CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC., petitioner-appellee, vs.

ENRICO PALOMAR, in his capacity as THE

POSTMASTER GENERAL, respondent-appellant.

FACTS:

The petitioner, CALTEX Philippines, INC, proposed a promotional scheme denominated “Caltex Hooded
Pump Contest”, a three-staged winner selection contest wherein the privilege participants have to
estimate the actual number of litres a hooded gas pump at their respective Caltex station dispense at a
specified period of time. The rules of which involved selection of winners by the form of drawing and
thereafter prices will be given. As it is foreseen that the extensive use of mails will be employed in
publishing the contest and as means of communication, Caltex advanced a formal letter to the
respondent, Postmaster Gen. Palomar, justifying its position that the contest does not transgress the
provisions in sections 1954(a), 1982 and 1983 of the Revised Administrative Code. This request by the
petitioner was denied by the respondent in his view that there are violations of the aforesaid provisions
and even gave a warning that if the proposed contest was conducted, a fraud order will have to be
issued against the petitioner and all its representatives. Caltex invoke judicial intervention by filing a
declaratory relief on the said issue on which the court sided. The responded appealed that there is no
sufficient cause of action for such declaratory relief to be granted.

ISSUES:

1. WON the petition states a sufficient cause of action for a declaratory relief.
2. WON the proposed promotional contest violates the Anti-lottery provisions of the Postal Law.

RULINGS:

1. Yes, the court held that the petition has a sufficient cause of action for a declaratory relief since
it satisfies the four necessary conditions under section 1 rule 64 of the Revised Rules of Court on
invoking declaratory relief available to any person whose rights are affected by a statute to
determine any question of construction or validity arising under the statute and for declaration
of his rights. To the appellee, the construction hampers or disturbs its freedom to enhance its
business while to the appellant, suppression of the appelle’s proposed contest believed to
transgress the law he has sworn to uphold and enforce is an unavoidable duty.

2. No, the court held that the appellee does not transgress the provisions of the Postal Law since
the said contest failed to exhibit the element of consideration which would brand it as a lottery
or gift enterprise.
RODERICK DAOANG, and ROMMEL DAOANG, assisted by their father, ROMEO DAOANG, petitioners, vs.
THE MUNICIPAL JUDGE, SAN NICOLAS, ILOCOS NORTE, ANTERO AGONOY and AMANDA RAMOS-
AGONOY, respondents.

FACTS:

The respondents Antero and Amanda Agonoy, filed a petition with the Municipal Court of San Nicolas,
Ilocos Norte, seeking the adoption of the minors Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos. The petition was
set for hearing on April 24, 1971 and notices thereof were caused to be served upon the office of the
Solicitor General and ordered published in the ILOCOS TIMES, a weekly newspaper of general circulation
in the province of Ilocos Norte.

On April 22 1971, the minors Roderick and Rommel Daoang, assited by their father and guardian, the
petitioners herein, filed an opposition on the ground that the spouses Agonoy has a legitimate daughter,
the mother of the oppositors and therefore said were disqualified to adopt under Art 335 of the Civil
Code.

After the required publication of notice had been accomplished, evidence was presented. Thereafter,
the Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos No rte rendered its decision, granting the petition for
adoption.

Hence, the petitioner file a review for centiorari.

ISSUE:

WON the Municipal Judge erred in granting the petition for adoption on the basis of Art 335 of the Civil
Code.

RULING:

No, the Municipal Judge did not err in granting the petition for adoption on the basis of Art 335 of the
Civil Code.

The court ruled that “the words used in paragraph (1) of Art. 335 of the Civil Code, in enumerating the
persons who cannot adopt, are clear and unambiguous. The children mentioned therein have a clearly
defined meaning in law and, as pointed out by the respondent judge, do not include grandchildren.”

Well known is the rule of statutory construction to the effect that a statute clear and unambiguous on
its face need not to be interpreted; stated otherwise, the rule is that only statutes with an unambiguous
or doubtful meaning may be subject of statutory construction.

Thus, the petition is DENIED and the previous ruling is AFFIRMED.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG, defendant-
appellant.

FACTS:

Mario M. Mapa was charged for illegal possession of firearm and ammunition in an information dated
August 14 1962 in violation of Section 878 of the Revised Administrative Code in connection with Section
2692 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended Commonwealth Act 56 and as further amended
by Republic Act No. 4. Accused admits to possession of Firearm on ground of being a secret agent of
Governor Feliciano Leviste. On November 27 1963, the lower court rendered a decision convicting the
accused of the crime and sentenced him to imprisonment for one year and one day to two years. As the
appeal involves a question of law, it was elevated to Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

WON a secret agent duly appointed and qualified as such governor is exempt from the requirement of
having licensed of firearm.

RULING:

No, the law is explicit that it is unlawful for any person to possess any firearm, detached parts of
firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or intended to be used in the
manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition except when such firearms are in possession
of such public officials and public servants for use in the performance of their official duties; as those
firearms and ammunitions which are regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors or marines,
the Philippine Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police,
provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasures, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors,
and guards of provincial prisoners and jails. It is the first and fundamental duty of courts to apply law;
Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible
or inadequate without them. The law cannot be clearer, there being no provision made for a secret
agent.

Reliance in the decision in People v. Macarandang is misplaced, and the case no longer speaks with
authority to the extent that the present decision conflicts with. It may be note that in People v.
Macarandang, a secret agent was acquitted on appeal on the assumption that the appointment of the
accused as a secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order equivalent even to a member
of the municipal police expressly covered by section 879, thus, in present case, therefore, the conviction
must stand.

The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed judgement.