CALTEX VS. PALOMAR (G.R.

L-19650, 09/29/1966)

FACTS:

Caltex conceived a promotional scheme which will increase its patronage for oil products called “Caltex
Hooded Pump Contest.” The contest calls for participants to estimate the number of liters a hooded gas
pump at each Caltex station will dispense during a specified period. To participate, entry forms are only
needed which can be made available upon request at each Caltex station. No fee is required to be paid
nor purchase has to be made prior to participating. Foreseeing the extensive use of mails to publicize the
promotional scheme, Caltex made representations with the postal authorities to secure advanced
clearance for mailing. Caltex, through its counsel, posited that the contest does not violate anti-lottery
provisions of the Postal Law. The Postmaster General Palomar declined the grant of the requested
clearance. Caltex sought a reconsideration. Palomar maintained that if the contest was pursued, a fraud
order will be issued against Caltex. Thus, this case at bar.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the petition states a sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief
2. Whether or not the proposed contest violates the Postal Law

RULINGS:

The Court held that the petition states a sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief since it qualifies for
the 4 requisites on invoking declaratory relief available to any person whose rights are affected by a
statute to determine any question of construction or validity. To the petitioner, the construction hampers
or disturbs its freedom to enhance its business while to the respondent, suppression of the petitioner’s
proposed contest believed to transgress the law he has sworn to uphold and enforce is an unavoidable
duty.

Likewise, using the rules of Statutory Construction in discovering the meaning and intention of the authors
in a case clouded with doubt as to its application, it was held that the promotional scheme does not
violate the Postal Law in that it does not entail lottery or gift enterprise. Using the principle “noscitur a
sociis’, the term under construction shall be understood by the words preceding and following it. Thus,
using the definitions of lottery and gift enterprise which both has the requisites of prize, chance and
consideration, the promo contest does not clearly violate the Postal Law because of lack of consideration.

PASTOR M. ENDENCIA AND FERNANDO JUGO, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES, VS. SATURNINO DAVID, AS

COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

Case Digest: G.R. No. L-6355-56. August 31, 1953. 93 Phil 696

FACTS:

This is a joint appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila declaring section 13 of
Republic Act No. 590 unconstitutional, and ordering the appellant Saturnino David as Collector of Internal
Revenue to re-fund to Justice Pastor M. Endencia the sum of P1,744.45, representing the income tax
collected on his salary as Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals in 1951, and to Justice Fernando
Jugo the amount of P2,345.46, representing the income tax collected on his salary from January 1,1950
to October 19, 1950, as Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals, and from October 20, 1950 to
December 31,1950, as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, without special pronouncement as to
costs. ***The lower court, citing the case Perfecto vs. Meer, exhaustively declared that the collection of
income taxes is a violation of the Philippines Constitution. The Solicitor General on the side of the
defendant stated that the legislative body were not in favor of the Court’s decision over Perfecto vs. Meer
and immediately enacted R.A. 380 thereby imposing taxes to the Judicial Officers. The Court in the case
questioned the legal basis of the Act.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Republic Act No. 590, particularly section 13, can justify and legalize the collection of
income tax on the salary of judicial officers.

RULING:

No. The Supreme Court reiterated the doctrine laid down in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, to the effect
that the collection of income tax on the salary of a judicial officer is a diminution thereof and so violates
the Constitution. It is further held that the interpretation and application of the Constitution and of statutes
is within the exclusive province and jurisdiction of the Judicial department, and that in enacting a law, the
Legislature may not legally provide therein that it be interpreted in such a way that it may not violate a
Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the hands of the courts in their task of later interpreting said
statute, especially when the interpretation sought and provided in said statute runs counter to a previous
interpretation already given in a case by the highest court of the land.

AMELITO R. MUTUC vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. L-32717 November 26, 1970

FACTS:

Petitioner Mutuc was a candidate for delegate to the Constitutional Convention. He filed a special civil
action against the respondent COMELEC when the latter informed him through a telegram that his
certificate of candidacy was given due course but he was prohibited from using jingles in his mobile units
equipped with sound systems and loud speakers. The petitioner accorded the order to be violative of his
constitutional right to freedom of speech. COMELEC justified its prohibition on the premise that the
Constitutional Convention act provided that it is unlawful for the candidates “to purchase, produce,
request or distribute sample ballots, or electoral propaganda gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of
whatever nature), flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches,
cigarettes, and the like, whether of domestic or foreign origin.” COMELEC contended that the jingle or the
recorded or taped voice of the singer used by petitioner was a tangible propaganda material and was,
under the above statute, subject to confiscation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the usage of the jingle by the petitioner form part of the prohibition invoked by the
COMELEC.
HELD:

The Court held that “the general words following any enumeration being applicable only to things of the
same kind or class as those specifically referred to”. The COMELEC’s contention that a candidate’s jingle
form part of the prohibition, categorized under the phrase “and the like”, could not merit the court’s
approval by principle of Ejusdem Generis. It is quite apparent that what was contemplated in the Act was
the distribution of gadgets of the kind referred to as a means of inducement to obtain a favorable vote for
the candidate responsible for its distribution.

Furthermore, the COMELEC failed to observe construction of the statute which should be in consonance
to the express terms of the constitution. The intent of the COMELEC for the prohibition may be laudable
but it should not be sought at the cost of the candidate’s constitutional rights.