Definition of Statcon – “Construction is the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of

the authors of the law with respect to its application to a given case, where that intention is rendered doubtful, amongst
others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law.”

Caltex v. Palomar
1960: Caltex announced its “Caltex Hooded Pump Contest”.
Mechanics are the ff:
1. Participants must estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump at each Caltex station will
dispense during a specified period;
2. Contest is open to all car owners or licensed drivers;
3. Participants need not buy any Caltex products to be eligible. No fee is required.
4. Participants just need to fill out a form and drop their entries at the nearest Caltex station.
To publicize their contest, Caltex sought the assistance of the Philippine Postal Office. However, then acting
Postmaster Enrico Palomar denied the request of Caltex as Palomar deemed that the contest is a violation of
the Postal Law (Chapter 52 of the Revised Administrative Code [RAC]).
Palomar cited Section 1954 of the RAC:
SECTION 1954. Absolutely non-mailable matter. — No matter belonging to any of the following classes, whether sealed as first-class
matter or not, shall be imported into the Philippines through the mails, or to be deposited in or carried by the mails of the
Philippines, or be delivered to its addressee by any officer or employee of the Bureau of Posts:
Written or printed matter in any form advertising, describing, or in any manner pertaining to, or conveying or purporting to convey
any information concerning any lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme depending in whole or in part upon lot or chance, or any
scheme, device, or enterprise for obtaining any money or property of any kind by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, or promises.

Palomar: the contest is a lottery; So Caltex via Philippine Post cannot mail communications pertaining thereto.
Caltex: petition for declaratory relief.  Not a lottery; because lotter has consideration, prize, and chance. We DON’T
have consideration since no need to pay anything to enter.
Palomar: assailed the petition; SAME is NOT PROPER. Applying law and there is no legal issue; No need for courts to
construe the statute.
Palomar: Even if it isn’t considered a lottery, it’s still a gift enterprise which is prohibited in Postal Law.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Caltex’s petition for declaratory relief is proper.
2. Whether or not the Caltex contest is a lottery/gift enterprise.
HELD:
1. Yes. The petition is proper. Construction of a law is in order if what is in issue is an inquiry into the intended meaning of
the words used in a certain law.
2. No.
- Not a lottery since no consideration
- Not a gift enterprise; Gift enterprise not defined so apply noscitur a sociis
- noscitur a sociis  no other meaning than what is consistent with the nature of the word associated with
- Hence, applying noscitur a sociis, if lottery is prohibited only if it involves a consideration, so also must the term
“gift enterprise” be so construed. Therefore, since the contest does not include a consideration, it is neither a
lottery nor a gift enterprise. Caltex should be allowed to avail of the Philippine postal service.

When construction is necessary – “Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated
that application is impossible or inadequate without them."
People v. Mapa
Facts:
- August 13, 1962: Mario Mapa was apprehended due to possession of an unlicensed firearm (home-
made revolver without serial number, w 6 rounds ammunition).
- Mapa admitted to the trial court that he was carrying the unlicensed firearm with no permit to carry.
In his defense, he said that he is a secret agent of the Governor Leviste of Batangas, showed
certification of appointment, and that he is exempt from the requirement of securing a license of
firearm.
- Nov 23 1963: convicted for illegal possession of firearms with 1-2yr penalty + costs
- Mapa: Basis that in People v. Macarandang, secret agent was acquitted. court cant set aside clear
statutory provision

Issue: WN an agent of the governor can hold a firearm without a permit issued by the Philippine Constabulary

Held: In the present case, there is no room for interpretation or construction because the law is clear. The law
provides for the class of people who are not covered in the prohibitive law. No exemption was provided for
secret agents.

Daoang v. Municipal Judge – “Only statues with an ambiguous or doubtful meaning may be the subject of
statutory construction”

Facts:
- Amanda& Antero Agonoy – free the kids from legal obedience and maintenance from their parents
- Filed a petition before the MTC of San Nicolas Ilocos Norte, seeking adoption of two minors (Quirino
Bonilla & Wilson Marcos) then change name to Agonoy
- Successional rights + adoption from Civil Code.
- That the respondents have a legitimate child (Estrella Agonoy), the mother of the petitioners, now
deceased, as such they are not qualified to adopt as per Article 335 of the aforesaid Code. The
petition for adoption was granted.

Issue:
Whether or not private respondents are disqualified to adopt under paragraph 1 of Art. 335.

Held:
No. The provision invoked by the petitioners is clear and unambiguous. Therefore, no construction or
interpretation should be made. To add “grandchildren” in this article where no such word is included would be
in violation to the legal maxim that what is expressly included would naturally exclude what is not included.

Characteristics of Construction: “Necessary when legislative intent cant be ascertained”

Alonzo v. IAC
– “The spirit, rather than the letter of a statue determines its construction, hence a statute must be
read according to its spirit or intent. For what is within the spirit is within the letter but although it
is not within the letter thereof, and that which is within the letter but not within the spirit is not
within the statute. Stated differently, a thing, which is within the intent of the lawmaker is as much
within the statute as if within the letter; and a thing which is within the letter f the statute is not
within the statue unless within the intent of the lawmakers.”
- Interpret law in consonance with justice
FACTS:
– Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a parcel of land registered in ‘the name
of their deceased parents.
– 3/15/63: Celestino Padua transferred his undivided share by way of absolute sale P550.
– A year later, his sister Estaquia sold her share in a “Con Pacto de Retro Sale”P440
– By virtue of such agreements, the petitioners occupied, after the said sales, an area corresponding to
two-fifths of the said lot, representing the portions sold to them.
– The vendees subsequently enclosed the same with a fence.
 – With their consent, their son Eduardo Alonzo and his wife built a semi-concrete house on a part of the
enclosed area.
– One of the five coheirs Mariano sought to redeem the area sold to petitioners but was dismissed
when it appeared that he was an American citizen.
– Another coheir, Tecla, filed her own complaint invoking the same right of redemption of her bro.
– Trial court dismissed the complaint: the right had lapsed, not having been exercised within 30 days
from notice of the sales. Although there was no written notice, it was held that actual knowledge of
the sales by the co-heirs satisfied the requirement of the law. Respondent court reversed the decision
of the Trial Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not actual knowledge satisfied the requirement of Art. 1088 of the New Civil Code.

HELD:
YES. Decision of respondent court was reversed and that of trial court reinstated.

RATIO:
The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales although no notice in writing was given them.
And there is no doubt either that the 30-day period began and ended during the 14 years between the sales in
question and the filing of the complaint for redemption in 1977, without the co-heirs exercising their right of
redemption. These are the justifications for this exception.
While [courts] may not read into the law a purpose that is not there, [courts] nevertheless have the right to
read out of it the reason for its enactment. In doing so, [courts] defer not to “the letter that killeth” but to “the
spirit that vivifieth,” to give effect to the law-maker’s will.

Judicial Function:
Endencia v. David
– The rule is recognized elsewhere that the legislature cannot pass any declaratory act, or act
declaratory of what the law was before its passage, so as to give it any binding weight with the courts.
A legislative definition of a word as used in a statute is not conclusive of its meaning as used
elsewhere; otherwise, the legislature would be usurping a judicial function in defining a term.
– Legislature: power to make and enact laws, but not to interpret them  would surely cause
confusion and instability in judicial processes and court decisions.
– The legislature cannot, upon passing a law, which violates a constitutional provision, validate it so as
to prevent an attack thereon in the courts, by a declaration that it shall be so construed as not to
violate the constitutional inhibition.
– Judicial department: The interpretation and application of the Constitution and of statutes

FACTS:
 Saturnino David, the then Collector of Internal Revenue, ordered the taxing of Justice Pastor
Endencia’s and Justice Fernando Jugo’s (and other judges’) salary pursuant to Sec. 13 of Republic Act
No. 590 which provides that
 No salary wherever received by any public officer of the Republic of the Philippines shall be
considered as exempt from the income tax, payment of which is hereby declared not to be a
diminution of his compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law.
 The judges however argued that under the case of Perfecto vs Meer, judges are exempt from taxation
– this is also in observance of the doctrine of separation of powers, i.e., the executive, to which the
Internal Revenue reports, is separate from the judiciary; that under the Constitution, the judiciary is
independent and the salaries of judges may not be diminished by the other branches of government;
that taxing their salaries is already a diminution of their benefits/salaries (see Section 9, Art. VIII,
Constitution).
 The Solicitor General, arguing in behalf of the CIR, states that the decision in Perfecto vs Meer was
rendered ineffective when Congress enacted Republic Act No. 590.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 13 of RA 590 is constitutional.

HELD: No. The said provision is a violation of the separation of powers. Only courts have the power to
interpret laws. Congress makes laws but courts interpret them. In Sec. 13, R.A. 590, Congress is already
encroaching upon the functions of the courts when it inserted the phrase: “payment of which [tax] is hereby
declared not to be a diminution of his compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law.”
Here, Congress is already saying that imposing taxes upon judges is not a diminution of their salary. This is a
clear example of interpretation or ascertainment of the meaning of the phrase “which shall not be diminished
during their continuance in office,” found in Section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution, referring to the salaries
of judicial officers. This act of interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof by the Legislature is an invasion
of the well-defined and established province and jurisdiction of the Judiciary.

Purpose of construction - “The cardinal rule in the interpretation of all laws is to ascertain, and give effect
to, the intent of the law. Hence, all rules of construction or interpretation have for their sole object the
ascertainment of the true intent of legislation.”

Legislative intent – the vital part, essence of the law. The intent is the law, and the key to, and the
controlling factor in, its construction or interpretation. It is the spirit, which gives life to the legislative. It
must be enforced when ascertained, although it may not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute.
Courts will not follow the letter of the statute when it leads away from the true intent of the legislature and
to the conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. Hence, where a statute can have more
than one construction, that construction should be adopted which will most tend to give effect to the
manifest intent of the legislature.

People v. Conepcion
FACTS:
Defendant authorized an extension of credit in favor of Concepcion, a co-partnership. Defendant’s wife
was a director of this co-partnership. Defendant was found guilty of violating Sec. 35 of Act No. 2747 which
says that “The National Bank shall not, directly or indirectly, grant loans to any of the members of the Board of
Directors of the bank nor to agents of the branch banks.” This Section was in effect in 1919 but was repealed
in Act No. 2938 approved on January 30, 1921.

ISSUE:
W/N Defendant can be convicted of violating Sections of Act No. 2747, which were repealed by Act No.
2938.

HELD:
In the interpretation and construction, the primary rule is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the
Legislature. Section 49 in relation to Sec. 25 of Act No. 2747 provides a punishment for any person who shall
violate any provisions of the Act. Defendant contends that the repeal of these Sections by Act No. 2938 has
served to take away basis for criminal prosecution. The Court holds that where an act of the Legislature which
penalizes an offense repeals a former act which penalized the same offense, such repeal does not have
the effect of thereafter depriving the Courts of jurisdiction to try, convict and sentence offenders charged
with violations of the old law.

Limitation on the power of courts to construe:

Tanada v. Yulo
FACTS:
Petitioner is a Justice of Peace appointed by the Gov. Gen. with the consent by the Philippine Commission,
assigned to Alabat, Tayabas. Later in his service, he was transferred to Perez, Tayabas. He reached his 65th
birthday on October 5, 1934, subsequent to the approval of Act No. 3899 which makes mandatory the
retirement of all justices who have reached 65 years of age at the time said Act takes effect on January 1,
1933. The judge of First instance, acting upon the directive of the Secretary of Respondent Justice, directed
Petitioner to cease holding office pursuant to Act No. 3899.

ISSUE:
1. W/N Petitioner should cease to hold office.
2. W/N his transfer is considered a “new transfer” and requires confirmation by the Philippine
Commission.
HELD:
No, Petitioner should not cease to hold office as Act No. 3899 clearly states that those who will cease to hold
office are those 65 yrs of age at the time the Act takes effect, not thereafter. Therefore, Petitioner shall be a
Justice of Peace for life as long as he stays in good behavior or does not become incapacitated.
No, his transfer is not a new appointment. Hence, no confirmation is required as it is just an enlargement of
the jurisdiction grounded on original appointment.

Ratio:
The natural and reasonable meaning of the language used in Act No. 3899, leaves room for no other deducting
than that a justice of the peace appointed prior to the approval of the Act and who completed sixty-five years
of age on September 13, 1934, subsequent to the approval of the Act, which was on November 16, 1931, and
to the date fixed for cessation from office which was on January 1, 1933, is not affected by the said Act.

A justice of the peace like the petitioner who became sixty-five years of age on October 5, 1934, was not
included in a law which required justice of the peace sixty-five years of age to cease to hold office on January
1,1933.

It is to be deduced that according to the United States Supreme Court, the transfer simply amounted to an
enlargement or change of jurisdiction grounded on the original appointment and thus did not require a new
appointment. Whatever our view is might have been to the contrary, it now becomes our duty to follow the
decision of the higher court. It also seems evident that a transfer as applied to officers amounts merely to a
change of position or to another grade of service.

Floresca v. Philex
FACTS:
Several miners, who, while working at the copper mines underground operations at Tuba, Benguet on June 28,
1967, died as a result of the cave-in that buried them in the tunnels of the mine. The heirs of the deceased
claimed their benefits pursuant to the Workmen’s Compensation Act before the Workmen’s Compensation
Commission. They also petitioned before the regular courts and sue Philex for additional damages, pointing
out in the complaint 'gross and brazen negligence on the part of Philex in failing to take necessary security for
the protection of the lives of its employees working underground'. Philex invoked that they can no longer be
sued because the petitioners have already claimed benefits under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, which,
Philex insists, holds jurisdiction over provisions for remedies.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the heirs of the deceased have a right of selection between availing themselves of the
worker’s right under the Workmen’s Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for
higher damages (actual, moral and exemplary) from the employers by virtue of that negligence or fault of the
employers or whether they may avail themselves cumulatively of both actions.

RULING:
 The court held that although the other petitioners had received the benefits under the Workmen’s
Compensation Act, such may not preclude them from bringing an action before the regular court
because they became cognizant of the fact that Philex has been remiss in its contractual obligations
with the deceased miners only after receiving compensation under the Act.
 Had petitioners been aware of said violation of government rules and regulations by Philex, and of its
negligence, they would not have sought redress under the Workmen’s Compensation Commission,
which awarded a lesser amount for compensation.
 The choice of the first remedy was based on ignorance or a mistake of fact, which nullifies the choice
as it was not an intelligent choice. The case should therefore be remanded to the lower court for
further proceedings. However, should the petitioners be successful in their bid before the lower
court, the payments made under the Workmen’s Compensation Act should be deducted from the
damages that may be decreed in their favor.

Title of Statute:
Art VI, Sec 26(1), 1987 Constitution
“Every bill passed by Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.”

This provision is mandatory. This contains dual limitations upon the legislature.

• The legislature is to refrain from the conglomeration, under one statute, of heterogeneous 
subjects. 


• The title of the bill is to be couched in a language sufficient to notify the legislators and 
the public and
those concerned of the import of the single subject thereof. 


***Govt of PHI v. HSBC

The title of an act must be comprehensive enough to include general object, which a statute seeks to
effect.

Preamble
- A preamble is a pre-factory statement or explanation or a fining of facts, reciting the purpose, reasons or
occasion for making the law to which it is prefixed. It is usually found after the enacting clause and before the
body of the law.

Eugenio v. Drilon
• The intent of the law culled from its preamble and from the situation, circumstances and conditions it
sought to remedy, must be enforced. 


• In construing statutes the proper course is to start out and follow the true intent of the legislature and to
adopt that sense which harmonizes best with the context and promotes in the fullest manner the
apparent policy and objects of the legislature. 


• In the case at bar, the law must favor the weak and the disadvantaged, including, in this instance, small lot
buyers and aspiring homeowners. P.D. 957 was enacted with no other end in view than to provide a
protective mantle over helpless citizens who may fall prey to the manipulations and machinations of
‘unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers,’ and such intent is nowhere expressed more
clearly than in its preamble. 


FACTS:
Private Respondent purchased on installment basis from Petitioner, two lots. Private respondent
suspended payment of his amortizations because of non-development on the property. Petitioner then
sold one of the two lots to spouses Relevo and the title was registered under their name. Respondent
prayed for annulment of sale and reconveyance of the lot to him. Applying P.D. 957 “The Subdivision and
Condominium Buyers’ Protective Decree”, the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission ordered
Petitioner to complete the development, reinstate Private Respondent’s purchase contract over one lot
and immediately refund him of the payment (including interest) he made for the lot sold to the spouses.
Petitioner claims that the Exec. Sec. erred in applying P.D. 957 saying it should have not been given
retroactive effect and that non-development does not justify the non-payment of the amortizations.

ISSUE:
W/N the Executive Secretary acted with grave abuse of discretion when he decided P.D. 957 will be given
retroactive effect.

HELD:
No. Respondent Executive Secretary did not act with grave abuse of discretion and P.D. 957 is to given
retroactive effect so as to cover even those contracts executed prior to its enactment in 1976. P.D. 957 did
not expressly provide for retroactivity in its entirety, but such can be plainly inferred from the
unmistakable intent of the law. “The intent of the statute is the law.”