United Nations,
called American intervention in Korea a “police
action” so that he would not have to get a declara-
tion of war and could circumvent constitutional
procedure. The outbreak of fighting was blamed
entirely on North Korea. Although most foreign
powers did not immediately commit their troops,
Britain sent the most soldiers, with the USA pay-
ing most of the bill for South Korea. The war was
violent and highly destructive for both sides. The
US troops were forced to retreat and withdraw
several times during the first several months. By
the end of 1950, not only did North Korean com-
munist forces gain back control of P’yŏngyang but
also Seoul was at the brink of falling. The USA’s
retreat led some American leaders to consider
using atomic warfare, but in the end they chose
aerial bombing as a type of psychological and
31 East Asia Invasion
social warfare, completely destroying North
Korea. The fighting stabilized around the current
38th parallel by the spring of 1951, and the Korean
War ended on July 27, 1953.
As briefly reviewed above, East Asian coun-
tries have invaded and have been invaded by other
nations at various times throughout their history
in efforts to gain economic and political power.
Now we turn to our survey data to examine how
contemporary East Asians feel, view, and think
about invasion in the context of international
conflicts.
East Asian Perspectives on Invasion
and Bombing
The East Asian Sample
The East Asian sample included 409 participants
(228 women, 181 men), recruited through a num-
ber of different approaches, including personal
networking and posting of the survey link on a
number of websites. While the majority of the
participants were living in their country of origin,
a substantial minority lived as immigrants in the
USA. Specifically, the sample included 135
Japanese (89 women, 46 men), 78 Chinese (48
women, 30 men), 10 Hong Kong Chinese
(8 women, 2 men), 8 Taiwanese (3 women,
5 men), and 178 South Koreans (80 women,
98 men). All participants completed the Personal
and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace
Survey (PAIRTAPS), either in hard copy format
or online (Malley-Morrison et al. 2006).
The ages of our participants ranged widely
from 18 to 87 with a mean of 30 years. This aver-
age age is typical for China with a mean age of
30.8 for its population and Korea with a mean
age of 31.4. Although the mean age of Japan’s
citizens was reported to be 30.3 years old in 1960,
by 1990 it was at 39.5 years old. The aging of
Japan is evident. In the PAIRTAPS study, 39%
identified themselves as Christian, 13% as Buddhist,
and 33% as not religious. The religious backgrounds
stated by our respondents were different from
reported figures for East Asians. According to
Henry Rowen (1998), 31.1% were Buddhist,
495
12.5% Christians, and 14.3% did not indicate any
religion. In the PAIRTAPS sample, the majority
of participants were Christians and a minority
were Buddhists.
In regard to socioeconomic status, 50%
reported themselves as middle class, followed by
28% upper middle class, and 13% lower class.
Twenty-two percent had personally served in the
military, and 47% had relatives in military ser-
vice. Finally, 19% had participated in protests
against war and in favor of peace.
Personal and Institutional Rights
to Aggression and Peace Survey
The PAIRTAPS included five items concerned
with the issue of invasion. The first item asked
participants to indicate their level of agreement
with the statement, “Sometimes one country has
the right to invade another country.” The partici-
pants were then asked to explain their rating in
their own words. The other four items asked par-
ticipants to describe how they would feel and
what they would want to do if exposed to a num-
ber of invasion-related events in a very direct and
immediate way. The first scenario was: “Another
country is indiscriminately bombing a major city
in your country, and women and children, the
elderly, and civilian men are running around
bloody and screaming.” The participants were
then asked two questions: “What would you feel?
What would you want to do?” The second sce-
nario was: “Your country is indiscriminately
bombing a major city in another country, and
women and children, the elderly and civilian men
are running around bloody and screaming.”
Again, participants were asked: “What would
you feel? What would you want to do?”
Sociocognitive Coding Procedures
In order to analyze the responses, two coding
manuals were developed, one focusing on
explanations for the right to invade item and the
other on responses to the “What would you feel?”
and “What would you want to do?” items. All
496
responses were broken down into smaller codable
units to better identify specific sociocognitive
themes derived from Bandura’s (1999) theory of
moral disengagement.
Although moral standards usually serve to
regulate one’s behavior, there exist many scenar-
ios where reprehensible acts are perpetuated
against standards of morality. According to
Bandura (1999), there are eight mechanisms by
which one’s moral sanctions can be disengaged.
Among these, removal or obstruction of personal
responsibility, misrepresentation of conse-
quences, advantageous comparison, and moral
justification are especially relevant to the inva-
sion discussion.
In contrast, one exhibits moral engagement
when one’s actions conform to one’s moral stan-
dards despite situational influences that may dic-
tate otherwise. Activation of moral engagement
is usually accompanied by feelings of empathy,
perceived similarity, and recognition of social or
moral obligations. In practice, one demonstrates
moral engagement through either actively engag-
ing in humane behavior (proactive) or refraining
from participating in inhumane activities (inhibi-
tive). In coding responses to the bombing sce-
nario items, emotions and actions were analyzed
for the presence of mechanisms of moral disen-
gagement (personal disengagement) and moral
engagement (personal engagement). Emphasis
was placed on participants’ acceptance or dis-
placement of responsibility, whether toward one’s
government or the international community.
Qualitative Survey Analyses
Views on the Right to Invade
Thirty-two percent of responses provided argu-
ments supportive of one country’s right to invade
another. Among these invasion-tolerant
responses, portrayals of invasion as essential for
national security, peace, or human rights were
most common. Such reasoning exemplifies
pseudomoral justification, a sociocognitive
mechanism by which acts of aggression are
remodeled to appear socially acceptable.
E. Hoshino-Browne et al.
Specifically, 38% of invasion-tolerant responses
supported invasion as a method of self-defense or
preemptive strike. According to a 35-year-old
Korean male doctor, invasion is acceptable
“to protect its citizens’ rights and interests.”
A 22-year-old Japanese male student qualified his
agreement by commenting “Only if the invading
country feels threatened by the invaded nation.”
Twenty-six percent of invasion-tolerant responses
expressed a belief that invasion could be allowed
when its purpose is to help others, demonstrating
the use of pseudoassistance as a justification for
state’s right to invasion. For example, a 19-year-
old Chinese female student supported invasion
“if the country is bullying another one,” and a
21-year-old Japanese female student speculated,
“Some countries improve through invasion. It
depends on the reason and purpose.” Finally,
17% of invasion-tolerant responses indicated
that invasion was acceptable for purposes of
revenge and punishment, demonstrating attribu-
tion of blame. Table 31.1 presents additional
examples of responses in support of a state right
to invasion.
In contrast, 68% of the responses to the inva-
sion item argued against a governmental right to
invasion. Twenty-six percent of these invasion-
intolerant responses reflected respect for govern-
ment and sovereignty. For instance, a 28-year-old
Japanese male freelancer stated, “Each country
should respect one another, and should have
no right to invade.” Nineteen percent of anti-
invasion responses regarded invasion as destruc-
tive, citing negative consequences, whereas 16%
of anti-invasion responses considered it unneces-
sary due to the availability of better alternatives.
According to a 19-year-old Japanese female stu-
dent, “The existence of this right is the reason
why wars exist.” A 29-year-old Japanese male
worker suggested, “Every country’s sovereignty
should be respected. Peaceful resolutions should
always be top priority.” Finally, 15% of invasion-
intolerant responses opposed invasion due to a
desire for nonviolence and concern for peace.
A 24-year-old Korean woman explained, “If the
countries are peaceful at present, then taking
away, invading, and having war does not make
31 East Asia Invasion 497

Table 31.1 Examples of arguments supportive of a state’s right to invasion

Code % Country Age Gender Statement
Self-defense/preemptive 12 (38) China 58 M Only if one of the parties poses a direct
strike and obvious threat to the peace of the
other
Taiwan 19 F If a country’s activities (or lack thereof)
will affect other countries and present a
potential risk, the country being affected
has the right to intervene
Japan 22 M Only if the invading country feels
threatened by the invaded nation
South Korea 23 M A war is a final political strategy, and it
can be an act of right to self-defense
Pseudoassistance 9 (26) China 20 F Once again, if the country poses a
threat, someone needs to keep them in
check
Hong Kong 19 M For the protection of the world, yes. But
for some other excuses, no
Japan 21 F Sometimes it is to improve the country
South Korea 27 M I agree providing that invasion does not
happen for a mere purpose of conquer-
ing another country. If that country
threatens other nearby countries or if
that country blocks the peace of people,
then it is okay to invade
Note: The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total
response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in that category out of all pro-
invasion responses
In the gender column, M refers to males. F refers to females

sense, because it can take away the lives of citizens
who exist in these countries.” Table 31.2 provides
additional examples of arguments against a right
to invade.
Personal Engagement and Emotional
and Motivational Responses to the
Bombing Scenarios
When participants were asked to consider their
feelings and actions in the scenarios of indiscrim-
inate bombing by another country of their own,
or about their countries bombing others, state-
ments indicative of personal disengagement
appeared in 24% of the responses. Among the
personally disengaged responses, 27% reflected a
removal or denial of personal responsibility for
the actions of the participant’s country. For exam-
ple, in response to one’s own government’s
bombing civilians in another country, a 21-year-
old Korean male student asserted, “I support it.
I fully support the government.” Thirty percent
of personally disengaged responses emphasized
harming emotions, such as anger and hatred, and
30% of personally disengaged responses indi-
cated vengeful agency. In response to another
country’s indiscriminate bombing in one’s own
country, a 23-year-old Korean male student
responded, “Even though I die, I would kill more
than ten armed men of that country.” A 19-year-
old Japanese female student said, “I want to stop
the bombing immediately. In order to stop it, I don’t
mind retaliating against the other country,” and a
19-year-old Chinese male student responded,
“Bomb the invading country and let them feel the
same fear.”
On the other hand, 76% of all of the responses
to the bombing prompts showed evidence of per-
sonal engagement in rejection of or resistance to
violence. Two percent of these responses referred
to the participant’s intention to stop the bombing,
demonstrating prosocial agency. Furthermore,
when participants confronted the scenario of their
498 E. Hoshino-Browne et al.

Table 31.2 Examples of arguments against a state’s right to invasion

Code % Country Age Gender Statement
Respect for government/ 18 (26) China 20 M We should respect another country
sovereignty
Japan 20 F Sovereignty is one of the defining
characteristics of an established state,
and thus, no other state has the right to
violate such a concept, just as they
would not allow for it to happen to their
own state
South Korea 41 F Every nation has their own national
system and has the right to respect other
countries while protecting its own. No
country has the right to invade another
Negative consequences 13 (19) China 24 F Countries should not be invaded as it
will only lead to more undesired
bloodshed
Japan 49 F I cannot forgive actions that lead to the
conquest of the world
South Korea 44 M When invading another country, its
basic purpose of making profits by the
invasion is damaging to another
country’s citizens
Better alternatives/ 11 (16) China 20 M No peace and trade
violence as unnecessary
Hong Kong 58 F We are actually brothers and sisters of
One Father in heaven, so why should we
invade another country and not use other
means to solve the problem?
Japan 45 M For terrorist states and those countries
that may become a threat to other
countries, it is possible to take measures
such as warning and economic
sanctions, but invasion is a bad thing
South Korea 45 M Resolve by conversation
Nonviolence/concern with 10 (15) Japan 53 F I wish this world was a place where
peace something like this would never happen.
If we truly wish for world peace, any
invasion should not be allowed
South Korea 20 M To maintain the order among countries,
invasion into other countries should not
happen
South Korea 57 F I absolutely disagree with it because
human beings have a right to live
peacefully
Note: The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total
response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in that category out of all anti-
invasion responses. In the gender column, M refers to male. F refers to female

own country bombing another, 13% of personally
engaged responses expressed helping emotions
such as shame, guilt, and responsibility, and 23%
of personally engaged responses expressed will-
ingness to participate in protests and demonstra-
tions to end the violence, indicating self-referenced
agency. For example, a 24-year-old Korean
female freelancer said she would “write an inter-
net statement calling for discontinuation of war.”
A 25-year-old Japanese female student declared,
31 East Asia Invasion 499

Table 31.3 Examples of personal engagement

Code % Country Age Gender Statement
Self-referenced agency 18 (23) China 20 F Protest the government against the war
Hong Kong 19 F I would want to protest against the war.
I would want to reelect a better
government
Taiwan 19 F I would want to hold protests and with
the support of enough people, change
what is happening
Japan 50 M If a quick action is needed, initiate a
major protest. However, instituting a
law banning such action will be more
effective as a long term solution. Elect
officers that would ban international
attack
Japan 22 M Call for justice, protest against actions,
and try those responsible through an
international court
South Korea 40 F I would participate in anti-war
demonstrations or petitions
Genuine assistance 13 (17) China 24 F Order a plane to evacuate all the
women, children, and elderly out of the
country to seek refuge somewhere
Hong Kong 58 F Help the wounded and pray that the
attack will stop
Japan 74 M Civilians are powerless. In general, all
I can do is run away from the bombing
or try to help those who are hurt
Japan 19 F I will move the people to a safe place.
As many as possible
South Korea 21 M Even if I may be injured by them, I
want to help
Note: The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total
response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in that category out of all personal
engagement responses
The percentages are for the combined responses to the scenario of one’s own country being bombed by another and of
one’s own county bombing another

“I would want to quit being Japanese. I would try
to do anything to stop my country.” Finally, 17%
of these responses recognized the inhumanity of
bombing and indicated a commitment to provid-
ing genuine assistance for the victims. In response
to one’s own country being attacked, a 60-year-
old Japanese male worker stated, “As long as
there is a life to be saved, I will try to help save
them.” In response to one’s own country bombing
another, a 23-year-old Korean female receptionist
said, “I would like to go to the attacked country to
do a voluntary work for people who have been
hurt.” Table 31.3 presents additional examples of
personal engagement.
Exploratory Quantitative Analyses
Right to Invasion Analyses
Chi-square tests were run on an exploratory basis
to examine the possibility of statistically
significant demographic differences in types of
responses. Specifically, group differences were
explored using the following self-reported
variables: (1) gender, (2) social class, (3) current
religion, (4) experience of military service, (5)
family member in the military, and (6) involve-
ment in protests for peace and against war.
In order to inform future research, marginally
statistically significant results were also reported.
500 E. Hoshino-Browne et al.

Table 31.4 A state’s right to invade: percentages of responses in coding categories by demographic groups
and chi-square values
Categories Group 1a Group 2a c2
Male Female
Appreciating consequences presence 17 31 5.70*
General anti-invasion 9 3 4.58*
Honor international mandates 6 0.8 4.82*
Negative consequences 7 19 5.96*
Military Nonmilitary
Anti-invasion presence 50 68 4.44*
Responsibility presence 13 27 3.66^
Appreciating consequences presence 10 28 5.44*
Respect for government/sovereignty 10 24 3.54^
Negative consequences 5 16 3.21^
Relative military No relative military
Principled moral justification presence 25 12 5.19*
Negative consequences 8 19 4.31*
Nonviolence/concern with peace 16 5 5.95*
Note: “Presence” at the end of a variable name indicates that the participant provided at least one example of a response
that was coded into that category and/or one of its subcategories
*p £ 0.05; ^=0.051 < p < 0.10.
a
The numbers in these columns are the percent of the group that gave responses falling into each of the specified
categories

All significant results have a p-value of less than
0.05. All marginally significant results have a
p-value between 0.05 and 0.1. All marginally and
statistically significant results are discussed,
nonsignificant results are not.
In responses to the item regarding the govern-
ment’s right to invasion, chi-squares revealed
significant differences based on several demo-
graphic variables, including gender, military
involvement, and the military involvement of
relatives (see Table 31.4). For example, these chi-
square analyses revealed significant differences
in anti-invasion response patterns contingent on
gender. A significantly greater proportion of
women than men gave responses indicating at
least one of the appreciating consequences
themes and referencing the negative conse-
quences of invasion. In contrast, a significantly
greater proportion of men than women gave
general anti-invasion responses and provided
responses coded as honoring international man-
dates in their arguments against a state’s right to
invasion.
Chi-square analyses revealed significant and
marginal differences in the use of anti-invasion
arguments in responses contingent on whether or
not the respondent had ever been in the military.
For example, a significantly greater proportion of
nonmilitary participants than military partici-
pants gave responses illustrating at least one of
the anti-invasion themes and at least one of the
appreciating consequences arguments; a margin-
ally greater proportion of nonmilitary respon-
dents also gave at least one example of a
responsibility argument and to give responses
citing respect for government and sovereignty
and negative consequences.
Finally, chi-square tests revealed significant
differences in the use of anti-invasion mecha-
nisms contingent on whether or not respondents
had relatives in the military. As compared with
their counterparts, a significantly greater propor-
tion of respondents with military relatives provided
responses coded for at least one of the principled
moral justification categories and responses
indicating nonviolence and concern with peace.
31 East Asia Invasion 501

Table 31.5 Another country bombing your country: percentages of responses in coding categories by demographic
groups and chi-square values
Categories Group 1a Group 2a c2
Male Female
Personal disengagement presence 40 28 2.94^
Vengeful agency 28 16 3.85*
Humanizing agency presence 19 31 3.36^
Military Nonmilitary
Antisocial agency presence 42 26 3.30^
Humanizing agency presence 11 30 5.20*
General responsibility 33 19 3.28^
Genuine assistance 12 29 3.89*
Relative military No relative military
Antisocial agency presence 34 21 3.25^
Vengeful agency 28 13 5.10*
Humanizing agency 18 32 4.04*
Genuine assistance 19 32 3.34^
Protest No protest
Vengeful agency 11 25 2.88^
Prosocial agency 24 10 4.33*
Note: “Presence” at the end of a variable name indicates that the participant provided at least one example of a response
that was coded into that category and/or one of its subcategories
*p £ 0.05; ^0.051 < p < 0.10
a
The numbers in these columns are the percent of the group that gave responses falling into each of the specified
categories

In contrast, a significantly greater proportion of responses indicating vengeful agency. A marginally

respondents without military relatives gave
responses citing negative consequences of inva-
sion. Refer to Table 31.4 for percentages of anti-
invasion responses in coding categories by
demographic groups with chi-square values.
Your Country Being Bombed Analyses
In response to items regarding a scenario in which
one’s own country is being bombed by another
country, chi-square analyses revealed significant
differences in the use of both personal engagement
and disengagement themes contingent on the gen-
der of the respondent, whether or not the respon-
dent had ever been in the military, whether or not
respondents had relatives in the military, and
whether or not respondents had participated in
peace protests (see Table 31.5). Specifically, a
marginally greater proportion of men than women
provided responses illustrating at least one form
of personal disengagement and in particular
greater proportion of women than men responded
with examples of at least one form of humanizing
agency categories in response to this scenario.
Chi-square analyses revealed marginal differ-
ences in the use of personally disengaged
responses and both marginal and significant dif-
ferences in the use of personally engaged
responses based on whether or not respondents
had ever been involved in the military. A margin-
ally greater proportion of respondents with
military involvement than their counterparts pro-
vided responses that were coded for at least one
of the antisocial agency categories. A significantly
greater proportion of nonmilitary respondents
than military respondents provided responses
illustrating at least one of the humanizing agency
themes as well as genuine assistance. In contrast,
a marginally greater proportion of respondents
with military experience than those without it
gave responses indicating general responsibility.
502 E. Hoshino-Browne et al.

Table 31.6 Your country bombing another country: percentages of responses in coding categories by demographic
groups and chi-square values
Categories Group 1a Group 2a c2
Male Female
Personal engagement presence 81 91 4.80*
Relative military No relative military
Personal disengagement presence 16 8 2.94^
Denial of responsibility presence 13 6 2.77^
Personal engagement presence 84 92 2.94^
Prosocial agency presence 39 51 3.12^
Protest No protest
Prosocial agency 7 0.7 6.10*b
Note: “Presence” at the end of a variable name indicates that the participant provided at least one example of a response
that was coded into that category and/or one of its subcategories
*p £ 0.05; ^0.051 < p < 0.10
a
The numbers in these columns are the percent of the group that gave responses falling into each of the specified
categories
b
Fisher’s p-value

Chi-square analyses also indicated significant
and marginal differences both for personally
engaged and personally disengaged response
patterns between respondents who had relatives
in the military and respondents without relatives
in the military. A marginally greater proportion
of respondents with relatives in the military than
their counterparts provided responses coded for
at least one of the antisocial agency themes and
significantly more likely to give responses dem-
onstrating vengeful agency. Conversely, a
significantly greater proportion of respondents
without relatives in the military used humanizing
agency in their responses and a marginally greater
proportion of them than their counterparts gave
responses indicating genuine assistance in
response to this bombing scenario.
In regard to the respondents with experiences in
peace protests, chi-squares revealed that nonpro-
testors were marginally more likely than protes-
tors to give responses indicating vengeful agency.
A significantly greater proportion of protestors
than nonprotestors gave responses demonstrating
prosocial agency. Refer to Table 31.5 for percent-
ages of responses in coding categories by demo-
graphic groups and chi-square values, in responses
to another country bombing one’s own.
Your Country Bombing Another Analyses
In response to the items regarding a scenario in
which one’s country is bombing another country,
group differences were found based on gender,
whether or not the respondent had relatives in the
military, and whether or not the respondent had
ever participated in protests (see Table 31.6). For
example, a significantly greater proportion of
women than men gave at least one example of
personal engagement. In addition, a marginally
greater proportion of respondents with relatives
in the military than their counterparts provided
responses coded for at least one of the personal
disengagement themes as well as at least one of
the denial of responsibility themes. A marginally
greater proportion of respondents without rela-
tives in the military than respondents with rela-
tives in the military gave responses illustrating at
least one of the personal engagement themes as
well as at least one of the prosocial agency cate-
gories. Finally, a significantly greater proportion
of protestors than nonprotestors gave responses
demonstrating prosocial agency. Refer to
Table 31.6 for percentages of responses in coding
categories by demographic groups and chi-square
values, in response to one’s own country bomb-
ing another country.
31 East Asia Invasion
Discussion
As the brief review of the history of invasion at
the beginning of this chapter indicates, interna-
tional conflicts have been prevalent in East Asia.
Not only have East Asian countries invaded and
interfered with one another but they also have
experienced invasion and similar interferences
from Western powers.
To examine contemporary East Asians’ per-
spectives on invasion, we analyzed the survey
data collected from more than 400 East Asians.
The results indicated that 68% of East Asian par-
ticipants opposed a government’s right to invade
another country, whereas 32% of the participants
supported such a right. Even those in favor of a
right to invasion asserted that justifiable reasons
for invasion include only self-defense (38%) and
helping others (26%) rather than for gaining
power or fortune.
In the nineteenth century, the East Asian coun-
tries were viewed as weak by the USA and the
European countries. China, Japan, and Korea
were all exploited by Western powers. For exam-
ple, the Opium War benefited the British over the
Chinese, and when China attempted to end it,
they were forced to cede Hong Kong. Moreover,
the USA forcefully demanded that Japan open its
ports for trade in 1854 and that Korea do so in
1882. Both the USA and European countries
imposed unequal trade treaties on East Asian
countries from which they sought goods.
Throughout Korea’s history, many groups and
countries sought to control it, although the Korean
government itself has never invaded another
country. Most of Japan’s invasions were con-
ducted from 1876 to 1941. After Japan suffered
an instant loss of nearly 100,000 lives in the
atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and
World War II ended, a very strong commitment
to peace was made, and today, there is no stand-
ing military in Japan. Since World War II, China’s
invasion of Tibet in 1950 is the only instance of
an East Asian country invading another country.
Korea and Japan have not invaded other territo-
ries since the end of World War II.
503
Our exploratory chi-square analyses indicated
that in opposing a state right to invasion, more
men than women argued for the importance of
respecting and following international agree-
ments, whereas more women than men empha-
sized negative consequences of state aggression.
Also, more participants without relatives in mili-
tary service, compared to their counterparts,
referred to negative consequences of invasion,
whereas more participants with relatives in mili-
tary service were concerned with maintaining
peace.
When asked how they would feel and what
they would want to do if indiscriminate bombing
by another country were to take place in their
countries, or in another country by their own
countries, 76% of the participants responded
with statements that indicated personal engage-
ment. These responses tended to include rejec-
tion or resistance to violence; feelings of shame,
guilt, and responsibility and the intention to par-
ticipate in protests against invasion of another
country; and commitment to help and protect
victims in an invaded country. On the other hand,
24% of the participants responded with state-
ments that indicated personal disengagement
characterized by a removal of personal responsi-
bility, anger and hatred, and retaliation and
punishment.
Regarding the specific scenario of an indis-
criminate bombing taking place in their countries
by another country, more people without rela-
tives in military service than those with such rela-
tives stated that they would help victims. In
addition, more people with military service than
those without military service provided responses
coded for antisocial agency through expressions
of intense anger and hatred. More men than
women mentioned revenge against and punish-
ment for the invading country and so did more
people with relatives in military service than
those without such relatives, as well as nonpro-
testors compared to protestors. As for the sce-
nario of an indiscriminate bombing in another
country by their own countries, more women
than men and more people without relatives in
the military than those with relatives in the military
504
provided responses showing various kinds of
personal engagement to intervene or help others.
The major pattern of the results suggests that
East Asians recognize the importance of peace
and nonviolence as part of basic human rights.
The results also indicate that East Asians are con-
cerned about various negative consequences and
implications of state aggression. What is espe-
cially encouraging is that more than 75% of the
participants made responses indicating an intent
to demonstrate personal engagement in response
to indiscriminate bombing, regardless of who
would be doing the bombing. It is encouraging
because the responses suggest that contemporary
East Asians are morally conscientious and mor-
ally engaged despite their past history of various
invasions and wars.
At the same time, it is hard to ignore the
finding that about one-third of the East Asian par-
ticipants advocated for a state right to invasion
and about one-quarter showed personal disen-
gagement in their responses to the bombing sce-
narios. It is interesting to note that in the
exploratory analyses, the specific variables
emerging as significant predictors of personal
disengagement were gender, one’s own military
experience, and having relatives in military ser-
vice. As the above summary indicates, men
tended to be more aggressive than women by
supporting revenge and punishment for the invad-
ing country, psychologically distancing from
their countries’ bombing, or supporting the
bombing. These findings gain validity from other
research indicating that men tend to be more
physically aggressive (Bartholow and Anderson
2002; Eagly and Steffen 1986) and less sympa-
thetic and empathetic (Cross and Madson 1997)
than women.
How would the variables relating to military
experience lead to personal disengagement from
invasions on the indiscriminating bombing sce-
narios? As the above summary indicates, people
with military experience and those with relatives
in military service were more likely than their
counterparts to express intense anger and hatred
and mention revenge and punishment. A military
organization has a mission to defend its country
E. Hoshino-Browne et al.
from any threats, often using weapons.
Considering this mission, it may be natural that
anyone who is directly (personal service) or indi-
rectly (having relatives) involved in the military
would react with intense negativity to situations
of aggression. It is understandable that these indi-
viduals would tend to defend and justify the
actions of their own military, even such actions as
invasions or bombing another country, because
military training supports such views. Even after
people leave military service, the military culture
or training they have had may have acculturated
them to advocate for military actions.
If so, then in promoting world peace and
reducing international conflicts, it seems crucial
to consider the role of the military as well as its
nature and culture in society. Is it too naïve to
consider the possibility of eliminating militaries
around the world? If the military is an essential
organization in any country, then is it possible to
change its primary mission, and consequently its
culture and training, to promote peace rather than
aggression, violence, and combat? Is a military
action by a country justifiable if it is for a human-
itarian cause? For instance, would an invasion be
justified if its purpose were to bring down a dic-
tatorship that was committing genocide?
Human beings are certainly capable of espous-
ing both good and evil and of showing both moral
engagement and disengagement, as the survey
data has demonstrated. It is important to keep in
mind, however, that what people say in response
to hypothetical scenarios regarding their feelings
or actions could be quite different from what they
would actually do in real situations of war and
invasion, in which they are directly involved.
How can people’s moral standards be improved?
How can moral engagement be taught and learned
so that it becomes a predominant response in a
real situation of conflict or war? How can moral
engagement be promoted in a military organiza-
tion so that governmental aggression and vio-
lence can be reduced even in conflict situations?
These questions cannot be easily answered, and
the answers will not be quickly implemented.
Still, they are important questions to contemplate
in today’s increasingly complex, global world.
31 East Asia Invasion
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Bandura A (1999) Moral disengagement in the perpetra-
tion of inhumanities. Pers Soc Psychol Rev 3:193–209
Bartholow BD, Anderson CA (2002) Effects of violent
video games on aggressive behavior: potential sex dif-
ferences. J Exp Soc Psychol 38:283–290
Cross SE, Madson L (1997) Models of the self: self-
construals and gender. Psychol Bull 122:5–37
Cumings B (2005) Korea’s place in the sun: a modern his-
tory, 2nd edn. W.W. Norton & Company, New York
Duus P (1984) Economic dimensions of Meiji imperialism:
the case of Korea, 1895–1910. In: Myers RH, Peattie
MR (eds) The Japanese colonial empire, 1895–1945.
Princeton University Press, Princeton, pp 128–171
Eagly AH, Steffen VJ (1986) Gender and aggressive
behavior: a meta-analytic review of the social psycho-
logical literature. Psychol Bull 100:309–330
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social, and political history. Wadsworth, Belmont
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Ienaga S (1978) The pacific war, 1931–1945: a critical
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 Patterns in the Justification
of Invasion and Responses to Attack 32
Alfred McAlister, Tristyn Campbell,
and Erin Murtagh

The previous nine chapters reported on survey

findings pertaining to invasion and bombing from
Africa, East Asia, the Gulf States, Latin America,
the Middle East, Russia and the Balkan Peninsula,
South and Southeast Asia, the UK/Anglo region,
and Western Europe. The specific items on the
Personal and Institutional Rights to Governmental
Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS) that
were analyzed were as follows: (a) “Sometimes one
country has the right to invade another country”; (b)
“Your country is indiscriminately bombing a major
city in another country, and women and children,
the elderly and civilian men are running around
bloody and screaming. What would you feel? What
would you want to do?”; and (c) “Another country
is indiscriminately bombing a major city in your
country, and women and children, the elderly, and
civilian men are running around bloody and scream-
ing. What would you feel? What would you want to
do?” In regard to the first item, participants were
asked to indicate their level of agreement on a
7-point rating scale and then to indicate in their own
words their rationale for the rating they provided.
The second item called for qualitative responses to
the two open-ended questions. This chapter
summarizes patterns in the responses across the
regions in regard to these items.
Coding Responses to the State’s
Right to Invade Item
In order to code responses to these items, we
developed coding manuals informed by Albert
Bandura’s theory of moral disengagement (1999)
and our extension of his more limited work on
moral engagement. The survey was not designed
specifically to assess moral disengagement and
engagement, and the participants from each region
were available samples that cannot be assumed to
be representative; consequently, we believe it is
important not to reify the theoretical constructs or
overgeneralize the findings. We believe it is partic-
ularly important not to characterize people or
regions as morally disengaged or engaged, although
much of the reasoning given by respondents in our
samples provides evidence of the kinds of thinking
Bandura calls “moral disengagement.” Therefore,
we refer to pro- and anti-invasion arguments, rather
than morally disengaged or engaged ones. Our cod-
ing manuals were designed to identify examples of
those types of reasoning and code them for the
kinds of sociocognitive mechanisms they seem to
show. The manuals were also designed to identify
types of reasoning and motives for action that were

K. Malley-Morrison et al. (eds.), International Handbook of War, Torture, and Terrorism, 507
Peace Psychology Book Series, DOI 10.1007/978-1-4614-1638-8_32,
© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2013
508
consistent with forms of engagement that seemed
like the logical reciprocals of Bandura’s moral dis-
engagement mechanisms.
As discussed in Chap. 22 (the introductory
chapter to this section of the book), all qualitative
responses for the state’s right to invasion item
were broken into codeable units and then coded
into categories derived from Bandura’s theory of
moral disengagement. These categories, repre-
senting forms of sociocognitive processes that
Bandura attributed to moral disengagement,
include (a) displacing responsibility for govern-
mental aggression, by deferring to government or
the international community/UN; (b) advanta-
geous comparison/positive consequences, which
represents invasion as a cost-benefit analysis done
as a last resort; (c) attribution of blame, which
presents invasion as a means of punishment for
previous aggression; and (d) pseudo-moral
justification such as framing invasion as a neces-
sary step to a morally worthy outcome, including
self-defense/preemptive strike arguments justify-
ing invasion if done in response to a perceived
threat or attack or to help others and pseudoas-
sistance rationales supporting invasion when done
to help citizens of another country. All of these
categories are consistent with Bandura’s descrip-
tion of the sociocognitive processes that he
believes are inherent in moral disengagement. We
also included a general invasion tolerant category
to capture responses that simply agreed with a
state’s right to invasion.
Expanding on Bandura’s theory, we also devel-
oped a set of guidelines for coding moral engage-
ment by identifying responses that seemed to
involve sociocognitive processes that were the
reciprocals of the moral disengagement processes
he identified. Specifically, we created a category
(a) for the assumption of responsibility (rather
than its denial), including insisting on respect for
governmental/sovereignty integrity (that is,
responses that reject a right to invade based on the
principle of sovereignty and national borders) and
honor international mandates (i.e., responses
indicating that one country has no right to invade
another if the invasion violates international
law or does not have international support);
(b) arguments appreciating the consequences of
A. McAlister et al.
invasion, including an emphasis on negative
consequences and better alternatives; and (c) two
subcategories of the major category principled
moral justification, including nonviolence/con-
cern with peace and an appeal to human rights/
concern for others, which in turn had subcatego-
ries for equality (responses rejecting a state’s right
to invasion based on variations of the golden rule)
and freedom (arguments that invasion violates the
right of peoples to be free). We also created a gen-
eral invasion intolerant category to capture
response that simply disagreed with a state’s right
to invasion.
Based on our coding manual for the first item
(“Sometimes one country has the right to invade
another country”), we first categorized every
codeable unit in a response as either tolerant of a
state’s right to invasion (pro-invasion) or intoler-
ant of a state’s right to invasion (anti-invasion).
We then analyzed the invasion-tolerant responses
to determine if they exemplified any of the
sociocognitive mechanisms that Bandura labeled
forms of moral disengagement. We also analyzed
the invasion-intolerant responses to determine
whether they exemplified any of the sociocogni-
tive mechanisms we had identified as evidence of
moral engagement, based on our extension of
Bandura’s theory. Regional files were created and
analyzed using Excel and the Statistical Package
for the Social Sciences (SPSS). Across each
region, percentages were calculated and themes
were identified. On a purely exploratory basis,
Pearson’s chi-squares, independent sample
t-tests, and analysis of variances (ANOVAs) were
run in SPSS to establish the role demographic
variables played in the use of the perceived pro-
war justifications. The demographic variables
studied were: (a) gender, (b) military service, (c)
relative’s participation in the military, (d) partici-
pation in peace protest, (e) religion, (f) socioeco-
nomic status, and (g) participant’s country.
However, some chapter authors did not run all of
the analyses and did not study all of the demo-
graphic variables. Because not all of the chapters
include findings on the role of religion, socioeco-
nomic status, and nationality in the frequency of
particular response patterns, results pertaining
to those demographic characteristics are not
32 Invasion Integration
discussed in this chapter. All of the demographic
differences reported in this chapter were identified
using chi-square analyses and are statistically
significant, with a p value of 0.05 or less. For
more information on coding, variable formation,
and analysis, refer to the invasion introductory
methods chapter, Chap. 22 of this volume.
Patterns of Responses to a State’s
Right to Invasion
Tolerance for a State’s Right to Invade
Responses that agreed with the prompt “Sometimes
one country has the right to invade another coun-
try” varied in the forms of pro-invasion rationales
they provided. The UK/Anglo region provided
the largest percentage of responses justifying a
state’s right to invasion, with 62% of all the inva-
sion responses providing some sort of argument
in support of one state’s right to invade another.
Western Europe was second with 51% of all
responses being arguments in favor of a state’s
right to invade, and the Middle East was third,
with 38% of all responses showing some support
for a state’s right to invasion. Justifications of a
state’s right to invade constituted just over 30%
of all responses in the Russia and Balkan region
and East Asia, and approximately 20% of all
responses from Latin America, South and
Southeast Asia, and Africa were coded for inva-
sion tolerance. The Gulf States was not included
in this analysis as the invasion item did not appear
on the survey those respondents took.
An overwhelming majority of responses that
were tolerant of a state’s right to invade used one
of the arguments that we have identified as
“pseudo-moral” justifications. For East Asia, the
Middle East, and Russia and the Balkan Peninsula,
the most common proinvasion response asserted
that states had the right to conduct an invasion if
it was done as a form of self-defense or preemp-
tive strike. In Africa, Latin America, South and
Southeast Asia, the UK/Anglo Region, and
Western Europe, pseudo-assistance, or a desire
to help citizens of a country, such as those ruled
by a dictator, was the most frequently given
justification for a state’s right to invasion.
509
Another, albeit less common, pattern that
emerged was in regard to cost–benefit analysis rea-
soning. For most of the regions, seeing the state’s
right to invasion as having positive consequences,
such as saving many lives, was a fairly common
response. Moreover, a large number of responses
from every region indicated a belief that invasion
was a right if done as an act of revenge or punish-
ment for a previous invasion or wrongdoing; that
is, these responses justified a right to invasion by
attributing blame onto the other country.
Gender differences in the use of pro-invasion
arguments were observed in the Latin American,
Russia and the Balkans, Western Europe, and UK/
Anglo countries. In all of these regions, men gave
significantly more responses than women provid-
ing support for a state’s right to invasion—the
only exception being that significantly more UK/
Anglo women than men gave arguments coded for
pseudo-assistance. On the other hand, significantly
more men than women from the UK/Anglo and
Western European countries provided pseudo-
moral justifications in support of a state’s right to
invasion. In Russia and the Balkans, significantly
more men than women gave responses displacing
responsibility for invasion onto another entity,
including specifically deferring to the interna-
tional community regarding a state’s right to
invade another state. Finally, significantly more
men than women from Latin America, Western
Europe, and the UK/Anglo region used at least
one of pro-invasion arguments.
In the UK/Anglo region, the Middle East,
Western Europe, Russia and the Balkans, and
Latin America, there were differences based on
military service in the use of at least one of the
pro-invasion arguments. Significantly more
Middle Eastern respondents who had been in the
military than their counterparts used at least one
of the pro-invasion justifications in their
responses. In the Middle East, Western Europe,
and the UK/Anglo region, significantly more par-
ticipants with than without a military background
used at least one of the displacement of responsi-
bility categories.
Respondents who had been in the military in
Western Europe, Russia and the Balkans, and
the UK/Anglo countries gave significantly more
responses deferring responsibility onto the
510
international community than their counterparts.
Significantly more of the military than the non-
military respondents from the UK/Anglo and
the Middle East samples also argued for a right
to self-defense or preemptive strike. As com-
pared to their counterparts, significantly more
Middle Eastern and Latin American military
respondents gave responses coded for pseudo-
moral justification when supporting a state’s
right to invade. Interestingly, in Latin America,
respondents who had not been in the military
gave significantly more responses than their
counterparts justifying a state’s right to invasion
as needed to help citizens of that country, which
we referred to as pseudo-assistance.
Having a relative in the military was also
associated with particular pro-invasion
justifications for participants from the UK/Anglo
and Western European regions. In particular,
respondents from UK/Anglo region with a rela-
tive in the military gave significantly more
responses using reasoning in line with what we
identified as a pseudo-moral justification when
supporting a state’s right to invade than respon-
dents without a relative in the military.
Respondents with a relative in the military in both
the Western European and UK/Anglo region gave
significantly more responses than those without a
relative in the military using at least one of the
pro-invasion themes.
Differences in the use of several invasion-
tolerant arguments were found based on whether
or not participants have ever been involved in an
anti-war protest. Significantly more non-protestors
than protestors in the Russian and Balkans, UK/
Anglo, and Middle Eastern regions gave at least
one of the pro-invasion and pseudo-moral
justification rationales for invasion. Additionally,
significantly more protestors than non-protestor
from the South and Southeast Asia region argued
in favor of the need to maintain security of their
country via self-defense or preemptive strike.
Intolerance for a State’s Right to Invade
In the African, East Asian, Latin American,
Middle Eastern, Russia and Balkan, and South
and Southeast Asian regions, more than 60% of
A. McAlister et al.
responses were coded for opposition to a state’s
right to invade. Only in the UK/Anglo and
Western European regions did fewer than 50% of
responses display an intolerance for a state’s right
to invade.
Responses rejecting a state’s right to invade
showed fairly similar reasoning across regions.
Concern for respecting government/sovereignty
was the most frequently expressed reason for dis-
agreeing with a state’s right to invade in every
region except for the UK/Anglo region and
Western Europe. In the UK/Anglo region, the
most frequent reason for opposition was the
need to honor international law. Conversely,
Western European responses were most frequently
coded for better alternatives to invasion.
In Latin America, South and South East Asia,
and the UK/Anglo regions, arguments against a
state’s right to invade due to sovereignty concerns
varied in relation to gender, with significantly
more women than men arguing that sovereignty
should be respected. References to honoring inter-
national mandates forbidding invasion were made
significantly more often made by men than women
in East Asia, Latin America, the Middle East, and
Russia and the Balkans. Significantly more women
than men in Africa, East Asia, and the UK/Anglo
region rejected a state’s right to invade by point-
ing out negative consequences of invasion.
Significantly more women than men in Western
Europe offered better alternatives to invasion.
Similarly, significantly more women than men
from Russia and the Balkans and the UK/Anglo
region gave responses coded for at least one of the
appreciating consequences types of argument.
Furthermore, women from Russia and the Balkans,
the UK/Anglo region, Latin America, and Western
Europe used reasoning coded for at least one of
the principled moral justification themes against a
state’s right to invade another country than men
from those regions. However, more men than
women from South and Southeast Asia provided
responses coded for at least one of the anti-inva-
sion arguments. Finally, significantly more men
than women from East Asia and South and
Southeast Asia provided general anti-invasion
arguments against a state’s right to invasion.
There were also several significant differences
in arguments opposing invasion based on whether
32 Invasion Integration
or not the participant had military experience.
In the Western Europe sample, significantly more
of the military than the nonmilitary respondents
cited the need to honor international mandates.
However, in South and Southeast Asia,
significantly more respondents who had never
been in the military made this argument than
respondents who had been in the military.
Significantly more nonmilitary participants than
military participants from the Middle East, East
Asia, and the UK/Anglo region provided
responses made at least one appreciating conse-
quences argument. In the UK/Anglo region, the
Middle East, and East Asia, significantly more
respondents without military experience gave
responses coded for at least one of the anti-inva-
sion themes than did their counterparts.
Significantly more nonmilitary than military
respondents from Western Europe and South and
Southeast Asia cited a concern for others as a
reason for opposing a state’s right to invade.
Finally, significantly more nonmilitary than mili-
tary respondents from the Middle East and
Russian and the Balkan gave at least one type of
principled moral justification for rejection of a
right to war as well as emphasizing nonviolence/
concern with peace.
In South and Southeast Asia and the UK/Anglo
region, significantly more respondents without a
relative in the military gave responses utilizing at
least one of the invasion-intolerant arguments than
respondents with a relative in the military. In East
Asia, significantly more respondents with relatives
without military service, as compared with respon-
dents who did have a relative in the military, pro-
vided responses that referenced the negative
consequences of invasion; however, the opposite
was true in the Latin American sample. As com-
pared to their counterparts, significantly more
Western European respondents with military rela-
tives emphasized respecting human rights, and
significantly more East Asian participants with a
military relative argued against a state’s right to
invade using at least one of the principled moral
justifications than did their counterparts. In
addition, significantly more respondents without
military relatives from South and Southeast Asia
and the UK/Anglo region stressed freedom, and
significantly more respondents without military
511
relatives from the UK/Anglo region gave princi-
pled moral justifications for rejecting a state’s right
to invasion as compared with their counterparts.
Finally, in five of the regions, there were some
differences in type of anti-invasion argument
made based on whether or not the respondents
had ever participated in an antiwar protest.
Specifically, in the UK/Anglo, Western Europe,
the Middle East, Russia and the Balkans, and
South and Southeast Asia regions, significantly
more protestors than non-protestors gave at least
one of the anti-invasion arguments.
Coding Responses to Indiscriminate
Bombing Items
We also developed coding manuals for the
scenario items asking participants to indicate in
their own words what they would want to do if
directly exposed to their country bombing inno-
cent civilians in another country or another coun-
try bombing innocent civilians in their own
country. We again looked for themes that were
consistent with Bandura’s moral disengagement
mechanisms but looked particularly for projected
personal behaviors that would be indicative of
various forms of proactive moral engagement.
Proactive moral engagement is “expressed in
the power to behave humanely” (Bandura 2002,
p. 111). In order to code for the proactive form of
moral engagement in responses to the “what
would you want to do” question regarding indis-
criminate bombing we elaborated on the con-
struct of personal engagement, which we view as
reflecting the kind of personal agency that
Bandura views as crucial to moral engagement.
As such, we created categories for: (a) general
responsibility for ending the bombings, with a
call for the international community as a subcat-
egory; (b) pro-social agency, including self-
referenced agency of protesting the government’s
actions and helping emotions of guilt or shame
over the acts; and (c) humanizing agency through
genuine assistance of victims of the bombings.
The converse to personal engagement is per-
sonal disengagement, which somewhat parallels
the concepts of moral disengagement. The cate-
gories of personal disengagement are: (a) a denial
512
of responsibility to do anything concerning the
bombings and include reliance on the govern-
ment/military by expressing support for its actions
and (b) anti-social agency, including vengeful
agency (an expression of a desire to punish the
offending country) and harming emotions, such
as anger or vengeance.
Coding and subsequent qualitative and quanti-
tative analysis was completed in the same manner
described previously.
Views on Another Country Bombing
Your Country
Personal Disengagement Themes
In general, there was little variation between the
responses coded for the personal disengagement
mechanisms. Russia and the Balkans had the
highest rates of personal disengagement, with
40% of all responses coded for the personal disen-
gagement constructs. The Middle East, East Asia,
and the UK/Anglo region followed with over 30%
of all responses showing personal disengagement
themes. Slightly over one-quarter of all responses
from Africa demonstrated elements of personal
disengagement. In the Gulf States and South and
Southeast Asia, roughly 20% of all responses
were coded for personal disengagement mecha-
nisms. Finally, about 15% of all responses from
Western Europe and Latin America depicted per-
sonal disengagement for this item.
In response to how you would feel and what you
would want to do if another country was bombing
your own, the most common responses demon-
strated feelings of or a desire to exact revenge
against or punish the other country in every region
except for Africa. In East Asia, the Gulf States,
Latin America, the Middle East, South and
Southeast Asia, the UK/Anglo region, and Western
Europe, the most common response to these items
was vengeful agency. Harming emotions was the
most common response in Russia and the Balkans.
In Africa, the most common personal disengage-
ment response to this item was a denial of respon-
sibility. This construct was seen in every other
region as well, although it was less common.
A. McAlister et al.
Usage of all the personal disengagement
constructs was contingent upon participants’
demographic characteristics. In Latin America,
eight of these mechanisms were contingent upon
demographic qualities. Russia and the Balkan
region followed with six constructs dependent
upon demographic variables. Five of these con-
structs were affected by demographic traits in the
Middle East and Western Europe. The UK/Anglo
region had the use of four personal disengage-
ment themes differ based on demographic
qualities. Two mechanisms were affected in the
Gulf States and South and Southeast Asia. Finally,
Africa and East Asia were tied with one construct
affected. Specific demographic differences in the
application of personal disengagement concepts
are discussed below.
Gender significantly affected the use of six of
the personally disengaged constructs: (a) anti-
social agency, (b) vengeful agency, (c) harming
emotions, (d) the personal disengagement catego-
ries, (e) the denial of responsibility categories, and
(f) the anti-social agency categories. In Latin
America, significantly more men than women gave
responses coded for the aforementioned catego-
ries, except anti-social agency categories. Gender
differences were not seen among Middle Eastern,
African, and South and Southeast Asian partici-
pants. Men from Western Europe, the UK/Anglo
countries, and Russia and the Balkans gave
significantly more responses than women to give
responses coded for at least one of the anti-social
agency categories. Men from the UK/Anglo region,
East Asia, and Latin America gave significantly
more responses utilizing the vengeful agency con-
struct. Finally, significantly more men from Latin
America, Russian and Balkan, Western Europe,
and the UK/Anglo region gave significantly
more responses coded for at least one of the
personal disengagement themes than women.
Respondents without a military background
from Latin America gave responses displaying
denial of responsibility than respondents who
had been in the military. In the UK/Anglo region,
the Middle East, and the Gulf States, respon-
dents who had been in the military gave
significantly more responses displaying vengeful
agency than their counterparts. Additionally,
32 Invasion Integration
military participants in the UK/Anglo, Middle
East, and Latin America gave significantly more
responses utilizing reasoning in line with at least
one of the anti-social agency themes than non-
military respondents.
Respondents with a relative in the military from
Western Europe and the UK/Anglo region gave
significantly more responses coded for at least one
of the anti-social agency categories than respon-
dents without family in the military. In Western
Europe and the Middle East, respondents with vet-
eran relatives gave significantly more responses
with harming emotions than their counterparts.
Protest participation only affected the use of
the personal disengagement themes in the UK/
Anglo region, Latin America, and Western
Europe. Respondents in the UK/Anglo region
who had never protested gave significantly more
responses using at least one of the personal dis-
engagement and anti-social agency themes than
respondents that had protested. Interestingly, the
opposite result was found among respondents
from Western Europe. Finally, Latin American
respondents who had never participated in a
peace protest gave significantly more responses
than those who had protested using at least one of
the denial of responsibility themes.
Personal Engagement Themes
Over 80% of all responses in the Gulf States,
Latin America, and Western Europe were coded
for personal engagement. Seventy-nine percent
of all responses from South and Southeast Asia
and 74% of all responses from Africa demon-
strated personal engagement themes. In the
Middle East, 70% of all responses were coded for
personal engagement constructs. In the UK/
Anglo region, East Asia, and Russia and the
Balkans, over 60% of all responses showed ele-
ments of personal engagement mechanisms.
In response to the prompt regarding what you
would want to do in this situation, two main
patterns emerged. In Africa, the Gulf States, the
Middle East, Russia and the Balkans, and UK/
Anglo region, the most common mechanism of
personal engagement identified in responses was
513
general responsibility. In Latin America, South
and Southeast Asia, and Western Europe,
responses to this item most often showed a desire
to help the victims of the bombing through what
we coded as genuine assistance. In East Asia,
these two mechanisms were tied as the most com-
mon personally engaged construct found in
responses to this item. Although less common,
responses from every region showed an assump-
tion of personal responsibility through self-refer-
enced agency, such as joining the military to fight
against the bombing.
Usage of all of the personal engagement
themes was affected by participants’ demo-
graphic characteristics. Of the 11 mechanisms of
personal engagement, 10 of the mechanisms were
affected by demographic variables in Latin
America. Nine of these constructs were affected
by demographic traits in South and Southeast
Asia and the UK/Anglo regions. Russia and the
Balkans followed these regions with eight mech-
anisms affected by demographics. In Western
Europe, the use of seven personal engagement
themes differed based on demographic qualities.
Six constructs were affected by demographics in
the Middle East. Africa and East Asia were tied
with three mechanisms affected. Finally, one per-
sonal engagement mechanism was affected in the
Gulf States. Specific demographic differences in
the application of personal engagement concepts
are discussed below.
In Western Europe and South and Southeast
Asia, significantly more women than men dem-
onstrated general personal engagement in their
responses. In Africa, however, this finding was
reversed. Significantly more men than women
from Africa and East Asia gave responses coded
for at least one of the personal engagement
themes. The opposite was true for the UK/Anglo,
Latin American, Middle Eastern, and Western
European regions.
In both the Middle East and the UK/Anglo
regions, significantly more respondents without
military experience gave responses coded for at
least one of the personal engagement categories
than respondents with military experience.
Significantly more of these same respondents from
the Middle Eastern and UK/Anglo regions gave
514
responses to the prompt with reasoning
exemplifying at least one of the pro-social agency
categories than their counterparts involved in the
military. In South and Southeast Asia, the opposite
result was found to be true. Additionally, civilian
respondents from the UK/Anglo, Middle East,
Latin America, and East Asia regions gave
significantly more responses using at least one of
the humanizing agency categories in their stance
against state-supported bombing than their mili-
tary counterparts.
Respondents from the Gulf States with a rela-
tive in the military gave significantly more
responses than respondents without a relative in
the military typifying the humanizing agency cat-
egory. The opposite was true of East Asian
respondents as those without relatives in the mili-
tary gave significantly more responses utilizing
this theme than their counterparts. Respondents
without a relative in the military from the Western
Europe and the UK/Anglo regions gave
significantly more responses calling upon the
international community in response to the bomb-
ing of another country than respondents with a
relative in the military. Finally, respondents from
Latin America and South and Southeast Asia
without a relative in the military gave significantly
more responses displaying reasoning consistent
with at least one of the pro-social agency themes
than respondents with a relative in the military.
In the UK/Anglo region, Russia and the
Balkans, Western Europe, and South and
Southeast Asia, respondents who had participated
in a peace protest used at least one of the per-
sonal engagement constructs significantly more
than respondents who had not participated in a
peace protest. Additionally, protestors from the
UK/Anglo region, Western Europe, South and
Southeast Asia, and the Middle East provided
significantly more responses coded for at least
one of the general responsibility categories than
respondents who did not protest. UK/Anglo,
Western European, and Russian and Balkan pro-
testors gave significantly more responses calling
upon the international community than those who
did not protest. Significantly more non-protestors
from Latin America demonstrated pro-social
agency in their responses than protestors. The
A. McAlister et al.
opposite was found in the South and Southeast
Asian and East Asian regions as protestors from
these areas gave significantly more responses
utilizing the pro-social agency construct than
non-protestors.
View on Your Country Bombing
Another Country
Personal Disengagement Themes
In general, responses coded for personal disen-
gagement for this hypothetical bombing situation
ranged from less than 10% to almost one-third of
all the responses to the “What would you want to
do item.” In the African sample, 32% of all
responses to the item were coded for personal
disengagement, followed by the Middle East with
23%, and Russia and the Balkan region with
18%; in East Asia, the Gulf States, and South and
Southeast Asia, 12% of all responses were coded
for personal disengagement. The percentages of
personal disengagement in the other regions were
9% in the UK/Anglo sample, 7% in the Latin
American sample, and 6% in the Western
European sample.
A denial of responsibility to take action against
the bombings was the most common theme
identified in responses from Africa, East Asia, the
Gulf States, Latin America, the Middle East, and
the UK/Anglo region. In Russia and the Balkans,
a denial of responsibility was seen in responses at
the same frequency as harming emotions, such as
anger toward one’s government. Vengeful agency
was the most commonly identified theme in South
and Southeast Asian responses. Finally, denial of
responsibility, harming emotions, and vengeful
agency were all coded for at the same frequency
in responses from Western Europe.
There were a number of demographic group
differences in the use of particular personal dis-
engagement constructs. Out of the ten coding cat-
egories for personal disengagement, significant
differences based on demographic variables were
found for nine of them in the South and Southeast
Asia; five of them in the UK/Anglo region; four
in Russia and the Balkans, Latin America, Middle
32 Invasion Integration
East, and Western Europe; one in Africa; and
none in the Gulf States and East Asia.
In the UK/Anglo region, significantly more
men than women denied any responsibility to
take action against the bombings. Additionally,
significantly more men than women from South
and Southeast Asia and the UK/Anglo region
responded with reasoning consistent with at least
one of the anti-social agency constructs.
Furthermore, in South and Southeast Asia, the
UK/Anglo countries, and Western Europe,
significantly more men than women gave at least
one type of personal disengagement response.
Interestingly, the opposite was found in the
Middle East. Also, Middle Eastern women gave
significantly more responses citing harming emo-
tions, such as hatred, toward their government
than men. The opposite result was found among
UK/Anglo and South and Southeast Asian
respondents.
In the Western European region, significantly
more respondents with military experience than
those without such experience gave at least one
response coded for anti-social agency and per-
sonal disengagement. Significantly more mili-
tary respondents from the Middle East gave
responses exemplifying at least one of the denial
of responsibility arguments than their non-military
counterparts.
In the Africa and Western Europe samples,
significantly more respondents with a relative in
the military than their counterparts denied any
responsibility to take action against the bomb-
ings. In South and Southeast Asia, significantly
more respondents without a relative in the mili-
tary indicated reliance on their government/mili-
tary in this situation than respondents with a
relative in the military.
There were also a few differences between
group that had and had not participated in anti-war
protests in responses to this scenario item. In
Africa, Latin America, and South and Southeast
Asia, significantly more non-protestors than pro-
testors denied any responsibility to take action
against the bombing. In Western Europe and South
and South East Asia, significantly more of the
non-protestors indicated that they would respond
with vengeful agency. In South and Southeast Asia
515
and Russia and the Balkans, significantly more of
the non-protestors gave at least one of the
anti-social agency responses. Finally, significantly
more non-protestors than protestors in South and
Southeast Asia and Latin America gave at least
one of the denial of responsibility arguments.
Personal Engagement Themes
The great majority of responses across the regions
were coded for some form of personal engage-
ment, including over 90% of all responses to this
item in Western Europe, Latin America, and the
UK/Anglo region; over 80% of all responses in
South and Southeast Asia, East Asia, the Gulf
States, and Russia and the Balkan region; 77% of
all responses from the Middle East; and 68% of
all responses from Africa.
For East Asia, the Middle East, Russia and the
Balkans, and the UK/Anglo region, the most
common response was to assume general respon-
sibility for stopping the bombing in an unspecified
manner. The most common personally engaged
argument in Africa, the Gulf States, Latin
America, and South and Southeast Asia was self-
referenced agency shown by a willingness to take
action against one’s government in response to
the bombings. Percentages for these two catego-
ries were tied in Western Europe.
All of the personal engagement variables
showed some variation across demographic
groups. Of the eleven personal engagement cod-
ing categories, ten showed some variation across
demographic groups in Russia and the Balkans,
Western Europe, and South and Southeast Asia;
nine in the UK/Anglo region; eight in Latin
America; six in the Middle East; three in the Gulf
States; and two in East Asia and Africa.
In Russia and the Balkans, significantly more
men than women provided responses demonstrat-
ing self-referenced agency, such as protesting
against their government’s role in the bombings.
Significantly more men than women from Russia
and the Balkans and the Middle East gave at
least one example of a pro-social agency argu-
ment; however, the opposite result was found in
Western Europe where it was the women who
516
gave significantly more responses demonstrating
pro-social agency. Additionally, women from
Western Europe, the UK/Anglo region, and the
Middle East responded significantly more often
with responses coded for at least one of the
humanizing agency categories than did men.
Lastly, significantly more women than men from
the UK/Anglo, Eastern Asian, Latin American,
and Western European regions gave at least one
response coded for personal engagement.
Response patterns varied in relation to military
service in five regions: Russia and the Balkans,
the Middle East, the Gulf States, South and
Southeast Asia, and the UK/Anglo region. In the
UK/Anglo region, significantly more respondents
not in the military than those in the military gave
responses coded for at least one of the humaniz-
ing agency categories. Respondents with military
experience gave significantly more responses
than their counterparts coded for at least one of
the prosocial agency categories in the Middle
East and Russia and the Balkans. Significantly
more veterans than non-veterans gave responses
demonstrating self-referenced agency in the
Russian and Balkan and Gulf States regions. By
contrast, significantly more respondents without
military experience than those with military expe-
rience in South and Southeast Asia and the UK/
Anglo region gave at least one example of gen-
eral responsibility.
Groups based on having or not having a
relative in the military differed in the use of
personally engaged responses in only two of the
regions. In the Gulf States, significantly more
participants without a relative in the military as
compared to those with a relative gave responses
demonstrating general responsibility to end the
bombings. Respondents without a relative in
the military than their counterparts also gave
significantly more responses displaying self-
referenced agency in a hypothetical bombing
situation.
Finally, in the Middle East and the UK/Anglo
samples, significantly more antiwar protestors
than nonprotestors indicated a sense of general
responsibility to do something in their responses
to the bombing scenario. By contrast, in the
A. McAlister et al.
Western European sample, significantly more
nonprotestors than protestors gave at least one
response codeable for general responsibility.
Significantly more protestors than nonprotestors
from the UK/Anglo region, the Middle East, and
South and South East Asia gave at least one of
example of a personally engaged response.
Nonprotestors from the Russian and Balkan
region gave significantly more responses than
protestors indicating general personal
engagement.
Conclusions
Support for a state’s right to invade other coun-
tries varied greatly by region. National experi-
ence appeared to play an important role in levels
of support. The strongest endorsement of inva-
sion came from respondents living in nations that
have already participated in NATO and other
multilateral military actions in formerly
Yugoslavian states, Afghanistan, Iraq, and most
recently Libya. Moderate support was seen in the
Middle East, the Russia and Balkan states, and in
East Asia. Lower degrees of support were found
in Latin America, Africa, and South and Southeast
Asia.
Interestingly, helping people threatened by
their own government was the most commonly
cited justification in the regions with the highest
level of support for invasion (UK/Anglo and
Western Europe) as well as in those with the low-
est level of support. Among the regions showing
an intermediate level of support for a right to
invasion, self-defense was the most frequently
cited justification. For both self-defense and
defense of others, the use of utilitarian reasoning
was commonly employed—particularly the
assertion that an invasion may be used as a last
resort to prevent deaths in another country or in
one’s own. Justification of invasion as an act of
revenge was less common, but at least a few
examples were found in all regions.
It was notable that women were less likely to
support invasion than men in the regions with the
greatest overall levels of support (UK/Anglo and
32 Invasion Integration
Western Europe) and in the Russian and Balkan
states but not in other regions. Support for
revenge and punishment in violent retaliation
following an attack on one’s own country was
higher among men in all regions. This finding
suggests that support from men may be a major
factor underlying public opinion about invasion
in regions that have already participated in mili-
tary actions beyond their own borders. It also
suggests that counterattacks motivated by the
desire for revenge will have greater support from
men than women in all regions.
Respondents’ and family members’ participa-
tion in the military was linked with more support
for invasions and violent retaliation following
attack in some countries and with less support in
others. This inconsistent pattern suggests that
unique national experiences with military service
may determine how that experience influences
support for military actions. Participation in
peace protests had similarly differential effects,
being positively associated with support for inva-
sion in Russian and the Balkan states and Western
Europe but negatively associated with support for
violent counterattack motivated by the desire for
revenge and punishment in the UK/Anglo region.
With respect to support for invasion, anti-war
protestors appear to vary across regions in their
views on the issue.
Violent retaliation following an attack on one’s
own country was offered as a justification of a
desire to punish the attacker and obtain revenge
by only approximately one in four respondents
across regions. This tendency was highest in
Russian and Balkan and UK/Anglo regions, mod-
erate in the Mideast, and lowest (approximately
one in five) in other regions. Interestingly, revenge
and punishment of the attacker was not a com-
mon justification for violent retaliation in the
African region.
When people choose to disengage their nor-
mal moral prohibitions against inflicting grievous
violence upon others, either in supporting the
invasion of another country or a violent retalia-
tion against an attack on one’s own country,
strong justifications are needed. Individuals who
reside in nations with frequent experience as
517
invaders seem more likely to view these actions
as morally worthy and describe themselves as
mainly motivated by the altruistic desire to help
others. The utilitarian decision that military inva-
sion is needed to save lives, whether in other
countries or in one’s own country, appears to be
the major justification offered for aggressive
actions in all regions of the world. However,
when one’s nation is itself the subject of an attack,
the desire to punish the attacker to obtain revenge
may become a stronger motivating factor, partic-
ularly among men.
To prevent unnecessary invasions and unnec-
essarily violent retaliations against attacks, public
discourse is urgently needed to question the valid-
ity of proposed justifications for aggressive mili-
tary action and to determine whether irrational
processes such as dehumanization are playing a
role in eliciting support (McAlister et al. 2006).
To engender opposition to invasion of another
country, appeals to concerns about respect for
international boundaries and national sovereignty
appear to be the most useful—particularly among
women and UK/Anglo, Latin American, and
South and Southeast Asian regions. In the Russian
and Balkan, East Asian, Middle Eastern regions,
as well as in Latin America, appeals to men to
respect international law may be more useful. In
all regions excluding Latin America, Gulf States,
and South and South Asia, opposition to invasion
may be influenced by consideration of its poten-
tial negative consequences, concern with peace,
the availability of better alternatives for resolving
conflict, and concern for human rights.
When one’s own country is involved in the
indiscriminate bombing of another country, our
findings indicate that only approximately 15%,
and no more than 30% in any region, will respond
with personal disengagement. When they do, they
tend to deny responsibility or express a desire for
revenge. On the other hand, approximately 85%
of the respondents across regions responded to
the idea of indiscriminate bombing of civilians by
one’s own country with resistance to personal and
moral disengagement, assuming personal respon-
sibility to do something and expressing feelings
of guilt and shame. Participation in peace protests
518
appears to strengthen—or simply to reflect—
resistance to moral disengagement.
When national conflicts become severe, it will
not help to label those who choose to support
military action as “morally disengaged.” These
persons may believe that their decision is based
on very strong moral reasoning. However, it will
be helpful to demand that assumptions about the
moral utility of aggressive military actions be rig-
orously explored and widely debated before the
decision to use force becomes irrevocable. If their
country chooses to use force and it results in
indiscriminate bombing, a majority of people in
many regions will tend feel a sense of responsi-
bility and guilt, and this may be enhanced by the
organization of protests against that action. When
A. McAlister et al.
nations are themselves attacked, their citizens
must be vigilant in avoiding support among men
for military overreactions that are motivated more
by the desire for revenge than by their value in
preventing future bloodshed.
References
Bandura A (1999) Moral disengagement in the perpetra-
tion of inhumanities. Pers Soc Psychol Rev 3:193–209
(Special issue on Evil and Violence)
Bandura A (2002) Selective moral disengagement in the
exercise of moral agency. J Moral Educ 31:101–119
McAlister A, Bandura A, Owen S (2006) Moral disen-
gagement and support for military force: the impact of
September 11. J Soc Clin Psychol 25(2):141–165
 Section IV
Perspectives on Torture
 Methods of Assessing Perspectives
on Torture
Charikleia Tsatsaroni
The chapters in this section of the book describe
our findings regarding the ways that ordinary
people from around the world reason about and
feel about the use of torture by governments.
These findings are based on the quantitative and
qualitative responses to the rights’ item, “The
government has the right to order the torture of
prisoners in time of war,” and to the emotional/
motivational scenario, “Military officials are tor-
turing somebody suspected of having information
about terrorists. What would you want to do?”
Participants were recruited by an international
team of collaborators through convenience sam-
pling via personal contacts, colleges, and univer-
sities and an Internet site from nine regions
around the world (e.g., Africa, Western Europe,
East Asia, and the Middle East). In each of the
individual chapters in this section, a detailed
description of the samples is provided of the par-
ticipants’ nationality, gender, educational and
occupational backgrounds, social status, etc.
Given lack of funding for recruiting random sam-
ples, our findings must be considered exploratory
and hypothesis-generating rather than as hypoth-
esis-testing and universally generalizable. The
presentations of results focus only on patterns in
the qualitative responses and some very basic
analyses of the demographic group differences
in particular sociocognitive and motivational
responses.
K. Malley-Morrison et al. (eds.), International Handbook of War, Torture, and Terrorism,
Peace Psychology Book Series, DOI 10.1007/978-1-4614-1638-8_33,
© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2013
33
The Personal and Institutional Rights
to Aggression and Peace Scale
Our respondents completed either the paper-
and-pencil or electronic version of the personal
and institutional rights to aggression and peace
scale (PAIRTAPS) (Malley-Morrison et al. 2006),
developed in order to investigate people’s per-
spectives on different aspects of governmental
aggression. The PAIRTAPS has five parts: (1) the
rights scale, which has items assessing people’s
tolerance of governmental rights to use aggres-
sive actions (e.g., invasion, capital punishment,
torturing prisoners in time of war), and support
for human rights to nonviolence; (2) the govern-
mental beliefs scale, which examines political
conservatism, morality of the US involvement in
Iraq, and views on justice; (3) projected emo-
tional responses that participants might experience
if exposed directly or indirectly to acts of govern-
mental aggression; (4) participants’ definitions of
major concepts related to governmental violence
or nonviolence (e.g., war, torture, terrorism,
rights, peace, apology); and (5) beliefs regarding
peace, national security, justice, and ethic of
reciprocity (Malley-Morrison et al. 2009). The
rights-to-aggression items included rating scales
on which participants indicated on a scale of 1
(total disagreement) to 7 (total agreement) the
521
522
extent to which they agree with the statements;
they also provided an explanation of the reason-
ing behind their rating of the item.
Qualitative Analyses
Regarding coding the qualitative/open-ended
responses of the items, “The government has the
right to order the torture of prisoners in time of
war” and “Military officials are torturing some-
body suspected of having information about ter-
rorists. What would you want to do?” one of the
purposes of our research was to explore the extent
to which coding categories derived from Albert
Bandura’s work on moral disengagement could
meaningfully apply to laypeople’s reasoning con-
cerning the acceptability of torture. Furthermore,
another primary goal of our research was to begin
the validation of a set of moral engagement
mechanisms informed by Bandura’s theoretical
framework for moral disengagement and his
notion of moral agency.
Bandura (1999) described four main sets of
sociocognitive mechanisms by which moral dis-
engagement is facilitated: (1) mechanisms of cog-
nitive reconstruction of injurious behavior, which
involve transforming harmful conduct into some-
thing that is apparently good or benign through
moral justifications, euphemistic labeling, and
advantageous comparisons; (2) mechanisms that
remove or obscure personal agency by displacing
and diffusing the responsibility; (3) mechanisms
that misrepresent, minimize, and disregard conse-
quences of harmful behaviors; and (4) mecha-
nisms that devalue the victims, dehumanize the
victims, and attribute blame to them.
Although Bandura recognized the significance
of moral engagement in defining inhumane
behavior, he did not identify specific mechanisms
of moral engagement. Also, when Bandura does
refer to moral engagement, he emphasizes per-
sonal agency more strongly than sociocognitive
mechanisms. Specifically, he holds that the exer-
cise of moral agency has dual aspects—inhibitive
and proactive (Bandura 1999). “The inhibitive
form is manifested in the power to refrain from
C. Tsatsaroni
behaving inhumanely. The proactive form of
morality is expressed in the power to behave
humanely” (Bandura 2002, p. 111). In the case of
proactive morality, “individuals invest their sense
of self-worth so strongly on human convictions
and social obligations that they act against what
they regard as unjust or immoral even though their
actions may incur heavy personal costs. Failure
to do what is right would incur self-devaluation
costs. In this higher order morality, people do
good things as well as refrain from doing bad
things” (Bandura 1999, p. 194). When individu-
als feel personally responsible for the well-being
of others, humanize others, and “see human com-
monalities rather than distancing themselves
from others or divesting them of human quali-
ties” (p. 203), empathy and proactive moral
behavior can be attained (Bandura 1999).
Our research group, which is diverse in terms
of national, educational, religious, social, and
political backgrounds (Malley-Morrison et al.
2009), developed coding procedures for the
specific items analyzed in this section of the
book, implementing two approaches. One
approach was deductive qualitative analysis
(Gilgun 2004), which begins with a conceptual
model for the purpose of testing it, refining it, or
refuting it, and identifies a set of concepts and
hypotheses that fit well with various types of evi-
dence and have implications for theory, research,
policy, and practice; in our case, the deductive
qualitative analysis was informed by Bandura’s
(1999) work on sociocognitive mechanisms of
moral disengagement. A second approach was
grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Glaser
1992), which involves beginning the coding pro-
cess with an open mind and developing concepts
and hypotheses that are linked to the data (e.g.,
identifying themes in responses).
In the process of developing our coding manu-
als, clear and detailed criteria and scoring guide-
lines were developed in order to ensure that
independent scorers would make reliable judg-
ments (Copeland and White 1991). In order to
develop our coding guidelines, we used the inter-
national coding sample that we have assembled
for the development of all our coding manuals
33 Perspectives on Torture
(Malley-Morrison et al. 2009). Following
completion of our coding manual, we asked our
trained coders to independently and blindly code
the responses of a random sample of codeable
units in order to calculate intercoder reliability.
The results showed that on our reliability sample,
we achieved (1) 93.33 % of agreement on the
number of codeable units between the two coders
and (2) 92.86 % of agreement regarding the valid
code for each codeable unit. (When we refer to
“responses” in this chapter, we mean each code-
able unit within an answer to the item analyzed;
many answers provided included several code-
able units/responses.)
For the findings reported in this section of the
book, responses/codeable units to the torture
items were coded for the presence or absence of
specific themes identified as representative of
sociocognitive mechanisms of moral disengage-
ment derived from (Bandura 1999), as well as for
the corresponding moral engagement processes
that we identified based on Bandura’s conceptual
framework (Bandura 2002). Moreover, as men-
tioned above, answers with multiple themes were
broken down into multiple responses/codeable
units, and each codeable unit was assigned to a
thematic category in our coding manual. Using
Excel formulas, percentages of responses/code-
able units were calculated per thematic category/
subcategory for each region. Finally, our coding
manual included subcategories to the major the-
matic categories in order to capture different
themes and nuances within the major categories.
Responses were coded for “general” major the-
matic categories only if they could not reliably be
coded for the more specific thematic subcatego-
ries of the major categories.
Although our coding manuals were informed
by Bandura’s theory and its related constructs,
the constructs of moral disengagement and moral
engagement are still in the process of construct
validation, as work on these constructs is evolv-
ing. It is quite clear to our research group that
there are some significant issues that have not
been resolved. For example, it is quite obvious
that one cannot always reliably and validly infer
moral disengagement or engagement from a brief
open-ended survey answer.
523
Government’s Right to Torture
Prisoners in Time of War
In order to code the answers for the government’s
right to torture prisoners in time of war, our coding
manual first identified two major categories of
response: (1) torture tolerant (also called “pro-tor-
ture”) and (2) torture intolerant (also called “anti-
torture”). Within the broad category for
torture-tolerant responses, we found that we could
reliably code responses into seven thematic catego-
ries and subcategories informed by Bandura’s
(1999) sociocognitive mechanisms of moral
disengagement: (1) pseudo-moral justification; (2)
advantageous comparison; (3) euphemistic label-
ing; (4) denial of responsibility; (5) misrepresenta-
tion, minimization, or disregarding of consequences;
(6) dehumanization; and (7) attribution of blame.
Most of these major thematic categories had subcat-
egories. In addition, torture-tolerant responses that
did not fit well into any of these specific thematic
categories were coded for general unspecified tor-
ture tolerance. Responses such as “depends on the
situation” that considered torture an option depend-
ing on the circumstances were also coded for gen-
eral unspecified torture tolerance.
Responses that justified torture by linking it to
socially worthy or moral purposes (e.g., protect-
ing cherished values, preserving world peace, sav-
ing humanity) were coded into the pseudo-moral
justification category. Within this major thematic
category, there were two subcategories: advanta-
geous comparison and last resort. Responses that
compared torture to some behavior that seemed
worse, making the act of aggression appear benign
or even purposeful (e.g., historical comparison,
cost–benefit calculations), referred to the danger
of an ideology or unspecified threat (e.g., terror-
ism), or indicated that the ends justify the means
(e.g., torture is useful or effective to achieve a
desired goal: to gain information, to save the lives
of civilians), were coded into the subcategory for
advantageous comparison. Responses that
justified torture as a last resort were coded under
the last resort subcategory.
Responses using sanitized or passive lan-
guage, slang, or slurs to make torture appear
524
benign or even respectable (e.g., “enhanced
interrogation techniques”) were coded for into
the major category called euphemistic labeling or
euphemistic language. The major category for
denial of responsibility had three subcategories:
diffusion of responsibility, displacement of
responsibility, and indifference. Diffusion of
responsibility was identified in responses indicat-
ing that torture was acceptable if others carried it
out (e.g., “every other government tortures”).
Responses were coded for displacement of
responsibility if they indicated that torture was
acceptable if a legitimate authority (e.g., govern-
ment) accepted responsibility for it. In this case,
torturing a prisoner was seen as justified under
the social pressure to be obedient, emphasizing
the government’s responsibility. Finally, some
responses indicated indifference toward the pris-
oner, which again indicated a denial of any
responsibility regarding the torture.
Responses that cognitively distorted the harm-
ful effects of torture were coded for misrepresent-
ing, minimizing, or disregarding the consequences
of torture for the prisoner—for example, by indi-
cating that torture was okay if it didn’t kill the
victim. Responses coded into the dehumaniza-
tion category depicted victims of torture as lack-
ing human qualities (e.g., “they are savages”),
possessing demonic qualities, or being “evil.”
Responses suggesting that the government
was provoked to act harmfully by circumstance
(e.g., nature of war) or that prisoners of war bring
suffering upon themselves (e.g., the soldier is
guilty) were coded for attribution of blame. This
major category had a subcategory of revenge for
responses that specifically referred to torture as a
mean to get even. Table 33.1 presents the major
thematic categories and their subcategories for
the torture-tolerant response, as well as illustra-
tive examples for each category/subcategory.
Thematic Categories Based on Moral
Engagement Theory
Our research group identified a set of theoreti-
cally derived sociocognitive mechanisms for
moral engagement, essentially corresponding to
C. Tsatsaroni
inverse forms of Bandura’s sociocognitive
mechanisms of moral disengagement. Overall,
six major thematic categories with their subcate-
gories were constructed for the torture-intolerant
responses.
Responses that referred to a general unspecified
disagreement or opposition of torture and the
right to torture, without providing an explanation
for the disagreement, were coded for unspecified
torture-intolerant as the reciprocal of the general
unspecified torture-tolerant category. The major
torture-intolerant coding categories were the fol-
lowing: (1) principled reasoning, (2) descriptive
language, (3) principled comparison, (4) aware-
ness of negative consequences, (5) awareness of
negative consequences, and (6) exonerating
prisoners.
Under the broader category of principled rea-
soning, which is for moral arguments against tor-
ture, responses that referred to the violation of
personal ethics were specifically coded for per-
sonal moral principles (e.g., “it is against my
moral principles”). Responses that referenced the
role, obligation, responsibility and agency of the
government, international law, treaties, etc., to
protect people were coded for honor international
mandates (e.g., “torture is against the Geneva
Convention”). Also, under the same major cate-
gory, humanization of victims with emphasis on
their humanity and emphasis on their human rights
protection was coded for humanization (e.g., “pris-
oners are still human beings, and they should be
treated as humans”) and human rights (e.g., “their
[the prisoners’] rights should be taken care of”).
Responses that explicitly described torture as
horrific and excessively violent were coded into
the descriptive language category (e.g., “torture
is disgusting”).
Reference to better practices that serve to
highlight the immorality of torture characterized
responses in the principled comparison major
thematic category. Within this category, responses
citing alternative options to torture (e.g., impris-
onment but not torture) were coded into the bet-
ter alternatives subcategory, whereas responses
stating that the act of aggression is not beneficial
or necessary were coded into the ineffective/not
useful subcategory (e.g., “torture does not resolve
33 Perspectives on Torture 525

Table 33.1 Categories and subcategories and examples of torture-tolerant responses

Major category
Torture tolerance (unspecified)
For example, “Yes”
“Depends on the situation…”
Pseudo-moral justification
For example, “to establish peace”
“Especially when it comes to global
security…”
Euphemistic labeling
For example, “To severely interrogate
prisoners…”
Denial of responsibility
For example, “The answer would differ
depending on his or her own values and
beliefs”
Misrepresenting, minimizing, or disregarding
consequences
For example, “Psychological torture maybe
but not other type”
“Psychological torture yes, not physical”
Dehumanization
For example, “Depends on the criminal”
Attribution of blame
For example, “Because it is war time”
“If the prisoners are not innocent”
Subcategory
None
Advantageous comparison
For example, “Only if the information would save lives of
civilians”
“To tackle terrorism and riots”
“I think that it is possible to torture another country’s prisoners of
war because your country citizens are more important during war”
Last resort
For example, “Except in very extraordinary circumstances… and
in these circumstances the decision be a one of a case-by-case
basis”
None
Diffusion of responsibility
For example, “Other countries use these techniques…”
“As long as it is public”
Displacement of responsibility
For example, “Well the people who are in charge should decide,
not me—I am not a political official”
“Governments make their own rights”
Indifference
For example, “Why not?”
“Because I don’t care”
None
None
Revenge
For example, “Unless they have been tortured too”
“Maybe if they killed someone or tortured someone…It has to be
fair”

anything other than revenge”). Awareness of torture-intolerant responses, as well as illustrative

negative consequences of torture was a category
for responses acknowledging the long-term
effects of torture for the torture and/or the victim
(e.g., “Can never lead to lasting conflict resolu-
tion. Only inflames situations”).
Finally, responses that removed the blame
from prisoners of war were captured under the
exonerating prisoner category (e.g., “our soldiers
may not be in complete support for the reasons of
the way they are fighting in, yet they have no
other choice”). Table 33.2 presents the major the-
matic categories and their subcategories for the
examples for each category/subcategory.
What Would You Want to Do
if Confronted with Torture?
The second PAIRTAPS item dealing with the
issue of torture was “Military officials are tortur-
ing somebody suspected of having information
about terrorists. What would you want to do?”
Building on Bandura’s emphasis on personal
agency as fundamental to moral engagement, we
526
Table 33.2 Categories and subcategories for torture-intolerant responses
Major category
Unspecified torture intolerance
For example, “No”
“No government has the right to torture anyone”
“No. We cannot do this”
Principled reasoning
For example, “No one should get hurt for a country”
“Even having a prisoner should not be allowed”
Descriptive language
For example, “Torturing prisoners is disgusting”
“No one has the right to cruel and unusual punishment”
“This would be a barbaric behavior”
Principled comparison
For example, “Prison is torture enough”
Awareness of negative consequences
For example, “At the end torture always ends
up brutalizing the torturer”
Exonerating the prisoner
For example, “At the time of war the opposition country
should be considered as enemy and not the prisoners
who just obey the order of their government”
“Presence of war does not give a government or a
group of people the right to torture prisoner of war”
developed a third set of coding manual guidelines
designed to assess the level of personal involve-
ment projected in the response. Personal involve-
ment as reflected in the responses could take one
of two major forms: personal engagement and
personal disengagement. The personal engage-
ment group of coding categories includes positive
unspecified action (subcategories: political/insti-
tutional activism, moral awareness, agentic
C. Tsatsaroni
Subcategory
None
Personal moral principles
For example, “Torture is immoral”
“Morally, no one has a right to torture”
Honor international mandates
For example, “Geneva Convention”
“Nations should respect international treaties regarding
the prisoners of war”
“It will be a war crime against prisoners, and it is
punishable by all international regulations”
Humanization
For example, “Torture is a denial of another person’s
humanity”
“Prisoners are all human beings”
“Torture is inhumane”
• Human rights
For example, “It is against human rights”
“The rights of man should be respected”
None
Better alternatives
For example, “Humane investigation”
Ineffective/not useful
For example, “Can never lead to lasting conflict
resolution”
“Torture is useless”
“Information gained from torture is not always reliable”
None
None
alternative solutions), while the personal
disengagement group includes the categories of
passivity regarding torture (subcategory: apathy),
compliance with torture (subcategory: alterna-
tive harmful solutions, related to compliance with
torture), and helplessness.
Personal engagement responses coded for posi-
tive action referred to expectations that the respon-
dent would do something to stop torture of a suspect.
33 Perspectives on Torture 527

Table 33.3 Categories and subcategories for personal involvement

Major category
Positive action
Passivity regarding torture
For example, “Observe”
Compliance with torture
For example, “I support it”
“Hand them the knife”
“I agree”
Helplessness
For example, “Helplessness”
Subcategory
Unspecified
For example, “Stop the torturing”
“Stop this situation”
Political/institutional activism
For example, “Protest for the suspect”
“Take political action”
“Bring charges against them based on international law, protest” (2)
“Encourage their (the military officials’) prosecution as war criminals”
“Expose the scandal, get legal reparation” (2)
Promote moral awareness
For example, “Make them understand why it’s wrong to do that…”
“Try to enforce sympathy and ethics and knowledge about human
rights to those in power and supervision of the prisoners” (3)
Agentic alternative solutions
For example, “Contribute to developing a nonviolent strategy
to oppose torture”
“Find another way to dissolve the information”
Apathy
For example, “Nothing”
“Change channel on TV”
Harmful alternative solutions
For example, “To pour a bucket of cold water”

These responses could be quite general
(unspecified positive action), without providing
a specific way to achieve this goal (e.g., stop
the torture), or they could be coded into one of
three subcategories referring to specific actions
designed to stop the torture. Specifically,
responses that referred to political activism and/
or use of institutions to support the victims of tor-
ture and restrain the perpetrators were coded into
the political/institutional activism subcategory
(e.g., protest). Responses that indicated a neces-
sity to raise the perpetrators’ moral awareness
regarding torture were coded into the moral
awareness subcategory, whereas responses
emphasizing the agentive role of the individuals
in order to achieve better alternatives to torture
were coded into the agentic alternative solutions
to torture subcategory. For instance, the response/
codeable unit “I would try to look for other ways
to get information without torturing” specifies
the individual as the agent of the action.
Responses coded for personal disengagement
were often explicitly non-agentic. For example,
responses indicating an expected lack of motiva-
tion to take action against torture were coded into
a major passive regarding torture category; this
category included an apathy subcategory captur-
ing responses indicating that the respondent
expected to remain apathetic if exposed to torture.
Responses that reflected an individual’s inclination
to support torture were coded for the compliance
with torture. Within this category, responses sug-
gesting alternative solutions that were themselves
inhumane (e.g., “I would kill him rather than tor-
ture him”) were coded into the harmful alternative
solutions subcategory. Finally, responses indicat-
ing a sense of helplessness in regard to torture
were put into the helplessness category. Table 33.3
presents the major thematic categories and their
subcategories for the personal involvement con-
struct, as well as illustrative examples for each
category/subcategory.
528
Finally, concerning our qualitative analyses of
the two items examined in this section of the
book, we also identified a few responses that did
not fall into the torture-tolerant, torture-intoler-
ant, or personal involvement coding categories in
our manuals. Specifically, some participants
made statements that addressed perceived reality
in regard to torture rather than providing their
views on whether it was acceptable (e.g., “[S]uch
is war; people die, and people get tortured”);
these responses were coded into a reality cate-
gory. Responses that did not take a position for or
against torture, but instead indicated indecision,
were captured under the do not know category
(e.g., “Not sure,” “I don’t know”). Also, there
were a few responses that did not address the
prompts and were coded into a does not address
the question category (e.g., “Loving heart”).
Exploratory Quantitative Analysis
Using Excel and recent versions of the Statistical
Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS), we con-
ducted exploratory analyses of the extent to
which there were democratic group differences in
the use of particular types of thematic response;
the demographic characteristics of interest were
gender, current religion, participation in protest,
country, social class, having a relative in the mili-
tary, and participation in the military.
Concerning the patterns of responses coded,
we created presence/absence scores (presence
coded as 1) to indicate whether each response
was coded for any of the torture-tolerant, torture-
intolerant, or personal involvement categories or
subcategories. For example, consider this
response to the item concerning a potential gov-
ernmental right to torture a prisoner of war:
“Depends on importance of information and
depends on importance of other people’s lives.”
This response expresses the view that the ends
justify the means and therefore was given a “pres-
ent” score (1) for the advantageous comparison
subcategory in the pseudo-moral justification
category for torture-tolerant responses. Chi-
square tests of independence with the presence/
C. Tsatsaroni
absence scores examined whether, for example,
more participants who were protestors provided a
particular type (category) of response than non-
protestors.
In order to give more flexibility to our
calculations, and given that each answer could be
broken down into multiple codeable units/
responses, we created count scores by summing
up how many times a specific mechanism was
mentioned within an answer. For instance, the
previous example contained two different types
of pseudo-justifications for torture in order to
achieve ends, “depends on importance of infor-
mation” and “depends on importance of other
people’s lives,” and therefore, the answer would
receive a count score of (2) for the advantageous
comparison response category. Count scores
allowed us to run t tests, analysis of variance
(ANOVA), and correlations.
We also created some superordinate torture-
tolerant, torture-intolerant, and personal involve-
ment categories by adding together categories.
For example, consider a different answer given to
the hypothetical torture scenario: “Stop torture
and defend the suspect.” Such an answer would
receive both a presence score and a count score of
(1) for the “stop torture” codeable unit indicating
positive unspecified action, as well as a presence
score and a count score of (1) for the “defend sus-
pect” codeable unit that suggests an action
through political activism/use of institutions.
Thus, this answer would receive a total count
score of (2) for the positive action themes (i.e., 1,
positive unspecified action + 1, political activism/
institutional + 0, moral awareness + 0, agentic
alternative solutions = total count score of 2).
It would also receive a “presence” score of 1 for
positive action themes, given that the answer
showed at least one positive action theme. Presence
scores for superordinate categories were, like
presence scores for individual categories and
subcategories, useful for chi-square analyses.
Because of the exploratory nature of our research
with available samples, our reports on prelimi-
nary findings focus primarily on chi-square anal-
yses, which are particularly appropriate to our
qualitative research approach.
33 Perspectives on Torture
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 Perspectives on Torture
in Western Europe 34
Julia Koenig, Eric Fischer, Mathilde Salmberg,
Mariana Barbosa, Silja Bara Ómarsdottir,
Michael Corgan, Alex Stankiewicz,
Elizabeth Leembruggen-Kallberg, Carla Machado,
Scott Borrelli, and Christine Roland-Levy

word itself has changed significantly over time.

Definitions
Torture has been defined in many different ways
throughout time. Even in recent history, the
definition seems to have changed dramatically.
At the 1984 Convention against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, the United Nations (UN) defined
torture:
Any act either committed or instigated by a public
official in which severe mental and/or physical pain
was inflicted upon a person or third person in an
attempt to obtain information, or to punish, intimidate
or coerce said person for any reason based on dis-
crimination of any kind. Pain and suffering resulting
from lawful sanctions is not included (UN 1984).
Only 9 years earlier, in their 1975 Declaration
on the Protection of All Persons from Being
Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the UN
issued a narrower definition in which the pain
and suffering caused by lawful sanctions must be
consistent with the standard minimum rules for
treatment of prisoners and where torture was an
aggravated and deliberate form of cruel, inhu-
man, or degrading treatment or punishment. The
definitions our Western European sample gave
for torture are described in Chap. 2 of this
volume.
Although today most of the world strongly
oppose the use of torture, at one point, its use
was considered both necessary and just. The
Peters (1991) notes that before the dawn of the
Enlightenment thinkers, the word “torture” was
used only in legal proceedings. That is, its use
was only relevant to the government, and dis-
cussions of torture did not exist throughout the
masses. In the nineteenth century, however, as a
movement was forming to improve human rights
universally, the term “torture” gained an emotional
dimension. This led to an expansion of the
definition so that “torture” was used for all types
of human cruelty. For example, one author issued
a pamphlet entitled “Wife Torture,” in which he
wrote against the practice of beating one’s wife.
Today, a teacher who assigns too much home-
work may be accused of torture by his/her stu-
dents, or as Peters (1991) puts it: “Everybody
can be accused of torturing everyone—and
therefore nobody tortures anyone” (p. 197). The
result of this expanded meaning is that the term
must be understood in the context of the time
period in which it is used. That is, the historical
part of this article will use a narrower definition
of torture than the part concerned with the
empirical data.
Torture in Ancient Greek Law
Examples of publically sanctioned torture can
be traced back to the eighth century BC, where
the law in pre-republic Greece made a sharp

K. Malley-Morrison et al. (eds.), International Handbook of War, Torture, and Terrorism, 531
Peace Psychology Book Series, DOI 10.1007/978-1-4614-1638-8_34,
© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2013
532
distinction between the rights of free citizens
and those of lower classes (strangers, slaves,
and persons not considered honorable). Free
citizens were considered honorable and had the
right to go to court and not be subjected to coer-
cive measures. While testimony by a citizen was
considered reliable, this was not true for lower
classes, whose testimony was considered believ-
able only if given under physical coercion.
Torture in the Roman Law
The Romans, influenced by the Greeks, also
policed their torture practices. When a citizen
was charged with a crime, only slaves could be
tortured for information or a confession. Peters
(1991) notes that the circumstances and groups
of possible people to be subjected to torture
expanded over the centuries, starting in the sec-
ond century BC when slaves could also be tor-
tured in cases where money was involved. In the
following centuries, the use of torture became
more widespread as the circumstances under
which torture could be used expanded, as well as
the groups of people who could be subjected to it.
In the third century AD, after a civil war, even
free citizens could legally be tortured. The privi-
lege of being exempted from torture was limited
more and more, even for the honestiores. By the
fourth century AD, both slaves and free citizens
could be tortured; initially, free citizens could be
tortured only for treason, but the practice soon
expanded to other crimes.
Development in the Middle Ages
in Europe
The Roman Empire fell in the fourth century,
and its land was soon settled by a Germanic
people who continued the Roman practice of tor-
turing slaves but chose to exempt free citizens.
Peters (1991) describes the development from
Germanic traditions of self-interest and revenge
toward an institutionalized legal process. The
change was a slow one, and only in the twelfth
J. Koenig et al.
century did Roman laws get integrated into
Northern European culture.
The law in Europe before the twelfth century
had been a private one. There were no civil ser-
vants to discover crimes and make investigations.
Instead, a victim had to inform the representa-
tives of justice about the crime and make sure
they took action. Since both parties had the status
of free men, there were limits to a legal process
because both were considered invulnerable. The
plaintiff went to court, stated his complaint and
confirmed its truth with an oath. The defendant
often only needed to swear an oath that the com-
plaint was not true and the process was over. If
the court did not find the defendant’s oath to be
sufficient, other people, not necessarily witnesses
of the crime, could be called on to confirm the
reliability of his oath. If the defendant had a bad
reputation and if the crime was very serious, the
defendant could be subjected to an ordeal involv-
ing boiling water or fire. If scarred by the treat-
ment, the defendant was considered guilty.
Another possibility was ordeal by battle. The rea-
soning behind this was that God would always
grant victory to the party that was in the right.
Those three methods, oath, ordeal, and ordeal by
battle, were their methods of proof.
The twelfth century also brought profound
changes in the law and in legal practice. In conti-
nental Europe, the process of complaint was
succeeded by the inquisition based on Roman-
canonical law, and in England, the jury court was
established. While the old proceedings were
abolished, the new ones brought many uncertain-
ties with the collecting, judging, and weighing of
evidence and also the involvement of judges or a
jury. The new legal methods led to the discovery
of more information than the old processes, but
they paradoxically heightened the fear of errors.
There was a strict hierarchy of the different kinds
of evidence. The confession was seen as the rem-
edy for these uncertainties, and in some circum-
stances (especially capital crime), it came to be
required. Also, there had to be either a confession
or the testimony of two witnesses for a guilty sen-
tence. Other forms of circumstantial evidence
could be brought, but a sentence could not be
34 Western Europe Torture
grounded on circumstantial evidence alone or on
one witness and circumstantial evidence.
The weight put on the confession brought with
it a rekindled interest in Roman law (including
the doctrines on torture) and a reemergence of
torture in continental Europe, where it was used
primarily to gather information before a legal
process began. From the second half of the thir-
teenth until the end of the eighteenth century, tor-
ture was a regular part of the criminal procedure
in the Roman Catholic Church and in most
European countries (Peters 1991). However,
courts frequently disregarded the specific rules
and limitations of the written law. This was most
evident in the persecution of heretics. The inqui-
sitional proceeding was frequently carried out in
a very drastic way and often without any under-
standing of traditional safety measures for the
protection of a defendant. The inquisitors of
the church, and later the secular courts, changed
the legal proceeding by limiting the rights of the
defendant in various ways.
In England, however, the importance of the
confession was minimized, and the new court
system gave great responsibility to the jury.
A similar system was developed in Scandinavia
as well, with torture not being part of the legal
proceeding and not being introduced before the
sixteenth century. Historians argue that this
relative reticence stems from the fact that courts
were dominated by laypeople (Pihlajamäki
2007).
Torture in the Ancient Regime
In the sixteenth and seventeenth century, the laws
on torture were published as great collections in
France, Spain, the Spanish Netherlands, and the
Holy Roman Empire. At the same time, criticism
of these practices was increasing. In the eigh-
teenth century, torture became heavily criticized
and by the end of the eighteenth century, torture
laws were so limited that they played hardly any
role at all.
Although Peters (1991) denies the existence
of a tangible “anti-torture movement,” he does
533
describe a set of logical, moral, social, and politi-
cal factors that have to be taken into account
when trying to understand the abolishment of tor-
ture. Torture had always been criticized on logi-
cal grounds. It was already known in Ancient
Greece that some people will not confess their
guilt even when tortured, while others will make
false confessions in order to stop the torment.
Peters (1991) believes moral criticism against
torture is the most appealing category but recog-
nizes that it didn’t become influential until rela-
tively late in the eighteenth century.
Social factors are important in explaining
why the logical and moral criticism against tor-
ture had little effect for so long. Roman law,
including the torture doctrines, was considered
fundamental for societal order. Opposing torture
therefore meant challenging the very foundation
of society. But increasingly, especially in the
cases of sorcery and witchcraft, many felt that
people were coerced into confessing and pun-
ished for acts they could not possibly have com-
mitted. This was one dimension of social change
that facilitated the abolishment of torture.
Another factor was the implementation of new
sanctions in the sixteenth and seventeenth centu-
ries. Instead of death, criminals could now be
sentenced to galley, workhouse, or deportation.
These options had implications for legal pro-
ceedings. The new, less severe sanctions gave
the judge more room for decision making, and it
became possible to sentence the defendant with-
out having “full” evidence (that is, two witnesses
or a confession), as required by Roman law.
Other forms of evidence were given more weight,
lowering the importance of the confession; there-
fore, the necessity for torture decreased (Peters
1991, p. 124).
The abolishment of torture in the nineteenth
century was the end result of the moral and social
developments of the previous centuries. Peters
(1991) points out that most states seem to have
waited to see the effects of their law reforms
before finishing the processes of abolishing tor-
ture and revising criminal law.
Sweden, a country where judicial torture never
gained widespread use (see Pihlajamäki 2007),
534
was the first European country to start this process
of abolishment and amendment. By 1734, most
torture methods that had been established in the
sixteenth century were banned. However, for
exceptional crimes, torture was legal until 1822.
Prussia was the first European state to abolish
torture completely in 1754, while the last was the
duchy of Gotha (today part of Thuringia,
Germany) in 1828.
Contemporary historians identify the abolish-
ment of torture as an example of progress away
from the superstitions and violence of the Middle
Ages toward a more enlightened society. For the
first time, the state’s main objective was under-
stood to be the protection of the natural rights of
all men (Peters, p. 135). Peters stresses that the
nineteenth century was not a time of nonviolence.
Wars were still fought. The innocent were still
often punished, but torture was no longer used as
an oppressive tool, and laws and reality were sur-
prisingly congruent.
The Reemergence of Torture
in the Early Twentieth Century
Peters (1991) lists three developments in the
twentieth century that influenced the reemer-
gence of torture in Western Europe: (1) the estab-
lishment of police forces, (2) the changes in
warfare, and (3) the attitudes toward political
crime. The establishment of police in the
different countries was especially significant.
Peters depicts the British Metropolitan Police as
having a status in between the citizens and the
military, behaving in a polite but distant way
toward the public and being under strict control
by the courts and the Parliament, while other
countries had systems that left the police force
under little control. Peters (1991) reports no evi-
dence of police torture in Western Europe in the
nineteenth century but states that police work
contributed to its later reemergence. This work
became more complicated with the emergence of
political crimes. As a result, the police uniformly
became a strictly supervised part of the govern-
ment instead of an independent judiciary.
J. Koenig et al.
Changes in the way wars were fought also
played an important role. After the French
Revolution, citizen armies began to replace the
kings’ armies, and wars were now fought for the
people, not the king. Peters (1991) points out that
these newly created armies required special rules
and special leaders. Information that could be
gathered from prisoners of war or secret agents
could be crucial, and obtaining it could not be
entrusted to ordinary citizens. Autonomy was
needed and needed quickly.
In the revolutionary societies of the first half
of the twentieth century, there was a change in
attitudes toward the role of the state, the law, and
the rights of the individual. The states became
more complicated and vulnerable, which led to
more weight being placed on political crimes.
The fascist regimes in Italy and Germany, for
example, gave “the people” and its benefit top
priority and viewed the state and the law as sub-
ordinate and existing only in service of the peo-
ple’s interest. According to Peters (1991), in
1929, the Italian political secret police started
routinely using torture against citizens who were
suspected of being enemies of the state, the
party, or the people. In Germany, after the estab-
lishment of special courts in 1933, the interroga-
tion methods of their police forces were
intensified. In 1942, Heinrich Himmler issued
an order that allowed the “third degree,” which
meant torture, against “communists, Marxists,
Jehovah’s Witnesses, saboteurs, terrorists, mem-
bers of resistance movements, unsocial ele-
ments, insubordinate elements, or Polish or
Russian vagabonds.”1 This was not a localized
problem, however; it is believed that in 1929,
the French secret police also began engaging in
torturous tactics.
After the overwhelming death and destruction
of the Second World War, there was an interna-
tional movement aimed at preventing another war
of similar magnitude. The first step was the cre-
ation of the United Nations (UN) in 1945.
Historians at this time were convinced that the
1
Peters (1991), S. 165, translation by author (JK).
34 Western Europe Torture
reemergence of torture in the twentieth century
had been limited to certain “deformed” societies
that had experienced special conditions, like Nazi
Germany and the Soviet Union in the early,
unstable stages of development under Lenin and
Stalin. Therefore, it came as a shock to not only
the French public but also the rest of the world
when evidence accumulated that the French army
and the French colonial police had used torture
against Algerian rebels.
Torture in Present-Day Europe:
The Laws
Officially, torture is prohibited throughout
Western Europe. On December 10, 1948, the
General Assembly of the UN proclaimed the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which
states in Article 5 that “no one shall be subjected
to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treat-
ment or punishment” (UN 1948). This was fol-
lowed in 1975 by the Declaration on the Protection
of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (UN 1975).
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
strongly influenced the European Convention on
Human Rights (ECHR), which was signed by the
European Council in 1953. In order to become a
member of the European Council, a state must
sign the ECHR and if necessary, change applica-
ble laws. Therefore, by law, torture and “inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment” is banned
in all of Western Europe.
In 1987, the European Council issued the
European Convention for the Prevention of
Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Punishment
(ECPT) and made amendments to it in 2002.
This treaty established the European Committee
for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT). The
CPT was created to help prevent such treatment
by regularly visiting places “where persons are
deprived of their liberty by a public authority”
(ECPT, Chap. 1, Article 2) and examining the
535
treatment of such persons throughout the
European states. The CPT provides reports of
each visit that include questions, comments, and
suggestions on the current environment and
then sends the reports to the respective
governments.
Even though these reports can be held
confidential (Article 11), most of them, along
with the governments’ replies, are published
online and are accessible at the CPT home page.
The committee is guaranteed far-reaching rights
during those visits, such as the right to be
informed about any place where persons are
deprived of their liberty and the right to move
around these places freely and interview detain-
ees in private (specified in Article 8). The CPT
has also issued a set of recommendations
(CPT 2006a) on different aspects of such depri-
vation of liberty, including health care services in
prison, foreign nationals detained under alien
legislations, and involuntary placement in psy-
chiatric establishments. The CPT does not have
the power to sanction infringements, but Article
10 (2) of the ECPT states: “If the Party fails to
co-operate or refuses to improve the situation in
the light of the Committee’s recommendations,
the Committee may decide, after the Party has
had an opportunity to make known its views, by
a majority of two-thirds of its members to make a
public statement on the matter.”
Torture in Present-Day Europe:
The Reality
The CPT’s main concern is eliminating the use of
“torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment.” Reading the CPT reports shows
that the committee also criticizes practices that,
while not lawful or not living up to the CPT stan-
dards, would not be considered “inhuman” or
“degrading” by many people, such as failing to
inform detainees of their rights promptly after
taking them in police custody.
In most of the countries where our sample was
recruited, the CPT delegation reported zero
(Iceland, CPT 2006b) or very few allegations of
536
physical maltreatment (Germany, Sweden,
France) on their most recent visit (CPT 2007a, c,
2009b). This was not true, however, in Portugal
and Spain where such allegations were “numer-
ous” (CPT 2007c, 2009a). In Portugal, the dele-
gation also noted finding a large number of
nonstandard and unlabelled objects that served
no reasonable purpose, such as baseball bats, a
plastic pistol, telescopic batons, and cudgels, in
the interview rooms of the two judicial police sta-
tions they visited. Apart from inviting specula-
tion about improper conduct on the part of police
officers, these objects are a potential source of
danger to staff and criminal suspects alike (CPT
2009a, p. 12).
A 2009 Amnesty International (AI) Report
came to similar conclusions. It alleges the use of
torture and maltreatment by law enforcement
bodies and suggests failures in investigating sim-
ilar allegations in Spain, Portugal, and France
(pp. 301, 265, and 148, respectively). There are
no such allegations for Germany. However, it was
reported that two persons died while in police
custody in the last 2 years. One was found bound,
facedown, which most likely led to asphyxiation,
while the other died as a result of a fire in his cell.
The AI Report did not mention any reports of tor-
ture or maltreatment in Sweden (p. 312), while
Iceland does not even appear in the report.
After 9/11, the threat of international terror-
ism was felt intensely in Western Europe and
came even closer with the assaults on the Madrid
and London public transport systems in 2004 and
2005, respectively. There are sections on “coun-
terterrorism” in relevant human rights publica-
tions, indicating that the fight against global
terrorism has in many cases led to human rights
infringements. In our globalized age, the absence
of torture allegations in a country does not mean
that the country’s policies and proceedings are in
accord with human rights; it means only that
such reports do not currently exist. In the
“Regional Overviews” part of the AI Report, two
major concerns related to torture and terrorism
are listed:
1. There continued to be a failure of political will
to reveal the truth about the rendition of
J. Koenig et al.
detainees by the USA to countries where they
faced abuses, in spite of evidence that put the
complicity of European states beyond doubt.
2. States such as Denmark, Germany, Italy,
Spain, and the UK were prepared to allow
unenforceable “diplomatic assurances” as a
justification to deport terrorism suspects to
countries where there was a real risk of torture
and other maltreatment… (AI 2009, p. 32).
Such extraditions, however, will become increas-
ingly problematic, as the report also states that in
February 2009 the European Court of Human
Rights “reaffirmed the absolute prohibition of
torture and other inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment. Furthermore, the ruling forbids
states to send anyone, including those suspected
of terrorism and/or those who are alleged to pose
a risk to national security, to countries where
there is reason to believe they would face such
violations” (p. 32). Amnesty International has
also criticized the German Federal Prosecutor’s
stance that “evidence obtained in a manner which
violated German standards could be used to initi-
ate a criminal investigation” (p. 153) and that
evidence obtained through torture shouldn’t be
excluded.
Although today torture is generally consid-
ered morally wrong, there’s increasing discus-
sion on possible exceptions to its ban. The
practices used in Guantanamo, Cuba, and Abu
Ghraib are current examples of the continued use
of torture. Many Western Europeans first became
acquainted with the term “waterboarding” from
accounts in the media. American movies and
television shows portraying torture have also
influenced Western European views. An impor-
tant example is the TV series “24.” First aired in
the USA in 2001, the show contains many torture
scenes—67 in the first five seasons (Arnold
2007a, b)—and it is not the “bad guys” who tor-
ture but the protagonist and his “counterterrorist
unit.” The series relies heavily on dramatic tick-
ing-bomb scenarios in which many lives can be
saved only if a terrorist shares certain informa-
tion quickly. Despite their extreme rarity in real-
ity, these scenarios dominate the discussion on
torture and terrorism.
34 Western Europe Torture
Aside from American influences, Western
European countries have their own histories that
have shaped their views on torture. Therefore, in
the following section we will give a brief over-
view of recent highly publicized events relating
to torture in each country, as well as some events
that failed to be appropriately publicized. These
will help provide a backdrop for understanding
the survey responses.
Recent Cases of Torture in Western
European Countries
France
During the Second World War, France was split in
two. One portion of the country was occupied by
Germany, while the rest of France was governed
by a puppet regime located in Vichy that was
actually more loyal to Germany than the people
of France. The French suffering at the hands of its
German occupants made it hard to believe rumors
in the late 1950s that the French military and
police had used torture against Algerian rebels.
As these rumors increased and evidence to sup-
port them began to accumulate, a widespread
public discussion began on how this could have
happened in a country that took pride in its
emphasis on human dignity and civil rights.
Germany
As previously mentioned, torture was continu-
ously used by the German Nazi regime. Despite
widespread acknowledgement of such practices,
it seems to fade from public consciousness, com-
pared to the atrocities committed in concentra-
tion camps. In more recent years, one incident
especially sparked public debate. In 2002, a stu-
dent kidnapped the 10-year-old son of a family in
his acquaintance. During the ransom exchange,
the student was arrested by police and confessed
to having kidnapped the boy but refused to tell
them where he had hidden him. The child was
537
expected to still be alive but in acute danger. The
chief of the Frankfurt police had one of his men
threaten the kidnapper with violence if he didn’t
lead them to the boy. The kidnapper eventually
succumbed to the pressure, but it turned out that
he had already killed the child before coming to
collect the money. The two policemen involved
were found guilty but received minimal punish-
ment, leading to an emotionally charged discus-
sion on whether torture should be allowed in
certain cases. Some proponents even went so far
as to argue that in some cases the state is not only
allowed to but also has the duty to torture crimi-
nals for the protection of its citizens. For a synop-
sis of the discussion and critique of those
arguments, see Reemtsma (2005).
Portugal
Portugal has the longest-standing twentieth-
century authoritarian regime in Western Europe,
lasting from 1926 to the military revolution in
1974. It was found that during this time, torture
was used against opponents of the regime. Since
the Carnation Revolution of 1975, there have
been great changes in Portuguese society.
According to Machado et al. (2009), the illiteracy
rate, which had been at about 40%, dropped
almost to zero, and legislation has been passed
concerning issues such as contraception, abor-
tion, and child and partner abuse. However, tor-
ture still seems to be used in Portuguese police
stations, as becomes apparent from the above
mentioned reports.
Iceland
Due to its remote location in the North Atlantic,
Iceland has experienced a unique development.
It is the only country that doesn’t have and never
has had a military force. Even the general police
force is unarmed! Ómarsdottir and Corgan (2009)
argue that the three “Cod Wars” fought against
Great Britain in the twentieth century hardly
538
deserve that name; Iceland does not have
experience with terrorism or violent upheaval.
As mentioned earlier, Iceland does not even
appear in relevant human rights publications
(AI 2009; Human Rights Watch 2009), suggesting
that any public discussion about torture in that
country will have to be fueled by external events.
Spain
Like most of Europe, Spain witnessed a lot of vio-
lence in the twentieth century. After a 1930s Civil
War, General Franco, a Nazi supporter, established
a dictatorship that continued the terror and repres-
sion occurring during the civil war. Castanheira and
Borrelli (2009) state that change and democracy
became possible only when Franco died in 1975,
and Juan Carlos became the King of Spain. Spain
has since gained complete autonomy and estab-
lished a liberal legislature on civil rights. However,
it seems that there is still progress to be made with
respect to torture in that country (CPT 2007b).
Sweden
As related earlier, torture never gained a strong
hold in Sweden even during the Middle Ages.
(Pihlajamäki 2007) Possibly due to its compara-
bly peaceful development, the people of Sweden
have experienced a continuously peaceful life-
style. Aside from supplying Germany with steel
and machine parts supplies during the Second
World War, Sweden remained officially neutral
during both World Wars, and its last military
engagement occurred in 1814. Because it was able
Table 34.1 Makeup of the Western European sample
Country Respondents Male
Portugal 298 142
Iceland 106 29
Germany 98 31
Spain 85 40
Sweden 82 42
France 56 25
Total 725 309
J. Koenig et al.
to retain its unoccupied status, Sweden functioned
as a safe haven for people who were persecuted by
German occupants in their own countries.
However, despite its very strong record regard-
ing human rights, it has, like other European coun-
tries, been criticized for human rights violations in
the wake of 9/11. For example, in 2001, two
Egyptian men were arrested and then later returned
to their home country, where they were in danger
of being tortured (Amnesty International 2001).
Perspectives on Torture in Western
Europe: The Current Study
The Western European Sample
The Western European sample consisted of 725
participants from six countries (France, Germany,
Iceland, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden). The num-
bers and genders of participants from each coun-
try are given in Table 34.1. Rows do not add up to
100% because of missing data. There were
slightly more female (56%) than male (43%)
respondents; 1% of respondents did not specify
their gender. The vast majority (90%) of respon-
dents who answered the religious affiliation ques-
tion indicated having been raised as Christians,
while 9% reported being raised with no religious
affiliation, agnostic, or atheist. The remaining,
<1%, consisted of two Muslims and one Jewish
respondent. Six percent of the respondents chose
not to answer the question.
When asked to indicate their religion at the
time of completing the survey, respondents
revealed some changes. The biggest group was
still Christian (67% of those who answered the
%Male Female %Female
32 155 66
27 77 73
31 66 67
47 42 49
51 38 46
45 29 52
43 407 56
34 Western Europe Torture
question), but the group reporting no religious
affiliation/agnosticism/atheism had increased to
30%, and the remainder was a little more diverse
with <1% Muslim, <1% Jewish, <1% other, and
interestingly, 2% Buddhists. These results illus-
trate both the strong Christian tradition of Western
Europe and growing flexibility in leaving or
changing religion in adulthood. Concerning mili-
tary service, 10% of respondents reported having
served in the military, while 83% had not. Seven
percent did not answer the question. However,
63% reported having relatives who had been or
were currently in military service, with 30% who
had not. Seven percent did not answer the ques-
tion. A substantial part of the sample had partici-
pated in a protest against war (35%); however,
more than half had not (57%). Eight percent did
not answer the question.
Do Governments Have a Right
to Torture?
The first item we considered was the question of
whether the government had the right to order the
torture of prisoners in time of war. This item con-
sisted of a two-part question that asked partici-
pants to rank on a 7-point Likert scale—ranging
from 1 equating to total disagreement to 7 equat-
ing to total agreement—their level of agreement
to the statement: “The government has the right
to torture prisoners during times of war.”
Participants were then asked to provide a detailed
response explaining the reasoning behind their
rating. The second item asked participants what
they would want to do to if “military officials are
torturing somebody suspected of having informa-
tion about terrorists.”
The coding system for torture-intolerant and
torture- tolerant qualitative responses was derived
substantially from Albert Bandura’s theory of
moral disengagement. Informed by his descrip-
tion of sociocognitive mechanisms of moral dis-
engagement, and based on responses from our
international coding sample, we identified and
developed coding criteria for the following cate-
gories of torture tolerance: (1) pseudo-moral
justification; (2) advantageous comparison; (3)
539
euphemistic labeling; (4) denial of responsibility;
(5) misrepresenting, minimizing, or disregarding
consequences; (6) dehumanization; and (7) attri-
bution of blame.
Our research team also developed coding cri-
teria to categorize torture-intolerant responses
into sociocognitive categories that were designed
to represent morally engaged forms of reasoning
and were roughly the inverse of the torture-
tolerant categories. Five major categories were
identified: (1) adhering to principled reasoning,
(2) using descriptive language, (3) making prin-
cipled comparisons, (4) showing awareness of
negative consequences, and (5) exonerating the
prisoner. Principled reasoning is reciprocal to
pseudo-moral justification. Principled compari-
sons are reciprocal to advantageous comparisons.
Descriptive language is the counterpart of euphe-
mistic labeling. Reciprocal to misrepresenting,
minimizing, or disregarding consequences is
awareness of negative consequences. Exonerating
the prisoner is the counterpart of attribution of
blame.
In our coding manual for responses to the item
concerning a potential right to torture prisoners
in time of war, the category for principled rea-
soning has three different subcategories: personal
moral principles, honoring international man-
dates, and humanization. The first subcategory,
personal moral principles, refers to the ability to
refrain from behaving inhumanely because inhu-
mane behavior violates personal moral standards.
Honoring international mandates references the
governmental obligation to adhere to interna-
tional law. Humanization is the attribution of
human qualities to the victim, thus making it eas-
ier to refrain from inhumane action. Human
rights, a subcategory of humanization, refers to a
person’s inherent right to life, happiness, equal-
ity, etc. The next category, descriptive language,
applies to responses that use language to accu-
rately describe the unjust behavior or action.
Principled comparison is broken down into two
processes: better alternatives and ineffective/not
useful. Responses coded for better alternatives
indicate that there are better options than torture
or that torture is too antiquated to be used.
Similarly, the ineffective/not useful category
540
refers to torture as being unnecessary or fruitless.
Awareness of negative consequences cites the
harmful results that could come about due to use
of torture and exonerating the prisoner removes
blame from the individual being subjected to
torture.
Tolerance for a State Right to Torture
About 15% of the answers given by Western
European participants showed some tolerance for
a state right to torture prisoners during times of
war. More than half (55%) of these responses fell
in the category of pseudo-moral justification,
indicating that torture was seen as justifiable when
done for socially valuable or moral purposes. The
great majority of answers in this subcategory
justified torture by advantageous comparison
(40% of all torture-tolerant responses), often
referring to the kind of ticking-bomb scenario so
frequently invoked in discussions on torture. For
example, a 37-year-old woman from Iceland
stated that “if you can save a human life by
torturing someone, it is justifiable, otherwise
not.” Fewer responses fell into the related cate-
gory of last resort (6% of all torture-tolerant
responses). A German 35-year-old woman would
tolerate torture “only in cases where nuclear
extinction can be avoided.”
The second most frequent type of torture-tol-
erant response fell into the general category
(22% of torture-tolerant responses), that is, the
answers indicated some tolerance for a right to
torture but did not give any reason for this view
and therefore could not be coded into one of the
more specific categories. Examples are the answer
from a 26-year-old German female who said
“depends on the situation in some cases” and the
response of a 40-year-old Spanish male who
stated: “Usually during war, anything goes.”
Another somewhat frequent torture-tolerant
response involved misrepresenting, minimizing,
or disregarding the consequences of torture,
which appeared in 9% of answers indicating any
tolerance of torture. Here, causes are disconnected
from effects, and harmful effects are cognitively
J. Koenig et al.
distorted. A 22-year-old woman from Spain
answered that “it depends on what you under-
stand by torture, because there are different types
of torture. There shouldn’t be any hitting and rap-
ing and all those things we see on television. But,
I repeat, there are more ways.” The last fairly fre-
quent type of torture-tolerant argument involved
attribution of blame, which was found in 8% of
the torture-tolerant responses. This category
includes statements that remove blame from per-
petrators and attribute it to circumstance or to the
victim, such as “it depends on what crime was
committed by the person who is being tortured,
insulted, or killed,” contributed by a 24-year-old
Frenchman.
Other types of justification of a state right to
use torture appeared only very rarely; no other
category amounted to more than 2% of torture-
tolerant responses. (See Table 34.2 for more
examples of pro-torture responses.)
Intolerance of Torture
The vast majority (81%) of responses showed no
tolerance for a state right to torture. The most
commonly occurring single category of torture-
intolerant responses (32% of the torture-intolerant
responses and 26% of all responses) was simply
general torture intolerant. This code was
assigned to responses that stated unambiguous
disagreement with a state right to torture but did
not give reasons for their disagreement.
Therefore, a more fine-grained classification of
these responses was not possible. For example, a
35-year-old woman from Iceland stated, “Torture
can never be justified, at the times of war.”
Further, a 19-year-old male from Spain responded
with a question, “Why would it be fine?” sug-
gesting torture should not even be considered
an option.
More than a third (35%) of torture-intolerant
responses fell into the general category of
principled reasoning or one of its subcategories.
These responses referred to some kind of
guiding principle or moral authority. One type of
principled reasoning was a reference to principles
34 Western Europe Torture 541

Table 34.2 Examples of responses of torture tolerance

Category Percent Country Age Sex Response
Advantageous 2 (40) France 38 M It’s sometimes useful to obtain information in times of war
comparison
Germany 18 M Yes, but only than when more human life can be rescued
Iceland 34 F It is easy to violate this right, especially during war when
the pressure level is high
Portugal 23 F If the person wasn’t tortured she wouldn’t talk, so it should
be used for crucial information
Spain 34 F Usually it is harmful and wrong. But I put 2 instead of 1 if
the prisoner can give valuable information
Sweden 60 F If you through torture can get the person to reveal plans
and that way save lives
Last resort 1 (6) Germany 19 F If they have information that is needed… maybe… in
extreme cases…
Sweden 55 M If the military on very good grounds suspect a deed of a
9/11 character, and all other methods have failed, the threat
and implementation of limited violence can be allowed
Misrepresenting, 1 (9) Germany 33 M What about withholding food for an extended time period
minimizing, for example (without endangering the life of the prisoner
or disregarding treated that way)? If that prisoner knows something that
consequences could save the lives of many others? I would probably
vote for certain types of pressure, but certainly not for
physical torture
Sweden 22 M …with a goal of preventing a future invasion, to gain
access to the strategies of the opponent, but not for
“enjoyment.” …the prisoner should however have the
right to be executed instead
Attribution of blame 1 (8) France 21 F I supposed that it’s used in times of war, but it should be
permitted
Germany 20 M Because there could be those that are suspected to be
significantly involved in the war
Note: The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total
response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses from that category out of all the
responses in the pro-torture category
M male, F female

of human rights (11% of torture-intolerant intolerant responses), that is, acknowledging or

responses). These responses describe the basic
privileges and freedoms with which all humans
are endowed. For example, a 50-year-old
Portuguese man said, “No one is above funda-
mental human rights.” This response describes
human rights as those that all humans intrinsi-
cally possess and implies that no one is justified
in showing indifference toward those rights.
“War is not normal and it is a violation of human
rights against all humans, as is violence. It is
never justified” said a 56-year-old woman from
Iceland.
An example for a response referring to prin-
ciples of humanization (11% of all torture-
respecting prisoners of war for their humanity, is
that of a 31-year-old man from Sweden: “It is a
given that one can’t have the right to hurt or kill
another human being.” Another principled rea-
soning subcategory, honor international man-
dates (8% of torture-tolerant responses), applies
to responses indicating that torture is against
international law, and violation of laws by states
should have repercussions. Here, a 38-year-old
German male stated that “Prisoners of war are
protected by the Geneva Convention. Abusing
them is a grave war crime.” Similarly, a
Portuguese male aged 65 responded, “International
agreements do not allow it.”
542
The principled comparison category and its
subcategories applied to 11% of the torture-
intolerant responses, with 8% of all torture-
intolerant responses indicating that torture is
ineffective/not useful, as argued, for example, by a
38-year-old male from Iceland, “Violence does not
solve anything,” and a Swedish female aged 40,
“It has been shown that it does not work. People
say anything to end the torture.” The second sub-
category of principled comparison was reserved
for responses offering better alternatives (5% of
invasion intolerant responses), like a 25-year-old
woman from Spain who stated that “Torture should
not be tolerated. Therefore, if the government
wants to obtain information, it is better that they
do it by speaking and communicating.”
Another argument against a state right to tor-
ture, exonerating prisoner, was found in 8% of
the torture-intolerant responses and is reciprocal
to the torture-tolerant category attributing blame.
These responses removed blame from the victim
of torture. “Even prisoners of war should not be
tortured, in that they are there because of a politi-
cian/government mandate,” said an 18-year-old
German woman. A Spanish woman aged 23
showed a somewhat different sort of reasoning:
“If they are prisoners then they cannot harm, so it
is not needed to torture them.”
In 7% of the torture-intolerant responses,
descriptive language was used, that is, torture
was described as horrific or violent in graphic
terms. This type of response can be seen as the
counterpart of the euphemistic labeling category
for torture-tolerant responses. “What a horror!”
was the reaction from a 26-year-old Frenchman,
and a 56-year-old female from Iceland responded,
“No, never. Torture is barbaric and cruel.”
Table 34.3 provides sample responses from some
of these anti-torture coding categories.
What Would You Want to Do?
Personal Involvement
In the second torture-related item of the
PAIRTAPS, participants were asked to imagine a
situation where they were directly exposed (in
J. Koenig et al.
reality or in a TV show) to a scenario in which
military officials were torturing somebody sus-
pected of having information about terrorists and
were asked to respond to the question, “What
would you want to do?” The coding manual for
this item was informed by Bandura’s conceptual-
ization of moral engagement as involving two
forms of agency—inhibitive or proactive.
Inhibitive agency is the ability to refrain from
behaving inhumanely, whereas proactive agency
means behaving humanely (Bandura 2002).
In the coding manual developed for the torture
scenario, Bandura’s concept of proactive agency
is represented as ranging from various forms of
personal engagement to various forms of personal
disengagement. The personal engagement group
of coding categories includes positive unspecified
action (subcategories: political/institutional activ-
ism, moral awareness, agentic alternative solu-
tions), whereas the personal disengagement group
includes passivity regarding torture (subcategory:
apathy), compliance with torture (subcategory:
alternative harmful solutions, related to compliance
with torture), and helplessness.
The torture scenario question was answered by
564 participants. The majority of these (72%)
indicated that they would want to take some form
of positive action, while 16% indicated no inclina-
tion to intervene. Twelve percent of the responses
fell in neither category (e.g., “do not know”), and
1% of answers received codes for both the positive
action and one of the other groups.
Positive Action
The most frequent code in this group (33% of
positive action responses) was the general cate-
gory of positive action, into which answers were
coded if they indicated a desire to stop the tor-
ture, but did not state a specific way to achieve
this goal. Examples are “Release that particular
person” by a 46-year-old woman from Iceland
and “Convince the military to stop” by a 22-year-
old French woman.
Some answers were more specific, with 26%
of positive action responses referring to political
activism or institutions connected with it, such as
34 Western Europe Torture 543

Table 34.3 Examples of responses of torture intolerance

Category Percent Country Age Sex Response
General torture 26 (32) France 21 M They don’t have the right but they do it anyway
intolerance Germany 19 F No one has that right, not even during the time of war
Iceland 28 M No one has the right to torture another person
Portugal 59 F Of course not
Spain 52 M Torture should be out of the question in any case
Sweden 28 F I think that is completely wrong, one should not be able
to torture POWs
Humanization 9 (11) France 22 M No, it’s inhumane
Germany 36 F All persons are equal and have equal rights, besides:
Geneva Convention, other agreements
Iceland 26 F Inhumane
Portugal 64 M Every human being should be respected
Sweden 29 F It is never justifiable to use torture as a method. This
deeply violates the person and the state can never have
the right to do that
Human rights 9 (11) France 24 M It’s against human rights
Germany 19 M Human rights also apply in war time
Iceland 38 F Violation of human rights
Sweden 25 F Again I refer to democracy and human rights
Honor 7 (8) Iceland 56 F No, never. Torture is barbaric and cruel. It makes people
international say anything. The world has an agreement on how to
mandates treat prisoners of war. It must be respected! Also by USA
Spain 36 M International treaties forbid it, and it would not be ethical
Sweden 69 M The country that does that steps outside international
law, outside civilization, and must be judged
Ineffective/not 7 (8) France 22 F It doesn’t do anything
useful Germany 39 F Under torture forced confessions have little significance.
It already didn’t help in medieval times
Iceland 56 F No, never. Torture is barbaric and cruel. It makes people
say anything. The world has an agreement on how to
treat prisoners of war. It must be respected! Also by USA
Spain 27 F Torture, besides useless, is inhumane
Sweden 25 F It is proven that torture is not effective on any level and
frequently counterproductive
Exonerating 6 (8) Germany 20 F Never, that is much too general an will only get out of
prisoner hand, only because they’re prisoners does not mean they
did anything except be from another country!
Descriptive 5 (7) France 23 F Barbarism is the worst regression that a state which
language wants to be civilized can know
Sweden 63 M Barbarian
Better alternatives 4 (5) Spain 22 – I don’t think people have the right to hurt other people.
Unfortunately it happens and it’s immoral. In addition
the governments may claim that it is because of
beneficial reasons but I think there is always another way
Sweden – – There has to be other methods of interrogation
Note: The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total
response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses from that category out of all the
responses in the anti-torture category
M male, F female, (–) information not available
544 J. Koenig et al.

Table 34.4 Example of responses of positive action

Category Percent Country Age Sex Response
General positive 28 (33) France 50 M Make torture stop
action Germany 26 F I would make sure that it would stop
Iceland 34 M Help the victim to escape
Portugal 65 M Stop the torturing
Spain 46 F To take him away from torture
Sweden 25 F Stop it
Political activism/ 22 (26) France 63 F Write letters to the press. Join other people fighting for
institutional human rights
Germany 30 F A huge process against all participants, prison sentences for
politicians also, bringing attention to the government which
allows this, and making it clear that there should be zero
tolerance for torture
Iceland 40 M Protest and see to that these methods be abolished
Portugal 59 F To protest against such act
Spain 27 F Would try to make sure they were judged
Agentic alternative 13 (15) France 21 F Get the info w/out the torture
solutions Germany 18 M Have him freed from this method of questioning and appeal
to have him questioned normally
Iceland 25 M That more humane methods would be used to get information
Portugal 64 M To find another way to get the information without torturing
Spain 25 S Talk in order to obtain information
Sweden 59 F Get them to use non violent interrogation methods
Moral awareness 5 (6) Iceland 50 F Try to enforce sympathy and ethics and knowledge about
human rights to those that are in power and supervision of
the prisoners
Germany 39 F To task the torturers and ask how it feels to be a stooge for
any top military men who do not want to torture themselves
Note: The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total
response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses from that category out of all the
responses in the positive action category
M male, F female

a 70-year-old woman from Spain who said “to
punish the torturer and whoever allowed the tor-
ture” or a 28-year-old Swedish man who
answered, “Write to decision makers, arrange
meetings of protest.”
Others (15% of responses demonstrating posi-
tive action) named agentic alternative solutions
to the problem, such as a 31-year-old Spanish
man who stated, “make sure that the person really
has the information and then try to obtain it in a
non-violent way.” A 24-year-old Portuguese
woman commented, “be persuasive enough to get
people using nonviolent strategies.” A Swedish
female aged 28 responded, “tell the torturer that
there are other methods.”
Only a relatively small group of responses
(6% of the positive action responses) fell into the
moral awareness group. An example of such a
response is “I would want to try to convince
somebody that torture is the wrong system,” by a
23-year-old German female. Furthermore, a
24-year-old Portuguese woman wrote, “to prose-
cute the authors for crimes against humanity and
to teach them about ethics and moral values.”
Response samples from some of these coding
categories are provided below in Table 34.4.
Passivity
Among the answers that did not indicate any
inclination for positive action, most codes fell
into the group passive regarding torture. The
most frequent subcategory, with 6% of codes
34 Western Europe Torture 545

with no positive action, was apathy, with answers
such as “try not to see it” (61-year-old woman
from Iceland) or “nothing” (29-year-old Spanish
man). Answers in this category fail to exhibit a
concern for this unjust act and express a prefer-
ence not to be involved in rectifying it.
Less frequent was the general passive regard-
ing torture category (1% of codes with no posi-
tive action). Here, responses described some sort
of action but not one that would be regarded as
actively intervening to stop the torture. Examples
are a 26-year-old German woman who stated
“Ask whether they are sure that he/she knows
something” or a 35-year-old Spanish man who
answered “listen.”
Compliance with Torture
Another subgroup of responses not evincing pos-
itive action indicated compliance with torture,
either in general (3% of non-positive action
responses) or by offering alternative harmful
solutions (4% of non-positive action responses).
An example for a generally compliant response
comes from a 32-year-old Swedish woman:
“Trust that the military knows what they are
doing,” while a 37-year-old German man states
he would “ask the person concerned insistently to
give all information they have before the torture
continues.” This response offered an alternative
that could also be seen as torture.
Helplessness
Three percent of non-positive action codes fell in
the category of helplessness. These are responses
that, like apathy responses, state no intervening
action, but it is often not clear whether there is no
desire to act or whether there is a desire but some-
thing prevents the person from acting. Examples
are, “I can’t do anything” (28-year-old Spanish
man) and “moral dilemma. Cannot do anything
about this” (37-year-old woman from Iceland).
Table 34.5 provides sample responses from the
coding categories for non-positive action.

Table 34.5 Example of responses of non-positive action

Category Percent Country Age Sex Response
Apathy 6 (7) France 25 F Never see this kind of images
Germany 56 F Nothing
Iceland 21 M Watch TV
Portugal 24 M Nothing
Sweden 30 M Nothing, it is actually happening today
Compliant 4 (5) Portugal 23 F Something in order for that person to tell what
with torture she knows
Spain 70 M Demand guarantees
Helplessness 2 (3) Iceland 37 F Moral dilemma. Cannot do anything about this.
Spain 28 M I can’t do anything
Sweden 40 F There is not much one can do, this happens
in the U.S. all the time
Passive regarding 1 (1) Germany 26 F Ask whether they are sure that he/she knows
torture something
Spain 35 M Listen
Alternative harmful 1 (4) Germany 37 M Ask the person concerned insistently to give all
solutions information they have before the torture continues
Spain 38 F There are different ways of torture
Note: The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total
response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses from that category out of all the
responses in the non-positive action category
M male, F female
546
Quantitative Analyses
Exploratory analyses were run using chi-square
tests to see whether demographic groups (based
on gender, current religion, military service, fam-
ily members in the military, and participation in
antiwar protest) tended to express different views
with respect to torture.
A 90% confidence interval was adopted which
means that marginally statistically significant
results are reported. We do this in an effort to
inform later research; however, considering the
great number of statistical tests done, there is a
high likelihood that some of the findings are arti-
facts. When the data did not meet the criteria for
chi-square tests due to small cell sizes, likelihood
ratios are reported if they were significant.
With respect to religion, the vast majority of
those respondents who answered the question
self-identified as either Christian or atheist/
agnostic, both at the time of completing the sur-
vey. Therefore, analyses include only these two
groups.
Tolerance and Intolerance for Torture
There were also only a few statistically significant
and marginally significant differences in the fre-
quency with which responses were coded into the
different torture coding categories. Significantly
more men than women gave responses demon-
strating pseudo-moral justification, and men were
also marginally more likely than women to give
responses emphasizing honoring international
mandates. On the other hand, significantly more
women than men gave responses demonstrating
torture intolerance. Significantly more respon-
dents with military experience than those without
indicated that governments should honor inter-
national mandates. Significantly more respon-
dents who had never been in the military as
opposed to their military counterparts gave
responses indicating torture intolerance.
Moreover, significantly more respondents with-
out relatives in the military than those with rela-
tives in the military referenced human rights.
J. Koenig et al.
Significantly more respondents with relatives in
the military used descriptive language in their
responses than their counterparts and were mar-
ginally more likely to demonstrate awareness of
negative consequences.
There were also only a few categories of
responses to the torture scenario that showed dif-
ferences between those who had been raised
Christian and the atheist/agnostic group.
Specifically, as compared to respondents raised
as Christians, significantly more respondents
raised atheist/agnostic in their childhood gave
answers coded for torture-tolerance than respon-
dents who had been raised as Christians.
Respondents who self-identified as currently
being atheists or agnostics were marginally more
likely than Christians to project torture-tolerance
and to refer to honoring international mandates,
such as to treaties like the Geneva Convention.
Significantly more Christians than agnostics and
atheists gave responses exonerating the prisoner.
These findings are summarized in Table 34.6.
Personal Involvement
We also ran exploratory chi-square analyses for
responses to the scenario item, “Military officials
are torturing somebody suspected of having
information about terrorists. What would you
want to do?” Again, there were only a few statis-
tically significant and marginally significant
group differences. For example, significantly
more women than men emphasized positive
action and used descriptive language in their
responses. Significantly more men than women
gave responses indicating apathy.
Although the numbers were small, significantly
more respondents who had served in the military
gave responses emphasizing revenge and aware-
ness of negative consequences than those who
had not served in the military. Significantly more
respondents who had never been in the military
gave responses referencing positive action than
their counterparts. In addition, significantly more
respondents with relatives in the military gave
responses referencing alternative harmful solu-
tions and were marginally more likely than those
34 Western Europe Torture 547

Table 34.6 State right to torture: percentages of responses in coding categories by demographic groups and
chi-square values
Group 1a Group 2a
Category Male Female c2
Pseudo-moral justification 4 <1 9.52**,b
Torture intolerance 22 37 12.25***
Honor internat’l mandates 11 6 3.70^
Military Nonmilitary
Torture intolerance 19 31 4.07*
Honor internat’l mandates 19 7 8.56**
Relative in military No relative in military
Human rights 9 16 5.35*
Descriptive language 7 2 4.68*
Awareness of negative 5 2 2.81^
consequences
Raised atheist/agnostic Raised Christian
Torture tolerance 12 3 6.73**,b
Current atheist/agnostic Current Christian
Torture tolerance 6 3 3.64^
Honor internat’l mandates 11 6 2.88^
Exonerating the prisoner 4 10 4.51*
a
The numbers in these columns are the percentage of the group that gave responses falling into each of the
specified categories
b
Likelihood ratio given instead of c2 due to small cell sizes
*
p < 0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001; ^p<0.10

without to give responses that were compliant
with torture.
Because of the very few respondents raised
atheist/agnostic, it is difficult to draw conclusions
concerning childhood religion. Due to very small
cell sizes, chi-square tests could not be used, and
likelihood ratios were calculated. These analyses
indicated that significantly more respondents
who had been raised as atheists evinced torture
tolerance and personal involvement than those
who had been raised Christian. In addition,
significantly more Christians gave responses ref-
erencing moral awareness than those raised as
atheist or agnostic. As stated above, these data
have to be interpreted with caution.
With respect to current religion, significantly
more Christians than agnostics and atheists gave
responses indicating helplessness, and Christians
were marginally more likely than agnostics and
atheists to give responses demonstrating moral
awareness. Significantly more agnostics and
atheists gave responses indicating personal
involvement and responses referencing political
activism than Christians. These results are sum-
marized in Table 34.7.
Discussion
In this chapter, we outlined the history of torture
in Western Europe, tracing its development from
a lawful practice within the justice system to a
crime forbidden by laws and largely abhorred in
general opinion. We reported data from 725
Europeans from six countries, France, Germany,
Iceland, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden. Therefore,
our sample includes respondents from countries
with virtually no current or historical occurrence
of torture, as well as countries where inspections
have revealed “irregularities.” Although some of
the patterns that we found are provocative, it
must be remembered that the responses were
generated by a convenience sample and may not
be representative of the populations of those
548 J. Koenig et al.

Table 34.7 Personal involvement: percentages of torture, with 81% of participants expressing tor-
responses in coding categories by demographic groups ture-intolerant views. When providing an argu-
and chi-square values
ment to support their torture-intolerant point of
Group 1a Group 2a view, the torture-intolerant group most frequently
Categories Male Female c2
based their rationale on principles of human
Positive action 26 39 10.90**
rights, honor international mandates, and human-
Descriptive 0 2 6.89**,b
language ization of the victim. However, a noteworthy
Apathy 10 4 9.62** minority of the sample (15%) expressed views
Military Nonmilitary indicating tolerance of torture under certain cir-
Positive action 22 35 4.10* cumstances. These respondents most frequently
Awareness of 2 0 4.15*,b specified a scenario in which they considered tor-
negative ture a better alternative or advocated using torture
consequences only as a last resort. Often, comments revealed
Revenge 2 0 4.15*,b
that participants found themselves unable to con-
Military No military
demn torture completely when they thought of
relatives relatives
Compliant 7 3 3.17^
situations when lives could be saved by torturing
with torture a perpetrator. This echoes the “ticking-bomb”
Alternative 16 9 4.15* scenarios often employed in the media, fictional
harmful stories, and also theoretical discourse. Such sce-
solutions narios are extremely rare in reality.
Current atheist/ Current
agnostic Christian
Personal 7 1 13.49***
involvement References
Political 32 17 13.99***
activism Amnesty International (2001) Sweden: deportations leave
Moral 3 7 3.73^ men at risk of torture in Egypt [Press Release].
awareness Retrieved from http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/
asset/EUR42/003/2001/en/c3e1ea33-d8ac-11dd-
Helplessness <1 4 5.42*,b
ad8c-f3d4445c118e/eur420032001en.pdf. Accessed 11
Raised atheist/ Raised Dec 2009
agnostic Christian Amnesty International (2009) Amnesty International
Torture 6 <1 7.58**,b report 2009: the state of the world’s human rights.
tolerance Amnesty International Publications, London
Moral 0 6 6.14*,b Arnold J (2007a) Auf die Folter gespannt. Facts und
awareness Fiction der US-Serie “24—Twenty Four” (Tantalizing
Personal 11 3 7.52**,b facts and fiction of the US TV series “24”). Message
involvement posted to http://www.medienheft.ch/kritik/bibliothek/
a
k07_ArnoldJudith_3.html. Accessed 11 Dec 2009
The numbers in these columns are the percentage of the
Arnold J (2007b) Folterszenen im Schweizer Fernsehen.
group that gave responses falling into each of the specified
Kontroverse um die US-Serie “24—Twenty Four”
categories
(Torture scenes in Swiss television. The controversy
b
Likelihood ratio given instead of c2 due to small cell
about the US TV series “24”). Message posted to
sizes
*
http://www.medienheft.ch/kritik/bibliothek/k07_
p £ 0.05; **p £ 0.01; ***p £ 0.001; ^0.051 < p < 0.10
ArnoldJudith_4.html. Accessed 11 Dec 2009
Bandara A (2002) Selective moral disengagement in the
exercise of moral agency. Journal of Moral Education,
countries. It is conceivable, for example, that
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1, Rev. 2006. Council of Europe. Retrieved from http://
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visit to Iceland carried out by the European Committee
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visit to Germany carried out by the European
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des peines ou traitements inhumains ou dégradants
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IMG/NR000165.pdf?OpenElement
 Perspectives on Torture in Great
Britain, Northern Ireland, the United 35
States, Canada, and Australia

John M. Davis, Jenet Cory, Carol J. Davis,

Tristyn Campbell, and Michael Whitely

This chapter considers perspectives on torture
from both official sources and from the views of
ordinary people. Historically, torture was used
in Greek and Roman societies, as well as in
twelfth-century Europe as a means for “truth”
extraction and display of power. Efforts toward
the abolition of torture, however, were con-
nected to changes in legal systems, establish-
ment of new ways of punishment, and alternative
demonstrations of control (Foot 2006). After the
appalling disregard for human rights during
World War II, new treaties and conventions were
created aimed at prevention of such atrocities in
the future. The Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, The Geneva Convention on the Protection
of Victims of War, and the European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) were adopted
in recognition of the need to eliminate torture
and cruel methods of punishment (Barrett 2001).
Article 3 of the ECHR prohibits torture: “No
one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment” (Barrett
2001). Although explicitly prohibiting the prac-
tice of torture, the convention did not define tor-
ture, allowing for wide latitude in the
interpretation and meaning of the term (Barrett
2001). Although torture has been internationally
condemned and special emphasis put on the
improvement of human rights, many questions
remain unanswered about the practice of torture
in the modern world.
The terrorists attacks of September 11, 2001
raised numerous questions about the relationship
between the individual and the state. Controversial
issues concerning how to balance national secu-
rity with individual personal rights and freedoms
remain unresolved. Such issues include (1)
attempts to find a balance between individual
rights and national security and whether defining
terrorism suspects as “illegal combatants,” is
denying them the rights and protection of the
Geneva Convention. Both are pressing problems
in the modern world.
An international poll, aimed at addressing
these questions, was recently conducted in the
United States of America (USA), Germany,
Great Britain, India, Poland, and Russia. The
study (Kull et al. 2006) surveyed people’s views
and attitudes toward terrorism suspects, their
rights, detention, and the use of torture. Poll
findings from the USA indicated strong support
for the rights of terrorism suspects, including the
right for a hearing, notification of the home gov-
ernment about their detention, monitoring by an
international organization (such as Red Cross),
and the right not to be tortured or threatened with
torture. A majority of the American respondents
disapproved of the use of “extraordinary rendi-
tion”, that is, the transfer of detainees to coun-
tries that use torture in their interrogations.
Although most of the American respondents
believed that the government has detained pris-
oners indefinitely for the purpose of intelligence

K. Malley-Morrison et al. (eds.), International Handbook of War, Torture, and Terrorism, 551
Peace Psychology Book Series, DOI 10.1007/978-1-4614-1638-8_35,
© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2013
552
gathering, they disapproved of such practices
(Kull et al. 2006).
Although the results of the US poll showed
evidence of people’s disapproval of torture and
inhumane treatment, the results of the interna-
tional poll revealed skepticism about the imple-
mentation of such beliefs in practice. Overall,
however, all polled countries supported compli-
ance with the international treaties on detainee
treatment, rejecting the idea that terrorism should
be used as an excuse for detainees’ torture and
abuse (Kull et al. 2006). Some respondents
believed that the USA broke international law on
the treatment of detainees, allowing torture to
take place during interrogations at Guantanamo
Bay. Perceptions of the existing of such abuse
undermined the image of the USA as an effective
human rights advocate in Germany and Great
Britain. However, US actions received positive
feedback in Poland and India (Kull et al. 2006).
In 2006, an investigation initiated by the
Parliamentary Assembly revealed that some
member states of the Council of Europe were
involved with the CIA’s program of prisoners
transfer to countries known to practice torture.
The report indicated that, “secret detentions and
unlawful inter-state transfers of persons deprived
of their rights and involving European countries
have taken place” (Hakimi 2007). Furthermore,
the Assembly acknowledged the necessity of pre-
venting such practices in the future, calling for
international cooperation aimed at the develop-
ment of a global approach toward fighting terror-
ism while respecting human rights (Hakimi
2007). Allegations of abuse and inhumane treat-
ment demand investigation. Despite their con-
demnation of the use of torture during
interrogation, many of the European countries
have mixed records in their efforts in the war
against international terrorism. Despite the criti-
cism of torture and inhumane practices, individu-
als in many countries support strong enforcement
of security measures in response to domestic ter-
rorism threats.
The United Kingdom (UK), Australia, and
Canada were all criticized for their various anti-
terrorism practices. The controversial Prevention
J.M. Davis et al.
of Terrorism Act 2005 in the UK introduced
control orders that impose restrictions and obli-
gations on terrorism suspects (Parliament 2005).
Such orders are aimed at prevention or restric-
tion of the suspected individual’s activity during
which a 16-hour detention is not considered an
encroachment on the individual’s freedom
(Bachmann and Burt 2010). The distinction
between torture and inhumane or degrading treat-
ment was made in a 1978 ruling by the European
Court of Human Rights in the case of Ireland vs.
United Kingdom. The Court ruled that interroga-
tion techniques used by the British authorities in
Northern Ireland did not constitute torture,
although it agreed with the findings of the
European Commission on Human Rights that
inhumane and degrading treatment was practiced
(Schabas 2007). Furthermore, in 2005, the British
House of Lords prohibited the use of materials
obtained under torture and made them inadmissi-
ble in British courts even if the torture was prac-
ticed by a foreign country. However, while the
use of such evidence is inadmissible in courts,
the controversy remains over the practice of tor-
ture for the purposes of obtaining information by
the authorities (Schabas 2007).
Australia’s security measures reflect antiter-
rorism legislation implemented in the UK includ-
ing the introduction of control orders as a
terrorism prevention measure. However, due to
the absence of a domestic Human Rights Act in
Australia and the lack of a written Bill of Rights,
there is no jurisprudence addressing the issue of
an individual suspected of terrorism (Bachmann
and Burt 2010). After the September 11 attacks,
the Australian Security Intelligence Organization
(ASIO) increased its activity in detaining and
questioning citizens without trial. Lack of
information about the ASIO’s activities, and
perceptions that the organization concealed its
practices from the public, raised concerns about
the state’s adherence to democratic principles
(McCulloch and Tham 2005). In Australia, the
psychological impact of detention and secrecy in a
hostile environment can be aggravated by the pos-
sibility of detaining children. Secrecy of detention
is protected by law and disclosing information
35 UK Anglo Torture
about the ASIO’s custody of a detainee could itself
result in criminal punishment (McCulloch and
Tham 2005).
Canada’s use of Security Certificates differs
from those of the UK and Australia and allows
deportation of noncitizens suspected in terrorism
activities. Canada’s policies allow terrorism sus-
pects to be detained indefinitely and deported
despite the possibility of torture in their country
of origin (Bachmann and Burt 2010). The
Canadian government’s, exoneration of, and
compensation and apology to one of its citizens,
Arar, in 2007 set a precedent in the practice of
extraordinary rendition of terrorism suspects. In
the case of Arar, Canada provided false informa-
tion to the USA, resulting in Arar’s transfer to
Syria and his yearlong imprisonment and torture.
Although the USA made no official apology the
European Parliament made a resolution declaring
“deep regrets” that Italy permitted use of the air-
port in Rome for transferring Arar to Syria
(Macklin 2008).
Carlson and Listhaug (2007) investigated the
concept of human rights in 55 countries of
Eastern and Western Europe, Asia, Africa, North
America, and Latin America to determine
whether it is universal. They examined the fac-
tors leading to the formation of people’s attitudes
and perceptions about human rights. They found
that the concept of the human rights was largely
universal, especially in relationship to torture.
They also determined that as political repres-
sions increased, people’s perceptions of human
rights became more. In countries where individ-
uals had greater control over political life, peo-
ple had greater satisfaction with the condition of
human rights. Moreover, in Western Europe, the
higher level of education reflected greater posi-
tive perception of human rights, although women
reported lower degrees of positive assessment
(Carlson and Listhaug 2007). The establishment
of long-term democratic practices is seen as a
necessary precondition for the development of
human rights.
Bellamy (2007) addressed the issue of break-
ing the moral and societal norms as well as the
treatment of enemy combatants during periods of
war. Discussing the “Dirty Hands” and the “Lesser
553
Evil” interpretations, he pointed out that both
principles agreed it was the government’s respon-
sibility to protect its citizens and therefore it was
allowed to break both legal and moral norms
when necessary (Bellamy 2007). Addressing the
issue of legitimacy of such political decisions,
Bellamy argued that subjective beliefs in the
legitimacy of one’s actions allowed one to gather
supporting evidence. However, believing that an
act is illegitimate or immoral justifies condemna-
tion and punishment of the actor (Bellamy 2007).
Thus, the punishment and even torture of terror-
ism suspects may seem justified. Recognizing that
judgments of what is legitimate and moral are
shaped by norms of legality, morality, and consti-
tutionality that a calculated decision to torture
could be seen as the means to achieve the desired
goals (Bellamy 2007). Disputes over the accept-
ability of such norms occur on both domestic and
international levels.
Albert Bandura has also been concerned with
the violation of moral codes and in particular
with tolerance for such violations when they are
part of state-sanctioned aggression. In his view,
there are a number of sociocognitive mechanisms
that work unconsciously to allow people to
engage in or give tacit (or even explicit) approval
to the perpetration of inhumane acts. He indi-
cated that tolerance of the use of torture and
exoneration of cruelty could lead to even greater
brutality (Bandura 2002). Much of our work on
perspectives on torture, as discussed in the next
section, is informed by Bandura’s work on moral
disengagement.
Perspectives on Torture: Methods
The UK/Anglo Sample
This sample is composed of participants from
Australia, Canada, Northern Ireland, the UK, and
the USA. There were a total of 1,049 participants
(564 females, 484 males, 1 undisclosed gender)
in this sample. Of these respondents, 270 (142
females, 128 males) were from Australia, 119
participants (80 females, 39 males) from Canada,
554
102 participants (54 females, 47 males, 1
undisclosed gender) from Northern Ireland, 94
respondents (39 females, 55 males) from Great
Britain, and 464 from the USA (249 females, 215
males). Ages of the participants in the sample
ranged from 18 to 86. A majority of respondents
reported being from the middle, working, or
upper middle classes while several respondents
indicated being from the lower or upper classes.
Fifty percent of the sample self-reported as
Christians, with lesser percentages for each of the
other world’s major religions. Almost 84% of the
sample reported never having been in the military.
Roughly 65% of the sample had had a relative in
the military. Finally, 33% of the sample had par-
ticipated in a protest against war and in favor of
peace.
The Survey
Participants were asked to complete the Personal
and Institutional Rights to Aggression Survey
(PAIRTAPS). This chapter focuses on participant
responses to two prompts regarding torture. The
first item was “The government has the right to
order the torture of prisoners during times of
war.” Participants were asked first to rate their
level of agreement on a 7-point Likert scale rang-
ing from 1, totally disagree, to 7, totally agree,
and then to respond qualitatively, explaining their
level of agreement and their reasoning behind it.
The second statement poses the scenario “Military
officials are torturing somebody suspected of
having information about terrorists. How would
you feel? What would you want to do?”
The Coding Systems for the Right
to Torture Item
Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement
For this chapter, participant responses to the tor-
ture items were analyzed for themes related to
sociocognitive mechanisms identified by Albert
Bandura in his theory of moral disengagement.
Coders used a coding manual developed by mem-
bers of the Group on International Perspectives of
J.M. Davis et al.
Governmental Aggression and Peace (GIPGAP).
This manual is based on a deductive qualitative
analysis approach (Gilgun 2005) informed by
Bandura’s theory of moral disengagement
(Bandura 1999). The qualitative responses to both
items were coded using this manual and then ana-
lyzed. In discussing these findings, we focus on
the use of sociocognitive mechanisms identified
by Bandura in regard to torture-tolerant and
torture-intolerant explanations of a government’s
right to torture, and also on personal involvement
as an indication of agency in response to the
hypothetical torture situation.
According to Bandura (1999), there are eight
sociocognitive processes that allow individuals to
behave inhumanely without sanctioning them-
selves for immoral behavior; indeed, these mech-
anisms allow individuals to believe that they are
acting morally. These mechanisms include (1)
moral and social justification (which we call
pseudo-moral justification), which is a means by
which people justify unethical behavior through
defining their actions in a moral or socially
acceptable fashion; (2) advantageous compari-
son, which works by contrasting a harmful act
with other actions in an effort to make the origi-
nal act seem acceptable; (3) euphemistic label-
ing, which replaces negative connotations in
words or phrases with positive or neutral ideas;
(4) displacement and diffusion of responsibility;
(5) misrepresenting, minimizing, or disregarding
consequences; (6) dehumanization; and (7) attri-
bution of blame to others including the victim or
the situation (Jackson and Sparr 2005). All of
these “mechanisms” can be identified as themes
in responses to the right-to-torture item and are
categories in the coding manual that apply to the
torture-tolerant responses.
Mechanisms of Moral Engagement
Based on its familiarity with the sociocognitive
mechanisms of moral disengagement and their
conceptually-guided review of responses in the
international coding manual sample, the GIPGAP
coding team identified a number of themes that
seemed to represent the reciprocals of the moral
disengagement mechanisms: principled reasoning,
descriptive language, principled comparisons,
35 UK Anglo Torture
awareness of negative consequences, and exon-
erating the prisoner. Themes representing each
of these mechanisms can be found in the anti-
torture responses to our survey. The coding man-
ual has a category for each of the themes, plus
subcategories. For example, the category for
principled reasoning has three different subcate-
gories: personal moral principles, honoring
international mandates, and humanization. The
first subcategory, personal moral principles,
refers to the ability to refrain from behaving inhu-
manely because inhumane behavior violates per-
sonal moral standards. Honoring international
mandates refers to the governmental obligation
to adhere to international law. Humanization is
the attribution of human qualities to the victim,
thus making it easier to refrain from inhumane
action. Human rights, a subcategory of human-
ization, refers to a person’s inherent right to life,
happiness, equality, etc. The next category,
descriptive language, applies to responses that
use language to accurately describe the unjust
behavior or action. Principled comparison is bro-
ken down into two additional subcategories: bet-
ter alternatives and ineffective/not useful.
Responses coded for better alternatives indicate
that there are better options than torture or that
torture is outdated. Similarly, the ineffective/not
useful category refers to torture as being unnec-
essary or fruitless. Awareness of negative conse-
quences cites the harmful results that could come
about due to use of torture and exonerating the
prisoner, removes blame from the individual
being subjected to torture.
Personal Involvement
The second aspect of moral agency, the proactive
form, concerns whether people would become
personally involved in a harmful or unjust situa-
tion or not—for example, if they were directly
and dramatically exposed to a prisoner being tor-
tured in a time of war. Individuals behaving in a
proactive manner will engage in behavior aimed at
preventing an action that they feel is inhumane or
detrimental (Bandura 1999). The personal involve-
ment coding scheme is used to code responses to
the torture scenario into one of four major cate-
gories: positive action, passive regarding torture,
555
compliant with torture, and helplessness.
Responses coded for positive action indicate that
the participant would engage in some unspecified
positive behavior to combat an immoral behav-
ior. The positive action category includes subcat-
egories for responses indicating an intention to
(1) take a political stand (political activism/insti-
tutional) by appealing to the government or an
organization to take action against a harmful
activity, (2) exhibit moral awareness in an effort
to enlighten and educate others as to the cruelty
of an act, or (3) recommend agentic alternative
solutions such as suggesting more humane ways
to act. The major category passive regarding tor-
ture applies to responses indicating that the
respondent would be unmotivated to take action
against inhumane behavior; apathy, a subcate-
gory of passive regarding torture, reflects indif-
ference toward the victim. The category compliant
with torture applies to responses indicating that
the participant would expect to view any torture
being witnessed as acceptable or necessary.
Responses that are compliant with torture may
also suggest harmful alternative solutions to
torture, such as killing the individual instead of
torturing him or her. Finally, helplessness refers
to responses indicating an inability to engage in
an action to combat the unjust behavior.
Results
Torture-Tolerant Responses
Twenty-five percent of the responses indicated
some support for a governmental right to torture,
at least under some circumstances. In this section,
we discuss the coding categories and subcatego-
ries into which at last 4% of the responses to each
item fell. Examples of the responses falling into
these categories can be found in Table 35.1 along
with basic demographic information.
The most frequently used pro-torture argu-
ment was advantageous comparison. These
responses showed a tendency to view torture as a
means to an end, with the ends justifying the
means. This reasoning is reflected in the response
of a 20-year-old American man who wrote, “The
556 J.M. Davis et al.

Table 35.1 Examples of torture-tolerant responses

Category Percent Country Gender Age Response
Advantageous 11 (43) Australia M 21 “I think it’s a matter of circumstance. If the lives of many
comparison depended on the information one person held, then is it
ok to torture them to find out? Alternatively, would one
life be sacrificed for many? While I disagree with the act
of torture, it is not a strong disagreement, because torture
MAY be necessary in some circumstances”
Canada F 19 “Sometimes during grave times, you need to do what
needs to be done to save one’s self and country. However
what kind of treatment is being used as torture is the
question because some of the tactics used by the United
States do not seem like torture to me”
N. Ireland F 39 Sometimes needed for greater good
UK M 49 “Only in extremely exceptional circumstances in order
to prevent even worse tortures being enacted against the
innocent and/or a greater number”
USA F 19 “It is inhumane, but if it is the only way to save the lives
of your citizens, then and only then should it be done”
Attribution 4 (14) Australia M 36 “Yes for anyone caught up in terrorist activities”
of blame N. Ireland M 19 “Only if they commit a serious crime”
UK F 23 “Depends on what they have done”
USA F 19 “This method seems extreme but in times of war many
things happen that are extreme”
Note: The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total set of
responses to the right-to-torture item. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in the
specified category out of all the pro-torture responses
N. Ireland Northern Ireland, UK United Kingdom, USA United States of America, F female, M male

fastest way to end a war and achieve the resulting
peace is for each side to fight using all available
tactics and resources to reach a decisive victory.
Torture that is not in support of a strategic or tac-
tical aim, however, is unreasonable and should
not be allowed.” This response suggests that the
young man believes that information gained
from torture will bring about an end to the war.
However, it also suggests an internal struggle in
the insistence that torture for any other reason is
unjustified. This mental battle can be seen in
other responses such as that of a 21-year-old
woman from Australia who stated, “Perhaps if
there was an impending threat that could kill
thousands of people. Otherwise there is no
excuse. Nobody should have to endure torture.”
This response also has elements of the classic
ticking bomb scenario. Similar thinking is seen
in a response from a 23-year-old Canadian man
who wrote, “Torture’s legitimization is a slip-
pery slope. A compelling and imminent need
(such as extracting info to save lives) must
be made.”
Attribution of blame was the second most
commonly occurring invasion-tolerant theme.
These responses often cited the very nature of war
as a reason for torture. For example, a 20-year-old
Australian woman said “Torture is a disgusting
act. However, in time of war, the rules of normal
reality cannot always be applied. If the torture of
a few prisoners gains valuable information for the
greater good (ends to the mean), this act is some-
what more justified (but still not desirable).”
In addition to using wartime as a justification for
a government’s right to torture, other responses
referenced a prisoner’s guilt as a reason to torture.
A 45-year-old man from the UK stated, “If an
ordinary soldier, then no. If it’s military personnel
who makes decisions to order his troops to kill
people, then yes.” A 20-year-old American woman
said, “Prisoners who are innocent citizens should
not be tortured. However, prisoners that acted as
35 UK Anglo Torture
spies or betrayed their country should be treated
in a manner to find the truth.” Both of these
responses show a delineation between “regular
prisoners” who should not be tortured and those
who should pay for their crimes.
Torture-Intolerant Responses
Seventy-two percent of the responses indicated
that the government did not have the right to tor-
ture prisoners in times of war. In the next section,
we discuss the particular categories into which
more than 6% of the responses were coded.
General torture intolerance was the most
common type of qualitative response provided by
participants indicating that they did not support a
governmental right to torture. Responses in this
category demonstrated general rejection of tor-
ture but did not offer further explanation for
reasoning behind the stance. For instance, a
35-year-old Australian woman wrote, “Torture
should never be used, ever.” A 60-year-old man
from the UK stated, “No government has the
right to torture anyone.”
The second most commonly found justification
found for torture intolerance was awareness of
negative consequences. These responses showed
an understanding of the negative outcomes that
can result from torture. A 33-year-old American
woman said, “…any act of torture or violence
against prisoners will only escalate inhumane
treatment of all prisoners, spread trauma and loss,
and make peaceful resolution of international
conflict increasingly difficult.” Many other conse-
quences of torture were identified, as is illustrated
by the response of a 29-year-old Canadian man
who wrote, “It’s not only a violation of human
rights, but it tends to produce bad information.
Also, we are at risk of torturing the innocent.”
The third most commonly used anti-torture
construct was humanization, a concern with treat-
ing prisoners of war humanely. For instance, a
28-year-old woman from Northern Ireland said,
“It [torture] isn’t a fair way to treat prisoners.”
Other responses referenced the fact that we are all
humans, regardless of which side of the war we
are on. This reasoning can be seen in the response
557
of a 21-year-old Australian woman who stated,
“Never. We always seem to be able to ‘justify’ it
when it is the enemy, but when it comes to ‘our’
people being tortured we think it is barbaric (e.g.,
Prisoners of War in WWII) We are all human
beings regardless of anything else and therefore
should by no means evoke someone else’s suffer-
ing in order to achieve our own goals.”
Additional examples of responses coded for
torture-intolerant, humanization, and awareness of
negative consequences can be found in Table 35.2
along with basic demographic information.
Personal Involvement Responses
Approximately 70% of the responses to the tor-
ture scenario indicated that the participant would
want to engage in some form of positive action if
forced to observe someone being tortured. A wide
range of personal involvement themes was found
among the coded responses; however, only the
categories with greater than 8% of the scenario
responses are discussed here.
The most frequently found examples of per-
sonal involvement were responses recommend-
ing general positive action. Responses in this
category indicated that the participant was pro-
posing that he or she would take some sort of step
to end the torture or help the prisoner but were
vague as to how to accomplish the goal. For
instance, a 21-year-old woman from Northern
Ireland indicated she would “tell them to let him
go.”
The second most common type of personal
involvement response was political activism/
institutional responsibility. The responses in this
category indicated an intent to appeal to a politi-
cal or institutional body in an effort to end torture.
For example, a 22-year-old Canadian man said,
“Passive protest against it, like signing petitions
and voicing my opinions online and to my elected
officials.”
Agentic alternative solutions was the third
most frequently mentioned form of personal
involvement. Responses in this category often
touched upon using other methods to deal with
the prisoners. A 20-year-old American woman
558 J.M. Davis et al.

Table 35.2 Examples of torture-intolerant responses

Category Percent Country Gender Age Response
General torture 18 (25) Australia M 22 “Nope. Never”
intolerance Canada M 36 “There is never an excuse for torture”
N. Ireland F 48 “No, they don’t”
UK M 19 “Torture should never be used”
USA F 52 “No torture should be avoided in all cases”
Humanization 8 (10) Australia M 24 “The dignity of each human person has to be
respected even in times of war”
Canada F 83 “Torture in any form is inhumane”
N. Ireland M 24 “As Q9—torture is usually inhumane and vindictive”
UK M 21 “Not humane, should interrogate without torture”
USA F 22 “This is a bad tactic during war. We may be fighting,
but we are all human beings. Furthermore, we are not
savages and should be able to control our actions and
be somewhat human to POWs. We might still be
fighting, but above all we are human beings”
Awareness 10 (13) Australia M 30 “Torture is a useless method of extracting intelligence
of negative and demeans both the tortured and the torturer”
consequences Canada F 70 “If nothing else, torture cannot guarantee the validity
of information as confession is gained. It is likely to
put the wielders of torture at a lower moral level than
those prisoners and affect their future conduct as
citizens”
N. Ireland F 37 “No-one right to torture—makes us as bad as Hitler”
UK F 28 “Torture dehumanizes both parties”
USA M 20 “No way. Torture breaks identity and community and
ruins both torturers and torture victims and torture
survivors”
Note: The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total set of
responses to the right-to-torture item. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in the
specified category out of all the anti-torture responses
N. Ireland Northern Ireland, UK United Kingdom, USA United States of America, F female, M male

stated, “Demand that other measures be taken,
without the use of physical violence to obtain
information.”
Only a relatively small proportion of the
responses to the torture scenario did not suggest
personal involvement and were coded for either
passive regarding torture or compliant with tor-
ture. All of the passive responses were coded into
the subcategory apathy, all indicated that the
respondent would do nothing to help the prisoner,
and all of them were the same one-word answer:
“Nothing.” Responses in the category compliant
with torture indicated some level of intent to sup-
port the torturing of the suspect. For example, a
19-year-old woman from the UK stated, “Make
sure that they are definitely involved and if they
are then torture them.”
Additional responses for personal involve-
ment can be found in the Table 35.3 along with
basic demographic information.
Exploratory Statistical Analyses
To explore the extent to which there might be
demographic group differences in respondents’
views on a state right to torture and what they
would do if they knew of an incidence of military
torture, exploratory chi-square tests, t-tests, and
analysis of variance (ANOVA) were run. The
demographic variables studied were (1) gender,
(2) military service, (3) relative in military service,
(4) protest participation, (5) country, (6) current
religion, and (7) social class. Marginally significant
35 UK Anglo Torture 559

Table 35.3 Examples of personal involvement responses

Code Percent Country Gender Age Response
General 33 (47) Australia F 20 “Tell them to stop”
positive Canada M 51 “Stop the action”
action N. Ireland F 48 “Expose the torture”
UK M 20 “Stop the torture”
USA F 27 “End it”
Political 25 (34) Australia F 66 “Take political action”
activism/ Canada F 45 “Call my government rep and ask that they halt
institutional torture”
N. Ireland M 69 “Protest”
UK M 21 “Understand why, oppose it via the means of freedom
of expression”
USA M 19 “Get the officials in question to cease their actions
and launch an investigation into why this action was
allowed”
Alternative 11 (16) Australia M 18 “Convince them of alternatives to torture”
harmful Canada F 53 “Give the military officials something more
solutions productive to do”
N. Ireland M 19 “Stop it. Use other methods”
UK F 62 “I would want to try and persuade the military
officials to find a less violent way to try and get the
information”
USA M 22 “Approach those being questioned in a different way”
Compliant 12 (85) Australia F 30 “Just stick to torturing the terrorists”
with torture Canada M 18 “I would establish that I have the right individual and
do what is necessary to get the right information out
of them”
N. Ireland F 21 “Make sure it keeps happening or terrorists will have
no fear”
UK M 27 “Support”
USA F 49 “Keep them alive until they speak”
Note: The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses falling into the specified category out
of the total response set of torture scenario responses. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of
responses in that category out of all the responses coded for the major category (e.g. positive action)
N. Ireland Northern Ireland, UK United Kingdom, USA United States of America, F female, M male

results are reported in an effort to inform future
research. All group differences identified as statis-
tically significant had p-values of 0.05 or smaller
and group differences identified as marginally
significant had p-values between 0.056 and 0.10.
Demographic Differences in Responses
to a Government’s Right to Torture
Gender differences were observed in the use of
torture-tolerant and torture-intolerant arguments.
Pearson’s chi-square analysis revealed that men
were significantly more likely than women to use
advantageous comparison, meaning they were
more likely to justify torture by arguing that the
means justified the ends. On the other hand,
women were significantly more likely than were
men to state that torture was not a right. Similarly,
use of humanizing arguments against torture was
contingent on gender: women were significantly
more likely than were men to engage in this type
of reasoning. Independent sample t-tests with
continuous scores for use of particular arguments
supported all of the gender differences found by
chi-square tests.
Significant differences between respondents
who had served in the military and those who had
not were found in the use of some of the torture-
intolerant but not torture-tolerant arguments.
560 J.M. Davis et al.

In arguments against a right to torture, respon- Table 35.4 Responses to a government’s right to torture
dents without military experience were margin- prisoners of war: percentages of responses in coding
categories by demographic groups and chi-square values
ally more likely to humanize the victim than
were respondents in the military. t-Tests sup- Group 1 (%) Group 2 (%)
Categories Male Female X2
ported this result. In addition, significantly more
Advantageous 20 13 5.73*
participants with a relative in the military gave
comparison
justifications supporting torture as a means to an Torture 21 29 6.18**
end (a form of advantageous comparison) than intolerance
their counterparts, a difference that was sup- Humanization 13 7 6.86**
ported by t-tests. Military Nonmilitary
Chi-squares tests also revealed group differ- Humanization 11 4 3.72^
ences in the use of torture-tolerant and torture- Relative No relative
intolerant arguments based on protest military military
participation. Respondents who reported having Advantageous 18 11 5.60*
comparison
protested against war and in favor of peace were
Protest No protest
significantly more likely to disagree with the
Advantageous 10 20 11.24***
right to torture and marginally more likely to comparison
identify negative consequences to torture than Torture 30 21 7.03**
their counterparts. Conversely, respondents who intolerance
had never participated in protest were Awareness 14 9 3.47^
significantly more likely than their counterparts of negative
consequences
to justify torture as a means to an end through
Note:
advantageous comparison. t-Tests supported *
p £ 0.05; **p £ 0.01; ***p £ 0.001; ^0.051 < p < 0.10
these findings and also showed that respondents
who had participated in a protest scored margin-
ally higher on the use of attribution of blame in higher on general torture intolerance than those
justifying torture than respondents who had not from Australia, the UK, and the USA.
been a protest participant. ANOVAs also showed differences based on par-
Table 35.4 presents percentages of responses ticipant’s current religion (Buddhist, Christian,
in coding categories and chi-square values by Hindu, Jew, Muslim, other, and agnostic/atheist/
demographic group for responses to the item none) in frequency scores for both pro-torture and
concerning a potential state right to torture anti-torture arguments. Differences were found in
prisoners of war. the use of advantageous comparison, with post
One-way ANOVAs showed significant group hoc multiple comparisons revealing that Hindus
differences in frequencies of particular themes scored significantly higher in use of principled
based on respondents’ country and current reli- comparison than Christians, Muslims, Buddhists,
gion, but did not show any significant or margin- and atheists/agnostics/none. Use of attribution of
ally significant group differences based on blame was also contingent on participants’ current
socioeconomic status. When nationality was religion. Specifically, post hoc multiple compari-
examined as an independent variable predicting sons showed that Hindus scored higher on the use
scores on the different arguments, an overall of this pro-torture theme than Christians, Jews,
significant difference was found in the use of Buddhists, others, and atheists/agnostics/none.
advantageous comparison and attribution of Lastly, an ANOVA showed that awareness of
blame; however, post hoc multiple comparisons negative consequences scores differed based on
failed to pinpoint specific intercountry differences. current religion, with post hoc multiple compari-
Additionally, the frequency of general torture sons showing that respondents who identified as
intolerance arguments was dependent on national- “other” scored significantly higher on the use of
ity, and post hoc multiple comparisons showed awareness of negative consequences than did
that respondents from Canada scored significantly Christians and atheists/agnostics/none.
35 UK Anglo Torture 561

Demographic Differences in Responses Table 35.5 Responses to a hypothetical torture situation:

to the Hypothetical Torture Situation percentages of responses in coding categories by demo-
graphic groups and chi-square values

Gender differences were observed for several Group 1 (%) Group 2 (%)
Categories Male Female X2
of the personal involvement themes. Men were
Apathy 13 10 2.99^
marginally more likely to be apathetic in regards
Positive action 32 38 3.44^
to the prompt: “Military officials are torturing
Alternative 7 18 22.51***
somebody suspected of having information about solutions
terrorists. What would you want to do?” than Military Nonmilitary
women. Women were marginally more likely to Apathy 16 11 2.95^
indicate that they would get involved in positive Positive action 24 37 7.07**
action in response to the hypothetical torture situ- Alternative 7 14 4.38*
ation; in addition, significantly more women than solutions
men said they would offer agentic alternative Relative No relative
military military
solutions to torture. t-Tests supported the results
Compliance 13 9 2.75^
concerning the use of personal involvement and with torture
agentic alternative solutions. Protest No protest
Respondents who had been in the military Compliance 6 16 20.14***
were marginally more likely than their counter- with torture
parts to indicate that they would be apathetic in Apathy 4 16 24.26***
response to viewing torture. Respondents without Positive action 41 31 8.09**
military service were significantly more likely to Political 33 16 30.64***
predict that they would take positive action and activism/
institutional
propose better alternatives for dealing with
Note:
someone suspected of having information about *
p £ 0.05; **p £ 0.01; ***p £ 0.001; ^0.051 < p < 0.10
terrorists than respondents with military service.
Once again, t-test results supported all of the mil-
itary service differences except the significant An ANOVA showed that frequency scores on
difference on the use of apathy contingent on compliance with torture varied by nationality.
military service. Respondents reporting a relative Post hoc multiple comparisons indicated that
with military service were marginally more likely respondents from the USA scored significantly
to be compliant with torture of an individual sus- higher in compliance with torture than respondents
pected of having terrorist information than their from Australia and Canada. Finally, appeals to
counterparts. political activism also varied significantly as a
Respondents who had never protested against function of nationality. However, Scheffe tests
war and in favor of peace were significantly more failed to reveal a specific country difference.
likely to respond apathetically to a torture situa- No significant results were found for the use of
tion and be compliant with torture than respon- the personal involvement themes as a function of
dents who had engaged in protest. Finally, as religion or socioeconomic status.
compared to their counterparts, significantly more
respondents who had been in a protest responded
to the hypothetical torture situation in a positive Discussion
personally involved manner and were willing to
take a political or institutional stand against tor- The practice of torture in the modern world
ture. t-Tests supported the findings for positive contradicts moral ethics and international norms
action and political/institutional activism. of human dignity and moral standards. The purpose
Table 35.5 shows the percentages of responses of this study was to investigate torture-tolerant
in personal involvement coding categories and and torture-intolerant responses in a large
chi-square values by demographic group. sample of participants from Western democratic
562
societies. Torture-tolerant and torture-intolerant
responses were examined within the framework
of Bandura’s theory of moral disengagement.
Furthermore, exploratory statistical analyses
were conducted to discover whether the forms of
reasoning shown by participants in their responses
regarding a state’s right to torture varied in rela-
tion to particular demographic variables such as
gender, military service, participation in protests,
country, religion, and class.
Thematic analyses revealed that 27% of the
arguments made by our participants supported a
governmental right to use torture, despite the fact
that use of torture would violate international
law. Support for this right came primarily from
arguments contrasting the possibility of losing
thousands of lives with the possibility of achiev-
ing socially worthy goals through application of
torture. Also relatively common in the torture-
tolerant responses were arguments attributing
blame to others for the necessity of a right to tor-
ture. Exploratory statistical analyses revealed
that advantageous comparisons were mostly pro-
vided by men, respondents with military experi-
ence, respondents with family members serving
in the military, and participants who had never
participated in antiwar protests. Attribution of
blame, which can be viewed as a tool for self-
exoneration and justification of violence, was the
second most prevalent torture-tolerant response.
Bandura (2002) argued that moral justifications
(which we call pseudo-moral justifications) and
advantageous comparisons are the most powerful
tools for moral disengagement (Bandura 2002).
Moreover, exploratory analyses suggested that the
use of both advantageous comparison and attri-
bution of blame varied somewhat in relation to
nationality and current religion of participants.
Despite some tolerance for a state right to tor-
ture, 60% of the responses expressed disapproval
of such a right, suggesting widespread accep-
tance of the value of human life (Carlson and
Listhaug 2007). Exploratory statistical analyses
suggested that participants from Canada were
more torture-intolerant than their counterparts in
Australia, the UK, and the USA. Analyses also
indicated that women, participants without mili-
tary experience (including those whose relatives
J.M. Davis et al.
did not serve in the military), as well as antiwar
protesters were more torture-intolerant than their
counterparts. A significant number of antiwar
protesters expressed willingness to take a political
stand advocating their views.
Our study revealed that a general torture-
intolerant position, awareness of negative conse-
quences, and humanization were the most
common anti-torture arguments and were consis-
tent with principles of moral engagement. Most
anti-torture respondents supported prohibition of
torture by governments and honoring of interna-
tional law, rendering torture as an inacceptable
aspect of human interaction. An agentic proac-
tive aspect of the participants’ compassion could
be identified in their expressed motivation to
intervene in the processes where torture was used.
Women and participants without military
affiliations indicated a greater likelihood of posi-
tive action and intent to seek agentic alternative
solutions to torture in the advent of direct expo-
sure to torture. The results indicated that positive
action, political activism, and agentic alternative
solutions were the most prevalent categories of
personal involvement, reflecting participants’
torture-intolerant perceptions.
Bandura (2002) has described proactive moral
actions as the power of an individual over a situa-
tion and perception of action as a duty, rather than
as heroism (Bandura 2002). When faced with the
possibility of aggression by their own govern-
ments, many people feel apathy. In our sample,
apathy was projected much less often than per-
sonal involvement, but when it was expressed, it
was done so at a greater rate by men, participants
with military experience, and participants who
never participated in protests, as compared with
their counterparts. Responses indicating compli-
ance with torture (that is, either unwillingness to
help the prisoner or agreement with use of torture)
were more common in participants with military
experience and those who did not participate in
antiwar protests rather than their counterparts.
It appears that overall, significant anti-torture
attitudes and beliefs prevail in the UK/Anglo
nations. Global antiterrorism measures, includ-
ing security enhancement, and intelligence shar-
ing often clash with the rights of individuals to
35 UK Anglo Torture
their liberties and dignity. To address rising
controversy over importance of the national secu-
rity and individuals rights, a global approach is
needed in addressing vital issues of torture and
value of the human life.
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 Perspectives on Torture in Russia
and the Balkan Peninsula 36
Charikleia Tsatsaroni, Sherri McCarthy,
Natalia Parnyuk, Nebojsa Petrović, Marko Polič,
Anna Medvedeva, Mimi Maritz, and Vlado Miheljak

The people of Europe have experienced a long
history of war over sovereignty, resources, and
ideas. Typically, the major powers have fought
for more power and more land, while the smaller
countries have fought for their independence.
Over the past millennia, these long and violent
wars have had devastating consequences for
the general populations of the warring nations.
Some view torture as an ancient evil of European
history that, today, is often justified from a
utilitarian standpoint (Glass 1996; Samaha
1979). The violent historical experiences of
these nations could help explain the current
views on torture amongst the Europeans
(Hodgson 2006).
Bronfenbrenner’s cognitive–ecological model
(as cited in Malley-Morrison et al. 2006a, b)
provides a theoretical perspective on four factors
affecting violence: (1) the macrosystem (e.g., the
nation’s legal international framework, the
nation’s involvement in internal and/or external
warfare); (2) the exosystem (e.g., the level of vio-
lence in the community, the extent to which the
outlets of communication are controlled by the
government); (3) the microsystem (e.g., involve-
ment of any family members in military service,
the amount of violence in the family); and (4) the
individual (e.g., the person’s gender, age, reli-
gion, personal involvement with violence, politi-
cal philosophy and personal worldviews on
morality).
Hodgson (2006) posits, “only 60 years ago,
Europeans lived with the terror of a heavy knock
on the door in the small hours of the morning, the
real danger of betrayal, humiliation, torture, and
summary execution” (p. 12). Thus, it is not
surprising that even younger generations of
Europeans oppose the idea that the need to
prevent terrorist attacks justifies the use of torture
(Hodgson 2006). Nevertheless, the European
continent is a mosaic of different countries with
significant differences.
This chapter focuses on Greece, Russia,
Serbia, and Slovenia, four different countries
from the central and southern part of Europe
and Eurasia. Further, it examines the arguments
people use to condone or reject a state right to use
torture during times of war. The traumatic effects
of torture inflicted on the citizens of Russia,
Slovenia, Greece, and Serbia throughout history
need to be considered for their potential macro-
systemic influences on individual perspectives
regarding whether governments should have a
right to torture human beings.
Historical Context for Perceptions
of Torture: Russia
The use of torture in Russia dates as far back as
1237, to the beginning of the period of Mongol
domination of the area (1237–1480 A.C.)

K. Malley-Morrison et al. (eds.), International Handbook of War, Torture, and Terrorism, 565
Peace Psychology Book Series, DOI 10.1007/978-1-4614-1638-8_36,
© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2013
566
(McCarthy et al. 2009). This era saw the intro-
duction of the use of torture to extract confes-
sions, disciplinary beatings that resulted in death,
and capital punishment to restrain opposition to
the rulers (Dewey 1988). On the other hand,
“judicial torture does not appear to have been
practiced in Russia’ or Muscovy prior to the mid-
sixteenth century” (Weickhardt 2007, p. 57).
Specifically, the Conciliar Law Code of 1649
stated that imperial Russia needed to create an
inquisitorial procedure for use in criminal cases
where the role of the judge merged with the role
of the prosecutor. As a result, judicial torture
gained a major role in criminal investigation
(Weickhardt 2007).
Between 1855 and 1881, Tsar Alexander II
ruled Russia. There were approximately twenty-
three million Russian serfs at this time, living
and laboring under the yoke of miserable pov-
erty. Tsar Alexander II gave a superficial promise
to these serfs that he would put an end to these
harsh conditions; in response, during the 1870s,
upper- and middle-class Russian citizens (in
movement called the People’s Will) set out to
liberate the serfs but were soon met with repres-
sion and torture by the Tsarist regime. The
conflict led to an ongoing struggle that eventu-
ally led to WWI and the Russian Revolution
(Ovetz 2007).
Oppression continued under Communist rule.
During the Stalin era (1922–1953), for example,
Stalin envisioned a rapid industrialization of the
Soviet Union. To accomplish this, Stalin created
the Gulag prison agency in 1934, using the prison
population for hard labor. Enemies of the state
were sent to these prison work camps to do
development work for the country (Piacentini
2004). Descriptions of the Gulag labor camps
confirm that individuals were treated horribly
and literally worked to death (Brent 2009). Under
Stalin alone, it is estimated that some twenty mil-
lion people were imprisoned (Wheatcroft 1985)
and by 1940, the economy was completely
dependent on this prison workforce. In addition,
between 1937 and 1938, a period known as the
Great Purge, Stalin’s officials used torture in
order to acquire confessions from individuals
C. Tsatsaroni et al.
who were considered a threat to the state
(McCarthy et al. 2009). Even since the Stalinist
era, there have continued to be reports of torture
by officials of the Soviet Union—for example, in
Afghanistan in the 1980s, following the Soviet
Union invasion against Islamist insurgents in
support of a Communist coup (Afghanistan
1986).
Although higher levels of transparency,
accountability, and management of the criminal
justice system came with the collapse of
Communism, recorded crime, for example,
increased by 85% from 1989 to 1999 (Piacentini
2004). The surge in numbers of prisoners proved
difficult to manage, so officials increasingly
treated captives inhumanely and used torture.
In 1997, the first steps were taken to resolve these
acts of inhumanity, as a Penal Code was passed
and a halt was placed on the death penalty
(Piacentini 2004). Nevertheless, a large number
of judgments from the European Court of Human
Rights refer to severe abuses of human rights,
such as enforced disappearances and torture, in
Chechnya (Human Rights Watch 2009).
Historical Context for Perceptions
of Torture: The Balkan Peninsula
Before World War II, Yugoslavia, which sits on
the Balkan Peninsula, was a multiethnic society
slightly dominated by Serbs, but consisting of
Serbs, Croatians, Bosnians, and Slovenians.
At that time, the Croatians were in search of a
more autonomous society, while the Serbs wanted
to extend their kingdom. As a result of this dis-
agreement, the Serbs’ larger population con-
stantly oppressed the Croatians. However, with
the help of the Nazis, the Croatians were able to
form a fascist revolutionary movement, known as
Ustaša, which was responsible for great brutality
during WWII. The final death toll of ethnic Serbs
during Ustaša rule was estimated at 320,000 to
340,000 (United States Holocaust Memorial
Museum 2010).
After World War II, a communist-led partisan
movement helped form the Socialist Federal
36 Russia and Balkans Torture
Republic of Yugoslavia, consisting of six repub-
lics: Socialist Republics of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro,
Slovenia, and Macedonia, which is sometimes
known as the Former Yugoslovic Republic of
Macedonia (FYROM). Very quickly, all six of
these republics desired greater autonomy. In
June of 1991, a series of wars began, culminat-
ing in the Kosovo War, fought between the
Kosovo Albanian guerillas and the army of the
Former Yugoslavia, from early 1998 to 1999,
and ending after the bombing of Yugoslavia by
NATO forces. During these wars people from all
sides endured crimes such as rape, murder, tor-
ture, and other barbaric behavior (Kosovar Faces
2005). Using the Nuremberg Trials as a model,
the International Criminal Tribunal for the for-
mer Yugoslavia (ICTY) was established in May
of 1993 with the help of the United Nations. The
goal of this tribunal was to expose the atrocities
and educate the public about human rights and
their violation, with the hope of cultivating a
more stable and peaceful society. Furthermore, a
serious attempt was made to distinguish clearly
between war crimes and crimes against human-
ity (Meron 1993).
In recent decades, the Greeks have also had to
deal with their own ghosts concerning torture.
The reestablishment of democracy in Greece
after 7 years of dictatorship (Junta) (1967–1974)
brought to trial a number of individuals respon-
sible for various atrocities against the citizens of
Greece during the colonels’ military rule (Neier
2002). Because many Greeks were unwilling to
comply with the rule of the colonels, the military
police used torture as a means to maintain power
(Gibson and Haritos-Fatouros 1986). Soldiers
who completed their regular military training,
who had strong physical ability, and who had the
“appropriate” political ideology (antisocialist and
anticommunist) were given training by the mili-
tary police to enter the elite unit of ESA (Army
Police Corps), who were notorious for their use
of torture on political prisoners (Gibson and
Haritos-Fatouros 1986; Huggins et al. 2002;
Zimbardo 2008). At these Military Police train-
ing centers (KESA), ordinary soldiers learned to
567
endure personal, physical, and psychological
harassment. In addition, they learned to consider
socialists and communists as threats to national
security, to dehumanize their victims (e.g., regard
their victims as “worms” and “scum”), to become
apathetic in their view of torture and/or the exer-
cise of it by gradual exposure to it, to develop
elitist attitudes, and to obey authority blindly
(Gibson and Haritos-Fatouros 1986; Huggins
et al. 2002; Zimbardo 2008; Daskalopoulos and
Tsatsaroni 2009).
Human Rights’ Considerations
International legal framework on human rights
(including Article 5 of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights (1948), Article 7 of United
Nations International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights Article 7 (1994), and the 1949
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
(CAT), also known as the First Geneva
Convention) have all declared torture to be a vio-
lation of human rights. The Convention bans tor-
ture under all circumstances and requires that
countries take sufficient measures to prevent tor-
ture and provide appropriate punishment for
those who commit such crimes. In recent decades,
the four countries under consideration in this
chapter have all become signatories to the CAT
and have demonstrated their willingness to com-
ply with the requirements of these conventions.
However, major international anti-torture organi-
zations have expressed concerns regarding the
current implementation of the agreed upon poli-
cies and the potential for human rights violations
that still exist in these countries.
Russia has recently adopted various
constitutional, legislative, administrative, and
practical changes to improve and promote the
protection of human rights in their country. For
example, Russia has administered new codes of
criminal procedure that have introduced jury
trials, stricter limits on detention and interroga-
tion, and provisions for the exclusion of evidence
obtained in the absence of a defense lawyer
568
(CAT 2007). Furthermore, the government
drafted a federal law to protect victims, wit-
nesses, and other participants in criminal pro-
ceedings when a decision or act degrades human
dignity (International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (CCPR), 2009). However,
according to international organizations investi-
gating human rights, work still needs to be done.
Russia still needs to define torture officially in a
way that fully reflects the definition according to
international law. Amendments should include
adopting a narrower definition of terrorist crimes,
limited to offenses that can justifiably be equated
to terrorism and its serious consequences.
Additionally, they must ensure that detainees are
afforded their rights (e.g., access to a lawyer, cir-
cumstances of detention) and that they are pro-
tected from torture and other maltreatment.
Investigations pertaining to the illegal use of
torture must be prompt, impartial, and effective,
and further steps must be taken to end unfair
prosecution techniques and to improve law
enforcement and penitentiary personnel train-
ing. These laws must ensure compensation and
rehabilitation for the victims of torture through
the necessary procedural revisions, ensure the
protection of human rights defenders (e.g., jour-
nalists, lawyers), provide statistical data dem-
onstrating that further steps have been taken to
eliminate the use of torture, and, finally, take
effective steps to ensure universal protection
from torture and other human rights violations
that allegedly occurred during the Chechen
Republic (e.g., abductions and enforced disap-
pearances) (CAT 2007; CCPR 2009; World
Organization against Torture 2009).
Greece, in response to these recent interna-
tional agreements, has also made significant
efforts to promote and protect human rights by
revising its legislation concerning the use of tor-
ture and the treatment of the prosecuted. Greece
has faced challenges with its inflow of migrants
and allegations of maltreatment of undocu-
mented migrants, asylum-seekers, and victims of
trafficking (Human Rights Watch 2010). Reforms
to the Greek Constitution have applied the man-
dates from the CCPR to domestic law in various
C. Tsatsaroni et al.
situations, including a code of ethics for all
police, containing guidelines for arrest and
detention. Furthermore, changes to the law have
called for the implementation of the principle of
equal treatment regardless of racial or ethnic ori-
gin, religious or other beliefs, disability, age and
sexual orientation (CAT 2004; CCPR 2005).
Despite these positive developments, interna-
tional organizations continue to criticize the gov-
ernment’s disorganized approach to reform and
lack of avenues for torture to be reported.
Furthermore, these organizations have requested
that Greece improve compensation for victims of
torture in their country and accelerate efforts to
promote a code of ethics for governing police
interrogations in order to prevent torture and
maltreatment (CAT 2004; CCPR 2005; European
Committee for the Prevention of Torture and
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
(CPT) 2009).
Serbia, like Russia and Greece, has adopted
legislative, administrative, and judicial measures
to implement the laws outlined in the Convention
against torture. The Serbian government has cre-
ated a new Constitution that provides that no one
may be subjected to torture, implemented a new
criminal code that defines and criminalizes tor-
ture, and introduced a series of new laws: one that
established the Protector of Citizens (Ombudsman),
one on asylum, and a third on criminal procedure
(CAT 2009). Again, despite these encouraging
steps, concerns were still expressed at the
Convention against Torture–Committee against
Torture in 2009. This committee stated that Serbia
needs to bring its definition of torture in line with
the one determined by the Convention. In doing
so, Serbia can better protect the human rights of
detainees (e.g., through systematic reporting of
torture and other cruel behavior), guarantee the
full independence and impartiality of the judi-
ciary, and ensure that the Ombudsman indepen-
dently monitors and investigates alleged police
misconduct. More specifically, the government
must guarantee that allegations of torture by pub-
lic officials will be immediately investigated by
the improved education and training of all law
enforcement personnel.
36 Russia and Balkans Torture
Slovenia has also undertaken efforts to
improve its protection of human rights (CAT
2003). Slovenia has heeded the Convention’s
orders regarding aliens and asylum-seekers and
now requires all ministries to cooperate closely
with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in
(1) preparing legislation and bylaws that discuss
human rights, (2) creating a special program
named “Hercules” aimed to reduce and eliminate
the court backlogs, and (3) the undertaking efforts
to further educate and familiarize policemen with
international human rights standards, including
the prevention of torture (CAT 2003). However,
like all other countries previously discussed,
Slovenia needs to bring its definition of torture
promptly into line with the Convention. It also
needs to repeal the statute of limitation for tor-
ture; establish an effective, reliable, and indepen-
dent system for addressing allegations of
maltreatment or torture by police and other pub-
lic officials; attend to ethnically motivated mis-
treatment; and strengthen safeguards against
torture and maltreatment (CAT 2003; Amnesty
International 2003).
Therefore, Slovenia, Serbia, Greece, and
Russia appear to share the will to remain consis-
tent with their international agreements, proceed-
ing toward positive developments regarding
protection from torture in their macrosystems.
These efforts are reflected in their legislations,
policies, and practices regarding torture, as well
as in their efforts to ensure the prevention of tor-
ture and the promotion of human rights. Beyond
the states’ struggle to align with international
humanitarian laws regarding torture, ordinary
people from Serbia, Greece, Slovenia, and Russia
have their own concerns and views about this
issue, which in several instances reflect the dialec-
tics between the specific macrosystems (e.g., his-
torical experiences of torture, positive
developments and negative considerations) and
the personal experiences of individuals from these
countries. In the next section, we consider under-
lying psychological processes that may influence
how ordinary people from Slovenia, Serbia,
Russia, and Greece view torture.
569
Bandura’s Theory of Moral
Disengagement
Albert Bandura (1999) considers that in the
course of socialization, people adopt moral stan-
dards that guide behavior. In his view, people
behave in a way that will bring them satisfaction
and enhance their sense of self-worth and abstain
from behaviors that could lead to negative self-
sanctions due to violation of their moral standards
(Bandura 1999); however, unconscious sociocog-
nitive mechanisms, which he identifies as forms
of moral disengagement processes, can work to
allow individuals to maintain their self-worth
even when behaving immorally or being tolerant
of others’ immoral acts.
Bandura (1999) described four main groups of
sociocognitive mechanisms by which moral obli-
gations can be disengaged from harmful behav-
iors: (1) mechanisms of cognitive reconstruction
of injurious behavior, where detrimental conduct
can be transformed into good or benign by moral
justifications, euphemistic labeling, and advanta-
geous comparisons; (2) mechanisms that remove
or obscure personal agency, where moral control
is weakened when the agentic role in one’s injuri-
ous actions is minimized or distorted by displace-
ment and diffusion of responsibility; (3)
mechanisms that misrepresent, minimize, and dis-
regard consequences of harmful behaviors; and
(4) mechanisms that devalue the victim, weaken-
ing the moral control through dehumanization of
the victims and attributing the blame to them.
Although Bandura recognized that processes
of moral engagement also play a role in moral
conduct, he did not identify specific sociocogni-
tive mechanisms of moral engagement; instead,
he focused on personal agency. Specifically, he
argued that the exercise of moral agency has an
inhibitive form expressed in the individual’s
strong will to abstain from behaving inhumanely,
and a proactive form manifested by active engage-
ment in humane behavior (Bandura 2002).
In regard to proactive moral agency, Bandura
noted, “individuals invest their sense of self-worth
570
so strongly on human convictions and social
obligations that they act against what they regard
as unjust or immoral even though their actions
may incur heavy personal costs” (Bandura 1999,
p.194). When people feel personal responsibility
for the well being of others, humanize others, and
identify with others, empathy for others’ suffer-
ing and proactive moral agency can be achieved
(Bandura 1999, p. 203).
For the purposes of this chapter, we analyzed
participant responses to survey items addressing
torture, using a coding system building on, and
modifying, the theoretical contributions of Albert
Bandura concerning moral disengagement and
engagement.
The Current Study: Methods
The Russian, Serbian, Greek, and Slovenian
respondents to the torture items on the Personal
and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace
Survey (PAIRTAPS) consisted of 607 partici-
pants (363 women, 235 men, and 9 participants
with undisclosed gender). Specifically, 313 par-
ticipants were from Russia, 100 participants were
from Slovenia, 97 participants were from Serbia,
and 97 participants were from Greece; this sam-
ple ranged in age from 18 to 90 with an average
of 33 years old. The overwhelming majority
(61%) of the participants identified themselves as
Christians and 11% reported themselves as
belonging to no religion or being agnostics or
atheists. The majority self-reported as belonging
to middle and upper middle class (56% and 14%,
respectively), 12% as working class, and 8% as
lower class. Although only 18% had participated
in military service, 51% had a relative in the mili-
tary. Finally, 15% had participated in protests
against war and in favor of peace.
As mentioned in our methods chapter (Chap.
34), the participants in our exploratory study
were not a probability sample. Specifically, our
participants were recruited through convenience
sampling and completed either the paper-and-
pencil or the electronic version of the Personal
and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace
Scale (PAIRTAPS) (Malley-Morrison et al.
C. Tsatsaroni et al.
2006a, b), which includes several items on torture.
For the purposes of this chapter, the quantitative
and qualitative responses to the rights’ item “The
government has the right to order the torture of
prisoners in time of war” and to the emotional–
motivational item “Military officials are torturing
somebody suspected of having information about
terrorists. What would you want to do?” were
examined.
Concerning the quantitative responses to the
item “The government has the right to order the
torture of prisoners in time of war,” participants
indicated on a scale from 1 (total disagreement)
to 7 (total agreement) the extent to which they
agreed with the statements and also provided an
explanation of the reasoning behind their rating;
their explanations were coded using a coding
manual informed by Bandura’s theory. The quali-
tative/open-ended responses to the items “The
government has the right to order the torture of
prisoners in time of war” and “Military officials
are torturing somebody suspected of having
information about terrorists. What would you
want to do?” were coded based on a manual
informed by Bandura’s notion of moral agency
(Bandura 2002). The manual identified where we
created torture-intolerant, torture-tolerant, and
personal involvement/agency coding procedures
that allowed us to code responses systematically.
Specifically, responses to the item “The gov-
ernment has the right to order the torture of pris-
oners in time of war” were first coded into one of
two broad categories (torture-tolerant and torture-
intolerant) and then, as appropriate, into subcate-
gories of those two major categories, based on the
participants’ rationales. The major torture toler-
ance category had the following subcategories:
general pro-torture/torture tolerance; pseudo-
moral justification (subcategories: advantageous
comparison and last resort); euphemistic labeling,
denial of responsibility (subcategories: diffusion
of responsibility, displacement of responsibility,
indifference); and misrepresenting, minimizing, or
disregarding consequences, dehumanization, and
attribution of blame (subcategory: revenge). The
major torture-intolerant category had subcatego-
ries for general anti-torture/torture-intolerant,
principled reasoning (subcategories: personal
36 Russia and Balkans Torture
moral principles, responsibility, honor interna-
tional mandates, humanization, human rights),
descriptive language, principled comparison
(subcategories: better alternatives and ineffective/
not useful), awareness of negative consequences,
and exonerating the prisoner. See Chap. 34 for
more details.
Responses to the item “Military officials are
torturing somebody suspected of having informa-
tion about terrorists. What would you want to
do?” were coded primarily into personal engage-
ment and personal disengagement categories.
Specifically, responses were coded for (1) per-
sonal engagement, including positive action
(subcategories: political activism, moral aware-
ness, and agentic alternative solutions), and (2)
personal disengagement, including passivity
regarding torture (subcategory: apathy), compli-
ance with torture (subcategory: alternative harm-
ful solutions), and helplessness.
Finally, responses to both items could be
coded for the categories of reality (meaning that
the response makes reference to some real life
event), do not know, and does not address the
question.
Although our coding manuals were informed
by Bandura’s theory, “moral disengagement” and
“moral engagement” remain theoretical con-
structs that are still in the process of construct
validation. It is quite clear to our research group
that there are some significant issues regarding
the use of the constructs of moral disengagement
and engagement that have not been resolved. For
example, it is quite obvious that one cannot
always reliably and validly infer moral disen-
gagement or engagement from a brief open-ended
survey answer. Therefore, you will notice that,
although in the description of our coding system,
as described in Chap. 34 of this book, we describe
thematic categories that appear to reflect “moral
engagement,” we use more descriptive terms like
“anti-right-to-torture” (which we generally abbre-
viate to “anti-torture”), “torture-tolerant,” and
“torture-intolerant” in presenting our findings.
Finally, in addition to describing the distribu-
tion of responses among the major thematic
response categories, we present results of very
571
basic descriptive analyses designed to explore the
extent to which there appeared to be interesting
patterns of tolerance or intolerance of torture
related to demographic characteristics of our par-
ticipants from the Russia/Balkan region. Also,
as stated in Chap. 34, the term “responses” refers
to codeable units within answers to the items,
many of which included several codeable units/
responses.
Perspectives on the Government’s
Right to Torture Prisoners of War:
Results
Torture-Tolerant Views
Our analysis of qualitative responses regarding
the government’s right to torture a prisoner in
times of war indicated that 27% of all responses
were coded into the torture-tolerant categories
and subcategories. More specifically, 11% of all
responses (42% of the torture-tolerant responses)
were coded for advantageous comparison, mean-
ing that those responses compared torture to some
behavior that seemed worse (e.g., terrorism). For
example, a 40-year-old man from Serbia com-
mented that the government has the right “Only
in case that some information can save potential
innocent victims” and a 21-year-old man from
Slovenia wrote, “If they anticipate that prisoners
hide anything that could help the soldiers.”
Five percent of all responses (17%) of the tor-
ture-tolerant responses were coded for attribution
of blame, referring to the circumstances in order
to justify the harmful conduct (e.g., war) or blam-
ing directly the prisoner of war for bringing suf-
fering upon himself/herself. A 27-year-old man
from Greece commented, “If, for example, pris-
oners are spies, they must reveal everything they
know,” and a 20-year-old woman from Russia
wrote, “They are enemies.” Finally, within the
context of attribution of blame either toward the
circumstances of war or the prisoners of war
themselves, 0.32% of all responses referred to the
idea of revenge. For instance, an 18-year-old
woman from Russia stated, “If they are torturing
572
Table 36.1 Percentages and examples of torture tolerant themes most frequently identified in responses from the
Russia/Balkans Peninsula region
Category Percent Country Age
Advantageous comparison 11 (42) Russia 20
Greece 27
Attribution of blame 5 (17) Serbia 21
Slovenia 24
Note: The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total
response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in that category out of all the
pro-torture responses
M male, F female
our people, so why we cannot do the same?”
while a 21-year-old Greek participant of
unspecified gender said, “I agree, and honestly, if
Bin Laden or a mass murderer were to be tor-
tured, I do not think I would be that upset.”
Another 5% of all responses referred to general
torture tolerance. For example, a 29-year-old
woman from Greece said, “For prisoners yes,”
and a 30-year-old female from Russia wrote,
“I agree.” Other coding categories had smaller
percentages of responses. For example, only
2% of all responses were coded for pseudo-
moral justification, justifying tolerance for tor-
ture with emphasis on socially worthy or moral
purposes. A 20-year-old woman from Russia
wrote, “Sometimes it is necessary” and a 21-year-
old man from Slovenia commented, “It is neces-
sary evil.” Two percent of all responses indicated
that torture was justifiable as a last resort in order
to achieve a goal. A 61-year-old man from Greece
stated, “Given that everything possible has been
done with scientific methods” and a 28-year-old
woman from Russia said, “Only in extreme
cases.” A very small percentage of all responses
(1%) demonstrated support for torture using
rationales that remove or obscure personal agency
either by displacement of the responsibility to a
legitimate authority (e.g., the government) or dif-
fusion of the responsibility in collective action
C. Tsatsaroni et al.
Gender Response
F “If the information saves lives”
M “If the lives of many are in danger, then
torture may be inflicted on a person to attain
information”
F “Both yes and no. If prisoners committed
horrible war crime on civilians, then yes. If
they did not commit a crime, then the
government has no right do to so”
M “In the case of need, if it is proven that he is
for example a traitor”
where personal agency is weakened (Bandura
1999). For example, indicating displacement of
responsibility, a 21-year-old man from Russia
wrote, “The direction of the government is the
right of the lead power,” while a 19-year-old
woman from Russia commented about the gov-
ernment diffusing its responsibility, “Are they
worse than others?” Finally, a very small per-
centage of all responses (1%) expressed toler-
ance for torture by misrepresenting, minimizing,
and disregarding consequences of the harmful
conduct. For example, a 25-year-old man from
Greece commented, “Psychology has advanced
so much that I believe methods exist to extract
information so that torture is not necessary.
Restriction yes, torture no,” and a 47-year-old
man from Russia wrote, “Not physically, but
psychologically.”
Table 36.1 provides percentages of responses
for the most frequently identified torture-tolerant
arguments out of the total percentage of the sam-
ple’s responses. It also provides additional sam-
ple quotes for each mechanism.
Torture-Intolerant Views
The majority of all responses (69%) were coded for
the anti-torture arguments that are assumed to
36 Russia and Balkans Torture
reflect a morality in which people tend to refrain
from behaving inhumanely (inhibitive form of
morality), as well as a power to behave humanely
(proactive form of morality) (Bandura 1999;
Bandura 2002). Specifically, 18% of all responses
(26% of the anti-torture responses) expressed a
general torture intolerance to the idea of a right of
torture. For example, a 32-year-old man from
Serbia wrote, “Any kind of torture is unacceptable
under any circumstances,” and a 19-year-old
woman from Russia said, “No one has right to tor-
ture other people.” Five percent of all responses
were coded for the broader theme of personal moral
principles. For example, a 50-year-old man from
Slovenia said, “Torture, even in war, is completely
intolerable,” and a 58-year-old man from Greece
commented, “It is an ethically wrong action.” Also,
9% of all responses were coded for honor interna-
tional mandates. A 76-year-old woman from
Greece wrote, “No. There are treaties like the
Geneva treaty that governments have to respect,”
and a 60-year-old man from Russia commented,
“The tortures are prohibited by international law.”
Fourteen percent of all responses (20% of the
anti-torture responses) were characterized by
humanization of the victims, with emphasis on
either their humanity per se or their human rights.
For example, emphasizing prisoners’ humanity, a
49-year-old man from Serbia commented,
“Torturing powerless people is not human,” and a
34-year-old woman from Greece wrote, “They
are humans.” Referring to prisoners’ human
rights, a 46-year-old man from Russia stated,
“This is violence against human rights,” and an
18-year-old Slovenian man wrote, “With this we
would violate human rights.”
Also, 3% of all responses expressed the view
that torture was morally unjustifiable by using
descriptive language identifying torture as
horrific and excessively violent. For example, a
55-year-old woman from Russia wrote, “Torture
was atrocity”, and a 59-year-old man from
Greece stated, “I disagree because it is a crime.”
In addition, 6% of all responses morally justified
opposition to torture by comparing torture to
better alternative options that make torture seem
immoral. A 34-year-old man from Greece said,
573
“Other methods exist besides torture,” and a
55-year-old man from Slovenia noted, “It should
be aspired to different solutions to crisis situa-
tions.” Another 3% of all responses referred to
torture as ineffective and/or not useful. For exam-
ple, a 33-year-old woman from Slovenia said,
“Unnecessary; has no function,” and a 19-year-
old woman from Russia wrote, “There are less
chances that information will be given with tor-
ture. There are people that will never tell secrets
even in torture,” and a 22-year-old woman from
Greece stated, “It is violent and useless.”
Another small percentage of all responses (4%)
indicated awareness of negative consequences of
the aggressive act. A 59-year-old man from Greece
wrote, “A bad military and psychological move.
Retaliation problem too,” and a 19-year-old
woman from Russia said, “The government is the
face of the nation, and when they torture people,
they teach citizens of this country to do the same,”
while a 50-year-old woman from Slovenia com-
mented, “Violence makes even more violence.”
Also, a small percentage of all responses exon-
erated the prisoner of war (5%), indicating anti-
torture mechanisms that value the victim by
removing blame from the victim of torture. For
an instance, a 20-year-old man from Russia said,
“Soldiers are people too, they are performing
their orders,” and a 47-year-old woman from
Serbia commented, “Prisoners had been sent to
war, it was not their own will; therefore they do
not deserve torture.”
Table 36.2 provides the percentages of
responses for the most frequently identified anti-
torture mechanisms out of the total percentage of
the sample’s responses. It also provides addi-
tional sample quotes for each mechanism.
Finally, a small percentage of all responses
(2%) referred to reality, stating the way things
really are (e.g., a 55-year-old Russian woman:
“The government does not have the right but do it
in the interests of the country”). Also, 1% of all
responses did not take a position for or against
torture and instead reflect uncertainty or difficulty
to decide (e.g., a 23-year-old Green man: “I have
no thoughts of this subject”), and 2% of all
responses did not address the question.
574 C. Tsatsaroni et al.

Table 36.2 Percentages and examples of anti-torture mechanisms most frequently identified in responses from the
Russia/Balkans Peninsula region
Category Percent Country Age Gender Response
Anti-torture (unspecified) 18 (26) Greece 65 M “Not in a period of peace nor in a period of
war, does the government have the right to
torture undefended people”
Principled reasoning: 5 (7) Russia 35 F “I am against violence!”
personal moral principals
Principled reasoning: 9 (13) Serbia 29 M “The state must respect Geneva
honor international mandates convention”
Slovenia 49 M “No. Always and also human right must be
taken into account. Regarding war
prisoners Geneva Convention exists”
Humanization 14 (20) Slovenia 29 F “The government should always conse-
and human rights quently take into account human dignity,
does not matter if it is in war situation or in
peace, what excludes torture of prisoners”
Russia 54 M “A human being is always a human being”
Serbia 28 F “Fundamental human rights should be
respected”
Greece 38 M “Above everything there are human rights”
Exonerate the prisoner 5 (8) Slovenia 45 F “Everybody has the right for trail and
of war finding of guilt. Torture is out of question.
Prisoner could be enlisted to army”
Principled comparison 7 (11) Russia 70 F “Information can be obtained by more
and better alternatives humane methods”
Serbia 57 F “Only prisons custody after court
judgment”
Greece 52 F “Both prisoners and captives have rights.
Nobody has the right to degrade anyone
during war or peace”
Note: The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total
response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in that category out of all the anti-
torture responses
M male, F female

Personal Engagement and the Issue
of Torture: Results
Personal Engagement
Regarding the item “Military officials are torturing
somebody suspected of having information
about terrorists. What would you want to do?”
49% of all responses indicated personal engage-
ment reflecting an agentic role regarding an of
morality (Bandura 2002). Specifically, 24% of all
responses (48% of personal engagement
responses) referred to general positive action to
cease torture without suggesting a specific way to
achieve this goal. For example, a 35-year-old
woman from Greece said, “I would like to stop
this cycle of violence and blood” and a 25-year-
old man from Slovenia stated, “To prevent such
treatment.” References to political/institutional
activism were found in 11% of all responses.
A 24-year-old woman from Serbia stated, “To
express public protest” and a 68-year-old man
from Russia said, “To bring them to court.”
Furthermore, 11% of all responses suggested
agentic alternatives solutions emphasizing the
agentic role of the individuals. For example, a
51-year-old woman from Slovenia wrote, “To
choose some other way to get information” and a
36 Russia and Balkans Torture
Table 36.3 Percentages and examples of personal engagement intentions most frequently identified in responses from
the Russia/Balkans Peninsula region
Category Percent Country
General positive action 24 (48) Russia
Serbia
Political activism/institutional 12 (23) Greece
Slovenia
Agentic alternative solutions 11 (22) Russia
Greece
Note: The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total
response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in that category out of all the per-
sonal engagement responses
M male, F female
27-year-old woman from Serbia commented,
“To find better (more peaceful) way to get
information.” Also, 3% of all responses provided
instances of raising moral awareness of the per-
petrators of torture. For example, a 57-year-old
woman from Serbia wrote, “I will try to bring
military officials to reason,” and a 20-year-old
woman from Russia wrote that she would
“Change their views to this man”, whereas a
23-year-old man from Greece commented, “Insert
reason onto the imbecile fascist military men.”
Table 36.3 presents percentages of agentic
responses for the most frequently identified pro-
cesses of personal engagement out of the total
percentage of the sample’s responses, as well as
additional examples of personal engagement.
In contrast, personal disengagement responses,
which appear to reflect a morality where actions
do not show sensitivity to the suffering of others,
were found in 37% of all responses to the torture
scenario. Specifically, 4% of all the scenario
responses reflected general passivity regarding
torture. For example, a 22-year-old Greek man
wrote, “Even if I wanted to do something, I could
not,” and a 34-year-old Slovenian man wrote,
“Let them,” while a 21-year-old woman from
Russia said that she would “Disappear.” Also,
17% of all responses demonstrated apathy (a
subcategory of passivity) toward the hypothetical
575
Age Gender Response
62 F “To stop the torture”
25 M “I would try to defend the suspect”
50 M “Demonstrate my objection and punish the
politically responsible people who handle it”
24 M “Protest against unethical acting of state
repressive apparatus”
20 M “To find a more peaceful way”
26 F “To oblige them to take information with a
civilized way and without torture”
torture, commonly stating that they would do
“nothing” (e.g., a 56-year-old Serbian woman
and 20-year-old Russian woman).
Furthermore, 9% of all torture scenario
responses were coded for compliance with
torture. A 40-year-old Serbian man stated that he
would want to do, “All that is necessary to receive
information” and 27-year-old Greek man wrote,
“Be certain that the suspicious one does have the
information.” Also, a smaller percentage of all
responses (3%) referred to alternative harmful
solutions (e.g., a 21-year-old woman from Russia:
“Pour a bucket of cold water”).
Finally, 3% of all responses indicated a sense
of helplessness in the face of the torture scenario.
For example, a 21-year-old woman from Greece
commented, “Unfortunately, I would not be able
to change their minds” and a 48-year-old man
from Slovenia wrote, “Such people that are able
to do so dirty work nobody could stop!” Difficulty
in determining a way to respond to the question
of torture (e.g., “do not know”) was found in 5%
of all responses and a few responses (2%) did not
address the question. Table 36.4 presents per-
centages of non-agentic responses for the most
frequently identified processes of personal agency
out of the total percentage of the sample’s
responses, as well as additional examples of per-
sonal agency responses.
576
Table 36.4 Percentages and examples of personal disengagement intentions most frequently identified in responses
from the Russia/Balkans Peninsula region
Category Percent Country
General passivity regarding torture 4 (20) Serbia
Apathy 17 (80) Slovenia
Greece
General Compliance with torture 9 (75) Russia
Note: The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total
response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in that category out of all the
responses in each of the specific personal disengagement categories
M male, F female
Exploratory Quantitative Analyses
As mentioned in Chap. 34, exploratory statistical
analyses were conducted to examine the extent to
which demographic groups in the Russia/Balkan
Peninsula region varied in the use of specific
arguments and intentions to act in regard to the
two torture items. In order to inform future
research and due to the exploratory nature of our
work, marginally statistically significant results
are reported in the current chapter. All group dif-
ferences identified as statistically significant had
p values of .05 or smaller, and all group differ-
ences identified as marginally significant had p
values between .051 and .10.
Rating Score Analyses
Concerning the rating scale response (1, total dis-
agreement to 7, total agreement) to the item con-
cerning the government’s right to torture a
prisoner in time of war, a one-way analysis of
variance (ANOVA), with country as independent
variable, revealed significant differences among
the countries. The Scheffe pairwise comparisons
between groups showed that the average rating
scale score for participants from Russia was
significantly higher than the average rating score
for participants from Greece, Serbia or Slovenia.
In addition, independent sample t-tests
revealed that men scored marginally higher than
women, and non-antiwar protestors scored
significantly higher than protestors on rating scale
scores. (See Table 36.5 for the t-tests analyses.)
C. Tsatsaroni et al.
Age Gender Response
53 M “I would leave from that place’
73 M “Nothing”
23 M “Nothing”
20 M “Support military”
Table 36.5 Mean +/− SD rating scale scores and t-tests
for the different demographic groups for the government’s
right to torture prisoners of war
Group 1a Group 2a t
Men Women
2.74 (2.21) 2.44 (1.95) −1.75^
Protest No protest
1.64 (1.62) 2.56 (2.08) 3.97***
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001; ^=0.051 < p < 0.10
a
Numbers in parentheses refer to standard deviations
Chi-Square Analyses of Themes
Chi-square tests of independence with the presence/
absence scores for the anti-torture and torture-
tolerant arguments revealed group differences
based on gender, participants’ military service,
whether the participant had a relative in the mili-
tary, and protest participation.1 Specifically,
regarding the government’s right to torture pris-
oners of war, significantly more men than women
indicated general torture tolerance and also
advantageously compared torture with something
that seems worse (e.g., terrorism), commonly
stating that information acquired from torture
could save more lives. Significantly more women
than men opposed torture as a violation of their
personal moral principles, humanized the vic-
tims of torture with emphasis on their human
rights, and exonerated the prisoner.
1
When the expected value of any cell was less than five,
we calculated Fisher’s Exact Test probabilities.
36 Russia and Balkans Torture 577

Table 36.6 Chi-square tests, Fisher’s exact tests, and percentages for responses per coding category on the govern-
ment’s right to torture prisoners of war
Group 1a Group 2a
Category Men Women c2
Torture-tolerant (unspecified) 10.0 3.1 8.93**
Advantageous comparison 19.5 11.8 4.98*
Personal moral principles 3.2 8.7 5.57*
Human rights 5.3 10.6 4.01
Exonerate the prisoner 4.2 9.8 5.01*
Ineffectiveness of torture 2.1 5.5 3.24^
Military Non-military
Personal moral principles 2.2 8.4 4.24*
Honor international mandates 18.3 8.7 6.41**
Relative military No relative military
Awareness of negative consequences 4.4 11.7 4.49^b
Exonerate the prisoner 5.3 15.0 6.6*b
Protest No protest
Advantageous comparison 4.2 16.8 7.51**
Anti-torture (unspecified) 37.5 23.3 6.05*
Human rights 19.4 5.8 13.58***
Better alternatives 13.9 5.8 5.47*
Personal moral principles 1.4 7.9 3.95^b
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001; ^=0.051 < p < 0.10
a
The numbers in these columns are the percent of the group that gave responses falling into each of the specified
categories
b
Refers to Fisher’s exact test probabilities

As compared to respondents who had served
in the military, significantly more nonmilitary
participants opposed torture as a violation of their
personal moral principles, whereas significantly
more military than nonmilitary participants
emphasized honoring international mandates.
Moreover, significantly more respondents who
did not have a family member in the military
exonerated the prisoner of war, as compared to
those who had a relative in the military.
Finally, as compared to antiwar protestors,
significantly more non-protestors gave an exam-
ple of advantageous comparison, generally sug-
gesting that obtaining vital information in order
to achieve a positive goal was better than allow-
ing some worse situation (e.g., terrorism) arise.
In contrast, significantly more protestors than
non-protestors opposed torture without providing
a justification or explanation for their disagree-
ment (general torture intolerance), by referring to
the basic, inherent human rights of the victims of
torture (such as the right to life) and by searching
for humane better alternatives to torture in order
to gain important information. Table 36.6 pres-
ents chi-square tests and Fisher’s exact test
results, as well as percentages of responses given
by different groups, per coding category for the
government’s right to torture prisoners of war.
In regard to the scenario where the participants
were asked to explain what they would want to
do if they viewed military officials torturing
somebody suspected of having information about
terrorists, significantly more men than women
indicated that they would feel apathy and would
be uncertain about what they would want to do.
Furthermore, as compared to counterparts with
military service, significantly more participants
who had not served indicated that they were
undecided about how they would react.
Significantly more protestors than non-protestors
indicated that they would engage in some form of
political activism against torture and try to raise
578 C. Tsatsaroni et al.

Table 36.7 Chi-square tests, Fisher’s exact tests, and percentages for responses per coding category for responses to
torture scenario
Group 1a Group 2a
Category Men Women c2
Apathy 23.0 16.0 3.93*
Do not know 8.0 3.4 4.39*
Military Non-military
Agentic alternative solutions 3.2 0.6 4.0^b
Do not know 1.1 8.2 5.96*
Relative military No relative military
Agentic alternative solutions 11.0 4.1 3.22^
Alternative harmful solutions 2.7 8.1 4.35^b
Protest No protest
Political activism/institutional 28.2 10.5 17.53***
Raise moral awareness 8.2 2.8 5.37*b
Agentic alternative solutions 3.5 0.6 4.75^b
Apathy 4.7 20.0 11.26***
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001; ^=0.051 < p < 0.10
a
The numbers in these columns are the percent of the group that gave responses falling into each of the specified
categories
b
Refers to Fisher’s exact test probabilities

moral awareness in the torturers in order to stop
torture. In contrast, significantly more non-pro-
testors than non-protestors said they would be
apathetic. Table 36.7 presents chi-square tests
and Fisher’s exact test results, as well as the per-
centages of responses given by different groups
per coding category for responses to the torture
scenario.
Discussion
Our findings revealed that the perspectives of
people with diverse cultural backgrounds from
Russia, Greece, Serbia, and Slovenia could be
analyzed for anti-torture and torture-tolerant
mechanisms informed by Bandura’s sociocogni-
tive mechanisms of moral disengagement and his
notion of moral agency. Major themes identified
in the majority of the responses from our sample
indicated disagreement with a governmental right
to torture under any circumstances and quite
often characterized torture as a violation of per-
sonal ethics/moral principles. Some responses
indicated that not only do governments not have
the right to torture someone, even in times of war,
they have an obligation to protect individuals
from harm, consistent with the international legal
framework that forbids torture and monitors
nations’ efforts to align with this prohibition. The
responses reflected people’s will to support their
governments in taking further steps for positive
developments regarding torture, according to the
international bodies’ recommendations men-
tioned earlier in the chapter. Acknowledging
common humanity with or granting human rights
to torture victims seems to help our participants
clearly oppose torture in their responses. Among
the most frequently identified anti-torture argu-
ments were recommendations to find better alter-
natives to torture, to consider torture as outdated,
to remove blame from the prisoner of war, and
statements concerning the potential negative con-
sequences and the ineffectiveness of torture tech-
niques in acquiring reliable information.
Moreover, these anti-torture response patterns
appear to reflect considerable direct or indirect
exposure to arguments regarding torture and its
potential harmful effects, suggesting that macro-
system factors such as the public media can
influence people’s perspectives on violence
(Malley-Morrison et al. 2006a, b).
36 Russia and Balkans Torture
Different worldviews indicative of tolerance
of torture were also identified in the responses
fromour sample. Assumptions that vital informa-
tion that would save innocent lives or prevent a
major catastrophe can be acquired only through
torture were common in responses indicating tol-
erance of torture, converting torture into an effec-
tive technique to achieve the desired goal, and
advantageously comparing torture with a behav-
ior that seems worse (e.g., terrorism). Such
assumptions can also be understood through the
prism of macrosystems characterized by distant
or more recent historical experiences with inter-
nal conflict and external warfare (Malley-
Morrison et al. 2009); such macrosystems may
cultivate attitudes that tolerate torture as an
acceptable method of gaining confessions that
could terminate a war or prevent a catastrophe
like a terrorist attack.
Moreover, personal engagement/personaliza-
tion of responsibility that would have a self-
restraining effect, arousing empathic concerns
and guiding individuals in proactive moral action
(Bandura 1999), or the lack of it was also dis-
cernible in the responses concerning what the
participant would do if confronted with cases of
torture. The majority of the responses empha-
sized the agentic role of the individual toward
potential action with inhibitive and/or proactive
characteristics (Bandura 2002), advocating stop-
ping the torture via personal positive action, par-
ticipating in political/institutional activism,
raising the moral awareness of the perpetrators of
torture, and searching for agentic alternatives to
torture. On the other hand, several responses
showed personal disengagement, reflecting a
non-agentic intent and indicating that the actions
of the viewers of torture are not always driven by
a sensitive approach to the suffering of others
(Bandura 1999). Such responses indicated lack of
motivation to stop torture (passivity regarding
torture), apathy to its use, an inclination to sup-
port torture (compliance with torture), and help-
lessness. Uncertainty of how to react in the matter
of torture was also a rather frequent response,
illuminating even more the difficulty of the issue
and people’s uncertainty about taking action or
remaining inactive. Further research should look
579
into such factors as predictors of personal action
or inaction in the use of torture, as well as help in
the designing of interventions that would
empower individuals to take an agentic role
toward the cessation of torture. Daniel Batson
(2001) suggests our willingness to help others
who are suffering is influenced both by self-serv-
ing and by selfless considerations and also by dis-
tress over others’ suffering that motivates us to
relieve our discomfort, either by escaping the dis-
tressing situation or by helping the person who
suffers.
Although the average score of the Russian
participants on the right-to-torture rating scale
was significantly higher than the scores for the
other three nations in the region, the difference is
not dramatic and should not be overinterpreted.
Nevertheless, it is worth considering the fact that
recent Russian history, and more specifically the
historical context of Russia’s conflict with
Chechnya, provides at least two examples of
major terrorist acts with civilian targets (Kramer
2010; Metro Blasts 2010):the Dubrovka Theater
crisis in Moscow (2002) and the Beslan School
siege (2004) (Snetkov 2007), where hundreds of
people lost their lives. The question is whether
such tragic events are sufficient to influence peo-
ple’s views on torture since they did not occur in
a vacuum but could be better understood as parts
of a vicious cycle of violence that has deep roots
in the Russian-Chechnyan wars, where major
violations of human rights were committed by
the Russian militia and their leaders (Steele 1994;
as cited in McCarthy et al. 2009). There is not an
easy answer to this question and therefore future
research should examine further the role of
nationality in people’s perspectives on torture,
adopting a cognitive–ecological approach
(Bronfenbrenner’s cognitive–ecological model)
in order to understand differences in views attend-
ing the historical complexities of the countries
examined.
Significantly more women than men in our
sample opposed a governmental right to torture a
prisoner of war; showed empathy; considered
torture a violation of personal ethics/moral prin-
ciples and a cruel, ineffective approach; removed
blame from the prisoner; acknowledged the
580
humanity of the prisoners of war and their human
rights; and declined to justify torture on utilitar-
ian grounds. These findings confirm previous
research results indicating less support for gov-
ernmental aggression in women than men
(Malley-Morrison et al. 2006a, b). On the other
hand, both genders appear to have difficulty
undertaking an agentic role to stop torture, with
men appearing less empathic and women being
less certain of how to react. Future research
should explore interventions through different
institutions (e.g., schools) that would increase
empathy (Malley-Morrison et al. 2009), since
scientific evidence indicates that male and female
observes of suffering are equally capable of
empathy, but only when both groups are
sufficiently motivated (Ickes 2001).
Participants who had engaged in protests
seemed to feel more empowered to oppose tor-
ture, being more empathic in their views of tor-
ture, personalizing/humanizing the victims of
torture, giving emphasis on the prisoner’s human
rights, taking personal responsibility to end tor-
ture via political activism and institutional appeals,
seeking humane alternatives to torture, and reveal-
ing concern about the torturers themselves. Future
research should explore ways to raise awareness
concerning torture and empower individuals to
defend theirs and others’ human rights. Education
could enable people to resist the potential evilness
of systems using torture since as Axtell (1998)
claimed, “a major key to social peace and prog-
ress is the universal education in the toleration
and appreciation of otherness” (p.70).
In addition, the effects of participation in the
military, and having a family member in the mili-
tary on people’s moral justifications concerning
torture, revealed interesting and, in some
instances, contradicting results. Lack of military
service seems to be associated with participants’
adopting a more personal approach to the issue of
torture, considering torture a violation of their
personal ethics/moral principles, but still remain-
ing uncertain of how to react to it. On the other
hand, individuals who have served in the mili-
tary, where authority figures have the power to
rule, may sometimes come to assume that it is the
role of governments rather than of individuals to
C. Tsatsaroni et al.
comply with international agreements and protect
people from torture. Interestingly, not having a
family member in the military was associated
with more frequent references to the negative
consequences of torture and exoneration of pris-
oners, yet participants without a relative in the
military were more likely to support torture by
providing alternative but still harmful solutions
to the process of obtaining information. Clearly,
there are many complex and interacting factors
that influence how individuals think about tor-
ture—and many of these seem to override the fact
that torture is a violation of international law.
Future research should examine further, among
other things, whether the nature of relationship
between the observer and the observed affects the
observer’s reaction to the subject of torture since
closer relationships (e.g., family relationships)
are expected to more readily elicit more and
stronger empathic responses than stranger and
adversarial relations (Craig 2007).
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 Perspectives on Torture
in the Middle East 37
Abdul Kareem Al-Obaidi, Stephen Gaillot,
Charikleia Tsatsaroni, Melike Eger,
Helena Syna Desivilya, Dalit Yassour-Boroschowitz,
Lane Smith, Kamala Smith, Rouba Youssef,
and Alev Yalcinkaya

The term “Middle East” generally describes the
region stretching from Egypt to Iran; however,
there are numerous definitions as the term has
referred to a plethora of distinct areas between
northern Africa and southwest Asia and still does
today. It can mean the non-European lands of
what was the Ottoman Empire plus Persia and
Afghanistan, only the former Ottoman lands, the
Levant, or any combination thereof. Thus, the
narrowest definitions include only Egypt, Israel,
Lebanon, Syria, and Turkey, while broader
definitions extend the region to Arab North Africa
and Sudan in the west, the countries on the
Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf in the
southeast, and Afghanistan in the east. For the
purposes of this chapter, we will use the more
inclusive definition and focus specifically on
Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon,
and Saudi Arabia. Before presenting the results
of the research, this section briefly describes
views on torture in international law, as well as
the extent to which the countries discussed in this
chapter adhere to international law.
Torture in International Law
Torture is proscribed by several international trea-
ties. The first of these, the 1948 Universal
Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR), set the
tone for future agreements regarding torture. This
document laid out the fundamental rights to which
all people are entitled, said, “No one shall be
subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment or punishment” (1948). In
1966, the International Convention on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR), comprised of 161 States’
parties, incorporated this statement, but also added,
“No one will be subjected without his free consent
to medical or scientific experimentation” (1966).
Although these agreements established a prec-
edent for international opposition to torture, they
did not offer a definition. The 1975 Declaration on
the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected
to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment of Punishment (Torture Declaration)
ameliorated this problem; however, it received
criticism due to its imprecision (Danelius 2008).
The 1984 Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Punishment (CAT)
expanded on it and provided international law with
the following definition:
Torture means any act by which severe pain or suf-
fering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally
inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining
from him or a third person information or a confes-
sion, punishing him for an act he or a third person
has committed or is suspected of having commit-
ted, or intimidating or coercing him or a third per-
son, or for any reason based on discrimination of
any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted
by or at the instigation of or with the consent or
acquiescence of a public official or other person
acting in an official capacity. It does not include
pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or
incidental to lawful sanctions (1984).

K. Malley-Morrison et al. (eds.), International Handbook of War, Torture, and Terrorism, 583
Peace Psychology Book Series, DOI 10.1007/978-1-4614-1638-8_37,
© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2013
584
There are several important points to take
from the international legal position on torture.
First, the right not to be tortured is absolute and
universal. The violation of this right is neither
permissible nor justified in any circumstance.
Second, members to the agreements are called
upon to prevent torture within their jurisdiction.
Because international law applies the principle of
universal jurisdiction to torture, offenders can be
tried regardless of where they are found. Finally,
torture has the special status jus cogens, which
means international torture law is binding on all
states including those that have not ratified the
treaty (Bagaric and Clarke 2007).
Adherence to International Law
Each Middle Eastern nation-state in this study
has taken a legal stance against the use of torture,
as they have ratified either the ICCPR or the CAT.
In fact, five of the eight countries have ratified both.
Only Saudi Arabia has not ratified the ICCPR,
and all but Iran and Iraq adopted the CAT. Thus,
each accepts at a minimum that the right not to be
tortured is universal. Iran and Iraq are set apart
from the rest in that they have not accepted the
other points listed above, although they are still
expected to uphold them due to torture’s special
status in international law.
Some Middle Eastern states have also attempted
to incorporate human rights into their domestic
political discourses (Cardenas and Flibbert 2005).
Afghanistan, Iran, and Jordan have established
National Human Rights Institutions (NHRI) in
order to implement internationally accepted stan-
dards, including those concerning torture. These
institutions aim to protect human rights by inves-
tigating and rectifying torture violations, as well
as to promote these rights through education,
training personnel, shaping school curricula, and
raising awareness. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia and
Iraq have proposed NHRIs of their own.
The impact of NHRIs seems to be insignificant,
as many of these institutions do not meet interna-
tional standards. It is unclear whether the pro-
posed edits will provide better protection, as they
A.K. Al-Obaidi et al.
are still expected to fall short of international
standards once established. Critics have even
gone so far as to claim that they are cosmetic;
they boost the state’s image but are forbidden
from performing the functions they stand for
(Cardenas and Flibbert).
Despite the numerous agreements, treaties,
and the NHRIs, there are still reports of torture in
each of the countries considered in this study.
In most cases, the reports assert that the violators
are the government or people affiliated with the
regime, such as security forces and prison guards,
but others implicate foreign forces, such as the
United States of America (USA), in Afghanistan
and Iraq. According to US State Department
accounts, Afghan authorities reportedly tortured
prisoners and detainees to elicit bribes, for per-
sonal enmity, or due to a failure to understand the
laws regarding torture (DoS Afghanistan 2010a).
In Iran, security officials were politically moti-
vated to target members of opposition groups,
especially after the June 2009 election (DoS Iran
2010b). Reports of torture in Saudi Arabia and
Israel are similar in that they focus on acts by
security apparatuses. However, some actions are
judicially sanctioned in Saudi Arabia (DoS Saudi
Arabia 2010g), whereas Israel’s judiciary has
been so uninvolved that the NGO Public
Committee Against Torture reported that more
than 600 complaints of torture by Israel Security
Authority agents have gone uninvestigated (DoS
Israel and the Occupied Territories 2010d).
In Jordan, there are allegations of widespread tor-
ture in police and security detention centers and a
severe lack of investigation and punishment of
security officials who engage in acts of torture
despite the fact that it is prohibited by the state
(DoS Jordan 2010e). Iraq too is subject to similar
allegations of torture, although the number of
incidents and laws regarding torture vary by
region (DoS Iraq 2010c). Human rights groups
assert that torture is also common in Lebanon,
with security officials abusing detainees and pris-
oners (DoS Lebanon 2010f). Other reports
include but are not limited to allegations of US
soldiers torturing Afghans in secret prisons in
Afghanistan, Iranian security forces torturing and
37 Middle East Torture
raping Iranian citizens in prisons, Iraqi security
forces torturing Iraqi citizens, and Jordan’s
General Intelligence Department interrogating
prisoners “warehoused” in Jordan for the CIA,
with “methods that were more brutal than those
the CIA has been implicated to date” (Human
Rights 2008).
Group Identity and Perspectives
on Torture
There are many factors that might impact a per-
son’s views on torture; identity groups—nation-
ality, religion, ethnicity, profession/occupation,
etc—shape a person’s values by promoting val-
ues of their own (Wanis-St. John 2005, pp. 119–
120). Each person belongs to multiple groups and
ranks his or her commitments to the particular
groups, ranks the values shared with each group,
and selects from the values of each group to form
his or her individual value system (Augsberger
1992, pp. 26–27). As this is the case, familiarity
with the identity groups to which individuals
belong can act as a guide in explaining their per-
spectives on torture. Given the array of identity
groups in the Middle East, which includes reli-
gious groups (Muslims, Christians, Jews, Druze,
Baha’i, Zoroasters, etc.), nationalities (Afghans,
Iranians, Iraqis, Israelis, Jordanians, etc.), ethnic
groups (Arabs, Kurds, Persians, etc.), as well as
many others, understanding such views can be a
daunting task.
Further complicating the matter is the fact that
identity groups change over time, which changes
the values the groups promote (Avruch 1998,
pp. 16), as well as their members’ values.
Consider the Salafi, often referred to as the
Wahhabis, a people who share a common creed
but disagree over how the creed should be applied.
Those termed the “purists,” who are primarily
concerned with maintaining the purity of Islam
as outlined in the Qur’an, Sunna, and the consen-
sus of the Companions, are traditionally leaders
of the Salafi. The “politicos,” a group that began
585
to emerge in the 1960s with the arrival of the
Muslim Brotherhood and Ikhwani teachings in
Saudi Arabia, argue that they have a better under-
standing of contemporary issues than the purists
and are therefore better suited to apply the Salafi
creed in a modern context through political analy-
sis. During the Soviet Union’s war in Afghanistan
(1979–1989) a third Salafi group, the “jihadis,”
formed supporting the establishment of Islamic
states. Like the politicos, this group is politically
oriented although with an emphasis on politics
through warfare (Wiktorowicz 2006).
Conflict within or with other identity groups
can shape an individual’s perspective on torture,
much in the way the arrival of the Muslim
Brotherhood and the Soviet war in Afghanistan
influenced the Salafi creed. Although a group
may normally oppose the use of torture on moral
or civil grounds, the values it promotes could
change to espouse torture in response to a threat
to the group’s safety. For example, the Landau
Commission, appointed following a 1987 Israeli
governmental decision to examine the General
Security Service’s methods of interrogation
against terrorist suspects, recommended that
“psychological forms of pressure be used pre-
dominantly and that only “moderate physical
pressure” be sanctioned in limited cases where
the degree of anticipated danger is considerable”
(Gaulan 1996). Although Israel asserts these
methods are in accordance with international law,
the UN Committee Against Torture reported they
constitute torture as defined in the CAT
(Holmström 2000, pp. 108).
In addition to a group’s insecurity, intractability
in conflict can also present justification for
torture. Intractable conflicts, disputes that are
not on the path to resolution such as the Israeli–
Palestinian conflict and the Kurdish conflict in
Turkey, are characterized by dehumanization.
This means that at least one side’s identity
depends on the dehumanization and defamation
of the other’s (Zartman 2005, p. 50). Expanding
on Shalit’s observation that, “The nearer or more
similar the victim of aggression is, the more we
can identify with him” (Grossman 2009, p. 156).
586
Grossman (2009, p. 161) noted that “This
process also works the other way around; if a
group is convinced its opponents are not really
human but are “inferior forms of life,” then the
groups natural resistance to inflicting harm on
the other will be reduced” (Grossman 2009, p.
161). Thus, one may find less resistance or even
an impetus to torture between groups in intrac-
table conflict.
Conflict over an extended period of time may
also shape perspectives on torture for groups that
live in those areas. Although the outcomes vary,
it is possible that a person in such an area could
support the use of torture either as a means of
obtaining security or because violence has
become the norm. It is also possible that individ-
uals could be opposed to torture on moral grounds,
out of a desire to end the violence they have suf-
fered, or for other reasons. Another possibility is
that a person might not have a strong opinion
about the dilemma of choosing between possible
security and inhumanity. In violent locales, all of
these sentiments may be present, although one
may be far more prominent than the others. These
sentiments may characterize countries such as
Afghanistan as it has experienced nearly nonstop
violence for the last several decades: Soviet occu-
pation from 1979 to 1989, a civil war from 1992
to 1996, and an American occupation from 2001
to the present. Similarly, Iraq has seen much vio-
lence over the last half century during Saddam
Hussein’s reign (1968–2003), the Iran–Iraq War
(1980–1988), the Gulf War (1990–1991), the
Kurdish Civil War (1994–1997), and Operation
Iraqi Freedom, the American occupation, and
insurgency (2003–present).
The next section reviews the methods and
results from the current study of views on tor-
ture in our Middle East sample. It is important to
remember that, as is true elsewhere, these views
were developed and perhaps modified within a
context of particular group affiliations and
events that are likely to have shaped their per-
spectives. This study addresses only a few, such
as gender, military service, and involvement in
antiwar protest activities, but there are a great
many more.
A.K. Al-Obaidi et al.
Methods and Results of Study
Our Middle East sample consisted of 366 men
and women from seven countries: Lebanon,
Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Jordan, Israel, Afghanistan,
and Iran. There were also six people from other
countries in the same region or who identified
with more than one Middle Eastern nationality.
The age of participants ranged from 18 to 81,
with a mean age of 30, excluding three partici-
pants who did not indicate their age. Women con-
stituted 57% of our sample; two people did not
disclose their gender.
All participants completed the Personal and
Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace
Survey (PAIRTAPS). The responses to two items
were analyzed for the purposes of this chapter.
Specifically, participants were asked to rate their
agreement with the statement: “The government
has the right to order the torture of prisoners in
time of war” on a 7-point scale ranging from 1
(=total disagreement) to 7 (=total agreement) and
to explain their rating in their own words. Another
item asked participants to assume they were expe-
riencing very direct and dramatic exposure to a
particular form of governmental aggression:
“Military officials are torturing somebody sus-
pected of having information about terrorists.”
Then they were asked to describe what they would
feel and what they would want to do in that situa-
tion in their own words. All responses were bro-
ken down into smaller thematic units for coding.
When we use the term “responses” when describ-
ing our analyses and findings, we are referring to
the codeable units within answers to the items.
Many of the participants’ answers included sev-
eral codeable units.
The Coding Manuals
As described in the introductory chapter for this
section of this book, we developed coding manu-
als for the torture items based on Bandura’s the-
ory concerning the sociocognitive mechanisms
involved in moral disengagement (Bandura
37 Middle East Torture
1999). We also built on his construct of moral
agency (Bandura 2002) in identifying responses
that appeared to be reflective of moral disengage-
ment and moral engagement; his construct of
moral agency was particularly helpful in our con-
struction of the coding manual for the torture sce-
nario item, where responses could generally be
coded for presence or absence of personal
involvement. Although Bandura’s theories of
moral disengagement and personal agency pro-
vided a valuable framework for the development
of our coding manuals, construct validation is an
ongoing process. Therefore, in discussing our
findings, we put our emphasis on the sociocogni-
tive mechanisms and agency reflected in
responses that are either tolerant or intolerant of a
state right to torture, rather than asserting that
particular responses show, or do not show, moral
disengagement or engagement. We also refrain
from ever calling respondents morally engaged
or disengaged.
In our coding manual, torture-tolerant
responses fall into seven main categories:
nonspecific tolerance; pseudomoral justification
(with two subcategories: advantageous compari-
son and last resort); euphemistic labeling; avoid-
ance of responsibility (with three subcategories:
diffusion of responsibility, displacement of
responsibility, and indifference); misrepresent-
ing, minimizing, or disregarding consequences;
dehumanization; and lastly attribution of blame
(with one subcategory: revenge).
More specifically, the torture-tolerant coding
categories into which the codeable units from the
right-to-torture replies were placed are as fol-
lows: Nonspecific tolerance is defined as general,
unspecified support for torture. Responses coded
for pseudomoral justification attempt to justify
injurious behavior through framing it in the lan-
guage of socially worthy and moral purposes—
for example, the well-being of a particular
population or of the world as a whole.
Advantageous comparison, which is a subcate-
gory of pseudomoral justification, involves com-
paring detrimental behaviors with others that
seem worse (e.g., crime threat). Labeling the
behavior as a last resort is another way of making
587
injurious behavior sound as if it stems from
moral reasoning. Responses coded for euphemis-
tic language were characterized by the use of
sanitized or passive language to make the detri-
mental behavior appear necessary and even
respectable. The avoidance of responsibility cat-
egory applied to responses indicating that other
people were responsible for the aggression (dif-
fusion of responsibility) and/or that a legitimate
authority had responsibility for the conduct (dis-
placement of responsibility). Responses express-
ing indifference toward victims of torture, coded
as indifference, reflect another way of avoiding
responsibility. Another torture-tolerant coding
category was for responses that underestimate
the negative consequences of inhumane behav-
iors (misrepresenting, minimizing, or disregard-
ing consequences). One way to eliminate the
distress that could result from committing or tol-
erating cruel actions is to attribute demonic qual-
ities to the victims being brutalized
(dehumanization) or to blame the circumstances
and one’s enemies (attribution of blame), and
frame the inhumane behavior as a means of
revenge against the other.
The coding system also recognizes six main
categories and their subcategories for responses
indicating intolerance for a state right to torture.
Responses referring to general and unspecified
opposition to the use of aggression are coded as
nonspecific intolerance. The principles category
is applied to responses referring to moral princi-
ples (raising moral arguments), and responsibil-
ity, with two subcategories: humanization
(respecting and valuing the person because he or
she is a human being) and honor international
mandates (references to legal agreements, the
responsibility of governments, international law,
treaties, etc.). The specific use of the term “rights”
in regard to humanization is categorized under
human rights.
Responses coded for descriptive language
used realistic language as opposed to euphemistic
labeling (using sanitizing or passive language) to
describe torture—for example, describing torture
as brutal. Another category, better alternatives
was for responses indicating that there are better
588
ways of achieving legitimate goals than inhumane
or immoral methods (e.g., imprison suspects but
do not torture them). Responses indicating that
the act of aggression is unnecessary and unhelpful
are coded as ineffective/not useful. In contrast to
responses that deny responsibility for inhumane
behavior, some torture intolerant responses were
coded for exonerating the prisoners, arguing that
prisoners of war were not necessarily responsible
for the circumstances that led to their detention.
The category for awareness of negative conse-
quences applied to responses that avoided mini-
mizing or disregarding the consequences of
immoral conduct, and instead acknowledged the
possible harmful consequences of inhumane
behavior. The answers that could not be coded as
examples of specific sociocognitive mechanisms
were coded as reality (e.g., “whatever people
might think, torture happens”), do not know, unco-
deable and specifiers (three subcategories: God,
USA and country specific).
The coding system for the scenario item was
also informed by Bandura’s theory. Bandura
(2002) described two ways by which individuals
can exercise moral agency: proactive and inhibi-
tive. People who avoid acting inhumanely show
an inhibitive form of moral agency, while the
proactive form of agency requires active perfor-
mance of behaviors that are humane. In order to
achieve a higher order morality, one has to
engage in both forms of agency: one must both
behave humanely and refrain from inhumane
actions (Bandura 2002). In order to code
responses to the scenario asking participants
what they would want to do if forced to watch
the torturing of somebody suspected of having
information about terrorists, we developed cod-
ing categories that described potential agentic or
non-agentic roles for the respondent. In our cod-
ing manual, responses indicating a motivation to
do something about a situation in which torture
was taking place were coded for nonspecific per-
sonal involvement. Also, the category for posi-
tive action includes responses reflecting either
proactive or inhibitive forms of moral agency,
indicating a general desire for cessation of
torture. References to political actions such as
A.K. Al-Obaidi et al.
protest and investigation were coded as political
activism/institutional action. Codeable units
mentioning raising moral issues and ethics to the
perpetrators of the injurious behavior were coded
for moral awareness. To be coded into the cate-
gory of agentic alternative solutions, partici-
pants’ responses had to specify that the respondent
as an active agent would seek alternative solu-
tions to the problem that would not involve tor-
ture. In contrast, responses reflecting a lack of
agency in regard to taking action against torture
were coded as passive regarding torture (e.g.,
responses indicating that the participant would
merely observe the torture). Responses such as
doing “nothing” were coded for apathy. The
compliance with torture category included
responses that were supportive of the use of tor-
ture. A response suggesting other ways to punish
a suspected terrorist (e.g., kill but not torture the
prisoner) was coded for alternative but still
harmful solutions for the prisoner. Lastly,
responses focusing on the helplessness or power-
lessness of the prisoner to change the situation
were coded for helplessness. Responses that
could not be coded for agency were coded for the
torture tolerance or intolerance mechanisms of
the coding manual.
Distribution of Qualitative Responses
Response Patterns to Right
to Torture Item
An examination of responses patterns showed
that 63% of all responses disagreed with the
statement, “The government has the right to order
the torture of prisoners in time of war” while 35%
of all responses agreed that the government has
such a right. The remaining 2% of the responses
expressed neither agreement nor disagreement
with a state’s right to torture; rather, they failed to
address the prompt or provided responses in the
“realism category” or made comments such as
“because it’s not God” (18-year-old Lebanese
woman).
Thirteen percent of all responses (20% of the
anti-torture responses) provided a general
37 Middle East Torture
disagreement with the right of a government to
torture prisoners. For example, a 59-year-old
man from Saudi Arabia stated that torture is
never acceptable. Humanization of the prisoner
and reference to honoring international man-
dates in order to protect the prisoner of war
occurred with relatively similar percentages
(11% and 10% of all responses respectively).
For example, an Iranian woman asserted, “we
should be mature enough to know torture is
inhumane,” and a 37-year-old Lebanese woman
said that torture breaches human rights treaties.
Arguments that referred to the prisoners’ human
rights and exonerated the prisoner occurred
within 6% and 5%, respectively, of all responses
to this item. A 44-year-old Iranian woman who
denied a state right to torture said, “it’s not con-
sistent with universal human rights,” and an
18-year-old woman from Saudi Arabia asserted,
“Prisoners taken in war should be treated with
respect. They are just soldiers following orders.”
Table 37.1 provides additional examples of anti-
torture arguments.
Despite a strong consensus that governments
do not have the right to order torture, some
responses provided support for such a right.
Twenty percent of all responses (57% of the tor-
ture-tolerant responses) were coded for advanta-
geous comparison; that is, they compared torture
with an act seen as even worse (e.g., terrorism) or
described torture as a purposeful act intended to
achieve a desired goal. For example, a 31-year-
old woman from Israel stated, “If the government
has decided that the torture will contribute greatly
to the solution of a security issue, then maybe
yes.” Also, 6% of all responses(18% of torture-
tolerant responses) attributed the blame for the
torture to the prisoner. A 31-year-old man from
Lebanon indicated that torture would be accept-
able only if the terrorists were spies. In addition,
3% of all responses provided an unspecified
agreement with a governmental right to torture,
and 3% of all responses indicated that the gov-
ernment had a right to use torture as a last resort.
For example, a 24-year-old Israeli woman
stated, “The circumstances call for it,” and a
589
31-year-old Lebanese woman said, “it’s the only
way sometimes.” None of the responses made
reference to issues of responsibility or revenge.
Table 37.2 presents additional examples of
torture-tolerant arguments.
Response Patterns to Torture Scenario
In response to the scenario item asking participants
what they would want to do if dramatically
exposed to a situation where someone who was
suspected of knowing a terrorist was being tor-
tured, 50% of the responses expressed a wish to
stop torture by either a proactive or inhibitive
form of moral agency (coded under positive
action and its subcategories). Specifically, 19%
of all responses referred to agentic solutions to
torture. For example, a 20-year-old Lebanese
woman stated, “solve it orally (not physically)”
and a 36-year-old Israeli woman suggested
finding ways to obtain information without vio-
lence. Also, 16% of all responses indicated gen-
eral positive action, such as a desire to stop
torture without providing a specific way to
achieve this goal, and 12% of all responses
suggested political activism as a way to end it. A
30-year-old Afghan woman stated that she would
write a petition and protest the case, while a
48-year-old Iranian man said he would write
either to the press or to members of the congress
to stop torture.
In contrast, 17% of all responses were coded
for apathy, indicating that participants would do
nothing if they observed torture, would try to
avoid the sight of it, or would somehow distance
themselves. Also, 15% of all responses referred
to compliance with torture. For instance, a
24-year-old Israeli woman said she would “con-
vince the military to continue trying,” and a
21-year-old Lebanese man said that torturing
prisoners is a soldiers’ job and they had to do it.
Four percent of all responses reflected passivity
towards torture. For example, a 24-year-old man
from Jordan stated, “Hold on in my place” and an
18-year-old man from Lebanon said, “I would
590 A.K. Al-Obaidi et al.

Table 37.1 Percentages and examples of anti-torture arguments most frequently identified in responses from the
Middle East
Category % Country Age Gender Response
Anti-torture 13 (20) Jordan 32 F “They do not have the right to torture”
(unspecified) S. Arabia 59 M “Never”
Lebanon 20 F “I am against torture”
Israel 28 F “No one has the right to torture another person”
Humanization 11 (17) Iran 20 F “We should be mature enough to know torture is
inhumane”
Afghanistan 51 M “No right as human being”
S. Arabia 24 F “They are still human and should get their rights
by not being tortured”
Israel 33 M “They must be prisoners with as fair conditions of
their imprisonment as possible until their release at
the end of the war”
Honor international 10 (16) Lebanon 18 M “The government must respect human rights law”
agreements Lebanon 37 F “Breaching of Human Rights treaty!”
S. Arabia 59 M “Torture should be treated as an international
crime and those who are guilty of it should be
tried and punished at the International Court of
Justice in the Hague”
Jordan 25 F “Respect for international treaties in wars”
Human rights 6 (9) Lebanon 43 M “From the early beginning, of finding states, the
prisoners had special rights, how then in these
days after such great progress, in civilization”
Iran 44 F “It’s not consistent with universal human rights”
Israel 22 F “No matter what, the prisoner is still a person and
he deserves rights. One of the most basic ones is
to not be tortured”
Jordan 29 M “Because prisoners of wars have their rights and
must not be violated (the rights)”
Exonerating 5 (7) Lebanon 19 M “Because it’s a forbidden act and prisoners are have
the prisoner no fault because they were forced to that thing”
S. Arabia 18 F “Prisoners taken in war should be treated with
respect. They are just soldiers following orders”
Jordan 41 M “And why these prisoners are tortured while what
they want is not in their hands”
Israel 33 M “Prisoners of war are part of the manifestations
of the war, and they must be prisoners with as
fair conditions of their imprisonment as possible
until their release at the end of the war”
Note: The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total
response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in that subcategory out of all the
anti-torture responses
F female, M male

wait for him to confess the information.” Finally,

7% of all responses reflected a sense of
helplessness.
Table 37.3 provides additional examples for
the personal engagement themes, whereas
Table 37.4 presents additional examples for the
personally disengaged themes.
Exploratory Quantitative Analyses
On an exploratory basis, chi-square tests of
independence were performed with the pres-
ence/absence scores for each coded variable, as
described in Chap. 33 of this book. When the
Table 37.2 Percentages and examples of torture-tolerant arguments most frequently identified in responses from the
Middle East
Category % Country Age Gender Response
Advantageous 20 (57) Lebanon 21 F “Depending on the crime”
comparison S. Arabia 18 M “Torturing a prisoner might get information
that may save 1000’s of lives”
Israel 31 F “If the government has decided that the torture
will contribute greatly to the solution of a
security issue, then maybe yes”
Iran Unidentified M “If you do not you get hurt more”
Attribution 6 (18) Lebanon 31 M “Only if they are spies”
of blame Jordan 49 M “Because among them wronged ones
(innocents) and criminals”
Israel 23 F “You are a prisoner, hence you committed a
crime, therefore it is allowed to torture you”
Note: The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total
response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in that subcategory out of the tor-
ture-tolerant responses
F female, M male

Table 37.3 Percentages and examples of personal engagement themes most frequently identified in scenario responses
from the Middle East
Category % Country Age Gender Response
Agentic alternative 19 (26) Lebanon 20 F “Solve it orally (not physically)”
solutions S. Arabia 18 F “Demand that the reasonability of
the suspicious against the person be
judged by a neutral third party”
Jordan 33 M “Because the information must be
taken from this person but in
gradual ways”
Israel 36 F “Find ways to obtain the informa-
tion without violence”
Middle Eastern Other 20 F “Question the individual not torture
them”
Positive action 16 (22) Afghanistan 28 F “Stop the torturing”
Lebanon 20 F “I would want this to stop”
S. Arabia 24 F “Stop that”
Iraq 23 F “Help if possible”
Jordan 29 F “Stop this work”
Political/institutional 12 (16) Afghanistan 30 F “Sign petitions, protest—same stuff
activism that I have been doing that hasn’t
worked”
Middle Eastern Other 56 M “Petition to ensure that my
government abides by international
laws and treaties”
Iran 48 M “Write to press/members of
congress to stop it”
Lebanon 19 F “Strip them [the military officials]
of their positions”
S. Arabia 59 M “Campaign against torture using
peaceful means”
Iraq 63 F “Protest
Note: The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total
response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in that subcategory out of all the
personal engagement responses. Refer to the introductory torture methods chapter for more information
F female, M male
592 A.K. Al-Obaidi et al.

Table 37.4 Percentages and examples of personally disengaged themes most frequently identified in scenario
responses from the Middle East
Category % Country Age Gender Response
Apathy 17 (23) Israel 21 F “To not see it”
Israel 20 F “At the beginning distancing it in some way”
Lebanon 19 F “Nothing”
Iraq 37 F “Nothing”
Jordan 35 M “Do nothing”
Compliance 15 (100) Iran 20 F “Yell at the suspect for not helping, yell at the
with Torture officials for letting their emotions get in the way”
Lebanon 21 M “But they must do their job in order for him to talk”
S. Arabia 18 M “Confirm he has the information then torture him”
Jordan 36 M “Support the government in solving the problem of
terrorism and the uncovering of terrorists”
Israel 24 F “Convince the military to continue trying”
Note: The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total
response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in that subcategory out of the per-
sonal disengagement responses
F female, M male

expected value of any cell was less than five,
we calculated Fisher’s exact test probabilities.
The goal of these exploratory analyses was to
determine whether groups based on demographic
characteristics differed in the frequency of par-
ticular themes in their responses. We were inter-
ested, for example, in whether more males than
females used a particular argument for or against
a state right to torture. These analyses were run to
compare groups on their responses regarding (1)
the government’s right to torture prisoners of war
and (2) the scenario asking participants what they
would want to do if dramatically exposed to an
incident of torture. Four demographic variables
were considered: gender, having been in the mili-
tary, having a relative who had served in the mili-
tary, and prior participation in protests against
war and in favor of peace. Finally, due to the
exploratory nature of our analyses marginally
statistically significant results were also reported
in order to inform future research.
Regarding the government’s right to torture
prisoners of war, significantly more participants
who self-reported military participation gave
responses than their counterparts comparing tor-
ture advantageously with a behavior that seems
worse (e.g., attacks), indicating advantageous
comparison. Conversely, significantly more civil-
ian respondents than veteran respondents made
the argument that the government has the respon-
sibility to protect the prisoners of war by honoring
international mandates and to humanize the
prisoners.
Additionally, significantly more women than
men gave responses describing torture as useless
or ineffective.
Finally, significantly more participants who
had protested against war than participants who
had not gave responses opposing torture without
providing a justification or explanation for their
opposition and responses disagreeing with tor-
ture practices by showing awareness of the nega-
tive consequences such practices might have.
No further significant differences were found.
Table 37.5 presents chi-square tests and
Fisher’s exact test results, as well as percentages
of responses given by different groups per coding
category on the government’s right to torture
prisoners of war.
For the second prompt regarding participants’
projected reaction to viewing torture, chi-square
analyses revealed significant differences for the
different demographic groups examined.
Specifically, significantly more respondents
who had served in the military than those who
had not gave responses showing compliance with
37 Middle East Torture
Table 37.5 Chi-square tests, Fisher’s exact tests, and percentages for responses per coding category on the govern-
ment’s right to torture prisoners of war
Coding categories
Torture as ineffective/not useful
Advantageous comparison
Governmental responsibility
Humanization
Anti-torture (unspecified)
Awareness of negative consequences
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001; ^=0.051 < p < 0.10
a
The numbers in these columns are the percent of the group that gave responses falling into each of the specified
categories
b
Refers to Fisher’s exact test probabilities
torture. In contrast, significantly more of those
who had not been in the military than those who
had gave responses indicating feeling helpless in
regard to the idea of forced viewing of torture.
Furthermore, significantly more men than women
gave responses showing compliance with the use
of torture and responses indicating that they
would remain passive if they witnessed torture.
Also, significantly more women than men gave
responses indicating that they would feel helpless
in the view of torture.
Additionally, participants who had no rela-
tives in the military were marginally more likely
than those who did to provide responses indicat-
ing a desire to raise the moral awareness of per-
petrators of torture in order to stop it and
significantly more gave responses expressing
feelings of helplessness.
Finally, significantly more participants who
had protested against war than their counterparts
gave responses advocating the cessation of tor-
ture through political activism and institutions,
and also they were marginally more likely than
those who had not protested to seek alternative
solutions to torture, acquiring an agentive role in
order to achieve such a goal. In contrast,
significantly more of those who had not protested
gave responses than those who had suggesting
that they would comply with the use of torture
and remain apathetic in the view of torture. Also,
those who had not protested were marginally
593
Group 1a Group 2a
Men Women c2
1 9 4.93*b
Military Non-military
44 16 14.24***
6 20 5.52*
3 22 10.78***
Protest No protest
23 11 3.89*
10 1 5.31*b
more likely than their counterparts to passively
view military officials to torture a suspect of hav-
ing information about terrorists.
No other significant differences were found.
Table 37.6 presents chi-square tests and
Fisher’s exact test results, as well as the percent-
ages of responses given by different groups per
coding category that examines the agentive role
of the individuals in the view of torture.
Discussion
The purpose of this section is to further explore
the responses to the survey questions based on
identity groups, as well as events and conditions
specific to the Middle East. The analysis addressed
the differences between certain identity groups—
men and women, military and nonmilitary, and
protesters and non-protesters—this discussion
will focus on the respondents’ nationalities.
In doing so, it will focus on relevant regional
events and circumstances as needed for a more
thorough explanation of results.
Regarding the first question—whether the
government has the right to order the torture of
prisoners in a time of war—35% disagreed, 63%
agreed, and 2% either did not agree or disagree,
failed to address the prompt, or provided
responses in the “realism category.” Because
most of the participants in the latter group did not
594 A.K. Al-Obaidi et al.

Table 37.6 Chi-square tests, Fisher’s exact tests, and percentages for responses per coding category on the agentive
role of the individuals in the view of torture
Group 1 (%) Group 2 (%)
Categories Men Women c2
Passivity in the view of torture 10 4 3.71*
Compliance with torture 22 9 8.61**
Helplessness 3 9 4.68*
Military Non-military
Compliance with torture 24 10 7.99**
Helplessness 2 9 4.33*
Relative military No relative military
Raise moral awareness 0.0 8 4.28^b
Helplessness 22 0.0 16.21***
Protest No protest
Political/institutional activism 16 6 5.12*
Better to torture alternatives 26 16 3.13^
Apathy 9 22 7.59**
Passivity in the view of torture 3 9 3.33^
Compliance with torture 10 20 4.48*
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001; ^=0.051 < p < 0.10
a
The numbers in these columns are the percent of the group that gave responses falling into each of the specified
categories
b
Refers to Fisher’s exact test probabilities

address the prompt in one form or another, it is
reasonable to attribute this small percentage
percentage to discomfort thinking about and
commenting on torture; it is, after all, an unpleas-
ant topic. Participants may also have been uncom-
fortable discussing their views due to familiarity
with torture, which could have been the result of
personal experience or through learning about
the experiences of others; either is possible. As
mentioned above, there are reports of torture by
security apparatuses in each of the countries rep-
resented in the study.
This explanation could account for the number
of abstentions to the torture scenario, which asked
participants to describe their thoughts and feelings
about torture, while allowing the greater number
of responses to the first part, which did not neces-
sitate such contemplation. In other words, respon-
dents may have found the scenario more
disconcerting because answering it required more
consideration of and perhaps deeper thought about
torture. This line of reasoning seems to fit the
results as the respondents from most national iden-
tity groups answered only the prompt regarding a
state right to torture, but not the scenario. The Iraqi
identity group is the perfect example; of all the
national groups, it was the only one for which all
participants responded to the state right to torture
prompt and was also the only one to completely
refrain from indicating what they would want to
do if confronted with torture. State sponsored tor-
ture over the past several years, of which there
have been many reports, may have been a factor.
Unfortunately, this explanation falls short for
the region as it does not adequately describe one
national identity group, the Israeli, which had by
far the largest number of participants that
refrained from answering the question in any
way. Unlike the other national identity groups,
no one in the Israeli sample expressed the extent
to which they agreed or disagreed to the state-
ment in the prompt whether the government has
the right to order the torture of prisoners in a
time of war. Although some in most of the other
national identity groups refrained from answer-
ing, they were not the majority, nor were they as
numerous. The Israeli sample was also different
because so many participants chose to explain
37 Middle East Torture
their position regarding torture despite not
having expressed it numerically; however, this
was true for slightly less than half—the others
did not respond at all.
The Israeli national identity group also differs
regarding the responses to the scenario item.
Among the explanations, the majority expressed
moral engagement, either nonspecifically through
general opposition to torture or by referencing
humanization or the government’s responsibility
not to torture prisoners. Although fewer partici-
pants expressed moral disengagement, more
responses fell under advantageous comparison
than any other category. This was the case because
this sentiment—that torture may be necessary or
better than the alternatives—was prominent
among the largest national identity group in the
sample, the Israeli. Not only did about half men-
tion it in their responses, but some did so while
also expressing moral engagement.
These trends in the Israeli responses are likely
due to a more complex approach to or under-
standing of torture within the national identity
group resulting from a shared experience,
specifically one containing contradictions that set
Israel apart from other countries in the Middle
East. Like other countries in the region, Israel has
been in a state of emergency for decades, but not
as part of an authoritarian ruler’s strategy for
retaining power. Instead, the country has per-
ceived existential threats from non-state actors
and its neighbors since its creation in 1948
through both physical and verbal attacks, largely
due to its central role in the intractable Arab–
Israeli dispute. While this has defined Israel over
the decades, Western values, such as those that
inspired the CAT, have also helped shape the
Israeli national identity, resulting in conflicting
views regarding torture.
For Israeli respondents, the decision only to
explain their positions and not quantify it may
reflect this conflict. The matter is more compli-
cated than merely being for or against the state’s
right to torture; it is at once ideologically imper-
missible as it is not in line with the aforementioned
values, yet it is pragmatically acceptable given the
threats to the nation’s security as it can be used to
ensure the country’s safety, such as in a “ticking
595
bomb” situation. The others, who did not respond
at all, may have chosen not to do so for the afore-
mentioned reason that they may have been uncom-
fortable by the topic; however, it is also possible
that the conflict between ideas and security needs
further exacerbated their discomfort.
Based on the results of the analysis, it is rea-
sonable to add that the results from the Israeli
sample also differed because Israel requires mili-
tary service for all citizens. This service can result
in what Grossman refers to as moral distance,
which involves legitimizing oneself and one’s
cause (Grossman, 164). In defending Israel from
existential threats, soldiers’ actions are legitimate
insofar as they protect the country and state from
aggressors. Additional legitimacy is offered in the
form of legal affirmation, which permits more
extreme tactics in cases where “the degree of
anticipated danger is considerable” [emphasis
added] (Gaulan 1996). The result insofar as torture
is concerned is that it may be deemed permissible
if it assists in protecting the country. Because mil-
itary service is compulsory, this value may have
come to shape the national identity to a greater
extent than in any other country in the region.
That being the case, one could expect similar
results from the Iranian sample as well since mili-
tary service is also compulsory in Iran; however,
this was not the case in this study perhaps because
there were far fewer Iranian participants than
Israelis. Had more Iranians taken part in the study,
the results may have been quite different. The
extent to which responses from a more inclusive
Iranian sample would differ from the responses
obtained in this study is unclear, but it is likely
that they would be more similar to those received
from the Israeli sample as Iran’s military training
establishes moral distance between soldiers and
the state’s enemies. Training exercises include
ideological and religious lectures that define for-
eign cultural influences and liberal ideals as
threats to the regime and its survival (Wehrey
et al. 2009, pp. 47–48). The soldiers can then con-
sider themselves legitimate in a similar way as the
Israelis because they aim to protect their country
but also as defenders of the regime and the revo-
lution because they thwart internal threats from
opposition groups (Wehrey et al. 2009, pp. 47).
596
Regarding the second prompt, which asked
participants to describe their feelings about
military officials torturing someone suspected of
having information about terrorists, 66% of the
responses expressed agentive or non-agentive
roles. Of this percentage, 35% mentioned a desire
to stop the torture via positive action. More of
the respondents indicated they preferred agentic
alternate solutions to torture than expressed moral
awareness or were partial to political action.
As was the case with the first prompt, many chose
not to address this issue. It is realistic to attribute
these omissions to the unpleasant nature of the
topic or individual discomfort in contemplating
the matter.
These results appear consistent with the
responses to the first prompt as nearly the same
percentage that disagreed that the government
has the right to torture prisoners during war stated
they would wish to stop an act of torture commit-
ted by the state. Put another way, a similar num-
ber from the sample seem to oppose torture as
would seek to stop it. This is, however, not so, as
some national identity groups that disagreed with
the first prompt did not indicate agency in their
responses to the second prompt. Most of the Iraqi
national identity group, for example, cited help-
lessness, accounting for the majority of responses
in that category. Given the number of reports and
allegations of torture during Saddam Hussein’s
rule (1968–2003), as well as those that have sur-
faced since, these results could reflect a com-
monly held vulnerability to the actions of the
security apparatus in the country.
It also seems at first glance that the responses
most frequently coded for each prompt—advan-
tageous comparison for the former and harmful
alternate solutions for the latter—may have been
inspired by a similar desire to obtain information
or intelligence in order to protect the country,
such as by preventing a terrorist attack. This may
be true for some of the respondents, but certainly
not all. Whereas advantageous comparison was a
popular sentiment among Israeli respondents for
the first prompt, whose numbers account for that
category’s high percentage, more than twice as
many Israeli participants displayed either apathy
or compliance with torture as did a preference for
harmful alternative solutions. It is reasonable to
A.K. Al-Obaidi et al.
say this indicates that even though those who
prefer harmful alternate solutions are really
concerned with the end result rather than the
means, most of the Israeli sample would choose
to do nothing or believes that torture may be
effective in achieving that end. Whether this is
the result of circumstance, moral distance, or
other factors is uncertain.
In this study, the Israeli national identity group
certainly stood out, in part because of the size of
the sample within the study but also because the
group’s experiences and position in the region
have played a significant role in determining how
its people view torture. After this discussion, it is
clear that there is not a single perspective on
torture in the Middle East, rather many that are
shaped by an individual’s group affiliations.
While some are similar across national borders,
those within also help determine one’s values and
ultimately one’s opinion on torture.
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 Perspectives on Torture in Africa
38
Mahlon Dalley, Savreen Hundal, Davies Banda,
Jacqui Akhurst, Abdelali Abdelkader,
Adeniyi Famose, Natoschia Scruggs,
and Eduardo Correia

In a bold and dramatic fashion on December 10,
1948, the General Assembly of the United
Nations adopted and proclaimed to the world the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).
This was the first international recognition that
people had fundamental rights and freedoms.
Among its provisions was a ban on all forms of
torture, as specified in Article 5, “No one shall be
subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment” (United
Nations n.d.).
The UDHR was not the first document to rat-
ify a belief in human rights. An act of the English
Parliament (the English Bill of Rights), which
proclaimed in 1689 that all Englishman have
certain rights, inspired formulators of the United
States Bill of Rights and the US Constitution’s
Eighth Amendment, which included protection
for American citizens from cruel and unusual
punishment by the federal government. Other
proclamations across the international scene have
been enacted recognizing rights of individuals and
a ban on torture, including Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms, 1982, the European
Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (n.d.), and the African Charter of
Human and Peoples Rights, which pledges to
respect Africans’ inherent dignity as human beings
and recognize their legal status. Additionally,
according to Article 5 of the African Charter, “all
forms of exploitation and degradation of man
particularly slavery, slave trade, torture, cruel,
inhuman or degrading punishment and treatment
shall be prohibited” (African Commission on
Human and Peoples’s Rights n.d.).
The United Nations Convention Against
Torture and Agreements on Human Rights, which
is perhaps the document most germane to this
chapter, was passed and opened for ratification in
February 1985 and immediately signed by 20
nations, with five more signing within the month.
Only two African countries, Togo and Tunisia,
ratified the convention and agreed to allow indi-
vidual complaints to a committee per Article 22,
which provides a mechanism allowing individu-
als to lodge complaints if states violate any of the
provisions of the Convention (OHCHR). The
African countries of Cameroon, Egypt, Guinea,
Libya, Senegal, Somalia, and Uganda ratified the
Convention Against Torture but did not agree to
the Committee oversight. Several other nations
signed, but did not ratify the Convention Against
Torture, including the United States (HRWEB). As
of January 2010, 146 nations had ratified the treaty
and ten more had signed but not yet ratified it.
The definition of torture can be found in Part
I, Article 1, of the Covenant Against Torture and
Agreements on Human Rights (United Nations
n.d.): “For the purposes of this Convention, tor-
ture means any act by which severe pain or suf-
fering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally
inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtain-
ing from him or a third person information or a
confession, punishing him for an act he or a third

K. Malley-Morrison et al. (eds.), International Handbook of War, Torture, and Terrorism, 599
Peace Psychology Book Series, DOI 10.1007/978-1-4614-1638-8_38,
© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2013
600
person has committed or is suspected of having
committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a
third person, or for any reason based on discrimi-
nation of any kind, when such pain or suffering
is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the
consent or acquiescence of a public official or
other person acting in an official capacity. It
does not include pain or suffering arising only
from, inherent in or incidental to lawful
sanctions”.
The Geneva Conventions and Protocols are
international treaties that contain rules limiting
the “barbarity of war” (International Committee
of the Red Cross 2009). The fourth Geneva
Convention (1949), which was adopted after
WWII, was the first to afford protection to civil-
ians, including those living in occupied territories
during wartime and internees. Among other pro-
tections, this article requires humane treatment
for all persons in enemy hands, specifically pro-
hibiting murder, mutilation, and torture, the tak-
ing of hostages, unfair trials, and cruel, humiliating
and degrading treatment of prisoners of war. As
of March 09, 2009, 194 states had ratified the
Geneva Convention; all African countries have
been party to at least part of the Geneva
Convention (International Commitee of the Red
Cross 2008). As noted by Jean Pictet (1958) in a
commentary on the IV Geneva Convention, its
authors took great care to develop a comprehen-
sive list of the ways in which a state could inflict
torture on an individual, as they realized that tor-
turers would continue to imagine crueler ones.
Thus, they intended to make the definition as
restrictive as possible by making it as specific yet
inclusive as possible (Pictet 1958).
Torture in Africa
After World War II and during the anticolonial
period in Africa, tactics such as torture, the abuse
of military rank to justify acts of rape, and civil-
ian abduction occurred all too frequently. Such
techniques tended to vary in relation to the gender
M. Dalley et al.
of the victim (White 2007). For example, male
interrogators often focused on inducing shame
and violations of honor to break women.
Frequently, this was done through rape but also
included other torture tactics such as requiring
victims to stand in and drink menstrual blood;
inserting foreign objects, including rats, in wom-
en’s vaginas; imposing sleep deprivation, physi-
cal beatings, electric shocks in the genital regions,
body searches and vaginal examinations; and
forcing women to have intercourse with other
prisoners for the entertainment of prison person-
nel (Goldblatt and Meintjes 1998; Lazreg 1994).
Women were also “subjected to combat duty as
well as sexual duty, forced marriages, and sexual
politics that required marriage to a commanding
officer in order for him to rise through the ranks”
(Lyons 2004, as cited in White 2007, pp. 886–
887). Reports or instances of sexual molestation
and harassment were often ignored. After these
postcolonial wars were fought, African soldiers,
especially women, were often treated as though
they had loose morals. This treatment has caused
many women to conceal their identity as former
combatants (White 2007).
According to Forje (2009), research indicates
that in many parts of Africa, the civilian popula-
tion and women in particular undergo various
forms of torture during and even after the
conflicts have subsided. In Sierra Leone, for
example, many ex-combatants and victims of its
long war are still suffering from the effects of
tactics like amputations as an instrument of ter-
ror. In the Congo, toward the end of its long and
bloody war, the UPC (French: Union des
Patriotes Congolais), which is an armed militia
in Ituri, northeastern Democratic Republic of the
Congo, arrested and tortured over 100 opponents
between August 2002 and March 2003 and was
responsible for the murder of a Kenyan peace-
keeper in January 2004 and the kidnapping of a
Moroccan peacekeeper later that year (Human
Rights Watch 2003, 2010). Even as recently as
2010, there are reports from the Democratic
Republic of the Congo that the UPC is operating
torture camps (Wakabi 2010a, b).
38 Africa Torture
Reports on the use of torture to indoctrinate
thousands of youth as agents of terror by
President Robert Mugabe’s government in
Zimbabwe have come from Andersson (2004a,
b), an African correspondent for the BBC.
Former recruits who escaped from what the
Zimbabwean government called “job training
centers” reported a horrific training program
encouraging teenagers to commit atrocities.
“Debbie,” one escapee from the camps, claimed
that she was raped repeatedly and that no one
complained because rape was considered part of
the training, along with beating the youths until
they obeyed orders. In another story from the
camps, a recruit named Daniel said he was plied
with alcohol and drugs and learned how to apply
electric shock to his victims. Accusations that
recruits are encouraged to rape and to commit
brutal murders have all been denied by Zimbabwe
officials (Muleya 2004).
Both before and after the end of apartheid,
there have been many reports of torture in South
Africa. In a speech covering his own experience
of torture and mutilation at the hands of the apart-
heid regime in South Africa, Lapsley (2000, p. 1)
noted,
Sad to say torture became a normative part of the
South African way of life especially during the
1980’s when repression and resistance was at its
strongest. Like so many other struggles, as the years
passed, we kept crossing thresholds of what we
were prepared to do to each other…. Evidence sug-
gested that more than 90% had been tortured…
Refugees from regional wars and state conflicts
in Africa have also been at risk of torture. One
report indicates that out of a group of refugees
from Sierra Leone and Liberia who had been sub-
ject to torture during the civil wars in those coun-
tries, 91% of the refugees experienced at least
some form of brutality in refugee camps (Center
for Victims of Torture 2006). The Center for
Victims of Torture (CVT) developed to help
lower the incidence of PTSD in refugees from
Sierra Leone, Liberia, and other parts of Africa
helped over 18,000 victims between 1985 and the
early twenty-first century (Center for Victims of
Torture 2006).
601
Ethnic Cleansing
The practice of targeting specific ethnic groups for
extinction or forcing them to leave a region has
been identified as “ethnic cleansing.” Starting after
World War II, Africa began to witness an intensified
level of such ethnic cleansing. Fueled by tense
relations, economic strain, and harsh living condi-
tions, South African natives (Zulus) became out-
raged over an incidence of violence committed by
an individual of Indian heritage on January 14,
1949. Their anger spurred an explosion of violence
against the Indian people who were in many ways
suffering as much as the native Africans were. The
aftermath of these riots included an expulsion of
the Indian population, which resulted in thousands
of Indian refugees, 142 deaths, 1,087 people
injured, several rapes, acts of arson, and looting
(Bhana and Pachai 1984).
One hallmark case of ethnic cleansing within
the continent of Africa is what is known as the
Rwanda Genocide. Between 500,000 and one
million of the Tutsi minorities and a few of
the peace-seeking Hutus were killed in 1994 over
the span of about 100 days by militias primarily
composed of the Hutu majority. Racial tensions
had been growing steadily because many of the
Hutu blamed the Tutsi for most of Rwanda’s
problems. After the death of the president, the
country was ignited by civil war and genocide as
well as the displacement of almost two million
refugees. In May of 1994, the United Nations
placed a weapons embargo on Rwanda and
expanded a mandate to allow troops to protect
civilians and refugees. Afterward, it became clear
that some of the media outlets in Rwanda were
greatly responsible for inspiring hate talk among
the Hutu and cultivating propaganda (United
Nations 2000).
Another example of intrastate racial violence
that may fit under the ethnic cleansing label
occurred between the Sudanese of Arab descent
and Sudanese of African descent in the Darfur
region of Sudan. Black militias rose up against
the government of Sudan with the claim that the
government was oppressing the black inhabitants.
602
Beginning in 2003, the Sudan military, along
with mostly Arab militia recruits known as the
Janjaweed, fought the uprising. The Janjaweed
have been the primary perpetrators of the mas-
sacres and rapes of Darfur’s black civilians
(Andersson 2004a, b). Instances of mass mur-
ders, rapes, torture, and other acts of crime
against human rights committed by the Sudanese
government and their allies the Janjaweed have
been identified by UN investigators, but the UN
has refrained from labeling this war a genocide
(International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur
2004). It is estimated that since 2003 over
298,000 people have died because of direct acts
of violence or the consequences of populations
being displaced and subject to greater risk for
disease (Degomme and Guha-Sap 2010).
Justifying Violence
How can the human race justify such horrific
destruction and torture of their own species? How
do they tolerate acts of war, torture, and geno-
cide? According to Schrepel (2005), who investi-
gated the cruel behavior of French paratroopers
in the Battle of Algiers, 1960–1962, the para-
troopers’ loyalty within their unit became greater
than their loyalty to the country for which they
were fighting, thereby creating an environment
where torture was justified. Based on his analy-
sis, Schrepel (2005) suggests that using torture to
gain intelligence or to “fight fire with fire” is a
dangerous tactic. In his view,
[W]hen soldiers defend civilization using barba-
rous tactics, the results are harmful and counter-
productive. On the strategic level, soldiers provide
a propaganda advantage to the insurgents. It is
difficult to defend civilized values of liberal
democracy with a straight face to the world while
simultaneously using Gestapo tactics to achieve
victory. (p. 72)
In Algiers, the French even resorted to torturing
antiwar Europeans, an example of how a culture
can become so polarized in times of war that
torture comes to be seen as an acceptable way of
M. Dalley et al.
dealing with anyone who disagrees with one’s
own position (Schrepel 2005).
Some of the pressure to resort to torture tech-
niques is attributed to belief in a phenomenon
known as the “ticking time bomb scenario.”
As described by Opotow (2007)
The scenario states that a time bomb is located in a
major city. A suspect in custody knows where the
bomb is located, but will not talk. Would you sup-
port torturing the suspect to obtain information that
would save many lives? This offers an argument
(i.e., the ends justify the means) that was used in
the Algerian War to justify French torture of
Algerian separatists. (p. 459)
In most cases in the recent history of torture,
mass killings, and genocide, violence escalates.
It generally begins with various forms of basic
racism; then, as relationships grow more and
more strained, a “we-they/us-them” process of
differentiation and devaluation begins to occur.
One can view this process, along with many
other factors, as contributors to moral disengage-
ment, a process whereby individuals can partici-
pate in inhuman acts without feeling immoral
(Staub 1990, p. 57). According to Albert Bandura
(1999), moral disengagement allows people to
believe or behave in ways that are counter to
their own moral standards and to feel vindicated
and avoid feelings of guilt in spite of their own
misbehavior. Bandura’s eight mechanisms of
moral disengagement occur in four groupings.
The first group of mechanisms involve forms of
cognitive restructuring, including (1) moral
justification, “they attacked us first, therefore,
we have a right to kill them”; (2) euphemistic
labeling, for example using the words “collat-
eral damage” to refer to the death of civilians;
(3) advantageous comparison, “we are more
advanced, therefore, what we do is more morally
right”; and (4) moral justification, the recon-
structing of harmful behavior and thought into
more palatable forms such as “conducting the
war to end all wars.”
The second grouping of moral disengagement
mechanisms involves removing or obscuring
personal responsibility for inhumane behavior. This
can be accomplished by not taking responsibility
38 Africa Torture
for one’s actions as was the case for many people
responsible for directly killing prisoners in
German concentration camps during World War
II and claiming, “I was only following orders.”
Another form of obscuring personal responsibil-
ity can be found in statements such as, “I was
only one of many who were torturing another.”
Mechanisms that misrepresent, minimize, and/
or disregard the negative consequences of injuri-
ous behavior are included in the third grouping
of moral disengagment mechanisms. An exam-
ple is that of the rapist who justifies his action by
saying that the victim really enjoyed being raped
or the murderer who states that the person killed
did not feel a thing. Dehumanizing and blaming
the victim or situation and/or devaluing the
recipient of the harm are the types of moral dis-
engagement. When soldiers state that the enemy
or the civilians they are fighting are “animals”
or “not human,” such as the derogatory state-
ments made about the Japanese during WWII,
they are engaging in dehumanizing and blaming
the victim.
Another theory as to why ordinary people can
become capable of carrying out or justifying
inhumane behaviors such as torture is the “Lucifer
effect,” which addresses the issue of how good
people turn evil (Zimbardo 2007). The theory of
the Lucifer effect emerged from Philip Zimbardo’s
(2007) Stanford Prison Experiment, which
involved randomly assigning volunteer univer-
sity students to be either inmates or guards in a
mock-up prison setting. The experiment had to
be ended in a matter of days because of the brutal
behavior of the students who took on the role of
the guards (Smith 2007). Based on the aggres-
sive behaviors that emerged in the mock “guards,”
Smith (2007) suggested that evil behavior may
best be understood by examining the situational
and systemic pressures pushing people to action,
especially in the context of the harsh conditions
and altered morality occurring during times of
war. Zimbardo (2007) suggested that the findings
of the Stanford Prison Experiment offer insight
into guard–prisoner power dynamics—and their
abuse—applicable to the modern-day Abu Ghraib
prison debacle in Iraq.
603
Methods
Participants
Using the Personal and Institutional Rights to
Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS) mem-
bers of the Group on International Perspectives
on Governmental Aggression and Peace
(GIPGAP) collected responses from eight African
countries pertaining to two statements regarding
torture (Malley-Morrison et al. 2006). The
African sample included a total of 456 partici-
pants of which 425 responses were analyzed from
eight different countries: Algeria (7 women and 5
men), Angola (5 women and 10 men), Botswana
(40 women and 28 men), Egypt (26 women and
40 men), Ghana (8 women and 36 men), Nigeria
(28 women and 22 men), South Africa (67 women
and 42 men), and Zambia (16 women and 13
men). Of the 425 responses, 393 identified them-
selves as either women or men with almost equal
representation (197 women and 196 men). The
participants’ ages ranged from 18 to 74 with
50% under 30 years of age. The majority of the
participants (90%) reported that they were from
the middle, working, or lower social classes
(50%, 21%, and 19%, respectively) with very
few identifying themselves as upper middle or
upper class (10%). Fifty-nine percent of the par-
ticipants said they were Christians; 35% were
Muslims, and 4% reported themselves as none/
agnostic/atheist. Of the 242 participants answer-
ing whether they had been or were now serving
in the military, only 21 responded in the
affirmative (9%); of 183 participants indicating
whether they had a relative in the military 40%
said yes. Only 7% of respondents reported that
they had ever participated in anti-war protest.
Materials and Procedures
All participants completed an electronic or hard
copy of the Personal and Institutional Rights to
Aggression Survey (PAIRTAPS) (Malley-
Morrison et al. 2006), usually within their native
604
lands. Participants were recruited through
various means, including personal networking,
posting of the survey link on various websites,
and recruitment from classes at universities. This
chapter discusses African responses to two items
concerning torture. The first item consisted of
two parts. First the participants rated the state-
ment, “The government has the right to order the
torture of prisoners during times of war” on a
7-point Likert rating scale from 1 = total disagree-
ment to 7 = total agreement; secondly, they pro-
vided a justification in their own words for the
rating they assigned. The second item was an
open-ended question asking the participants how
they would respond if they were exposed to the
following situation, “Military officials are tortur-
ing somebody suspected of having information
about terrorists.” Specifically, they were asked to
indicate in their own words, how they would feel
and then asked what they would want to do.
Coding Arguments for and Against
a State Right to Torture
Responses to both of these items were coded by
the torture coding team of the Group on
International Perspectives of Governmental
Aggression and Peace (GIPGAP). The coding
team developed the coding manuals using both a
deductive qualitative analysis (Gilgun 2005)
informed by Bandura’s theory and grounded the-
ory methods. That is, working with an interna-
tional coding manual sample, the team developed
coding categories appearing to reflect the forms
of reasoning people used when considering inhu-
mane behavior.
The coding system developed for the item on
a potential government right to order torture
focused particularly on the forms of reasoning
identified by Bandura as reflecting moral disen-
gagement; specifically, we coded the pro-right to
torture responses for pseudo-moral justification,
advantageous comparisons, last resort, euphe-
mistic labeling, responsibility, diffusion of
responsibility, displacement of responsibility,
apathy, misrepresenting, minimizing or disregard-
ing consequences, dehumanization, attribution of
M. Dalley et al.
blame, and revenge. The team also developed a
more articulated framework for identifying forms
of moral engagement and identified responses
reflecting those mechanisms (Malley-Morrison
et al. 2009).
Among the types of qualitative response coded
in the overarching anti-right-to-torture (which we
label subsequently as “anti-torture”) category were
the following: (1) rejecting torture based on moral
principles; the specific moral principles identified
in the coding manual included morality, responsi-
bility, and humanization; (2) using accurate
descriptive language in either referring to hurtful
practices or protesting against adverse actions
such as torture; (3) suggesting better alternatives
to torture or focusing on the ineffective or outdated
qualities of torture; (4) pointing out the negative
consequences associated with torture; and (5)
exonerating the prisoners by removing blame from
them. Although our coding system was informed
by Bandura’s moral disengagement and engage-
ment constructs, these constructs are highly theo-
retical; consequently our report on findings focuses
directly on arguments tolerant of or opposed to a
state right to order torture rather than moral disen-
gagement and engagement per se.
For coding purposes, the replies to both items
were first broken down into codeable units that
were evaluated separately. For example, a reply
such as “Torture is unacceptable because it is
immoral and only causes greater problems” has
two distinct codeable units (each of which can be
considered a meaningful response in its own
right): (1) it is immoral, and (2) it causes greater
problems. Each codeable unit could be placed
into just one coding category. In the discussion of
findings, the term “response” should be under-
stood as referring to a codeable unit.
The second set of coding guidelines informed
by moral engagement theory was designed to
assess themes related to levels of personal agency
in expressed motivations for action identified in
participants’ answers regarding what they would
want to do if they witnessed torture of someone
suspected of knowing a terrorist. Each codeable
unit in an answer could be placed into one of four
thematic categories reflecting different levels of
agency: (1) positive action, (2) passivity regarding
38 Africa Torture
torture, (3) compliance with torture, and (4) help-
lessness. Positive action referred to responses
indicating a proactive orientation with a focus on
assuming some form of responsibility to act
against what was regarded as unjust or immoral.
Responses coded into the passivity category indi-
cated a lack of motivation to take any sort of
action regarding torture. Responses coded as
compliant with torture revealed support for tor-
ture under specified conditions. Lastly, responses
coded for helplessness suggested an inability or
unwillingness on the part of respondents to do
anything one way or another concerning torture.
The item asking participants what they would
want to do if they were directly and immediately
exposed to a situation where the military was tor-
turing someone was included only in the version
of the survey administered in Algeria, Botswana,
Egypt, Ghana, and Nigeria.
Patterns of Responding
Arguments Indicating Tolerance
for Torture
Out of a total of 267 responses (codeable units) to
the right-to-torture item, 20% were coded as indi-
cating at least some tolerance for torture, often
under specified conditions. Appeals to advanta-
geous comparison were the most frequent
type (40%) of pro-torture argument. These
justifications for a state right to torture empha-
sized the contrast principle; specifically, in most
of these responses, torture was compared with
other, more horrifying potential scenarios to
make the act of torture seem less wrong and more
right by comparison. For example, a 48-year-old
Angolan man replied “in case the information is
necessary, so be it.” Within this response, the det-
rimental action of torture is compared to a posi-
tive gain (necessary information), and the positive
gain is seen as outweighing the negative aspects
of torturing someone. The struggle that may
underlie such reasoning can be seen in the reply
of a 51-year-old woman from Zambia: “Torture
should only be used when there is need to obtain
information from a culprit. Otherwise, why
should prisoners of war be tortured?”
605
The second most frequent form of reasoning
supportive of a right to torture (18% of pro-torture
responses) was attribution of blame. Responses
coded into this category attributed the need for a
right to torture to characteristics of the victim (the
individual being tortured). Good examples of
attribution of blame can be seen in the responses
of a 23-year-old Botswanan man who said that
governments have the right to torture “those peo-
ple who have killed or injured innocent people…”
and a 38-year-old South African woman who
stated, “If they have been convicted of their
crimes, then let’s get as much information out of
them as possible. But not just for fun.”
Several other arguments indicating some tol-
erance for torture were found in the African
responses, but only in very small frequencies.
Table 38.1 provides additional examples of the
two most frequently occurring justifications for a
state right to torture, advantageous comparison
and attribution of blame.
Arguments Rejecting a State Right
to Torture Prisoners
Approximately 75% of the right-to-torture
responses from the African sample indicated that
the government had no right to torture prisoners
in times of war. Some of these responses (18% of
the anti-torture responses) were general, not pro-
viding any rationale for the rejection: “no need”
(33-year-old woman from Botswana), “no one
should be tortured” (44-year-old Zambian man),
and “…it should not be permitted” (21-year-old
Algerian woman). Other responses indicated
more explicitly the reasoning behind the rejec-
tion of a state right to torture. The most frequently
occurring type of specific argument against a
right to torture was humanization (15%) appeal-
ing to humanitarian principles or emphasizing
the humanness of the victim. For example, a
59-year-old South African man asserted that tor-
ture is simply “inhuman” and a 35-year-old
Algerian man stated, “it is unhuman treatment.”
In a more articulated argument, a 22-year-old
Angolan woman stated, “In my opinion, when we
torture someone, we are committing a savage act
because its a human being.”
606 M. Dalley et al.

Table 38.1 Arguments supportive of a state right to torture

Category Percent Country Age Sex Response
Advantageous 9 (40) Botswana 20 F “would help them get vital info”
comparison South Africa 19 M “It should be avoided a at all costs, unless said prisoner
holds information which is a threat to the country and its
citizens”
Angola 48 M “if they are already in prison, there shouldn’t be a need to
torture. But in case the information is necessary, so be it”
Zambia 51 F “No government has the right to order the torture of
prisoners in time of war. Torture should only be used when
there is need to obtain information from a culprit.
otherwise, why should prisoners of war be tortured?”
Algeria 25 F “Difficult to judge…in theory, no. // In practice certain
information can save numerous human lives…but where do
we put the limit?”
Ghana 18 M “for them to reveal secrets of their enemies”
Attribution 4 (18) Botswana 23 M “well only to those people who have killed or injured
of blame innocent people but innocent people should be left alone
because others may be taken by mistake”
South Africa 38 F “If they have been convicted of their crimes, then lets get
as much information out of them as possible. but not just
for fun”
Zambia 34 F “I agree in the sense that if those being tortured had
invaded other peoples land, so that they stop. I disagree in
that if the locals are defending their land then captured,
they are not supposed to be tortured”
Ghana 27 M “government can only torture prisoners of war when a
prisoner is considered to be a major suspect but failed to
talk when being interrogated. Other than that prisoners
should not be maltreated”
Note: The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total
response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in that category out of all pro-torture
responses
F Female, M Male

In our coding system, references to human
rights were included as a subcategory of the
humanization category. Responses coded into
this category of anti-torture responses (11%) ref-
erenced international human rights doctrine when
rejecting a governmental right to torture prison-
ers of war. As argued by a 26-year-old Zambian
woman, “Any form of torture should not be toler-
ated. It is a breach of basic human rights.”
A number of arguments (11% of the anti-tor-
ture responses) exonerated prisoners of war—
that is, they indicated that prisoners of war did
not necessarily deserve to be tortured. These
responses usually conveyed a sense of doubt
about whether anyone ever really knows if a pris-
oner is guilty. As a 26-year-old woman from
Botswana said, “some prisoners are innocent in
time of war and do not deserve to be ill-treated.”
Other responses in the exoneration category
emphasized that people do not deserve to be ill-
treated and subjected to torture just because they
have become imprisoned. For example, a 24-year-
old South African woman stated, “Nobody
deserves to be tortured, in spite of who they are or
what they have done. They go to jails to change
and become better people, they can’t do that if
they are being tortured, where is the lesson of
reforming them to be good citizens?”
More examples of the principal arguments
made against torture can be seen in Table 38.2.
38 Africa Torture 607

Table 38.2 Arguments against a state right to torture

Category Percent Country Age Sex Response
General anti-torture 14 (18) Botswana 33 F “no need”
South Africa 59 M “Inhuman. I can’t think of any obvious instance in
which torture can be justified”
Angola 50 M “I completely disagree”
Zambia 44 M “No one should be tortured,”
Algeria 21 F “I suppose that it’s often used in times of war, but it
should not be permitted”
Ghana 48 M “Total disagreement…”
Humanization 15 (20) Botswana
South Africa 59 M “Inhuman. I can’t think of any obvious instance in
which torture can be justified,”
Angola 22 F “In my opinion, when we torture someone, we are
committing a savage act because it’s a human being.
I don’t believe that it is the most appropriate way to
achieve peace,”
Zambia 34 F “it is inhuman to torture prisoners in time of war
because you are only when you proven guilty you are
subjected to torture,”
Algeria 35 M “it is inhuman treatment”
Ghana 26 M “they should be counted as human beings.”
“Inhuman. I can’t think of any obvious instance in
which torture can be justified”
Human rights 8 (11) Botswana 20 F “abuse is totally against human rights,”
South Africa 55 M “There is no necessity to torture prisoners—this is
against all human rights”
Angola 45 M “it is a violation of human rights,”
Zambia 26 F “Any form of torture should not be tolerated. It is a
breach of basic human rights,”
Egypt 32 F “When Egypt took prisoners of war from Israel in
1967, the Egyptian government made sure they
received medical attention and were treated well.
They even took them on a tour of Cairo to see the
pyramids! It is a human right to not be tortured even
if there is a war going on”
Ghana 27 M “this is a human right abuse”
Exonerating 9 (11) Botswana 26 F “some prisoners are innocent in time of war and do
prisoners of war not deserve to be ill treated”
South Africa 24 F “nobody deserves to be tortured, in spite of who they
are or what they have done. they go to jails to change
and become better people, they can’t do that if they
are being tortured, where is the lesson of reforming
them to be good citizens?”
Zambia 43 M “I agree in the sense that if those being tortured had
invaded other peoples land, so that they stop. I
disagree in that if the locals are defending their land
then captured, they are not supposed to be tortured”
Algeria 24 F “prisoners could simply be hostages and therefore
totally innocent of any crime”
Ghana 22 M “He may if he like the same thing from somebody too.
The question is, is everybody right at all times? They
should not take advantage over somebody’s weakness”
Note: The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total response
set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in that category out of all anti-torture responses
F Female, M Male
608
Personal Involvement
In regard to the item asking participants what
they would want to do if directly and dramati-
cally exposed to the torture of someone suspected
of knowing a terrorist, responses coded into the
proactive personal involvement category
expressed a desire for some type of positive
action, such as an unspecified cessation of the act
of torture (e.g., “stop the torture”), political or
institutional activism (e.g., “protest”), moral
awareness (e.g., “make them understand why it is
wrong”), and reference to agentic alternative
solutions (e.g., “discuss”). The positive action
responses (40% of all the “what would you want
to do” responses) indicated some type of motiva-
tion to stop the torture from continuing. For
example, a 22-year-old Ghanaian woman said
she would want to “report those officials for
investigation about what is going on.” Responses
in the positive action category also included
appeals to political/ institutional activism. For
example a 34-year-old man from Botswana
responded that he would want to “expose them
[military officials conducting the torture] so they
are brought to justice.” Another type of positive
action response expresses a sense of moral
awareness; for example, a 21-year-old Botswanan
man said, “tell them about the importance of
instilling one’s dignity.” The last type of positive
action response included suggestions for agentic
alternative solutions. As one 20-year-old Algerian
woman said simply “get information without
torture.”
In contrast to responses indicating a desire to
undertake positive action to resist state-sanc-
tioned torture, about 5% of the responses indi-
cated that the participant would feel acceptance
of the aggression. An example of responses in
this category, which we named compliant with
torture, came from a 26-year-old Egyptian man
who stated that he would do “Nothing, because I
do not mind if they torture him until they get the
information that they want.”
The largest percentage of responses to the
“what would you want to do” item (42%) evi-
denced neither positive action nor compliance,
M. Dalley et al.
and were coded instead for passivity/apathy.
These responses expressed no motivation to take
any kind of step toward preventing the act of tor-
ture from continuing. The typical response in this
category was “nothing.” The apparent lack of
motivation expressed by the participants regard-
ing torture may be explained in two ways. Either
the participants are expressing a sense of help-
lessness and feel there is nothing they can do or
they may simply not care about whether prison-
ers of war are tortured. More examples of
responses, along with their percentage of occur-
rence, and information concerning participants’
country of origin, age, and sex can be found in
Table 38.3.
Exploratory Analyses of Demographic
Correlates
On a purely exploratory basis, a series of very
basic statistical analyses were performed to
explore the possibility that the occurrence of par-
ticular themes varied in relation to gender, reli-
gion, class status, military status, involvement in
protest, and age. Because of the relative small-
ness of some of the demographic groups (e.g.,
groups based on social class), the qualitative
nature of the variables, and the non-representa-
tiveness of the sample, we report only the findings
from nonparametric analyses. In describing the
patterns revealed in these exploratory analyses,
we use the term “statistically significant” to refer
to group differences reaching a 0.05 probability
level and “marginally significant” for findings
with a p value in the 0.055–0.10 range.
Chi-Square Analyses for
Right-to-Torture Item
In regard to the pro-torture arguments, there were
few notable group differences; however, there
was a marginally significant gender difference in
attribution of blame, with more men than women
attributing the need for a state right to torture to
the blameworthiness of the people deserving to
be tortured. There were also statistically
38 Africa Torture 609

Table 38.3 Examples of torture scenario responses

Category Percent Country Age Sex Response
Positive action 13 (40) Ghana 22 F “report those officials for investigation
about what is going on”
Nigeria 32 M “pray for them”
Egypt 33 F “If I heard about this, I would not do
anything. But, if I saw it with my own eyes,
I would say something to make them stop”
Agentic alternative solutions 10 (32) Ghana: M “more friendly ways must be used”
Botswana 20 F “find another way to get info. From him”
Algeria 48 M “it may get information without torture”
Apathy 41 (97) Ghana 54 M “nothing”
Botswana: 23 F “nothing they do what they do to get what
they want”
Egypt 24 M “I would not do anything”
Note: The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total
response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in that subcategory out of the major
category that includes the subcategory
F Female, M Male

Table 38.4 Torture tolerance: percentages of responses in coding categories by demographic groups and chi-square
values
Category Demographic groupa c2
Male Female
Attribution of blame 8 2 2.73^
Lower class Working class Middle class Upper middle class Upper class
General pro-torture 20 0 0 0 0 14.59**
Displacement of 0 0 5 10 100 20.53***
responsibility
a
The numbers in these columns are the percent of the group that gave responses falling into each of the specified
categories
**
p £ 0.01; ***p £ 0.001; ^0.051 < p < 0.10

significant social class differences in the use of
pseudo-moral justifications, which were used
only by self-reported members of the “lower
class.” By contrast, more members of the upper
middle and upper classes produced arguments
displacing responsibility for a state right to tor-
ture onto the victims deserving torture.
Table 38.4 shows the percentages of responses
in torture tolerant coding categories and chi-
square values by demographic group.
Exploratory analyses of the anti-torture
response categories revealed more marginally
significant and statistically significant group dif-
ferences. For example there was a marginally
significant difference among countries in the use
of arguments based on moral principles, with the
South Africans and Angolans in particular mak-
ing arguments appealing to moral principles;
respondents from Ghana, Angola, and Botswana
were more likely than their counterparts to refer
to human rights. South Africans tended to empha-
size negative consequences in greater numbers
than participants from other African countries.
A tendency for more women than men to express
a general rejection of a state right to torture was
marginally significant. A marginally significant
difference was also found among age groups,
with significantly more respondents in the over
50 group providing these arguments than those in
the 20–25 years of age group; the older group
610 M. Dalley et al.

Table 38.5 Torture intolerance: percentages of responses in coding categories by demographic groups and chi-square
values
Category Demographic groupa c2
Male Female
General anti-torture 13 24 2.73^
Protest No protest
Awareness negative 10 0 6.49*
consequences
18–25 years old 26–35 years old 36–50 years old +51 years old
Moral engagement (general) 9 24 18 35 9.04*
Humanization 25 29 18 6 6.90^
Awareness negative 4 6 3 18 8.14*
consequences
Algeria Angola Botswana Egypt Ghana South Africa
Moral principles 22 0 0 0 6 16 9.93^
Human rights 0 18 15 100 16 5 14.15*
Awareness negative 0 9 0 0 0 13 10.43^
consequences
a
The numbers in these columns are the percent of the group that gave responses falling into each of the specified
categories
*
p £ 0.05; ^0.051 < p < 0.10

also gave more responses indicating awareness
of negative consequences of a right to torture. By
contrast, proportionately more respondents in the
youngest age group than in the other age groups
humanized the victim when rejecting a state right
to torture.
Table 38.5 shows the percentages of responses
in torture intolerant coding categories and chi-
square values by demographic group.
Chi-Square Analyses for Torture
Scenario Item
In response to the PAIRTAPS scenario item ask-
ing what participants would want to do if con-
fronted with torture, there were some differences
among groups based on nationality, gender, reli-
gion, and social class. Specifically, significantly
more participants from Algeria and Botswana
provided personal involvement responses than
their counterparts in other countries; significantly
more participants from Ghana and Botswana
expressed a desire to take positive action to stop
torture; and significantly more participants from
Ghana, Botswana, and Algeria preferred alterna-
tive solutions than participants from the other
countries. Significantly more women than men
provided general personal involvement responses;
men were marginally more likely than women to
provide political/institutional activism responses.
Christians were more likely than Muslims to
reject torture with personal involvement, positive
action, political activism, and agentic alternative
solution responses. Significantly more respon-
dents from the working class and upper middle
class participants gave positive action responses
than members of the other classes.
There were also a few group differences in
likelihood of providing responses coded for pas-
sivity/apathy. For example, more Muslims than
Christians tended to give apathy responses,
although again it is impossible to know what kind
of underlying judgments those responses
reflected. More Egyptians and Botswanans than
respondents from other national groups provided
apathy responses. More individuals in the mili-
tary gave apathetic responses than those with no
military experience.
Table 38.6 shows the percentages of responses
in personal involvement coding categories and
chi-square values by demographic group.
38 Africa Torture 611

Table 38.6 Personal involvement: percentages of responses in coding categories by demographic groups and chi-square
values
Categories Demographic group a c2
Male Female
General personal involvement 0 8 6.71**
Political activism 10 3 3.09^
18–25 years old 26–35 years old 36–50 years old 51+ years old
General personal involvement 5 0 0 17 6.69^
Christian Muslim None/agnostic/atheist
General personal involvement 6 0 33 11.52**
Positive action 25 3 0 15.06***
Positive activism 8 3 33 5.80^
Agentic alternative solutions 17 0 33 14.87***
Apathy 13 83 0 70.06***
No military Military
Positive action 16 0 3.02^
Apathy 42 88 12.09***
Algeria Botswana Egypt Ghana Nigeria
Personal involvement (general) 20 5 0 3 0 11.53*
Positive action 30 19 0 29 50 22.23**
Alternative solutions— 20 7 0 29 0 23.82***
positive action
Passive regarding torture 0 3 0 0 50 38.84***
Apathy 0 24 88 3 0 90.84***
a
The numbers in these columns are the percent of the group that gave responses falling into each of the specified
categories
*
p £ 0.05; **p £ 0.01; ***p £ 0.001; ^0.051 < p < 0.10

Quantitative Analyses of Rating
Scale Scores
Analysis of variance and Pearson product
moment correlation were performed with the rat-
ing scale scores (ranging from 1, totally disagree,
to 7, totally agree) for degree of agreement with
the statement, “The government has the right to
order the torture of prisoners in time of war.”
Results of the ANOVA for the seven countries in
their ratings showed a significant difference. A
Tukey post hoc analysis revealed that Egyptians
scored significantly higher in level of agreement
than South Africans and Algerians (albeit, all
countries scored in the direction of more dis-
agreement than agreement). There were no gen-
der differences in rating scale scores. Muslims
scored significantly higher than Christians and
the none/agnostic/atheist group. The working
class participants scored significantly lower on
agreement than participants from all the other
social classes, and individuals who had served in
the military showed higher levels of agreement
than those who had not served. There were no
significant differences between participants with
a relative who had served in the military and
those without such a relative. Individuals who
had participated in an antiwar protest scored
marginally lower in level of agreement with the
right to torture than those who had not protested.
Finally, there was a statistically significant
(though small) negative correlation between age
and rating scale scores for the right to torture—
the older the individual, the lower their agree-
ment with such a right.
Discussion
Because Africa is such a large and diverse conti-
nent, it is important not to make sweeping gener-
alizations based on our convenience samples
612
from six countries; however, these countries did
represent three major regions of Africa: the
Northern, Western, and Southern areas. From our
results, we believe that hypotheses can be gener-
ated to spark further research regarding views on
torture. As noted in the introduction, many inter-
national and regional proclamations have rein-
forced the incontrovertible idea that human
beings should not be tortured. These pronounce-
ments come from the United Nations Declaration
of Human Rights (United Nations 1948) and also,
more specifically to Africa, from Article 5 of the
African Charter of Human and Peoples Rights in
which “all forms of exploitation and degradation
of man particularly slavery, slave trade, torture,
cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment and
treatment shall be prohibited” (African Charter
of Human and Peoples Rights).
Over the past 30 years, Africa has been faced
with a bitter legacy, including the civil strife stem-
ming from apartheid of South Africa (Robinson
1999), the horrors of the genocide in Rwanda,
butchery in Sierra Leone and neighboring Liberia,
and the carnage regarding the Democratic
Republic of Angola—to name just a few of the
bloodbaths in Africa (Andersson 2004a, b;
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 2004; Center
for Victims of Torture 2006; Crane 2008; General
Accounting Office 2008; Goldblatt and Meintjes
1998; Human Rights Watch 2010; Kanogo 1987;
Krog 2001; Lyons 2004; Muleya 2004; White
2007). A valid question to ask was how would the
common citizens living with this legacy view tor-
ture. Our findings indicated that the vast majority
of African participants rejected torture at least in
part and in some cases completely. For the most
part, even respondents who suggested situations
in which torture might be acceptable also empha-
sized the need for restrictions on its use. For
example, some respondents said, torture might be
necessary for garnering extra information if there
were no other means for obtaining that informa-
tion. Or, others said, if the tortured subjects were
proven to be guilty of crimes hypothetically, it
would be acceptable to utilize torture to get as
much information as possible. For these individu-
als, torture was mainly a last resort scenario for
the prevention of something much larger or more
M. Dalley et al.
horrific. Such arguments are, of course, consistent
with the “ticking bomb” scenario and utilitarian
reasoning that the ends justify the means—argu-
ments that are not acceptable within international
law. To a lesser extent, there were some partici-
pants who indicated that torture was an accept-
able action when done to persons deserving it for
some reason. Although the differences were mod-
est, there was some evidence indicating that
African women in the sample were more opposed
to torture and more ready to actively resist torture
than the men given the history of women being
subjected to degrading tortuous conditions
(Kanogo 1987; Lyons 2004; White 2007), such a
finding is not surprising.
Although some participants indicated some
tolerance for torture under specific hypothetical
situations, the greater majority was completely
opposed to it. Among the participants who voiced
outright disapproval for torture, most offered no
explanation or rationale for their statement. These
participants may have believed that it was unnec-
essary to expound on the principle that torture is
wrong under every imaginable circumstance or
might have lacked the time to respond in more
depth. For those who explained why they opposed
the use of torture for prisoners of war, the most
given reason was associated with humanization.
These participants indicated that torture was
wrong simply because it is inhumane to do some-
thing so terrible as torture another person—even
if it were to serve a “greater good.” “Human
rights” arguments, which were coded into the
overarching humanization category, were a very
popular response to the question.
Several participants responded with concern
that simply because one is a prisoner, it does not
mean that he or she is not innocent. Therefore,
many argued that torture should never be con-
ducted because there is always a possibility that
innocent people have been incarcerated. Others
suggested that incarcerating was a way for
reforming those who have done wrong. These
participants indicated that the practice of torture
would not benefit these prisoners or efforts to
reform them. Based on such responses, it is clear
that the vast majority of the African participants
were against torture mainly for reasons that it
38 Africa Torture
violates basic human rights or that it has no
positive effect.
When asked what they would do if they were
presented with the situation of directly observing
the military conducting torture of a prisoner, over
one-third of participants stated that they would
take positive action to stop the torture. These
positive actions could be anything from simply
“stopping the torture” to participating in protests
to raise awareness. Also notably included within
the realm of positive action was to help to try and
find alternative methods for obtaining informa-
tion. Compared to over one-third of the sample
who indicated they would be active resisters,
there were only 6% of participants who gave
compliant answers. As was true of answers to the
right-to-torture item, a few respondents indicated
that some torture was acceptable under the “right”
circumstances. A larger group of participants
(almost half) essentially stated that they would do
nothing if they were to witness the application of
torture. This is possibly because they simply do
not care about the torture of prisoners, or that
they feel helpless and unable to do anything
against something as powerful as the military.
When looking at the countries that endorsed
personal involvement, especially with concern to
positive action, participants from Ghana and
Botswana were significantly more likely to
endorse these behaviors. Combined with partici-
pants from Algeria, those from Botswana and
Ghana also were significantly more likely to be
proponents of agentic alternative solutions. On
the other end of this spectrum were the partici-
pants from Egypt who expressed more apathy to
the hypothetical situation of encountering torture;
it would be interesting to find out how ordinary
Egyptians today, in the wake of their overthrow of
the government, feel about government-sponsored
aggression. There were also a few differences by
religion, with more Christian than Muslim advo-
cating both personal involvement and the positive
action against torture; however, as indicated
before, it is important not to overgeneralize any
findings from our convenience samples.
Although the world continues to hear argu-
ments in favor of “enhanced interrogation,” Foley
(2003), from the Human Rights Centre, argued in
613
Combating Torture: A Manual for Judges and
Prosecutors, that there are no circumstances
(including war or apparent threats to national
security) that can justify the suspension or restric-
tion of the absolute right to freedom from torture.
Furthermore, nations are prohibited from keeping
detainees “incommunicado” for extensive peri-
ods of time. Attempting to diffuse responsibility
for the conduct of torture (e.g., “I was under
orders”) is also not acceptable as a justification
for torture (Foley 2003). International law pro-
hibits torture and most people around the world
agree that it is immoral and unacceptable to tor-
ture other human beings. What kinds of steps are
necessary to achieve universal acceptance for this
principle? In what ways have the imperialist
nations been the ones to both encode anti-torture
principles in international law and also spread the
arguments that it is sometimes necessary and for
a good cause?
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 Perspectives on Torture in Latin
America 39
Amanda Clinton, José Anazagasty, Javier Fortín,
Luciana Karine de Souza, Sherri McCarthy,
Tristyn Campbell, Alex Stankiewicz,
Ricardo Angelino, Rodrigo Barahona, Eddy Carillo,
Eros DeSouza, and Michael Stevens

Merriam-Webster defines torture as “anguish of
body or mind; something that causes agony or
pain” or “the infliction of intense pain (as from
burning, crushing, or wounding) to punish, coerce,
or afford sadistic pleasure” (Torture 2011). For our
purposes, we will focus on state-sponsored torture.
Members of the military and police have almost
universally been permitted, or even encouraged, to
engage in acts that have resulted in significant
physical or psychological pain, sometimes even
resulting in death, in order to obtain information or
to punish an act considered contradictory to the
stated policies of the government. These govern-
ment agencies would engage in torturous acts
ranging from sleep deprivation to rape to mutila-
tion and other forms of physical abuse.
Latin America consists of nearly all the coun-
tries in the Western Hemisphere below the United
States. More specifically, it consists of Mexico, the
countries of the Caribbean (e.g., Puerto Rico, the
Dominican Republic, and Cuba), Central America,
and most of South America with the exception of
Guyana, Suriname, and French Guinea. In Latin
America, state-sponsored torture is best character-
ized by acute periods of human rights violations. It
was found that during the twentieth century, an
alarmingly high level of Latin American govern-
ment officials condoned or partook in the cruel
treatment of prisoners and citizens in their respec-
tive countries. This was true for nearly all of Latin
America, from the highly ethnically diverse coun-
tries, such as Brazil, to the less ethnically diverse
countries, such as Argentina.
In historical and political terms, the issue of
state-sponsored torture used by the military or
the police is a highly complex subject. The pres-
ence of torture in Latin America has been well
documented, and despite efforts to quell its exis-
tence, torture continues to be a prevalent part of
the Latin American legal system whose volume
fluctuates depending on the current events within
any particular Latin American country. However,
the environmental, social, and individual factors
that motivate and perpetuate torture in the region
are a more critical and complex topic.
The aim of this chapter is to elucidate the
current public perceptions and opinions regard-
ing the state-sponsored use of torture in a series
of Latin American countries including
Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Colombia, Peru,
Argentina, and Brazil. We will also address
issues in Puerto Rico. To adequately address
this topic, several factors will be taken into con-
sideration. First, a brief history of the use and
prevalence of torture in a few selected Latin
American regions will be presented to provide a
contextual backdrop. Next, a consideration of
the current psychosocial context will be pro-
vided wherein the individual and group views
on torture will be examined. Subsequently, an
analysis of the data that was collected from the
aforementioned countries on items pertaining
to torture from the Personal and Institutional
Right to Aggression and Peace Scale
(PAIRTAPS) is given. Finally, the three prior
topics—history, psychosocial context, and

K. Malley-Morrison et al. (eds.), International Handbook of War, Torture, and Terrorism, 617
Peace Psychology Book Series, DOI 10.1007/978-1-4614-1638-8_39,
© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2013
618
findings from respective countries—will be
examined and then integrated to form a conclu-
sion on the current state of torture in Latin
America.
State-Sponsored Torture:
Latin American Examples
At the end of the fifteenth century, the land now
known as Latin America was colonized by
Spanish settlers. During the following three cen-
turies, as the Spanish empire commanded much
of the New World, the indigenous peoples across
Mexico, the Caribbean, Central, and South
America suffered at the hands of their new lead-
ers, enduring harsh treatment in order to feed
Spanish greed for riches (Beverly 2007).
Ranging from cruel and inhumane treatment
of the Contras in Nicaragua to the “routine and
institutionalized” torture documented during
Fujimori’s rule of Perú (Human Rights Watch
2007), virtually every country in the region has
experienced some form of state-sponsored tor-
ture in the past 100 years. In an effort to provide
further insight into the history of state-sponsored
torture in this region, a few well-documented
cases that are representative of the larger region
will be discussed in the following paragraphs.
South American examples include, but are not
limited to, state-sponsored torture in Chile and
Argentina. In Chile, US-supported dictator
Augusto Pinochet oversaw at least 3,000 killings
or “disappearances” during his reign from the
mid-1970s until 1990 (Reel and Smith 2006 ).
During Argentina’s “Dirty War,” an estimated
9,000 presumably innocent individuals endured
torture at the hands of military personnel only to
disappear and die (Gunson 2009).
In the Dominican Republic, US-trained Rafael
Trujillo, known as “El Jefe,” (the Boss) took
charge of the island’s military ranks in 1924 when
US troops departed after a nearly decade-long
occupation. In 1930, Trujillo held an election in
which he earned more votes than the number of
registered voters. Although the elections were
declared fraudulent, “El Jefe” assumed dictatorial
A. Clinton et al.
powers anyway and initiated 30 years of a brutal
regime that included the merciless massacre of
tens of thousands of Haitians and countless
Dominicans until his CIA-backed assassination in
1961 (United States Department of Justice 1975).
In Central America, specifically in Guatemala,
like most countries in Latin America, the use of
torture was linked to human rights violations
committed by the state at the height of the Cold
War during the 1970s and 1980s. Ruthless coun-
terinsurgency campaigns were carried out from
1979 to 1983 during the 35-year conflict that
ended in 1996 with the signing of the Peace
Accords. Strategies like tierra arrasada (scorched
earth), fusiles y frijoles (guns and beans), and
comités de auto-defensa (civil defense patrols)
are allegedly responsible for the torture, massa-
cre, and killing of more than 200,000 people
(CEH 2004) in one of the bloodiest and cruelest
armed conflicts in the Western Hemisphere.
The end of the armed conflict displaced ide-
ology as the source of torture and human rights
violations. Those practices are nowadays associ-
ated to social cleansing groups, organized crime,
clandestine groups, and youth gangs. The exis-
tence of these groups—sometimes embedded
within state institutions—prompted the signing
of an agreement between Guatemala and the
United Nations in December 2006 for the estab-
lishment of the International Commission
against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG). This
entity is an independent body that supports the
Public Prosecutor’s Office, the National Civilian
Police, and other state institutions in the investi-
gation of sensitive cases associated to the opera-
tions of illegal security groups and clandestine
security organizations in order to dismantle
them. Recently, CICIG has assisted with the
investigations of extrajudicial torture and kill-
ings inside the prison system (allegedly planned
by former top rank officials like the Minister of
Interior and the Director of the National Civilian
Police) and the murder of three congressmen
from El Salvador in Guatemala, among other
cases (CEH 2004).
In the past decade, Amnesty International has
repeatedly highlighted Colombia’s human rights
39 Latin America Torture
violations. (Amnesty International 2003) One
such report estimated that nearly 55% of per-
sons kidnapped by paramilitary, leftist-guerrilla,
or governmental security forces are subject to
torture, sometimes even resulting in death. One
recent example is the death of communist-party
member and trade unionist Guillermo Rivera.
Mr. Rivera had been detained while waiting
with his daughter at her school bus stop and
according to video and forensic evidence was
later tortured by the Colombian police force
(Vieira 2008).
Recently, a number of shocking reports
describing the torture used by public officials to
garner information from local citizens involved
in the Mexican drug trade have also surfaced. In
August of 2010, the body of the 38-year-old
mayor of Monterrey was found dumped on the
side of the road with his hands bound and his
eyes blindfolded. Amnesty International found
that just 1 year earlier in Las Ollas, the Mexican
military had stuck needles under the fingernails
of a disabled farmer, fired weapons at the village
priest, and jabbed a knife into the back of a
13-year-old boy in an effort to obtain information
(Fainaru and Booth 2009). The most pressing
issue now, according to public interest groups,
such as Judicial Watch (www.judicialwatch.org),
is the continued employment of Mexican officials
who participated in, or at least condoned, the use
of torture. The United States Department of
Homeland Security reports have documented an
apparent collaboration between Mexican police
and the military in a fight against the drug trade in
which they used these torturous tactics (2003).
While not all members of the police or govern-
ment personally tortured anyone, they are all
guilty for allowing such policies to exist (Fainaru
and Booth 2009).
The stain of torture exists even in those Latin
American countries most commonly recognized
for their low levels of violence and their contin-
ued pursuit of a civil society. In Uruguay during
the mid-1970s, citizens from all walks of life
were detained and later tortured by Uruguayan
police (Morris 1976). Puerto Rico and Costa
Rica have both been informed that they need to
619
control the use of “torture and inhumane and
degrading treatment” of members of the lesbian,
gay, bisexual, and transgender communities
(International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights
Commission 2008, p. 7; PR Ref).
The Issue of Torture
The history of torture seems as long as the history
of man. Its main purpose throughout time has
been to acquire information or punish one for
doing wrong (Mannix 2003; Pyle 2009). Ancient
Persia, one of the world’s oldest societies, was
known for its widespread use of torture.
As reported by Lincoln (2009), King Artaxerxes
II flaunted having killed his younger brother and
competing provincial governor, Cyrus, in battle.
Despite the legend, it turned out that the King
was actually absent from the battle and one of his
soldiers, Mithridates, killed Cyrus. At the order
of the King and his “spin masters,” the soldier
was instructed to remain silent while Artaxerxes
bragged incessantly about killing Cyrus.
Ultimately, Mithridates grew tired of the king’s
boasting and claimed credit for Cyrus’ death.
Artaxerxes could not have this, so he sentenced
Mithridates to death. According to legend,
Mithridates was placed in a wooden box and
slowly consumed by vermin and maggots, whose
consumption of the body represented the inner
moral decay the royal court declared he had
already shown.
How Torture Happens
Torture may be used for a variety of reasons.
As observed in the case of Artaxerxes and
Mithridates, it may be used to punish. It could
also be used to obtain desired information. As
elegantly stated by Lincoln, “In place of the tale
told by apologists of torture, which construes
pain as a useful, if regrettable, instrument of
truth….most critics advance quite a different line
620
of analysis, according to which torturers are less
interested in hearing truth told by others than in
writing their own preferred truths on the bodies
of captives and victims” (Lincoln 2009, p. 163).
Lincoln’s (2009) assertion that those who tor-
ture do so in order to prove their own “truth”
rather than seek a presumed “truth regarding a
situation” offers one interpretation of why gov-
ernments may explicitly or implicitly sanction
the cruel treatment of others. According to Phillip
Zimbardo (2007), several other factors contribute
to the creation of situations in which human
beings may be inclined toward torture and other
cruel acts. One such factor known as “administra-
tive evil” (Adams and Balfour 2004) appears to
be critical. Administrative evil is most important
in countries with strong, centralized govern-
ments. A combination of these factors may con-
tribute to an environment in which individuals,
who may not otherwise engage in cruel behavior
toward others, may be inclined to act in a heinous
and harmful manner.
Zimbardo’s thesis presents six points related to
“evil acts” such as torture. First, he explains how
even good people can become violent and abusive
when the limits and expectations of their power are
not held in check. Second, Zimbardo discusses the
process of “deindividualization.” This process
allows for individuals to create anonymity by hid-
ing behind uniforms, badges, ranks, titles, or even
masks and shields. In doing so, people no longer
feel responsible for their actions, so, while they
may actually object to torture, their created
anonymity may permit them to partake in torturous
acts. Similarly, “dehumanization,” or devaluing the
life of the enemy to categorize them in a demean-
ing manner, further facilitates abuse of power.
In fact, the total lack of perception of prisoners as
humans, or nothing more than an object that is tor-
tured as part of one’s job, has been reported in other
accounts as well (Langguth 1978).
The third of the six points highlighted by
Zimbardo involves placing individuals in a demor-
alizing context, which may exacerbate psycho-
logical stress or conditions. This is, in itself, a form
of torture. As the prisoner’s behavior becomes
more unstable as a result of these conditions,
A. Clinton et al.
officials use this behavioral instability as a reason
for further use of such harsh treatments.
The fourth point is the quality (or lack thereof)
of internal policing within government agencies.
Zimbardo documented tacit approval of abuse
and torture during his own Stanford Prison
Experiment in the 1960s. When officers in charge
of detainees receive instructions that are rela-
tively lax in terms of standard operating proce-
dure and there is no obvious strict chain of
command, guards tend to enumerate their own
rules. In the case of the prisons at Abu Ghraib, for
example, the most extreme abuses occurred dur-
ing the night shift when only superficial supervi-
sion was in place.
The fifth in the list of six factors is the notion
of social loafing, whereby observers refuse to
take action against torture and abuse because
they assume someone else will intervene. As
such, soldiers and police may torture prisoners,
while fear paralyzes those who are not involved
and they remain silent. Finally, Zimbardo dis-
cusses the development of a series of vicious
cycles as a result of the aforementioned factors.
That is, mutual fear and resentment grow and
continue to feed into one another. As guards mis-
treat prisoners, prisoners become rebellious.
When prisoners rebel, guards become more vio-
lent, and so on.
The six factors Zimbardo discussed can all be
observed in Latin America. In general, “adminis-
trative evil” is generally widespread and multi-
layered. In many cases, such as the Dominican
Republic, Colombia, or Brazil, there is a docu-
mented relationship between the United States
military and the local government. Latin America
soldiers are taught oppressive and violent tech-
niques at United States Military training facilities
such as the School of the Americas which may
provide implicit approval for these types of tac-
tics from the outset. So, from the “highest”—at
least in terms of political power—levels, no
checks or balances are presented.
In many Latin American countries, leaders
rarely had reason to discourage abuse of detain-
ees as long as they retained their positions of
political control. As noted in Langguth’s (1978)
39 Latin America Torture
historical account of torture in Brazil’s prisons,
dehumanization was further inherent in the prac-
tice of torture. In fact, he reported that torturers
stated that their victims were “cool” toward them
and that, from the torturer’s point of view, “…
nothing [they] did to [the victims] was ever per-
sonal” (Langguth 1978, p. 763).
The conditions in Latin American prisons are
dismal. They are often dirty, dark, and over-
crowded. Prisoners are housed in patios, dusty
(or muddy, depending on the season) and exposed
to the brutally hot sun. These circumstances are
by their very nature demoralizing, another condi-
tion mentioned by Zimbardo. Work in criminal
justice or military professions is renowned for
relatively limited pay and low status across Latin
America (Call 2000; Latin Herald Tribune 2011).
As with many fields that offer poor compensa-
tion, standards can be compromised from the
highest general to the foot soldier. Furthermore,
state funds for training and establishing sufficient
numbers of police and military personnel can be
reduced (REF), and, as such, understaffing may
plague even the best-intentioned forces. In effect,
this situation results in the kind of environment
discussed by Zimbardo, wherein lax oversight
by superiors serves as a contributing factor to
certain abuses of power.
Across Latin America, local residents fre-
quently refrain from speaking out. This may be in
part because they are afraid of becoming victims
themselves, as was observed in the case of the
Colombian unionist Guillermo Rivera, who was
tortured and killed for his opposing views.
Further, the Brazilian rebels who kidnapped US
Ambassador Elbrick in 1969 explained that
citizens recognize that their judicial system does
not work: “The army,” they said, “supported by
your country, has taken away our rights. We have
no freedom of speech or expression. We have no
free press or trade unions to represent the aspira-
tions of our people. We have no elections, no
forums. If we want to change things, violence is
the only way” (Langguth, p. 763).
And so, as Zimbardo indicates, violence
breeds violence and the cycle continues….
621
Arguments Against the Use of Torture
In 1985, the United Nations (UN) adopted its
Convention Against Torture in which they
declared the “inherent dignity of the human per-
son” (UN 1985, p.1) and ordained “cruel, inhu-
man or degrading treatment or punishment” (UN
1985, p.1) a criminal offense. As a result, the
world’s governments were called to prevent all
acts of torture at any level. Across the globe,
international agencies attempt to educate the
public about issues related to human rights and
the humane treatment of all persons, including
prisoners. In 2005, the American Psychological
Association and Physicians for Human Rights
protested the use of torture by the United States
military. This was done as “an expression of the
professional and ethical commitment to prevent
torture wherever it is inflicted” (Physicians for
Human Rights 2005). On the other hand, unfortu-
nately, there is considerable evidence that high
ranking members of the American Psychological
Association have been complicit in the conduct
of torture (Allen et al. 2010).
If not on humanitarian principles, then torture
may be opposed on academic principles. In his
examination of the historical success record of
torture—including the Nazis, the French in
Algeria, and the Americans in Vietnam—Rejali
(2007) posits that torture does not produce any
information of value. Instead, he argues that tor-
ture results in false confessions and misleading
evidence which, if anything, overwhelms investi-
gators. Legitimate legal tactics for obtaining the
truth, such as wiretapping, appear to be more
effective (CNN International Law Center 2003),
and the long-term consequences of torture are
severely damaging (Bufacchi and Arrigo 2006).
History certainly seems to support the aca-
demic argument against the use of torture in Latin
America in that threatening and harming detain-
ees seems to have provided little key information
upon which any conflict hinged. In fact, one of
the most successful “rehabilitation” programs in
the region—that of reintegrating Colombian
622
rebels into civil society—has been based on
forgiveness and job training in exchange for arms
and uniforms (Forero 2001).
Arguments in Support of Torture
Arguments in favor of the use of torture or, as it
were, the inevitability of torture tend to be of two
types. First, and broader in scope, is the “ticking
bomb” theory. The second argument in favor of
the use of torture—the idea that humans are natu-
rally violent—is based on individual psychology.
The “ticking bomb” theory suggests that a gov-
ernment should have the right to torture prisoners
of war when evidence suggests the presence of a
severe and imminent security threat. Alan
Dershowitz, a Harvard professor of law, argues in
favor of a “torture warrant” that, albeit under very
controlled circumstances, would permit the use of
torture in the interest of the greater good (CNN
International Law Center 2003). Little evidence
exists to support the legitimacy of this argument
even in the most complex conflict zones, such as
Israel and Palestine, much less in Latin America.
Those who have criticized Zimbardo’s thesis
regarding the contextual factors that contribute to
one’s likelihood to engage in or condone torture
have argued that he has overlooked the more
important factor—individual tendencies. That is,
those who become prison guards typically
selected their profession, and, as such, they pre-
sumably were inclined toward a need for power
and authority (Lurigio 2009). Naturally, some
torturers are sadists, although these may be con-
sidered “the freaks, the exceptions, acting out
some quirk of psyche on the backs of strangers”
(Langguth 1978). Instead, it has been agreed
(e.g., Haney et al. 1973; Haritos-Fatouros 2003;
Langguth 1978), after an exhaustive exploration
of torture in Latin America, that Zimbardo may
be right in that the majority of the men and
women who torture others do not choose their
actions. Instead, they have their decisions made
for them by others.
A. Clinton et al.
Methods
Sample
The Latin America sample consisted of respon-
dents from Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Nicaragua, Peru, and Puerto Rico. There
were a total of 778 respondents in this sample,
including 457 females, 260 males, and 71 respon-
dents who elected not to identify their gender.
Ages of respondents ranged from 18 to 79 years,
with an average age of 27 years. A majority of the
sample reported their religion as Christian, with a
decreasing percentage of other religions repre-
sented. Eighty-six percent of the sample had
never been in the military. Roughly 40% of the
sample had a relative with military service, while
35% had no relationship to the military. Almost
60% of the sample had never taken part in a pro-
test for peace and against war. A majority of the
sample self-identified as middle class and all
other classes were represented at a decreasing
percentage.
Measures
To assess Latin American perspectives on torture,
responses to two items on the PAIRTAPS were
analyzed: (1) “The government has the right to
order the torture of prisoners during times of
war” and (2) “Military officials are torturing
somebody suspected of having information about
terrorists. What would you want to do?”
For the initial item measuring opinions regard-
ing the government’s right to torture, participants
were asked first to indicate on a rating scale from
1 (completely disagree) to 7 (completely agree)
the extent to which they agreed with a state’s
right to torture. Next, they were asked to explain
their level of agreement or disagreement in their
own words.
For a thorough explanation of the coding
categories, refer to the methods of analysis
chapter in this book.
39 Latin America Torture 623

Table 39.1 Sample responses of torture- tolerant mechanisms

Code Percent Country Gender Age Response
Advantageous 4 (27) Argentina F 36 “It all depends on if the person is confirmed a threat.
comparison The participation to hurting prisoners is an act against
humanity, however it may be important and help the
bigger cause”
Brazil F 21 “Unless it is an issue of national security to extract
some vital information”
Colombia M 33 “When they are sad they are informed they can save
lives”
Nicaragua F 19 “Yes, if torture is to obtain information that can harm
the country, but only if it is done for beating the enemy”
Peru M 24 “If the situation requires it”
Puerto Rico F 48 “Only if the information could save the life of a country”
Attribution 3 (21) Argentina F 36 “It all depends on if the person is confirmed a threat.
of blame The participation to hurting prisoners is an act against
humanity, however it may be important and help the
bigger cause”
Brazil M 21 “Even though the US is against it, I admit that there
might be NECESSARY measures in a war situation”
Colombia F 42 “If it is a just cause, yes. If not, no”
Nicaragua F 20 “If they are traitors who sell-out their country, yes, it can
be used”
Peru M 24 “It depends on the government policies and on the acts
of the prisoner”
Puerto Rico F 19 “They should not pay the bad with the bad [use bad as a
method for justice against those who have done bad]”
Note: The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total
response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in that category out of all pro-torture
responses
F female, M male

Arguments Showing Tolerance summed up this category when she responded,

of Torture
In regard to the item about a government’s right
to torture prisoners of war, 14% of the responses
demonstrated views supportive of such a right.
Only themes found at a frequency greater than or
equal to 3% of all responses are discussed.
The most frequently coded pro-torture argu-
ment was advantageous comparison, comprising
4% of all responses to the first item (and 20% of
the torture-tolerant responses). Typical responses
in this category justified torture using a cost-
benefit analysis with the benefit serving morally
worthy purposes, such as ending a war by gaining
information. A 42-year-old Brazilian woman
“If hurting one means saving two or more, it
depends on the situation but it might be neces-
sary.” Attribution of blame was the second most
frequently coded torture-tolerant argument, total-
ing 3% of all responses concerning a govern-
ment’s right to torture. Responses in this category
generally blamed the prisoner for bringing tor-
ture upon himself or blamed the nature of war for
why torture is a right. A 21-year-old Peruvian
man stated, “The rules are changed during war,
[if torture] is just for fun, I do not agree.” This
response justifies torture by saying that war calls
for different tactics that should not be considered
acceptable during a time of peace. Table 39.1
provides additional examples of torture-tolerant
624
responses from participants from several Latin
American countries, along with basic demo-
graphic information.
Arguments Showing Intolerance
of Torture
Eighty-four percent of the total set of responses to
the government’s right to torture item provided an
argument against governments having such a right.
Only the response categories with at least 6% of
the total set of responses are discussed here.
The most frequently employed type of torture-
intolerant response (29% of all responses) was
characterized by a general disagreement with the
act of torture. For example, a 24-year-old Puerto
Rican man asserted, “No one should be tortured,”
and a 33-year-old Costa Rican man said, “No,
I do not agree with torture in any situation.”
The second most recurrent type of torture-
intolerance argument fell into the category of
humanization (14% of all responses, 17% of anti-
torture responses), which is characterized by rec-
ognition of the prisoner’s humanity and the view
that humanity entitles one to respect and to human
rights. A 29-year-old Colombian man affirmed,
“They are people and it’s important to respect
them,” and a 45-year-old Peruvian man asserted,
“No, we are all humans.” Further, a 19-year-old
Brazilian woman stated, “Every citizen has the
right of peace. Torture is inhumane.”
Human rights, a subcategory of humanization,
was used to code responses that specifically men-
tioned inherent rights held by all people. Eight
percent of the entire responses showed reasoning
coded for this category. Examples included the
response of a 25-year-old Peruvian woman who
stated, “People have rights and they should be
respected, even if they are prisoners in time of
war.” Similarly, a 26-year-old Nicaraguan woman
affirmed, “No government should torture their
prisoners in a time of war; this is a violation of
human rights.”
Another type of torture-intolerant response
(7% of all responses) was exonerating prisoners.
These responses involved removing blame from
A. Clinton et al.
the prisoner. For example, a 24-year-old
Argentinean man declared that “War is between
countries, not between prisoners.” This specific
response recognizes prisoners as pawns within
the war; thus, it is unwarranted to torture these
individuals. This same notion was reflected in a
response by a 20-year-old woman from Peru who
stated: “There should be no torture, especially
because the majority of those who go to war are
required to do so.” The specific idea of exonera-
tion during war was clearly expressed by a
19-year-old Nicaraguan woman who said, “No,
because it is not their fault.”
The category better alternatives/outdated (6%
of all responses) was used to code responses that
indicated that there were preferable options to the
use of torture. A 42-year-old woman from
Nicaragua responded, “I think persuasion is the
best means of obtaining information.” Similarly,
a 21-year-old woman from Peru stated “No, there
are other ways of gathering information with
clarity and dignity.”
Table 39.2 provides additional examples of
torture-intolerant responses from participants
from Latin America along with basic demo-
graphic information.
The Torture Scenario: Predictions
of Personal Involvement
For the prompt regarding a hypothetical torture
situation, 92% of responses were coded for one
or more of the personal involvement themes.
Only arguments found at a frequency greater than
10% are discussed. The three themes that were
coded for most frequently were political
activism/institutional, agentive alternative solu-
tions, and apathy.
The most common response, making up over
25% of all responses to the hypothetical torture
scenario, was political activism. Most of these
responses suggested appealing to the government
or another institution to end the torture of a pris-
oner of war. For example, a response by a 30-year-
old Brazilian woman said, “mobilize an action
39 Latin America Torture 625

Table 39.2 Sample responses of torture-intolerant mechanisms

Category Percent Country Gender Age Response
Humanization 14 (17) Argentina F 54 “The prisoners should deserve the same
treatment that all subjects do”
Brazil M 25 “Nothing that goes against human life is
legitimate, except in self defense”
Nicaragua F 21 “No, because prisoners are human beings and they
have the same rights as their captors in spite of
race or religious differences”
Puerto Rico M 19 “It is an inhumane act”
Human rights 8 (10) Argentina M 43 “Never can they administer it. It violates human
rights”
Colombia F 30 “No, because the greatest right of human beings
is the right to life”
Puerto Rico F 22 “They do not have the right to mistreat them nor
violate rights”
Exonerating the 7 (8) Brazil F 21 “Every human being must be treated indepen-
prisoner dently of which country he/she belongs to”
Colombia F 44 “If they have fallen, it is because they were also
fighting for an ideal”
Better alternatives/ 6 (7) Brazil M 24 “There are better ways to deal with a prisoner,
outdated such as restorative justice and rehabilitation”
Colombia M 26 “No, every human being has a right to not be
tortured, for that reason jails exist to pay for their
bad actions”
Puerto Rico F 42 “No, because there are other ways”
Note: The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total
response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in that category out of all anti-
torture responses
F female, M male

against torture to prevent it from happening Demographic Differences

again.” Agentive alternative solutions, account-
ing for 19% of total responses, was also a fairly
common theme. Responses in this category
offered ideas for interacting with the prisoner that
did not include torture or other negative behav-
iors. The response of a 55-year-old Colombian
man is a good example of this category: “Think
about new methods that respect the rights of the
prisoners.”
In contrast to replies indicating some sort of
intended action, there were also responses
expressing apathy. Responses in this category
indicated that the respondent would do nothing to
help the prisoner. All responses in this category
were the same: “Nothing.” Refer to Table 39.3 to
see more personal involvement responses and
basic demographic information.
in the Use of Torture Themes
As explained in the introductory chapter,
chi-square tests, t-tests, and analysis of variance
(ANOVA) were run in order to determine the
effect that certain demographic variables have on
the use of pro-torture, anti-torture, and personal
involvement arguments in response to two
prompts: “Does the government have the right to
torture prisoners of war?” and “Military officials
are torturing somebody suspected of having
information about terrorists. What would you
want to do?” The demographic variables studied
were: (1) gender, (2) military service, (3) having
a relative in the military, (4) participation in a
protest against war and in favor of peace, (5) current
religion, (6) country, and (7) socioeconomic status.
626 A. Clinton et al.

Table 39.3 Sample responses of personal involvement mechanisms

Category Percent Country Gender Age Response
Political activism/ 26 (44) Argentina F 27 “Resort to human rights organizations. I would
institutional ask for their name just before”
Brazil F 25 “Protest against”
Colombia M 20 “Try to make the fact known”
Costa Rica F 48 “Protest for the human rights respect”
Nicaragua M 30 “Free the person and prosecute the military”
Peru F 29 “I would ask the government to renounce it”
Puerto Rico F 40 “Put pressure on the appropriate authorities”
Agentive alternative 19 (31) Argentina F 54 “Look for other methods to obtain
solutions information”
Brazil M 45 “Violence is not the best way to extract
information, the best way is dialogue”
Colombia M 26 “Fix things with a discussion”
Costa Rica F 24 “To defend them and resolve the situation in a
better way”
Nicaragua F 18 “Find a mediator to mediate the dialogue long
term”
Peru M 18 “I would look for methods to protect human
rights”
Puerto Rico M 52 “To mediate among both parts so that they can
reason”
Note: The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total
response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in that category out of all the posi-
tive action responses
F female, M male

In order to inform future research, marginally
significant results have been reported. All group
differences identified as statistically significant
had p values less than 0.05; marginal results had
p values between 0.10 and 0.05.
Demographic Differences
in Responses to a Government’s
Right to Torture
Chi-square analysis revealed that men were mar-
ginally more likely than women to provide pseudo-
moral justifications when supporting the gover-
nment’s right to torture prisoners. Significantly
more respondents without military experience used
general torture intolerance than respondents with
military experience when arguing that the govern-
ment does not have the right to torture prisoners of
war. T-tests supported this finding and also revealed
that men scored significantly higher than women
on the use of attribution of blame and attribution of
blame sum score.
Chi-square testing also indicated that respon-
dents who had been in a protest were marginally
more likely to use descriptive language and
respond that torture is ineffective than non-
protestors. T-tests showed that respondents who
had never protested scored marginally higher on
the use of better alternatives/outdated. Table 39.4
provides the percentages of responses given by
demographic groups and chi-square results for a
government’s right to torture prisoners of war.
Demographic Differences
in Responses to a Hypothetical
Torture Situation
Chi square analyses revealed no significant or
marginally significant group differences related
to gender or military service in the use of any of
39 Latin America Torture 627

Table 39.4 Responses to a government’s right to torture Prisoners of war: Percentages of responses in coding catego-
ries by demographic groups and chi-square values
Group 1a Group 2a
Categories Male Female c2
Pseudo-moral justification 4 1 3.32^b
Military Non-military
General torture intolerance 18 40 4.04*
Protest No protest
Descriptive language 6 3 3.28^b
Ineffective/not useful 8 4 2.75^
*p £ 0.05; ^=0.05 < p < 0.10
a
The numbers in these columns are the percent of the group that gave responses falling into each of the specified
categories
b
Fisher’s exact test

Table 39.5 Responses to a hypothetical torture situation: percentages of responses in coding categories by demo-
graphic variables and chi-square associations
Group 1a Group 2a
Categories Relative military No relative military c2
Passive regarding torture 0.7 4 6.44**b
Protest No protest
Personal involvement 11 6 3.89*
Moral awareness 8 4 2.91^
*p £ 0.05; **p £ 0.01; ^=0.051 < p < 0.10
a
The numbers in these columns are the percent of the group that gave responses falling into each of the specified
categories
b
Fisher’s exact test

the personal involvement categories. Respondents

without a relative in the military were significantly
more likely to be passive regarding torture than
those with a relative in the military. T-tests sup-
ported this finding.
For protest participation, chi-square analysis
found that significantly more protestors than non-
protestors projected personal involvement in their
responses to the hypothetical torture scenario.
This finding was also supported by t-tests. The
protestors were also marginally more likely than
non-protestors to respond with moral awareness.
Finally, t-tests showed that non-protestors scored
marginally higher than protestors on compliance
with torture. Refer to Table 39.5 for the percent-
ages of responses given by demographic groups
and chi-square results for the hypothetical torture
situation.
Summary and Conclusions
State-sponsored acts of torture have been
approved by leaders and carried out by military
or police organizations for centuries. Latin
America is no exception to this rule. During
recent decades, nearly all of the countries form-
ing the region have suffered governments that
condoned and facilitated torture of their citizens.
This chapter was designed to explore the per-
ceptions and reasoning of Latin Americans
regarding the use of torture. Nearly 800 individuals
ranging in age from 18 to 79 years old and hailing
from countries including Nicaragua, Costa Rica,
Colombia, Peru, Argentina, and Brazil responded
to two questions from the PAIRTAPS survey.
They were asked: 1) to indicate their level of
628
agreement regarding the government’s right to
torture prisoners of war and 2) to share their
response to a hypothetical torture situation.
The minority of morally disengaged Latin
Americans who reported a tolerance for torture
on the first prompt (“The government has the
right to order the torture of prisoners during times
of war”) tended to do so by evaluating the situa-
tion in terms of sacrifices that may need to be
made for the greater good. They also place the
use of torture in context and hold the prisoner
who is tortured responsible for his participation
in the same. However, the vast majority of Latin
American respondents reported an unwillingness
to accept torture, typically at a categorical level
such as, “Torture cannot be tolerated.” Still, many
Latin American respondents rejected torture
based on empathy for their fellow humans.
A smaller number considered the possibility
that prisoners of war and those torturing them
may be better classified as “prisoners of their
country” and should not be judged for their lack
of options. In many Latin American countries,
such as Colombia and Guatemala, for example,
military service is mandated. Other Latin
Americans indicated torture is unacceptable
because it violates human rights and interna-
tional legal agreements. Some suggested that
the aim of torture—garnering information—
may be reached in a more effective manner.
In regard to the more personal scenario regard-
ing torture (“Military officials are torturing some-
body suspected of having information about
terrorists. What would you want to do?”), Latin
Americans expressed a tendency toward becom-
ing involved, either directly or through another
organization. Responses ranged from generally
positive action to generating specific alternatives,
such as less violent means of gathering informa-
tion, to political activity like becoming involved
in organized protests. However, a notable—albeit
lesser—percentage of respondents reported they
would avoid any involvement.
In terms of potential demographic differences
regarding the government’s right to torture, there
were few reliable differences. Men did seem
somewhat more likely to provide rationalizations
for torture than women, and significantly more
A. Clinton et al.
respondents without military experience than
their military counterparts gave responses show-
ing general torture intolerance. In regard to the
torture scenario, the only significant group differ-
ence was that respondents without a relative in
the military were more passive in respect to tor-
ture than their counterparts. As one might expect,
individuals who had participated previously in an
anti-war activity expressed much high levels of
personal involvement in relation to the issue of
torture than non-protestors.
Overall, Latin Americans demonstrate
significant concern regarding the use of torture
by any government and by their own govern-
ment. In general, Latin Americans tend to be
engaged as citizens and interested in enhancing
a civil society within their own borders and
beyond. Although specific tendencies may vary
depending on the nationality, religion, or gender
of the individual, Latin Americans largely share
one voice in terms of their desire to treat human
beings with dignity even in the worst of
circumstances.
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html
Pyle C (2009) Getting away with torture: secret govern-
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The Washington Post. Retrieved from http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
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Torture (2011) In Merriam-Webster. Retrieved 17 May
2011 from http://www.merriam-webster.com/diction-
ary/torture
United Nations, General Assembly (1985) Convention
against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment. New York
United States Department of Justice (1975). National
security archive. (MORI DocID: 1451843)
Vieira C (2008) Torture as a ‘side effect’ of forced disappear-
ance, killings. Interpress Service News Agency. Retrieved
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Zimbardo P (2007) The lucifer effect. Random House,
New York
 Perspectives on Torture in South
and Southeast Asia 40
Savreen Hundal, Sherri McCarthy,
Ma. Regina E. Estuar, Darshini Shah, Ellora Puri,
Megan Reif, and Jas Jaafar

Words like “freedom,” “justice,” and “democracy,”
according to James Baldwin are abstract concepts
and that no one is born with an understanding of
what these words mean. Instead, one gains under-
standing of these words through experience.
Baldwin also adds that understanding and imple-
menting human rights reform require tremendous
individual effort. Most people support the main
tenet behind these reforms—that is, that every
individual is born with certain inalienable rights
that should not be violated. How is it, then, that
violations of these rights come to be accepted and
justified?
One aspect of human rights that this chapter
focuses on is the use of torture, specifically on
prisoners of war. According to the Convention
Against Torture, torture is defined within Article
1.1 as:
Any act by which severe pain or suffering,
whether physical or mental, is intentionally
inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtain-
ing from him or a third person, information or a
confession, punishing him for an act he or a third
person has committed or is suspected of having
committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a
third person, or for any reason based on discrimi-
nation of any kind, when such pain or suffering is
inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the
consent or acquiescence of a public official or
other person acting in an official capacity. It does
not include pain or suffering arising only from,
inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions
(Convention 2007).
In addition to this definition of torture, a
definition of prisoner of war (POW) is also useful.
According to the Encyclopedia Britannica
(2010), a POW is “any person captured or
interned by a belligerent power during war. In
the strictest sense it is applied only to members
of regularly organized armed forces, but by
broader definition it has also included guerrillas,
civilians who take up arms against an enemy
openly, or noncombatants associated with a mili-
tary force.” As defined by Article 1.1 of the
Convention Against Torture, any POW who has
been tortured has been the victim of a human
rights violation.
The torture of POWs is almost universally
outlawed. According to the United Nations (UN)
International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, Article 7 states, “No one shall be sub-
jected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment. In particular,
no one shall be subjected without his free
consent to medical or scientific experimentation”
(International Covenant 1997). The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights Article 5 states,
“No one shall be subjected to torture or to
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punish-
ment” (Universal Declaration 1997). In addition,
in 1984 the UN launched the United Nations
Committee Against Torture (CAT) whose only
mission was to prevent torture around the world
(Committee 2010). The clear denunciation of the
use of torture by any party or institution was also
outlined at the first Geneva Convention, which
was known as the Convention Against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading

K. Malley-Morrison et al. (eds.), International Handbook of War, Torture, and Terrorism, 631
Peace Psychology Book Series, DOI 10.1007/978-1-4614-1638-8_40,
© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2013
632
Treatment or Punishment. Under this convention,
all states are required to criminalize the use of
torture and to provide attentive measures to
assure that appropriate interrogation methods are
being used. All the countries studied in this chap-
ter from the region of South and Southeast Asia,
India, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Pakistan, and
the Philippines have signed the Geneva
Convention (Geneva Convention 2005).
Southern Asia has been fraught with turmoil
since the time it was colonized by Europeans cen-
turies ago. In 1947 India received its indepen-
dence and became the Republic of India while
simultaneously the India-Pakistan partition
resulted in the establishment of the Islamic
Republic of Pakistan. (Bajoria and Bruno 2010;
Pitt 2009; Ridge 2008). Sri Lanka with a similar
history, received its independence in the middle
of the twentieth century. These three governments
have dealt with significant human rights viola-
tions since gaining independence and have strug-
gled to keep their citizens safe. The 2009 Human
Rights Report by the United States (US)
Department of State on Sri Lanka criticized it for
“unlawful killings by paramilitaries and others
believed to be working with the awareness and
assistance of the government, assassinations by
unknown perpetrators, politically motivated
killings, and disappearances” (2009 Human
Rights Report 2010).
India and Pakistan face similar issues of
corruption, injustice, and lack of accountability, a
majority of which are domestic occurrences.
Both India and Pakistan have been accused of
torturing each other’s soldiers. Countless articles
have been published in the media accusing each
government of heinous and detrimental actions.
In one media article, it was claimed that a
Pakistani solider was brutally tortured and then
murdered at the border of the two countries
(“Pakistani Solider tortured to death,” 2002).
Another media article claimed that Indian POWs
from the war with Pakistan in 1971 were being
held and tortured in military prisons (Mohan
2007). In sum, people in India, Pakistan, and Sri
Lanka have suffered from a lack of governmental
protection against human rights violations.
S. Hundal et al.
The UN’s Office of the High Commissioner
on Human Rights (OHCHR) has established a
regional office for South and West Asia to over-
look programs aimed at safeguarding human
rights in these areas. However, there are no addi-
tional organizations or binding agreements that
reinforce tactics and procedures to prevent
torture and human rights violations in these
countries (OHCHR- South and West Asia 2010).
The closest independent organization tying this
region together is the South Asian Association
for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), which con-
sists of the countries of Afghanistan, Bangladesh,
Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and
Sri Lanka. This organization specifically focuses
on economic and political concerns in South
Asia but does consider certain human rights
issues when they are relevant to the organiza-
tion’s greater interests (OHCHR- South and West
Asia 2010).
According to a 2009 report from the OHCHR
regional office, there continues to be persistent
conflict in India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka result-
ing in violations of human rights, such as tor-
ture. Furthermore, the report stated that
governments in these regions currently have
legal systems in place to combat such violations,
but actual implementation and enforcement have
been proven very difficult (OHCHR- South and
West Asia 2010). On a positive note, it was
reported that within this region, there are “thriv-
ing and active civil societies and media actors
playing an important role in human rights and
other social issues” (OHCHR- South and West
Asia 2010). OHCHR’s South Asian Regional
Office has stated that improving human rights is
one of their fundamental goals. One of the
report’s top recommendations was the need to
strengthen their ties with regional organizations
like SAARC. With such ties, they believe that
they will be creating connections which will
allow both institutions to work together to
strengthen human rights in this region(OHCHR-
South and West Asia 2010).
Times were difficult in Southeast Asia follow-
ing World War II. The Japanese forces had
invaded parts of Southeast Asia including
40 South and Southeast Asia Torture
Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Laos.
During this time, the Japanese exceeded expecta-
tion with their inhumane treatment and torturing
of POWs (World Scarred by History 1997).
According to one report, “the Japanese treated
POWs and civilians barbarically. Survivors of
camps in Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore, Burma
and Laos all reported experiencing tremendous
cruelty, torture, disease and starvation. It is an
astounding fact that while POWs died at a rate of
1.2% in Germany, they died at a rate of 37%
across the Pacific” (People and Events 2003).
One former POW described his stay in a Japanese
POW camp by recalling that once, “a fully preg-
nant Filipino woman threw some food out… this
POW in front of me picked up the food and
started eating it; and a Japanese guard came…
and decapitated that POW… and then he went
and cut the stomach out of the Filipino woman.
She was screaming ‘kill me, kill me,’ and they
wouldn’t do it” (People and Events 2003).
Years after World War II, Indonesia, the
Philippines, Malaysia, and Laos eventually
gained their independence from either the
Japanese or a colonizing European nation. Each
government has dealt with concerns of instability
due to the conflict between democratic and
authoritarian governmental systems that has
persisted since independence (Hickens 2006).
Torture has become a tool for maintaining power
during these periods of instability. Although very
few claims of torturing POWs in these nations
have been made, numerous domestic violations
of human rights have been reported.
The OHCHR Regional Office for Southeast
Asia is responsible for Brunei Darussalam,
Cambodia, Indonesia, the Lao People’s Democratic
Republic, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines,
Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste, and Vietnam
(OHCHR- South and East Asia 2010). The
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN),
which includes the countries of Indonesia, Malaysia,
the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand, has also
been established to combat human rights viola-
tions. ASEAN is an organization rooted in geopo-
litical and economic missions. Recently, however,
633
in the years 2009–2010, it has established an
Intergovernmental Commission on Human
Rights (AICHR) whose mission is to advocate
and protect human rights within the region of
Southeast Asia in an effort to promote notions of
peace and prosperity (OHCHR- South and East
Asia 2010).
These organizations have made commend-
able efforts to improve human rights. However,
their mission is far from over. For one thing,
they need to continue building programs that
promote education, justice, and legislative
change. Government agents are rarely held
accountable for compromising the human rights
of others; ASEAN incorporates very few coun-
tries within Southeast Asia and has been accused
of not being open to hearing perspectives and
voices for change on the topic of human rights
(OHCHR- South and East Asia 2010). However,
there are great hopes for more productive
changes in the future with more countries being
involved due to ASEAN establishing AICHR.
How can human rights violations, especially
the torturing of POWs, be justified? In his theory
of moral disengagement, Albert Bandura
describes the disconnection between individuals’
moral self and their ability to participate in detri-
mental actions through the operation of particu-
lar sociocognitive mechanisms (Bandura 1999,
2002). Ben Saul (2009) described three tactics
people use in the effort to justify torture: (1)
people will often use human rights language for
a paradoxical appeal to justifying torture; (2)
they will play on the asymmetry of power in
which the situation is embedded; and (3) they
will use a series of strategies to convey a sense of
just cause in the action of torture. All three of
these strategies are consistent with Bandura’s
view on how moral disengagement operates to
allow people to justify inhumane behaviors such
as torture.
In order to understand the different types of
cognitive mechanisms involved in this process, it
may be helpful to understand the most common
justifications for torture, known as the “ticking
time bomb” scenario (Bellamy 2009). In this
634
scenario, time is limited and authorities must
choose between torturing one individual in order
to obtain information that will save the lives of
many, or respect the prisoner’s human rights and
resist committing torturous acts. This common
defense rests on the act-utilitarianism model
where torture is permissible when “cost-benefit
analysis reveals that more lives are saved by
resorting to torture than by choosing not to do so”
(Bellamy 2006, p. 132). This common argument
uses all three of the strategies identified by Saul:
use of human rights language, asymmetry of
power, and just cause ideology to promise that
torture is the best solution (Saul 2009). The alter-
native to the cognitive mechanisms that reinforce
moral disengagement is the understanding of the
reality of the situation and how torturing a POW
is actually counterproductive.
In the Philippines in 1995, there was a real-life
ticking bomb scenario. The Filipino police had
arrested an individual who was plotting to crash
11 official aircraft over the Pacific, along with a
plot to destroy a CIA building in the United States
of America. The police officials tortured the pris-
oner for 67 days, trying to get him to talk and
unfold his plan. Eventually, the officials revealed
they had succeeded in prying the information
from the prisoner and were able to disable the
plan, preventing any further destruction. However,
it was later revealed that it was not the torturing
of the prisoner that led to thwarting the plan but
rather the discovery of documents in the prison-
er’s house, revealing his plan (Bellamy 2009).
This scenario disproves some popular beliefs in
favor of torture and highlights its often ineffec-
tive and unreliable methods.
The use of euphemistic language also pro-
motes the use of torture. The way the media con-
veys messages to the public can have a major
influence on public opinion. Euphemistic
language is often used to swing a situation in an
intended direction (Graber and Holyk 2009). For
example, rather than stating that the government
is torturing a prisoner to attain information, the
statement would be converted to interrogation
techniques are being used to gather more infor-
mation. Much of the criticism surrounding the
S. Hundal et al.
use of torture is that the public is not truly
informed about how or when it is used. Some
argue that if the media were able to shed light on
actual uses of torture, this exposure would lead to
public arousal and opposition. The people would
demand an explanation from their government,
and tolerance for torture would be diminished.
The failure of the media to “arouse effective
opposition” speaks to the media’s use of one-
sided stories aided by the role of politics in the
media (Graber and Holyk 2009).
Euphemistic labeling is also considered nec-
essary due to legal implications. Torture is, at
least in principle, universally illegal. Thus, if the
media stated that the government was commit-
ting acts of torture, it would be accusing it of
breaking an international law. This quandary fur-
ther explains why the media prefer to use euphe-
misms that do not carry any legal implications
(Graber and Holyk 2009).
It is important to understand the realities of
torture in the world today. In the book Terrorism
and Torture, Bellamy (2009) argues that both tor-
ture and terrorism are used as violent tools to
instill fear in citizens in order to gain power.
Furthermore, the two are dependent on each
other. That is, the existence of terrorism is used
as justification for the use of torture, and the
existence of torture is used as justification for
acts of terrorism (Bellamy 2009).
The Current Study: Methods
and Findings
This chapter specifically focuses on the views of
everyday people from South and Southeast Asia.
Responses to two items concerning torture that
were part of the Personal and Institutional Rights
to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS)
(Malley-Morrison et al. 2006) were analyzed.
The first item, which has two parts, asks the par-
ticipants to rank on a 7-point Likert scale their
level of agreement with the statement, “Does the
government have the right to torture prisoners of
war?” Participants are then asked to provide in
their own words a justification for the rating they
40 South and Southeast Asia Torture
assigned. The second item is a scenario to which
participants are asked to respond: “Military
officials are torturing somebody suspected of
having information about terrorists.” Specifically,
they were asked to indicate in their own words
how they would feel and what they would want
to do about it.
Responses to both these items were coded by
the torture coding team of the Group on
International Perspectives of Governmental
Aggression and Peace (GIPGAP). The coding
team developed the Moral Disengagement/
Engagement Coding Manual for Perspectives on
Torture using a deductive qualitative analysis
(Gilgun 2005), combined with grounded theory
methods. That is, working with an international
coding manual sample, the team developed cod-
ing categories appearing to reflect Bandura’s
moral disengagement mechanisms. They also
developed an in-depth framework outlining all
the mechanisms underlying moral engagement
(Malley-Morrison et al. 2009). It is important to
note that the responses being coded from each
world region do not derive from a representative
sample; therefore, in order to avoid making
claims that one nation and/or region is more or
less moral than the next, coding categories will
not include the terms moral engagement or
disengagement. Instead, for the analyses con-
ducted for this chapter, all South and Southeast
Asian answers for the two torture items on
the PAIRTAPS were analyzed for themes of
tolerance and intolerance and agency and lack
of agency in respect to a government’s perpetra-
tion of torture.
To code responses to the right-to-torture item,
the GIPGAP coding team identified a number of
torture-tolerant (“pro-torture”) themes in the
coding manual sample that corresponded directly
to Bandura’s sociocognitive mechanisms of
moral disengagement: pseudo-moral justification;
euphemistic language; misrepresenting, minimiz-
ing, or disregarding consequences; attributing
blame; and advantageous comparison. The team
also identified a set of reciprocal themes consis-
tent with morally engaged mechanisms and that
characterized torture-intolerant (“anti-torture”)
635
arguments: descriptive language, awareness of
negative consequences, exonerating the prisoner,
and recognition of better alternatives and ones
that can establish the ineffective or outdated
qualities of the harmful practices of torture. In
addition, it developed a category of honor inter-
national agreements for responses citing interna-
tional laws against torture. (For a fuller description
of the relevant features of Bandura’s theory of
moral disengagement and moral engagement, see
Chaps. 1 and 43.)
The second set of coding guidelines was
designed to assess the extent to which there was
evidence of personal agency in participants’
responses to the item “Military officials are
torturing somebody suspected of having
information about terrorists. What would you
want to do?” These guidelines, summarized in
the personal involvement section of the Moral
Disengagement/Engagement Coding manual,
include four major thematic categories: positive
action, passive regarding torture, complaint with
torture, and helplessness. Positive action referred
to responses that were proactive in that the
respondents indicated that they took some form
of responsibility to act against what they regarded
as unjust or immoral. Responses coded for pas-
sivity indicated a lack of motivation to take any
sort of action regarding torture. Responses coded
as compliant with torture indicated support for
the act of torture, and responses coded for help-
lessness indicated a perceived inability to do any-
thing about the torture.
The South and Southeast Asian Sample
Participants from the South and Southeast Asian
regions were recruited from India, Indonesia,
Laos, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Sri
Lanka. These participants completed the
PAIRTAPS either online or by the use of a hard
copy in their native lands or, in the case of the
Laos participants in countries in which they had
sought refuge, including the USA. The partici-
pants were recruited by personal networking
and through a survey link on various online sites.
636
A total of 751 South and Southeast Asian partici-
pants were recruited from seven different coun-
tries as follows: India (230), Indonesia (26), Laos
(24), Malaysia (150), Pakistan (55), the
Philippines (256), and Sri Lanka (10). Also from
the total number of participants, 51% indicated
that they were female and 45% were male. The
age of the participants ranged from 18 to 75, with
an average of 29 years. A majority stated that
they were middle class (46%) or upper middle
class (25%). Three major religions found within
this region were Christianity (39%), Islam (12%),
and Hinduism (19%). Most of the participants
had not been in the military themselves (86%),
but a majority (61%) had at least one family
member who had been in the military. Also, 69%
in this region indicated that they had not been
involved with any type of protest, but approxi-
mately 30% had done so.
A Governmental Right to Torture?
In our analyses of participants’ responses to the
two torture items presented from the PAIRTAPS,
all three torture-tolerant, torture-intolerant, and
personally involved themes were identified
and coded for. Approximately 20% of the South and
Southeast Asian responses were coded as torture
tolerant. From all the torture-tolerant arguments
identified, advantageous comparison was the
most frequent (6% of all responses, 30% of tor-
ture-tolerant responses). For example, a 33-year-
old Pakistani woman replied to the question,
“Does the government have the right to torture
prisoners of war?” by stating, “Torture must be
prohibited, unless torturing an individual can pre-
vent escalation of war and can save many other
lives. However, since definitions of national secu-
rity tend to vary, therefore torture perhaps is not a
reliable tool.” In this response, the detrimental
action of torture is compared to a positive gain,
and the positive gain outweighs the negative
aspects of torturing someone, thus providing for
a torture-tolerant justification. It is apparent from
the response that there is a struggle to justify tor-
ture completely, since she mentions that it can be
S. Hundal et al.
an “unreliable tools”. However, the participant is
not opposed to the act of torture and would agree
with it if the possible positive gain is attractive
enough. The struggle highlighted in the above
response can be seen in another example by a
21-year-old woman from Sri Lanka who replied
that the government does have the right to torture
prisoners of war (POWs) “if the torture is to gain
pertinent information that will bring about the
end of the war. There is a huge gray area here
because what exactly is pertinent info?”
The second most frequent torture-tolerant
argument was pseudo-moral justification (4% of
all responses, 21% of torture-tolerant responses).
Responses coded into this category justify the use
of torture by emphasizing a socially worthy or a
moral purpose for it. A participant from Laos
stated, “It depends on the reason for torture but
prisoners of war should not be tortured but be
treated humanely.” Although the respondent
states that a POW should be treated humanely,
he/she nevertheless also indicated that torture
might be justifiable depending on the circum-
stances. A 25-year-old Indian man agrees with a
right to torture in order to “establish peace and to
tackle terrorism and riots.” A 31-year-old Filipino
woman suggests, “The government should at
least be accountable also to the public as to their
procedures as to why torture has to even be
resorted to (ex. extract info? punish convicted
war criminals?).” Again, in this response, torture
is acceptable as long as there is a “justifiable”
purpose for it.
Several other torture-tolerant arguments were
found in the South and Southeast Asian responses;
however, the frequency of their occurrence was
extremely low. For the two most frequently coded
arguments, advantageous comparison and
pseudo-moral justification, additional examples
of responses can be found in Table 40.1 with the
respondents’ country, age, and sex.
Approximately 74% of the responses from
South and Southeast Asia were coded as torture
intolerant (anti-torture). Responses that were
coded simply as general torture intolerance (13%
of all responses) disapproved of a governmental
right to torture prisoners of war without giving
40 South and Southeast Asia Torture 637

Table 40.1 Sample responses for torture-tolerant coding

Category Percent Country Gender Age Response
Advantageous 6 (30) India F 40 “Yes, government has the right to cause the torture
comparison of prisoners in time of war, if any fruitful result is
awaited”
Indonesia F 20 “If it can save the peace of the world”
Laos “If info needed is critical to war”
Malaysia “For the sake of the citizen”
Pakistan F 32 “That is a violation of basic humanity. However, if
the individual has information that may save several
lives, it could be justified”
Philippines M 23 “Yes, to insure victory, but no[t] to the extent of
another human being’s dignity”
Sri Lanka “If the torture is to gain pertinent information that
will bring about the end of the war. There is a huge
gray area here because what exactly is pertinent
info?”
Pseudo-moral 4 (21) India M 25 “Again to establish peace & to tackle terrorism &
justification riots”
Laos “It depends on the reason for torture but prisoners of
wa[r] should not be tortured but be treated
humanely”
Malaysia F 23 “No rights since they may have a reason to do so”
Pakistan F 33 “Torture must be prohibited, unless torturing an
individual can prevent escalation of war and can
save many other lives. however since definitions of
national security tend to vary, therefore torture
perhaps is not a reliable tool”
Philippines M 25 “If it is necessary”
Note: The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total
response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in that category out of all the torture-
tolerant responses
F female, M male

any specific justifications. Examples of responses
coded as general torture intolerance include “no”
(20-year-old woman from Malaysia; 21-year-old
woman from India), “never…” (21-year-old
woman from Pakistan; 59-year-old man from Sri
Lanka), and “the government doesn’t have the
right to punish someone imprisoned” (32-year-
old Filipino man).
Responses coded into the humanization cate-
gory (13% of all responses, 17% of the torture-
intolerant responses) appealed to the humanity
of the POW to justify their rejection of a state
right to torture. A 22-year-old Malaysian woman
stated, “Prisoners must be treated nicely because
they are humans,” and a 24-year-old Indonesian
woman said, “They are prisoners of war but they
are still human beings and should still be treated
with dignity.” In Pakistan a 32-year-old woman
stated, “That is a violation of basic humanity…,”
and in India a 23-year-old woman said, “very
inhumane,” when asked if the government has
the right to torture a POW.
Similar to the humanitarian plea, responses
categorized as exonerating prisoners speak in
behalf of the victim and attempt to remove blame
from the POW. Exonerating prisoners was the
second most frequently coded category of torture
intolerance. These responses usually indicate a
sense of hesitancy about assigning guilt to the
prisoner. An example of a response coded for
638 S. Hundal et al.

exonerating prisoners of war was given by an
18-year-old woman from Pakistan who stated,
“Never, prisoners are often held in prison even
though they are not decidedly guilty of whatever
crime. Governments never regardless of whether
the citizen is guilty or not guilty have the right to
humiliate or torture any prisoners in a time of
war….” A 20-year-old Malaysian woman stated,
“Prisoners of war should not be tortured because
the government must consider their situation (their
country has been taken over, loss of property).”
Attempting to relate to the prisoner on a personal
and individual level appears to make it easier for
one to respond in a torture-intolerant manner.
A subcategory of humanization that was fre-
quently coded was human rights. Responses
coded into this category reference international
human rights doctrine when justifying why the
government does not have the right to torture
prisoners of war. For example, a 22-year-old
Indian man said, “This kind of activity is a viola-
tion of international human rights,” and a 22-year-
old Filipino woman said, “Torturing prisoners of
war means they are emotionally disregarded as
human beings having basic rights.”
The category of honor international agree-
ments reflects responses that hold governments
accountable to international laws and treaties
protecting the rights of prisoners of war.
Responses that reflected the government’s role
referenced how the government should handle
their prisoners and discussed a government’s lack
of a right to torture. An example of a response
coded as honor international agreements was
given by a 59-year-old Sri Lankan man, who
stated, “Never. Torture should be treated as an
international crime and those who are guilty of it
should be tried and punished at the International
Court of Justice in the Hague.” Several other
torture-intolerant arguments were found in the
South and Southeast Asian responses; however,
they accounted for less than 7% of all the
responses. More examples of responses, along
with demographic information about the respon-
dent and their percentage of occurrence of the
type of response, can be seen in Table 40.2.

Table 40.2 Sample responses for torture-intolerant coding

Category Percent Country Gender Age Response
Torture intolerant 13 (17) India F 20 “No”
Indonesia F 24 “Not into torture”
Malaysia F 20 “No”
Pakistan M 53 “Total disagreement”
Philippines F 20 “People should not be tortured”
Sri Lanka M 59 “Never”
Humanization 13 (17) India F 29 “All humans are equal”
Indonesia F 24 “They are prisoners of war but they are
still human beings and should still be
treated with dignity”
Laos “Regardless of my earlier statements of
selfishness, people are still living
beings”
Malaysia F 20 “Prisoners must be treated nicely
because they are humans”
Pakistan F 32 “That is a violation of basic
humanity…”
Philippines F 22 “Torturing prisoners of war means they
are emotionally disregarded as human
bein[g]s having basic rights”
Human rights 6 (8) India M 72 “Prisoners should have right to survive”
Malaysia M 22 “Prisoners have rights”
(continued)
40 South and Southeast Asia Torture 639

Table 40.2 (continued)

Category Percent Country Gender Age Response
Pakistan F 23 “Human rights should never be
compromised on”
Philippines F 21 “Our government has no right because
that prisoner also has the right to live
and give him chance to survive”
Exonerating prisoners 12 (16) India M 21 “At the time of war the opposition
of war country should be considered as enemy
& not the prisoners who just obey the
order of their gov[ernmen]t”
Malaysia F 20 “Prisoners of war should not be tortured
because the government must consider
their situation (their country has been
taken over, loss of property)”
Pakistan F 18 “Never, prisoners are often held in
prison even though they are not
decidedly guilty of whatever crime.
Governments never regardless of
whether the citizen is guilty or not
guilty have the right to humiliate or
torture any prisoners in a time of war or
during any other time”
Philippines F 38 “Bec[ause] they’re only following what
they pledged for, to protect their own
country”
Governmental 7 (10) India M 26 “It is under international law”
Indonesia F 24 “They are prisoners of war but they are
still human beings and should still be
treated with dignity”
Malaysia M 20 “The government must not give orders
for the prisoners of war to be tortured,
instead it should educate and advise
them to not repeat the mistakes”
Pakistan M 74 “Probably there is some sort of
international agreement about the
treatment of prisoners. That should be
followed”
Philippines F 26 “It is against the law”
Sri Lanka M 59 “Never. Torture should be treated as an
international crime and those who are
guilty of it should be tried and punished
at the International Court of Justice in
the Hague”
Note: The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total
response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in that category out of all the anti-
torture responses
F female, M male

For the second torture item, participants were
asked what they would want to do if they were
directly and dramatically exposed to the military
torturing somebody suspected of knowing a ter-
rorist. Responses for this item of the survey were
collected from all the countries in our South and
Southeast Asia sample except Laos. The personal
involvement section of the Torture Coding
Manual was designed to code responses to this
scenario item. Personal involvement has three
640
subcategories including passive regarding torture,
compliant with torture, and positive action. About
14% of responses from this sample indicated some
sort of general positive action, that is, some type
of motivation to stop detrimental actions like tor-
ture from continuing, but without any specific
suggestions about how to accomplish this—like
“try to stop it.” Another common response coded
for personal involvement-positive action was by a
24-year-old Indonesian man who stated he would
simply “pray for him.” Two subcategories of posi-
tive action that were frequently coded include
political activism (19% of all responses, 39% of
positive action responses) and agentic alternative
solutions (11% of all responses, 23% of positive
action responses). Examples of responses that
indicated political activism were “If possible, pro-
test” (20-year-old Indian man) and “Appeal to the
authorities to stop torture” (49-year-old man from
Sri Lanka). The second most frequently coded
subcategory response under positive action is
agentic alternative solution. A 23-year-old
Pakistani man responded that he would “try con-
vincing that there are other ways.” Other sug-
gested alternatives to torture included “using lie
detector to know what happened exactly” (37-year-
old Indonesia man).
The torture-tolerant orientation that contrasts
with positive involvement against torture is called
compliant with torture. These responses indicate
support for the detrimental action. About 11% of
all coded responses for the torture scenario were
categorized as compliant with torture. An exam-
ple of a response from this category is by a
Malaysian man, 22 years old, who stated that he
would “call for the citizens to work together anni-
hilating the terrorists.” Responses can be compli-
ant with torture in one of two ways: if they
indicate an allowance for the act to continue,
either by the respondent taking an active step in
assuring the torture continues; or by the respon-
dent simply indicating agreement with the act
itself. An example of a response indicating an
active step was given by a 47-year-old Indian
man who stated he would “help the officials,” and
an example of a response that is compliant with
torture but without the personal involvement/
responsibility was by a 33-year-old Pakistani
S. Hundal et al.
woman who stated, “I would want to stop it! But
thinking of all those wasted lives in bomb blasts
in my own country, I would probably trust the
military officials.”
Responses coded for apathy, a subcategory of
passive regarding torture, comprised 11% of all
the personal involvement responses and 73% of
the passivity responses. These responses
expressed no motivation to take any kind of step
toward preventing the act of torture from con-
tinuing. Examples of responses include, “Switch
the channel or close my eyes” (20-year-old
Filipino man). Also a majority of the responses
coded into this category were identical to the one
given by a 20-year-old Indonesian woman who
simply responded that she would do “nothing.”
In this category, the lack of motivation expressed
by the participants can be explained in two ways:
either the participants are expressing a sense of
helplessness regarding their ability to change the
situation or they simply do not care whether the
detrimental actions continue or not. Since no fur-
ther explanation was given by the participants in
their responses, it is unclear how the statements
should be interpreted.
Other personally involved themes were found
in the South and Southeast Asian responses; how-
ever, their frequency of occurrence was less than
eleven percent. More examples of responses,
along with their percentage of occurrence, can be
seen in Table 40.3, along with the country of ori-
gin, age, and sex of the respondent providing the
quote.
Exploratory Analyses with
Demographic Variables
On an exploratory basis, several quantitative sta-
tistical analyses were conducted to examine the
possibility of demographic differences in
responses based on gender, class status, country,
military experience, and if participants have rela-
tives in the military. All group differences
identified as statistically significant had p values
of 0.05 or smaller.
Neither the participants’ nationalities nor
their social class were significant predictors of
40 South and Southeast Asia Torture 641

Table 40.3 Sample responses for personal involvement coding

Category Percent Country Gender Age Response
Political activism/ 19 (39) India M 25 “I would try to gain attention from our top official
institutionalism organizations to do something for them”
Malaysia F 22 “Go to higher authority”
Pakistan F 34 “Write in a public forum about this”
Philippines F 20 “Join the rally protesting against it”
Sri Lanka M 59 “Campaign against torture using peaceful means”
General positive 14 (30) India F 40 “Stop the officials”
action
Indonesia F 24 “Try to stop military officials”
Malaysia M 23 “The torturing action is not supposed to be
practiced. It needs to be prevented by any means”
Pakistan F 24 “Make my opinion heard”
Philippines F 19 “Tell them to stop the violence”
Alternative 11 (23) India M 29 “Would ask them lovingly the information about
solutions terrorists”
Indonesia M 37 “Using lie detector to know what happened exactly”
Malaysia F 20 “No need to use violence to obtain information”
Pakistan M 23 “Try convincing that there are other ways”
Philippines M 39 “Do the right way of punishment”
Sri Lanka F 45 “Use different means (NVC) that will generate a
productive response”
Apathy 11 (73) India M 75 “Move away”
Indonesia M 29 “Nothing, that is intelligence bureau business”
Malaysia F 23 “Nothing”
Pakistan M 24 “Nothing…”
Philippines F 20 “Turn away”
Compliant with 11 (81) India M 36 “Tell the officials, what were they waiting for???
torture They should have done this much before…”
Indonesia M 22 “I want to join torturing”
Malaysia M 20 “Force the person to provide the information
about terrorist”
Pakistan M 33 “I would want to stop it! But thinking of all those
wasted lives in bomb blasts in my own country,
I would probably trust the military officials”
Philippines M 25 “Cheer”
Note: The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total
response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in that category out of all the
responses coded for the theme of the major category
F female, M male

frequency scores for the major thematic catego-
ries into which responses were coded. In contrast,
t-tests revealed significant differences based on
gender, participants’ military status, and having
relatives in the military.
Gender was found to be a significant predictor
of several sociocognitive response types.
Table 40.4 lists the specific arguments that varied
significantly by gender along with their respec-
tive means, standard deviations, t-scores, and
degrees of freedom. In regard to the item
concerning whether a government has the right to
torture prisoners of war (Torture Right), men
provided significantly more torture-tolerant
responses and specifically gave significantly
more pseudo-moral justifications for torture.
Similarly, women gave significantly more
responses than men that were coded torture intol-
erant: humanization. In regard to the torture sce-
nario, the only gender difference was on the
642 S. Hundal et al.

Table 40.4 Means, standard deviations, and t-test results by demographic variables for coding categories
Group 1 Group 2
Categories Female Male t df
Torture-tolerant sum (TR) 0.22 (0.46) 0.32 (0.55) 2.01* 361.86
Pseudo-moral justification 0.10 (0.32) 0.17 (0.41) 2.00* 344.67
Sum (TR)
Humanization sum (TR) 0.29 (0.54) 0.21 (0.45) 1.67** 433.91
Passive regarding 0.13 (0.34) 0.23 (0.43) 2.62** 424.32
Torture sum (TD)

Military history No military history

Better alternatives sum (TR) 0.00 (0.00) 0.10 (0.30) 6.48*** 395.00

Relative in military No relative in the military

Torture tolerant (TR) 0.00 (0.00) 0.05 (0.22) 3.83*** 280.00
Humanization sum (TR) 0.14 (0.38) 0.31 (0.54) 3.29*** 261.27
Humanization (TR) 0.08 (0.27) 0.19 (0.42) 2.97** 290.88
Pseudo-moral justification 0.02 (0.13) 0.04 (0.22) 1.52* 346.04
Sum (TD)
Principles sum (TD) 0.00 (0.00) 0.03 (0.16) 3.31** 327.00
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001
Note: Standard deviations appear in parentheses next to means. Sums of categories were created by adding the general
category score and its subcategory scores together
TR torture right, TD torture do

personal involvement scale; men provided
significantly more responses coded as being pas-
sive or actually compliant with the acts of torture.
Refer to Table 40.4 below for means, standard
deviations, and t-test results by demographic
variables for responses to the government’s right
to torture and the hypothetical torture situation.
Participants’ military history also played a
role in the kinds of arguments they used in their
responses. A list of all the variables that varied as
a function of military history is given in Table 40.4
with respective means, standard deviations, t-val-
ues, and degrees of freedom. Participants who
had not been in the military used significantly
more torture-intolerant arguments comparing
torture with better alternatives or describing its
ineffectiveness than their counterparts.
Scores on justifications for torture also varied
in relation to having or not having at least one
military relative in the family. In Table 40.4 all
the arguments that varied as a function of hav-
ing a relative in the military are presented with
their respective means, standard deviations,
t-values, and degrees of freedom. Participants
who did not have relatives in the military
responded to the question about whether the
government has a right to torture, with
significantly more responses coded as torture
tolerant than participants with relatives in the
military. However, participants without relatives
in the military also provided significantly more
responses than their counterpoints illustrating
the torture-intolerant argument of human rights
justifications. In regards to the scenario question
asking what the participant would do if witness-
ing torture, participants who did not have a rela-
tive in the military provided significantly more
responses with pseudo-moral justification and
torture-intolerant principles.
One of the most interesting findings in this
chapter was the lack of significant differences in
patterns of response across countries. No one
country could be identified as having participants
whose responses were more or less torture toler-
ant or torture intolerant than participants from
another country. It appears that participants
40 South and Southeast Asia Torture
throughout this region see POWs not as foreign
enemies but rather as human beings, thus making
it harder for them to accept the practices of
torture. As for the South and Southeast Asian par-
ticipants’ notions of what they would do if they
knew the government was torturing a POW, most
responded with a positive personal involvement
motive. The majority of the responses indicated
that the act of torture is wrong and would take a
rightful step to correct it, if they were aware that
such a detrimental action was occurring.
Discussion
Studying these different types of cognitive mech-
anisms found in the South/Southeast Asian popu-
lation has provided greater insight into how
torture is understood across the world by the
everyday person. Though torture is understood as
an unacceptable, inhumane act according to sev-
eral international bodies, it is still found in many
parts of the world, including areas of South and
Southeast Asia. How often, by whom, and for
what reason are always questionable because of
the sensitive nature of the topic; however, no one
can deny that it does happen and perhaps without
consequences for the torturers. Why torture
occurs and how individuals can agree to such
horrific actions has been explained by Bandura in
his theory of moral disengagement. According to
this theory, by the use of various cognitive mech-
anisms, individuals can disconnect their moral
values from their actions to help them condone
the continuation of detrimental actions like tor-
ture. Themes reflective of Bandura’s posited
sociocognitive mechanisms were identified
within torture-tolerant, torture-intolerant, and
personally involved survey responses. South and
Southeast Asian participants were found to
respond predominantly with torture-intolerant
reasoning and with both inhibitive and proactive
forms of agency toward governmental aggres-
sion. These participants’ responses suggest that
at least in the abstract and in hypothetical situa-
tions, they maintain moral sanctions that prevent
them from making justifications and rationaliza-
tions for torture.
643
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 Perspectives on Torture in East Asia
41
Etsuko Hoshino-Browne, Ting Wu, Alba N. Villamil,
Hillary Mi-Sung Kim, Alice Murata, Michelle Murata,
and Andrea Jones-Rooy

Several international agreements (such as the
United Nations International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights and the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights) have banned the use of state-
sponsored torture. Torture was also a major issue
at the United Nation’s first Geneva Convention
where they drafted the United Nations Convention
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment. Not only
does the Convention against Torture require
countries to make the use of torture illegal, but it
also specifies that under no state of emergency,
external threat, or orders from a superior officer
or authority can a right to torture be justifiably
invoked. As of June 1, 2011, 65 nations, includ-
ing China and Japan, but not North and South
Korea, had ratified the Convention against
Torture.
Despite the UN and other conventions, the
use of torture is still prevalent throughout the
world. As originally broadcasted in “60 Minutes
II” on April 28, 2004 (Fager 2004), the proce-
dures used in the Abu Ghraib Prison by the US
military, for example, served as an eye-opening
reminder that such inhumane treatment still
exists. Since the end of World War II and the
Korean War, most East Asian countries have
maintained a period of relative peace and non-
violence internationally. Consequently, the con-
temporary people of East Asia are less likely to
experience torture as prisoners of war (POWs).
However, as reviewed in this chapter, in some
East Asian countries such as China and Koreas,
torture has been used on these peoples by their
governments until recently. The question then
becomes, in the current warless time, how do
East Asians conceptualize torture and justify its
use in international conflicts?
In this chapter, we focus on Japan, China,
North Korea, and South Korea. First, a recent his-
torical background relating to the use of torture in
these countries will be provided, followed by an
analysis of the survey data collected from East
Asians residing in Japan, mainland China, Hong
Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, and the USA.
Brief Review of East Asian History
of Militarism and Torture
Japan
The development of Japanese imperialism and
torture took place within a context of social, eco-
nomic, and political transformation. In 1868, the
Meiji Restoration began after the overthrow of
the Tokugawa Shogunate, which brought an end
to the Edo era (Ebrey et al. 2009). The first actions
of the new government were to institute several
land reforms to promote rapid industrialization
and to establish new trade relationships with
neighboring Asian countries. Various sectors of
Japanese society resisted these political, eco-
nomic, and social reforms, causing the initial part
of the Meiji Restoration to be marked by protest
and violence.

K. Malley-Morrison et al. (eds.), International Handbook of War, Torture, and Terrorism, 645
Peace Psychology Book Series, DOI 10.1007/978-1-4614-1638-8_41,
© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2013
646
To control growing discontent, the Meiji
government restricted free speech and freedom
of expression by imposing strict censorship, and
generally interfered with basic human rights
(Ienaga 1978). The government was able to
accomplish these reforms by controlling the flow
of information in the media and education sys-
tem. Since the majority of Japanese children
rarely attended school beyond the elementary
level, the government was able to standardize a
public school curriculum that emphasized the
new, sacred, emperor-centered state and constitu-
tion at the expense of Western democratic thought
and human rights. By the time of the Russo-
Japanese War of 1904 to 1905, class subjects
focused on militarism (e.g., students learned mil-
itary calculations in their arithmetic class and
read imperial war edicts in their Japanese lan-
guage class), and by 1925, all male students
became subject to mandatory military training. In
addition to these policies, the Ministry of
Education indoctrinated students toward jingo-
ism and submissiveness to the state and the mili-
tary through patriotic rituals and ceremonies.
Thus, support for Japanese imperialism and eth-
nocentrism grew rapidly. Organized activities
against war and militarism were severely pun-
ished, and public dissent was silenced with fear
as the Japanese military gained political power
under imperialism. For instance, during the
1930s, communists were arrested, assaulted, and
illegally detained.
In order to foster violent and ruthless military
support for its imperialist agenda, the Japanese
military emphasized “spirit,” determination, obe-
dience to authority, and sacrifice among its troops
(Ienaga 1978). The army units, for example, were
forbidden to withdraw or become POWs. Instead,
soldiers and officers were to fight until the last
man was dead and, if captured, to commit suicide.
The Japanese military also maintained a very
strict hierarchy in accordance with status ranking
and authority. Each rank oppressed the rank below
it in an attempt to instill an urge for ruthless
fighting against enemy troops. Privates and new
recruits were treated especially inhumanely and
were humiliated on a daily basis. For similar reasons,
E. Hoshino-Browne et al.
senior officers warned junior officers against
being too lenient with their troops.
Despite its strict training methods, the Japanese
military treated POWs captured during the Russo-
Japanese War (1904–1905) relatively well.
German POWs captured during World War I were
also treated well. By World War II, however,
POWs and local populations were mistreated and
tortured. Towle (2000) attributed part of this
change in military behavior to three major fac-
tors: (1) influence of the German army on guer-
rilla warfare; (2) violence between China and
Japan during the 1930s; and (3) problems in the
expansion of the Japanese empire in the early
1940s. The ways by which the treatment of POWs
by the Japanese military changed from a once fair
system to a more brutal and violent one involving
torture are highlighted in this chapter.
The German Empire viewed guerilla warfare
as illegitimate. POWs and any civilians that pro-
tected them were to be punished (Towle 2000).
As Germany replaced France as the chief mili-
tary advisor to Japan in the 1880s, the Japanese
army began to adopt these German military ten-
dencies, especially those directed toward guer-
rilla fighters. It was not until Japan invaded Korea
in the 1890s that this new attitude toward guerilla
warfare became obvious because the Russo-
Japanese War had not involved much guerrilla
warfare. After the invasion, the Japanese army
began a violent era of suppression in Korea, lead-
ing to riots and the establishment of anti-Japanese
partisan groups.
By the 1930s, Japan began to invade China
through Manchuria. The war was violent and bru-
tal, and the Japanese were merciless to the large-
scale network of guerrilla fighters in China (Towle
2000). The military police was given great power
to control any dissent (Edgerton 1997). Throughout
the 1930s and into the 1940s, the military police
became increasingly violent and extremely brutal,
culminating in the mass torture, murder, and ille-
gal detention of suspected radicals or enemies of
the government (Tanaka 1996).
Atrocities and cruelty were demonstrated in
the Japanese military’s mistreatment and torture
of Chinese POWs during the Chino-Japanese
41 East Asia Torture
War (1937–1945) (Towle 2000). On December 9,
1937, the Japanese military captured Nanking,
the former capital of China. In the 6-week period
that followed the capture, the Japanese military
killed hundreds of thousands of civilians and
raped countless women. There is much disagree-
ment among Japanese, Chinese, and Western
scholars over the extent of these atrocities. Some
scholars (e.g., Yamamoto 2000) claim that
although the Japanese military committed large-
scale killings of POWs and the murder, rape, and
looting of civilians, the crimes did not constitute
a planned extermination of the Chinese, and that
some of the deaths, rapes, and thefts could be
attributed to the Chinese army. In stern contrast,
other researchers (e.g., Chang 1997) claim that
the Japanese military used ultraviolent torture
methods against the Nanking civilians. Some
captives were even forced to dig their own graves
before being buried alive, while others were
mutilated through disembowelment, decapita-
tion, and dismemberment. In addition to these
grotesque deaths, large numbers of Chinese were
imprisoned and tortured to instill fear among the
remaining civilians. Prisoners were beaten,
whipped, crucified, used for bayonet practice,
stabbed repeatedly with needles, or had pieces of
their flesh carved off. The Japanese military also
conducted mass executions in which they pushed
groups of captives into a pit and sprayed them
with gasoline before igniting them.
Another major instance of the Japanese
military’s torture and mistreatment of POWs
occurred in Sandakan, Malaysia, during World
War II (Tanaka 1996). The Sandakan camp, run
primarily by Taiwanese guards under the com-
mand of the Japanese, was one of the largest
Japanese camps of Allied Australian and British
POWs. The camp became a place of ill-treatment
and ultimately of massacre. In order to build an
airfield in Sandakan to bridge the Philippines and
Singapore, the Japanese military exploited the
labor power of POWs who had been captured in
Singapore, Malaysia, and Timor. In one incident,
a group of POWs at the camp built a radio trans-
mitter by smuggling in parts from anti-Japanese
647
Chinese in the area. However, one of the Chinese
collaborators was caught and was tortured until
the names of other collaborators were revealed.
These collaborators were also tortured until the
identities of the POWs involved in the radio
transmitter plot were given up. The Japanese mil-
itary police spent 3 months torturing and interro-
gating the POW group in hopes of discovering
where the radio transmitter was hidden. Extreme
forms of torture included “water torture” (in
which victims’ faces were covered with a cloth
mask that was repeatedly doused with water,
forcing the victims to inhale water until their
stomachs almost burst) and “rice torture” (in
which having been starved, victims would have
uncooked rice forced down their throats only to
later swallow large amounts of water so that the
rice would expand and cause excruciating pain in
their stomachs and internal bleeding). Victims
were also beaten with wooden sandals after being
smeared with wet sand.
A growing trend of violence and torture toward
POWs and civilians was emerging across the
Japanese military police bases in Asia (Tanaka
1996). After the Sandakan incident, POW treat-
ment worsened drastically, and as Japan experi-
enced more defeats, the military police became
increasingly paranoid and aggressive toward
local populations. Suspected criminals were tor-
tured until they confessed—sometimes, to crimes
that they had not committed. As the war was end-
ing, a growing resentment and frustration devel-
oped among the Japanese toward advancing
Allied forces. Such feelings were manifested in
the military police’s torture and violence toward
the local populations. Torture was also used as a
symbolic act to demonstrate dominance.
China
While Japan was transforming under imperialism,
with rapid industrialization and modernization
under the Western influences, China was also
experiencing historically significant events and
dynamic changes. Riots and political uprisings by
648
frustrated citizens led to the 1911 military coup,
known as the Xinhai Revolution, which overthrew
the Qing Dynasty, the last dynasty in imperial
China (Ebrey et al. 2009). Tibet and Mongolia
declared their independence, while Japan began
to develop tighter control in Manchuria. For sev-
eral decades, China went through economic and
political reforms as it adapted to the industrializa-
tion and modernization that was taking place in
the rest of the world. Several alternative political
groups were formed in search of a better political
model for China during this period of political
instability. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP),
which followed the Russian political ideology of
Marxism and Leninism, was formed in 1921. The
CCP, led by Mao Zedong, and the Nationalist
Party engaged in a civil war until 1949, when they
gained sovereign authority of China and estab-
lished the People’s Republic of China.
The CCP used many forms of propaganda and
controlled all forms of mass media in order to
legitimize its ascendancy and to spread commu-
nist state ideology. Local meeting halls were used
as billboards for political propaganda. Each indi-
vidual was assigned to a work unit (e.g., students
were assigned to their school unit, workers to
their place of work). These units became the cen-
ter of life: they provided ration coupons, assigned
housing, organized mass campaigns, and
approved marriages (Ebrey et al. 2009).
Acts of violence and torture were used under
Mao’s regime as a means to transform China into
a communist state. Mao believed that in order to
maintain the communist state, the government
should act as a “people’s democratic dictatorship.”
He distinguished between “people” who prac-
ticed democracy and “counterrevolutionaries”
(ideological dissenters and political rebels) upon
whom dictatorship needed to be imposed (Wu
1988a). In effect, the CCP’s mass campaigns
became opportunities for violent purges of sus-
pected or accused enemies of the state. These
counterrevolutionaries were subjected to betrayal
and terror (sometimes by their own neighbors
and families) for the sake of revolution.
Prison camps became a critical component of
the purges of counterrevolutionaries (Margolin
1999). To the outside world, these prison camps
E. Hoshino-Browne et al.
were portrayed as factories in urban centers and
farms in rural areas, which focused on the
“reform” or “reeducation” of counterrevolution-
aries through labor. In reality, these prison camps
were filled with violence and oppression.
Upon arrival to the prison camps, suspected
counterrevolutionaries were put through a three-
step process of rehabilitation that was made to
destroy their sense of resolve and self. First, they
were obligated to acknowledge any past wrongs.
Secondly, they were forced to accept a “correc-
tion” of their ideas, and finally, the counterrevo-
lutionary had to submit to the CCP regime.
Although physical violence toward counterrevo-
lutionaries had been outlawed by the CCP
between 1950 and 1970, torture still served as a
critical tool in the process of rehabilitation.
Prison officials “persuaded” prisoners to confess
to counterrevolutionary acts using torture such
as beatings and sleep deprivation. Officials also
reeducated prisoners with Maoist dogma through
starvation and “nonstop study” sessions (after
long hours of labor, prisoners were forced to
read and listen to Maoist ideology for hours
without being able to move or sleep). As punish-
ment for any violations of prison regulation, the
prisoners were confined to tiny rooms that were
unheated, unventilated, and too small to either
sit or stand erect. Prisoners were often perma-
nently chained or handcuffed so that it was
impossible for them to eat or groom themselves.
Punishment also included “struggle sessions” in
which prisoners would physically beat those
who did not follow prison regulation. The goals
of these prisons were to make prisoners accept
punishment for crimes against the CCP (whether
real or fabricated), obey the authority of the Mao
regime, and strip away their sense of self and
humanity. The process was rarely contested, as
prisoners were too fearful of additional punish-
ment for further resistance.
One group that was particularly targeted for
counterrevolutionary activities was the land-
owner class (Wu 1988b). During the land reforms
of the 1950s, the government confiscated the
property of this class, whose principle income
was from renting land, and then redistributed it
among tenant farmers, who did not own any
41 East Asia Torture
land. This redistribution (and later collectiviza-
tion) process was not only economically harmful
but also violent and terrorizing. Trained party
members were sent to communities to identify
and expose landlords guilty of past wrongdo-
ings. The identification of such “counterrevolu-
tionaries” occurred in mass meetings where they
were subjected to “confessions” and “public
assessments,” which involved name-calling,
manhandling, public humiliation, arrest, torture,
and execution. Those who survived the ordeal
were either adjudged to medium- or long-term
prison sentences or put under constant surveil-
lance (Margolin 1999). Other forms of property,
such as livestock and housing, were also used for
reclassification (Wu 1988b). Although the goal
of such policies was to correct for the historical
exploitation of the lower peasant classes and lib-
erate the forces of production, the land distribu-
tion process also helped maintain the CCP power
by effectively pitting groups against one another
and cultivating fear.
The CCP’s mass campaigns also targeted intel-
lectuals (Lee 1988). Despite the fact that intellec-
tuals founded the CCP and had played important
roles in establishing the new political system,
many members were from the bourgeois or
landowning class. Moreover, the intellectuals
tended to be critical and defy CCP doctrine.
While many of them supported the CCP, they also
believed in serving the public due to their histori-
cally high social status. Consequently, the CCP
considered them to be either traditionally “feu-
dalistic” or indoctrinated by Western bourgeois
thought. The thought reform campaigns of the
early 1950s started with university professors and
later reached other intellectuals outside the uni-
versity, such as writers and artists. These groups
were forced to read CCP literature, attend meet-
ings led by local cadres, and engage in self-criti-
cism and sometimes self-humiliation. The greatest
infringement on human rights, however, occurred
during the Cultural Revolution.
Mao launched the Cultural Revolution in 1966
to create order and stability in the communist
state through the purging of capitalists, bour-
geois, and nonbelievers (Lee 1988). The
Revolution was largely conducted by the “Red
649
Guards,” a group that consisted of mostly middle-
school, high school, and university students who
were ready and willing to give up their lives for
Mao. Students were ordered to purge the country
of CCP dissidents and supporters of capitalism.
They were also urged to destroy “any signs of
what they regarded as the four olds—old culture,
old ideas, old customs, and old habits” (Lee 1988,
p. 196). Students began to form investigative
units, prisons, and tribunals that were used to
identify counterrevolutionaries among the intel-
lectuals and local leaders. The targeted individu-
als were referred to with dehumanizing and
pejorative terminology, such as “evil geniuses,”
“reptilian spirits,” and “animals” (Margolin
1999). To humiliate them further, students posted
derogatory notices on their backs, forced them to
wear ridiculous clothing, and posed them in gro-
tesque and painful positions in front of the school.
Some teachers were hung upside down in public,
severely beaten, or electrocuted. Thousands of
intellectuals were tortured to death, often by their
own students. The Red Guards also set up peni-
tentiaries, or “study centers,” in every school that
were used to confine, interrogate, and torture any
suspected class enemies.
The fervor and violence of the Cultural
Revolution was the result of several factors
(Margolin 1999). Some of the brutality could be
attributed to the hot summer weather or a true
desire for the transformation of society. Students
were frustrated at not being part of the historic
revolutions. Many students transferred this frustra-
tion to the CCP and intellectual class, criticizing
both groups for being too lenient on the “class
enemies” and uncommitted to Maoism. Most
likely, however, many students were swept up in
the craze of a mass movement and feared being
singled out for not carrying out their citizenship
duty of supporting the communist state.
After Mao’s death in 1976, Deng Xiaoping
seized control of the CCP, and the mass violence
and oppression of the Cultural Revolution began
to end (Margolin 1999). Prisoners were gradually
released from the prison camps or had their sen-
tences shortened. In 1979, the first penal code
was instituted, and by the 1990s, the use of law-
yers was more prevalent. The 1994 State
650
Compensation Law gave citizens the right to seek
compensation against state organizations and
functionaries for infringements of their rights
(Amnesty International 1996). Similarly, the
Prison Law, also adopted in 1994, prohibited the
torture and ill-treatment of prisoners, as stipu-
lated in the Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure
Law of 1979. Today citizens can also make
complaints against the police, security, and gov-
ernment without fear of immediate death since
China participates in the UN Convention against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment.
Despite these changes and improvements,
however, the Chinese government still uses tor-
ture as a way to obtain confessions and punish,
coerce, or intimidate political and criminal pris-
oners (Amnesty International 1996). Police
officers and prison officials serve as the torturers
in the detention centers and prisons. In some
cases, prisoners entrusted with supervising other
prisoners also committed torture. These “cell
bosses” or “prison trustees” allowed prison
officials to pass responsibility for any infliction
of harm onto prisoners. Officials would blame
the injuries on a fight between prisoners or claim
that the wounds were self-inflicted. Current
means of torture include electric batons, hand-
cuffs and leg-irons, whippings, beatings, and sus-
pension by the arms. As was the case in the 1950s
and 1960s, prisoners are still often incarcerated
in small, dark cells with little ventilation, heat, or
sanitation and are exposed to extreme heat or
cold for long periods of time, deprived of sleep
and food, and forced to stand or sit motionless for
excruciatingly long periods of time.
North Korea
Whereas imperialism and ethnocentrism fueled
the use of torture in Japan and other parts of East
Asia, it was communism that afflicted citizens
with torture in China. Similarly, communism led
North Korea to use torture on its citizens.
World War II ended in East Asia with the
Japanese surrender in 1945. As a result, the
Korean peninsula was freed from Japanese
E. Hoshino-Browne et al.
occupation. Instead, Korea came under the
control of the Soviet Union and the USA
(Armstrong 2001; Rigoulot 1999). The Soviet
Union took north of the 38th parallel, and the
USA took south of the parallel. In 1948, these
two separated Koreas became North Korea
(Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) and
South Korea (Republic of Korea), reflecting the
political ideology of the Cold War between the
Soviet Union and the USA (Armstrong 2001).
Kim Il Sung became the new head of North
Korea and initiated a series of political, social,
and economic reforms that emulated Stalinist
policies of the Soviet Union (Armstrong 2001).
A centralized party state was soon established,
with Kim Il Sung as the main leader. Large-scale
social organizations were formed for women and
adolescents. The arts were dedicated to spreading
party propaganda and instigating a “Cultural
Revolution” and industrialization in North Korea,
mirroring the Stalinist model. The economy soon
became state-directed and included multiyear
plans that emphasized rapid heavy industrializa-
tion and collective agriculture to establish an
economic independence and a weapons industry.
The North Korean government, like the one in
China, made great use of propaganda to gain
legitimacy. Because of the relative ethnic homo-
geneity of North Korea, propaganda could rally
national support by tapping into Koreans’ ethno-
centrism and desire to preserve certain artifacts
of Korean culture (Steinberg 2001). Students
were inundated with political education that
promised loyalty to Kim Il Sung. They were led
to believe that correct thoughts supported by their
loyalty would allow them to accomplish any-
thing. The importance of manual labor, collective
life, and the benevolence and success of Kim Il
Sung (and later Kim Jong Il) were also stressed.
In addition to participating in loyalty marches
and cultural events, both students and adults were
subjected to “study sessions” supervised by party
leaders. During these sessions, North Koreans
were forced to engage in self-criticism and to
memorize Kim’s speeches. They risked banish-
ment, torture, and death if they did not perform
up to the standards of party leaders. Outside of
school, the flow of information was strictly
41 East Asia Torture
controlled. The media was rigidly censored,
especially through outlets to the outside world.
Public address speakers were placed in all apart-
ments, houses, and public buildings, and sound
trucks patrolled the streets, disparaging foreign
countries and praising North Korea.
Opponents of Kim Il Sung’s agrarian reform,
his political opponents, and their suspected col-
laborators were systematically hunted down and
intimidated (Oh and Hassig 2000). An important
difference between the political purges and
imprisonment in the Soviet Union and China and
those practices in North Korea was that it was not
until after the Korean War that North Korea began
to use mass terror techniques. During the first
3 years of the regime, there was a large exodus of
North Koreans to the South until 1950 when Kim
Il Sung closed the North Korean border.
During the Korean War (1950–1953), more
than a million civilians on both sides of the paral-
lel died. Many Americans and South Koreans
died in North Korean detention centers after
being tortured and mistreated (Oh and Hassig
2000). After the 38th parallel was reinstated with
the Panmunjom Armistice in 1953, the North
Korean government committed more purges.
Targeted were North Korean supporters of
Khrushchev’s “de-Stalinization” policies as well
as communists not in favor of the growing cult of
personality surrounding Kim Il Sung. These
political prisoners and party opponents were
either housed in newly developed prison camps
(Rigoulot 1999) or were executed with no notice
or legal procedures.
In addition to housing victims of political
purges, some of these camps were inhabited by
common criminals and the children of political
prisoners. Others served as transitional camps for
those who awaited trial. Dictatorship zones,
which served as concentration camps, were
located in isolated mountain regions in the north-
ern part of the country. These camps were guarded
by high barbed wire fences, armed guards, and
minefields. Prisoners were often tortured into
giving confessions. Once incarcerated, prisoners
were subjected to long hours of harsh work, sleep
deprivation, starvation, torture, and social
experiments.
651
Based on thirty in-depth interviews with former
North Korean prisoners who had sought asylum
in South Korea, the U.S. Committee for Human
Rights in North Korea (2001) provided a detailed
account of North Korean prison camps. There
were at least three systems of incarceration: (1)
political penal-labor colonies, (2) prison-labor
facilities, and (3) a system of detention centers for
North Koreans repatriated from China.
Primitive political penal-labor camps were
used to imprison suspected or assumed enemies
of the North Korean revolution after WWII.
These penal-labor camps also imprisoned sus-
pected collaborators of American or South
Korean forces after the Korean War and later,
members of the Korean Workers’ Party, state
bureaucracy, and army. Because of the “guilt by
association” policy put in place by Kim Il Sung,
up to three generations of family members could
be imprisoned for one family member’s crime.
Once families were imprisoned, they were sepa-
rated by gender, and if impregnated, were put
through forced abortions (the U.S. Committee for
Human Rights in North Korea 2001). As a result
of the isolated nature of the colony, the camps
were self-contained and left prisoners with no
contact with the outside world except for word
from the newest prisoners (Rigoulot 1999).
Because prisoners were not expected to be
released, there were no “reeducation” centers or
“revolutionizing zones.” Instead, they were
assigned to hard labor for the rest of their lives.
Prisoners of the penal-labor camps were
forced to withstand extreme physical and
psychological conditions (the U.S. Committee
for Human Rights in North Korea 2001). They
were first abducted by the police without proper
arrest, sentencing, or trial and were not given the
opportunity to confront their accusers or defend
themselves. Instead, they were taken to interroga-
tion facilities and tortured until they “confessed”
to counterrevolutionary crimes. Initial torture
methods included sleep deprivation, beatings,
and forced motionless sitting and standing. After
confessing, prisoners were assigned to lifetime
sentences of hard labor (e.g., mining, timber cut-
ting, farming, etc.) and were severely punished
for any rule-breaking or slow work pace.
652
Punishment included a reduction in food rations
or a stay in a detention cell that was too small
either to stand in or sit. Punishments also included
water torture, during which prison guards poured
water in the prisoner’s mouth and nose until the
victim gagged or suffocated. If prisoners tried to
escape, they were publicly hanged or killed by a
firing squad. In addition to withstanding torture,
prisoners lived in brutal conditions in which they
were induced into a deliberate contrived state of
semi-starvation, resulting in an almost animal-
like state. People often competed for little scraps
of food or the clothes of the deceased. Violence
would almost always erupt over coveted food and
supplies. This extremely competitive environ-
ment also fostered a strong feeling of hostility
and distrust toward other prisoners, increasing
the psychological burden of imprisonment.
Prison-labor facilities, the second system of
incarceration, were used as “reeducation” or
“resocialization” centers (the U.S. Committee for
Human Rights in North Korea 2001). The major
difference between political penal-labor colonies
and prison-labor facilities was that the crimes of
the prisoners in the latter group had been deemed
non-counterrevolutionary. In order to indoctri-
nate criminals or suspected counterrevolution-
aries, prison officials subjected prisoners to hard
labor and intense, violent study sessions. Prisoners
were forced to learn speeches by Kim Il Sung and
Kim Jong Il and were deprived of sleep until they
could recite the speeches by memory. They also
attended “self-criticism” sessions in front of their
work-units and commanding prison officials.
Torture was used to attain prisoner confessions or
to punish the prisoners for breaking rules.
The third system of incarceration included
detention centers for North Koreans repatriated
from China (the U.S. Committee for Human
Rights in North Korea 2001). Although mistreat-
ment may not have been as lifelong and perni-
cious as in political penal-labor colonies and
prison-labor facilities, North Koreans who were
arrested in China and forcibly returned to North
Korea experienced similar forced labor and pun-
ishment. At these camps, prisoners would go
through several weeks of interrogation where
they were questioned as to the reason they were
E. Hoshino-Browne et al.
in China. Prisoners could be severely beaten and
starved until they falsely admitted that they met
South Koreans or went to a Christian church ser-
vice. Then they would be sent to short-term
detention-labor facilities before being sent to
hard-labor detention/punishment facilities. As a
result of improper food rations and brutally hard
labor, death was common in these facilities.
In addition to the torture used in interrogation
and the large number of deaths, perhaps the worst
mistreatment was infanticide and forced abor-
tions for the purpose of ethnic cleansing. These
North Korean prison camps and detention centers
completely disregarded internationally recog-
nized human rights and have abhorrently violated
basic human rights.
South Korea
While North Korea was governed and solidified
by Kim Il Sung and his communist regime, South
Korea was developing as a democratic state,
known as the Republic of Korea, under President
Syngman Rhee with the guidance and aid of the
USA (Cumings 1997). Although South Korea
had become politically democratic by the 1990s,
mass killings, jailing, and torture still served as
important tools among competing parties as a
means to gain power after World War II. In the
process of becoming a democratic state, South
Korea experienced economic hardship and politi-
cal oppression similar to its neighbor north of the
38th parallel.
Rhee’s regime tried to repress and eliminate
any political dissents, leftist activists, communist
supporters, and political guerrillas (Cumings
1997). It suppressed communism by every pos-
sible means. In August 1948, for example, Rhee
proposed the National Security Law, in which he
allowed officials to imprison any suspected sup-
porters of North Korea, known then as the “enemy
state” (Neary 2002). Suspects needed only to be
members of the opposition, not participants in
political crimes. Despite protests against its
potential abuse and arbitrary enforcement, the
law passed in 1949. The government also created
the National Guidance Alliance to convert and
41 East Asia Torture
reeducate political prisoners in concentration
camps. The vagueness of the National Security
Law, however, enabled Rhee to rid the govern-
ment of his political opponents as his party began
to lose face in light of “corruption” and “inepti-
tude” (Neary 2002).
Rhee’s underhanded attempts at maintaining
power were met with large-scale protest (Ebrey
et al. 2009). Rhee faced mass demonstrations,
found little support from the military, and took
exile to Hawaii in 1960. After Rhee’s successors
failed to control several student demonstrations
or the economy, Park Chung Hee seized control
of the government in a 1961 coup d’état.
He became the president in 1963 and held the
longest-reigning dictatorship in South Korea’s
history. Although Park censored some members
of the press, intellectuals, and political oppo-
nents, dissenters were given some degree of free-
dom to criticize the administration and participate
in opposing it (Lee 1992). After nearly losing the
1971 elections, however, Park tightened control
and revised the constitution, giving himself the
power to control the National Assembly and to
declare martial law at any time. Under the new
constitution, any criticisms of the president and
labor union activity were prohibited. Park
declared martial law and issued successive emer-
gency measures when met by large-scale student
protests. Publicly criticizing the constitution
became illegal. Political opponents and suspects
calling for the reinstatement of democracy were
often abducted, imprisoned, and tortured. Park’s
government justified these harsh measures and
the atmosphere of terror by citing the nation’s
need for national security in the face of a contin-
ued North Korean threat.
South Korea experienced a period of extensive
political change and upheaval following Park’s
assassination in 1979, which coincided with the
assassination and arrest of the regime’s major
leaders, such as the director of presidential secu-
rity and the director of the Korean Central
Intelligence Agency (KCIA) (Lee 1981). The
military, though present, was hardly unified
among its top-ranking officials, as was evident by
General Chun Doo Hwan’s December coup. Chun
issued martial law, suspending the National
653
Assembly and prohibiting political activity (Ebrey
et al. 2009). He also arrested hundreds of students
and opposition politicians. Not only was it a crime
to belong to the opposition, but also those who
supported such organizations were punished.
In order to establish independent power, Chun
revised the constitution in 1980. Although the
draft included many democratic elements, such
as the right to privacy in communications and the
prohibition of torture, it also contained supple-
mentary provisions that extended the presidential
term to 7 years and banned hundreds of politi-
cians from political activity (Lee 1992).
A system of dictatorship continued even after
Chun stepped down and General Roh Tae Woo
became his successor (Lee 1992). In 1992, how-
ever, Kim Young Sam became the president and
started the process of democratizing the nation.
Kim began by minimizing military interference
with political affairs. He purged the military of
previous dictators and even prosecuted Chun Doo
Hwan and Roh Tae Woo for treason, mutiny, and
corruption. He also established the first local
elections for provincial governors, city mayors,
county magistrates, and local assemblies.
Even during the late twentieth century, the
National Security Law was used to justify torture
and ill-treatment of prisoners who tried to pro-
mote freedom of expression in peaceful political
activities (Amnesty International 1998). Those
accused of belonging to underground socialist
and communist groups continued to be arrested
for “antistate” activities (Amnesty International
1991). As recently as 1998, almost 400 people
were arrested for “alleged pro-North Korean
offences” as well as 15 leaders of trade unions,
workers’ associations, and youths’ and women’s
groups. Supporters of political reform were
labeled as North Korean sympathizers and sen-
tenced to imprisonment of 3 to 15 years (Amnesty
International 1999). Sadly, despite a movement
towards democracy, the maltreatment by police
interrogators continued. Common torture meth-
ods included sleep deprivation and beatings.
Prisoners were denied the opportunity of having
family or lawyer visits, and long-term prisoners
were not released until they signed an agreement
under the National Security Law.
654
In their latest report, Amnesty International
(2009) found that the South Korean government
has continued to use excessive force and impris-
onment against antistate activities. The police
used excessive force against a group of predomi-
nantly peaceful citizens who were protesting the
importation of US beef. Reports claimed that
police beat some protestors with shields and
batons, fired water cannons at close range, and
denied medical care to detained protestors. The
report also described the violent mistreatment of
irregular migrant workers during the recent
crackdown.
In sum, East Asian countries have used torture
at various times, during the war and during their
social and economic development and political
transformations. Now, we turn to the present.
How do contemporary East Asians view the use
of torture? We will examine our survey data to
determine how contemporary East Asians view
and think about torture in the context of interna-
tional conflicts.
Survey Data and Analysis
The East Asian sample included 409 participants
(228 women, 181 men) recruited through several
different approaches; collection methods included
personal networking and posting of the survey link
on a number of sites. Although the majority of the
participants were living in their country of origin, a
substantial minority was living in the USA.
Specifically, the sample included 135 Japanese
(89 women, 46 men), 78 mainland Chinese (48
women, 30 men), 10 Hong Kong Chinese (8
women, 2 men), 8 Taiwanese (3 women, 5 men),
and 178 South Koreans (80 women, 98 men). All
participants completed the Personal and Institutional
Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey
(PAIRTAPS), either in hard copy format or online.
The ages of our participants ranged from 18 to
87 with a mean age of 30 years. Thirty-nine per-
cent identified themselves as Christians, 13% as
Buddhist, and 33% as not religious. In regard to
socioeconomic status, 50% reported being mid-
dle class, followed by 28% upper middle class,
and 13% working class. Twenty-two percent had
E. Hoshino-Browne et al.
personally served in the military, and 47% had
relatives in military service. Finally, 19% had
participated in protests against war and in favor
of peace.
The PAIRTAPS included three items concern-
ing torture. The first item asked participants to
indicate and explain their level of agreement with
the statement, “The government has the right to
order the torture of prisoners in times of war.”
The other two survey items concerned the
following scenario given to the participants:
“Military officials are torturing somebody
suspected of having information about terror-
ists.” Participants were asked to describe how
they would feel and what they would want to do
when confronted with an incident of torture.
Sociocognitive Coding Procedures
In examining participants’ responses, we devel-
oped a coding scheme based on Bandura’s (1999)
theory of moral engagement and disengagement.
Bandura identified four sociocognitive processes
through which moral self-sanctions can be disen-
gaged from immoral actions. First, cognitive
reconstruction of injurious behavior allows one to
portray a wrong action as serving or necessary for
a good cause by using moral justifications, euphe-
mistic labeling, or advantageous comparisons.
Second, removing or obscuring personal agency
weakens moral control as responsibility is removed
from one’s actions through displacement or diffu-
sion of responsibility. Third, misrepresenting,
minimizing, or disregarding consequences allows
one to ignore the sufferings and disconnect
the detrimental effects from the wrongdoings.
Finally, devaluing the victim allows perpetrators
to distance themselves from the recipient of their
actions and consequently decreases their level of
moral self-censure. These four processes are fur-
ther exhibited in eight mechanisms of moral
disengagement.
In contrast, one exhibits moral engagement
when one’s actions conform to one’s moral stan-
dards despite situational influences that may dic-
tate otherwise (Bandura 1999). Activation of
moral engagement is usually accompanied by
41 East Asia Torture
feelings of empathy, perceived similarity, and
recognition of social or moral obligations. In
practice, one demonstrates moral engagement
either through actively engaging in humane
behavior (proactive) or through refraining from
participating in inhumane activities (inhibitive).
Qualitative Survey Analyses
Views on a Government’s Right to Torture
In regard to the first survey item, governments’
right to torture, 44% of all responses provided
arguments supporting this right. Among the pro-
torture responses, 42% were coded into a sum-
mary category for pseudo-moral justifications
(e.g., “it could save lives”), advantageous com-
parison and last resort. For example, a 21-year-
old Korean male student responded, “I think that
it is possible to torture another country’s POWs
because our country citizens are more important
during a war.” A 35-year-old male Japanese
worker explained, “I know it’s not good, but I
think that torture is woven into a professional sol-
dier’s duty. And if the torture is to gain informa-
tion for one’s own country’s safety/people’s
safety, then I can’t really say that torture is all that
bad.” A 32-year-old male Chinese worker said,
“You do not get correct and truthful answers from
asking prisoners nicely. Torture is an option to be
considered.” By pointing out the ineffectiveness
of nonviolent methods and comparing this inef-
fectiveness to the necessity of achieving a goal
beneficial to many, this argument can contribute
to tolerance for torture. Other common themes
used in support of torture included attribution of
blame onto either the prisoner as a criminal or the
unusual circumstances of war (20% of all pro-
torture responses) and minimizing consequences
of torture (10% of all pro-torture responses). For
instance, a 68-year-old retired male Japanese
interpreter explained, “All torture inflicting phys-
ical pain must not be utilized, but some form of
psychological torture may be used if that would
save many lives.” A 20-year-old Chinese male
student responded, “In trying to play mind
games with the terrorist, psychological torture
is always better than physical.” Table 41.1
655
provides additional examples of responses in
support of a right to torture.
In contrast, 56% of all responses to this item
argued against the right to torture. Among the
responses arguing against a government’s right to
torture, 37% emphasized the humanity of prison-
ers as well as the importance of respecting human
rights. For example, a 26-year-old Korean male
student responded, “He/she may be guilty law-
fully, but one human’s right should be guaran-
teed.” An 18-year-old Japanese female student
explained, “At the point that they are war prison-
ers, they do not have weapons, and even though
they are soldiers of the enemy, they only have the
power of a single human being. Thus, torturing
war prisoners does not go with the purpose of
war, so it should not be allowed.” A 19-year-old
Chinese male student said, “This type of treat-
ment is inhumane. I can think of no circumstances
at this moment that warrant torture.” Fourteen
percent of the anti-torture responses emphasized
honoring international agreements. According to
a 61-year-old third-generation Japanese-
American woman, “The military must be account-
able to Congress, international tribune.” Finally,
12% of anti-torture responses pointed out the
ineffectiveness of torture and the availability of
better alternatives. For example, a 20-year-old
Japanese female student asked, “Why do you
have to torture? I think just imprisoning them is
enough,” and a 20-year-old Chinese male student
believed torture “isn’t constructive at all.”
Table 41.2 provides additional examples of
responses against a right to torture.
Personal Engagement and Emotional
and Motivational Responses
to the Torture Scenario
When participants were asked to consider what
they would want to do if they were confronted
with the sight of a military official torturing
someone who might know a terrorist, 22% of
responses indicated inclination for general posi-
tive action. Indeed, 73% of Japanese responses
called for actions to stop the torture. For instance,
a 74-year-old male Japanese retiree responded, “I
would want this to become public and give this
information to the mass media.” Others called for
656 E. Hoshino-Browne et al.

Table 41.1 Examples of arguments supportive of governments’ right to torture

Code % Country Age Gender Response
Pseudo-moral 18 (42) China 20 M If used correctly, it could save countless
justification sum lives. However, I’ve been hearing a lot
about abuse of this “right”
Taiwan 19 F This practice should not be used.
However, other countries use these tactics
and thus withholding the use of torture
could prove to be a disadvantage
Japan 79 M To obtain useful information from a war
prisoner, is there an ideal way? Respecting
the human rights of war prisoner, it is very
difficult to obtain information
South Korea 21 M A necessary evil for “living”
South Korea 26 F The general soldiers act under command,
but it would help our nation if we torture
the head of the force or a person with
authority, when appropriate, to find out the
information about the opposing country
Attribution of blame 9 (20) Hong Kong 21 F War is war
Taiwan 18 M I would establish that I have an individual
right to do what is necessary to get the
right information out of them
South Korea 24 F If it is the time of war, then it seems that
torture can be used from time to time.
I still see torture as not good though
South Korea 35 M To keep public order in time of war
Note: The pseudo-moral justification sum includes pseudo-moral justification scores as well as advantageous compari-
son and last resort scores. The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category
out of the total response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in that category out
of all pro-torture responses

Table 41.2 Examples of arguments against governments’ right to torture

Code % Country Age Gender Response
Honor international agreements 8 (14) China 19 F Torturing is not right. Who gives the
right for government to do that?
Japan 28 M If it is written as an international law,
that should not be allowed
Humanization and human rights 21 (37) Hong Kong 19 M They are humans, too. I don’t agree
that we can go torture other people
South Korea 44 M Although the war is occurring, one
cannot invade the prisoner’s basic
rights as a human, in situations without
involvement of justified processes
Note: The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total
response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in that category out of all anti-tor-
ture responses
41 East Asia Torture
Table 41.3 Responses to a hypothetical torture situation
Code/categories % Country
Positive actions– 15 (27) Taiwan
alternative solutions
Japan
South Korea
South Korea
Apathy 21 (75) China
Japan
South Korea
Compliant with torture 8 (86) Taiwan
South Korea
Note: The first number in the percent column refers to the percentage of responses in that category out of the total
response set. The second number (in parentheses) refers to the percent of responses in that category out of the major
category
agentive alternative solutions (15% of positive
action responses), such as a 45-year-old Japanese
male worker who responded, “Stop the torture,
and would want to start a just lawful procedure.”
A 34-year-old Korean male company employee
demanded “humane investigation.” In contrast,
22% of all responses to this item were coded for
apathy. A 35-year-old male Japanese worker
responded, “I don’t think I want to do anything. I
feel bad and feel like a coward, but I’d want to
keep a distance from the situation, physically and
mentally.” Finally, 8% of all responses to this
item were coded as being compliant with torture.
For example, a 57-year-old Korean male sug-
gested, “Continue the torture until the truth is
told.” Table 41.3 provides additional examples of
responses in the various personal involvement
categories.
Exploratory Quantitative Analyses
Chi-square tests were run to determine whether
there were any statistically significant demo-
graphic differences in participant responses.
Specifically, we explored the possibility of group
differences as a function of the following self-
reported variables: gender, social class, current
657
Age Gender Response
19 F Isolate the persons and don’t let them go.
No need to torture, as they will talk if they
want to leave
29 M Find other methods to extract information,
without torture
21 F I prefer conciliation over torture
34 M Humane investigation
19 M I don’t want to do anything
63 F I don’t want anything to do with it
24 M Remaining as a spectator
19 M Support the military officials’ torture
57 M Continue the torture until the truth is told
religion, service in the military, family member
in military, and involvement in antiwar protests.
In order to inform future research, marginally
statistically significant results were also reported.
Significant results have a p value of less than
0.05. Marginally significantly results have a p
value between 0.05 and 0.1.
Regarding support for a right of governments
to torture POWs, a significantly greater propor-
tion of men than women utilized reasoning asso-
ciated with advantageous comparison, and a
significantly greater proportion of participants
with experience in the military than participants
without military experience attributed blame to
the prisoners. Also, a marginally greater propor-
tion of participants who had served in the mili-
tary than their counterparts provided pseudo-moral
justifications in support of torture. In addition, a
significantly greater proportion of Buddhists than
nonreligious participants described torture as a
last resort.
In contrast, among the anti-torture arguments,
a significantly greater proportion of women than
men referenced moral principles, a significantly
greater proportion of working-class participants
than middle-class participants described the nega-
tive consequences of torture, and a significantly
greater proportion of nonreligious participants
658 E. Hoshino-Browne et al.

Table 41.4 Government’s right to torture prisoners of war: percentages of responses in coding categories by demographic
groups and chi-square values
Group 1a Group 2a
Categories Male Female c2
Advantageous comparison 17 6 7.81**
Moral principles 0 6 6.97**b
Military Nonmilitary
Attribution of blame 16 6 5.30*b
Pseudo-moral justification 7 1 5.20^b
Honor international agreement 0 8 3.70^b
Humanization 0 9 3.98*b
Protest No protest
Exonerating prisoners 6 0.7 5.88*b
Working class Middle class
Negative consequences 10 0 4.94*
Nonreligious Buddhist
Last resort 0 6 4.91*
Ineffective/not useful 0 9 7.34**
Christian Nonreligious
Moral principles 1 7 4.48*
**p £ 0.01; *p £ 0.05; ^0.05 < p < 0.10
a
The numbers in these columns are the percent of the group that gave responses falling into each of the specified
categories
b
Fisher’s exact test

than Christians quoted moral principles against
torture. In addition, a significantly greater propor-
tion of Buddhists than nonreligious participants
described torture as ineffective. Furthermore, a
significantly greater proportion of participants
who had not served in the military provided
responses humanizing torture victims than those
who had served. Also, a marginally greater pro-
portion of nonmilitary participants emphasized
honoring international agreements. Finally, a
significantly greater proportion of antiwar protes-
tors than non-protestors exonerated the prisoners
of war in their arguments against torture. These
statistics can be found in Table 41.4.
Statistically significant group differences were
also observed for emotional and motivational
responses to the scenario of military officials tor-
turing someone suspected of having information
concerning terrorists. Specifically, a significantly
greater proportion of women than men suggested
general positive actions to stop the torture,
whereas a significantly greater proportion of men
than women provided agentive alternative solu-
tions. A marginally greater proportion of men
than women were compliant with torture. Also, a
significantly greater proportion of participants
who had served in the military than those who
had not exhibited views that were compliant with
torture. A significantly greater proportion of
Buddhists suggested agentive alternative solu-
tions than did Christians and nonreligious partici-
pants. A significantly greater proportion of
participants with no history of military service
recommended political activism and institutional
changes through protest and appeals to interna-
tional committees than did their counterparts.
A marginally greater proportion of participants
who had served in the military than those with no
history of military service appeared passive
regarding torture, whereas a significantly greater
proportion of participants without military ser-
vice showed apathy toward torture. Similarly, a
41 East Asia Torture 659

Table 41.5 Torture scenario analyses: percentages of responses in coding categories by demographic groups
and chi-square values
Categories Group 1a Group 2a
Male Female c2
Positive action 10 20 3.93*
Alternative solutions 15 6 4.75*
Compliant with torture 8 2 3.40^
Helplessness 1 7 5.36*b
Military Nonmilitary
Political activism/institutional 2 15 5.04*
Passive regarding torture 12 4 3.82^b
Apathy 5 18 4.63*
Compliant with torture 12 3 4.79*b
Relative military No relative military
Passive regarding torture 10 2 5.76*
Apathy 6 21 9.46**
Protest No protest
Apathy 6 17 3.42^
Buddhist Christian
Alternative solutions 18 10 5.62*
Buddhist Nonreligious
Alternative solutions 18 10 4.91*
Christian Nonreligious
Passive regarding torture 12 0 10.24***
Apathy 9 22 6.28**
***p £ 0.001; **p £ 0.01; *p £ 0.05; ^0.05 < p < 0.10
a
The numbers in these columns are the percent of the group that gave responses falling into each of the specified
categories
b
Fisher’s exact test

significantly greater proportion of participants men demonstrated helplessness in their responses

with relatives in the military were passive regard-
ing torture, whereas a significantly greater pro-
portion of participants without relatives in the
military showed apathy toward torture than did
their counterparts. This same pattern was seen in
the religion category. That is, a significantly
greater proportion of Christians than nonreligious
participants were passive regarding torture,
whereas a significantly greater proportion of non-
religious participants demonstrated apathy
towards torture. A marginally greater proportion
of participants who had not protested against war
than participants who had protested gave
responses demonstrating apathy. Finally, a
significantly greater proportion of women than
to torture. Statistical information on responses to
this item is available in Table 41.5.
Summary and Discussion
As indicated in the brief review of the history of
torture at the beginning of this chapter, torture
and mistreatment have long been prevalent in
East Asia, and in some countries, it has been used
until quite recently. East Asian countries have
tortured and mistreated not only the POWs of
their enemies or citizens of invaded countries,
but also each country has engaged in the inhu-
mane oppression of its own people.
660
To examine contemporary East Asians’
perspective on torture, we analyzed the survey
data collected from more than 400 East Asians.
The results indicate that 56% of East Asian par-
ticipants opposed the government’s right to order
the torture of prisoners in times of war, whereas
44% of the participants supported that right. When
asked how they would feel and what they would
wish to do when confronted with an incident of
torture, 55% of the participants indicated that they
would take positive actions, such as stopping the
torture by making it public, protesting, and encour-
aging a humanitarian investigation. On the other
hand, 28% of the participants were either passive
about torture or apathetic to the prisoner, and 7%
were compliant with the use of the torture.
The major pattern of results indicates that the
majority of East Asian participants were against
the government’s right to torture, and they sug-
gested taking positive actions against torture.
However, this positive result is shadowed by the
finding that a substantial minority of the partici-
pants advocated the government’s right to torture
and that about one-third of the participants were
either passive or apathetic toward torture, or
accepting torture. What would be the reasoning
or justifications for such moral disengagement?
Although it is hard to interpret the results by
religious category or by socioeconomic class cat-
egory, it is illuminating to consider sex differ-
ences and differences due to military service. In
supporting the government’s right to torture,
males tended to make advantageous comparisons
and argue for the importance of saving the lives
of those from their own country. Males also
tended to accept the use of torture when con-
fronted with an incident of torture. Numerous
past studies demonstrated sex differences in
aggression, finding that males tend to be more
physically aggressive than females (e.g.,
Bartholow and Anderson 2002; Eagly and Steffen
1986). Such an aggressive tendency among males
seems to overlap with the current result of males’
inclination toward the use of torture and their
justification for it.
Experiences in the military or having relatives
in the military also seemed to influence people’s
perspectives on torture. Participants with military
E. Hoshino-Browne et al.
service and those who had relatives in the military
tended to support the government’s use of tor-
ture as the most effective method to obtain neces-
sary information. They also regarded the use of
torture justifiable because it could save many
lives, and they tended to blame the war or the
circumstances in justifying torture. When con-
fronted with the torture incident, they were
inclined to be passive and avoid taking any
actions. Although it is difficult to determine the
exact cause of moral justification and passivity
that people with military experience showed, it
can be speculated that military training and mili-
tary culture cultivate the use of torture as a legiti-
mate means of investigation. It is also possible
that those who justify torture are more likely to
join the military. However, this possibility does
not explain why those who had relatives in the
military also tended to support and justify the use
of torture. One plausible reason for justifying tor-
ture may be reduction of dissonance they experi-
ence. According to the cognitive dissonance
theory (Festinger 1957), when behavior is not
consistent with attitude, a person experiences dis-
sonance or psychological discomfort. In order to
alleviate this psychological tension, the person
would adjust attitude to align it with the behavior.
When people are in the military, they may not be
able to avoid the possibility of torturing terrorists
or POWs. Even if they are not directly involved
in torture, through a collective identity with the
military, they may be psychologically associated
with its use of torture. As for those who had rela-
tives in the military, they are associated by blood
or marriage with those who have the possibility
of engaging in torture. Thus, actively opposing
torture would produce psychological discomfort.
On the other hand, defending or justifying the use
of torture, or at least passively observing torture,
would protect their collective identity with the
military or with the relative and their sense of
self-worth. Perhaps such self-protective rational-
ization leads people who had served in the mili-
tary or who had relatives in the military to express
passivity and apathy toward torture or to blame
the enemy in justifying torture.
Such a potential role of cognitive dissonance
in the moral disengagement process is yet to be
41 East Asia Torture
tested. Once a causal mechanism becomes clearer,
researchers may be able to identify factors that
could help in reducing moral disengagement and
promoting moral engagement. It is hoped that
such promotion of moral engagement will be
another effective step forward to peace.
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 Torture: Integrative Chapter
Kimberly Rapoza and Megan Clapp
In the 1970s, Shue (1978) noted that torture was
both contrary to international law and, like slav-
ery, generally universally condemned. Shue
noted, however, that although slavery was in
decline, the use of torture was growing. Even
governments widely viewed as civilized were uti-
lizing torture as part of policy. Torture in the con-
text of war is not new and reference to such
behaviors date back to medieval times and before
(Rosemann 2006). However, in the last 100 years,
attempts have been made to define and prevent
torture in times of both war and peace.
The Geneva Convention (IV) adopted in 1949
set forth provisions for the protection of combat-
ants and civilians in times of war (Geneva
Convention n.d.). Informed by the experiences of
civilians and soldiers in World War II, Article 3.1
of the Geneva Convention states that civilians
should be treated humanely in all circumstances.
It specifically prohibits violence to life and per-
son (i.e., mutilation, cruel treatment, and torture),
taking hostages, humiliating and degrading treat-
ment, and executions without judgment by a reg-
ularly constituted court.
Another definitional approach has come from
the 1984 Convention against Torture and Other
Cruel and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment (Declaration on the Protection of All
Persons n.d.). Article 1 of this convention defines
torture as “any act by which severe pain or suffer-
ing, whether physical or mental, is intentionally
inflicted by or at the instigation of a public official
on a person for such purposes of obtaining from
K. Malley-Morrison et al. (eds.), International Handbook of War, Torture, and Terrorism,
Peace Psychology Book Series, DOI 10.1007/978-1-4614-1638-8_42,
© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2013
42
him or a third person information or confession,
punishing him for an act he has committed or is
suspected of having committed, or intimidate
him or other persons.” Article 3 states that no
state may permit torture and that “exceptional
circumstances such as a state of war or threat of
war, internal political instability or any other
public emergency may not be invoked as a
justification of torture or other cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment.”
The reasons preventing torture are multifold,
but certainly, the long-term consequences of
torture make a compelling argument against its
use. Not only does the actual act of torture cause
immediate physical pain, maiming, or
disfigurement, but the effects of torture may last
far longer than the duration of the actual event or
specific physical injuries stemming from the
violence. Commonalities in long-term compro-
mised physical and mental health have been
found in victims of torture from diverse back-
grounds and cultures. For example, common
symptoms found in victims of torture are post-
traumatic stress disorder (Van Velsen et al.
2006); anxiety disorders, affective disorders,
and somatic complaints (Holtz 1998; Mollica
et al. 1987); and impaired memory, headaches,
depression, sleeplessness, sexual disturbances,
apathy, and helplessness (Turner and Gorst-
Unsworth 1990).
One trend occurring in the last decade has
been governmental acknowledgement of involve-
ment in torture. Recent news stories include
663
664
apologies by governments (some for the first
time) for state-sanctioned torture committed at
some previous time. For example, the president
of El Salvador, Mauricio Funes, apologized to
victims of the 1980–1992 civil war (El Salvador
President n.d.), including Archbishop Oscar
Romero, whose murder made international head-
lines. In his speech, President Funes noted that
the government had been involved in serious
human rights violations, such as torture, massa-
cres, forced disappearances (approximately 8,000
people are still missing), sexual abuses, and
executions.
In other examples of official acknowledge-
ment of previous involvement in inhumane acts,
the government of the United Kingdom admitted
that it covered up the role of M15 (a UK intelli-
gence agency) in the “extraordinary rendition”
of suspected terrorists for the CIA (a US intelli-
gence agency) and apologized for the withhold-
ing of documentation of said involvement from
the courts (Rose 2009). Japan, for the first time,
acknowledged and apologized for the torture of
South Korean citizens from 1910 to 1945,
including forcing women to work as sex slaves
and forced manual labor by the Japanese army
(Kim 2010). For the first time in Turkish history,
the Turkish government has recently apologized
for the death of an imprisoned leftist author
(Gilmore 2008).
Torture and incidents involving torture have
been part of recent international debate and high-
profile cases in the news. The 2003 torture of
Iraqi prisoners in Abu Ghraib by American sol-
diers and photographic evidence released to the
public made international headlines. According
to Sontag (2004), the images of prisoners who
were forced to stand or maintain physically
stressful positions, attacked by dogs, and sub-
jected to acts of sexual humiliation spurred
international outrage; these images also stimu-
lated debate as to the applicability of prior
international law regarding torture to “new cir-
cumstances.” That is, the American government
declared that terrorists are “unlawful combatants”
and so do not have rights under the Geneva
Convention.
K. Rapoza and M. Clapp
Another incident recently in the news was the
discovery of secret prisons, located in Lithuania,
Romania, Thailand, Poland, Morocco, and
Afghanistan, and used by the American CIA for
torture (Cole and Ross 2009). These secluded
prisons inflicted harsh interrogation tactics such
as sleep deprivation, forced standing, and painful
stress positions on terrorism suspects.
In 2009, the trial of Khmer Rouge prison chief
Kaing Guek Eav revealed the torture and brutal-
ity experienced by 14,000 Cambodians in Tuol
Sleng prison (Mydans 2009). Many of these pris-
oners were tortured and killed for political dis-
sent (which was sometimes “established” through
appearance or background). The Khmer Rouge
regime killed an estimated 1.7 million people;
many were brutally beaten to death and left in
mass graves known as the “killing fields.” The
composition and creation of the tribunal has been
criticized by human rights groups as compromis-
ing international standards of justice since allega-
tions of corruption and manipulation by the
Cambodian government have surfaced.
The imprisonment of journalist Roxana
Saberi also made international headlines. She
was arrested and detained at Evin prison in Iran,
known for brutal treatment and for housing
political prisoners, sometimes indefinitely.
Although Saberi was a citizen of both Iran and
the United States, Iran stated it would recognize
only Iranian citizenship, and so Saberi was sub-
ject only to Iranian law. Saberi referred to her
experiences as “white torture” (Memarian and
Saberi 2010). “White torture” does not leave
physical marks but is designed to cause mental
anguish and pain. Saberi was denied access to an
attorney and family, often blindfolded and inter-
rogated, denied access to the charges against her,
and threatened with long-term imprisonment
and death.
What all the recent cases seem to have in com-
mon is both the generation of a sense of interna-
tional disgust and outrage at the use of torture by
a government and also clear evidence of efforts
on the part of that government to manipulate,
avoid, or circumvent the application of already
existing international law.
42 Torture: Integrative Chapter
Given growing attention to the issue of torture,
what kinds of judgments do ordinary people in
today’s world, more than 60 years after the first
international agreements on torture, make about
the use of state-sanctioned torture? In an investi-
gation aimed at understanding why ordinary
people torture, Fiske et al. (2004) conducted a
meta-analysis of 25,000 studies of how people
influence each other; they found that social con-
text and social processes, and not just personal
deficiencies and sadistic character, are an expla-
nation for brutality and aggression. Emotions and
attitudes such as prejudice may lead to or stem
from contempt for an out-group that increases
susceptibility to aggression, violence, or exclu-
sion toward “one of them.” Obedience to author-
ity can enhance and smooth out social relations
but can also lead to violent or destructive behav-
ior. Fiske et al. note that “torture is partly a crime
of socialized obedience. Subordinates not only
do what they are ordered to do, but what they
think their superior would order them to do, given
their understanding of the authority’s overall
goals” (p. 1483). Hence, the commission of tor-
ture is a complex interplay between individual
propensities, the specific context into which indi-
viduals are placed, and the society’s social norms
toward such behavior. The proceeding chapters
examined the kinds of reasoning individuals
bring to questions regarding torture; such reason-
ing is reflective of the society and social forces
that surround their daily lives. Fiske et al. argue
that although individuals should be held account-
able for their actions, so to should the peers and
superiors who create and maintain the social con-
tacts and contexts that make torture appear to be
permissible.
Perspectives on Torture
The previous chapters in this section have consid-
ered the coded qualitative responses of partici-
pants from Africa, East Asia, South Asia/
Southeast Asia, Latin America, Russia and the
Balkans, the Middle East, Western Europe, and
our four-country “Anglo region” regarding torture.
This chapter considers the extent to which the
665
participants from these eight regions have similar
or different views concerning the right of states
to sanction torture, as well as similar or different
expectations about what they would want to do if
directly exposed to torture.
As explained in earlier chapters, responses to
the two torture items from the Personal and
Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace
Survey (PAIRTAPS) were coded using a
Moral Engagement/Disengagement Coding
Manual developed by members of the Group on
International Perspectives of Governmental
Aggression and Peace (GIPGAP). The manual
was researcher-developed using a “deductive
qualitative analysis” approach (Gilgun 2004)
based on work by Albert Bandura (e.g., Bandura
et al. 1996; Bandura 1999). The first item directs
survey respondents to indicate their level of
agreement, on a 7-point Likert scale, with the
item: “The government has the right to order the
torture of prisoners in time of war,” and then to
explain the reasoning behind their rating. The
second statement poses the scenario: “Assume
that you have very direct and dramatic exposure
to each of the situations below—that is, either
you witness them directly or you see them hap-
pening live on a TV show or documentary that
exposes you to the event in the most immediate
and dramatic way. Please indicate first how you
would feel in the situation and then what you
would want to do. Military officials are torturing
somebody suspected of having information about
terrorists. What would you want to do?”
Moral Disengagement Theory
as a Basis for Coding
Albert Bandura views the individual as self-
organizing, proactive, and self-modulating. His
theory (2002) on moral disengagement and
engagement holds that individuals develop ethi-
cal standards that guide social conduct, that they
derive self-esteem and worth from behaving in
ways that are in keeping with their standards, and
that they will attempt to refrain from violating
these self-imposed internal standards. However, at
times and in some contexts, the self-regulation of
666
conduct is suspended as the individual becomes
convinced that ethical standards no longer apply,
thereby diverting moral reactions away from
reprehensible conduct.
According to Bandura’s theory of moral dis-
engagement, there are several specific sociocog-
nitive mechanisms by which self-condemnation
for inhumane behavior is disabled; each of these
mechanisms is represented as a major coding cat-
egory in our coding manual. Based on our deduc-
tive qualitative analysis, we also identified a
number of subsidiary sociocognitive mechanisms
embraced by his larger moral disengagement cat-
egories; these subsidiary mechanisms became
subcategories for the more general coding cate-
gories within the coding manual. Our focus in all
of our coding has been not so much on Bandura’s
more general categories of moral disengagement
and engagement as on the particular ways of
thinking and responding that people bring to
judgments concerning torture.
Coding of Torture-Tolerant
Responses
In regard to responses indicating at least some
tolerance for torture, one of the major categories
derived from Bandura’s theory was moral and
social justification; responses in this category
were generally rationalizations for torture that
emphasized a moral or socially worthy purpose.
Moral and social justification subcategories
included advantageous comparison, which
justifies an action by comparing it with a morally
worse action, and last resort, that is, responses
indicating that torture is justifiable only as a last
option. A second major category derived from
Bandura’s theory is euphemistic labeling,
responses that reframe the harmful realities of
torture in more pleasant or neutral speech.
Another major category, denial of responsibility,
has three subcategories: (1) diffusion of responsi-
bility, which spreads the responsibility for torture
among many agents and lessens the contributions
of the individual; (2) displacement of responsibil-
ity, which shifts blame for the use of torture onto
the involvement or social pressure of others; and
K. Rapoza and M. Clapp
(3) indifference. Other major categories of
responses showing some tolerance for torture
include the following: misrepresenting/disputing
or minimizing the consequences of the individu-
al’s actions, dehumanization of the “other” so as
to depersonalize or make less human the mem-
bers of the outside group, and attribution of
blame, that is, suggestions that the victims acted
so as to bring on their own suffering. Revenge is
a subcategory of attribution of blame that implies
that torture is justifiable on a tit-for-tat basis.
Coding of Anti-Torture Responses
When faced with a situation of potential harm to
others, individuals may also choose to act in
ways that maintain their internal standards of
morality. When acting in accord with their moral
standards, individuals are described as morally
engaged in Bandura’s theory. Based on our artic-
ulation of sociocognitive mechanisms of moral
engagement that are the reciprocal of Bandura’s
moral disengagement mechanisms, we identified
five coding categories for responses arguing
against a state’s right to torture. The first major
category, principles, applies to responses that
refer to moral principles as a basis for rejecting a
direct or indirect request to condone injurious
behavior. The principled reasoning category is
further divided into three subcategories: (1) per-
sonal moral principles, that is, arguments that
torture must not be tolerated because it violates
ethical standards; (2) honor international agree-
ments, responses emphasizing the importance of
respect for international laws; and (3) humaniza-
tion, responses emphasizing the other person’s
humanity and/or human rights, the basic privi-
leges that should be granted to all people, such as
equality, liberty, etc.
A second major sociocognitive mechanism
and coding category is descriptive language,
which is the counterpart to euphemistic labeling
and frames inhumane actions in accurate and
realistic terms. The third mechanism/coding
category, principled comparison, which applies
to responses indicating human alternatives to tor-
ture, includes two subcategories: (1) better
42 Torture: Integrative Chapter
alternative, for responses indicating that there are
now more appropriate or humane behaviors for
dealing with a suspect than torture, and (2) inef-
fective/not useful for responses arguing that
torture is actually ineffective. The fourth mecha-
nism, awareness of negative consequences, is
reflected in responses holding the use of torture
will result in negative outcomes. The last mecha-
nism, exonerating prisoners, removes blame
from the prisoner or intended victim for the cir-
cumstances in which they find themselves.
Views on Government Right to Torture
In response to the first prompt, “The government
has the right to order the torture of prisoners dur-
ing times of war,” responses varied across regions.
East Asia had the highest rate of responses agree-
ing with the prompt, at 44%. Southeast Asia,
Africa, and the Middle East all had approximately
34% of responses agreeing with the state’s right
to use torture. Russia/the Balkans followed with
a 27% agreement rate, the UK/Anglo group a
25% agreement rate, and the South Asia/Southeast
Asia sample had 21%. Fifteen percent of Western
European responses and 14% of Latin American
responses agreed with the prompt.
There were commonalities across regions,
with advantageous comparison being the most
commonly expressed justification for tolerance
of torture in each country. The second most com-
mon of the torture-tolerant responses was attri-
bution of blame. Only in Southeast Asia was
pseudo-moral justifications mentioned more than
attribution of blame.
Responses from Latin Americans disagreed
with a government’s right to torture at a rate of
84%, followed by 81% of Western European
responses, 74% of South/Southeast Asians and
75% of Africans. Responses from Russia and the
Balkans disagreed with the prompt at the rate of
69%, US/UK participant responses disagreed at a
rate of 72%, Middle Eastern responses 63%, and
East Asian responses disagreed at the rate of 56%.
Qualitative responses rejecting a state’s right
to torture were most frequently expressed in very
general terms, although responses also represented
667
a fairly wide set of sociocognitive processes
reflective of morally engaged reasoning. The most
common argument against torture in almost every
region was the humanization of the victim, and
arguments exonerating the prisoner were almost
as popular across regions. In the African sample,
these two forms of reasoning prevailed. Arguments
appealing to human rights were also notable in
the South/Southeast Asian, Western European,
and UK/Anglo samples. Recommendations to
honor international mandates to protect people
from torture tended to occur most often in the
Western European, East Asian, Russia/Balkans,
and UK/Anglo samples; references to the ineffec-
tiveness of torture were also found in Western
Europe, East Asia, and the UK/Anglo samples.
It is interesting that the regions with govern-
mental or legal emphasis contain countries that
have been known as “super powers” or emerging
“super powers” within the last 50 years. The
countries within these regions also make up pow-
erful leadership in the United Nations. For
instance, the five permanent members on the
United Nations Security Council are China,
France, the United States, the United Kingdom,
and the Russian Federation, which has the power
to sanction or endorse armed conflict between
one nation and another for reason of self-defense.
Perhaps respondents from these regions invoked
legalistic arguments because socially or cultur-
ally, the options are perceived as both possible
and politically well defined.
The Role of Demographic
Characteristics in Reasoning About
Torture
All respondents provided demographic informa-
tion in addition to their responses to the
PAIRTAPS. The demographic responses pro-
vided us with the opportunity to determine the
extent to which the frequency of particular forms
of reasoning that were tolerant or intolerant of
torture varied as a function of gender, religion,
military experience, having a family member in
the military, involvement in protest activities,
social class, and nationality.
668
Gender
Across regions, gender was the most robust
contributor to reasoning about torture. Overall,
women tended to disagree with the state’s right to
torture more often than men. In particular, women
from Russia and the Balkans, Southeast Asia, and
the United Kingdom/Anglo samples tended to
rely more on the mechanism humanizing the pris-
oners to argue against a state’s right to torture.
Men in the same regions tended to justify the
state’s use of torture by using advantageous com-
parison, suggesting that torturing prisoners can
lead to better outcomes than failure to torture.
Men, more so than women, in Western Europe
also tended to refer to honor international
mandates.
In general, the greater number of arguments
against torture offered by females in our samples
is in keeping with cross-cultural research, which
has found women to be less supportive than men
of conflict and war. Several studies have indi-
cated that women experience more negative emo-
tions than men during times of conflict.
Specifically, in a cross-national study of attitudes
toward the Gulf War in adults from large cities in
11 countries (Turkey, Belgium, Germany, Nigeria,
England, Mexico, Russia, France, Italy, Israel,
and Japan), many of which overlap with the sam-
ples from the current project, fewer women than
men supported military action (Wilcox et al.
1996). Also, in a study of secondary school stu-
dents from the United States and four European
countries (Estonia, Finland, Romania and the
Russian Federation), girls were consistently less
likely than boys to agree that war was necessary
(McAlister et al. 2001).
Military Experience
Whether or not a person had military experience
was also related to the use of particular arguments
for or against state’s use of torture. In the Middle
East and East Asia samples, advantageous
comparison was significantly more prevalent in
the responses of people with military experience
than in those without any such experience.
K. Rapoza and M. Clapp
Respondents with military service from Western
Europe and Russia/the Balkans were less likely
to mention torture as violation of human rights,
but responses from both regions were more likely
to call upon the government to conform to inter-
national agreements. On the other hand, East
Asians without military experience were more
likely than their counterparts to invoke the honor
international mandates to honor international
agreements.
The regions in our project vary in regard to
the nature of military service within the different
countries in each region. That is, for countries in
the UK/Anglo region, the Western European
region, and the Latin American region, military
service generally is on a volunteer basis
(although in some of the nations in those region,
a war or conflict would lead to implementation
of a draft). By contrast, in the Russian/Balkans
region, almost all countries have mandatory
conscription. The other regions, Africa, East
Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East are mixed,
with some countries having voluntary armies
and others engaging in conscription. These dif-
ferences in recruitment policy did not always
seem to play a role in our samples’ attitudes
toward a state’s right to torture; for example,
despite their major differences in military
recruitment, Western European and Russian/
Balkan participants were similar in viewing tor-
ture less as a violation of human rights and more
as a responsibility of the government in regulat-
ing military behavior.
Castano et al. (2008) note that the military in
general plays a role in the formation of an indi-
vidual’s self-identity; in addition, group member-
ship creates and maintains social norms of
acceptable and unacceptable behavior, especially
if there is emotional significance attached to
group membership. According to Castano et al.,
the military can shape attitudes and behaviors
that respect or disrespect international law in par-
ticular because of the small to average size of the
units soldiers are in and also because the military
is rooted in and defined by political, social,
religious, and ideological mechanisms. Hence,
whether personnel are recruited or drafted, the
actual institution of the military (and government
42 Torture: Integrative Chapter
oversight) may set the tone for individual attitudes
and beliefs.
Results from Latin America were interesting
when compared with responses from other
regions. In contrast with participants with mili-
tary experience in East Asia, who often men-
tioned attribute blame for the use of torture to the
prisoners of war, Latin Americans with military
experience less often mentioned attribute blame
in regard to POWs than those without military
experience. Latin American respondents with
military experience showed greater propensity to
humanize the POWs than respondents without
military experience, while those with military
experience in the Middle East and the United
States/United Kingdom showed less propensity
to humanize.
These variations in relationships between mil-
itary status and views may stem from the differ-
ent histories of war and peace in the different
regions. In the last half decade, the majority of
conflicts and wars involving the Middle East and
the United States/United Kingdom have been
interstate wars. During the same period, armed
conflict in Latin America has been primarily
intrastate, comprised of civil wars, military coups,
or guerrilla warfare. Fitch (2001) noted that in the
previous 20 years in Latin America, there had
been a trend of demilitarizing governments,
transferring power to civilian governments, and
undertaking democratic elections. Perhaps the
tendency for participants in Latin America with
military experience to refrain from attributing
blame to prisoners of war and to humanize them
is in part due to a direct relationship with the vic-
tims of torture. That is, in Latin America, torture
victims were less likely to be outsiders and more
likely to be fellow citizens—perhaps even family
members or neighbors. Fitch (2001) noted the
strain and struggle experienced within Argentina
when attempts were made to bring both high-
ranking and low-ranking officers from the “dirty
war” to trial for violations of human rights laws.
Perhaps the attributions made regarding the
acceptability or lack of acceptability of torture
are complex and also dependent on whether the
tortured is perceived as a fellow citizen (right or
wrong in their behavior) or an outsider.
669
Religion
Cook and Powell (2003) noted that religious
traditions within a society can influence punitive
mentalities (i.e., personal attitudes towards pun-
ishment), and these in turn can influence or be
influenced by legal sanctions and punitive state
responses to crime. Interestingly, religious ideol-
ogy can be the source both of the perpetration of
aggression towards others and the theological
justification for persecuting some other group. In
the current project, there were some significant
differences among religious affiliations in the
likelihood that particular arguments would be
made regarding a right to torture, though the
responses did not often follow any clear trends
across regions. However, the relative lack of reli-
able differences in patterns of responses based on
religious affiliations might signal the need to
assess religious conservatism in addition to
affiliation. Across religions, religious fundamen-
talism has been found to be positively related to
greater willingness to support the arrest, torture,
and execution of political radicals (Altemeyer
and Hunsberger 1992), and so the intertwining of
political conservatism with religious conserva-
tism may increase propensity or advocacy of the
government’s use of torture, particularly if it
involves a group towards which there is general
prejudice in the society. Studies have found posi-
tive relationships between religious fundamental-
ism and negative social attitudes toward
individuals of other religious groups (Altemeyer
2003). Thus, specific religious affiliations may
matter less in relationship to attitudes towards
torture than whether there is greater or less ten-
dency towards religious fundamentalism.
Participation in War Protesting
A participant’s history of participating in war
protests heralds mostly predictable outcomes,
with protestors generally giving responses reject-
ing the acceptability of torture. However, one
somewhat weak but potentially provocative
finding was that although war protestors in East
Asia tended to exonerate the prisoners of war in
670
their arguments against torture, war protestors in
the UK/Anglo sample more often mentioned
responses attributing blame to prisoners of war
than nonprotestors. This finding is interesting
because both regions generally have strong tradi-
tions of protest. For instance, a 2006 military
coup in Thailand has sparked years of political
protests. China has traditions of protest going
back to the Qing dynasty, centering on issues
such as justice and equity (the most famous recent
demonstration was held at Tiananmen Square).
Recent protests in China have involved worker’s
rights and the government’s use of eminent
domain to take land for factories (Cha 2009).
The UK/Anglo countries also have traditions
of protest, which in recent years have been
directed at ending particular wars. The United
States had mass protests against involvement in
the Vietnam War (and smaller scale protests
against the first Iraqi war). Recently, large scale
protests have been staged in the UK regarding the
second Iraqi war. Regarding protest movements
in the UK, McKay (1998) noted that as
compared to earlier protest movements, which
often involved blockades and leafleting, the direct
action movements of the 1990s took on more
confrontational tactics that might involve sabo-
tage or damaging property. Bromley et al. (2004)
noted that protest activity in the UK has increased
in recent years, and this activity may be one
means by which people are choosing to engage in
the political process, despite a steady decline in
voter turnout. The differences in ideology under-
lying the different protest movements could be
one reason for some apparent differences between
regions in views on whether there is a state’s right
to torture.
Responses to the Torture Scenario
This section discusses responses to the second
prompt: “Military officials are torturing some-
body suspected of having information about ter-
rorists. You have direct and dramatic exposure to
the event. What would you want to do?” The cod-
ing guidelines for responses to this item, informed
by Bandura’s construct of moral engagement,
K. Rapoza and M. Clapp
were designed to assess the extent to which there
was evidence of personal agency in the partici-
pants’ descriptions of their projected motivations
for action (or not). The coding manual identifies
four major thematic categories: positive action,
passivity regarding torture, compliance with tor-
ture, and helplessness.
Moral Agency Coding
Responses that were proactive, indicating a belief
in the need to assume some form of responsibility
for action in regard to the torture portrayed in the
scenario, were coded for positive action. Some of
the positive action responses were quite general,
an appeal to action in order to stop or prevent tor-
ture, but failed to give details or describe a plan.
There were also, however, several different types
of positive action, which led to three different
positive action subcategories: political/institu-
tional activism, moral awareness, and agentic
alternative solutions. Political/institutional activ-
ism is coded from responses imploring the gov-
ernment or another institution to prohibit torture.
Moral awareness responses project an attempt to
make others understand why torture is an immoral
act. The last subcategory of positive action, agen-
tic alternative solutions, involves generating
ideas for interacting with the prisoners that do not
include torture.
Responses coded into the category passivity
regarding torture indicated a lack of motivation
to take action regarding torture. A subcategory of
passive regarding torture, apathy, applied to
responses demonstrating indifference and detach-
ment regarding torture. Another subcategory,
compliant with torture, applied to responses indi-
cating tolerance for the torture being portrayed.
Lastly, some responses were coded for helpless-
ness because they expressed an inability to take a
personal stand for or against torture.
Results by Region
Consistent with a high level of rejection of a state’s
right to torture, many regions demonstrated
42 Torture: Integrative Chapter
response rates over 50% for personal engage-
ment. For example, a majority of responses from
Western Europe and the UK/Anglo region were
coded for some form of positive action. Thirteen
percent of responses from Africa mentioned posi-
tive action.
The three different types of positive action
responses given include general nonspecific pos-
itive action responses, political activism/institu-
tional, and agentic alternative solutions. A
common response across regions, political activ-
ism/institutional, was frequently mentioned in
responses by Western European, UK/Anglo,
Latin American, South and Southeast Asia, and
Russia and the Balkans. Although mentioned less
frequently in participant responses across regions,
agentic alternative solutions constituted the third
most frequently mentioned subcategory of posi-
tive action responses.
Interesting differences emerged in the mention
of the apathy and compliance with torture catego-
ries across regions. For instance, in Western
Europe, the least frequent responses were apathy
(6%) (i.e., a lack of concern for the prisoner and
no desire to attempt to rectify the situation) and
compliance with torture (4%). Less than 10% of
responses from East Asia were compliant with
torture, and approximately one-third were passive
regarding torture mechanisms, while approxi-
mately 10% of the American, Canadian, British,
and Australian responses were compliant with
torture. For South Asian and Southeast Asian par-
ticipants, apathy and compliance accounted for
around 11% each. Around 9% of Russian/Balkans
responded with compliance, and 17% of responses
mentioned apathy. In the Middle East, 17% of
responses expressed apathy. Compliance with
torture made up 15% of Middle Eastern responses.
The most common type of response in African
participants was apathetic. Approximately 64%
of African respondents suggested that they would
not take any sort of action if faced with a torture
scenario, often simply replying with a variation of
“nothing.” Despite Africa’s low positive action
response rate, they also had one of the lowest
response rates for compliant with torture (4%).
Any consideration of differences in thinking
about issues cross-culturally can be enriched by a
671
consideration of the constructs of individualism
and collectivism. Individualism is characterized
by giving priority to self-reliance, personal iden-
tity, and an internal locus of control. The self is
viewed as unique and with special personal traits
or characteristics; this set of values and perspec-
tives tends to predominate in countries (regions)
with affluence, mobility, and urbanization
(Marshall 1997). Collectivism is characterized by
an interdependent sense of self, where identity is
defined in relation to others (especially family or
work groups) and an emphasis is placed on tradi-
tion, harmony, and honor (Kim and Markus
1999). It is interesting that in our project, the
regions with individuals most often noting some
form of positive action and political activism/
institutional response were also regions known to
be individualistic cultures. The regions where
passive mechanisms and apathy were greatest
also tended to be collectivistic cultures. A meta-
analytic review spanning 17 different countries
found overall collectivistic cultures tended to
contain individuals more willing to conform to
group pressure than individualistic cultures (Bond
and Smith 1996). Perhaps the choice of action (or
inaction) is guided by strong cultural influences
on what constitutes normative behavior regarding
authority (such as the government or military).
However, it is interesting to note that there is
great variability among collectivistic cultures in
regard to themes of positive action or apathy,
with Africa and the Middle East having a high
frequency of responses indicating no action
would be taken, while Latin America and East
Asia showing higher positive action response fre-
quencies. It seems that it would be necessary to
take into consideration additional cultural, social,
and historical aspects of each region to better
understand our project’s findings.
Cingranelli and Richards (1999) examined
governmental respect for physical integrity
rights—that is, freedom from arbitrary physical
harm and coercion by the government. The four
forms that physical rights violations may take are
extrajudicial killings, torture, disappearances,
and political imprisonment. In general, govern-
ments seem to respect least the right of people
not to be tortured; the right not to be politically
672
imprisoned is next, followed by extrajudicial kill-
ing. Most respected is the right not to be disap-
peared. However, the pattern of respect by the
government for these physical integrity rights can
vary depending on whether the country is devel-
oping or developed and the level of economic
development. For instance, many European coun-
tries such as Austria, Denmark, Switzerland, and
Portugal, described as fully developed, score high
on the physical integrity rights scale, but coun-
tries still developing with good economies (e.g.,
Costa Rica, Argentina) also score relatively high
as do developed countries in collectivistic regions
such as Asia (e.g., Japan and Singapore). Hence,
economic and political situations, combined with
individualistic vs. collectivistic cultural orienta-
tions, may contribute to inclinations to respond
identically to what is seen as governmental usur-
pation of rights.
The Role of Demographic
Characteristics in Scenario Responses
Gender
In response to the second prompt, given a sce-
nario where they are exposed to a military official
using torture, women in East Asia, the Middle
East, the United States/United Kingdom, and
Western Europe show an inclination toward men-
tioning positive action to end the use of torture by
the military official. Men in East Asia often sug-
gested agentic alternative solutions to the use of
torture in the hypothetical scenario, while the
pattern was reversed in the USA/UK, where
females often mentioned agentic alternative solu-
tions. Attribution of blame onto the POW occurred
frequently in men’s responses from Latin America
and Southeast Asia. While females in East Asia
and Russia often mentioned disagreeing with the
use of torture and responses mentioning empa-
thy, they also frequently mentioned helplessness
in response to the scenario.
Across almost all of the regions, females
showed a tendency toward responses indicating
either positive action, disagreement with the use
of torture, or empathy. It is possible that females,
as compared to males, are more disturbed by the
K. Rapoza and M. Clapp
use of torture and harm to a victim. However,
caution must be used in interpreting potential
gender differences in spontaneous implicit
thoughts as predictors of potential differences in
actual courses of action. Blass (1999) reported
that in numerous replications of the Milgram
obedience paradigm, studies have not consis-
tently found gender differences in the propensity
of the teacher (aggressor) to harm the learner
(victim) with an electric shock when ordered to
do so by an authority figure. Although studies
have found that under conditions where research
participants are ordered to inflict pain on a
stranger, females are consistently more tense and
distressed when faced with the prospect of harm-
ing another than males are. It is possible that pat-
tern of strong frequencies across regions in
women’s positive action responses when faced
with knowing of someone being tortured is a gen-
dered effect resulting from greater distress regard-
ing the proposed scenario, as compared with
males in general.
Military Experience
When groups that had not had military experi-
ence were compared with those that had had mili-
tary experience in regard to the presence or
absence of particular scenario themes, the results
seemed quite conflicting. For example, in East
Asia, apathy was more prevalent in the partici-
pants who had not had military experience, but in
the UK/Anglo sample, participants with military
experience provided the greater number of apa-
thy responses. Personal involvement as a response
to the scenario was provided as an example more
often in Latin American responses for those with
military experience but was mentioned less fre-
quently in responses from those with military
service in the USA/UK, in contrast to those with-
out a service history. Responses that humanized
the POW occurred more in respondents without
military experience in the USA/UK, East Asia,
Southeast Asia, and the Middle East; only in
Latin America did participants with military
experience mention the category humanize more.
Political activism responses were less frequent in
respondents with military experience than in
those without such experience in both East Asia
42 Torture: Integrative Chapter
and the Middle East. Finally, Eastern Asian par-
ticipants with military experience gave fewer
responses indicating compliance with torture
than their counterparts without military experi-
ence, whereas in the Middle East and the UK/
Anglo sample, it was the participants without
military experience who provided fewer compli-
ance responses.
Whether or not a participant had a relative in
the military appeared to be associated with only a
few response patterns. Specifically, in both
Western Europe and the UK/Anglo samples,
respondents with relatives in the military were
more likely to respond to the scenario by men-
tioning compliance with torture than those with-
out relatives in the military.
Castano et al. (2008) argued that social identi-
ties held by those in the military are important in
shaping attitudes and behavior. Military training
often consists of a process of deindividuation of
both the soldier and the enemy in addition to
instilling coping mechanisms that foster moral
exclusion and delegitimization of the “out-
group’s” humanity. Castano and colleagues noted
that violations of international law and codes of
conduct (such as torture) often occur due to a sol-
dier’s feeling of moral duty towards the immedi-
ate group (e.g., unit, army, society) and the feeling
that it is a moral duty to kill those in the “out-
group.” It is not surprising then that overall, there
was a tendency across regions for those with mil-
itary service to be more apathetic towards victims
of torture. Given the specific training and coping
mechanisms required to deal with the stress
encountered in military life and war, a propensity
to see the victim as outside the scope of interna-
tional law or justice might be seen as expectable.
However, military experience was not associ-
ated with a propensity towards apathy in all
regions. Those with military experience in the
Latin American and East Asian regions tended to
humanize the victim and showed less compliance
with torture. Castano et al. (2008) noted that
when faced with in-group behavior that is repre-
hensible, one method of moral disengagement
that is used to deal with the atrocities is to simul-
taneously dehumanize and devalue the out-group
victim and to glorify the in-group members’
673
behavior. However, this response tendency is not
universal and is dependent on how much indi-
viduals glorify their group and their military. For
example, it was found in one study that when par-
ticipants were given a scenario of an in-group
soldier torturing an out-group combatant, the
higher their tendency to glorify the in-group
army’s actions the more they attributed blame to
the victim and minimized the event (Roccas et al.
2006). Those who glorified their own army less
did not show this dehumanizing and minimizing
tendency.
Conclusion
Overall, across regions, support was never greater
than the lack of support for torture in any region.
Luban (2005) noted that although many countries
have values and legal mechanisms that are incom-
patible with torture, under the threat of war or
attack general abhorrence towards such behavior
often evaporates. The most frequently cited ratio-
nale given for overriding international law, legis-
lation, and values often derives from the “ticking
time bomb scenario.” In this scenario, the tortur-
ing of a prisoner brings forth information about a
planned destructive act that saves countless lives.
However, Luban noted that a ticking bomb
scenario is only one historical justification for the
use of torture. In the past, torture was often used
with four aims: to torture a vanquished enemy for
the pleasure of the victor, to terrorize people into
submission, to punish criminals, and to extract
confessions. Luban noted that although a liberal
society may view the first three aims as barbaric,
tyrannical, and uncivilized, there is still support
for and belief in that last aim.
To gather intelligence, torture may be por-
trayed as and viewed as a necessary evil. Across
regions, when providing arguments supportive of
torture, respondents often suggested that in the
situation of a “ticking time bomb,” torture might
be a necessary and a fruitful way to gather infor-
mation to save countless lives. Even individuals
who have an absolute stance against torture may
be stymied when presented with this type of sce-
nario. Luban posited, however, that the ticking
674 K. Rapoza and M. Clapp

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 Conclusions
Kathleen Malley-Morrison, Andrea Mercurio,
and Andrew Potter
Across the globe, acts of violence are committed
on a daily basis, often with shocking disregard for
human life. As described in the opening chapter of
this handbook, almost every area of the world has
witnessed acts of aggression from forces from
within or beyond their borders during the twenty-
first century. In 2009, according to the Ploughshares
Armed Conflict Reports 2010 Summary, “Africa
and Asia continue to be the regions of the world
most affected by war, hosting 11 armed conflicts
each, or over three-quarters of the world’s total.”
In the Middle East and Africa, there are many
examples of governments at war either with occu-
pying/invading forces or with their own people.
In 2011, as part of considerable upheaval in the
Middle East and North Africa, totalitarian govern-
ments in Tunisia and Egypt were overthrown with
remarkably restricted violence. When more severe
violence broke out between the Gaddafi govern-
ment and protestors in Libya, NATO became
involved to protect civilians, and the Syrian
government reportedly lashed out at protests against
its ruling regime, killing dozens of its own people
(http://www.economist.com/node/18530525). A
similar situation unfolded in Bahrain, with gov-
ernment forces allegedly using tear gas and other
methods of violence to quell dissenting protestors
(CNN Wire Staff 2011).
In 2009, the United States, Canada, Australia,
the United Kingdom, most of Western Europe,
and most of Latin America were free of armed
conflict on their own soil; however, the United
States and many other countries have sent troops
K. Malley-Morrison et al. (eds.), International Handbook of War, Torture, and Terrorism,
Peace Psychology Book Series, DOI 10.1007/978-1-4614-1638-8_43,
© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2013
43
to engage in armed conflict elsewhere, generally
with the stated purpose of humanitarian inter-
vention, but often to the dismay of many of their
own citizens as well as the purported beneficiaries
of the intervention. The use of military force on
the grounds of “humanitarian intervention” is
controversial (Holzgrefe and Keohane 2003).
On the one hand, some would argue that there
exists a moral imperative to intervene on behalf
of those suffering human rights violations (e.g.,
see Simons 2005). On the other hand, critics
allege that nations may carry out military action
under false pretenses (e.g., under the guise of
humanitarian efforts), when in reality pursuing
political or economic goals that primarily serve
their own national interests (Falk 2005). The
labeling of military action as “humanitarian
intervention” could be considered what Thakur
(2005) calls a “polite euphemism for war” (p. 3),
and the decision to intervene in certain interna-
tional crises but not others undoubtedly reflects
the decision to selectively pursue economic and
social interests that serve those who hold the
most power.
US involvement in Iraq under the leadership of
President George W. Bush serves as a clear con-
temporary example of intervention initiated based
on what are now considered by many to be mis-
leading claims. The justification for the Iraq war in
2003 was predicated on a claim that then President
Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass
destruction. The United States and the United
Kingdom now argue retrospectively that invasion
677
678
occurred for humanitarian reasons, an assertion
that according to some lacks credibility and “dam-
ages the very concept of humanitarian interven-
tion” (Abbot 2005, p. 9). Moreover, thousands of
innocent Iraqis have died in the supposed pursuit
of humanitarian ends, and there have been many
long-term unanticipated consequences that the
United States has been ill-prepared to handle.
Military and political leaders often have the
authority and power to declare particular acts of
aggression to be justifiable and to execute these
actions with impunity, irrespective of the views
of their countrymen. For example, the decision
by the US government to invade Iraq and
Afghanistan, the nation’s continued involvement
in the Middle East, and its expanding involve-
ment in Africa has not been uniformly supported
by US citizens nor has it always been supported
by US allies. A relative lack of power does not
prevent the public, however, from having strong
psychological and behavioral reactions to politi-
cal and military leaders who initiate invasions or
perpetrate torture.
One question that arises is why some individ-
uals develop supportive attitudes towards collec-
tive violence while others develop and maintain
moral objections to such violence. A range of
influences may contribute to emotional, cogni-
tive, and behavioral responses to acts of state
aggression, including factors such as the per-
ceived justifiability of the actions, the objectives
and results of such actions as they relate to indi-
vidual and family safety and security, the media,
government propaganda, religious affiliation,
military experience, gender, and the sociopoliti-
cal history of conflict in a region. All of these fac-
tors may, alone or in combination, contribute to
the sociocognitive processes operating in indi-
viduals who come to justify and support the
infliction of harm on others while simultaneously
maintaining a moral and positive view of them-
selves (Bandura 1999).
It is within this context of widespread violence
in many parts of the world, violence character-
ized by varying levels of compliance and
resistance from ordinary people in the afflicted
areas, that we have shared the voices of people
K. Malley-Morrison et al.
from the USA and abroad who participated in an
ambitious international research project designed
to investigate ordinary citizens’ perspectives on
issues surrounding war and other forms of gov-
ernmental and nongovernmental aggression.
Through extensive collaboration, the Personal
and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace
Survey (PAIRTAPS) was administered to conve-
nience samples in countries across nine regions
of the world, including Western Europe, Russia
and the Balkans, the Middle East, the Gulf States,
Africa, South and Southeast Asia, East Asia,
Central and South America, and a United
Kingdom/Anglo “cultural region.” In their own
words, people from these regions have provided
personal definitions of war, torture, and terrorism
and have provided their views on national secu-
rity. They have also shared their reasoning con-
cerning the potential right of governments to
undertake invasions of other lands as well as to
torture prisoners in times of war. Although we
did not have the resources to recruit large random
samples from participating countries, we believe
that the rich qualitative responses provided by
our participants provided us with a unique oppor-
tunity to consider the views of people faced
directly and indirectly, and in varying degrees,
with violence that is often state-sanctioned.
A grounded theory approach, which is
designed to recognize recurrent patterns in quali-
tative data without any effort to impose prior
theories and assumptions onto the data, proved
useful in our analysis of the definitions of war,
terrorism, and torture and views on national secu-
rity. By contrast, Bandura’s theoretical work on
moral disengagement and engagement provided
a valuable framework for analyzing the sociocog-
nitive and emotional/motivational mechanisms
appearing to underlie perspectives on a potential
state right to invade other countries or torture
prisoners in times of war. We have already pre-
sented a brief summary of Bandura’s theory of
moral disengagement in earlier chapters; we have
also presented our extension of his specific
mechanisms of moral disengagement to a poten-
tial set of reciprocal mechanisms that support
moral engagement. Although our PAIRTAPS
43 Conclusions
items calling for definitions of war, torture, and
terrorism and views on national security did not
lend themselves to coding for expressions of
moral disengagement and engagement, the items
concerning invasion and torture produced
responses that were quite amenable to moral dis-
engagement and moral engagement coding. In
particular, several sociocognitive mechanisms
identified by Bandura as working in the service
of moral disengagement could be seen quite read-
ily in responses regarding a state’s right to invade
other countries and to torture prisoners in times
of war. For example, many justifications for tor-
ture consisted of advantageous comparisons
(e.g., “A grey area, only if the information would
save lives of civilians”) and attribution of blame
(e.g., “If the prisoners are not innocent”), and
common justifications for invasion included
pseudo-assistance (e.g., “If the other country is
truly a danger to the rest of the world”) and self-
defense (e.g., “Only when that country is a clear
and definite threat to the other country. So like
self-defense”).
Although responses to the right to invasion
and right to torture PAIRTAPS items seemed to
fall quite readily into coding categories derived
from Bandura’s theory of moral disengagement
and our extension of it, the categories are funda-
mentally theoretical, and it is important not to
reify them. There has been limited empirical
work validating Bandura’s framework, particu-
larly cross-nationally. Our intent was not to sug-
gest that specific groups of people or certain
regions of the world are more morally engaged or
disengaged than others; rather, our goal was to
explore the extent to which the kinds of sociocog-
nitive mechanisms Bandura discusses can be
seen in participants’ explanations of their views
on the acceptability of state-sanctioned aggres-
sion—exactly the issues that Bandura believes
are the operating grounds for moral disengage-
ment (or engagement).
We also have presented findings from some
simple exploratory analyses undertaken in order
to examine whether factors such as gender and
military experience might possibly be associated
with particular patterns of responses across
679
regions; again, because the samples were not
randomly selected, we caution against assuming
that the patterns we found are generalizable to
the entire populations of the regions from which
our samples were drawn. Our data represent only
a cross-sectional snapshot of views provided by
participants at the time of data collection
(between 2005 and 2009), and the convenience
sampling strategy precludes the possibility of
drawing any strong conclusions regarding differ-
ences within and among regions.
The View Across the Regions
In this section, findings are organized into tables
providing the percentages by region of the major
themes found in response to the items addressed
in this book—thus facilitating a comparison of
similarities and differences in response patterns
between and across regions.
Table 43.1, which summarizes regional pat-
terns in definitions of war, torture, and terror-
ism, provides the percentage of all the definitions
of the specified term (e.g., “war”) that fell into
the most popular thematic category (i.e., the one
with the largest percentage of responses) and, in
italics, the percentage of all the definitions of the
specified term (e.g., “war”) that fell into the
most popular subcategory within the more gen-
eral thematic category. For example, if we look
at the East Asian region, and specifically at
definitions of war, we can see that 34% of this
region’s definitions of war were coded into the
category called qualifying criteria for war—that
is, they were definitions that focused on the
qualifications or criteria that must be present to
justify calling violence or fighting a war (e.g., a
military action between two countries). The
qualification that was specified most often (in
12% of all the definitions of war) indicated that
the label of “war” could be applied only if a cer-
tain level or amount of violence or destruction
occurred. This subcategory is referred to as scale
or intensity of conflict and is reflected in the
definition “large scale battle between two or
more nations.”
680 K. Malley-Morrison et al.

Table 43.1 Most common thematic categories for definitions across regions
Most common definitions
Item War Torture Terrorism
What is your What is your definition of torture? What is your definition of
definition of war? terrorism?
Regions
East Asia Qualifications of war, Focus on method, 49% (physical Process/method, 38%
34% (scale or method, 18%) (physical method, 17%)
intensity, 12%)
Russia/Balkans Outcomes of war, Focus on method, 41% (harming/ Process/method, 29%
32% (concrete hurting, 18%) (physical method, 25%)
outcomes, 19%)
UK/Anglo Qualifications of war, Focus on method, 43% (physical Process/method, 39%
49% (groups officially method, 20%) (physical method, 28%)
or legally recognized
as holding political
power, 18%)
South/Southeast Qualifications of war, Focus on method, 51% (physical Process/method, 32%
Asia 33% (scale or method, 18%) (physical method, 24%)
intensity, 14%)
Middle East Outcomes of war, Judgment concerning morality/ Judgments, 32% (moral
40% (concrete justice/humanity, 43% (immoral/ judgments, 16%)
outcomes, 21%) inhumane/cruel/abusive/vile, 15%)
Gulf States Outcomes of war, Judgment concerning morality/ Judgments, 31% (moral
49% (concrete justice/humanity, 42% (immoral/ judgments, 12%)
outcomes, 26%) inhumane/cruel/abusive/vile, 15%)
Africa Qualifications of war, Focus on method, 40% (physical Causes/motives, 35%
43% (scale or method, 18%) (political motivation, 14%)
intensity, 16%)
Latin America Qualifications of war, Focus on method, 45% (physical Process/method, 28%
29% (scale or method, 16%) (physical method, 23%)
intensity, 12%)
Western Europe Qualifications of war, Focus on method, 40% (physical Process/method, 34%
37% (scale or method, 16%) (physical method, 25%)
intensity, 15%)
Note: Figures indicate the percentages, by region, of definitions falling into the most common thematic categories (those
with the largest percentage of responses out of all the definitions of that item (war, torture, or terrorism) in that region)
Note: Italicized words and percentages indicate the subcategory having the largest proportion of responses within the
major category

As can be seen in Table 43.1, across regions,
definitions of war occurring with the highest fre-
quencies (ranging from 29% to 49% of all the
definitions of war within a region) were definitions
focusing on qualifying criteria for war and out-
comes of war. The most common qualification
mentioned across regions was scale or intensity
of conflict, although the most common qualifier
in the UK/Anglo “region” focused on the type of
group involved in the conflict. In the regions
where the most common definitions of war
focused on outcomes (the Middle East and the
Gulf States), it was concrete outcomes that
predominated.
Table 43.1 also shows that the most commonly
occurring definitions of torture across regions
(between 40% and 51% of all the definitions
within each region except the Middle East and
the Gulf States) focused on methods, particularly
physical methods. By contrast, in the Middle East
and the Gulf States, the most common definitions
consist of moral judgments concerning torture; in
particular, torture is identified with immorality,
injustice, or inhumanity.
43 Conclusions 681

Finally, Table 43.1 also shows that the most Table 43.2 Most common thematic categories for
common definitions of terrorism in most of the national security across regions
regions focused on the processes or methods Item National security
involved in terrorism, with the Middle East and The best way to achieve
security for individuals
the Gulf States again being similar in the fre-
and families throughout
quency of moral judgments concerning terrorism the world is…..
and Africa having a plurality of definitions focus- Regions
ing on the causes or motivations for terrorism. East Asia Peace/nonviolence, 21%
In addition to considering which major catego- Russia/Balkans Diplomacy/international
ries contained the largest percentages of responses, relations/international law,
15%
it is also useful to look at the subcategories with
UK/Anglo Recommending peace, 8%
the most responses, particularly given that some
South/Southeast Asia Philosophical principles,
major categories are comprised of many subcate- 11%
gories and that some of them were used much Middle East Recommending peace, 8%
more than others. Among definitions of war, the Gulf States
majority of responses in each region identified it Africa Diplomacy/international
with a focus on conflict (UK/Anglo, Latin relations/international law,
16%
America, Western Europe, Africa, and South/
Latin America Philosophical principles,
Southeast Asia) or concrete outcomes (Gulf 42%
States, Middle East, and Russia/Balkans). Western Europe Diplomacy/international
Interestingly, the Gulf States and Middle East relations/international law,
were the two regions where the samples most education, 9%
typically identified war with its outcomes, primar- Note: Figures indicate the percentages, by region, of
ily concrete but also abstract, whereas the UK/ responses falling into the most common thematic catego-
ries (those with the largest percentage of responses for the
Anglo, East Asian, Western European, and African item regarding national security in that region)
samples mainly provided classic definitions of
war as “armed conflict” (coded as focus on conflict
and scale or intensity of conflict). with its political agenda and Russia/Balkans, the
In regard to definitions of torture, the subcat- Middle East, and the Gulf States making moral
egories into which larger percentages of responses judgments when defining terrorism. Interestingly,
were coded generally equated torture with its in South and Southeast Asian responses, the sec-
methods, predominantly physical methods fol- ond most common response fell into the subcat-
lowed by psychological methods, or the more egory for uncodeable responses. This could be
general hurting/harming methods theme. The due to the difficulty in coding because of transla-
Middle Eastern and Latin American samples both tion difficulties.
most commonly defined torture as immoral/abu- Table 43.2 provides the percentages (out of all
sive, which was the second most common type of responses to the item) of the most commonly
definition in the Gulf States sample. The African occurring thematic responses to the item asking
sample was the only one in which the intent cod- participants to make suggestions concerning the
ing subcategory had the second highest percent- best way to achieve national security for individ-
age of responses. uals and their families. For example, in Latin
Finally, definitions of terrorism showed simi- America, 42% of all responses to the item were
lar patterns to definitions of torture, with physical coded into the thematic category philosophical
methods representing the most commonly coded principles, as were 11% of the responses from
subcategory among all of the regions. The second South/Southeast Asia. These responses generally
most commonly represented subcategory varied mention the importance of respecting individuals
more, with East Asia, Africa, and Western and cultures by following principles such as “do
Europe providing responses linking terrorism unto others.” The most popular thematic category
682 K. Malley-Morrison et al.

Table 43.3 Percentages, within and across regions, of tolerance responses overall and in subcategories in regard to a
state’s right to torture and invasion
Invasion Right to torture
Sometimes one country has the right to invade The government has the right to order the
another country torture of prisoners in times of war
Tolerance
Regions UK/Anglo, 62% (pseudo-assistance) East Asia, 44% (advantageous
Western Europe, 51% (pseudo-assistance) comparison)
Middle East, 38% (self-defense) South and Southeast Asia, 21%,
Russia/Balkans, 34% (self-defense) Africa, 20%, Middle East, 35%
East Asia, 32% (self-defense) (advantageous comparison)
South/Southeast Asia, 23% (pseudo-assistance) Russia/Balkans, UK/Anglo, 25%
Latin America, 24% (self-defense) (advantageous comparison)
Africa, 21% (pseudo-assistance) Latin America, 14% (advantageous
comparison)
Western Europe, 15%, (advantageous
comparison)
Most common Pseudo-moral justifications (self-defense, Advantageous comparison
rationales pseudo-assistance) Attribution of blame
Note: The most popular response categories by region for the right to invasion and torture are presented in descending
order. There are no Gulf States percentages offered here because most of the Gulf States respondents did not get or did
not complete that item

in the African, Russian/Balkan, and Western
Europe samples was diplomacy/international
relations and international law; this coding cat-
egory applies to responses mentioning the impor-
tance of international law and diplomacy in
guaranteeing the security of individual nations.
In East Asia and the Middle East, the largest per-
centage of responses to the item stressed the
importance of peace.
Arguments Expressing Some Tolerance
for State Rights to Invasion and Torture
Based on coding manuals, themes reflective of
Banduran sociocognitive mechanisms of inva-
sion tolerance and torture tolerance were
identified, along with invasion-intolerant and
torture-intolerant themes. Table 43.3 provides the
percentages of the most common invasion-toler-
ant and torture-tolerant responses, and Table 43.4
presents the percentages of the most common
invasion-intolerant and torture-intolerant
responses with respect to the potential right of
governments to torture prisoners of war and to
invade other countries.
Overall, across regions, there were propor-
tionately more themes expressing tolerance of a
governmental right to invade other countries than
a governmental right to torture prisoners during
times of war. Nevertheless, as can be seen in
Table 43.3, levels of tolerance varied markedly
in response to both items. For example, 62% of
responses from the UK/Anglo nations and 51%
of responses from Western Europe showed toler-
ance of a state’s right to invasion, whereas only
21% of responses from Africa did so. Indeed, it
was only in the UK/Anglo nations and Western
Europe where more than half of the responses to
the invasion item indicated some support for a
state’s right to invasion. On the other hand, 44%
of the East Asian responses but only 15% of the
Western European responses showed some
support for a state’s right to torture. (Again,
the samples were not probability samples, so it is
important not to overinterpret these findings.)
In Table 43.3, we also see that responses
coded into the categories of pseudo-assistance
and self-defense/preemptive strike were the most
common arguments found in support of toler-
ance for a state’s right to invade other nations.
The thematic category of pseudo-assistance
applies to assertions that invasion is permissible
when the aggressor is assisting others in need
(e.g., “done to stop atrocities or genocide”). Of
those responses expressing tolerance to invasion,
43 Conclusions
pseudo-assistance was the most popular
justification in the United Kingdom/Anglo
“region,” Western Europe, South/Southeast Asia,
and Africa. Responses in the self-defense/pre-
emptive strike thematic category, indicating that
invasion is allowable, for example, to “prevent
invasion or to protect oneself,” were the most
popular form of justification in the samples from
the Middle East, Russia and the Balkans, Latin
America, and East Asia.
Table 43.3 also provides the percentages for
the principal arguments in support of a govern-
ment’s right to torture prisoners in times of war.
The most common argument for a state’s right to
torture invoked the principle of advantageous
comparison. In our coding system, informed by
Bandura’s theory of moral disengagement, advan-
tageous comparison can be viewed as a type of
pseudo-moral justification, a form of reasoning
suggesting that inhumane acts are morally
justified because they have a lofty purpose or are
socially or morally responsible. A typical exam-
ple of a torture-tolerant response in the advanta-
geous comparison subcategory of pseudo-moral
justification is that torture is allowable “if the
information would save the lives of civilians.”
It is interesting that across all the regions from
which our samples came, with their diverse histo-
ries and current political contexts, when torture-
tolerant arguments were provided, they must
commonly took the form of advantageous com-
parison. It appears that the ticking bomb scenario
has some familiarity around the world.
Arguments Indicating Intolerance
of State Rights to Invade and Torture
So, to what degree do nations express intolerance
toward a state’s right to invasion? Responses
from Africa revealed the highest rate of intoler-
ance (79%), with the majority of arguments
against a state’s right to invade falling into the
category of respect for government/sovereignty.
Responses from the UK/Anglo countries reflected
the lowest rate of intolerance (28%), but the most
common of these anti-invasion responses was the
same as for most of the other regions—that is,
683
respect for government/sovereignty. In Western
Europe, 49% of the responses indicated intoler-
ance of the idea of a state’s right to invasion, with
references particularly to a theme we called bet-
ter alternatives.
In contrast to pro-torture responses, where the
most typical argument always took the form of
advantageous comparison, the most common
argument rejecting a right to torture varied some-
what across regions. For example, in Western
Europe, the most common form of anti-torture
argument was a very general nonspecific rejec-
tion of a state’s right to torture (e.g., “No, it is not
fair, we cannot do this”). In Africa, the most com-
mon anti-torture argument was captured in the
thematic category humanization (e.g., “torture is
the denial of another man’s humanity”). In South
and Southeast Asia, the torture-intolerant argu-
ments most commonly either invoked the impor-
tance of human rights or emphasized the fact that
prisoners of war are often acting under the com-
mand of others in power and therefore are not
necessarily to blame (coded into the category of
exonerating the prisoner). In the Anglo countries,
the most typical torture-intolerant responses
focused on awareness of the negative conse-
quences of torture (e.g., “any act of torture or vio-
lence against prisoners will only escalate
inhumane treatment of all prisoners”), and in East
Asia, the most popular torture-intolerant
responses focused on the ineffectiveness of tor-
ture (e.g., torture “can never lead to lasting
conflict resolution”).
What Participants Would Want
to Do if Faced with Bombing or Torture
Patterns of responses across regions to our hypo-
thetical scenarios involving torture and bombing
are displayed in Table 43.5. On one bombing sce-
nario, participants were asked to imagine that
“another country is indiscriminately bombing a
major city in [their] country, and [that] women
and children, the elderly, and civilian men are
running around bloody and screaming.”
Participants were then asked what they would
want to do in light of this situation. In a second
684 K. Malley-Morrison et al.

Table 43.4 Percentages, within and across regions, of intolerance responses overall and in subcategories in regard to
a state’s right to torture and invasion
Invasion Right to torture
Sometimes one country has the right to invade The government has the right to order
another country the torture of prisoners in times of war
Intolerance
Regions Africa, 79% (respect for government/sovereignty) Latin America, 84% (general and
South/Southeast Asia, 77% (respect for government/ affirmative disagreement)
sovereignty) Western Europe, 81% (unspecified
Latin America, 76% (respect for government/ intolerance for torture)
sovereignty) Southeast Asia, 74% (human rights,
East Asia, 68% (self-defense) exoneration of prisoner)
Russia/Balkans, 66% (respect for government/ Africa, 75%, (humanization)
sovereignty) Russia/Balkans, 69% (humanization,
Middle East, 62% (respect for government/ better alternatives)
sovereignty) Anglo countries, 72% (awareness of
Western Europe, 49% (better alternatives) negative consequences)
UK/Anglo, 28% (respect for government/ East Asia, 56% (ineffectiveness of
sovereignty) torture)
Middle East, 63% (general disagreement)
Most common Responsibility (government/sovereignty, interna- Humanization
rationales tional community) Exoneration of prisoner
Note: The “Regions cells” list the regions in order of descending level of tolerance or intolerance regarding a state’s
right to torture and to invade. There are no Gulf States percentages offered here because this item did not appear on the
survey

bombing scenario, participants were asked to
imagine the same situation only with their nation
as the aggressor. For the torture scenario, partici-
pants were asked to imagine that “military
officials are torturing someone suspected of hav-
ing information on terrorists” and subsequently
asked what they would want to do.
Table 43.5 indicates the percent of responses
to the bombing scenarios that were coded as
showing personal engagement and what percent
showed personal disengagement, with the term
“engagement” reflective of Bandura’s construct
of personal agency. The italicized text indicates
the specific engagement and disengagement
theme that occurred most frequently in the region,
as well as indicating what percentage of all the
bombing and torture responses fell into that cat-
egory. For example, in Africa, 26% of all the
responses to the item asking participants what
they would want to do if another country was
indiscriminately bombing their country showed
personal disengagement; the major type of disen-
gagement response (11% of all the responses)
indicated that the participant denied responsibil-
ity; that is, the participant felt no responsibility to
do anything about the situation. Moreover, 74%
of the African responses to that item showed per-
sonal engagement; the most common personal
engagement response (35% of all the responses)
indicated that the participant would assume
responsibility to do something. As can be seen
from the table, in all regions except East Asia, a
larger percentage of the responses provided evi-
dence of personal engagement than of personal
disengagement. The most common examples of
personal engagement included a desire to assume
general responsibility or to provide genuine
assistance (“give shelter to refugees”). The most
common examples of personal disengagement
generally denied responsibility or expressed
vengeful agency.
In regard to what participants would want to
do if their country was bombing another country,
the majority of responses in all regions provided
evidence of personal engagement; indeed, across
regions, from 68% to 94% of all responses
projected a motivation to become personally
involved in responding to the aggression.
Moreover, in every region, the most popular
responses emphasized assuming responsibility
to take action (e.g., “to make reparation with my
fellow nation”). The relatively small percentage
43 Conclusions 685

Table 43.5 Scenarios involving invasion and torture

Invasion scenarios Torture scenario
Item Another country is indiscriminately Your country is indiscriminately Military officials are
bombing a major city in your bombing a major city in another torturing somebody
country, and women and children, country, and women and children, suspected of having
the elderly, and civilian men are the elderly and civilian men are information about
running around bloody and running around bloody and terrorists. What would
screaming. What would you want to screaming. What would you want you want to do?
do? to do?
Region
Africa Disengaged 26% (denial of Disengaged 32% (denial of Apathy 41%
responsibility 11%) responsibility 28%) General Positive
Engaged 74% (general Engaged 68% (self-referenced action 13%
responsibility 35%) responsibility 20%) (Compliant) 4%
East Asia Disengaged 38% (vengeful agency Disengaged 13% (denial of General Positive
19%) responsibility 10%) action 22%
Engaged 26% (pseudo-assistance Engaged 87% (general Apathy 21%
8%) responsibility 26%) (Compliant) 8%
Middle Disengaged 30% (vengeful agency Disengaged 22% (denial of Agentic solutions 19%
East 24%) responsibility 9%) Apathy 17%
Engaged 70% (general Engaged 78% (general (Compliant) 15%
responsibility 30%) responsibility 23%)
Russia/ Disengaged 40% (harming Disengaged 18% (harming General positive
Balkans emotions 19%) emotions 7%) action 24%
Engaged 60% (general Engaged 82% (general Apathy 17%
responsibility 23%) responsibility 26%) (Compliant) 9%
South/ Disengaged 21% (vengeful agency Disengaged 12% (revenge 4%) Political activism 19%
Southeast 10%) Engaged 88% (self-referenced Agentic solutions, passive
Asia Engaged 79% (pseudo-assistance responsibility 25%) regarding torture 11%
26%) (Compliant) 11%
UK/Anglo Disengaged 38% (vengeful agency Disengaged 9% (denial of Political activism 25%
19%) responsibility 6%) Alternative harmful
Engaged 62% (general Engaged 91% (general solutions 11%
responsibility 24%) responsibility 23%) (Compliant) 12%
Western Disengaged 18% (vengeful agency Disengaged 6% (denial of General positive
Europe 10%) responsibility 2%) action 28%
Engaged 82% (genuine assistance Engaged 94% (self-referenced Political activism 22%
31%) responsibility 23%) (Compliant) 4%
Gulf States Disengaged 18% (vengeful agency Disengaged 13% (denial of –
8%) responsibility 10%)
Engaged 81% (general Engaged 87% (general
responsibility 34%) responsibility 26%)
Latin Disengaged 17% (vengeful agency Disengaged 7% (denial of Political activism 26%
America 6%) responsibility 3%) Agentic solutions 19%
Engaged 83% (genuine assistance Engaged 93% (self-referenced (Compliant) 6%
32%) agency 40%)
Note: For the invasion hypothetical scenarios, figures indicate the percentages of responses in the major response cate-
gories for each item in each region
For the torture scenario, the first two percentages indicate the two most commonly coded categories and the third per-
centage indicates the most commonly used personal disengagement response. No percentages appear for Gulf States
torture because they had no data for that item

of responses to this scenario that were coded for although participants in some regions
personal disengagement mainly denied responsi- indicated a desire for revenge against one’s gov-
bility for resisting the government’s attack on ernment (e.g., “kill those who are in charge”).
civilians (e.g., “support the government”) Although the pattern may be a spurious result of
686
nonrepresentative samples, it is interesting that
across regions, respondents appeared to project
greater personal engagement when the hypotheti-
cal aggressor was their own nation.
In regard to responses to the torture scenario,
Table 43.5 presents three different figures for
each region: the percentages of responses in the
first and second most commonly used coding cat-
egories and the percentage of responses in the
most commonly used personal disengagement
category (italicized and in parentheses). For
example, in the African sample, the largest pro-
portion of responses (41%) display some level of
apathy, and the second largest proportion (13%)
endorse positive action (e.g., “stop the tortur-
ing”). Lastly, 4% of the torture scenario responses
from Africa express the form of personal disen-
gagement coded as compliance. Responses
reflecting compliance indicate either support or
agreement with the military’s use of torture as a
means of extracting information from those who
may possess knowledge about terrorist activities
(e.g., “I support it”). Across regions, an expressed
desire to take positive action to stop torture is the
most common theme present in responses to this
scenario, with the exception of responses from
Africa, where a majority of the responses were
coded for apathy.
The second most common type of response to
the torture scenario in Western Europe, South/
Southeast Asia, Latin America, and the Anglo
nations recommended political action. This the-
matic category is characterized by appeals to law
and justice and is illustrated in responses such as
“bring charges against them based on interna-
tional law.” In East Asia and the Middle East, the
second most common type of response fell into
the passive category and is reflected in responses
like “change the channel on the T.V. [to avoid
seeing the torture scene].” The most common
form of personal disengagement shown in all
regions was compliance.
Demographic Findings
Exploratory analyses were run to assess the extent
to which response patterns differed as a function
of several demographic variables, including gen-
K. Malley-Morrison et al.
der, participation in the military, and having a
relative who had participated in the military.
In the sections that follow, we consider the pat-
terns found in relation to the invasion and torture
items; demographic correlates of the definitions
of war, torture, and terrorism and responses to the
national security items seemed to provide less
information about the role of demographic vari-
ables in the kinds of reasoning in which people
around the world engage when considering issues
of war, torture, and terrorism. Moreover, we were
particularly interested in exploring the possibility
of demographic differences in the kinds of social
cognition identified by Bandura in his theory of
moral disengagement and engagement.
Principal Gender Differences
in Response Patterns
Consistent with research in the United States
(e.g., Sapiro and Conover 1993; Malley-Morrison
et al. 2006), our findings indicated that overall,
more women than men tended to disagree with a
state’s right to invade other countries and con-
duct torture. They also showed some tendency to
reason about issues of governmental aggression
differently than the men did. For example,
as compared with their male counterparts,
significantly more women from South/Southeast
Asia, Russia/Balkans, and the UK/Anglo region
provided responses humanizing the prisoner
when arguing against a state’s right to torture. By
contrast, as compared with women, significantly
more men from the same regions provided pro-
torture responses reflecting the Banduran
mechanism of advantageous comparison—that
is, they showed a greater likelihood to refer to the
ticking bomb scenario.
With respect to a state’s right to invasion and
the bombing of civilians, there were a number of
significant gender differences. For example,
significantly more men than women from the
Russian/Balkan region provided displacement of
responsibility arguments in their responses to
invasion. In regard to the scenario regarding
bombing conducted by one’s country, significantly
more men than women from the UK/Anglo region
denied personal responsibility in their responses.
43 Conclusions
By contrast, significantly more women than men
from Western Europe and the UK/Anglo region
provided responses indicating a desire to help in
this bombing scenario.
Men and women also tended to differ in the
kinds of emotional responses they expected to
feel in the event of exposure to governmental
aggression. For example, in regard to the scenar-
ios asking participants what they would want to
do if faced directly with the torturing of someone
suspected of knowing a terrorist, significantly
more women than men from Russian/Balkan
region and East Asia expressed feelings of help-
lessness in their responses. On the other hand,
significantly more men than women from East
Asia gave responses coded for agentic alterna-
tive solutions.
Finally, there were some differences in what
men and women thought should be done in circum-
stances involving government aggression. For
example, significantly more men than women from
East Asia, Latin America, and the Anglo countries
mentioned vengeful agency in their invasion-tol-
erant responses to the hypothetical scenario, in
which another country bombs their county. More-
over, with regard to this scenario, significantly
more men than women from Western Europe, the
Anglo countries, South and Southeast Asia, and the
Russian/Balkan region gave at least one response
in the antisocial categories.
Finally, significantly more women than men
from almost all regions indicated that they would
like to take positive action.
Military Experiences
In a number of regions, direct and indirect experi-
ence with the military was related to the use of
particular arguments for or against a state’s right
to use torture and to invade other countries.
Significantly, more military than nonmilitary
members from the Middle East provided
responses invoking advantageous comparison in
their torture-tolerant responses. However, our
data also revealed that in some regions, certain
types of torture-intolerant rationales were more
687
common among those with military experience
compared to those without military experience.
For instance, veterans from Latin America and
East Asia, more often than nonveterans, provided
responses humanizing the victim in their torture-
intolerant responses; perhaps, the veterans had a
greater ability than the nonveterans to put
themselves in the shoes of someone who might
be tortured during wartime. With regard to inva-
sion-intolerant arguments, veterans from the
Russian/Balkan region relied more on an appeal
to governmental responsibility than did nonveter-
ans from this region.
There were also a few group differences based
on whether or not participants had a relative in
the military, although for the most part significant
differences based on this variable did not gener-
alize beyond one or two regions. For example,
more individuals from nonmilitary than from
military families in East Asia focused on argu-
ments expressing apathy in their invasion-toler-
ant arguments. More respondents from
nonmilitary families in the Anglo countries and
South/Southeast Asia gave at least one example
of an invasion-intolerant argument.
Religion
Although there were a number of statistically
significant differences among groups based on
religion, these differences were almost always
confined to just one region. We will not reiterate
those differences here. The only exception to the
pattern of religious groups differences not gener-
alizing beyond particular regions comes from
comparisons between the group composed of all
participants identifying a faith and the group
professing no faith. For instance, South/Southeast
Asian respondents who identified as atheists,
agnostics, and other were significantly more
likely to cite deferral to the international com-
munity than Christian, Muslim, and Hindu
respondents from the region in their justification
of a state’s right to invasion. Russian/Balkan
respondents who identified as Christians were
significantly more likely than their nonspecified,
688
agnostic, and atheist counterparts to utilize
principled moral justification. Interestingly, the
Russian/Balkan Christians were also more likely
than nonspecified, agnostic, and atheist respon-
dents to justify their intolerant views on a state’s
right to invasion with freedom. Interestingly,
nonspecified, agnostic, and atheist respondents
from South/Southeast Asia were more likely to
cite freedom than their Muslim and Hindu
counterparts.
Conclusions
Across regions, we did not find dramatic differ-
ences in definitions of war, torture, or terrorism in
the participants we sampled. With few excep-
tions, the most common definitions in one region
were similar to the most common definitions in
another region. Perhaps this reflects a somewhat
universal understanding of what these concepts
mean to individuals from around the world.
Views on the best way to achieve national
security were somewhat diverse across regions.
There were many different views as to how to
achieve security for individuals and families.
Forty-two percent of Latin American responses
cited philosophical principles as the best way to
achieve national security; this was the largest
response rate for any of the categories pertaining
to the prompt in any of the regions studied. The
most utilized categories in each of the other
regions ranged from 21% to 8% of total responses.
Despite the breadth of categories into which
responses were coded, most answers reflected
pro-social or nonaggressive attitudes and reflected
three major types of recommendations for achiev-
ing national security for individuals and their
families; these were general recommendations
for peace and nonviolence, appeals to diplomacy/
international relations/international law, and
appeals to philosophical principles.
On an encouraging note, responses reflecting
intolerance of a state’s right to invade or torture
were more common than the expression of toler-
ance for such actions, although overall there
appeared to be greater tolerance for invasion than
for torture.
K. Malley-Morrison et al.
The Evolving Context of War
The nature and landscape of war and conflict has
changed dramatically since World War II, and it
continues to evolve. The personal views of our
participants have been captured within a social,
political, and economic world climate that seems
to be moving away from what we think of as tra-
ditional warfare. There are several aspects of this
movement that have raised alarm in the interna-
tional community, not the least of which is
advances in modern technology. New tools of
war allow perpetrators to have a faster, more
global reach while simultaneously limiting their
own casualties. The increasing use and develop-
ment of drones, for example, creates the ability to
attack from a distance and to cause death and
destruction without ever needing to be present.
It is not clear how this changing technology and
increased globalization will affect people’s views
on state-sanctioned forms of aggression. Will it
be easier, for instance, for US citizens to support
governmental decisions to invade other nations if
it can be accomplished with fewer American
deaths? And how will these novel and increas-
ingly sophisticated modes of warfare impact peo-
ple’s tolerance or intolerance to war, torture,
terrorism, and other forms of aggression? These
questions and ones similar to them are important
in understanding the evolving context of war, and
each requires further study and exploration.
A related set of questions stems from the com-
munications revolution—particularly, the instant
access of people around the world to the Internet
and all of its resources. Some governments,
including the US government, may try to restrict
representatives of the news media from direct
observation of the death and chaos stemming
from state- and non-state violence, but cell phones,
digital cameras, and an evolving set of devices
increasingly allow anyone to send news and pho-
tos to Twitter, Facebook, OpEdNews, and numer-
ous other Internet sites; moreover, governments
and other groups monitor such reports 24/7.
Many people consider the self-immolation of
Mohamed Bouazizi in Tunisia, an event that
quickly spread through the social media, to be the
43 Conclusions
starting point of the Arab Spring. Wikileaks
exposed secret communications, dirty tricks,
behind-the-scene machinations by many govern-
ments, and much of this information is still to
be mined. Photographs by the “kill team” in
Afghanistan, glorying in their murder of civilians,
were obtained and published by Rolling Stone
despite Pentagon efforts to squash their release.
How will the availability of graphic photos
and disturbing information about state-sponsored
violence and flouting of international law affect
views on state aggression? Will ordinary people
become increasingly hardened towards violence
and maintain their efforts to justify violence by
their own governments? Or will they be horrified
when faced directly with the violence being per-
petrated in the name of justice and democracy?
Among the trends in present-day conflicts and
wars are the ongoing push for self-determination
and freedom of many groups from control by
others—not from the colonial powers of the past
but from dictators who have often had the support
of former colonial powers. Some of the most
memorable examples of this kind of rebellion
occurred in 2011 in Middle Eastern and North
African countries. Although the UN resolved to
enforce a no-fly zone over Libya on March 17,
2011 (Security Council 2011) to stymie Gaddafi’s
military forces and NATO forces commenced
offensive strikes only 2 days later on ground
vehicles and assets, widespread popular support
for the anti-Gaddafi rebels did not lead to univer-
sal support for these western interventions.
The direct involvement of western militaries
in this internal rebellion is a first in this timeline
of uprisings commonly referred to as the “Arab
Spring” (Khalidi 2011) and may represent a para-
digm shift into direct external involvement of UN
military power, whereas before they had resolved
not to engage in military intervention (Moran
2006). Interestingly, Gaddafi was previously sup-
plied with weapons and equipment from NATO
members (Rogers and Sedghi 2011). For instance,
France supplied a total of 30,542,753 Euros worth
of military equipment in 2009, including military
planes, electronic equipment, and small guns,
and the number of EU arms export licenses went
from 72,193,357 in 2005 to 343,734,632 in 2009
689
(Rogers and Sedghi 2011). These figures cast a
light on the role of other countries in supplying
Middle Eastern dictatorships with material sup-
port. In general, civil society knows little about
such deals until the effects of armed conflicts
touch home.
Within the Arab Spring rebellions, the move-
ments themselves were given life and purpose by
the common citizens. On the other side, civilians
are increasingly paying the price of modern wars.
In major conflicts such as the ones in Iraq and
Afghanistan, civilian casualties make up the
majority of the deaths. For instance, in Iraq, 3,469
US military personnel were killed in hostile
action from early 2003 to early 2010 (Leland and
Oboroceanu 2010), while conservative estimates
suggest 43,099 civilians died from April 2005 to
August 2008 (Fischer 2008). Estimates from
sources like the World Health Organization are
much higher; from 2003 to 2006, civilian casual-
ties were projected around 151,000 (CRS Report
for Congress 2008). In Afghanistan, civilian
deaths have been increasing steadily year to year.
In 2006, an estimated 929 civilians were killed,
with that number increasing to 1,523 in 2007 and
2,777 in 2010 (Rogers and Sedghi 2011).
Moreover, women and children suffer propor-
tionally the largest amount of deaths. For instance
in Iraq, casualties from airstrikes by the USA
have been 39% children and 46% female (The
Telegraph 2009).
If the Arab Spring continues to spread, or if it
leaves increasing death and destruction in its
wake, or one set of military leaders replaces
another, how will that affect views on war, tor-
ture, and terrorism?
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Index

A qualifications, 100, 101

Act-utilitarianism model, 634 statistically significant, 100–101
African definitions World War I, 96
coding manuals, 98–99 World War II, 96–97
democratic rights, 97 Albert Bandura’s Theory
description, 95 cognitive reconstruction, 326
DRC, 97 misrepresenting/minimizing/disregarding
eighteenth century, 96 consequences, 326
human civilizations, 95 moral disengagement, 326
military experience, 111 victim devaluation, 326–327
non-protesters, 111 Alexander, M., 166
participants, measures, and procedures, 98 American Imperialism and Neoimperialism,
plentiful natural resources, 97 363–364
religion, 95 Analysis of variance (ANOVA), 21–22, 68, 78,
terrorism 199, 407, 408, 473, 475–476, 558
categories, 110 Andersson, H., 601
causes/motivations and process/methods, ANOVA. See Analysis of variance (ANOVA)
107, 108 Anwar, D.F., 289
chi-square associations, 107–109 Archik, K., 193
coding definitions, 107 Aron, R., 360
judgments, 107 ASEAN. See Association of Southeast Asian Nations
military participants, 108 (ASEAN)
negative environmental conditions, 109 Ashy, M.A., 246
political agenda, 109 Assessment methods, torture
valence, 107 aggression and peace scale, 521–522
thirteenth century, 96 Bandura’s emphasis, 525–526
torture exploratory quantitative analysis, 528
categories, 110 government’s right to torture prisoners
categories/subcategories, 105 demonic qualities, 524
characteristic, 104 pseudo-moral justification, 523
chi-square tests, 105–106 torture-tolerant responses, 524, 525
constructive intent responses, 107 moral engagement theory, 524–525
definitions, 103 PAIRTAPS, 525
intent, motivation/emotion, 103 personal engagement responses, 526
methods, 104–105 personal involvement, 527
military, 105 qualitative analyses
morality/justice/humanity, 104 Bandura’s theory, 523
war coding manuals, 522–523
atheist/agnostic, 102 military officials, 522
causes, 99, 100 proactive form, morality, 522
conflict and qualifications, 99–101 sociocognitive mechanisms, 523
definitions, 99 Association of Southeast Asian Nations
demographic groups and chi-square,100–102 (ASEAN), 134, 633
Muslims, 102 Axtell, J., 580

K. Malley-Morrison et al. (eds.), International Handbook of War, Torture, and Terrorism, 691
Peace Psychology Book Series, DOI 10.1007/978-1-4614-1638-8,
© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2013
692 Index

B C
Bacevich, A., 364 Carlson, M., 553
Bajpai, K., 288 Castanheira, H., 230, 538
Balkans Peninsula and Russian definitions Castano, E., 668, 673
bridging war, torture and terrorism responses, 60 CCP. See Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
causes, 56 CCPR. See International Covenant on Civil
coding guidelines and Political Rights (CCPR)
torture, 58–60 Center for International Development and Conflict
war, 55–56 Management (CIDCM), 243
coding process, 55 China, militarism and invasion
concrete and abstract outcomes, 57 Britain’s opium trading, 489
demographic correlates, response categories, 55 CCP, 490
description, 49 cultural revolution, 490
geopolitical and cultural region, 49 Mongol rule, 489
Greece, 50 Qing dynasty, 302
moral judgments, 57 Chinese Communist Party (CCP), 490
orthodox Christianity, 49 Chomsky, N., 228, 364
qualifying criteria, war, 57 Chung, C., 148
Russia, 52–54 CIDCM. See Center for International Development
sample, 54–55 and Conflict Management (CIDCM)
Serbia, 50–52 Cingranelli, D.L., 671
Slovenia, 52 Coding and variable formation
terrorism coding, 57–58 categories, 3
themes, 58 moral judgment, 3
valence, 58 PAIRTAPS, 3
war as conflict, 56–57 subcategories, 4
Bandura, A., 326, 367, 370, 383, 384, 404, 406, 415, terrorism
423, 431, 439, 452, 454, 469, 471, 496, 522, categories, 10, 11
523, 542, 553, 554, 562, 569, 588, 602, 633, causes/motivation, 10
654, 665 ideological motivation, 10
Bandura’s theory, 415, 679, 683 judgments, 12
Barbosa, M., 159 political motivation, 12
Barnet, B., 212 process/method category, 12
Bar-Tal, D., 223 torture
Batson, C.D., 579 “harm”, coders, 9
BBC. See British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) intent, motivation/emotion, 6–7
Beasley-Murray, J., 129 judgmental definitions, 7–9
Beaud, M., 449 methods, 7, 9
Befu, H., 312 valence, 9–10
Bellamy, A.J., 553, 634 victim/context, 7
Benshal, N., 243 war
Berry, M., 211 categories, 4, 5
Bilgin, P., 243 causes, 4
Blass, T., 672 conflict identification, 4
Bolivar, S., 444 moral judgment, 6
Bombing scenarios, 684, 685 physical and psychological harm, 6
Borrelli, S., 538 qualifying criteria, 4, 6
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) quantitative analyses, 12–14
and CNN, 212 terrorism, 9–12
coverage, 212 torture, 6–9
state-sponsored, 210 Coding categories
terrorist organizations, 212 country and religion, 177–178
British Imperialism and Australasia, 364–366 favor of peace, 177
Brock-Utne, B., 159 gender, 176–177
Bromley, C., 670 military experience, 177
Bronfenbrenner, U., 401 Coding systems
Burke, E., 361 mechanisms, moral disengagement, 554
Buvinic, M., 273 moral engagement mechanisms, 554–555
Byman, D., 243 personal involvement, 555
Index 693

Common thematic categories East Gulf States definitions

national security, 681 exploratory quantitative analyses, 92
terrorism, 679, 680 methodology, 82–83
torture, 679, 680 political and cultural
war, 679, 680 Arabs, 81, 82
Congressional Research Service (CRS), 193 description, 81–82
Cook, K.J., 669 Muslims, 81, 82
Corgan, M., 537 terrorism
Crosby, A.W., 359 causes, 89, 90
CRS. See Congressional Research Service (CRS) chi-square analyses, 90–92
coding categories, 90, 91
definition, 87–88
D judgments, 90, 91
Darwin, J., 359 methods, 88, 89
Dawisha, K., 60 sample responses, 89
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), 97 valence, 87–88
Demographic correlation torture
another country bombing, 373–374 categories, 84–85
anti-invasion, 371–373 intent, 87
chi-square tests, 370 intolerance, 86–87
coding categories, 370–372 judgments, 84, 86
military and nonmilitary, 372 methods, 85, 86
participants’ country, 375, 376 tolerant, 86
de San Martin, J., 444 unjustified crime, 87
DeSouza, E.R., 114, 117, 129, 273, 281 war
De Tocqueville, A., 362 causes, 83–84
Diamond, J.M., 359 conflict and qualifications, 84, 85
“Dirty war”, 116 definitions, 83
Doctrine, M., 446, 449 moral judgments, 83
DRC. See Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) ECHR. See European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR)
EI. See Emotional intelligence (EI)
E Emotional intelligence (EI), 192
East Asian definitions English imperialism and British isles
ancient China conquest and colonization, 361–632
culture, 146 food, 361
duty and family, 146 Welsh antagonism, 360
family loyalty, 146 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), 551
antiwar sentiments, 159
China, Hong Kong and Macau
economy, 148 F
nuclear weapons, 148 Family and individual security, East Asia
PRC, 147 demographic correlation, response themes
terrorism, perspectives, 148 ANOVAs, 310
coding system, 154 chi-square tests, 310
colonialism/revolutionary civil wars, 159 coding categories, 311
description, 145–146 statistical significant, 310
economic and political changes, 146 qualitative response patterns
exploratory analyses coded, conditional agreement, 308–309
characteristics, 157 diplomacy, 309–310
chi-square analyses, 157–158 fear, governmental deception, 308
judgments, 158 feeling safe and general disagreement, 307–308
Japan, 149–150 interventionist/protecionist, 310
Koreas, 150–153 national security, 307
PAIRTAPS, 153 protecting nations against external/general
sample limitations and intercountry, 154 threats, 308
scale/intensity, conflicts, 159 universalistic, prosocial themes, 309
Taiwan, 148–149 Faruqi, A., 291
terrorism, 154–155 FATA. See Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)
torture, 155–156 Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), 242
war, 156–157 Feldmann, A.E., 115, 117, 118
694 Index

Ferguson, N., 364, 366 I

Fischer, M., 239 Ignatief, M., 364
Fiske, S.T., 665 India, national security
Fitch, J.S., 669 cold war, 287
Flynn, J., 191 core and contemporary, 287
Foley, C., 613 long-term strategy, 287
Forje, G., 600 modified structuralism, 288
Former Yugoslovic Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), 567 Sino-Indian border, 287
French, H.W., 152 Inglehart, R., 226, 236
Fukuyama, F., 304 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
FYROM. See Former Yugoslovic Republic of Macedonia (CCPR), 568
(FYROM) International Monetary Fund crisis, 303
Intolerance
government/sovereignty, 683
G humanization, 683
Gates, R., 356 torture and invasion, 684, 685
Gender differences, 686–687 Invasion perspectives in Africa
George, L., 361 conquests and division
Gettleman, J., 426 Berlin Conference, 423–424
Gilligan, C., 377 imperial powers and countries, 424
GIPGAP. See Group on International Perspectives scramble, 423
of Governmental Aggression and Peace creation, borders
(GIPGAP) Afro-Asiatic languages, 424
Global Peace Index (GPI), 421 colonialists and ethnic groups, 424
Goleman, D., 192 Niger-Congo language family, 424
Governmental aggression and peace (GIPGAP), 212, 263 religious groups and World Bank report, 424–425
GPI. See Global Peace Index (GPI) social capital, 424
Greenberg, J., 206 demographic analyses
Grimmett, R.F., 445, 446, 448 another country bombing your country, 437
Grossman, D., 586, 595 chi-square tests, 435
Group on International Perspectives of Governmental p-value, 435
Aggression and Peace (GIPGAP), 183, 186, your country bombing another country, 437–438
452, 635, 665 description, 421
emotion/motivation
denied responsibility, 434
H international community, 435
Han, X., 146, 152 personal disengagement responses, 434–435
Haspel, M., 335 personal engagement responses, 435, 436
HDI. See Human development index (HDI) European invasions, 422–423
Herman, S., 228 GPI, 421
Hitti, P.K., 244 human development, 426–429
Hobsbawm, E., 377, 378 and interventions, 421
Hodgson, G., 565 least peaceful region and women, 439
Hoffman, D., 29 participants, 431
Hoffmann, S., 362 peace and participation, 429, 430
Howard, D., 273 personal responsibility and engaging, 438
Hudson, H., 361 police violence and human rights, 422
Hughes, R., 364 postcolonial coups and civil wars
Human development, Africa Cold War, 425
ecological scarcity, 427 genocidal war, 425
economic infrastructure, 427 proxy and genocidal war, 425
indicators, 427, 428 sub-Saharan Africa, 425
natural resources, 427 pre-colonial societies, 422
safe drinking water, 427 principles, 439–440
school attendance and UNDP, 427 pro-invasion responses and punishment
sub-Saharan, 426, 427 and revenge, 438
type/cause, conflict, 426–427 rebel movements, 425–426
United Nations Program Development report, 427 rights to
Human development index (HDI), 207 acceptability, 432
Humanitarian intervention, 677 arguments against, state, 433–434
Index 695

arguments supportive, state, 432 protestors, 390

principled moral justifications, 433 response percentages, coding categories, 391, 392
pseudo-moral justifications, 432 self-referenced agency, 395
socio-cognitive coding procedures, 431 standard deviations and t-test, 391, 393
uprisings, 421 t-tests, 390, 395
Invasion perspectives in East Asia description, 381
and bombing methods, 383
demographic groups and chi-square power, legitimate use, 382
values, 500, 501 qualitative patterns, 385–388
exploratory quantitative analyses, 499–502 region, 382
PAIRTAPS, 495 social interaction, 382
personal engagement, 497–499 state’s right
personal networking, 495 opposition, 384–385
sociocognitive coding procedures, 495–496 support, 384, 385
views, right, 496–497 Invasion perspectives in South and Southeast Asia
chi-square analyses, 503 being attacked, participants responses
exploratory analyses, 504 personal disengagement responses, 478–479
militarism and personal engagement responses, 479–480
China, 489–490 colonial power, 468
Japan, 487–489 emerging constructs, invasion
Korea, 491–495 Bandura’s theory, moral disengagement, ,469,
political power., 487 self-regulatory mechanisms, 469
Invasion perspectives in Gulf States emotional and motivational responses
9/11 attacks, US, 414 indiscriminate bombing scenario, 473, 474
Bandura’s theory, 415 personally disengaged responses, 473, 474
definition, Muslim, 413 self-referenced agency, 473
First Persian Gulf War, 413 vengeful agency, 473
hypothetical bombing scenarios, 415 forms, trading, 467
Islamic countries, 413 nationalism and independence, 468
Jihad and mujahid, 414 participant’s responses, attacking another country
Mardin fatwa, 420 personal disengagement response, 480–481
moral engagement, 415 personal engagement responses, 481–483
nationalism and personal responsibility, 419 reflections
Operation Desert Storm, 413 colonialism and imperialism, 483
PAIRTAPS, 415 engagement and disengagement, 484
peace, 414 responses, state’s right
personal engagement, 415 arguments, support, 472
personally disengaged and engaged responses government and sovereignty, 470
bombing scenario, 417 pseudo-moral justifications, 471
chi-square analyses, 417–418 reflective, accepting consequences, 470
coding manual, 415 social class, distance, gender and identity
Denial of responsibility, 416, 418 in-group glorification, 484
general responsibility, 417 moral agency, 485–486
genuine assistance, 417 psychological landscape, 485
harming emotions, 416, 418 statistical analyses, 484
prosocial agency, 419 state’s right, 475–478
self-referenced agency, 418–419 Invasion perspectives in the Middle East
vengeful agency, 416 ANOVAs, 410
sample, 415 chi-square analyses, 408–409
SPSS, 415–416 coding categories, 407
Invasion perspectives in Russia and Balkans demographic variables, 406
demographic correlates description, 401
coding categories, 393 emotion/motivation, 405–406
description, 388 exploratory analyses, 406
gender differences, 388 gender differences, 406
Greek respondents, 395 history, 403–404
invasion-intolerant, 389 Islam, 402
military service, 389 microsystem, 401
personal disengagement, 393–394 military experience, 409
proinvasion, 390–391 Muslim Arabs, 402
696 Index

Invasion perspectives in the Middle East (cont.) North Korea

procedure, 404 Democratic People’s Republic, 150
state’s right, 405 education, 150
Sykes-Picot Agreement, 402 policies and military investment, 150
tribes, 402 torture and terrorism, 151–152
Invasion perspectives in UK/Anglo countries reform-conscious phase, 493
bombing civilians scenario, 369–370 reforms, 492
PAIRTAPS, 367 South Korea
thematic patterns, response birth rate, 152
government and sovereignty, 368 democracy, 152
honoring international mandates, 369 mounting threats, 152
peace and nonviolence, 369 terrorism and torture, 152–153
positive consequences, 368 Tonghak Rebellion, 492
pseudomoral justifications, 367 World War II, 494
Invasion perspectives in Western Europe
description, 335
experiences L
France, 337–338 Langguth, A.J., 621
Germany, 338 Lapsley, M., 601
Iceland, 336–337 Latin American definitions
Portugal, 339–340 complexity and nuances, 129
Spain, 338–339 democracy, 130
Sweden, 336 design, 118–119
exploratory demographic analyses gun violence, 130
chi-square analyses, 354 terrorism
description, 351 cause/motivation, 126, 127
military respondents, 352–353 demographic groups and chi-square
state’s right, 352 values, 128, 129
perceptions “dirty war”, 116
measures and procedures, 340 hypothetical attack, 117
moral disengagement, 341 judgments, 128
personal engagement and disengagement, 342–343 military and police corps, 116
prosocial agency code, 343 nongovernmental terrorist, 117
sample, 340 Peru’s antiterrorism laws, 117
themes, qualitative responses process/method, 127
arguments support government’s right, 343, 344 qualitative analysis, 126
bombing scenario, 349–350 tactical-level attacks, 116
personal engagement, 346–348 USA’s war, 115
perspectives, state right, 343–345 torture
categories, 122
characteristics and conditions, 122, 123
J chi-square analyses, 125
Janowski, L., 364 intent, motivation / emotion, 122, 123
Japan, militarism and invasion judgments, 122–124
export, metal, 488 method, 123–125
form, colonization, 487 perceptions, 115
gunboat diplomacy, 488 psychological processes, 126
imperialism, 487 war
Juma, M., 261, 262 categories, 119
causes, 119
conflict and qualifications, 120
K definition, 113–114
Kaid, L., 212–213 demographic groups and chi-square
Kaldor, M., 426 value, 121, 122
Kant, I., 163–164 large-scale international conflicts, 114
Kennedy, P., 360 legally recognized authority, 122
Keohane, R.O., 364 moral judgments, 120, 121
Khalaf, S., 245 Lebanon, national security system
Korea, militarism and invasion CIA World Factbook, 245
“cultural government” policy, 493 description, 244–245
modernization, 491 Israel-Palestine, 245
Index 697

national assembly, 245 terrorist attacks, 79

political and economic differences, Syria vs., 245 torture
Lerner, J.S., 206, 207 chi-square analyses, 73
Lethem, M., 381 demographic group, coding categories, 73
Lincoln, A., 362 demographic groups and chi-square values, 70, 72
Lincoln, B., 619, 620 destroying psychology and personality, 73
Listhaug, O., 553 frequency, codable units, 71, 72
Lopez, G.A., 281 judgments, 71
Luban, D., 673 moral ambiguity, 74
moral judgment, 73
tolerance and intolerance, 72
M Turkish woman, 71, 72
Maathai, W., 438 war
Machado, C., 537 categories, 68
Mahan, A.T., 190, 401 causes, 69
Mahoney-Norris, K., 281 characteristics, 69
Malley-Morrison, K., 118 conflict, 70
Mancall, P.C., 361 demographic groups and chi-square values, 70
Mann, M., 449, 450 “destruction”/“instability”, 68
Mardin fatwa, 420 frequency, codable units, 68
Martin, C.E., 444–445, 448 moral judgment, 71
Maslow, A., 205, 206, 212, 221 nonphysical conflict, 70–71
Masmoudi, R.A., 413 political motivation, 69
Maston, A.S., 191 qualifications, 70
Mayer, J.D., 192 Miheljak, V., 235
McCoy, A.W., 448 Military experiences, 687
McDermott, R., 224 Mix, D., 193
McKay, G., 670 Mohandas, K., 468
Mehta, S., 288 Moral disengagement and invasion
Meyer, B., 336 intolerant responses, 341–342
Middle East definitions tolerant responses, 341
Ba’ath party, 65
civilization, 64
Cold war, 65 N
description, 63 National Human Rights Institutions (NHRI), 584
Iraq-Iran war, 64 Nationalism and independence, Asian nations
military service, 79 civil wars, 468
natural resources, 64 Eastern tradition, 468
oil-rich Gulf States, 66 National security
PAIRTAPS, 67–68 categories, 316
political systems, 63 concept, 315
sample, description, 66–67 family and individual security
superpowers, 66 conditional/partial agreement category, 317
Sykes-Picot Agreement, 65 description, 316
Taliban, 66 gender, age and religion, 317–318
terrorism regions, 316–317
Afghan, 77 responses, 317
ANOVA, 78 participants, 316, 320
categories, 74 peace and nonviolence, 319
causing, 74 role, 315
codeable units, 78 National security coding system
demographic groups and chi-square creation and analysis
values, 77, 78 codeable units, 186
frequency, codeable units, 75, 76 cumulative count scores, 186
judgments, 75 GIPGAP, 186
physical methods, 77 PAIRTAPS, 187
sample responses, 74, 75 regional datasets, 186
valence, 75 data collection and preparation
violence, 77 coding category, 184–185
698 Index

National security coding system (cont.) feudal system, 303

GIPGAP coders, 183 imperialistic competitions, 302–303
negative/protectionist/interventionist/ vs. individual
abandonment responses, 186 constitution of Japan, Article 9, 305–306
positive/universalistic/pro-social, 185 ethnic minorities, China, 306
description, 183 North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, 305
National security system in Africa interventionist/protectionist approaches, 313
cold war, 263 Mandate of Heaven, 301
colonial period, 259 on-site war and imperialistic competition, 312
demography, geography, languages and religion, PAIRTAPS, 312
257–258 participants, 307
description, 257 state-centered culture, 301–302
exploratory analyses state-centered ideas, 311–312
categories, 267 National security system in Latin America
chi-square analyses, 268 democracy, 274
conditional/partial agreement, 265–266 design, 275
demographic groups and chi-square values, 268 environmental danger, 275
general agreement and disagreement, 266 exploratory analyses
human and resource development, 268 chi-square analyses, 279
individual and family security, 265, 266 coding categories, 279
peaceful methods, 267 quantitative analysis, 280
positive/universalistic/pro-social response, 267 homophobia and transphobia, 273
GIPGAP, 263 political patrimonialism, 274
HIV and malaria, 260 predictors, 274
human trafficking, 270 qualitative responses
intrinsically tied, 270 coding manuals, 276
negative/protectionist category, 271 disagreement, family and individual security,
OAU, 262, 269 276, 277
PAIRTAPS, 269 individual and family security, 276, 277
participants, measures and procedures, 263 negative/protectionist/interventionist/
peace and security, 261–262 abandonment, 280
potential essentialness partial agreement, family and individual
description, 264 security, 276–278
essential, family and individual security positive, universalistic/pro-social practices, 279
response, 265 sample, 275
general conditional agreement, 265 social/economic development, 273
not essential, family and individual security “undeclared civil war”, 280
response, 265, 266 violence, 273
precolonial, 258–259 National security system in Russia and Balkans
qualitative response patterns, 264 Austro-Hungarian monarchy, 225
quantitative analyses, rating scale responses, 263–264 contextual knowledge, 223
rationales, 270 cultural map, values, 226, 227
unanimity, 269 description, 223
universalistic/pro-social responses, 271 diplomacy and international relations, 235
World War I and II, 259–260 essential individual and family security
National security system in East Asia all sample reasons, 230, 232
Confucian ideology, 302 assuring family/individual security, 234
democracy and economic growth conditional/partial agreement, 232, 233
China and Japan, 304 exploratory analyses, 234
citizens, 304 family and individual security, 230, 231
civil society and integration, 304 feeling of safety, 232
Cold War, 304 general disagreement, 232
decision-making procedures, 303 reasons, 230, 231
globalization process, 304 reasons not essential, 232
Kwangju democratization movement, 304 sample responses, 232, 233
World Economic Forum’s 2009, 304 sample responses, reasons not essential, 232, 233
description, 306 exploratory analyses, 235
family and individual (see Family and individual global super power, 225
security, East Asia) Greece, 225
Index 699

Inglehart’s cultural map, 226 general disagreement category, 253

nationalism and democracy means, standard deviations and t-test
description,223–224 results, 253, 254
social identity theory, 224–225 way to achieve national security, 254
PAIRTAPS, 223 FATA, 242
quality of life, 227–229 individual and family security, 250–252
regional sample, 229–230 Iran, 248–249
sample responses, suggestions, 234, 235 Iraq, 247–248
Serbia and Slovenia, 225 Jordan, 246
ways of achieving security, 234 Lebanon (see Lebanon, national security system)
National security system in South and Southeast Asia Middle Eastern regime, 242
amity and enmity, 283 PAIRTAPS, 249
ASEAN, 286–287 Persia and Ottoman Empire, 239
barbarism, 284 responses, achievement, 252–253
colonization, 284 Saudi Arabia, 246–247
commonalities, culture and ethnicity, 283 Syria and Lebanon, 241
conditional agreement,294, 295 territorial battles and religious persecution, 240
contingent/partial agreement, 294 WMD, 241
decolonization, 284 World War I, 240
description, 283 National security system in UK Anglo countries
exploratory demographic analyses, 296 context and press
gender and military service, 296–297 ABC and NITV, 211
gender difference, 298 BBC, 210
India, 287–288 CNN, 210
Indonesia, 288–289 current events, 208
internal and external threats, 297 description, 207
Laos, 289–290 financial aid and diplomatic assistance, 208
Malaysia, 290–291 GINI, 207
modernization, 286 media-driven phenomenon, 211
necessary, family and individual security, 294 military and foreign affairs, 208
not important, family and individual security, 294 modern news media, 209–210
Pakistan, 291 organizations, 210
political legitimacy, 283 “oxygen of publicity”, 211
PRC, 287 racial and cultural tensions, 209
principle, achieving, 295 racism and immigration, 209
prosocial/universalistic strategies, 295 standard of living, 207–208
SAARC, 286 terrorism, 208–209
sample, 293 description, 205, 212
sample “agree” responses, 294 GIPGAP, 212
sample “disagree” responses, 294 international security policy vs. media,
SEATO treaty, 285 211–212
Singapore, 285 qualitative data
Sri Lanka, 292–293 achievement, National security, 217
state-building policies, 285 agreement, 213
Western imperialism, 284 conditional/partial agreement, 216
National security system in the Middle East essential but incomplete, 217
Afghanistan, 249 essential vs. not essential, 213–215
Al-Qaeda, 242 family and individual security, 213
CIDCM, 243 feel safer category, 214
coding categories, 250 government deception, 216
democratization and human rights, 243 human resource development, 218
description, 239 illusion/impossible theme, 215
essential for individual and family security measures category, 217
general agreement, 250 peace/nonviolence, 218
peace/nonviolence category, 252 protection theme, 214
sample responses, agreement, 250, 251 protect values, 215
sample responses, disagreement, 251 strong nation theme, 215
exploratory analyses tolerance, 219
chi-squares, 253 useful but not essential, 217
demographic group, coding categories, 253, 254 ways achievement, National security, 218
700 Index

National security system in UK Anglo countries (cont.) O

quantitative data, 213 Oates, S., 212
and safety OAU. See Organization of African unity (OAU)
behavior and judgment, 206 Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights
“desire for vengeance”, 207 (OHCHR), 632, 633
hierarchical progression, 205 OHCHR. See Office of the High Commissioner on
personal and national risk, 207 Human Rights (OHCHR)
“pro-US essay” and “anti-US essay”, 206 Ohlmeyer, J., 360
theory, human motivation, 205 Ómarsdottir, S.B., 537
TMT, 206–207 Operation Desert Storm, 413
National security system in Western Europe Opotow, S., 602
Congress of Vienna, 190 Organization of African unity (OAU)
CRS, 193 cold war, 261
cultures, 202 cradle of modern humans, 262
dynastic politics, 189 cumbersome and ineffective, 269
EI, 192 decolonization, 261
essentiality geostrategic interests, 261
agreement, 197 national security, 269
disagreement, 197 Orwell, G., 367
partial agreement, 197, 199
family and individuals, 191
France, 195 P
Germany, 195 PAIRTAPS. See Personal and Institutional Perspectives
homeland security, 202 on Governmental Aggression and Peace
Iceland, 194 Survey (PAIRTAPS)
Napoleonic invasions, 190 Parchami, A., 360
nationalism spawned, 190 Park, B.H., 302
Ottoman Empire, 190 Parrott, B., 60
Portugal, 196 Peace, Africa
positive/universal/pro-social responses, 200, 201 equitable system and GPI, 429
psychological focus, 193 rural to urban migration and rapid sociocultural, 429
quantitative analysis UNDP statistics, 429, 430
ANOVA, 199 youth bulge and engagement, 429
Chi square contingency analyses, 200 People’s Republic of China (PRC), 147, 148
means, standard deviations, and t-test, 199, 201 Peräla, M., 115, 117, 118
military, 200 Personal and Institutional Perspectives on Governmental
statistical or marginal significance, 199 Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS)
religion, 191 coding categories, 33
resiliency, 191 coding process, 3
sample demographics, 196–197 internet, 153
social and behavioral sciences, 202 participant definitions, 33
“social” Darwinian role, USA, 190 qualitative responses, 165
Spain, 195–196 sociopolitical issues, 187
Sweden, 194–195 Peru’s antiterrorism laws, 117
television/media exposure, 201–202 Peters, E., 531–534
transatlantic cooperation, 193–194 Petras, J., 364
universalistic/pro-social practices, 198 Pictet, J., 600
NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Pillar, P.R., 29
NHRI. See National Human Rights Institutions (NHRI) Planje, E., 246
Nizar, M., 241 Ploughshares Armed Conflict Reports 2010, 677
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Porter, B., 364
Balkan war, 17 POW. See Prisoners of war (POW)
EU membership, 15 Powell, C., 669
forces, 689 PRC. See People’s Republic of China (PRC)
“no fly” zone, 241 Prisoners of war (POW)
peace and security, 208 definition, 631
“stay behind armies”, 18 Indian, 632
threats, 51 Japanese and civilians barbarically, 633
transatlantic relationship, 340 torture, 631
North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, 305 treated humanely, 636
Index 701

Q S
Quantitative analyses SAARC. See South Asian Association for Regional
categories, 13, 14 Cooperation (SAARC)
description, 12 Salovey, P., 192
official and unofficial groups, 13 Saul, B., 633, 634
political motivations, 13 Schatzman, C., 274
preliminary analysis, 13 Schmelzle, B., 239
Schneider, B., 241
Schrepel, M.W., 602
R Scruggs, N., 439
Ranković, A., 51 Serbia
Reemtsma, J., 537 archeological sites, 50
Rejali, D., 621 axis powers, 50
Reynolds, A., 212 land-locked nation, 50
Richards, D.L., 671 NATO, 51
Rieff, D., 364 Southeastern Europe, 49
Right to invasion in Latin America State Union, Montenegro, 52
colonial era, 444 totalitarian communist state, 51
exploratory analyses, demographic differences Shue, H., 663
attacking another country, 461–463 Silver, C.B., 312
being attacked, 463–464 Smith, M., 603
participants’ responses, 461–464 Social identity theory, 224–225
right to invasion, 459–460 Socio-cognitive coding, 431
nineteenth century Sontag, S., 664
civil and transnational wars, 448 South and Southeast Asia definitions
international wars and foreign invasions, culture, economy, and politics
444–445 ASEAN, 134
profit and security, 446 Buddhism, 133
Spanish-American war and island empire, 446 environmental degradation, 134
US Armed Forces, 445–448 natural resources, 134
personal disengagement, 457–458 description, 133
personal engagement globalization, 142
description, 456–457 horrors and atrocities, 134
general responsibility and genuinely motivating factor, 142
assist, 457 PAIRTAPS, 135–136
self-referenced agency, 457 participant demographics, 136
postcolonial era, 444 terrorism
precolonial era, 443–444 causes/motivation, 139
project measures and procedures chi-square analysis, 141–142
coding manual development, 452 judgments, 139–140
GIPGAP and PAIRTAPS, 452 process/method categories, 139
personal engagement and disengagement, 454 thematic coding, 139
qualitative responses, 452–454 torture
right to invasion (see Right to invasion in Latin characteristics, 138
America) chi-square analysis, 140, 141
sample, 452, 453 description, 137
twentieth century hurting/harming, 138
“capitalism’s great leap forward”, 449 intent, motivation / emotion, 137
Cold War and comprador, 450 intolerant/condemning, 138
global phase and real socialism, 451 judgment, 138
postcolonial era, 451 method category, 138
Second World War, 449 Vietnam War, 135
US domination, 451 war
uses, US Armed Forces, 447–449 causes, 136–137
Rizal, J.P., 468 chi-square analysis, 140, 141
Roberts, A., 32 focus, conflict, 136–137
Roosevelt, E., 228 moral judgment, 137
Roselle, L., 212 qualifications, 137
Rowen, H.S., 495 World War II, 135
702 Index

South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation country, religion, and socio-economic status, 176
(SAARC) description, 164–165
description, 286 favor of peace, 176
treaty, 297 gender, 175
SPSS. See Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) International Humanitarian Law, 167–168
State right to invasion and bombing scenarios military experience, 175
Albert Bandura’s Theory, 326–327 multivalence, 179
attacking another country PAIRTAPS samples, 168
personal disengagement themes, 514–515 political violence, 178
personal engagement themes, 515–516 Terror Management Theory (TMT), 206
being attacked Thakur, R., 677
personal disengagement themes, 512–513 Thorkildsen, T.A., 327
personal engagement themes, 513–514 Thorndike, E.L., 192
coding guidelines TMT. See Terror Management Theory (TMT)
advantageous comparison/positive consequences, Tolerance
327–328 advantageous comparison., 683
anti-social agency, 330 Banduran sociocognitive mechanisms, 682
appreciating consequences, 329 invasion and torture, 682
attribution of blame, 328 Torture
Bandura’s theory, 327, 332 barbarity, tyranny, and uncivilization, 673
displacement of responsibility, 327 cause, 663
invasion-tolerant sociocognitive processes, coding
328, 329 categories, 176–178
moral engagement processes, 329–330 procedures, 168
personal disengagement processes, 331 country, religion, and socio-economic
personal engagement, 331 status, 173
principled moral justification, 329 description, 165–167
pseudo-moral justification, 328 emotions, 665
responsibility, 328 favor of peace, 173
coding manual, 325–326 gender, 172
coding responses, state’s right Geneva Convention, 663
ANOVAs, 508 GIPGAP, 665
Bandura’s theory, 508 human rights violations, 663, 664
moral disengagement, 507 International Humanitarian Law, 167–168
SPSS, 508 international law, 664
description, 325 interrogation tactics, 664
hypothetical, 332–333 military experience, 172–173
indiscriminate bombing items, 511–512 moral disengagement theory, 665–666
intolerance, state’s right, 510–511 multivalence, 179
invasion coding manual, 327 PAIRTAPS, 168, 665
national conflicts, 518 political violence, 178
self-defense, 516 ticking bomb scenario, 673
SPSS, 333 tolerant responses
tolerance, state’s right to invade, 509–510 apathy and compliance, 671
violent retaliation, 517 Bandura’s theory, 666
Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS), demographic characteristics, 672–673
333, 415–416, 508 euphemistic labeling, 666
Stevens, M.J., 273 gender, 668
Stohl, R., 130 government right, 667
Sullivan, M.P., 116 military experience, 668–669
Sykes-Picot Agreement, 402 moral agency coding, 670
moral and social justification, 666
PAIRTAPS, 667
T physical integrity rights, 672
Tajfel, H., 224 positive action, 671
Taylor, W.J. Jr., 115 religion, 669
Terrorism sociocognitive mechanism and coding category,
coding 666–667
categories, 176–178 thematic categories, 670
procedures, 168 war protesting, 669–670
Index 703

Torture perspectives in Africa less violent, 628

anticolonial period, 600 methods
arguments, tolerance, 605 measures, 622
chi-square analyses sample, 622
anti-torture, 609 minority, morally disengaged, 628
pseudo-moral justifications, 608–609 Mithridates, 619
tolerance and intolerance, 609, 610 perceptions and reasoning, 627
torture scenario item, 610, 611 personal involvement, 624–626
definition, 600 prisoners, 621
electric shock, 601 responses, hypothetical situation, 626–627
enhanced interrogation, 613 state-sponsored, 618–619
ethnic cleansing, 601–602 support, 622
forms, exploitation, 612 theme uses, 625–626
Geneva conventions and protocols, 600 tolerance, 623–624
justification, violence against uses, 621–622
inhumane behaviors, 603 Torture perspectives in Russia and Balkan Peninsula
moral disengagement, 602 Bandura’s Theory of moral disengagement, 569–570
pressure, techniques, 602 Bronfenbrenner’s cognitive–ecological model, 565
methods cycle, violence, 578
coding argument, torture, 604–605 exploratory quantitative analyses, 576–578
materials and procedures, 603–604 FYROM, 567
participants, 603 historical context, 565–566
personal involvement human rights
agentic alternative solutions, 608 CCPR, 568
exploratory analyses, demographic correlates, 608 international legal framework, 567
political/ institutional activism, 608 protection, 568
torture scenario responses, 608, 609 Slovenia, 569
quantitative analyses, rating scale scores, 611 methods, 570–571
regional wars, 601 multiethnic society, 566
state right, torture prisoners personal engagement, 574–576
arguments, 606, 607 personal ethics, 580
humanization, 605 techniques, 578
UDHR, 599 torture-intolerant views, 572–574
Torture perspectives in East Asia torture-tolerant views, 571–572
China, 647–650 Torture perspectives in South and Southeast Asia
cognitive dissonance, 660–661 act-utilitarianism model, 634
collection methods, 654 Albert Bandura and Ben Saul description, 633
exploratory quantitative analyses, 657–659 ASEAN and AICHR, 633
government’s right, 655–656 coding team, GIPGAP, 635
international agreements, 645 definition, Article 1.1, 631
Japan, 645–647 democratic and authoritarian governmental
military, 660 systems, 633
moral justification and passivity, 660 euphemistic language and labeling, 634
North Korea, 650–652 exploratory analyses, demographic variables
PAIRTAPS, 654 notions, 643
personal engagement and emotional and sociocognitive response types, 641–642
motivational, 655, 657 thematic categories, 640–641
POWs, 645 governmental rights
sociocognitive coding procedures, 654–655 intolerant coding, 637–639
South Korea, 652–654 personal involvement coding, 639–641
Torture perspectives in Latin America tolerant coding, 636–637
administrative evil, 620 horrific actions, 643
Ancient Persia, 619 India and Pakistan, 632
Colombia and Guatemala, 628 Japanese forces, 632–633
Colombian unionist Guillermo Rivera, 621 OHCHR, 632, 633
description, 617 participants and scenario, 634–635
evil acts, 620 POW (see Prisoners of war (POW))
government’s right, 626 SAARC, 632
intolerance, 624 sample, 635–636
704 Index

Torture perspectives in South and Southeast Asia (cont.) definitions, 531

survivors, camps, 633 development, middle ages, 532–533
ticking time bomb, 633–634 France, 537
types, cognitive mechanisms, 633–634 Germany, 537
Universal Declaration of Human Rights global terrorism, 536
Article 5 states, 632 Iceland, 537–538
Torture perspectives in the Middle East justice system, 547
adherence, international law non-positive action, 545
human rights groups, 584 passivity, 544–545
NHRI, 584 personal involvement, 542
agentive role, individuals, 593, 594 Portugal, 537
coding manuals positive action, 542, 544
Bandura’s theory, 588 present-day, laws, 535
descriptive language, 587 quantitative analyses
distribution of qualitative responses, 588–591 personal involvement, 546–548
political activism/institutional action, 588 tolerance and intolerance for torture,
torture-tolerant responses, 587 546, 547
exploratory quantitative analyses reemergence, early twentieth century, 534–535
agentive role, 593 rights, governments
Fisher’s exact test probabilities, 592 coding manual, responses, 539
government’s right, prisoners of war, 592, 593 euphemistic labeling, 542
group identity and perspectives, torture humanization, 539
factors, person’s views, 585 intolerance, torture, 540–543
intractability in conflict, 585 torture, tolerance, 540, 541
methods and results of study, 586 Roman law, 532
identity groups, 593 sample, 538–539
international law, torture, 583–584 Spain, 538
Israeli national identity group, 595, 596 Sweden, 538
military officials, 596 theoretical discourse, 548
realism category, 593 Tos, N., 235
response patterns, 588–590 Towle, P., 646
security apparatus, 596 Triandis, H., 382
Torture perspectives in UK/Anglo countries Turner, J., 224
Bandura’s theory of moral disengagement., 562 Tuttle, D., 130
ECHR, 551
exploratory statistical analyses
ANOVA, 558 U
demographic differences, 559–560 UDHR. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights
hypothetical torture situation, 561 (UDHR)
global antiterrorism measures, 562 UK/Anglo countries definition
Guantanamo Bay, 552 armed conflict, invasion and occupation
human rights, 553 Dominions and Crown Colonies, 29
legitimacy judgments, 553 Iraq war, 31–32
methods Korean war, 30
coding systems, 554–555 torture, 32
survey, 554 Vietnam war, 30–31
UK/Anglo sample, 553–554 war in Afghanistan, 31
personal involvement responses, 557–558 World War II, 30
thematic analyses, 562 commonwealth, Australia, 28
torture-intolerant responses, 557 democratic government, 28
torture-tolerant responses description, 27
attribution, blame, 556 economic influence, 27–28
demographic information, 555 exploratory analyses
World War II, 551 categories, 43
Torture perspectives in Western Europe chi-square, 42
Amnesty International (AI) Report, 536 definitions of war, torture and terrorism, 42
ancient Greek Law, torture, 531–532 demographic group differences, 41
ancient regime, 533–534 morality-based definitions, 42
compliance, 545 moral judgment and intolerance, 43
CPT, 535 sadistic/sick, 43
Index 705

terrorism and war, 44–45 communications revolution, 688

torture, 43, 44 definitions, 163–164
gender differences, 46 demographic correlates, 169
human habitation, 27 favor of peace, 170–171
market-oriented economic systems, 27 gender, 169–170
methods International Humanitarian Law, 167–168
PAIRTAPS, 33 military equipment, 689
participants, 32–33 military experience, 170
parliamentary democracies, 28 multivalence, 179
participants responses, 45 PAIRTAPS samples, 168
physical and psychological harm, 46 political violence, 178
political protest participants, 47 qualitative analysis, 168–169
quantitative analyses, 46 religion, 171
terrorism self-immolation, 688–689
causes/motivations, 39, 40 violence, 689
definitions, 29 Wasserman, M., 444, 445, 448
judgments and real life reference, 41 Weapons of mass destruction (WMD), 241
outcomes category, 41 Western European definitions
process/method, 39, 40 armed conflicts, 16
state-sponsor, 32 Catholicism and Protestantism, 15
valence, 39 coding manuals, 19
torture description, 15
characteristics of individuals, 37 exploratory analyses
conditions, 37–38 ANOVAS, 21–22
content-based categories, 36 chi-square, 21
definition, 28–29 definitions of war, torture, and terrorism, 21, 22
intent, 36 description, 21–22
method, 38 moral judgments, 21
morality/justice/humanity, 38 terrorism, 21–23
outcome, 38–39 war, 21, 22
war French Revolution, 16
causes, 33, 34 global unrest and fear, 19
as conflict, 34 intent/motivation, 24
content-based categories, 33 PAIRTAPS, 19
definition, 28 physical processes/methods, 23
outcomes and judgments, 34–35 post-world war II era, 16–17
world’s strongest power, 29 terrorism
Western contemporary civilization, 27 diplomacy, 20
World war II, 45 ethnic, 17
Universal Declaration of Human Rights moral judgment, 21
(UDHR), 599 open-ended response format, 19
Un-wars, Africa physical process/method, 21
“Acholi” problem, 426 restrict Muslim immigration, 18
Lord’s Resistance Army, Uganda, 426 right-and left-wing extremists, 18
new wars, 426 9/11 terrorist attacks, 17
rebels and military oppositions, 426 and torture, 24
torture
coding subcategories, 19
V as cruel/immoral, 20
Vellinga, M., 274 global unrest and fear, 19
intolerance, 19
physical pain/strong violence, 20
W prisoners, 18
Wandi, A., 286 psychological, abstract/conceptual, 20
War and terrorism, 24
Arab Spring rebellions, 689 “ticking bomb scenario”, 20
coding war
categories, 176–178 armed conflict and violent assault, 20
procedures, 168 conflict, battle/comba, 19–20
706 Index

Western European definitions (cont.) Y

global unrest and fear, 19 Young, D., 230
Napoleonic, 16
post-world war II, 16–17
related decisions, 24 Z
World war I, 16 Zaide, G., 485
World war II, 16 Zaide, M., 485
Willkie, W., 228 Zedong, M., 493
Wolfers, A., 283 Zimbardo, P.G., 224, 603, 620–622
Wu, T., 381 Zinn, H., 164