B'j. Gopalan Vs Municipal Corporation of ... On 29 February, 1996'

J. Gopalan vs Municipal Corporation Of ...
on 29 February, 1996
Andhra High Court

J. Gopalan vs Municipal Corporation Of ... on 29 February, 1996
Equivalent citations: AIR 1996 AP 371, 1996 (1) ALT 600
Bench: S Nayar
ORDER
1. There is conflict of perception of a problem, the problem of dealing with stray dogs in the twin
Cities of Hyderabad and Secunderabad and remedial measures to be adopted to solve that problem,
between an individual and a public authority and this conflict is carried to this Court for
consideration and resolution by way of this writ petition, styled as Public Interest Litigation (PIL)
under Article 226 of the Constitution. The petitioner is one J. Gopalan. He claims to be an Engineer
by profession and he is a permanent resident of Hyderabad for the past 30 years. The petitioner has
stated that he has filed this PIL to espouse the cause of the residents of the twin cities of Hyderabad
and Secunderabad.
2. The Respondent No. 1 is the Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad, for short 'the Corporation'; the
second respondent is Smt. Rachel Chatterjee who was the Commissioner of the Corporation at the
relevant time and the third respondent is Blue Cross represented by its Chair-Person Smt. Amala
Akkineni. After the writ petition was filed in this Court on 17-10-1994, the A. P. Jeeva-raksha
Sangam represented by its Secretary Peela Ramakrishna was impleaded as additional respondent
No. 4 to the writ petition by an order of this Court dated 2-3-1995 made in W.P.M.P. No. 3819/95.
3. In this writ petition, the petitioner has prayed for a writ of mandamus for declaring the action of
the first respondent in stopping the destruction of unlicensed stray dogs, as required under the
provisions of sub-section (5) of Section 249 of the Hyderabad Municipal Corporation Act, 1955 for
short 'the Act' and handing over the dog pound to the third respondent permitting them to release
the stray dogs back into the streets after sterilising them as arbitrary, illegal and unconstitutional.
4. The facts pleaded by the petitioner in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition may be
summarised briefly as under:
Under sub-section (5) of Section 249 of the Act the Corporation is under an obligation to destroy
unlicenced and unclaimed stray dogs. In pursuance of this statutory duty cast on the Corporation,
the Corporation, earlier used to seize unlicenced stray dogs and cause them to be destroyed. The
third respondent Blue Cross claims to be an Animal Welfare Organisation and that was established
recently by Smt. Amala Akkineni, aformer film actress. The said organisation has been taking up the
cases of percieved cruelty to animals. In the issue ol Hindu dated 18-7-1994 it was reported that the
second respondent Smt. Rachel Chatterjee and Smt. Maneka Gandhi, the former Union Minister for
State decided at a meeting to hand over the dog pound of the Corporation to the Blue Cross for being
converted into a birth control centre for stray dogs and under the said agreement, according to
Hindu, the stray dogs would be caught and handed over to the Blue Cross which will conduct
sterilisation operations, inoculate and release the dogs back into their respective streets. It is also
reported in Hindu that tags and marks would be put on dogs before releasing them back into their
respective streets for the purpose of easy identification. It is also claimed, as per the press report,
Indian Kanoon - http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1512129/ 1

according to the second respondent and Smt. Maneka Gandhi adoption of this new method would
result in reduction of stray dogs population at least by half in a period of three years and
consequently the Corporation would be in a position to put an end to the inhuman method of
destruction of unlicenced and unclaimed stray dogs. 'The second respondent, without due
application of mind and without examining whether the new method suggested by Smt. Maneka
Gandhi was viable and expedient, acceded to the method suggested by Smt. Maneka Gandhi and
accorded permission to hand-over dog pound to the third respondent for being converted into a
birth control centre for stray dogs. The second respondent did it with sole intention to appease 'Smt.
'Maneka Gandhi and Smt. Amala Akkineni completely ignoring the health and safety of the
residents of the twin cities of Hyderabad and Secundera-
bad. On account of introduction of new method of sterilisation of the stray dogs and abandoning the
earlier method of destruction of the dogs, instances of dog bites have shown an alarming rise and
this fact was reported in the issues of Hindu and Deccan Chronicle dated 13-10-1994 and according
to these reports, groups of stray dogs have been roaming freely in the public streets and they are
terrifying the public who use the public streets. The petitioner claims that he has been personally
witnessing stray dogs chasing scooterists and innocent children in a menacing manner on the
streets, many times biting the unfortunate victims. Sometimes, the terrified scooterists and cyclists
dash against one another or fall down with fright. The stray dogs, most of the times, are found
fighting with one another on the roads and show their anger on the passers-by by chasing or biting
them. It is impossible for the public to know whether the dog that bites them is inoculated or not. It
is also claimed by the petitioner that he has not come across even a single stray dog with either any
tag or mark. This has resulted in innocent, poor and middle class residents of the twin-cities
becoming victims of dog bites and they are forced to run from pillar to post for painful medical
treatment. It is also claimed that the Blue Cross does not have adequate staff trained in sterilising
dogs.
5. The respondents 1 to 3 have filed their respective counters. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf
of the respondents 1 and 2, it is claimed that the new measure of sterilising stray dogs is taken in
good faith and to reduce stray dog population in the twin cities. It is claimed that the
"sterlisation-cum-immunisa-tion" of stray dogs is an internationally accepted programme and that
programme has been impleme nted in several developed countries like Holand, Spain, Hongkong
and U.S.A. In India also this programme is being implemented in other metropolis of India like
Delhi, Bombay, Madras, Bangalore etc. The third respondent Blue Cross is a voluntary organisation
and it is affiliated to Animal Welfare Board of India, an organ of the Ministry of Environment,
Government of India. The Corporation has not handed over the dog pound to the Blue Cross and the
Corporation is only co-operating with the Blue Cross by supplying stray dogs for
sterilisation-cum-immunisation. Sub-section (5) of Section 249 of the Act does not mandate the
Corporation to destroy ail the stray dogs and there is a discretion vested in the Corporation to
destroy or not to destroy the unlicenced and unclaimed stray dogs. The Corporation has claimed
that the new method has been introduced on trial basis and if tangible results are not seen by
adoption of the new method, the Corporation may review the situation and adopt any other method
or the earlier method to deal with the menace of stray dogs. The Corporation is keeping a close
watch on the outcome of the adoption of the new method of sterilisation-cum-immunisation.

6. The counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the third respondent is sworn to by its Chairperson Smt.
Amala Akkineni. The facts stated in the counter-affidavit of the third respondent be summarised as
under:
7. Blue Cross is an animal welfare organisation founded in January, 1993 by Smt. Amala Akkineni
and a small group of animal lovers and the organisation is registered and ever since its inception it
has been working sincerely for animal welfare in the twin cities. It is a moral obligation on every one
that all animals whether domesticated or wild should be protected from cruelty. Animal welfare is a
cause which has been thoroughly neglected though animals have been serving humanity from the
dawn of civilisation. The Blue Cross has been working with the main object of preventing the
uncontrolled proliferation of stray dogs and the incidence of rabies in the twin cities and it has ben
conducting 25 sterilisation operations per day and the dogs' are given anti-rabies inoculations,
tagged and released back in their respective areas. The laudable and result oriented new programme
has resulted in tangible improvement in reducing stray dog population and it has earned
compliments from the Animal Welfare Board of India. Even according to the World Health
Organisation, mass destruction of dogs is not to be considered a reliable or an effective way to deal
with the stray dog over-population. It is claimed that wherever there is disposal of garbage and food
on the streets, there will automatically be stray dogs and the number of stray dogs, in spite of killing
thousands every year, will remain in porportion to the amount of food and space available.
Therefore mass destruction of stray dogs is not viable measure to deal with the problem. The
effective measures recommended by the World Health Organisation in the third world countries are
mass sterilisation, mass vaccination against rabies and removal of all garbage dumps, waste food
etc., from city roads. The new project has been approved by the Animal Welfare Board of India by its
letter dated 4-2-1994 and the Animal Welfare Board of India is providing ample funds for executing
the project. It is also claimed that the dog pound is very much with the Corporation. The
Corporation after noticing the miserable failure to control the stray dog over population through
mass killing, has accepted the new method of sterilisation-cum-immunisa-tion with the help of the
Blue Cross. The third respondent has produced materials and details to contend that the new project
is not a failure but it has achieved tangible good results and the Animal Welfare Board also noticed
these results and complimented the Blue Cross for its services. Lastly, the third respondent has
taken strong exception to the pleading of the petitioner castigating motives to Smt. Maneka Gandhi,
Smt. Amala Akkaineni and the then Commissioner Smt. Rachel Chatterjee. It is stated that without
any warrant and basis, certain demeaning observations and statements are made throughout the
petition averments and this part of the pleading should be disapproved.
8. The impleaded additional respondent No. 4, as could be seen from the averments made in
W.P.M.P. No. 3819/95, has fully supported the claim of the respondents 1 to 3. The respondent No.
4 is also a registered society and is interested in the protection of stray dogs and in fact it wanted to
launch a similar project of sterilisation-cum-immuni-sation in Guntur city and in that regard the
society has been corresponding with the Animal Welfare Board of India for approval and financial
assistance.
9. Heard Sri Prabhakar Sripada, the learned counsel for the petitioner; Sri K.N. Jwala, the learned
standing counsel for the first and second respondents, Smt. C. Jaya-shree Sarathy, the learned

counsel for the third respondent and Sri B. S Thakur, the learned counsel for the fourth respondent.
10. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that
(a) the first respondent is under a statutory obligation as commanded by the provisions of
sub-section (5) of the Section 249 and Section 112 of the Act read with Section 27 and Section 66(f)
of the Hyderabad City Police Act, 1348F to destroy unlicenced and unclaimed stray dogs and this
duty cast on the corporation is absolute and mandatory and under no circumstance the performance
of its duty can validly be delegated to an external agency like the third respondent Blue Cross in the
absence of any provision in the Act empowering it to delegate the performance of the said duty, and
therefore the action of the first respondent to hand over the dog pound to the third respodent and
empowering the latter to deal with stray dogs is totally ultra vires of Section 249(5) of the act;
(b) that the new project/programme of sterilisation-immunisation of stray dogs is neither pragmatic
nor viable approach to deal with the problem of over-population of stray dogs and moreover the new
project is not supported by any scientific investigation. The adoption of the new programme has
resulted in an alarming increase in the population of stray dogs in the twin cities threatening safety
and health of its residents;
(c) the action of the Corporation in entrusting the statutory duty to the third respondent-Blue Cross
is otherwise invalid inasmuch as the action is tainted by malice in fact exhibited by the second
respondent Smt. Rachel Chatterjee; and
(d) that serious personal allegations are levelled against the second respondent by the petitioner and
therefore if the second respondent wanted to deny those allegations, she herself ought to have filed
counter-affi-davit and for the reasons best known to her, she has not chosen to file the
counter-affidavit, The counter-affidavit filed by the deputy of the second respondent denying those
allegations cannot be taken into account while dealing with the allegations levelled against the
second respondent in the writ petition.
11. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents 1 to 4 would contend that
(i) the writ petition is a frivolous and vexatious one which is liable to be dismissed in limine;
(ii) the writ petition is grounded solely on the misleading, inaccurate and dishonest reports in the
press and no acceptable materials worth the name are placed before the Court in support of the
allegations contained in the writ petition;
(iii) the third respondent started functioning only from the month of September, 1994 whereas the
writ petition was filed in this Court on 17-10-1994 making reckless and unfounded allegations
against the second and third respondents and obviously the petitioner could not expect any tangible
results within a period of one month from the initiation of the project and without waiting even for a
reasonable time had rushed to this Court and made totally baseless allegations;

(iv) the materials placed before the Court by the respondents 1 to 3 clinchingly prove the fact that
the new project providing for sterilisation-cum-immunisation of stray dogs is not only expedient,
result-oriented and humane but also inconsonance with the prevailing thinking in the world, fully
supported by scientific investigations carried out by the agencies and experts throughout the world
including the world body like World Health Organisation, and moreover the adoption of the new
programme has resulted in tangible and quite encouraging progress in containing the dog-bite
menace and the public at large including the poor and middle class citizens for whom the petitioner
is stated to have special concern have welcomed the adoption of the new programme and no one
except the petitioner, that too, in this petition, has so far complained about the expediency and
utility of the new programme. On the other hand the Animal Welfare Board of India has very much
appreciated the working of the Blue Cross and it complimented the Blue Cross for the results so far
achieved by it.
12. In addition to these arguments, Smt. C. Jayashree Sarathy, the learned counsel for the third
respondent took strong exception to the scandalizing averments mode in the writ petition
castigating motive to the third respondent and she particularly drew the attention of the Court to
what is stated by the petitioner in para 12 of the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition and
contended that such a motivated, unnecessary and baseless allegations should be disapproved by the
Court and the petitioner for having made such reckless and baseless allegations should be saddled
with exemplary costs payable to the third respondent to vindicate the requirement of decency and
propriety in the matter of pleadings.
13. The last two contentions of the petitioner may be considered in the first instance. The last and
the least attracting but quite vociferously argued technical argument of the learned counsel for the
petitioner is that the petitioner has levelled serious personal allegations against the second
respondent Smt. Rachel Chatterjee to bring home the charge of malice in fact and therefore the law
requires that if according to Smt. Rachel Chatterjee those allegations are baseless and false, she
should have filed her personal counter-affidavit denying those allegations and the counter-affidavit
sworn to by Sri M. Chandrapal Reddy, the Veterinary Officer of the Corporation denying those
allegations is not a denial at all in the eye of law, and therefore the allegations of the petitioner
should be taken to be true and correct and on that basis the Court should decide the case.
14. This is not an adversarial litigation but a public interest litigation filed under Article 226 of the
Constitution. The Constitutional Courts, while exercising anew jurisdiction under Articles 32 and
226, are not bound to follow technical rules of procedure. The Supreme Court, in Bandhua Mukti
Morcha v. Union of India, dealing with a public interest litigation filed under Article 32 of the
Constitution of India and the procedure to be followed in such proceedings, held that the adversarial
procedure embodied in the Code of Civil Procedure and the Indian Evidene Act have no application
where the Constitutional Courts exercise a new jurisdiction conferred upon them under Articles 32
and 226 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court held that the Courts can adopt any 'appropriate'
proceeding, 'appropriate' not in terms of any particular form but 'appropriate' with reference to the
purpose of the proceeding. The Supreme Court in para 15 of its judgment made it very clear that
what it observed by it in paragraphs 11 to 14 would equally apply in relation to the exercise of
jurisdiction by High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution.

15. Even otherwise it is not an invariable rule that the affidavit must be sworn by the party himself in
all cases. Demand for compliance with the rule that the counter-affidavit must be sworn by the party
himself depends upon many attending circumstances such as the nature of the allegations, whether
those allegations are within the knowledge of the party himself or whether those allegations could be
traversed on the basis of the records, whether those allegations, if not denied, will have any bearing
or impact on the decision to be reached, the official status of the person who has sworn to the
counter-affidavit and whether such official is the custodian of, and has access to, the relevant
records and whether he has authority from the party to the legal action etc. The Court has to decide
the necessity of filing the counter-affidavit by the party himself taking into account all these factors
and circumstances. There is no hard and fast rule in this regard even in the field of adversarial
litigations. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents 1 and 2, Sri M. Chandrapal
Reddy has specifically stated that he was authorised by the respondents 1 and 2 and he is well
acquainted with the facts of the case. This assertion of Sri Chandrapal Reddy is not denied by the
petitioner in his reply affidavit. The petitioner has utterly failed to prove the charge of mala fide
against the second respondent Smt. Rachel Chatterjee for the reasons to follow presently. Therefore,
the failure of Smt. Rachel Chatterjee to swear to the counter-affidavit is no way helpful to the
petitioner and there was no necessity for Smt. Rachel Chatterjee to file her personal affidavit. In the
facts-situatioin of this case, Smt. Rachel Chatterjee perhaps might have been advised that there was
no necessity to file her personal counter-affidavit.
16. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the action of the Corporation in
adopting the scheme of sterilisation-cum-immunisation of stray dogs is tainted by the malice in fact
exhibited by the second respondent Smt. Rachel Chatterjee. The decision of the Corporation to
adopt the scheme for sterilisation-cum-immunisation of stray dogs is a policy decision of the
Corporation. Policy is an art of Government, a State craft or a course of action based on some
declared principle or expediency. 'Policy' is a system of administration guided more by interest than
by principle. The very notion of 'policy' indicates its leaning towards a particular declared principle
or expediency or utility. Looking from that angle and broad speaking one will find an element of
orientation bias in large number of policy decisions of the administration. Generally speaking,
departmental or ministerial policy cannot be regarded as disqualifying bias. As rightly pointed out
by the learned author, S.A. de Smith in his book 'Judicial Review of Administrative Action' (4th
Edition), that the public administration cannot be carried on in a spirit of judicial detachment. We
should note that it will be legitimately proper and legal for a public authority to make a particular
decision for its own perceived advantage or benefit, as distinct from the advantage or benefit
perceived by individual members, and a decision as to the mode of discharging a public duty will not
necessarily be vitiated by the personal interest of the officer occupying the public office in the
method adopted. Only in those cases where the policy decisions in question have a judicial flavour
because of express procedural requirements or an obligation to act or operate under the limitations
or constraints imposed by the statute, before discretion is exercised in a matter having civil
consequences for individuals, a duty to comply with the rule against bias can be insisted. It is true
that the policy decisions are not beyond the pale of Article 14 of the Constitution. The right or
discretion to have a policy should not detract from fair mindedness, impartial enquiry, examination
of relevant facts and due application of mind to those facts. The policy cannot be arbitrary,
unreasonable and fanciful. In other words, the policy decisions also should satisfy the postulates of

Article 14 of the Constitution. If the Court finds that the policy in question is illegal, irrational or it
offends any of the provisions of the Constitution or suffers from procedural impropriety is such
policy decision is required to be taken after following a specific procedure contemplated in a statute,
the Court can interfere with such policy decision.
17. When we speak about 'a policy', we should remember that a policy is only a course of action in
respect of a subject matter and there are other alternative courses of action to deal with the same
subject matter. Here, the administration plays a key role. It has to choose one of the many courses of
action to deal with the subject matter and it can choose any course of action which it thinks is
advantageous to it unless its discretion to choose is taken away by law. Expediency and utility of a
policy is primarily with the domain of the administration and the scope of judicial review in that
regard is very much limited and circumscribed and the Court can interfere with policy decisions only
under those circumstances set out above.
18. Even an administrator is entitled to have a particular perception about a policy administered by
him. Frank, J., an American Judge speaking about 'bias' and 'partiality' of the Judges, in In re
Linahan (1943) 138 F 2d.
650 observed as under:
"If, however, 'bias' and 'partiality' be defined to mean the total absence of pro-conceptions in the
mind of the judge, then no one has even had a fair trial and no one ever will. The human mind, even
at infancy, is no blank piece of paper. We are born with predispositions; and the processes of
education, formal and informal, create attitudes in all men which affect them in judging situations,
attitudes which precede reasoning in particular instances and which, therefore, by definition, are
prejudices."
In the same decision Frank, J., proceeded to observe that "Much harm is done by the myth that,
merely in putting on a black robe and taking the oath of office as a judge, a man ceases to be human
and strips himself of all predilections, and becomes a passionless thinking machine."
Bias in the sense of conviction in moral and ethicai values is not avoidable, Professor Robson in his
book "Justice and Administrative Law (1951), writes:
"In all civilised countries the judge must, in fact, possess certain conceptions of what is socially
desirable, or at least acceptable, and his decisions, when occasions arise, must be guided by these
conceptions. In this sense judges are and must be biased .... It is a simple fact that a man who had
not a standard of moral values which approximated broadly to the accepted opinions of the day, who
had no beliefs as to what is harmful to society and what beneficial, who had no bias in favour of
marriage as against promiscuous sexual relations, honesty as against deceit, truthfulness as against
lying; who did not think wealth better than poverty, orthodox religion preferable to atheism, courage
better than cowardice, constitutional Government more desirable than anarchy, would not be
tolerated as a judge on the bench of any Western country."

19. What is stated by Frank, J., and Professor Robson about the judges are also equally apply to the
administrators. A person, after becoming an administrator, does not strip himself of all human
perceptions and predilections and take the role of a machine.
20. In this case the main contention of the petitioner is that the Corporation, as per the provisions of
Section 249(5) and Section 112 of the Act read with Sections 27 and 66(f) of the Hyderabad City
Police Act, 1348F, is under an obligation to destroy the unlicenced and unclaimed stray dogs and
this duty cast on the Corporation is absolute and mandatory. If that is so, even accepting the case of
the petitioner that Smt. Maneka Gandhi and Smt. Amala Akkineni persuaded the second respondent
Smt. Rachel Chatterjee, the then Commissioner of the Corporation to accept their view point, that
fact itself will in no way relevant or have a bearing on the issue to be decided. Admittedly, both the
ladies are exponents and rigorously pleading with the authorities against killing of stray dogs and
they pleaded for humane approach to solve the dog-bite menace. There was nothing wrong on their
part to plead with the Commissioner to accept their view point and equally there was nothing wrong
on the pan of the Commissioner to hear them before she decided to involve the Blue Cross and adopt
the new scheme of sterilisation-cum-immuni-aation. Any modern responsible and responsive public
authority is expected to act and react with the public opinion voiced through the enlightened citizens
in the society. Smt. Maneka Gandhi and Smt. Amala Akkineni are not higher authorities in the
echelon of Administration of the Corporation and therefore the Commissioner acting under their
dictation without applying her mind did not Arise. The allegation is that the Commissioner was
unduly influenced by Smt. Gandhi and Smt. Amala and in order to please them she approved the
scheme of sterilisation-cum-immunisation of stray dogs. Every man including men holding public
officers are capable of influencing others and in turn amenable to be influenced by others if the word
'influence', in the context, means the power of producing an effect. These are the traits of an efficient
teacher and a open mind person respectively. Nodoby can have valid objection to it. Nothing is
placed on record to show that Smt. Rachel Chatterjee acted mechanically without due application of
mind to appease the two ladies for any collateral or extraneous consideration. Factual foundation is
totally lacking in the pleading of the petitioner to bring home the charge of malice in fact against
Smt. Rachel Chatterjee and the pleading in that regard is poorer than the poorest.
21. It is true that when an administrative or statutory action is taken out of affection, friendship,
personal animosity, ill-will, grudge or vengeance, such action will be struck down by the Courts on
the ground of malice in fact. Mala fides or bad faith means dishonest intention or corrupt motive.
Sometimes, it is difficult to discern whether or not the administration has exceeded its powers
because of the broader terms of the concerned statutes, nevertheless, administrative or statutory
action may be declared invalid if the motivation behind the action is corrupt or dishonest. But, the
burden of proving mala fides is on the individual making the allegation and this burden is very
heavy. There is a presumption in favour of the administration that it exercises its power and
discretion in good faith and for public purpose and benefit. The very seriousness of allegation of
mala fides demands proof of a high degree of credibility. Law requires that the particulars of fraud
or mala fides must be specifically alleged. Facts and grounds as basis of allegations of mala fides,
must be clearly stated in the affidavit. The Court will not entertain general allegations of bad faith
unless expressly pleaded. The petitioner has to clearly mention the ground of mala fides, as an
attack in the pleadings and he is also under an obligation to make a full disclosure of all material

facts within his knowledge in clearest possible terms failing which he may be disentitled to the relief.
Comments based on impressions or opinions are completely out of place- The Supreme Court in
Bharat Singh v. State of Haryana, held that in a writ petition a party raising a point must plead not
only relevant facts but also state facts by way of evidence in proof of the facts so pleaded. This rule
laid down by the Apex Court is a departure from the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure. The rule
is so because the writ petitions are decided by the Constitutional Courts on the basis of affidavits
and counter-affidavits and seldom the parties are examined and cross-examined in such
proceedings.
22. The Supreme Court, in Pratap Singh v. State of Punjab, has emphasized that mala fides should
be established only by direct evidence, i.e., that must be discernible from the order impugned or
must be shown from the notings in the file which preceded the order.
23. In E. P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, although three out of the five Judges on the Bench
thought that there were circumstances to create suspicion in the mind of the Court about the bona
fides of the Government, nevertheless, the Court refused to declare the action mala fide holding that
suspicion could not take the place of proof and proof needed is a high degree proof.
24. In the present case, the petitioner except stating that the Commissioner took the impugned
action to please the two ladies has not set out circumstances or background facts in the pleading to
show that Smt. Rachel Chatterjee, the then Commissioner was obliged to appease Smt. Maneka
Gandhi and Smt. Amala Akkineni for any extraneous or collateral considerations. Therefore the plea
of mala fide levelled against Smt, Rachel Chatterjee is not proved and the argument of the learned
counsel based on alleged mala fide had to be rejected and it is accordingly rejected on the ground of
lack of necessary pleading and proof. Alternatively, even accepting the case of the petitioner that
Smt. Maneka Gandhi and Smt. Amala Akkineni pleaded with and pursuaded Smt. Rachel Chatterjee
to adopt the scheme of sterilisa-tion-cum-immunisation of stray dogs and Smt. Rachel Chatterjee
adopted the said scheme, that fact itself will not be a proof to bring home the charge of mala fide
against her, if the action is otherwise legal and justified.
25. This takes us to the main contention of the learned co unsel for the petitioner. The contention-is
that the provisions of Section 249(5) and Section 112 of the Act read with the provisions o f Sections
27 and 66(f) of the Hyderabad City Police Act mandate the Corporation to destroy unlicenced and
unclaimed stray dogs and the duty cast on the Corporation is mandatory and absolute. To appreciate
the argument of the learned counsel it is useful to refer to certain provisions of the Act and that of
the Hyderabad City Police Act. Chapter III of the Act deals with obligatory and discretionary duties
of the Corporation. Section 112 mandates the Corporation to make adequate provision for the
matters specified therein. For our purpose, Entry 18 and Entry 21 are relevant. The matter in Entry
18 is 'preventing the spread of infectious diseases'. The matter in Entry 21 is 'the fulfilment of any
obligation imposed by or under the Act or any other law for the time being in force'. The duty cast on
the Corporation under Section 112 is obligatory. Section 113 of the Act provides that the Corporation
shall make payments at such rates and subject to such conditions as the Government may from time
to time by general or special order determine, for the maintenance and treatment in any institution
which the Government declares by notification in the Andhra Pra-desh Gazette to be suitable for

such purpose either within or without the City and other necessary expenses of persons undergoing
anti-rabies treatment as indigent persons according to the rules applicable to such institutions, In
other words, under Section 113 of the Act the Corporation is required to reimburse the expenses
incurred for maintenance of institutions and treatment of the patients. Section 115 of the Act deals
with the matters which may be provided for by the Corporation at its discretion and it states that the
Corporation may provide from time to, time, either wholly or partly, for all or any of the matters
specified in that section. Section 115 contains 40 Entries. The matter included in Entry 20 is 'the
destruction of vermins, birds or animals causing a danger or nuisance, and the confinement or
destruction of stray dogs. Section 27 of the Hyderabad City Police Act provides that the
Commissioner of City Police, Hyderabad may, from time to time, by notification proclaim that any
stray dog found, during such time as may be specified in the notification, wandering in any street or
in any public place shall be destroyed and every such dog found in any street or public place, during
the hours mentioned in the notification, shall be destroyed. Section 66 provides, among other
things, that whoever in any street, or public place negligently lets loose any horse, or other animal so
as to cause danger, injury, alarm or annoyamce or lets loose any ferocious dog without a muzzle,
shall for every such offence, be pu nished with fine which may extend to Rs. 50/-. Section 248 of the
Act deals with tax on dogs whereas Section 249 of the Act deals with grant of licence and providing
number tic ket for dogs and disposal of unlicenced and unclaimed dogs. Sections 248 and 249 read
as under:
"248. Tax on Dogs: (1) A tax not exceeding rupees ten per annum shall be levied on every dog kept
within the city and not under the age of six months.
(2) Every person who owns or is incharge of any dog on which a tax is leviable under sub-section (1)
shall be liable for such tux.
(3) (a) Every person who owns or is incharge of any dog shall, before the first day of May in each
financial year, forward to the Commissioner a return signed by him containing his name and
address and the age of such do?
(b) Every person who after the first day of May in any financial year becomes the owner or takes
charge of any dog, shall within one week from the date on which he becomes the owner o r takes
charge of the dog, forward to the Commissioner a like return, singned by him.
(4) The tax shall be payable for every financial year in advance on the first day of May.
Provided that -
(i) in respect of a dog which attains the age of six months after the first day of May, the tax shall be
payable immediately after the expiry of one week from the day on which the dog attains such age,
and
(ii) in cases in which a person becomes the owner or takes charge of any dog, not under the age of
six months, after the first day of May, the tax shall be payable immediately after the expiry of one

week from the day on which he becomes the owner or takes charge of such dog.
Provided further that the tax shall not be payable more than once for the financial year in respect of
any dog.
(5) The Commissioner shall maintain a register showing the persons liable to pay the tax under this
section.
249. Licence and number ticket for and disposal of dogs: (1) when the owner or pers on-in-charge of
any dog has paid the tax levi able on and the price fixed for the number tickets for such dog, the
Commissioner shall -
(a) grant him a licence for the keeping by him of such dog during the financial year for which he had
paid the tax, and
(b) provide him with a number ticket, the number of which shall be specified in such licence.
(2) The owner or person in-charge of any dog so licensed shall at all times cause the said number
ticket to be kept attached to the collar or otherwise suspended from the neck of the dog.
(3) Any dog, which has no number ticket so attached or suspended -
(i) shall be presumed to be a dog in respect of which no licence has been granted, and
(ii) may be seized by the police or by any officer duly authorised by the Commissioner in this behalf,
and detained until the tax due, if any, has been paid.
(4) If any person, within three days from the date of such seizure, satisfies the Commissioner that he
is the owner or person incharge of such dog, the Commissioner shall order it to be delivered to such
person on payment of the tax if any, due and the costs incurred by the Commissioner by reason of its
detention.
(5) if, within the said three days, no person satisfies the Commissioner that he is the owner or
person in-charge of the dog, the Commissioner may cause the dog either -
(a) to be destroyed, or
(b) to be sold and the proceeds of the sale, after deducting therefrom the said tax and costs (together
with the costs of sale) to be paid to any person who within six months from the date of such sale
establishes to the satisfaction of the Commissioner, his claim to such proceeds.
26. Dog is a domestic animal. There are two classes of dogs -- one class of dogs owned by persons
and the other class of dogs not owned by any person. The reading of the provisions of Sections 248
and 249 together makes it very clear that these two sections essentially deal with the dogs owned by

persons. Section 248 required that every person who owns or is in-charge of any dog to pay tax.
Section 249 provides that when the owner or person in-charge of any dog pays the tax under Section
248. The Commissioner shall grant him a licence for keeping the dog by him and provide him with a
number ticket and the owner is obliged to keep the number ticket attached to the collar or
suspended from the neck of the dog. Sub-section (3) of Section 249 provides that if any dog which
had no number ticket shall be presumed to be a dog in respect of which no licence has been granted
and the officer duly authorised by the Commissioner of the Corporation is entitled to seize such dog.
Sub-section 4 of the Section 249 provides that within three days from the date of such seizure, if any
person satisfied the Commissioner that he is the owner of the dog, then the Commissioner shall
order the delivery of the dog to the custody of such person on payment of the tax, if any, due and the
costs incurred by the Corporation by reason of detention of the dog. Sub-section (5) provides that
within the said three days, if no person comes forward claiming the ownership of the dog, the
Commissioner may cause the dog either to be destroyed or to be sold.
The language of sub-section (5) of Section 249 does not warrant an interpretation to hold that there
is mandatory duty cast on the Corporation to destroy each and every unlicenced and unclaimed dog.
On the other hand, the language of sub-section (5) of Section 49 is clear that there is a discretion
vested in the Com missioner either to destroy the unlicenced and unclaimed dogs or he may choose
to sell the dogs as provided under clause (b) of sub-section (5) or he may resort to some other
procedure to dispose of the unlicenced and unclaimed dogs. The provisions of sub-section (5) do not
mandate the Commissioner to destroy or sell the dogs. These are not the only options open to the
Commissioner to dispose of the unlicenced dogs.
27. While interpreting these provisions, the Court may take into account the fundamental duties of
the citizens set out i.n Article 51A of the Constitution. Part IV A has been added by the Constitution
(42nd Amendment)' 1976 in accordance with the recommendations of the Swaran Singh Committee,
Clause; (g) of Article 51A provides that it shall be the duty of every citizen of India to protect and
improve the natural environment including forests, lakes, rivers and wild life, and to have
compassion for living creatures (emphasis is supplied by the Court), Therefore if is expected that a
citizen while exercising and enforcing his fundamental rights, should remember that he owes the
duties specified in Article 51A to the State and that if he does not care for the duties he should not
deserve the rights. Of course, the duty as such is not legally enforceable in the Courts; but if the State
makes a law to prohibit any act or conduct in violation of any of the duties, the Courts would uphold
that as a reasonable rest tiction on the relevant fundamental right, just as they did uphold any law
implementing a Directive Principle. Even before Part IVA was in troduced by the Constitution (42nd
Amendment) Act, 1976 the Supreme Court in Chandra Bhavan v. State of Mysore, AIR 1970 SC 3042
had to observe as under;
"It is a fallacy to think that under our Constitution there are only rights and no duties. The
provisions in Part IV enable the Legislatures to impose various duties on the citizens. The mandate
of our Constitution is to build a welfare society and that object may be achieved to the extent the
Directive Principles are implemented by legislation."

If so, either in determining the constitutionality of such laws, or in interpreting the same, the Court
should have regard to the Fundamental Duties as well as Directives along with the Fundamental
Rights.
28. In Mumbai Kamgat Sabha v. Abdul-bhai, the Supreme Court held that "the Courts may also look
at the duties while interpreting equivocal statutes which admit of two constructions."
To the same effect is the decision of the Apex Court in Mohan v. Union of India, (1992) Supp (1) SCC
594, AIR 1992 SC 1.
29. After insertion of Article 51 A. it has become the duty of every citizen to have compassion for
living creatures. Firstly, to have beneficial considerations at the hands of the State is not the
monopoly of human beings. Innate compassion in man extends not only towards the fellow
human-beings but also it extends towards all the creatures in his surrounding. Secondly, and more
importantly the man has come to realise that his very existence is very much dependant upon the
sustenance and protection of the creatures including plants. This historical realisation, rather the
truth, led men to voluntarily enact laws for sustenance and protection of flora and fauna. If this
aspect and the duty cast on the citizens under Article 51 A(g) are kept in mind, the provisions of
sub-section (5) of Section 249 of the Act have to be interpreted in such a way as to advance the
Constitutional goal. If it is so interpreted, it is not possible to accept the argument of the learned
counsel that Section 249(5) of the Act mandates mass destruction of all the unlicenced dogs. It is
equally not possible for the Court to hold that sub-section (5) of Section 249 of the Act gives only
two options to the Commissioner to dispose of the unlicenced and unclaimed dogs, either by
destruction or by sale. There-
fore the argument of the learned counsel for , the petitioner is rejected.
30. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner based on Section 112 of the Act and
Sections 27 and 66 (f) of the Hyderabad City Police Act is misconceived. As already pointed out
supra, there is a specific entry. Entry No. 20 in Section 115 of the Act dealing with the destruction of
certain animals including confinement and destruction of stray dogs. Section 115 of the Act
unmistakingly states that the Corporation may provide from time to time, either wholly or partly, for
all or any of the matters specified in that section at its discretion. Therefore, it cannot be held that
confinement or destruction of stray dogs is a mandatory duty cast On the Corporation. When there
is. specific entry in Section 115 of the Act itself dealing with confinement and destruction of stray
dogs, it is not permissible to hold that there is a mandatory duty cast on the Corporation to destroy
the stray dogs basing on the general Entry No. 18 in Section 112 of the Act dealing with the
prevention of the spread of'ihfectious diseases. The mandatory duty of the Corporation under
Section 112 of the Act to make adequate provision for preventing the spread of infectious diseases
does not include the duty to destroy the unlicenced and unclaimed stray dogs. There-fore there is no
merit in, the contention of the learned counsel. Equally, the argument of the learned counsel based
on Sections 27 and 66(f) of the Hyderabad City Police Act should be rejected in limine for more than
one reason. In the first instance, Section 27 of the said Act deals with the power of the
Commissioner of City Police, Hederabad to order destruction of stray dogs. The Commissioner of

City Police, Hyderabad is not a party to the writ proceedings and no relief is sought against him.
Secondly the reading of Section 27 of the said Act makes it very clear that sections does not madate
the Commissioner of City Police, Hyderabad to destroy all stray dsgs. A discretionary power is
conferred upon the Commissioner of City Police. The provisions of Section 66(f) of the Hyderabad
City Police Act has no bearing on the issue, raised before the Court. Section 66(f) of the Hyderabad
City Police Act only provides that whoever in any street or public place negligently lets loose any
ferocious dog without a muzzle is liable to be punished with fine which may extend to rupees fifty.
From this provision, it cannot be said that there is a duty cast on the Corporation to destroy all stray
dogs.
31. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the entrustment of the dog pound
and implementation of the scheme of sterilisation-cum-immunisation of stray dogs to the Blue
Cross tantamounts to sub-delegation of statutory duty to an external agency without authority
conferred upon the Corporation under the Act is misconceived and not tenable. In the first place, the
allegation of the petitioner that dog pound is handed over to the Blue Cross is factually incorrect.
The dog pound is still managed and maintained by the Corporation. Blue Cross is a voluntary social
organisation and it has come forward to assist the Corporation in its battle against the problem of
dog-biting menace in the twin cities of Hyderabad and Secunderabad and the Corporation has
accepted its voluntary services. It is stated that Blue Cross is mainly funded by the Animal Welfare
Board of India. Therefore it is not a case of sub-delegation. There is a difference between
sub-delegation and taking of assistance. This is a case where the Corporation is taking assistance of
a voluntary organisation. The Supreme Court in Pradyat Kumar v. Chief Justice of Calcutta High
Court, has pointed out the difference between sub-delegation and taking of an assistance. In that
case, the Chief Justice of Calcutta High Court appointed a puisne Judge to enquire into certain
charges leveled against the Registrar of the High Court. After consideration of the enquiry report
submitted by the puisne Judge, the Chief Justice dismissed the Registrar. Assailing the said action of
the Chief Justice, it was contended by the Registrar that under the relevant Rules, only the Chief
Justice was competent authority to hold the enquiry and therefore the entrustment of the case to the
puisne Judge to hold enquiry into the charges against him tanta-mounted to sub-delegating the
statutory power without there being any provision in the rules empowering the Chief Justice to
sub-delegate his power to any one else and therefore the action of the Chief Justice in dismissing
him was vitiated. Repelling that contention, the Supreme Court held that the Chief Justice by
entrusting the enquiry to a puisne Judge took only assistance from the puisne Judge and did not
sub-delegate his power to the puisne Judge. Therefore it cannot be said that the Corporation has
abdicated its statutory function and sub-delegated the same to the Blue Cross. The Corporation itself
still manages, controls and supervises the new scheme of sterilisation-cum-immunisation of stray
dogs. Involvement of the Blue Cross in the scheme is only an instance of assistance.
32. The other argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the new scheme of
sterilisation-cum-immunisation of stray dogs is neither pragmatic nor viable and is it not based on
any scientific investigation or enquiry. As already pointed above, the utility and expediency of the
new scheme is primarily within the domain of the administration of the Corporation. Of course,
policy decisions are not sacrosanct against the unreasonableness doctrine and in certain
circumstances, even policy decisions can be reviewed and struck down by applying the tests of

rationality provided necessary and acceptable materials are placed before the Court to show that the
policy decision in question is wholly irrational and prejudicial to the public interest. It is not for the
Court to appraise the wisdom of a policy decision in the absence of such acceptable materials. Lord
Parker put the same point more strongly in stating that where no agreement exists on the ends of
society and the means of achieving those ends, it would be disastrous if Courts did not eschew the
temptation to pass judgment on an issue of policy (see pages 27-28 of Recent Developments in the
Supervisory Powers of the Courts over Inferior Tribunals (1959)). Judicial self-preservation should
dictate restraint in this field.
33. The contention of the petitioner is based on nothing except the reports in the Press and the
petitioner's personal perception of the problem. No acceptable materials of any sort are placed
before the Court to show that the new scheme is a failure. The new scheme was launched in the
month of September, 1994 whereas the writ petition was filed in this Court on 17-10-1994. It was an
impossibility for anybody to assess the viability, expediency, utility and result of the scheme in a
matter like this within the period of one and half month. The petitioner has (produced a report
which appeared in the issue of Deccan Chronicle dated 13-10-1994, as the factual matrix in support
of his contention. The said report reads as under:
"Alarming rise in dog-bites Thanks to Amala Akkineni and Maneka Gandhi's campaign to save the
street dogs from a brutal end by the dog squad of the Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad (MCH),
the twin cities are facing a serious menace and there is a rapid increase in the number of cases of
dog bites. The rush at the Rabies Clinic at the Institute of Preventive Medicine is a testimony to it.
The authorities at the clinic say the cases have increased in recent months -- an average of 700
dog-bite victims come to the Institute to take the anti-rabies treatment and vaccine everyday. Apart
from this clinic, many other private clinics and doctors are also giving the anti-rabies injections. The
Institute produces around 25 lakh doses per annum. There is an increase in the demand for the
vaccine in the city and the State. However, the Institute is not able to serve the needs of other States.
Meanwhile, four vehicles of the MCH's dog squad are lying unused. Under a deal struck between the
Blue Cross and the MCH, the Municipal authorities have stopped killing stray dogs. Instead, they
are being sterilised.
But the MCH officials feel that the solution is not effective in controlling the dog population. They
are of the view that if stray dogs are not killed, their population will increase rapidly and the people
will continue to suffer. The problem has already become serious in many localities, especially with
residents returning to their homes late at night becoming the favourite targets of stray dogs.
But the most vulnerable are children, whose number among dog-bite victims is going high.
Tailpiece: Maneka Gandhi was in the city on Monday and shared the platform with NTR. If NTR
comes to power, he is reported to have promised not only to protect the stray dogs, but also offer
free food to all the street dogs in the twin cities."

34. In the first place, who has authorised this report is not forthcoming from the report. It does not
state that the report was preceded by any investigation or enquiry. It also does not state that before
the new project was launched how many patients were visiting the Rabies Clinic. In other words, the
opinion expressed in the report seems to be based on the subjective and personal opinion of the
author and not on any impartial enquiry, investigation and collection of relevant materials.
Therefore, it is totally improper for the Court to act on such report and hold that the new scheme is a
failure.
35. The petitioner in para 8 of the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition has stated:
"I submit that I have been personally witnessing stray dogs chasing scoolerists and innocent
children in a menacing manner on the streets, many times biting the unfortunate victims.
Sometimes the terrified scooterists and cyclists dash against one another or fall down with fright.
The stray dogs, most of the time are fighting with one another on the roads and show their anger on
the passersby, by chasing or biting them."
36. The petitioner has not stated that what he claims to have personally witnessed was something
new and such a thing never happened or existed before the launching of the new project. Even
assuming that such state of affairs existed at the time when the new scheme was launched in
September, 1994 and the same state of affairs continued even there afterwards, that fact itself
cannot be an indication to say that the scheme is a failure. It was totally unreasonable to expect that
within a short period of one and half month the new scheme involving an element of
experimentation should have brought out some discernible encouraging results. The Corporation
has specifically denied the allegation that there is an increase in the population of stray dogs after
the new scheme was launched. The Blue Cross, in its counter, has set out the following statistics
relating to number of dog bites, number of dogs killed and number of cases of rabies before and
after the new project began.
Year No. of dog bites No. of dogs killed Rabies 1991-92 34,700 12,360 1992-93 42,201 16,353
1993-94 51,490 17,371 1994-95 April 5344 150 per day May 4955 150 per day June 4543 150 per
day July 3539 150 until 17th After the project began:
Aug. 2183 Sept. 1933
37. In the counter it is stated that even the above figures do not reflect the correct state of affairs. It
is stated that the above numbers include also the patients coming from villages for treatment and
monkey bites, cat bites, pet dog bites and rat bites. It is also stated that if a pet dog has not received
the anti-rabies vaccine, it is also registered as a stray dog in the Institute of Preventive Medicine.
This assertion of the third respondent seems to be correct because the Director of Preventive
Medicine in a statement given to the Blue Cross and also in the statement issued to the press which
is reported in the issue of the Hindu dated 21-10-1994 has endorsed this position.

38. The statistics furnished by the res-
pondents clearly go to show that there is considerable decrease in number of dog bites after the new
project was launched. Therefore, the allegation of the petitioner to the contrary is baseless. On the
contrary the work of the Blue Cross was appreciated. The Secretary to the Animal Welfare Board of
India in his communication dated 9-5-1995 has stated as under:
"Animal Welfare Board of India (Ministry of Environment and Forests, Govt. of India) No. 60, 4th
Street, Abhiramapuram, Madras-600018.
N . R a v i S h a n k e r , I . A . S . ,
Secretary. 9-5-95.
To Whomsoever It May Concern This is to certify that Blue Cross of Hyderabad, 8-2-544/1, Road
No. 7, Banjara Hills, Hyderabad-500 034 is an Animal Welfare Organisation, recognised by the
Animal Welfare Board of India.
The organisation participated in the Animal Birth Control Programme, launched in Six Metros on a
pilot project basis. The area of operation of Blue Cross of Hyderabad is Hyderabad City.
Among 15 organisations who were participants in the Animal Birth Control Programme in Six
Metros, the work of Blue Cross of Hyderabad was exceptionally good and in quantitative terms they
performed the largest number of ABC Operations (3,233 cases) in the span from July 1994 to March,
1995.
We recommend all assistance to this NGO which is doing yeomen service for the cause of Animals,
specially Stray Dogs.
Sd. N. Ravi Shanker (N. RAVI SHANKER) Secretary."
39. The petitioner seems to think that destruction of stray dogs is the only effective remedy to
combat the dog bites menace.
Destruction, throughout the history, appealed to the 'irrationalists' as the only remedy or at least the
best remedy to get over a problem or a danger or a confrontation. Destruction as a remedy is a
short-cut remedy but in the long run, in large number of cases, found to be ineffective and capable
of creating counter problems to the destroyer. Man cannot afford to kill all dangerous animals in his
own interest and for his survival. This realisation in man, in the ultimate analysis, was responsible
for making provisions in our public law for protection and sustenance of even dangerous animals
like lions, tigers, leopards and elephants. One will ill-afford to resort to destruction of the creatures
in meeting a problem unless he is left with no other alternative course of action to meet such
problem. In the cycle of creation, sustenance and destruction, the real challenge is to sustain the
'created' and not to destroy the 'created'. If the public administration is appraised of this realisation,
one- should welcome it. The Father of the Nation said : "The morality of a nation reflects on the way

it treats its animals."
World Society for the Protection of Animals, an organ of the World Health Organisation, in its
bulletin titled as 'A Practical Guide to Stray Control Programmes for Dogs' states thus:
"A Practical Guide to Stray Control Programmes for Dogs
1. Historical Perspective The bond between man and dog is said to have had its beginning 12-14
millennia ago somewhere in Eurasia, where a reciprocal relationship first emerged. Provided: with
scraps of food when approaching the early encampments and settlements of man, the wolf soon
became a frequent and welcome visitor, warning man of imminent danger and later assisting him in
the hunt for wild animals. Thus began the domestication of the dog and the establishment of a bond
between man and animals that has no equal.
2. Benefits of Dog Ownership There are numerous benefits of dog ownership. Dogs are used in a
number of ways to provide practical support to humans - as working animals, such as sheep dogs,
steigh dogs and guard dogs, and as assistance animals for disabled people, including the blind, the
deaf and those with Downs syndrome. Dogs kept as companions can decrease loneliness and
depression by providing companionship, exercise, an interesting and varied life-style and an
impetus for nurturing. They can reduce anxiety by providing an external focus of attention, promote
feelings of safety and provide a source of contact comfort.
Various scientific studies have confirmed that dogs can be of benefit to their owners in terms of both
psychological and physiological health. They can reduce stress, which is known to improve the
effective functioning of immune system. The benefits of companion dogs to people's psychological
health has been a reason behind the introduction of dogs to visit patients in hospices and hospitals.
3. Breakdown of the Bond Domestication of the dog, usefulness of the dog to man and the protection
that man has given to the dog in return, has led to the development of this storyboard. Today, man
often violates this bond by allowing dogs to breed excessively and then abandoning them in great,
numbers, causirjg immense suffering to the animals themselves and, sometimes, a health risk to
human society. Governments and local authorities confronted with the problems caused by these
dogs have often turned to mass destruction, in the hope of finding a quick solution, only to discover
that the destruction had to continue, year after year, with no end in sight. Moreover, by reducing
temporarily the population of straying dogs, the authorities had improve the chances of survival of
the remainder and encouraged migration of stray dogs into 'cleared areas', thus exacerbating the
spread of any existing diseases -- including rabies, if present.
A practical consideration is that the dogs most likely to be caught in these 'catch and kill' campaigns
are those staying not far from home. The owners of these dogs may resent the activity of the dog
catchers, and if the dogs are actually killed there will naturally be an outcry against the authorities. A
humane programme to control dog populations, on the other hand, should gain the support of the
local community and animal protection societies.

Removal and killing of dogs should never be considered as the most effective way of dealing with a
problem of surplus dogs in the community, it has no effect on the root cause of the problem, which
is the over-population of dogs. It is now being recognised that removal of surplus dogs alone cannot
solve the stray problem. It is essential that long-term, proactive measures are taken, including
registration, neutering and public education."
40. Therefore, mass destruction of dogs is not to be considered a reliable or effective way to deal
with stray dog over-population. Wherever there is disposal of garbage, and food on the streets, there
will automatically be stray dogs. The number of stray dogs, in spite of killing them in thousands
every year, will remain in proportion to the quantum of food and space available on the streets. The
population of dogs is instinctively and automatically controlled by the amount of space and food
available. This is the experience of the Corporation. Therefore, the Corporation wanted to
experiment the new method of combat the menace of stray dog-bites. The more effective measures
recommended by the World Society for the Protection of Animals in the third world countries are:
a) Mass sterilisation of dogs;
b) Mass vaccination against rabies;
c) Removal and killing of dangerous and diseased dogs; and
d) Removal of all garbage dumps, waste food etc., from city roads.
41. Effective control needs a comprehensive proactive programme which includes educating dog
owners and prospective owners, controlling the reproduction of owned dogs, controlling the
environment of unsupervised dogs, compulsory registration and identification of dogs and licencing
and control of breeders and sales outlets.
42. The Corporation falling in line with these loud and laudable thinking, decided to implement the
new scheme on experiment basis. The Corporation, in its counter, has made it very clear that if the
implementation of the new project does not yield expected results, it would review the working of
the new project and adopt any other alternative and more efficacious method or revert to the old
method of mass destruction of stray dogs. It is also stated by the Corporation that even now the
diseased and dangerous dogs are seized and destroyed. Therefore, no exception can be taken to the
action of the Corporation.' Materials placed before the Court by the respondents show that the
results so far achieved are quite encouraging. No grounds are made out to allow the writ petition.
43. Before concluding, the grievance made by Smt. Amala Akkineni that the allegations made by the
petitioner against her are scandalizing, humiliating and totally unfounded has to be considered.
Smt. Jaya-shree Sarady, the learned counsel drew the attention of the Court specifically to what is
stated in para 12 of the writ petition. Para 12 reads as under:
"12. I submit that the 3rd respondent has no locus standi to interfere in the affairs of the 1st
respondent. It appears that the 3rd respondent society is a mere congregation of high society

multi-millionaire ladies residing in posh Banjara and Jubilee Hills who have no understanding of
the miseries of victims of dog bites. They only appear to be interested in publicity rather than doing
any concrete work to reduce the sufferings of the victims of dog bites. The respondents appear to be
more concerned about the perceived cruelty of stray dogs rather than the actual cruel acts
committed by stray dogs on poor and middle class human beings who are forced to undergo painful
injections by waiting in long queues as reported in the press. Many poor and ignorant people do not
know the seriousness of dog bite and do not take timely treatment resulting in dangerous
"hydrophobia" afflicting them. The sympathies of the respondents towards the stray dogs is not
shown towards the victims of stray dogs. The respondents' sympathies appear to be misplaced which
is arbitrary, quixotic and illegal."
44. The whole object of pleading is to bring the parties to an issue, and to prevent the issue being
enlarged, which would prevent either party from knowing when the case came on for trial or
hearing, what the real point to be discussed and decided was. In civil suits, every pleading must state
facts and not law, but that rule applicable to the civil suits stands modified by the decision of the
Apex Court in Bharath Singh's case, (supra). Now, a party raising a point for decision in the writ
petition must plead not only relevant facts but also state facts by way of evidence in proof of facts
pleaded. The party, whether it is a suit or writ petition, must plead only relevant material facts on
which the party pleading relies for his claim or defence. Pleading is not a garb to scandalize or
humiliate others and if a party does it he should be accountable. Any tendency to scandalize should
be scrupulously avoided. Innuendo, insinuation, sarcasm have no place in pleadings. In the light of
these well accepted principles governing pleadings, it should be held that what is stated by the
petitioner in para 12 of the affidavit is totally unwarranted, unnecessary, not at all relevant and
material and it tends to scandalize and humiliate Smt. Amala Akkineni and others who formed Blue
Cross. In para 10 of the affidavit also the petitioner has described Smt. Amala Akkineni as 'cine
glamour'. Such kind of pleadings should be disapproved and it is accordingly disapproved. As
though such pleadings are not enough, the learned counsel for the petitioner, in the course of
argument, submitted that Blue Cross was formed as a publicity stunt and to acquire wealth and in
pursuance of such scheming the office bearers of Blue Cross got a valuable and prime land at the
hands of the Government and the office bearers of Blue Cross are more interested in publicity and
acquisition of the properties than serving mute animals like dogs. At that stage the Court had to
intervene and point out to the learned counsel that he should not make such submission on facts
without the support of pleading. I think that disapproval of such pleadings and submission made by
the learned counsel for the petitioner without the support of the pleadings is sufficient vindication of
the grievance of Smt. Amala Akkineni, though Smt. Jayashree Saradhy, her learned counsel prayed
the Court to award of exemplary costs.
45. In the result and for the foregoing reasons the writ petition is dismissed. The parties are directed
to bear their own costs.
46. Petition dismissed.

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10. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that

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650 observed as under:

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(3) Any dog, which has no number ticket so attached or suspended -

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Aug. 2183 Sept. 1933

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38. The statistics furnished by the res-

Sd. N. Ravi Shanker (N. RAVI SHANKER) Secretary."

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it treats its animals."

"A Practical Guide to Stray Control Programmes for Dogs

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a) Mass sterilisation of dogs;

b) Mass vaccination against rabies;

c) Removal and killing of dangerous and diseased dogs; and

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46. Petition dismissed.

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