MACARIOLA Vs.

ASUNCION 114 SCRA 77

FACTS:

- On June 8, 1963, respondent Judge Elias Asuncion rendered a decision in Civil Case 3010 final for
lack of an appeal.
- On October 16, 1963, a project of partition was submitted to Judge Asuncion. The project of
partition of lots was not signed by the parties themselves but only by the respective counsel of
plaintiffs and petitioner Bernardita R. Macariola. The Judge approved it in his order dated
October 23, 1963.
- One of the lots in the project of partition was Lot 1184, which was subdivided into 5 lots
denominated as Lot 1184 A – E. Dr. Arcadio Galapon bought Lot 1184-E on July 31, 1964, who
was issued transfer of certificate of Title No, 2338 of the Register of Deeds of Tacloban City. On
March 6, 1965, Galapon sold a portion of the lot to Judge Asuncion and his wife.
- On August 31, 1966, spouses Asuncion and Galapon conveyed their respective shares and
interest inn Lot 1184-E to the Traders Manufacturing & Fishing Industries Inc. Judge Asuncion
was the President and his wife Victoria was the Secretary. The Asuncions and Galapons were also
the stockholder of the corporation.
- Respondent Macariola charged Judge Asuncion with "Acts unbecoming a Judge" for violating the
following provisions: Article 1491, par. 5 of the New Civil Code, Article 14, par. 1 & 5 of the Code
of Commerce, Sec. 3 par H of RA 3019 also known as the Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practice Act., Sec.
12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules and Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics.
- On November 2, 1970 a certain Judge Jose D. Nepomuceno dismissed the complaints filed
against Asuncion.

ISSUE:

- Whether or Not the respondent Judge violated the mentioned provisions.

RULING:

- No. Judge Asuncion did not violate the mentioned provisions constituting of "Acts unbecoming a
Judge" but was reminded to be more discreet in his private and business activities.
- Respondent Judge did not buy the lot 1184-E directly on the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010 but
from Dr. Galapon who earlier purchased the lot from 3 of the plaintiffs. When the Asuncion
bought the lot on March 6, 1965 from Dr. Galapon after the finality of the decision which he
rendered on June 8, 1963 in Civil Case No 3010 and his two orders dated October and
November, 1963. The said property was no longer the subject of litigation.
- In the case at bar, Article 14 of Code of Commerce has no legal and binding effect and cannot
apply to the respondent. Upon the sovereignty from the Spain to the US and to the Republic of
the Philippines, Art. 14 of this Code of Commerce, which sourced from the Spanish Code of
Commerce, appears to have been abrogated because whenever there is a change in the
sovereignty, political laws of the former sovereign are automatically abrogated, unless they are
reenacted by Affirmative Act of the New Sovereign.
- Asuncion cannot also be held liable under the par. H, Sec. 3 of RA 3019, citing that the public
officers cannot partake in any business in connection with this office, or intervened or take part
in his official capacity. The Judge and his wife had withdrawn on January 31, 1967 from the
corporation and sold their respective shares to 3rd parties, and it appears that the corporation
did not benefit in any case filed by or against it in court as there was no case filed in the different
branches of the Court of First Instance from the time of the drafting of the Articles of
Incorporation of the corporation on March 12, 1966 up to its incorporation on January 9, 1967.
The Judge realized early that their interest in the corporation contravenes against Canon 25.
MUTUC VS. COMELEC, 36 SCRA 228

FACTS:

- Petitioner Mutuc was a candidate for delegate to the Constitutional Convention. He filed a
special civil action against the respondent COMELEC when the latter informed him through a
telegram that his certificate of candidacy was given due course but he was prohibited from using
jingles in his mobile units equipped with sound systems and loud speakers. The petitioner
accorded the order to be violative of his constitutional right to freedom of speech. COMELEC
justified its prohibition on the premise that the Constitutional Convention act provided that it is
unlawful for the candidates “to purchase, produce, request or distribute sample ballots, or
electoral propaganda gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature), flashlights,
athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, cigarettes, and the like,
whether of domestic or foreign origin.” COMELEC contended that the jingle or the recorded or
taped voice of the singer used by petitioner was a tangible propaganda material and was, under
the above statute, subject to confiscation.

ISSUE:

- Whether or not the usage of the jingle by the petitioner form part of the prohibition invoked by
the COMELEC.

RULING:

- The Court held that “the general words following any enumeration being applicable only to
things of the same kind or class as those specifically referred to”. The COMELEC’s contention that
a candidate’s jingle form part of the prohibition, categorized under the phrase “and the like”,
could not merit the court’s approval by principle of Ejusdem Generis. It is quite apparent that
what was contemplated in the Act was the distribution of gadgets of the kind referred to as a
means of inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the candidate responsible for its
distribution.
- Furthermore, the COMELEC failed to observe construction of the statute which should be in
consonance to the express terms of the constitution. The intent of the COMELEC for the
prohibition may be laudable but it should not be sought at the cost of the candidate’s
constitutional rights.
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS. GSIS, 267 SCRA 408

FACTS:

- Respondent (GSIS) decided to sell 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of
respondent Manila Hotel Corporation through public bidding as part of the Philippine
government’s privatization initiative under Proclamation No. 50.
- According to its terms, the winning bidder is to provide management expertise and/or an
international marketing/reservation system, and financial support to strengthen the profitability
and performance of the Manila Hotel.

Only two (2) bidders participated:

a. petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the
corporation or 15.3M shares at P41.58 per share, and

b. Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or
P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.

- In a letter to respondent, petitioner matched Renong Berhad’s bid price of P44.00 per share,
pending the designation of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder partner and the execution of
the relevant contracts.
- In a subsequent letter petitioner sent a manager’s check for P33.000.000.00 as Bid Security to
match the bid of Renong Berhad which respondent refused to accept.
- Because of this refusal by the respondent, petitioner came to the Supreme Court on prohibition
and mandamus. The SC issued a TRO enjoining respondents from consummating and perfecting
the said sale.

The petitioner hinged its arguments on Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution. It argued
that :

a. Manila Hotel had become part of the national patrimony, having become a historical monument for
the Filipino nation; and

b. Because respondent GSIS, a GOCC, owns 51 percent of the corporation’s shares, the hotel business of
GSIS, which is part of the tourism industry, is unquestionably a part of the national economy. Hence, the
petitioner claimed that the corporation is clearly covered by the term national economy under the
contemplation of Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, 1987 Constitution.

The respondent, on the other hand, raised the following arguments:

a. Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is merely a statement of principle and policy
since it is not a self-executing provision and requires implementing legislation

b. While the hotel is indeed historic, Manila Hotel does not fall under the term national patrimony
c. But even if it is, the constitutional provision invoked is still inapplicable since what is being sold is only
51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the hotel building nor the land upon which the
building stands

d. the privilege of submitting a matching bid has not yet arisen since it only takes place if for any
reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares.

ISSUE:

- Whether the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII Section 10, are self-executing.

RULING:

- The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative.

- Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of the
constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive
branch or entered by private persons for private purposes is null and void and without any force
and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental and supreme law of the nation, it is
deemed written in every statute and contract.
- While the Article 12, Sec. 10 (2) may be couched in such a way as not to make it appear that it is
non-self-executing, the legislature is not precluded from enacting other further laws to enforce
the constitutional provision so long as it is consistent with the Constitution. The SC remarked
that Article 12, Sec. 10 (2) is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and
which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement.
- The SC added further that there is a presumption that all provisions of the constitution are self-
executing and minor details may be left to the legislature without impairing the self-executing
nature of constitutional provisions.
- A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Article II of the 1987
Constitution, is usually not self-executing. However, a provision which is complete and becomes
operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies
sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-
executing.
- Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a
constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-
executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-
executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of
the fundamental law.
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO v. COMELEC, GR No. 127325, 1997-03-19

FACTS:

- Delfin alleged in his petition that

- Attached to the... petition is a copy of a "Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution"[10]
embodying the proposed amendments which consist in the deletion from the aforecited
sections of the provisions concerning term limits, and with the following proposition:
- DO YOU APPROVE OF LIFTING THE TERM LIMITS OF ALL ELECTIVE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS,
AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTIONS 4 AND 7 OF ARTICLE VI, SECTION 4 OF ARTICLE VII,
AND SECTION 8 OF ARTICLE X OF THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION?
- According to Delfin, the said Petition for Initiative will first be submitted to the people, and after
it is signed by at least twelve per cent of the total number of registered voters in the country it
will be formally filed with the COMELEC.
- On 18 December 1996, the petitioners herein -- Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander
Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin -- filed this special civil action for prohibition raising the
following arguments:

(1) The constitutional provision on people's initiative to amend the Constitution can only be
implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed;

(2) It is true that R.A. No. 6735 provides for three systems of initiative, namely, initiative on the
Constitution, on statutes, and on local legislation. However, it failed to provide any subtitle on initiative
on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative, which... are specifically provided for in
Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This deliberate omission indicates that the matter of people's initiative to
amend the Constitution was left to some future law.

(5)The people's initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to revision thereof. Extending
or lifting of term limits constitutes a revision and is, therefore, outside the power of the people's
initiative.

ISSUES:

Issue No. 1

- Whether R.A. No. 6735, entitled An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and
Appropriating Funds Therefor, was intended to include or cover initiative on amendments to the
Constitution; and if so, whether the Act, as worded, adequately covers... such initiative

Issue No. 2

- Whether that portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 (In re: Rules and Regulations Governing
the Conduct of Initiative on the Constitution, and Initiative and Referendum on National and
Local Laws) regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution is valid,...
considering the absence in the law of specific provisions on the conduct of such initiative
Issue No. 3

- Whether the lifting of term limits of elective national and local officials, as proposed in the draft
"Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution," would constitute a revision of, or an
amendment to, the Constitution.

RULING:

Ruling on the first issue:

- R.A. NO. 6735 INTENDED TO INCLUDE THE SYSTEM

- OF INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, BUT IS, UNFORTUNATELY,...
INADEQUATE TO COVER THAT SYSTEM.
- Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution provides: SEC. 2. Amendments to this Constitution
may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least
twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district
must be represented by at least... three per centum of the registered voters therein. No
amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of
this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.
- The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
- This provision is not self-executory. In his book,[29] Joaquin Bernas, a member of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, stated: Without implementing legislation Section 2 cannot operate.
Thus, although this mode of amending the Constitution is a mode of amendment which
bypasses congressional action, in the last analysis it still is dependent on congressional action.
- Bluntly stated, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution
through the system of initiative would remain entombed in the cold niche of the Constitution
until Congress provides for its implementation. Stated otherwise, while the Constitution has...
recognized or granted that right, the people cannot exercise it if Congress, for whatever reason,
does not provide for its implementation.

Ruling on the second issue

- COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300, INSOFAR AS IT PRESCRIBES RULES AND REGULATIONS ON THE
CONDUCT OF INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, IS VOID.
- It logically follows that the COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to
implement the exercise of the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution through the system of initiative. It does not have that power under R.A. No. 6735.
- Reliance on the COMELEC's power under Section 2(1) of Article IX-C of the Constitution is
misplaced, for the laws and regulations referred to therein are those promulgated by the
COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of Article IX-C of the Constitution, or (b) a law where subordinate...
legislation is authorized and which satisfies the "completeness" and the "sufficient standard"
tests.
Ruling on the 3rd issue

- The foregoing considered, further discussion on the issue of whether the proposal to lift the
term limits of the elective national and local officials is an amendment to, and not a revision of,
the Constitution is rendered unnecessary, if not academic.

PRINCIPLES:

- Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution... is not self-executory.

- Without implementing legislation Section 2 cannot operate. Thus, although this mode of
amending the Constitution is a mode of amendment which bypasses congressional action, in the
last analysis it still is dependent on congressional action.
RAUL L. LAMBINO v. COMELEC, GR NO. 174153, 2006-10-25

FACTS:

- Raul L. Lambino
- Erico B. Aumentado... gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987
Constitution.
- petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under
Section 5(b) and (c)[2] and Section 7[3] of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and
Referendum
- Act ("RA 6735").
- The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals
constituting at least twelve per centum (12%) of all registered voters, with each legislative
district represented by at least three per centum (3%) of its registered voters. The
- Lambino Group also claimed that COMELEC election registrars had verified the signatures of the
6.3 million individuals.
- Lambino petition – proposal
- The Lambino Group's initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7
of Article VI (Legislative Department)[4] and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive Department)[5]
and by adding Article XVIII entitled
- "Transitory Provisions."... shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-
Parliamentary form of government... the COMELEC should submit the... following proposition in
a plebiscite for the voters' ratification
- The Ruling of the COMELEC - COMELEC issued its Resolution denying due course to the Lambino
Group's petition for lack of an enabling law governing initiative petitions to amend the
Constitution.
- The COMELEC invoked this Court's ruling in Santiago v. Commission on Elections[8] declaring RA
6735 inadequate to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.

ISSUES:

- Whether the Lambino Group's initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a people's initiative;
- Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 "incomplete,
inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions" to implement the initiative clause on
proposals to amend the Constitution; and
- Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the
Lambino Group's petition.

RULING:

- There is no merit to the petition.

- failed to comply with the basic requirements of the Constitution for conducting a people's
initiative
- The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct
Proposal by the People
- Clearly, the framers of the Constitution intended that the "draft of the proposed constitutional
amendment" should be "ready and shown" to the people "before" they sign such proposal.
- [A] signature requirement would be meaningless if the person supplying the signature has not
first seen what it is that he or she is signing.
- The purpose of the full text requirement is to provide sufficient information so that registered
voters can intelligently evaluate whether... to sign the initiative petition."
- Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution does not expressly state that the petition must set
forth the full text of the proposed amendments. However, the deliberations of the framers of
our Constitution clearly show that the framers intended to adopt the relevant American...
jurisprudence on people's initiative.
- Constitutional Commission explicitly reveal that the framers intended that the people must first
see the full text of the proposed amendments before they sign, and that the people must sign...
on a petition containing such full text. Indeed, Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 6735, the
Initiative and Referendum Act that the Lambino Group invokes as valid, requires that the people
must sign the "petition x x x as signatories."
- The proponents bear the burden of proving that they complied with the constitutional
requirements in gathering the signatures - that the petition contained,... or incorporated by
attachment, the full text of the proposed amendments.
- The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition with this Court a copy of the paper
that the people signed as their initiative petition.
- There is not a single word, phrase, or sentence of text of the Lambino Group's proposed changes
in the signature sheet. Neither does the signature sheet state that the text of the proposed
changes is attached to it.
- The signature sheet does not show to the people the draft of the proposed changes before they
are asked to sign... the signature sheet.
- The Lambino Group's statement that they circulated to the people "the petition for initiative
filed with the COMELEC" appears an afterthought, made after the intervenors Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (Cebu City Chapter and Cebu Province Chapters) and Atty. Quadra had... pointed
out that the signature sheets did not contain the text of the proposed changes... they circulated
"the petition for initiative" but failed to mention the amended petition.
- "a signer who did not read the measure attached to a referendum petition cannot question his
signature on the ground that he did not understand the nature of the act."
- Nevertheless, even assuming the Lambino Group circulated the amended petition during the
signature-gathering period, the Lambino Group... admitted circulating only very limited copies of
the petition.
- the Lambino Group expressly admits that "petitioner Lambino initiated the printing and
reproduction of 100,000 copies of the petition for initiative x x x."[25] This... admission binds the
Lambino Group and establishes beyond any doubt that the Lambino Group failed to show the
full text of the proposed changes to the great majority of the people who signed the signature
sheets.
- Thus, of the 6.3 million signatories, only 100,000 signatories could have received with certainty
one copy each of the petition, assuming a 100 percent distribution with no wastage
- The inescapable conclusion is that the Lambino Group failed to... show to the 6.3 million
signatories the full text of the proposed changes.
 - Petitioner Atty. Lambino admitted this during... the oral arguments, and this admission binds the
Lambino Group. This fact is also obvious from a mere reading of the signature sheet. This
omission is fatal.
- These three specific amendments are not stated or even indicated in the Lambino Group's
signature sheets. The people who signed the signature sheets had no idea that they were
proposing these amendments.
- During the oral arguments, petitioner Atty. Lambino stated that he and his group assured the
people during the signature-gathering that the elections for the regular Parliament would be
held during the 2007 local elections if the proposed changes were ratified before the

2007 local elections. However, the text of the proposed changes belies this.

- The proposed Section 5(2), Article XVIII on Transitory Provisions, as found in the amended
petition, states:
- Section 5(2). The interim Parliament shall provide for the election of the members of Parliament,
which shall be synchronized and held simultaneously with the election of all local government
officials. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
- Section 5(2) does not state that the elections for the regular Parliament will be held
simultaneously with the 2007 local elections. This section merely requires that the elections for
the regular Parliament shall be held simultaneously with the local elections without... specifying
the year.
- the 6.3 million signatories had to rely on the verbal... representations of Atty. Lambino and his
group because the signature sheets did not contain the full text of the proposed changes. The
result is a grand deception on the 6.3 million signatories who were led to believe that the
proposed changes would require the... holding in 2007 of elections for the regular Parliament
simultaneously with the local elections.
- Section 4(4) is a subject matter totally unrelated to the shift from the Bicameral-Presidential to
the Unicameral-Parliamentary system.
- he Lambino Group inserted the proposed Section 4(4) to compel the interim Parliament to
amend or revise again the Constitution within 45 days from ratification of the proposed changes,
or before the May 2007 elections. In the absence of the proposed
- Section 4(4), the interim Parliament has the discretion whether to amend or revise again the
Constitution. With the proposed Section 4(4), the initiative proponents want the interim
Parliament mandated to immediately amend or revise again the Constitution.
- The signature sheets do not also explain what specific amendments or revisions the initiative
proponents want the interim Parliament to make, and why... there is a need for such further
amendments or revisions. The people are again left in the dark to fathom the nature and effect
of the proposed changes.
- Section 4(3). Senators whose term of office ends in 2010 shall be members of Parliament until
noon of the thirtieth day of June 2010.
- After 30 June 2010, not one of the present Senators will remain as member of Parliament if the
interim Parliament does not schedule elections for the regular Parliament by 30 June 2010.
However, there is no counterpart provision for the present members of the House of
Representatives even if their term of office will all end on 30 June 2007, three years earlier than
 that of half of the present Senators. Thus, all the present members of the House will remain
members of the interim Parliament after 30 June 2010.
- The term of the incumbent President ends on 30 June 2010. Thereafter, the Prime Minister
exercises all the powers of the President. If the interim Parliament does not schedule elections
for the regular Parliament by 30 June 2010, the Prime Minister will come only from the... present
members of the House of Representatives to the exclusion of the present Senators.
- The signature sheets do not explain this discrimination against the Senators. The 6.3 million
people who signed the signature sheets could not have known that their signatures would be
used to discriminate against the Senators. They could not have known that their signatures...
would be used to limit, after 30 June 2010, the interim Parliament's choice of Prime Minister
only to members of the existing House of Representatives.
- An initiative that gathers signatures from the people without first showing to the people the full
text of the proposed amendments is most likely a deception, and can operate as a gigantic fraud
on the people.
- However, this trust emanates from a... fundamental assumption: the full text of the proposed
amendment is first shown to the people before they sign the petition, not after they have signed
the petition.
- Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people
through initiative x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
- MR. SUAREZ: We would be amenable except that, as we clarified a while ago, this process of
initiative is limited to the matter of amendment and should not expand into a revision which
contemplates a total overhaul of the Constitution. That was the sense that was conveyed... by
the Committee.
- There can be no mistake about it. The framers of the Constitution intended, and wrote, a clear
distinction between "amendment" and "revision" of the Constitution. The framers intended, and
wrote, that only Congress or a constitutional convention may propose... revisions to the
Constitution. The framers intended, and wrote, that a people's initiative may propose only
amendments to the Constitution.
- The initiative power reserved by the people by amendment to the Constitution x x x applies only
to the proposing and the adopting or rejecting of "laws and amendments to the Constitution"
and does not purport to extend to a constitutional... revision.
- It is a fundamental principle that a constitution can only be revised or amended in the manner
prescribed by the instrument itself, and that any attempt to revise a constitution in a manner
other than the one provided in the instrument is almost invariably treated... as extra-
constitutional and revolutionary.
- Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino Group's initiative is a revision and
not merely an amendment. Quantitatively, the Lambino Group's proposed changes overhaul two
articles - Article VI on the Legislature and Article VII on the Executive - affecting a... total of 105
provisions in the entire Constitution
- Qualitatively, the proposed changes alter substantially the basic plan of government, from
presidential to parliamentary, and from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature.
- A change in the structure of government is a revision of the Constitution, as when the three
great co-equal branches of government in the present Constitution are reduced into two. This
alters the separation of powers in the Constitution.
- A shift from the presentBicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system is a
revision of the Constitution Merging the legislative and executive branches is a radical change in
the structure of government.
- By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift from a Bicameral-Presidential to a
Unicameral-Parliamentary system, involving the abolition of the Office of the President and the
abolition of one chamber of Congress, is beyond doubt a revision, not a mere amendment.
- On the face alone of the Lambino Group's proposed changes, it is readily apparent that the
changes will radically alter the framework of government as set forth in the Constitution
- Thus, for instance a switch from the presidential system to a parliamentary system would be a
revision because of its over-all impact on the entire constitutional structure. So would a switch
from a bicameral system to... a unicameral system be because of its effect on other important
provisions of the Constitution.
- Thus, the difference between the words "revision" and "amendment" pertain only to the process
or procedure of coming up with the corrections,... Stated otherwise, the difference between
"amendment" and "revision" cannot reasonably be in the substance or extent of the correction
- A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary. There is no need to revisit this Court's ruling
in Santiago declaring RA 6735 "incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and
conditions" to cover the system of initiative to amend the Constitution.
- An affirmation or reversal of Santiago will not change the outcome of the present petition. Thus,
this Court must decline to revisit Santiago which effectively ruled that RA 6735 does not comply
with the requirements of the Constitution to implement the initiative clause on amendments to
the Constitution.
- Even then, the present initiative violates Section 5(b) of RA 6735 which requires that the
"petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per centum (12%)
of the total number of registered voters as signatories." Section 5(b) of RA 6735 requires that the
people must sign the "petition x x x as signatories."
- The 6.3 million signatories did not sign the petition of 25 August 2006 or the amended petition
of 30 August 2006 filed with the COMELEC. Only Atty. Lambino, Atty. Demosthenes B. Donato,
and Atty. Alberto C. Agra signed the petition and amended petition as counsels for "Raul L.
Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado, Petitioners." In the COMELEC, the Lambino Group, claiming to
act "together with" the 6.3 million signatories, merely attached the signature sheets to the
petition and amended petition. Thus, the petition and amended petition... filed with the
COMELEC did not even comply with the basic requirement of RA 6735 that the Lambino Group
claims as valid.
- The Lambino Group's logrolling initiative also violates Section 10(a) of RA 6735 stating, "No
petition embracing more than one (1) subject shall be submitted to the electorate; x x x." T The
COMELEC Did Not Commit Grave Abuse of Discretion in Dismissing the Lambino Group's
Initiative This Court exists to defend and protect the Constitution.
- WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition in G.R. No. 174153.
MABANAG VS. LOPEZ VITO, 78 PHIL. 1

FACTS:

- This is a petitioner for prohibition to prevent the congressional resolution proposing an

amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines to be appended as an ordinance thereto.
Petitioners are 8 senators, 17 representatives, and the presidents of the Democratic Alliance, the
Popular Front and the Philippine Youth Party. Petitioners allege that the resolution is contrary to
the Constitution.
- The 3 petitioner senators and 8 representatives have been proclaimed by a majority vote of the
Comelec as having been elected senators and representatives in the elections held on April 23,
1946. The 3 senators were suspended by the Senate shortly after the opening of the first session
of Congress due to alleged irregularities in their election. The 8 representatives since their
election had not been allowed to sit in the lower House, except to take part in the election of the
Speaker, although they had not been formally suspended. A resolution for their suspension had
been introduced in the House of Representatives, but that resolution had not been acted upon
definitely by the House when the petition was filed. Consequently, the 3 senators and 8
representatives did not take part in the passage of the questioned resolution, nor was their
membership reckoned within the computation of the necessary ¾ vote which is required in
proposing an amendment to the Constitution. If the petitioners had been counted, the
affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment would have been short of the necessary
¾ vote in either House of Congress.
- Respondents argue that the Court has jurisdiction, relying on the conclusiveness on the courts of
the enrolled bill/resolution.
- Petitioners contend that respondents are confusing jurisdiction (substantive law) with
conclusiveness of an enactment or resolution (evidence and practice).

ISSUE:

- WON the Court can take cognizance of the issue.

- WON the resolution was duly enacted by Congress.

RULING:

- No. Political questions are not within the province of the judiciary, except to the extent that
power to deal with such questions has been conferred upon the courts by express constitutional
or statutory provisions. The difficulty lies in determining what matters fall within the meaning of
political question. However, in Coleman v. Miller, the efficacy of ratification by state legislature of
a proposed amendment to the Federal Constitution is a political question and hence not
justiciable. If a ratification of an amendment is a political question, a proposal which leads to
ratification has to be a political question. There is no logic in attaching political character to one
and withholding that character from the other. Proposal to amend the Constitution is a highly
political function performed by Congress. If a political question conslusively binds the judges out
of respect to the political departments, a duly certified law or resolution also binds the judges
under the “enrolled bill” rule born of that respect.
- Yes. Section 313 of the Code of Civil procedure, as amended by Act No. 220, provides two
methods of proving legislative proceedings:
- By the journals, or by published statutes or resolutions, or copies certified by the clerk or
secretary or printed by their order; and In case of acts of the Legislature, a copy signed by the
presiding officers and secretaries thereof, which shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of
such Acts and of the due enactment thereof.
- In US v. Pons, the Court looked into the journals because those were the documents offered in
evidence. It does not appear that a duly authenticated copy of the Act was in existence or was
placed before the Court; and it had not been shown that if that had been done, this Court would
not have held the copy conclusive proof of the due enactment of the law.
- Even if both journals and an authenticate copy of the Act had been presented, the disposal of
the issue by the Court on the basis of the journals does not imply rejection of the enrollment
theory, for the due enactment of a law may be proved in either of the 2 ways specified in Section
313 of The Code of Civil Procedure. No discrepancy appears to have been noted between the 2
documents and the court did not say or so much as give to understand that if discrepancy
existed it would give greater weight to the journals, disregarding the explicit provision that duly
certified copies “shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due
enactment thereof.”
RAMON A. GONZALES, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, DIRECTOR OF PRINTING and
AUDITOR GENERAL, respondents.

FACTS:

- The Congress passed 3 resolutions simultaneously.

- The first, proposing amendments to the Constitution so as to increase the membership of the
House of Representatives from a maximum of 120, as provided in the present Constitution, to a
maximum of 180.
- he second, calling a convention to propose amendments to said Constitution, the convention to
be composed of two (2) elective delegates from each representative district, to be elected in the
general elections.
- In addition, the third, proposing that the same Constitution be amended so as to authorize
Senators and members of the House of Representatives to become delegates to the
aforementioned constitutional convention, without forfeiting their respective seats in Congress.
Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which, upon approval by the President, became Republic
Act No. 4913 providing that the amendments to the Constitution proposed in the
aforementioned resolutions be submitted, for approval by the people, at the general elections.
- The petitioner assails the constitutionality of the said law contending that the Congress cannot
simultaneously propose amendments to the Constitution and call for the holding of a
constitutional convention.

ISSUE(S):

- Is Republic Act No. 4913 constitutional?

- WON Congress can simultaneously propose amendments to the Constitution and call for the
holding of a constitutional convention?

RULING:

- YES as to both issues. The constituent power or the power to amend or revise the Constitution,
is different from the law-making power of Congress. Congress can directly propose amendments
to the Constitution and at the same time call for a Constitutional Convention to propose
amendments.
- Indeed, the power to amend the Constitution or to propose amendments thereto is not included
in the general grant of legislative powers to Congress. It is part of the inherent powers of the
people — as the repository of sovereignty in a republican state, such as ours— to make, and,
hence, to amend their own Fundamental Law. Congress may propose amendments to the
Constitution merely because the same explicitly grants such power. Hence, when exercising the
same, it is said that Senators and Members of the House of Representatives act, not as members
of Congress, but as component elements of a constituent assembly. When acting as such, the
members of Congress derive their authority from the Constitution, unlike the people, when
performing the same function, for their authority does not emanate from the Constitution —
they are the very source of all powers of government, including the Constitution itself.
- Since, when proposing, as a constituent assembly, amendments to the Constitution, the
members of Congress derive their authority from the Fundamental Law, it follows, necessarily,
that they do not have the final say on whether or not their acts are within or beyond
constitutional limits. Otherwise, they could brush aside and set the same at naught, contrary to
the basic tenet that ours is a government of laws, not of men, and to the rigid nature of our
Constitution. Such rigidity is stressed by the fact that, the Constitution expressly confers upon
the Supreme Court, the power to declare a treaty unconstitutional, despite the eminently
political character of treaty-making power.
PABLO C. SANIDAD and PABLITO V. SANIDAD, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
and HONORABLE NATIONAL TREASURER, respondents.

FACTS:

- President Marcos issued P.D. 991 calling for a national referendum on October 16, 1976 for the
Citizens Assemblies (―Barangay) to resolve, among other things, the issues of martial law, the
interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period of its existence,
the length of the period for the exercise by the President of his present powers.
- Thereafter, P.D.1031 was issued, amending P.D. 991 by declaring the provisions of P.D. 229
applicable as to the manner of voting and canvassing of votes in barangays for the national
referendum-plebiscite of October 16, 1976. P.D. 1033 was also issued, declaring therein that the
question of the continuance of martial law will be submitted for referendum at the same time as
the submission of his (President) proposed amendments to the Constitution through a plebiscite
on October 16, 1976.
- Petitioner Sanidad filed suit for Prohibition and Preliminary Injunction, seeking to enjoin the
COMELEC from holding and conducting said Referendum-Plebiscite on the basis that under the
1935 and 1973 Constitution, there is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the
constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution; hence, the Referendum-
Plebiscite on October 16 has no legal basis.
- Petitioner Guzman filed another action asserting that the power to propose amendments to or
revision of the Constitution during the transition period is expressly conferred to the interim
National Assembly under sec.16, Art. XVII of the Constitution.
- A similar action was instituted by petitioners Gonzales and Salapantan arguing that even
granting him legislative powers under the martial law, the incumbent President cannot act as a
constituent assembly to propose amendments to the Constitution, and that a referendum-
plebiscite is untenable under the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973. The submission of the
proposed amendments in such a short period of time for deliberation renders the plebiscite a
nullity. To lift martial law, the President need not consult the people via referendum. Allowing
15-year-olds to vote would amount to an amendment of the Constitution, which confines the
right of suffrage to those citizens of the Philippines 18 years of age and above.
- The Solicitor General, in his comment for respondent COMELEC, maintains that Petitioners have
no standing to sue and that the issue raised is political in nature, beyond judicial cognizance of
the court. At this state of the transition period, only the incumbent President has the authority
to exercise constituent power. The referendum-plebiscite is a step towards normalization.

ISSUES:

- Is the question of the constitutionality of the Presidential Decrees 991, 1031, and 1033 political
or judicial?
- Does the President possess the power to propose amendments to the Constitution as well as set
up the required machinery and prescribe the procedure for the ratification of his proposal, in the
absence of an interim National Assembly?
- Is the submission to the people of the proposed amendments within the time frame allowed
therefore a sufficient and proper submission?
RULING:

- YES. At the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement of public funds may be
enjoined upon the theory that the expenditure of public funds by the State for executing an
unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds. It is a judicial question.
- YES. If the President has been legitimately discharging the legislative functions of the Interim
Assembly, there is no reason why he cannot validly discharge the function of that assembly to
propose amendments to the Constitution, which is but adjunct, although peculiar, to its gross
legislative power. This is not to say that the President has converted his office into a constituent
assembly of that nature normally constituted by the legislature. Rather, with the Interim
Assembly not convened and only the Presidency and Supreme Court in operation, the urges of
absolute necessity render it imperative upon the President to act as agent for and in behalf of
the people to propose amendments to the Constitution.
- Parenthetically, by its very constitution, the Supreme Court possesses no capacity to propose
amendments without constitutional infractions. For the President to shy away from that
actuality and decline to undertake the amending process would leave the governmental
machinery at a stalemate or create in the powers of the State a destructive vacuum. After all, the
constituent assemblies or constitutional conventions, like the President now, are mere agents of
the people.
- YES. Art. XVI of the Constitution makes no provision as to the specific date when the plebiscite
shall be held, but simply states that ―it shall be held not later than 3 months after the approval
of such amendment or revision. The period from September 21 to October 16, or a period of
three weeks is not too short for free debates or discussions on the referendum-plebiscite issues.
The issues are not new. They are the issues of the day, and the people have been living with
them since the proclamation of martial law four years ago. The referendums of 1973 and 1975
carried the same issue of martial law. That notwithstanding, the contested brief period for
discussion is not without counterparts in previous plebiscites for constitutional amendments.
ALMARIO VS. ALBA, 127 SCRA 69

FACTS:

- On January 27, 1984, the average voter goes to the polling place and reads Question No. 3 will
know whether or not he or she is in favor of distributing alienable public lands through "grants"
in addition to leases, homesteads and purchases. Upon reading Question No. 4, the voter will
know whether or not he or she is in favor of an urban land reform program. I personally find
existing provisions of the Constitution more than sufficient basis for legislation... to achieve the
objectives of the proposed amendments. To me, the second question on the Vice-Pr

ISSUES:

- GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: As provided for in Batas Pambansa Blg. 643, the Filipino electorate will go to
the polls on January 27, 1984 to either approve or reject amendments to the Constitution
proposed by Resolution Nos. 104, 105, 110, 111, 112, and 113 of the Batasang Pambansa. The...
proposed amendments are embodied in four (4) separate questions to be answered by simple
YES or NO answers.
- Petitioners herein seek to enjoin the submission on January 27, 1984 of Question Nos. 3 and 4,
which cover Resolution Nos. 105 and 113, to the people for ratification or rejection on the
ground that there has been no fair and proper submission following the doctrine laid down... in
Tolentino v. COMELEC (41 SCRA 707). The petitioners do not seek to prohibit the holding of the
plebiscite but only ask for more time for the people to study the meaning and implications of
Resolution Nos. 105 and 113 until the nature and effect of the proposals are... fairly and properly
submitted to the electorate.
- GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: As provided for in Batas Pambansa Blg. 643, the Filipino electorate will go to
the polls on January 27, 1984 to either approve or reject amendments to the Constitution
proposed by Resolution Nos. 104, 105, 110, 111, 112, and 113 of the Batasang Pambansa. The...
proposed amendments are embodied in four (4) separate questions to be answered by simple
YES or NO answers. Petitioners herein seek to enjoin the submission on January 27, 1984 of
Question Nos. 3 and 4, which cover Resolution Nos. 105 and 113, to the people for ratification or
rejection on the ground that there has been no fair and proper submission following the
doctrine laid down... in Tolentino v. COMELEC (41 SCRA 707). The petitioners do not seek to
prohibit the holding of the plebiscite but only ask for more time for the people to study the
meaning and implications of Resolution Nos. 105 and 113 until the nature and effect of the
proposals are... fairly and properly submitted to the electorate.

RULING:

- GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: As provided for in Batas Pambansa Blg. 643, the Filipino electorate will go to
the polls on January 27, 1984 to either approve or reject amendments to the Constitution
proposed by Resolution Nos. 104, 105, 110, 111, 112, and 113 of the Batasang Pambansa. The...
proposed amendments are embodied in four (4) separate questions to be answered by simple
YES or NO answers.
- Petitioners herein seek to enjoin the submission on January 27, 1984 of Question Nos. 3 and 4,
which cover Resolution Nos. 105 and 113, to the people for ratification or rejection on the
ground that there has been no fair and proper submission following the doctrine laid down... in
Tolentino v. COMELEC (41 SCRA 707). The petitioners do not seek to prohibit the holding of the
plebiscite but only ask for more time for the people to study the meaning and implications of
Resolution Nos. 105 and 113 until the nature and effect of the proposals are... fairly and properly
submitted to the electorate.
EUGENE TAN VS. MACAPAGAL , G.R. NO. L-34161, FEBRUARY 29, 1972

FACTS:

- Petitioners Eugene Tan and others filed a petition fordeclaratory relief as taxpayers,
but allegedly suing onbehalf on themselves and the Filipino people, questioningthe range
of the authority of the 1971 Constitutional Convention and have the COURT declare
that the Constitutional Convention is “without power and discuss and adopt proposals
which seek to revise the current Constitution through the adoption of a form of
government other than the form now outlined in the present Constitution.
- The Court issued a judgement dismissing it.
- The petitioners then returned a motion of reconsideration, which, of course, was ultimately
dismiss again.
- Declaratory relief - a binding judgment from a court defining the legal relationship
between parties and their rights in a matter before the court)

ISSUES:

- WON the Court has jurisdiction over the matter.

RULING:

- No. Based on the motions, the petitioners are oblivious to the authoritative precedents in
the jurisdiction. Separation of powers should be left alone to do duties as they see fit. The
exclusive and legislative branch are not bound to ask for advice in carrying out their duties.
Because the Constitutional Convention has not yet finalized any resolution that may
or may not radically alter the 1935 Constitution, therefore petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration cannot be helped.
DEL ROSARIO VS. COMELEC G.R. NO L-32476 OCTOBER 20,1970

FACTS:

- Petitioner Simeon Del Rosario filed a declaratory relief against the National Treasurers and
Comelec. The Petitioner believes that that entire R.A. NO. 6132 unconstitutional due to the fact
that the it failed to include the phrase "To Propose Amendments to the Constitution of the
Philippines". The title of the law is "An Act Implementing Resolution of Both Houses Numbered
Two as Amended by Resolution of Both Houses Numbered Four of the Congress of the
Philippines Calling for a Constitutional Convention, Providing for Proportional Representation
Therein and Other Details Relating to the Election of Delegates to and the Holding of the
Constitutional Convention, Repealing for the Purpose Republic Act Four Thousand Nine Hundred
Fourteen, and for Other Purposes"

ISSUE:

- WON R.A. NO. 6132 is unconstitutional due to its title

RULING:

- According to the ruling of the court, the petition of prayer has been denied thus R.A. No. 6132
still constitutional based on the evidences presented. The court stated the following:

(1) Inclusion of aforementioned phrase is superfluous and unnecessary

(2) Title expressly states that the act implements Resolutions of Both Houses Nos. 2 and 4, respectively
of 1967 and 1969

(3) The power to propose amendments to the Constitution is implicit in the call for the convention itself,
whose raison d'etre is to revise the present Constitution.

(4) It is not required that the title of the bill be an index to the body of the act or be comprehensive in
matters of detail.

(5) It is enough that it fairly indicates the general subject and reasonably covers all the provisions of the
act so as not to mislead Congress or the people

(6) Therefore, R.A. No. 6132 is germane and comprehends to its title
GREGORIO AGLIPAY, petitioner, vs. JUAN RUIZ, respondent.

FACTS:

- The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church,
seeks the issuance from this court of a writ of prohibition to prevent the respondent Director of
Posts from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third International
Eucharistic Congress.
- In May, 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would order the
issuance of postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the Thirty-
third International Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church. In spite of the
protest of the petitioner’s attorney, the respondent publicly announced having sent to the
United States the designs of the postage for printing.

ISSUE:

- Is there a violation of principle of separation of church and state?

RULING:

- In the case at bar, it appears that the respondent Director of Posts issued the postage stamps in
question under the provisions of Act. No. 4052 of the Philippine Legislature.
- Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the Director of Posts is the
discretionary power to determine when the issuance of special postage stamps would be
“advantageous to the Government.” Of course, the phrase “advantageous to the Government”
does not authorize the violation of the Constitution. It does not authorize the appropriation, use
or application of public money or property for the use, benefit or support of a particular sect or
church. In the present case, however, the issuance of the postage stamps in question by the
Director of Posts and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications was not inspired by any
sectarian feeling to favor a particular church or religious denominations. The stamps were not
issued and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. Nor were money derived from the
sale of the stamps given to that church. On the contrary, it appears from the letter of the
Director of Posts of June 5, 1936, incorporated on page 2 of the petitioner’s complaint, that the
only purpose in issuing and selling the stamps was “to advertise the Philippines and attract more
tourists to this country.” The officials concerned merely took advantage of an event considered
of international importance “to give publicity to the Philippines and its people”. It is significant to
note that the stamps as actually designed and printed, instead of showing a Catholic Church
chalice as originally planned, contains a map of the Philippines and the location of the City of
Manila, and an inscription as follows: “Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7,
1937.” What is emphasized is not the Eucharistic Congress itself but Manila, the capital of the
Philippines, as the seat of that congress. It is obvious that while the issuance and sale of the
stamps in question may be said to be inseparably linked with an event of a religious character,
the resulting propaganda, if any, received by the Roman Catholic Church, was not the aim and
purpose of the Government. We are of the opinion that the Government should not be
embarrassed in its activities simply because of incidental results, more or less religious in
character, if the purpose had in view is one which could legitimately be undertaken by
 appropriate legislation. The main purpose should not be frustrated by its subordination to mere
incidental results not contemplated.
- There is no violation of the principle of separation of church and state. The issuance and sale of
the stamps in question maybe said to be separably linked with an event of a religious character,
the resulting propaganda, if any, received by the Catholic Church, was not the aim and purpose
of the government (to promote tourism).
PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO v. GOVERNMENT OF REPUBLIC PEACE PANEL ON ANCESTRAL
DOMAIN, GR No. 183591, 2008-10-14

FACTS:

- On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the MILF,
through the Chairpersons of their respective peace negotiating panels, were scheduled to sign a
Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli

Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

- The signing of the MOA-AD between the GRP and the MILF was not to materialize, however, for
upon motion of petitioners, specifically those who filed their cases before the scheduled signing
of the MOA-AD, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the GRP from...
signing the same.
- Towards the end of 1999 up to early 2000, the MILF attacked a number of municipalities in
Central Mindanao and, in March 2000, it took control of the town hall of Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte.[3] In response, then President Joseph Estrada declared and carried out an "all-out-war"
against the MILF.
- Formal peace talks between the parties were held in Tripoli, Libya from June 20-22, 2001, the
outcome of which was the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace (Tripoli Agreement 2001)
containing the basic principles and agenda on the following aspects of the negotiation: Security
Aspect, Rehabilitation Aspect, and Ancestral Domain Aspect. With regard to the Ancestral
Domain Aspect, the parties in Tripoli Agreement 2001 simply agreed "that the same be
discussed further by the Parties in their next meeting."
- In 2005, several exploratory talks were held between the parties in Kuala Lumpur, eventually
leading to the crafting of the draft MOA-AD in its final form, which, as mentioned, was set to be
signed last August 5, 2008.
- On August 19, 2008, Ernesto Maceda, Jejomar Binay, and Aquilino Pimentel III filed a petition for
Prohibition,... praying for a judgment prohibiting and permanently enjoining respondents from
formally signing and... executing the MOA-AD and or any other agreement derived therefrom or
similar thereto, and nullifying the MOA-AD for being unconstitutional and illegal. Petitioners
herein additionally implead as respondent the MILF Peace Negotiating Panel represented by its
Chairman MohagherIqbal.

ISSUES:

- Whether the petitions have become moot and academic

(i) insofar as the mandamus aspect is concerned, in view of the disclosure of official copies of the final
draft of the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA); and

(ii) insofar as the prohibition aspect involving the Local Government Units is concerned, if it is considered
that consultation has become fait accompli with the finalization of the draft

- Whether the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for adjudication
 - Whether respondent Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it negotiated and
initiated the MOA vis-à-vis ISSUES Nos. 4 and 5

- Whether there is a violation of the people's right to information on matters of public concern
(1987 Constitution, Article III, Sec. 7) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions
involving public interest (1987 Constitution, Article II, Sec. 28)... including public consultation
under Republic Act No. 7160 (LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991) If it is in the affirmative,
whether prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is an appropriate remedy

- Whether by signing the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines would be
BINDING itself... a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate
state, or a juridical, territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law;... b) to revise or
amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA;... c) to concede to or
recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain in violation of
Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997), particularly Section
3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION, RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS) If in the affirmative,
whether the Executive Branch has the authority to so bind the Government of the Republic of
the Philippines

- Whether the inclusion/exclusion of the Province of North Cotabato, Cities of Zamboanga, Iligan
and Isabela, and the Municipality of Linamon, Lanao del Norte in/from the areas covered by the
projected Bangsamoro Homeland is a justiciable question... hether desistance from signing the
MOA derogates any prior valid commitments of the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines.

RULING:

- In general, the objections against the MOA-AD center on the extent of the powers conceded
therein to the BJE. right to self-determination of a people is normally fulfilled through internal
self-determination - a people's pursuit of its political, economic, social and cultural development
within the framework... of an existing state. A right to external self-determination... arises in only
the most extreme of cases and, even then, under carefully defined circumstances.
- External self-determination can be defined as in the following statement from the Declaration on
Friendly Relations, supra
- One, E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both national and
local levels and for a principal forum for consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of the
Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process to conduct regular dialogues to seek... relevant
information, comments, advice, and recommendations from peace partners and concerned
sectors of society.
- Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 requires all national offices
to conduct consultations before any project or program critical to the environment and human
ecology including those that may call for the eviction of a particular group of... people residing in
such locality, is implemented therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally
and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could
 pervasively and drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of a... great number of
inhabitants from their total environment.
- Three, Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 provides for clear-cut
procedure for the recognition and delineation of ancestral domain, which entails, among other
things, the observance of the free and prior informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural
Communities/Indigenous Peoples. Notably, the statute does not grant the Executive Department
or any government agency the power to delineate and recognize an ancestral domain claim by
mere agreement or compromise.
- The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific
provisions but the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned
between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional , for the concept... presupposes that the
associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to independence.
- While there is a clause in the MOA-AD stating that the provisions thereof inconsistent with the
present legal framework will not be effective until that framework is amended, the same does
not cure its defect. The inclusion of provisions in the MOA-AD establishing an associative...
relationship between the BJE and the Central Government is, itself, a violation of the
Memorandum of Instructions From The President dated March 1, 2001, addressed to the
government peace panel. Moreover, as the clause is worded, it virtually guarantees that the
necessary... amendments to the Constitution and the laws will eventually be put in place.
Neither the GRP Peace Panel nor the President herself is authorized to make such a guarantee.
Upholding such an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers
vested only in Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves through the
process of initiative, for the only way that the Executive can ensure the outcome of the
amendment process is through an undue influence or interference with that process.
- While the MOA-AD would not amount to an international agreement or unilateral declaration
binding on the Philippines under international law, respondents' act of guaranteeing
amendments is, by itself, already a constitutional violation that renders the MOA-AD fatally...
defective.
- WHEREFORE, respondents' motion to dismiss is DENIED. The main and intervening petitions are
GIVEN DUE COURSE and hereby GRANTED.
MERLIN M. MAGALLONA, AKBAYAN PARTY-LIST REP. RISA HONTIVEROS, PROF. Magallona Vs Ermita

FACTS:

- RA 3046 was passed in 1961 which provides amona others the demarcation lines of the
baselines of the Philippines as an archipelago. This is in consonance with UNCLOS I.
- RA 5446 amended RA 3046 in terms of typographical errors and included Section 2 in which the
government reserved the drawing of baselines in Sabah in North Borneo.
- RA 9522 took effect on March 2009 amending RA 5446.
- The amendments, which are in compliance with UNCLOS IlI in which the Philippines is one of the
signatory, shortening one baseline while optimizing the other and classifying Kalayaan Group of
Island and Scarborough Shoal as Regimes of Island.
- Petitioners in their capacity as taxpayer, citizen and legislator assailed the constitutionality of RA
9522:- it reduces the territory of the Philippines in violation to the Constitution and it opens the
country to maritime passage of vessels and aircrafts of other states to the detriment of the
economy, sovereignty, national security and of the Constitution as well. They added that the
classification of Regime of Islands would be prejudicial to the lives of the fishermen.

ISSUES:

1. WON the petitioners have locus stand to bring the suit; and

2. WON RA 9522 is unconstitutional

RULING

1. The SC ruled the suit is not a taxpayer or legislator, but as a citizen suit, since it is the citizens who will
be directly inured and benefitted in affording relief over the remedy sought.

2. The SC upheld the constitutionality of RA 9522.

First, RA 9522 did not delineate the territory the Philippines but is merely a statutory tool to demarcate
the country's maritime zone and continental shelf under UNCLOS III. SC emphasized that UNCLOS III is
not a mode of acquiring or losing a territory as provided under the laws of nations. UNCLOS IlI is a multi-
lateral treaty that is a result of a long-time negotiation to establish a uniform sea-use rights over
maritime zones (i.e., the territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the baselines], contiguous zone [24
nautical miles from the baselines], exclusive economic zone [200 nautical miles from the baselines]), and
continental shelves. In order to measure said distances, it is a must for the state parties to have their
archipelagic doctrines measured in accordance to the treaty the role played by RA 9522. The contention
of the petitioner that RA 9522 resulted to the loss of 15,000 square nautical miles is devoid of merit. The
truth is, RA 9522, by optimizing the location of base points, increased the Philippines total maritime
space of 145,216 square nautical miles.

Second, the classification of KGI and Scarborough Shoal as Regime of Islands is consistent with the
Philippines' sovereignty. Had RA 9522 enclosed the islands as part of the archipelago, the country will be
violating UNCLOS III since it categorically stated that the length of the baseline shall not exceed 125
nautical miles. So what the legislators did is to carefully analyze the situation: the country, for decades,
had been claiming sovereignty over KGI and Scarborough Shoal on one hand and on the other hand they
had to consider that these are located at non-appreciable distance from the nearest shoreline of the
Philippine archipelago. So, the classification is in accordance with the Philippines sovereignty and State's
responsible observance of its pacta sunt servanda obligation under UNCLOS III.

Third, the new base line introduced by RA 9522 is without prejudice with delineation of the baselines of
the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over which the Republic of
the Philippines has acquired dominion and sovereignty.

And lastly, the UNCLOS III and RA 9522 are not incompatible with the Constitution's delineation of
internal waters. Petitioners contend that RA 9522 transformed the internal waters of the Philippines to
archipelagic waters hence subjecting these waters to the right of innocent and sea lanes passages,
exposing the Philippine internal waters to nuclear and maritime pollution hazards. The Court
emphasized that the Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of water lying landward of the
baselines, including the air space over it and the submarine areas underneath, regardless whether
internal or archipelagic waters.

However, sovereignty will not bar the

Philippines to comply with its obligation in maintaining freedom of navigation and the generally
accepted principles of international law.

It can be either passed by legislator as a municipal law or in the absence thereof, it is deemed
incorporated in the Philippines law since the right of innocent passage is a customary international law,
thus automatically incorporated thereto.

This does not mean that the states are placed in a lenser footing; it just signifies concession of
archipelagic states in exchange for their right to claim all waters inside the baseline. In fact, the
demarcation of the baselines enables the Philippines to delimit its exclusive economic zone, reserving
solely to the Philippines the exploitation of all living and non-living resources within such zone. Such a
maritime delineation binds the international community since the delineation is in strict observance of
UNCLOS III. If the maritime delineation is contrary to UNCLOS III, the international community will of
course reject it and will refuse to be bound by it.

The Court expressed that it is within the Congress who has the prerogative to determine the passing of a
law and not the Court.

Moreover, such enactment was necessary in order to comply with the UNCLOS III; otherwise, it shall
backfire on the Philippines for its territory shall be open to seafaring powers to freely enter and exploit
the resources in the waters and submarine areas around our archipelago and it will weaken the country's
case in an international dispute over Philippine maritime space

The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the Philippine archipelago and adjacent areas,
as embodied in RA 9522, allows an internationally-recognized delimitation of the breadth of the
Philippines' maritime zones and continental shelf. RA 9522 is therefore a most vital step on the part of
the Philippines in safeguarding its maritime zones, consistent with the Constitution and our national
interest