• Romualdez vs.

COMELEC, April 30, 2008

Facts:
Garay and Apostol filed a complaint against Sps. Romualdez for violation of the OEC and RA
8189 or Voter’s Registration Act of 1996 for making false information as to their residence in their
applications as new voters in Burauen, Leyte.
The Complaint-Affidavit contained a prayer that a preliminary investigation be conducted by
the COMELEC, and if the evidence so warrants, the corresponding Information against petitioners be
filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for the prosecution of the same.
Sps. Romualdez contend that they intend to reside in Burauen, Leyte since 1989. On May 2000,
they took actual residence in Burauen by leasing for 5 years the house of Renomeron.
The Complaint-Affidavit contained a prayer that a preliminary investigation be conducted by the
COMELEC, and if the evidence so warrants, the corresponding Information against petitioners be filed
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for the prosecution of the same.

Issue: WON due process was violated.

Held: No.

First, the Complaint-Affidavit filed by private respondent with the COMELEC is couched in a language
which embraces the allegations necessary to support the charge for violation of Section 10(g) and (j), in
relation to Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189.
Petitioners cannot be said to have been denied due process on the claim that the election offenses
charged against them by private respondent are entirely different from those for which they stand to be
accused of before the RTC, as charged by the COMELEC. In the first place, there appears to be no
incongruity between the charges as contained in the Complaint-Affidavit and the Informations filed
before the RTC, notwithstanding the denomination by private respondent of the alleged violations to be
covered by Section 261(y)(2) and Section 261(y)(5) of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 12 of
Republic Act No. 8189. Evidently, the Informations directed to be filed by the COMELEC against
petitioners, and which were, in fact, filed with the RTC, were based on the same set of facts as originally
alleged in the private respondent’s Complaint-Affidavit.
In Lacson, we underscored the elementary rule that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the
allegations in the Complaint or Information, and not by the evidence presented by the parties at the
trial. Indeed, in Lacson, we articulated that the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from
the caption or preamble of the Information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to
have been violated, they being conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of facts in the Complaint or
Information.

Petitioners’ reliance on Lacson, however, does not support their claim of lack of due process because, as
we have said, the charges contained in private respondent’s Complaint-Affidavit and the charges as
directed by the COMELEC to be filed are based on the same set of facts. In fact, the nature of the
criminal charges in private respondent’s Complaint-Affidavit and that of the charges contained in the
Informations filed with the RTC, pursuant to the COMELEC Resolution En Banc are the same, such that,
petitioners cannot claim that they were not able to refute or submit documentary evidence against the
charges that the COMELEC filed with the RTC. Petitioners were afforded due process because they were
granted the opportunity to refute the allegations in private respondent’s Complaint-Affidavit. On 2 April
2001, in opposition to the Complaint-Affidavit, petitioners filed a Joint Counter-Affidavit with Motion to
Dismiss with the Law Department of the COMELEC. They similarly filed a Memorandum before the said
body. Finding that due process was not dispensed with under the circumstances in the case at bar, we
agree with the stance of the Office of the Solicitor General that petitioners were reasonably apprised of
the nature and description of the charges against them. It likewise bears stressing that preliminary
investigations were conducted whereby petitioners were informed of the complaint and of the evidence
submitted against them. They were given the opportunity to adduce controverting evidence for their
defense. In all these stages, petitioners actively participated.
Digest: Spouses Carlos S. Romualdezand Erlinda Romualdez vs. COMELECand Dennis GarayG.R.
No. 167011 April 30, 2008FACTS:Dennis Garay filed a case alleging thatpetitioners made false and
untruthfulrepresentations in their Voter’sRegistration Record by indicatingtherein that they are
residents of 935San Jose Street, Burauen, Leyte, when intruth and in fact, they were and still
areresidents of 113 Mariposa Loop,Mariposa Street, Bagong Lipunan ngCrame, Quezon City in
violation ofSection 10(g) and (j) in relation toSection 45 (j) of Republic Act Nos. 8189– Voter’s
Registration Act of 1996. \Petitioners knowing fully well said truth,intentionally and willfully, did not fill
theblank spaces corresponding to thelength of time for residence. 1. A Complaint-Affidavit with a
Prayerfor Preliminary Investigation beconducted by the COMELEC;2. Petitioners filed a Joint
Counter-Affidavit with Motion to Dismisscontending that they did not make anyfalse or untruthful
statements in theirapplication for registration as evidencedby;o Their act of leasing a house for
5years in the locality.o A Resolution of Welcome passed byBarangay District III Council of Barauen.3.
COMELEC investigating officerissued a resolution recommending tothe COMELEC Law
Department the filingof appropriate information against thepetitioners.4. COMELEC en banc filed
informationbefore RTC5. Petitioners filed a Motion forReconsideration Petitioners contend that
Section 45(j) ofthe Voter’s Registration Act was void forbeing vague as it did not refer to
adefinite provision of the law, theviolation of which would constitute anelection offense; hence, it
ran contraryto Section 14(1) and section 14(2),Article III of the 1987 Constitution ( dueprocess
clause)Nevertheless, the Commission onElection (COMELEC) Charged thepetitioners with
violations of Section 10(g) and (j) , in relation to Section 45 (J)of the Voter’s Registration Act. Section 10
of RA No. 8189:SEC 10 – Registration of Voters. - Aqualified voter shall be registered in
thepermanent list of voters in a precinct ofthe city or municipality wherein heresides to be able
to vote in anyelection. To register as a voter, he shallpersonally accomplish an applicationform
for registration as prescribed bythe Commission in three (3) copiesbefore the Election Officer
on any dateduring office hours after havingacquired the qualifications of a voter.The
application shall, inter alia, containthe following data:(g.)Periods of residence in thePhilippines and
in the place ofregistration;(j.) A statement that the application isnot a registered voter of any
precinct; SEC 45. Election Offense. - The followingshall be considered election offensesunder this
Act:(j.) Violation of any of the provisions ofthis Act.ISSUE:Whether or not the COMELEC
gravelyabused its discretion amounting to lackor in excess of its jurisdiction when itpremised its
resolution on amisapprehension of facts and failed toconsider certain relevant facts thatwould
justify a different conclusion.HELD:NO.The COMELEC did not commit graveabuse of discretion.
The void-for-vagueness doctrine holds that a law isfacially invalid if men of commonintelligence
must necessarily guess at itsmeaning and differ as to its application.However, this Court has imposed
certainlimitations by which a criminal statute,as in the challenged law at bar, may bescrutinized. This
Court has declared thatfacial invalidation or an “on-its-face”invalidation of criminal statutes is
notappropriate. Indeed, an “on-its-face” invalidationof criminal statutes would result in amass
acquittal of parties whose casesmay not have even reached the courts.Such invalidation would
constitute adeparture from the usual requirementof “actual case and controversy” andpermit
decisions to be made in a sterileabstract context having no factualconcreteness. The rule
established inour jurisdiction is, only statutes on freespeech, religious freedom, and
otherfundamental rights may be faciallychallenged. Under no case may ordinarypenal statutes be
subjected to a facialchallenge. Moreover, it is a well-settledprinciple of legal hermeneutics
thatwords of a statute will be interpreted intheir natural, plain and ordinaryacceptation and
signification, unless it isevident that the legislature intended atechnical or special legal meaning
tothose words. It is succinct that courtswill not substitute the finding ofprobable cause by the
COMELEC in theabsence of grave abuse of discretion.The abuse of discretion must be
sopatent and gross as to amount to anevasion of a positive duty or a virtualrefusal to
perform a duty enjoined bylaw, or to act at all in contemplation oflaw as where the power is
exercised inan arbitrary and despotic manner byreason of passion or hostility
SUBJECT: Due Process of Law FACTS: 2000 – respondents Dennis Garay and Angelino Apostol before
COMELEC filed election charges against the petitioners for violating: a. b. c.

Omnibus Election Code (BP 881) Sec. 261(y)(2) - knowingly making any false or untruthful statements
relative to any data or information required in the application for registration as new voters Omnibus
Election Code (BP 881) Sec. 261(y)(5) - committed by any person who, being a registered voter, registers
anew without filing an application for cancellation of his previous registration Section 12 of Republic Act
No. 8189 (Voter’s Registration Act) - for failure to apply for transfer of registration records due to
change of residence to another city or municipality

Petitioners indicated in their application that they are residents of Burauen, Leyte, when in truth and in
fact, they were and still are residents and registered voters of Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, Quezon City,
and that they did not indicated the length of time which they have resided in Burauen, Leyte. 2004 -
COMELEC issued June 11 Resolution directing the filing of two separate informations against petitioners
for violation of Section 10 (g) and (j) in relation to Section 45 (j) of Republic Act 8189 before RTC. SEC.
10. Registration of Voters. – A qualified voter shall be registered in the permanent list of voters in a
precinct of the city or municipality wherein he resides to be able to vote in any election. To register as a
voter, he shall personally accomplish an application form for registration as prescribed by the
Commission in three (3) copies before the Election Officer on any date during office hours after having
acquired the qualifications of a voter. The application shall contain the following data: g) Periods of
residence in the Philippines and in the place of registration; j) A statement that the application is not a
registered voter of any precinct SEC. 45. Election Offense. – The following shall be considered election
offenses under this Act. j) Violation of any of the provisions of this Act. Petitioners’ contentions: 1.

They did not make any false or untruthful statements in their application for registration: a. They
intended to reside in Burauen, Leyte, since the year 1989 and took actual residence on 2000 by leasing
for (5) years a house there. b. Barangay District of Burauen passed a Resolution of Welcome for them.

2.

Lack of Due Process - Election offenses charged against them are entirely different from those which
they stand to be accused of before the RTC by the COMELEC: a. They were charged in RTC for violating:
1) Section 261(y)(2) and Section 261(y)(5) of the Omnibus Election Code 2) Section 12 of the Voter’s
Registration Act b. They were not given right to refute or submit documentary evidence against the new
charges filed by COMELEC. c. Lacson v. Executive Secretary - the real nature of the criminal charge is
determined by the actual recital of facts in the Complaint or Information; and that the object of such
written accusations was to furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him, as will
enable him to make his defense. The elementary rule that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by
the allegations in the Complaint or Information, and not by the evidence presented by the parties at the
trial. 3. Section 45(j) of the Voter’s Registration Act is vague – it is contrary to Section 14(1) and Section
14(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution because it does not refer to a definite provision of the law on
the violation of which would constitute an election offense. Section 14 (1), Article III of the 1987
Constitution - No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.
Section 14 (2). Article III of the 1987 Constitution - In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and
counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy,
impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure
the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment,
trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified
and his failure to appear is unjustifiable. COMELEC contentions: 1.

Filing of request for the cancellation and transfer of Voting Registration Record does not automatically
cancel the registration records. a. At the time of application for registration at Leyte – petitioners’ voting
registration in Barangay Bagong Lipunan ng Crame Quezon City was still valid and subsisting. They
cannot claim ignorance of section 10 on the procedure for transfer of registration records by reason of
transferred new residence to another municipality. b. Petitioners cannot claim an honest mistake -
election law is mala prohibita. Proof of criminal intent is not necessary.

ISSUE: Whether COMELEC gravely abused its discretion. HELD: Due Process: 1.

2.

Complaint filed by Garay with the COMELEC is couched in a language which embraces the allegations
necessary to support the charge for violation of Section 10(g) and (j), in relation to Section 45(j) of
Republic Act No. 8189. Mere perusal of the Complaint-Affidavit would readily show that Section 10 of
Republic Act No. 8189 was specifically mentioned therein. It supports the charged filed by COMELEC in
RTC. Spouses are registered as new voters of the Municipality of Burauen, Leyte, despite they are
registered voters of Quezon City (1997):

a.

3.

4.

Double Registration is an election offense - A person qualified as a voter is only allowed to register once.
If a person registers anew as a voter in spite of a subsisting registration, the new application for
registration will be disapproved. The registrant is also liable not only for an election offense of double
registration, but also for another election offense of knowingly making any false or untruthful statement
relative to any data or information required in the application for registration. Lacson case does not
support their claim of lack of due process: a. There appears no incongruity between the charges in the
Complaint and the Informations filed before the RTC. b. Charges contained in Complaint and
Informations filed by the COMELEC are based on the same set of facts. c. Informations filed by COMELEC
- based on the same set of facts as originally alleged in Garay’s complaint. Petitioners were granted the
opportunity to refute the allegations in Garay’s Complaint-Affidavit – thru filing Joint Counter-Affidavit
with Motion to Dismiss and a Memorandum. a. In Preliminary investigations petitioners were informed
of the complaint and of the evidence submitted against them to which they actively participated. b. In
Orquinaza v. People - The court held that the designation by the police officer of the offense (sexual
harassment) is not conclusive as it is within the competence of the prosecutor to assess the evidence
submitted and determine the appropriate offense (acts of lasciviousness) to be charged.

Validity of the Law: 5.

The Court is not convinced on the vagueness of Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189: a. Section 45 of
Republic Act No. 8189 makes a recital of election offenses under the same Act - without doubt, crystal in
its specification that a violation of any of the provisions of Republic Act No. 8189 is an election offense.
The challenged provision renders itself to no other interpretation. b. Void-for-vagueness doctrine is not
applicable – a law is facially invalid if men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning
and differ as to its application. Facial invalidation or an "on-itsface" invalidation of criminal statutes is
not appropriate. It is subject to the same principles governing overbreadth doctrine. Like overbreadth, it
is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible applications.
c. In Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan: The doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are
analytical tools developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called
in American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a
criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the established rule is that 'one to whom application of a
statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also
be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might be
unconstitutional.' As has been pointed out, 'vagueness challenges in the First Amendment context, like
overbreadth challenges typically produce facial invalidation, while statutes found vague as a matter of
due process typically are invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular defendant.'"

6.

To this date, the Court has not declared any penal law unconstitutional on the ground of ambiguity. In
Santiago v. Comelec held that a portion of RA 6735 was unconstitutional because of undue delegation of
legislative powers, not because of vagueness. a. Indeed, an "on-its-face" invalidation of criminal statutes
would result in a mass acquittal of parties whose cases may not have even reached the courts. Such
invalidation would constitute a departure from the usual requirement of "actual case and controversy"
and permit decisions to be made in a sterile abstract context having no factual concreteness. b. For this
reason, generally disfavored is an on-its-face invalidation of statutes, described as a "manifestly strong
medicine" to be employed "sparingly and only as a last resort." In determining

7.

8.

the constitutionality of a statute, therefore, its provisions that have allegedly been violated must be
examined in the light of the conduct with which the defendant has been charged. (Younger v. Harris) c.
In David v. Arroyo - Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law
that "reflects legitimate state interest in maintaining comprehensive control over harmful,
constitutionally unprotected conduct." (Broadrick v. Oklahoma) - claims of facial overbreadth are
entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only "spoken words" and
again, that "overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary
criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct." Facial challenge on the ground of
overbreadth is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish
that there can be no instance when the assailed law may be valid. d. Estrada v. Sandiganbayan - A
statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used therein, or because of
the employment of terms without defining them; much less do we have to define every word we use.
Besides, there is no positive constitutional or statutory command requiring the legislature to define each
and every word in an enactment. Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of its will, and its
inability to so define the words employed in a statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness or
ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole
act. Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be
interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification, unless it is evident that the
legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words. The intention of the lawmakers
who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists and lexicographers to use statutory phraseology in such a
manner is always presumed. Section 45 (j) conjointly with the provisions Sections 10 (g) and (j) - reveal
that the matters that are required to be set forth under the sections are crucial to the achievement of a
clean, complete, permanent and updated list of voters. The factual information required by the law is
sought not for mere embellishment but is directly relevant to the right of suffrage, which the State has
the right to regulate. Phraseology in Section 45(j) is employed by Congress in a number of our laws. In
Gatchalian - "any of the provisions of this [A]ct" as all-embracing the legislative fiat intends to punish not
only those expressly declared unlawful but even those not so declared but are clearly enjoined to be
observed to carry out the fundamental purpose of the law.

Jurisdiction and Power of COMELEC: 9.

COMELEC did not gravely abused its discretion - Omnibus Election Code and Article IX (C), Section 2 (6)
of the 1987 Constitution - the task of the COMELEC whenever any election offense charge is filed before
it is to conduct the preliminary investigation of the case, and make a determination of probable cause. It
is succinct that courts will not substitute the finding of probable cause by the COMELEC in the absence
of grave abuse of discretion. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion or hostility. a. Power to prosecute include the right to determine under which laws prosecution
will be pursued. The courts cannot dictate the prosecution nor usurp its discretionary powers. As a rule,
courts cannot interfere with the prosecutor’s discretion and control of the criminal prosecution. b.
Resolutions of 11 June 2004 and 27 January 2005 are AFFIRMED.

• Southern Hemisphere vs. Anti-Terrorism Council, October 5, 2010

FACTS:

Six petitions were filed challenging the constitutionality of RA 9372, otherwise known as the Human
Security Act of 2007 for being intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad. They argue that the definition
of the crime of terrorism under RA 9372 in that terms like “widespread and extraordinary fear and panic
among the populace” and “coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand” are nebulous,
leaving law enforcement agencies with no standard to measure the prohibited acts.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the doctrines of void-for-vagueness and overbreadth finds application in RA9372?
RULING:

No, it does not.

A facial invalidation of a statute is allowed only in free speech cases, wherein certain rules of
constitutional litigation are rightly excepted. RA 9372 regulates conduct, not speech.

Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial
challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against
socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free
speech.

The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free speech cases. They
are inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes.
FACTS:

Six petitions were filed challenging the constitutionality of RA 9372, otherwise known as the Human
Security Act of 2007 for being intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad. They argue that the definition
of the crime of terrorism under RA 9372 in that terms like “widespread and extraordinary fear and panic
among the populace” and “coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand” are nebulous,
leaving law enforcement agencies with no standard to measure the prohibited acts.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the doctrines of void-for-vagueness and overbreadth finds application in RA9372?

RULING:

No, it does not.

A facial invalidation of a statute is allowed only in free speech cases, wherein certain rules of
constitutional litigation are rightly excepted. RA 9372 regulates conduct, not speech.

Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial
challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against
socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free
speech.

The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free speech cases. They
are inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes.
Case Digest Consti 1 ARTICLE VII – Conditions For Exercise of Judicial ReviewSouthern Hemisphere vs
Anti-terrorism CouncilG.R. No. 178552, October 5, 2010FACTS:Six petitions were filed challenging the
constitutionality of RA 9372, otherwise known as theHuman Security Act of 2007 for being intrinsically
vague and impermissibly broad. They arguethat the definition of the crime of terrorism under RA 9372
in that terms like “widespread andextraordinary fear and panic among the populace” and “coerce the
government to give in to anunlawful demand” are nebulous, leaving law enforcement agencies
with no standard tomeasure the prohibited acts.ISSUE:Whether or not the doctrines of void-
for-vagueness and overbreadth finds application inRA9372?RULING:No, it does not.A facial
invalidation of a statute is allowed only in free speech cases, wherein certain rules ofconstitutional
litigation are rightly excepted. RA 9372 regulates conduct, not speech.Criminal statutes have general in
terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, iffacial challenge is allowed for this reason
alone, the State may well be prevented from enactinglaws against socially harmful conduct. In the area
of criminal law, the law cannot take chancesas in the area of free speech.The overbreadth and
vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free speechcases. They are inapt for testing
the validity of penal statutes
FACTS:


This case consists of 6 petitions challenging the constitutionality of RA 9372, “An Act to Secure
the State and Protect our People from
Terrorism,” aka Human Security Act of 2007.

Petitioner-organizations assert
locusstandi
on the basis of being
suspected “communist fronts
” by
the government, whereas individual petitioners invoke the
“transcendental importance”
doctrineand their
status as citizens and taxpayers
.


KARAPATAN, Hustisya, Desaparecidos, SELDA, EMJP, and PCR allege they have been subjected to
“close security
surveillance

by state security forces,” their members followed by “suspiciouspersons” and “vehicles with dark
windshields,” and their offices monitored by “men with militarybuild.” They likewise claim they have
been branded as “enemies of the State.”

BAYAN, GABRIELA, KMP, MCCCL, COURAGE, KADAMAY, SCW, LFS, Anakbayan, PAMALAKAYA,ACT,
Migrante, HEAD, and Agham would like the Court to take
judicialnotice

of respondents’
alleged action of tagging them as militant organizations fronting for the CPP and NPA. They claimsuch
tagging
is tantamount to the effects of proscription without following the procedure underthe law.

Meanwhile, IBP and CODAL base their claim of
locusstandi
on their sworn duty to uphold theConstitution.


Petitioners claim that RA 9372 is vague and broad, in that terms like “widespread andextraordinary fear
and panic among the populace” and “coerce the govern
ment to give in to an
unlawful demand” are nebulous, leaving law enforcement agencies with no standard to measure
the prohibited acts.
ISSUES:
1.

WON petitioners’ resort to certiorari is proper


NO.
2.

WON petitioners have

locusstandi

NO.
3.

WON the Court can t

ake judicial notice of the alleged “tagging”

NO.
4.

WON petitioners can invoke the “transcendental importance” doctrine


NO.
5.

WON petitioners can be conferred

locusstandi
as they are taxpayers and citizens

NO.
6.

WON petitioners were able to present an actual case or controversy


NO.
7.

WON RA 9372 is vague and broad in defining the crime of terrorism


NO.
8.

WON a penal statute may be assailed for being vague as applied to petitioners

NO.
9.

WON there is merit in the claim that RA 9372 regulates speech so as to permit a facial analysis ofits
validity

NO.

HELD AND RATIO:1.

Petition for certiorari is improper.

a.

Certiorari does not lie against respondents who do not exercise judicial or quasi-judicialfunctions.
Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court states that petition for certiorariapplies when any tribunal,
board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions
has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretionamounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction.b.

Petitioners do not even allege with any modicum of particularity how respondents actedwithout or in
excess of their respective jurisdictions, or with grave abuse of discretionamounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.c.

The power of
judicial review
has
4 requisites
:i.

There must be an
actual case or controversy
.ii.

Petitioners must possess

locus standi
.
iii.

Question of constitutionality must be raised at the

earliest opportunity
.iv.
The issue of constitutionality must be the
lismota
of the case.The present case lacks the 1
st
2 requisites, which are the most essential.2.

Petitioners lack
locus standi
a.

Locusstandi
or legal standing requires a personal stake in the outcome of thecontroversy as to assure concrete
adverseness.b.

In
AnakMindanaoParty-ListGroupv.TheExecutiveSecretary,locusstandi
has beendefined as that requiring:i.

That the person assailing must have

a direct and personal interest
ANDii.

That the person

sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining some directinquiry as a result of the act being
challenged.
c.

For a concerned party to be allowed to raise a constitutional question, he must showthat:i.

He has personally suffered some

actual or threatened injury
;ii.

The injury is
fairly traceable
to the challenged action; ANDiii.

The injury is likely to be

redressed by a favorable action
.d.

RA 9372 is a penal statute. While

Chavezv.PCGG
holds that transcendental publicimportance dispenses with the requirement that petitioner has
experienced or is inactual danger of suffering direct and personal injury, cases involving the
constitutionalityof
penal
legislation belong to an altogether different genus of constitutional litigation.Such necessitates
closer judicial scrutiny
of
locusstandi.
e.

The mere invocation of the duty to preserve the rule of law does no, however, suffice toclothe the IBP or
any of its members with standing. They failed to sufficientlydemonstrate how its mandate under the
assailed statute revolts against its constitutionalrights and duties.f.

Former Senator Ma. Ana Consuelo Madrigal who claims to have been the subject of
“political surveillance” also lacks
locusstandi.
The same is true for WigbertoTañada andOsmeña III, who cite their being a human rights advocate and
an oppositor, respectively.No concrete injury has been pinpointed, hence, no
locusstandi.
3.

Court cannot take judicial notice of the alleged “tagging.”

a.

Matters of judicial notice have 3 material requisites:i.

matter must be one of

common and general knowledge
ii.

must be well and authoritatively settled, not doubtful or uncertain or

capable ofaccurate and ready determination
iii.

known to be
within thelimits of the jurisdiction
of the courtb.

The principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known isthat of
notoriety.
It can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by publicrecords and facts of general
notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limitedto: (1) facts evidenced by public records and
(2) facts of general notoriety.c.

A court cannot take judicial notice of any fact which, in part, is dependent on the
existence or non-existence of a fact of which the Court has no constructive knowledge.d.

Petitioners’ apprehension is insufficient to substantiate their plea. That no specific charge

or proscription under RA 9371 has been filed against them, 3 years after its effectivity,belies any claim of
imminence of their perceived threat emanating from the so-calledtagging. They fail to particularize how
the implementation of specific provisions of RA9372 would result in direct injury to their organization
and members.e.
Notwithstanding the statement of Ermita and Gonzales that the Arroyo administrationwill adopt the US
and EU classification of CPP and NPA as terrorist organizations, there isyet to be filed before the courts
an application to declare the CPP and NPA organizationsas domestic terrorist or outlawed organization
under RA 9372.4.

In
Kilosbayanv.Guingona,
to invoke the transcendental doctrine, the following are thedeterminants:a.

The character of the funds or other assets involved in the caseb.

The presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition bythe public
respondent agency or instrumentality of the government;c.

The lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in the questions beingraisedIn the
case at bar,
there are other partiesnot before the Court withdirect and specific interests
inthe questions being raised.5.

Petitioners cannot be conferred upon them as taxpayers and citizens.

a.

A taxpayer suit is proper only when there is an exercise of the spending or taxing powerof Congress,
whereas citizen standing must rest on direct and personal interest in theproceeding.b.

RA 9372 is a penal statute and does not even provide for any appropriation fromCongress for its
implementation, while none of the individual petitioner-citizens hasalleged any direct and personal
interest in the implementation of the law.c.

Generalized interest, albeit accompanied by the assertion of a public right, do notestablish

locusstandi
. Evidence of a direct and personal interest is key.6.

Petitioners fail to present an actual case or controversy. None of them faces any charge under RA9372.
a.

Judicial power operates only when there is an actual case or controversy. An actual caseor controversy
means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe fordetermination, not conjectural or
anticipatory, lest the decision of the court wouldamount to an advisory opinion.b.

Courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest. Thepleadings must
show:i.

an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right andii.

a denial thereofc.
However, a reasonable certainty of the occurrence of a
perceivedthreat
to anyconstitutional interest suffices to provide a basis for mounting a constitutional challenge.This,
however, is qualified by the presence of
sufficient facts.
d.

Prevailing American jurisprudence allows adjudication on the merits when ananticipatory petition
clearly shows that the challenged prohibition forbids the conduct oractivity that a petitioner seeks to do,
as there would be a justiciable controversy.However, in the case at bar, the petitioners have failed to
show that the challengedprovisions of RA 9372 forbid constitutionally protected conduct or activity.
Nodemonstrable threat has been established, much less a real and existing one.e.

Petitioners have yet to show any connection between the purported “surveillance” and
the implementation of RA 9372. Petitioners obscure allegations of sporadic “surveillance”and
supposedly being tagged as “communist fronts” in no way approximate a
crediblethreatofprosecution.
From these allegations, the Court is being lured to render anadvisory opinion, which is not its function.
If the case is merely theorized, it lies beyond judicial review for
lack of ripeness
. Allegations of abuse must be anchored on real events.7.

The doctrines of void-for-vagueness and overbreadth find no application in the present case sincethese
doctrines apply only to free speech cases and that RA 9372 regulates conduct, not speech.
a.

Romualdezv.Sandiganbayan:
The overbreadth and the vagueness doctrines have specialapplication only to free speech cases, and are
not appropriate for testing the validity ofpenal statutes.b.

Romualdezv.COMELEC:
A facial invalidation of criminal statutes is not appropriate, butthe Court nonetheless proceeded to
conduct a vagueness analysis, and concluded that
the therein subject election offense under the Voter’s Registration Act of 1996, with
which the therein petitioners were
charged
, is couched in precise language.c.

The aforementioned cases rely he

avily on Justice Mendoza’s Separate Opinion in the
Estrada case: Allegations that a penal statute is vague and overbroad do not justify afacial review of its
validity. A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute andto one, which is overbroad
because of
possible chilling effect upon protected speech.
Thisrationale does
not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terroremeffect.
If facial challenge is allowed, the State may well be prevented from enacting lawsagainst socially
harmful conduct. Overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have specialapplication only to free speech
cases. They are inapt for testing the validity of penalstatutes.8.

Since a penal statute may only be assailed for being vague as applied to petitioners, a limited
vagueness analysis of the definition of “terrorism” in R 9372 is legally impossible absent an
actualor imminent chargeagainst them.

a.

The doctrine of vagueness and the doctrine of overbreadth do not operate on the sameplane.
i.

A statute or acts suffers from the defect of vagueness when:1.

It lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligencemust necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application. It isrepugnant to the Constitution in 2 ways:a.

Violates due process for failure to accord fair notice of conductto avoidb.

Leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out itsprovisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing
of the Governmentmuscle.ii.

The overbreadth doctrine decrees that a governmental purpose to control orprevent activities
constitutionally subject to state regulations may not beachieved by means, which sweep unnecessarily
broadly and thereby invade thearea of protected freedoms.b.

“facial” challenge is likewise different from an “as applied” challenge

.
i.

“As applied” challenge considers only extant facts affecting real litigants.
ii.

“Facial” challenge is an examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and
defects, not only on the basis of its actual operation to the parties, but also onthe assumption or
prediction that its very existence may cause others not beforethe court to refrain from constitutionally
protected speech or activities.1.

Under no case may ordinary penal statutes be subjected to a facial

challenge. If facial challenge to a penal statute is permitted, theprosecution of crimes may be hampered.
No prosecution would bepossible.9.

There is no merit in the claim that RA 9372 regulates speech so as to permit a facial analysis of
itsvalidity.
a.

Section 3 of RA 9372 provides the following elements of the crime of terrorism:i.

Offender commits an act punishable under RPC and the enumerated specialpenal laws;ii.
Commission of the predicate crime sows and creates a condition of widespreadand extraordinary fear
and panic among the populace;iii.

The offender is actuated by the desire to coerce the government to give in to anunlawful demand.b.

Petitioners contend that the element of “unlawful demand” in the definition of terrorism
must necessarily be transmitted through some form of expression protected by the freespeech clause.
The argument does not persuade. What RA 9372 seeks to penalize isconduct, not speech.c.

Petitioners’ notion on the transmission of message is entirely inaccurate, as it unduly

focuses on just one particle of an element of the crime. Almost every commission of acrime entails some
mincing of words on the part of offender.
Utterances not elementalbut inevitably
incidental
to the doing of the criminal conduct alter neither the intent of thelaw to punish socially harmful
conduct nor the essence of the whole act as conduct and notspeech.

Concurring opinion of Justice Abad:

- He concurs with the majority opinion, but he says he needs to emphasize that the grounds for
dismissalin this case are more procedural than substantive. Hence, when an actual controversy arises
and when itbecomes ripe for adjudication, the specific questions raised here may be raised again.

• Minuchier vs. Scalzo, Feb. 11, 2003

Facts

Violation of the “Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972,” was filed against Minucher following a “buy-bust
operation” conducted by Philippine police narcotic agents accompanied by Scalzo in the house of
Minucher, an Iranian national, where heroin was said to have been seized. Minucher was later acquitted
by the court.

Minucher later on filed for damages due to trumped-up charges of drug trafficking made by Arthur
Scalzo.

Scalzo on his counterclaims that he had acted in the discharge of his official duties as being merely an
agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration of the United States Department of Justice.

Scalzo subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that, being a special agent of
the United States Drug Enforcement Administration, he was entitled to diplomatic immunity. He
attached to his motion Diplomatic Note of the United States Embassy addressed to DOJ of the
Philippines and a Certification of Vice Consul Donna Woodward, certifying that the note is a true and
faithful copy of its original. Trial court denied the motion to dismiss.

ISSUE
Whether or not Arthur Scalzo is indeed entitled to diplomatic immunity.

RULLING

YES.

A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with immunity from suit as long as it can be
established that he is acting within the directives of the sending state.

The consent or imprimatur of the Philippine government to the activities of the United States Drug
Enforcement Agency, however, can be gleaned from the undisputed facts in the case.

The official exchanges of communication between agencies of the government of the two countries
Certifications from officials of both the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs and the United States
Embassy
Participation of members of the Philippine Narcotics Command in the “buy-bust operation” conducted
at the residence of Minucher at the behest of Scalzo
These may be inadequate to support the “diplomatic status” of the latter but they give enough
indication that the Philippine government has given its imprimatur, if not consent, to the activities
within Philippine territory of agent Scalzo of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency.

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The job description of Scalzo has tasked him to conduct surveillance on suspected drug suppliers and,
after having ascertained the target, to inform local law enforcers who would then be expected to make
the arrest.

In conducting surveillance activities on Minucher, later acting as the poseur-buyer during the buy-bust
operation, and then becoming a principal witness in the criminal case against Minucher,

Scalzo hardly can be said to have acted beyond the scope of his official function or duties.
Facts:

On 03 August 1988, Minucher filed Civil Case before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for damages on
account of what he claimed to have been trumped-up charges of drug trafficking made by Arthur Scalzo.
The Manila RTC detailed what it had found to be the facts and circumstances surrounding the case.

Then, on 14 June 1990, after almost two years since the institution of the civil case, Scalzo filed a motion
to dismiss the complaint on the ground that, being a special agent of the United States Drug
Enforcement Administration, he was entitled to diplomatic immunity. In an order of 25 June 1990, the
trial court denied the motion to dismiss.

On 27 July 1990, Scalzo filed a petition for certiorari with injunction with the SC asking that the Civil Case
complaint be ordered dismissed. The case was referred to the Court of Appeals which sustaining the
diplomatic immunity of Scalzo and ordering the dismissal of the complaint against him. Minucher filed a
petition for review with the SC appealing the judgment of the Court of Appeals which the SC reversed
the decision of the appellate court and remanded the case to the lower court for trial. RTC continued
with its hearings on the case Adjudging defendant liable to plaintiff in actual and compensatory damages
of P520,000.00; moral damages in the sum of P10 million; exemplary damages in the sum of
P100,000.00; attorney’s fees in the sum of P200,000.00 plus costs.The trial court gave credence to the
claim of Scalzo and the evidence presented by him that he was a diplomatic agent entitled to immunity
as such, it ruled that he, nevertheless, should be held accountable for the acts complained of committed
outside his official duties. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and
sustained the defense of Scalzo that he was sufficiently clothed with diplomatic immunity during his
term of duty and thereby immune from the criminal and civil jurisdiction of the “Receiving State”
pursuant to the terms of the Vienna Convention. Hence, this case.

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Issue:

Whether Arthur Scalzo is indeed entitled to diplomatic immunity.

Held:

Yes, Arthur Scalzo is indeed entitled to diplomatic immunity. Concededly, vesting a person with
diplomatic immunity is a prerogative of the executive branch of the government. The Court has
recognized that, in such matters, the hands of the courts are virtually tied. Amidst apprehensions of
indiscriminate and incautious grant of immunity, designed to gain exemption from the jurisdiction of
courts, it should behoove the Philippine government, specifically its Department of Foreign Affairs, to be
most circumspect, that should particularly be no less than compelling, in its post litem motam issuances.
It might be recalled that the privilege is not an immunity from the observance of the law of the
territorial sovereign or from ensuing legal liability; it is, rather, an immunity from the exercise of
territorial jurisdiction. But while the diplomatic immunity of Scalzo might thus remain contentious, it
was sufficiently established that, indeed, he worked for the United States Drug Enforcement Agency and
was tasked to conduct surveillance of suspected drug activities within the country on the dates pertinent
to this case. If it should be ascertained that Arthur Scalzo was acting well within his assigned functions
when he committed the acts alleged in the complaint, the present controversy could then be resolved
under the related doctrine of State Immunity from Suit.

The precept that a State cannot be sued in the courts of a foreign state is a long-standing rule of
customary international law then closely identified with the personal immunity of a foreign sovereign
from suit and, with the emergence of democratic states, made to attach not just to the person of the
head of state, or his representative, but also distinctly to the state itself in its sovereign capacity. If the
acts giving rise to a suit are those of a foreign government done by its foreign agent, although not
necessarily a diplomatic personage, but acting in his official capacity, the complaint could be barred by
the immunity of the foreign sovereign from suit without its consent. Suing a representative of a state is
believed to be, in effect, suing the state itself. The proscription is not accorded for the benefit of an
individual but for the State, in whose service he is, under the maxim – par in parem, non habet
imperium – that all states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another.

This immunity principle, however, has its limitations. “It is a different matter where the public official is
made to account in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law and injurious to the rights of the
plaintiff. Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of
government officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action against the officials or officers by
one whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit
against the State within the rule of immunity of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has been said
that an action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or the director of a State department on the
ground that, while claiming to act for the State, he violates or invades the personal and property rights
of the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority which he does not
have, is not a suit against the State within the constitutional provision that the State may not be sued
without its consent. The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as
an instrument for perpetrating an injustice.
FactsViolation of the “Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972,” was filed against Minucher following a “buy-bust
operation” conducted by Philippine police narcotic agents accompanied by Scalzo in the house of
Minucher, an Iranian national, where heroin was said to have been seized. Minucher was later acquitted
by the court.Minucher later on filed for damages due to trumped-up charges of drug trafficking made by
Arthur Scalzo. Scalzo on his counterclaims that he had acted in the dischargeof his official duties as being
merely an agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration of the United States Department of Justice.
Scalzo subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that, being a special agent of
the United States Drug Enforcement Administration, he was entitled to diplomatic immunity. He
attached to his motion Diplomatic Note of the United States Embassy addressed to DOJ of the
Philippines and a Certification of Vice Consul Donna Woodward, certifying that the note is a true and
faithful copy of its original. Trial court denied the motion to dismiss.ISSUEWhether or not Arthur Scalzo
is indeed entitled to diplomatic immunity.RULLINGYES.A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can
be cloaked with immunity from suit as long as it can be established that he is acting within the directives
of the sending state. The consent or imprimatur of the Philippine government to the activities of the
United States Drug Enforcement Agency, however, can be gleaned from the undisputed facts in the
case. The official exchanges of communication between agencies of the government of the two
countries Certifications from officials of both the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs and the
United States EmbassyParticipation of members of the Philippine Narcotics Command in the “buy-bust
operation” conducted at the residence of Minucher at the behest of ScalzoThese may be inadequate to
support the “diplomatic status” of the latter but they give enough indication that the Philippine
government has given its imprimatur, if not consent, to the activities within Philippine territory of agent
Scalzo of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency. The job description of Scalzo has tasked him to
conduct surveillance on suspected drug suppliers and, after having ascertained the target, to inform
local law enforcers who would then be expected to make the arrest.In conducting surveillance activities
on Minucher, later acting as the poseur-buyer during the buy-bust operation, and then becoming a
principal witness in the criminal case against Minucher, Scalzo hardly can be said to have acted beyond
the scope of his official function or duties.
FACTS: The testimony of the plaintiff disclosed that he is an Iranian national. He came to the Philippines
to study in the University of the Philippines in 1974. In 1976, under the regime of the Shah of Iran, he
was appointed Labor Attach for the Iranian Embassies in Tokyo, Japan and Manila, Philippines. When the
Shah of Iran was deposed by Ayatollah Khomeini, plaintiff became a refugee of the United Nations and
continued to stay in the Philippines. He headed the Iranian National Resistance Movement in the
Philippines. He came to know the defendant on May 13, 1986, when the latter was brought to his house
and introduced to him by a certain Jose Iigo, an informer of the Intelligence Unit of the military. During
his first meeting with the defendant on May 13, 1986, upon the introduction of Jose Iigo, the defendant
expressed his interest in buying caviar. As a matter of fact, he bought two kilos of caviar from plaintiff
and paid P10,000.00 for it. During their introduction in that meeting, the defendant gave the plaintiff his
calling card, which showed that he is working at the US Embassy in the Philippines, as a special agent of
the Drug Enforcement Administration, Department of Justice, of the United States, and gave his address
as US Embassy, Manila.

On May 26, 1986, defendant visited plaintiff again at the latter’s residence for 18 years at Kapitolyo,
Pasig. The defendant wanted to buy a pair of carpets which plaintiff valued at $27,900.00. After some
haggling, they agreed at $24,000.00. At about 3:00 in the afternoon of May 27, 1986, the defendant
came back again to plaintiff’s house and directly proceeded to the latter’s bedroom, where the latter
and his countryman, Abbas Torabian, were playing chess. The defendant told him that he would be
leaving the Philippines very soon and requested him to come out of the house for a while so that he can
introduce him to his cousin waiting in a cab. Without much ado, and without putting on his shirt as he
was only in his pajama pants, he followed the defendant where he saw a parked cab opposite the street.
To his complete surprise, an American jumped out of the cab with a drawn high-powered gun. He was in
the company of about 30 to 40 Filipino soldiers with 6 Americans, all armed. He was handcuffed and
after about 20 minutes in the street, he was brought inside the house by the defendant. He was made to
sit down while in handcuffs while the defendant was inside his bedroom. He asked for any warrant, but
the defendant told him to `shut up. He was nevertheless told that he would be able to call for his lawyer
who can defend him.

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The plaintiff took note of the fact that when the defendant invited him to come out to meet his cousin,
his safe was opened where he kept the $24,000.00 the defendant paid for the carpets and another
$8,000.00 which he also placed in the safe together with a bracelet worth $15,000.00 and a pair of
earrings worth $10,000.00. He also discovered missing upon his release his 8 pieces hand-made Persian
carpets, valued at $65,000.00, a painting he bought for P30,000.00 together with his TV and betamax
sets. He claimed that when he was handcuffed, the defendant took his keys from his wallet. There was,
therefore, nothing left in his house.

After the arrest made on plaintiff and Torabian, they were brought to Camp Crame handcuffed together,
where they were detained for three days without food and water.

Minucher was aquitted by the RTC for the charges against him. He then filed a civil case against Scalzo
but Scalzo invoked the doctrine of state immunity since he was acting in behalf of the united states in
apprehending persons suspected of transporting illegal drugs to the U.S.

ISSUE: WON scalzo is acting in behalf of U.S. and therefore immune from suit.

HELD: YES. According to the Court, a foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with
immunity from suit but only as long as it can be established that he is acting within the directives of the
sending state. The consent of the host state is an indispensable requirement of basic courtesy between
the two sovereigns. The official exchanges of communication between agencies of the government of
the two countries, certifications from officials of both the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs and
the United States Embassy, as well as the participation of members of the Philippine Narcotics
Command in the “buy-bust operation” conducted at the residence of Minucher at the behest of Scalzo,
may be inadequate to support the “diplomatic status” of the latter, but they give enough indication that
the Philippine government has given its imprimatur, if not consent, to the activities within Philippine
territory of agent Scalzo of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency. The job description of Scalzo
has tasked him to conduct surveillance on suspected drug suppliers and, after having ascertained the
target, to inform local law enforcers who would then be expected to make the arrest. In conducting
surveillance activities on Minucher, later acting as the poseur-buyer during the buy-bust operation, and
then becoming a principal witness in the criminal case against Minucher, Scalzo hardly can be said to
have acted beyond the scope of his official function or duties. All told, this Court is constrained to rule
that respondent Arthur Scalzo, an agent of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency allowed by the
Philippine government to conduct activities in the country to help contain the problem on the drug
traffic, is entitled to the defense of state immunity from suit.

• Liang vs. People, March 26, 2001

Lesson: Criminal acts not immune

Laws Applicable: Vienna Convention

FACTS:
· 2 criminal informations for for grave oral defamation were filed against Jeffrey Liang, a Chinese
national who was employed as an Economist by the Asian Development Bank (ADB), by Joyce V. Cabal, a
member of the clerical staff of ADB
· MTC: dismissed the complaint stating that Liang enjoyed immunity from legal processes
· RTC: Upon a petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by the People of the Philippines annulled
and set aside the order of MTC

· SC: Denied petition for review on the ground that the immunity granted to officers and staff of the
ADB is not absolute and is limited on the official capacity and immunity CANNOT cover the commission
of a crime such as slander or oral defamation in the name of official duty
· A motion of reconsideration is filed

ISSUE: W/N the crime of oral deflamation enjoys immunity

HELD: NO

· slander, in general, cannot be considered as an act performed in an official capacity

· issue of whether or not petitioner's utterances constituted oral defamation is still for the trial court
to determine

PUNO, J., concurring:

· the nature and degree of immunities vary depending on who the recipient is
· Under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic envoy is immune from criminal
jurisdiction of the receiving State for all acts, whether private or official, and hence he cannot be
arrested, prosecuted and punished for any offense he may commit, unless his diplomatic immunity is
waived. On the other hand, officials of international organizations enjoy "functional" immunities, that is,
only those necessary for the exercise of the functions of the organization and the fulfillment of its
purposes.

o officials and employees of the ADB are subject to the jurisdiction of the local courts for their private
acts, notwithstanding the absence of a waiver of immunity
o If the immunity does not exist, there is nothing to certify by the DFA
Facts:

Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Sometime in 1994, for
allegedly uttering defamatory words against fellow ADB worker Joyce Cabal, he was charged before the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Mandaluyong City with two... counts of grave oral defamation

The next day, the MeTC judge received an "office of protocol" from the Department of Foreign Affairs
(DFA) stating that petitioner is covered by immunity from legal process under Section 45 of the
Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine Government regarding the

Headquarters of the ADB (hereinafter Agreement) in the country. Based on the said protocol
communication that petitioner is immune from suit, the MeTC judge without notice to the prosecution
dismissed the two criminal cases.

Issues:

that he is covered by immunity under the Agreement

Ruling:

the mere invocation of the... immunity clause does not ipso facto result in the dropping of the charges.

under Section 45 of the Agreement which provides:

"Officers and staff of the Bank including for the purpose of this Article experts and consultants
performing missions for the Bank shall enjoy the following privileges and immunities:... a.)... immunity
from legal process with respect to acts performed by them in their official capacity except when the
Bank waives the immunity."... the immunity mentioned therein is not absolute, but subject to the
exception that the act was done in "official capacity." It is therefore necessary to determine if
petitioner's case falls within the ambit of Section 45(a).

slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity agreement because our laws do not
allow the commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of official duty.[3] The imputation of
theft is ultra vires and cannot be part... of official functions. It is well-settled principle of law that a public
official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act
done with malice or in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction.

under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic agent, assuming petitioner is such,
enjoys immunity from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state except in the case of an action relating
to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the... diplomatic agent in the receiving state
outside his official functions.[5] As already mentioned above, the commission of a crime is not part of
official duty.

Principles:

Fourth, under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic agent, assuming petitioner is
such, enjoys immunity from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state except in the case of an action
relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the... diplomatic agent in the receiving
state outside his official functions.[5] As already mentioned above, the commission of a crime is not part
of official duty
FACTS:
Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Sometime in 1994, for
allegedly uttering defamatory words against fellow ADB worker Joyce Cabal, he was charged before the
MeTC of Mandaluyong City with two counts of oral defamation. Petitioner was arrested by virtue of a
warrant issued by the MeTC. After fixing petitioner’s bail, the MeTC released him to the custody of the
Security Officer of ADB. The next day, the MeTC judge received an “office of protocol” from the DFA
stating that petitioner is covered by immunity from legal process under section 45 of the Agreement
between the ADB and the Philippine Government regarding the Headquarters of the ADB in the country.
Based on the said protocol communication that petitioner is immune from suit, the MeTC judge without
notice to the prosecution dismissed the criminal cases. The latter filed a motion for reconsideration
which was opposed by the DFA. When its motion was denied, the prosecution filed a petition for
certiorari and mandamus with the RTC of Pasig City which set aside the MeTC rulings and ordered the
latter court to enforce the warrant of arrest it earlier issued. After the motion for reconsideration was
denied, the petitioner elevated the case to the SC via a petition for review arguing that he is covered by
immunity under the Agreement and that no preliminary investigation was held before the criminal case.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the petitioner’s case is covered with immunity from legal process with regard to
Section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine Gov’t.
(2) Whether or not the conduct of preliminary investigation was imperative.

HELD:
(1) NO. The petitioner’s case is not covered by the immunity. Courts cannot blindly adhere to the
communication from the DFA that the petitioner is covered by any immunity. It has no binding effect in
courts. The court needs to protect the right to due process not only of the accused but also of the
prosecution. Secondly, the immunity under Section 45 of the Agreement is not absolute, but subject to
the exception that the acts must be done in “official capacity”. Hence, slandering a person could not
possibly be covered by the immunity agreement because our laws do not allow the commission of a
crime, such as defamation, in the name of official duty.
(2) NO. Preliminary Investigation is not a matter of right in cases cognizable by the MeTC such as this
case. Being purely a statutory right, preliminary investigation may be invoked only when specifically
granted by law. The rule on criminal procedure is clear that no preliminary investigation is required in
cases falling within the jurisdiction of the MeTC.

Hence, SC denied the petition.

• People vs. Lacson, April 1, 2003

FACTS:

Respondent and his co-accused were charged with multiple murder for the shooting and killing of eleven
persons who were claimed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang.
The said cases docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 were provisionally dismissed
with the express consent of the respondent as he himself moved for said provisional dismissal when he
filed his motion for judicial determination of probable cause and for examination of witnesses.

Respondent asserts that the new rule under Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure may be applied retroactively since there is no substantive right of the State that may be
impaired by its application to the criminal cases in question.

According to the respondent, penal laws, either procedural or substantive, may be retroactively applied
so long as they favor the accused. He asserts that the two-year period commenced to run on March 29,
1999 and lapsed two years thereafter was more than reasonable opportunity for the State to fairly indict
him.

ISSUE:

Whether or not procedural laws may be applied retroactively.

RULING:

The Court agrees with the respondent that procedural laws may be applied retroactively. As applied to
criminal law, procedural law provides or regulates the steps by which one who has committed a crime is
to be punished.

In Tan, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that:

Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that
extent. The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants rights may not preclude their
retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative
of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected. Nor is the retroactive application of
procedural statutes constitutionally objectionable. The reason is that as a general rule no vested right
may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws. It has been held that a person has no vested right in any
particular remedy, and a litigant cannot insist on the application to the trial of his case, whether civil or
criminal, of any other than the existing rules of procedure.

*****Sec. 8. Provisional dismissal. A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the express
consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party.

The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a fine of
any amount, or both, shall become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order without the case
having been revived. With respect to offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than six (6) years,
their provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order without the
case having been revived.
FACTS:

The respondent and his co-accused were charged with multiple murder for the shooting and killing of
eleven male persons, bandied as members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang.

The Court held therein that although Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
could be given retroactive effect, there is still a need to determine whether the requirements for its
application are attendant. It emphasized that the new rule fixes a time-bar to penalize the State for its
inexcusable delay in prosecuting cases already filed in court.

In support of their Motion for Reconsideration, the petitioners contend that (a) Section 8, Rule 117 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is not applicable to Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-
81689; and (b) the time-bar in said rule should not be applied retroactively. The petitioners aver that
Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is not applicable to Criminal Cases Nos. Q-
99-81679 to Q-99-81689 because the essential requirements for its application were not present when
Judge Agnir, Jr., issued his resolution of March 29, 1999.

The petitioners contend that even on the assumption that the respondent expressly consented to a
provisional dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 and all the heirs of the victims
were notified of the respondent's motion before the hearing thereon and were served with copies of
the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the eleven cases, the two-year bar in Section 8 of Rule 117
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should be applied prospectively and not retroactively against
the State. To apply the time limit retroactively to the criminal cases against the respondent and his co-
accused would violate the right of the People to due process, and unduly impair, reduce, and diminish
the State's substantive right to prosecute the accused for multiple murder.

For his part, the respondent asserts that the new rule under Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure may be applied retroactively since there is no substantive right of the State that
may be impaired by its application to the criminal cases in question since 'the State's witnesses were
ready, willing and able to provide their testimony but the prosecution failed to act on these cases until it
became politically expedient in April 2001 for them to do so. 'According to the respondent, penal laws,
either procedural or substantive, may be retroactively applied so long as they favor the accused. He
asserts that the two-year period commenced to run on March 29, 1999 and lapsed two years thereafter
was more than reasonable opportunity for the State to fairly indict him. In any event, the State is given
the right under the Court's assailed Resolution to justify the filing of the Information in Criminal Cases
Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 beyond the time-bar under the new rule.

Remedial legislation, or procedural rule, or doctrine of the Court designed to enhance and implement
the constitutional rights of parties in criminal proceedings may be applied retroactively or prospectively
depending upon several factors, such as the history of the new rule, its purpose and effect, and whether
the retrospective application will further its operation, the particular conduct sought to be remedied
and the effect thereon in the administration of justice and of criminal laws in particular.

ISSUES:
I.

Whether or not Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is applicable to Criminal
Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689.

II.

Whether or not the time-bar in said rule be applied prospectively or retroactively.

RULING:

I.

No. Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure reads: A case shall not be
provisionally dismissed except with the express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended
party. The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding 6 years or a fine
of any amount, or both, shall become permanent 1 year after issuance of the order without the case
having been revived. With respect to offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than (6) years, their
provisional dismissal shall become permanent 2 years after issuance of the order without the case
having been revived.

Having invoked said rule before the petitioners-panel of prosecutors and before the Court of Appeals,
the respondent is burdened to establish the essential requisites of the first paragraph thereof, namely:
(1) the prosecution with the express conformity of the accused or the accused moves for a provisional
dismissal of the case; or both the prosecution and the accused move for a provisional dismissal of the
case; (2) the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case; (3) the court
issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally; (4) the public prosecutor is
served with a copy of the order of provisional dismissal of the case. In this case, the respondent has
failed to prove that the first and second requisites of the first paragraph of the new rule were present
when Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689. Irrefragably, the
prosecution did not file any motion for the provisional dismissal of the said criminal cases. For his part,
the respondent merely filed a motion for judicial determination of probable cause and for examination
of prosecution witnesses alleging that under Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution and the decision of
this Court in Allado v. Diokno, among other cases, there was a need for the trial court to conduct a
personal determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest against respondent and
to have the prosecutions witnesses summoned before the court for its examination. The respondents'
admissions made in the course of the proceedings in the Court of Appeals are binding and conclusive on
him. The respondent is barred from repudiating his admissions absent evidence of palpable mistake in
making such admissions. To apply the new rule in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 would
be to add to or make exceptions from the new rule which are not expressly or impliedly included
therein. Therefore, the State is not barred by the time limit set forth in the second paragraph of Section
8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The State can thus revive or refile Criminal
Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 or file new informations for multiple murder against the
respondent.
II.

Time-bar should not be applied retroactively. Though procedural rules may be applied retroactively, it
should not be if to do so would work injustice or would involve intricate problems of due process.
Statutes should be construed in light of the purposes to be achieved and the evils to be remedied. This is
because to do so would be prejudicial to the State since, given that the Judge dismissed the case on
March 29,1999, and the New rule took effect on Dec 1,2000, it would only in effect give them 1 year and
three months to work instead of 2 years.

At that time, they had no knowledge of the said rule and therefore they should not be penalized for
that. "Indeed for justice to prevail, the scales must balance; justice is not to be dispensed for the
accused alone." The two-year period fixed in the new rule is for the benefit of both the State and the
accused. It should not be emasculated and reduced by an inordinate retroactive application of the time-
bar therein provided merely to benefit the accused. To do so would cause an injustice of hardship to the
state and adversely affect the administration of justice. To require the State to give a valid justification
as a condition sine qua non to the revival of a case provisionally dismissed with the express consent of
the accused before the effective date of the new rule is to assume that the State is obliged to comply
with the time-bar under the new rule before it took effect. This would be a rank denial of justice. The
State must be given a period of one year or two years as the case may be from December 1, 2000 to
revive the criminal case without requiring the State to make a valid justification for not reviving the case
before the effective date of the new rule. Although in criminal cases, the accused is entitled to justice
and fairness, so is the State.
FACTS: Before the court is the petitioner’s motion of reconsideration of the resolution dated May 23,
2002, for the determination of several factual issues relative to the application of Sec. 8 Rule 117 of
RRCP on the dismissal of the cases Q-99- 81679 and Q-99-81689 against the respondent. The
respondent was charged with the shooting and killing of eleven male persons. The court confirmed the
express consent of the respondent in the provisional dismissal of the aforementioned cases when he
filed for judicial determination. The court also ruled the need to determine whether the other facts for
its application are attendant.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the requisites for the applicability of Sec. 8, Rule 117 of 2000 Rules on Criminal
Procedure were complied with in the Kuratong Baleleng cases
a. Was express consent given by the respondent?
b. Was notice for the motion, the hearing and the subsequent dismissal given to the heirs of the victims?
Section 8, Rule 117 is not applicable to the case since the conditions for its applicability, namely: 1)
prosecution with the express consent of the accused or both of them move for provisional dismissal,
2) offended party notified,
3) court grants motion and dismisses cases provisionally,
4) public prosecutor served with copy of orders of provisional dismissal, which is the defendants burden
to prove, which in this case has not been done
a. The defendant never filed and denied unequivocally in his statements, through counsel at the Court of
Appeals, that he filed for dismissal nor did he agree to a provisional dismissal thereof.
b. No notice of motion for provisional dismissal, hearing and subsequent dismissal was given to the heirs
of the victims.
2. WON time-bar in Sec 8 Rule 117 should be applied prospectively or retroactively.

Time-bar should not be applied retroactively. Though procedural rules may be applied retroactively, it
should not be if to do so would work injustice or would involve intricate problems of due process.
Statutes should be construed in light of the purposes to be achieved and the evils to be remedied. This is
because to do so would be prejudicial to the State since, given that the Judge dismissed the case on
March 29,1999, and the New rule took effect on Dec 1,2000, it would only in effect give them 1 year and
three months to work instead of 2 years. At that time, they had no knowledge of the said rule and
therefore they should not be penalized for that. “Indeed for justice to prevail, the scales must balance;
justice is not to be dispensed for the accused alone.” The two-year period fixed in the new rule is for the
benefit of both the State and the accused. It should not be emasculated and reduced by an inordinate
retroactive application of the time-bar therein provided merely to benefit the accused. To do so would
cause an injustice of hardship to the state and adversely affect the administration of justice.

Held: Motion granted

Facts:

the respondent and his co-accused were charged with multiple murder for the shooting and killing of
eleven male person... bandied as members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang.

The Court also held therein that although Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
could be given retroactive effect, there is still a need to determine whether the requirements for its...
application are attendant.

It emphasized that the new rule fixes a time-bar to penalize the State for... its inexcusable delay in
prosecuting cases already filed in court

In support of their Motion for Reconsideration, the petitioners contend that (a) Section 8, Rule 117 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is not applicable to Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-
81689; and (b) the time-bar in said rule should not be applied... retroactively.

The petitioners contend that even on the assumption that the respondent expressly consented to a
provisional dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 and all the heirs of the victims
were notified of the respondent's motion before the hearing thereon and were... served with copies of
the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the eleven cases, the two-year bar in Section 8 of Rule 117
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should be applied prospectively and not retroactively against
the State. To apply the time limit... retroactively to the criminal cases against the respondent and his co-
accused would violate the right of the People to due process, and unduly impair, reduce, and diminish
the State's substantive right to prosecute the accused for multiple murder.

They submit that in case of conflict between the Revised Penal Code and the new rule, the former
should prevail. They also insist that the State had consistently relied on the prescriptive... periods under
Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code. It was not accorded a fair warning that it would forever be barred
beyond the two-year period by a retroactive application of the new rule.[

For his part, the respondent asserts that the new rule under Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure may be applied retroactively since there is no substantive right of the State that
may be impaired by its application to the criminal cases in question... since '[t]he State's witnesses were
ready, willing and able to provide their testimony but the prosecution failed to act on these cases until it
became politically expedient in April 2001 for them to do so.'[29] According to the respondent, penal
laws,... either procedural or substantive, may be retroactively applied so long as they favor the accused.
[30] He asserts that the two-year period commenced to run on March 29, 1999 and lapsed two years
thereafter was more than reasonable opportunity for the State... to fairly indict him.[31] In any event,
the State is given the right under the Court's assailed Resolution to justify the filing of the Information in
Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 beyond the time-bar under the new rule.

The Court agrees with the respondent that procedural laws may be applied retroactively. As applied to
criminal law, procedural law provides or regulates the steps by which one who has committed a crime is
to be punished.

further

It further ruled therein that a procedural law may not be applied retroactively if to do so would work
injustice or would involve intricate problems of due process or impair the independence of the Court.

Remedial legislation, or procedural rule, or doctrine of the Court designed to enhance and implement
the constitutional rights of parties in criminal proceedings may be applied retroactively or prospectively
depending upon several factors, such as the history of the new rule,... its purpose and effect, and
whether the retrospective application will further its operation, the particular conduct sought to be
remedied and the effect thereon in the administration of justice and of criminal laws in particular

Issues:

whether the 2-year period to revive it has already lapse... whether there is any... justification for the
filing of the cases beyond the 2-year period

Ruling:

In this case, the Court agrees with the petitioners that the time-bar of two years under the new rule
should not be applied retroactively against the State.

The Court agrees with the petitioners that to apply the time-bar retroactively so that the two-year
period commenced to run on March 31, 1999 when the public prosecutor received his copy of the
resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the criminal cases is inconsistent with the... intendment of the
new rule. Instead of giving the State two years to revive provisionally dismissed cases, the State had
considerably less than two years to do so.

If the Court applied the new time-bar retroactively, the State would have only one year and three
months or until March 31, 2001 within which to revive these criminal cases.

The two-year period fixed in the new rule is for the benefit of both the State and the accused. It should
not be emasculated and reduced by an inordinate retroactive application of the time-bar therein
provided merely to benefit the accused. For to do so would cause an

"injustice of hardship" to the State and adversely affect the administration of justice in general and of
criminal laws in particular.
the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED.

Principles:

Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure reads:

Sec. 8. Provisional dismissal. A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the express consent
of the accused and with notice to the offended party.

In a per curiam... decision in Stefano v. Woods,[49] the United States Supreme Court catalogued the
factors in determining whether a new rule or doctrine enunciated by the High Court should be given
retrospective or prospective effect:

"(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement
authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive
application of the new standards."

• Go vs. Dimagiba, June 21, 2005

Facts:

Respondent Fernando L. Dimagiba issued to Petitioner Susan Go thirteen (13) checks which, when
presented to the drawee bank for encashment or payment on the due dates, were dishonored for the
reason "account closed.

Dimagiba was subsequently prosecuted for 13 counts of violation of BP 22

On February 27, 2001, Dimagiba filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the MTCC Order. He prayed for
the recall of the Order of Arrest and the modification of the final Decision, arguing that the penalty of
fine only, instead of imprisonment also, should have been imposed on... him.

The RTC held that this rule should be retroactively applied in favor of Dimagiba.[23] It further noted that
(1) he was a first-time... offender and an employer of at least 200 workers who would be displaced as a
result of his imprisonment; and (2) the civil liability had already been satisfied through the levy of his
properties.[24]... questions of law

Issues:

whether the Petition for habeas corpus was validly granted

Ruling:

The issue of retroactivity of SC-AC No. 12-2000 was settled in De Joya v. Jail Warden

In the present case, the Petition for a writ of habeas corpus was anchored on the ruling in Vaca and on
SC-AC No. 12-2000, which allegedly prescribed the imposition of a fine, not imprisonment, for
convictions under BP 22.

Respondent sought the retroactive... effect of those rulings, thereby effectively challenging the penalty
imposed on him for being excessive.

The following alternative penalties are imposable under BP 22: (1) imprisonment of not less than 30
days, but not more than one year; (2) a fine of not less or more than double the amount of the check, a
fine that shall in no case exceed P200,000; or (3) both such fine and... imprisonment, at the discretion of
the court

When the circumstances of the case clearly indicate good faith or a clear mistake of fact... without taint
of negligence, the imposition of a fine alone may be considered as the preferred penalty.

Should the... judge deem that imprisonment is appropriate, such penalty may be imposed

SC-AC No. 12-2000 did not delete the alternative penalty of imprisonment. The competence to amend
the law belongs to the legislature, not to this Court.

Petitioners argue that respondent is not entitled to the benevolent policy enunciated in SC-AC No. 12-
2000, because he is not a "first time offender... t is the trial court's discretion to impose any penalty
within the confines of the law. SC-AC No. 13-2001 explains thus:... good faith or a clear mistake of fact...
without taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine alone should be considered as the more appropriate
penalty. Needless to say, the determination of whether the circumstances warrant the imposition of a
fine alone rests solely upon the Judge.

The Judges concerned, may in the exercise of sound discretion, and taking into consideration the
peculiar circumstances of each case, determine whether the imposition of a fine alone would best serve
the interests of justice, or whether forbearing to impose imprisonment... would depreciate the
seriousness of the offense, work violence on the social order, or otherwise be contrary to the
imperatives of justice

The Court notes that the Petition for a writ of habeas corpus relied mainly on the alleged retroactivity of
SC-AC No. 12-2000, which supposedly favored BP 22 offenders

The rule on retroactivity states that criminal laws may be applied retroactively if favorable to the
accused.

SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 is not a penal law; hence, Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code is not
applicable.

The circular applies only to those cases pending as of the date of its effectivity and not to cases already
terminated by final judgment.

SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 merely lays down a rule of preference in the application of the penalties
for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. It does not amend B.P. Blg. 22, nor defeat the legislative intent behind... the
law. SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 merely urges the courts to take into account not only the purpose
of the law but also the circumstances of the accused -- whether he acted in good faith or on a clear
mistake of fact without taint of negligence -- and such other... circumstance which the trial court or the
appellate court believes relevant to the penalty to be imposed.

Because the Circular merely lays down a rule of preference, it serves only as a guideline for the trial
courts. Thus, it is addressed to the judges, who are directed to consider the factual circumstances of
each case prior to imposing the appropriate penalty.

In... other words, the Administrative Circular does not confer any new right in favor of the accused,
much less those convicted by final judgment.

Indeed, SC-AC No. 12-2000 necessarily requires a review of all factual circumstances of each case. Such
a review can no longer be done if the judgment has become final and executory.

Hence, RTC-Branch 5 did not have the jurisdiction to modify the lawful judgment in the guise of granting
a writ of habeas corpus.

Respondent seeks the retroactive application of SC-AC No. 12-2000 in his favor on the basis alone of the
alleged settlement of his civil liability.[

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Orders NULLIFIED.

Respondent's Petition for habeas corpus is hereby DENIED.

Principles:

writ of habeas corpus... required the imposition of a fine only... if the accused was not a recidivist or a
habitual delinquent.

The writ of habeas corpus applies to all cases of illegal confinement or detention in which individuals are
deprived of liberty.

The writ may not be availed of when the person in custody is under a judicial process or by virtue of a
valid judgment

However, as a post-conviction remedy, it may be allowed when, as a consequence of a judicial

proceeding, any of the following... exceptional circumstances is attendant: (1) there has been a
deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person; (2) the court had no
jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (3) the imposed penalty has been excessive, thus voiding the...
sentence as to such excess... it is merely... a rule of preference as to which penalty should be imposed
under the peculiar circumstances of a case.

The law punishes the act not as an offense against property but an offense against public order."
FACTS
Dimagiba issued Go thirteen checks that were subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for the
reason “Account Closed”.

Go lodged a complaint against Dimagiba for violating B.P. 22 in the MTCC of Baguio City (Branch 4)
which convicted the respondent on July 16, 1999 for 13 counts of violation of the law a quo. Dimagiba
was also ordered to serve 2-month imprisonment for each count and a fine of 1,295,000 pesos.

Dimagiba appealed in Baguio City RTC Branch 4 on May 23, 2000, but the latter denied the appeal.
Having no further appeal in CA, Branch 4 issued a Certificate of Finality of the Decision on February 1,
2001.

The MTCC issued an Order directing the arrest of Dimagiba for the service of his sentence and a Writ of
Execution for the enforcement of his civil liability. Dimagiba filed a Motion for Reconsideration on
February 27, 2001, praying to recall the Order of Arrest and a Modification of the Final Decision, arguing
that only the penalty of fine shall be imposed on him. The MTCC denied the motion. Dimagiba was
arrested on September 28, 2001.

Dimagiba filed a Petition of Habeas Corpus in Baguio City RTC Branch 5. The court ordered the
immediate release of the respondent and ordered Dimagiba to pay 100,000 pesos in lieu of his
imprisonment. The court justified this modification by invoking the SC ruling on Vaca v. Court of Appeals
and Supreme Court Administrative Circular (SC-AC) No. 12-2000, which allegedly required the imposition
of only a fine instead of imprisonment for BP 22 violations, provided that the accused was not a
recidivist or a habitual delinquent.

The RTC held that this rule should be retroactively applied in favor of Dimagiba. It further noted that (1)
he was a first-time offender; and (2) the civil liability had already been satisfied through the levy of his
properties.

Petitioner Susan Go elevated the case to the Supreme Court assailing the order a quo.

ISSUES
Whether or not habeas corpus is a proper remedy since the case has conclusively been decided.
Whether or not the SC-AC No. 12-2000 deleted the imposition of the penalty of imprisonment if a fine
has already been imposed.
Whether or not the preferential imposition of a fine in lieu of imprisonment as allegedly enunciated in
SA-AC No. 12-2000 shall be applied in the case at bar as the respondent is not a “first-time offender”.
RULING
On the first question of law.

No, the writ of habeas corpus may not be availed of when the person in custody is under a judicial
process or by virtue of a valid judgment. The writ of habeas corpus applies to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention in which individuals are deprived of liberty. It was devised as a speedy and
effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint; or, more specifically, to obtain immediate
relief for those who may have been illegally confined or imprisoned without sufficient cause and thus
deliver them from unlawful custody.

However, as a post-conviction remedy, it may be allowed when, as a consequence of a judicial

proceeding, any of the following exceptional circumstances is attendant: (1) there has been a
deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person; (2) the court had no
jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (3) the imposed penalty has been excessive, thus voiding the
sentence as to such excess. The remedy should have been an appeal of the MTCC Order denying his
Motions, in which he should have prayed that the execution of the judgment be stayed.
On the second question of law.

No, SC-AC No. 12-2000 did not delete the alternative penalty of imprisonment. The competence to
amend the law belongs to the legislature, not to the Court. The circular in question, as clarified by SC-AC
No. 13-2001, merely established a rule of preference in imposing the above penalties. When the
circumstances of the case clearly indicate good faith or a clear mistake of fact without taint of
negligence, the imposition of a fine alone may be considered as the preferred penalty.

On the third question of law.

Not necessarily. Being not a first-time offender is not a sole factor in determining whether he deserves
the preferred penalty of fine alone. It is in the trial court’s discretion to impose any penalty within the
confines of the law (SC-AC No. 13-2001).
FACTS:
Respondent Fernando L. Dimagiba issued to Petitioner Susan Go thirteen (13) checks which, when
presented to the drawee bank for encashment or payment on the due dates, were dishonored for the
reason "account closed." Dimagiba was subsequently prosecuted for 13 counts of violation of BP 22
under separate Complaints filed with the (MTCC) in Baguio City.

After a joint trial, the MTCC (Branch 4) rendered a Decision convicting the accused in the 13 cases and
imposes upon the accused the penalty of 3 months imprisonment for each count (13 counts) and to
indemnify the offended party the amount of One Million Two Hundred Ninety Five Thousand Pesos
(P1,295,000.00) with legal interest per annum.

Dimagiba made an appeal but the RTC denied the appeal and sustained his conviction. There being no
further appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), the RTC issued a Certificate of Finality of the Decision.

Thus, MTCC issued an Order directing the arrest of Dimagiba for the service of his sentence as a result of
his conviction. The trial court also issued a Writ of Execution to enforce his civil liability.

Dimagiba filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the MTCC Order. He prayed for the recall of the Order of
Arrest and the modification of the final Decision, arguing that the penalty of fine only, instead of
imprisonment also, should have been imposed on him.

MTCC denied the Motion for Reconsideration and directed the issuance of a Warrant of Arrest against
Dimagiba, he was arrested and imprisoned for the service of his sentence.

However he filed with the RTC of Baguio City a Petition17 for a writ of habeas corpus. The case was
raffled to Branch 5, which scheduled the hearing.

RTC issued an Order directing the immediate release of Dimagiba from confinement and requiring him
to pay a fine of P100,000 in lieu of imprisonment.
In justifying its modification of the MTCC Decision, the RTC invoked Vaca v. CA and Supreme Court
Administrative Circular (SC-AC) No. 12-2000,22 which allegedly required the imposition of a fine only
instead of imprisonment also for BP 22 violations, if the accused was not a recidivist or a habitual
delinquent. The RTC held that this rule should be retroactively applied in favor of Dimagiba.
Petitioner Go filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the RTC Orders but was denied.

Hence, this Petition filed directly with this Court on pure questions of law.

ISSUE:
(1) Whether the petition for writ of habeas was validly granted.
(2) Whether SC-AC No. 12-2000 can be given retroactive effect on this case.

RULING:
(1) NO.
The writ may not be availed of when the person in custody is under a judicial process or by virtue of a
valid judgment. However, as a post-conviction remedy, it may be allowed when, as a consequence of a
judicial proceeding, any of the following exceptional circumstances is attendant: (1) there has been a
deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person; (2) the court had no
jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (3) the imposed penalty has been excessive, thus voiding the
sentence as to such excess.

While it js true that the petition was anchored with no. 3 exception, it appears that respondent has
previously sought the modification of his sentence in a Motion for Reconsideration of the MTCC's
Execution Order and in a Motion for the Partial Quashal of the Writ of Execution.36 Both were denied by
the MTCC on the ground that it had no power or authority to amend a judgment issued by the RTC.

The court ruled that his Petition for a writ of habeas corpus was clearly an attempt to reopen a case that
had already become final and executory. Such an action deplorably amounted to forum shopping.
Respondent should have resorted to the proper, available remedy instead of instituting a different
action in another forum.

(2) NO.
The following alternative penalties are imposable under BP 22: (1) imprisonment of not less than 30
days, but not more than one year; (2) a fine of not less or more than double the amount of the check, a
fine that shall in no case exceed P200,000; or (3) both such fine and imprisonment, at the discretion of
the court.

SC-AC No. 12-2000, as clarified by SC-AC No. 13-2001, established a rule of preference in imposing the
above penalties. When the circumstances of the case clearly indicate good faith or a clear mistake of
fact without taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine alone may be considered as the preferred
penalty. The determination of the circumstances that warrant the imposition of a fine rests upon the
trial judge only.

In the present case, the MTCC of Baguio City had full knowledge of all relevant circumstances from
which respondent's conviction and sentence were based. The penalty imposed was well within the
confines of the law. Upon appeal, the conviction was sustained by RTC-Branch 4 of Baguio City.
Eventually, the Decision attained finality. Hence, RTC-Branch 5 did not have the jurisdiction to modify
the lawful judgment in the guise of granting a writ of habeas corpus.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Orders NULLIFIED. Respondent's Petition for
habeas corpus is hereby DENIED.
Topic: PRINCIPLE OF RETROACTIVITYThe rule on retroactivity states that criminal laws may be
applied retroactively iffavorable to the accused. This principle, embodied in the Revised Penal Code,
hasbeen expanded in certain instances to cover special laws. FACTSFernando L. Dimagiba issued to
Susan Go 13 checks. Go presented the checks to thedrawee bank for encashment but were dishonored
due to the reason “account closed”.Dimagiba was prosecuted for the violation of BP 22 under separate
complaints filed withthe Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) in Baguio City. After a joint trial, the
MTCC(Branch 4) rendered a decision convicting the accused in the 13 cases. Dimagiba filed for a Motion
for Reconsideration of the MTCC Order. He prayed for therecall of the order of Arrest and
Modification of the Final Decision arguing that thepenalty of fine only, instead of imprisonment also,
should have been imposed on him.MTCC denied the motion for reconsideration. On October 2001, he
filed with the RTC of Baguio City a Petition for a writ of habeascorpus. The RTC issued an order
directing the immediate release of Dimagiba fromconfinement and requiring him to pay a fine of
100,000 in lieu of imprisonment. The RTC justified its decision invoking the Supreme Court
Administrative Circular No.12-2000, which allegedly required the imposition of a fine only instead of
imprisonmentalso for BP 22 violation if the accused was not a recidivist or a habitual delinquent. TheRTC
held that this rule should be retroactively applied in favor of Dimagiba. ISSUE: Whether or not the
principle of retroactivity be applied in this case. RULING:No, principle of retroactivity shall not be applied
in this case. SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 is not a penal law; hence, Article 22 of
theRevised Penal Code is not applicable
The circular applies only to those cases pending as of the date of its effectivity and notto cases already
terminated by final judgment.SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 merely lays down a rule of
preference in theapplication of the penalties for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. It does not amend B.P. Blg.
22,nor defeat the legislative intent behind the law.SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 merely urges the
courts to take into account not onlythe purpose of the law but also the circumstances of the accused
whether he acted ingood faith or on a clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence and such
othercircumstance which the trial court or the appellate court believes relevant to the penaltyto be
imposed.Because the Circular merely lays down a rule of preference, it serves only as
aguideline for the trial courts. Thus, it is addressed to the judges, who are directed toconsider the
factual circumstances of each case prior to imposing the appropriatepenalty.In other words,
the Administrative Circular does not confer any new right in favor of theaccused, much less those
convicted by final judgment.Indeed, SC-AC No. 12-2000 necessarily requires a review of all factual
circumstancesof each case. Such a review can no longer be done if the judgment has become finaland
executory.Hence, RTC-Branch 5 did not have the jurisdiction to modify the lawful judgment in theguise
of granting a writ of habeas corpus.WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Orders
NULLIFIED.Respondent's Petition for habeas corpus is hereby DENIED

• Magno vs. CA, June 26, 1992

Oriel Magno, petitioner, vs. Honorable Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines, respondents.

June 26, 1992

Paras, J:

Facts:
Oriel Magno, lacking fund in acquiring complete set of equipment to make his car repair shop
operational, approached Corazon Teng, Vice President of Mancor Industries.
VP Teng referred Magno to LS Finance and Management Corporation, advising its Vice President, Joey
Gomez, that Mancor was willing to supply the pieces of equipment needed if LS Finance could
accommodate Magno and and provide him credit facilities.
The arrangement went on requiring Magno to pay 30% of the total amount of the equipment as
warranty deposit but Magno couldn't afford to pay so he requested VP Gomez to look for third party
who could lend him that amount.
Without Magno's knowledge, Corazon was the one who provided that amount.
As payment to the equipment, Magno issued six checks, two of them were cleared and the rest had no
sufficient fund.
Because of the unsuccessful venture, Magno failed to pay LS Finance which then pulled out the
equipment.
Magno was charged of violation of BP Blg. 2 (The Bouncing Checks Law) and found guilty.
Issue:
Whether or not Magno should be punished for the issuance of the checks in question.
Held:
No
Ratio:
To charge Magno for the refund of a warranty deposit which he did not withdraw as it was not his own
account, it having remained with LS Finance, is to even make him pay an unjust debt since he did not
receive the amount in question. All the while, said amount was in the safekeeping of the financing
company which is managed by the officials and employees of LS Finance.
Magno v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 96132, June 26, 1992Under the utilitarian theory, the "protective
theory" in criminal law, "affirms that theprimary function of punishment is the protective (sic) of society
against actual andpotential wrongdoers." It is not clear whether petitioner could be considered as
havingactually committed the wrong sought to be punished in the offense charged, but on theother
hand, it can be safely said that the actuations of Mrs. Carolina Teng amount tothat of potential
wrongdoers whose operations should also be clipped at some point intime in order that the
unwary public will not be failing prey to such a vicioustransaction (Aquino, The Revised Penal
Code, 1987 Edition, Vol. I, P. 11)Corollary to the above view, is the application of the theory that
"criminal law isfounded upon that moral disapprobation . . . of actions which are immoral, i.e.,
whichare detrimental (or dangerous) to those conditions upon which depend the existenceand progress
of human society. This disappropriation is inevitable to the extent thatmorality is generally founded
and built upon a certain concurrence in the moralopinions of all. . . . That which we call
punishment is only an external means ofemphasizing moral disapprobation the method of punishment
is in reality the amountof punishment," (Ibid.,P. 11, citing People v. Roldan Zaballero, CA 54 O.G. 6904,
Note also Justice Pablo'sview in People v. Piosca and Peremne, 86 Phil. 31).Thus, it behooves upon a
court of law that in applying the punishment imposed uponthe accused, the objective of retribution
of a wronged society, should be directedagainst the "actual and potential wrongdoers." In the
instant case, there is no doubt thatpetitioner's four (4) checks were used to collateralize an
accommodation, and not tocover the receipt of an actual "account or credit for value" as this was
absent, andtherefore petitioner should not be punished for mere issuance of the checks in
question.Following the aforecited theory, in petitioner's stead the "potential wrongdoer",
whoseoperation could be a menace to society, should not be glorified by convicting
thepetitioner.
FACTS: Petitioner was in the process of putting up a car repair shop sometime in April 1983, butdid not
have complete equipment that could make his venture workable. Thus,
petitioner,representing Ultra Sources International Corporation, approached Corazon Teng,
(privatecomplainant) Vice President of Mancor Industries (hereinafter referred to as Mancor) for
hisneeded car repair service equipment of which Mancor was a distributor. Teng referred Magno toLS
Finance and Management Corporation (LB Finance for brevity) advising its Vice-President,Joey Gomez,
that Mancor was willing and able to supply the pieces of equipment needed if LSFinance could
accommodate petitioner and provide him credit facilities. Agreement between the petitioner and
respondentPetitioner has to put up a warranty deposit equivalent to thirty per centum (30%) of thetotal
value of the pieces of equipment to be purchased, amounting to P29,790.00. Since petitionercould not
come up with such amount, he requested Joey Gomez on a personal level to look for athird party who
could lend him the equivalent amount of the warranty depositFurthermore, petitioner and LS Finance
entered into a leasing agreement whereby LSFinance would lease the garage equipment and petitioner
would pay the corresponding rent withthe option to buy the same.Defect in the
agreementUnbeknownst to Magno, Teng was the third party who advanced the deposit in question,on
the condition he same would be paid as a short term loan at 3% interest. Teng also specificallyrequested
Gomez not to divulge the source of the "warranty deposit".Magno’s mode of paymentAfter the garage
equipment was delivered as stated earlier, petitioner issued a postdatedcheck and gave it to Joey
Gomez who, unknown to the petitioner, delivered the same to CorazonTeng. When the check matured,
Petitioner requested through Joey Gomez not to deposit thecheck as he (Magno) was no longer banking
with Pacific Bank. To replace the first check issued,petitioner issued another set of six (6) postdated
checks. 2 of the checks were cleared while theother four became the subject of this petition.
Subsequently, petitioner could not pay LS Financethe monthly rentals, thus it pulled out the garage
equipment
Antecedent events after discovery of Teng as the third-personPetitioner with his wife went to see
Corazon Teng and promised to pay the latter but thepayment never came and when the four (4) checks
were deposited they were returned for thereason "account closed."RTC Ruling: GUILTY. Magno violated
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. 4 checks that were bouncedwere a clear indication of violation.CA Ruling:
AFFIRMED the RTC ruling in toto. Assumed that the obligation to pay Teng was notextinguished since the
petitioner had no proof that the warranty deposit was not liquidated by theL.S. Finance.ISSUE/S:HELD:
CA and RTC Decision REVERSED, in favor of PETITIONER. Warranty deposit of thirty per centum
(30%) of the total value of the pieces of equipment to be purchased is NOT A PAYMENT to acquire the
equipment, but as a rental.Warranty deposit in this context was not used by the petitioner to purchase.
It would havebeen different if petitioner opted to purchase the pieces of equipment on or about the
terminationof the lease-purchase agreement in which case he had to pay the additional amount
of thewarranty deposit which should have formed part of the purchase price. As the transaction did
notripen into a purchase, but remained a lease with rentals being paid for the loaned equipment,which
were pulled out by the Lessor (Mancor) when the petitioner failed to continue payingpossibly due to
economic constraints or business failure, then it is lawful and just that thewarranty deposit should not
be charged against the petitioner. Additionally, the amount inquestion was not returned to Magno as it
was still in the possession of the financing company(LS Finance), charging him the same would be a kin
to paying an unjust debt. Teng’s schemeTeng as the supplier of the equipment in the name of her
corporation, Mancor, would beable to "sell or lease" its goods as in this case, and at the same time,
privately financing thosewho desperately need petty accommodations as this one. This modus operandi
has in so manyinstances victimized unsuspecting businessmen, who likewise need protection from the
law, byavailing of the deceptively called "warranty deposit" not realizing that they also fall prey toleasing
equipment under the guise of a lease-purchase agreement when it is a scheme designed toskim off
business clients
• US vs. Bull, 15 Phil. 7
Lessons Applicable: Applicability of Provision

Laws Applicable: Art. 2 RPC

FACTS:
• accused H. N. Bull, master of vessel, willfully, unlawfully, and wrongly carry, transport, and bring into
the port and city of Manila, aboard said vessel, from the port of Ampieng, Formosa, 677 head of cattle
and carabaos, without providing suitable means for securing the animals while in transit, so as to avoid
cruelty and unnecessary suffering.
• animals to be tied by means of rings passed through their noses, and allow and permit others to be
transported loose in the hold and on the deck of said vessel without being tied or secured in stalls, and
all without bedding
• neglect and failure of the accused to provide suitable means for securing said animals while so in
transit, the noses of some of said animals were cruelly torn, and many of said animals were tossed about
upon the decks and hold of said vessel, and cruelly wounded, bruised, and killed.

• All contrary to the provisions of Acts No. 55 and No. 275 of the Philippine Commission.
Section 1 of Act No. 55, which went into effect January 1, 1901, provides that —
The owners or masters of steam, sailing, or other vessels, carrying or transporting cattle,
sheep, swine, or other animals, from one port in the Philippine Islands to another, or from
any foreign port to any port within the Philippine Islands, shall carry with them, upon the
vessels carrying such animals, sufficient forage and fresh water to provide for the suitable
sustenance of such animals during the ordinary period occupied by the vessel in passage from

the port of shipment to the port of debarkation, and shall cause such animals to be provided
with adequate forage and fresh water at least once in every twenty-four hours from the time
that the animals are embarked to the time of their final debarkation.
• Bull(Norweigan): Norwegian vessel, and it is conceded that it was not registered or licensed in the
Philippine Islands under the laws thereof so it is not within the jurisdiction of the Philippines

ISSUE: W/N the court had jurisdiction over an offense of this character when the neglect and omission
which constitutes the offense continued during the time the ship was within the territorial waters of the
United States
HELD: The defendant was found guilty
YES.
• No court of the Philippine Islands had jurisdiction over an offenses or crime committed on the high
seas or within the territorial waters of any other country, but when she came within 3 miles of a line
drawn from the headlines which embrace the entrance to Manila Bay, she was within territorial waters,
and a new set of principles became applicable.
Note: when it comes in our territory it has the discretion to prosecute or not.
If it choose to prosecute must be justified.
• 2 well-defined theories as to extent of the immunities ordinarily granted to them
1. French theory and practice-matters happening on board a merchant ship which do not concern the
tranquillity of the port or persons foreign to the crew, are justiciable only by the court of the country to
which the vessel belongs. The French courts therefore claim exclusive jurisdiction over crimes
committed on board French merchant vessels in foreign ports by one member of the crew against
another.

2. The United States has adhered consistently to the view that when a merchant vessel enters a
foreign port it is subject to the jurisdiction of the local authorities, unless the local sovereignty has by act
of acquiescence or through treaty arrangements consented to waive a portion of such jurisdiction.
• The disembarkation of the animals is not necessary in order to constitute the completed offense, and
a reasonable construction of the language of the statute confers jurisdiction upon the court sitting at the
port into which the animals are bought. They are then within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, and
the mere fact of their disembarkation is immaterial so far as jurisdiction is concerned.
• The appellant contends that the language of the Spanish text of the information does not charge him
with failure to provide "sufficient" and "adequate" means. The words used are "medios suficientes" and
"medios adecuados." In view of the fact that the original complaint was prepared in English, and that the
word "suitable" is translatable by the words "adecuado," "suficiente," and "conveniente," according to
the context and circumstances, we determine this point against the appellant, particularly in view of the
fact that the objection was not made in the court below, and that the evidence clearly shows a failure to
provide "suitable means for the protection of the animals."
Lessons Applicable: Applicability of Provision

Laws Applicable: Art. 2 RPC

FACTS:
• accused H. N. Bull, master of vessel, willfully, unlawfully, and wrongly carry, transport, and bring into
the port and city of Manila, aboard said vessel, from the port of Ampieng, Formosa, 677 head of cattle
and carabaos, without providing suitable means for securing the animals while in transit, so as to avoid
cruelty and unnecessary suffering.
• animals to be tied by means of rings passed through their noses, and allow and permit others to be
transported loose in the hold and on the deck of said vessel without being tied or secured in stalls, and
all without bedding
• neglect and failure of the accused to provide suitable means for securing said animals while so in
transit, the noses of some of said animals were cruelly torn, and many of said animals were tossed about
upon the decks and hold of said vessel, and cruelly wounded, bruised, and killed.

• All contrary to the provisions of Acts No. 55 and No. 275 of the Philippine Commission.
Section 1 of Act No. 55, which went into effect January 1, 1901, provides that —
The owners or masters of steam, sailing, or other vessels, carrying or transporting cattle,
sheep, swine, or other animals, from one port in the Philippine Islands to another, or from
any foreign port to any port within the Philippine Islands, shall carry with them, upon the
vessels carrying such animals, sufficient forage and fresh water to provide for the suitable
sustenance of such animals during the ordinary period occupied by the vessel in passage from
the port of shipment to the port of debarkation, and shall cause such animals to be provided
with adequate forage and fresh water at least once in every twenty-four hours from the time
that the animals are embarked to the time of their final debarkation.
• Bull(Norweigan): Norwegian vessel, and it is conceded that it was not registered or licensed in the
Philippine Islands under the laws thereof so it is not within the jurisdiction of the Philippines

ISSUE: W/N the court had jurisdiction over an offense of this character when the neglect and omission
which constitutes the offense continued during the time the ship was within the territorial waters of the
United States
HELD: The defendant was found guilty
YES.
• No court of the Philippine Islands had jurisdiction over an offenses or crime committed on the high
seas or within the territorial waters of any other country, but when she came within 3 miles of a line
drawn from the headlines which embrace the entrance to Manila Bay, she was within territorial waters,
and a new set of principles became applicable.
Note: when it comes in our territory it has the discretion to prosecute or not.
If it choose to prosecute must be justified.
• 2 well-defined theories as to extent of the immunities ordinarily granted to them
1. French theory and practice-matters happening on board a merchant ship which do not concern the
tranquillity of the port or persons foreign to the crew, are justiciable only by the court of the country to
which the vessel belongs. The French courts therefore claim exclusive jurisdiction over crimes
committed on board French merchant vessels in foreign ports by one member of the crew against
another.

2. The United States has adhered consistently to the view that when a merchant vessel enters a
foreign port it is subject to the jurisdiction of the local authorities, unless the local sovereignty has by act
of acquiescence or through treaty arrangements consented to waive a portion of such jurisdiction.
• The disembarkation of the animals is not necessary in order to constitute the completed offense, and
a reasonable construction of the language of the statute confers jurisdiction upon the court sitting at the
port into which the animals are bought. They are then within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, and
the mere fact of their disembarkation is immaterial so far as jurisdiction is concerned.
• The appellant contends that the language of the Spanish text of the information does not charge him
with failure to provide "sufficient" and "adequate" means. The words used are "medios suficientes" and
"medios adecuados." In view of the fact that the original complaint was prepared in English, and that the
word "suitable" is translatable by the words "adecuado," "suficiente," and "conveniente," according to
the context and circumstances, we determine this point against the appellant, particularly in view of the
fact that the objection was not made in the court below, and that the evidence clearly shows a failure to
provide "suitable means for the protection of the animals."
Case Title: US vs Bull, 15 Phil 7
Subject Matter: Applicability of Art. 2 of the Revised Penal Code
Facts:

On December 2, 1908, a steamship vessel engaged in the transport of animals named Stanford
commanded by H.N. Bull docked in the port of Manila, Philippines. It was found that said vessel from
Ampieng, Formosa carried 674 heads of cattle without providing appropriate shelter and proper suitable
means for securing the animals which resulted for most of the animals to get hurt and others to have
died while in transit.

This cruelty to animals is said to be contrary to Acts No. 55 and No. 275 of the Philippine Constitution. It
is however contended that cases cannot be filed because neither was it said that the court sitting where
the animals were disembarked would take jurisdiction, nor did it say about ships not licensed under
Philippine laws, like the ships involved.

Issue:

Whether or not the court had jurisdiction over an offense committed on board a foreign ship while
inside the territorial waters of the Philippines.

Held:

Yes. When the vessel comes within 3 miles from the headlines which embrace the entrance of Manila
Bay, the vessel is within territorial waters and thus, the laws of the Philippines shall apply. A crime
committed on board a Norwegian merchant vessel sailing to the Philippines is within the jurisdiction of
the courts of the Philippines if the illegal conditions existed during the time the ship was within the
territorial waters - regardless of the fact that the same conditions existed when the ship settled from the
foreign port and while it was on the high seas,

In light of the above restriction, the defendant was found guilty and sentenced to pay a fine of two
hundred and fifty pesos with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
Facts:On the 2nd day December 1908, a Norwegian steamship vessel commanded by H.N Bull docketed
in theport of Manila which travelled from the port of Ampieng, Formosa. Said vessel named “Standard”
wasfound to be carrying 677 heads of cattle without providing appropriate shelter and suitable means
forsecuring the animas which resulted the animals’ injury and, to some, death. The cruelty and
unnecessary sufferings to the animals are all contrary to the provisions of Acts No. 55and No. 275 of the
Philippine Commission. However, it is contended that the information is insufficient because it does not
state that the court wassitting at a port where the cattle were disembarked, or that the offense was
committed on board a vesselregistered and licensed under the laws of the Philippine
Islands.Issue:Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over an offense committed onboard by a foreign
shipwhile inside the territorial waters of the Philippines.Ruling:Yes, the offense committed by said vessel
is within the jurisdiction of the courts of the Philippines.No court of the Philippine Islands had
jurisdiction over an offenses or crime committed on the high seas orwithin the territorial waters of any
other country, but when she came within 3 miles of a line drawn fromthe headlines which embrace the
entrance to Manila Bay, she was within territorial waters, and a new setof principles became applicable.
(Wheaton, Int. Law (Dana ed.), p. 255, note 105; Bonfils, Le Droit Int.,sec 490 et seq.; Latour, La Mer
Ter., ch. 1.)The offense, assuming that it originated at the port of departure in Formosa, was a
continuing one, andevery element necessary to constitute it existed during the voyage across the
territorial waters. Thecompleted forbidden act was done within American waters, and the court
therefore had jurisdiction overthe subject-matter of the offense and the person of the offender.The
Supreme Court of the United States has recently said that the merchant vessels of one countryvisiting
the ports of another for the purpose of trade, subject themselves to the laws which govern theports
they visit, so long as they remain; and this as well in war as in peace, unless otherwise provided
bytreaty. (U. S. vs. Diekelman, 92 U. S., 520-525.)The defendant was found guilty, and sentenced to
pay a fine of two hundred and fifty pesos, withsubsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency,
and to pay the costs. The sentence and judgment isaffirmed. So ordered

• People vs. Wong Cheng, 46 Phil. 729

FACTS:
· appellee is accused of having illegally smoked opium, aboard the merchant vessel Changsa of
English nationality while said vessel was anchored in Manila Bay two and a half miles from the shores of
the city.
· Lower court dismissed the case

ISSUE: W/N the courts of the Philippines have jurisdiction over crime committed aboard merchant
vessels anchored in our jurisdiction waters

HELD: The order appealed from is revoked and the cause ordered remanded to the court of origin for
further proceedings in accordance with law, without special findings as to costs.
YES.
· 2 fundamental rules on this particular matter in connection with International Law
French rule-according to which crimes committed aboard a foreign merchant vessels should not be
prosecuted in the courts of the country within whose territorial jurisdiction they were committed
UNLESS: their commission affects the peace and security of the territory
English rule
-based on the territorial principle and followed in the United States
-according to which crimes perpetrated under such circumstances are in general triable in the courts of
the country within territory they were committed.

· As to whether the United States has ever consented by treaty or otherwise to renouncing such
jurisdiction or a part thereof, we find nothing to this effect so far as England is concerned, to which
nation the ship where the crime in question was committed belongs.
· mere possession of opium aboard a foreign vessel in transit was held by this court not triable by or
courts, because it being the primary object of our Opium Law to protect the inhabitants of the
Philippines against the disastrous effects entailed by the use of this drug, its mere possession in such a
ship, without being used in our territory, does not being about in the said territory those effects that our
statute contemplates avoiding. Hence such a mere possession is not considered a disturbance of the
public order.
· to smoke opium within our territorial limits, even though aboard a foreign merchant ship, is
certainly a breach of the public order here established, because it causes such drug to produce its
pernicious effects within our territory. It seriously contravenes the purpose that our Legislature has in
mind in enacting the aforesaid repressive statute.
Case Title: People vs Wong Cheng, 46 Phil 729
Subject Matter: Applicability of Art. 2 of the Revised Penal Code
Facts:

The appellant, in representation of the Attorney General, filed an appeal that urges the revocation of a
demurrer sustained by the Court of First Instance of Manila presented by the defendant. The defendant,
accused of having illegally smoked opium aboard the merchant vessel Changsa of English nationality
while the said vessel was anchored in Manila Bay, two and a half miles from the shores of the city. In the
said demurrer, the defendant contended the lack of jurisdiction of the lower court of the said crime,
which resulted to the dismissal of the case.

Issue:

Whether or not the Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the crime committed aboard merchant
vessels anchored in our jurisdictional waters.

Held:

Yes. The crime in the case at bar was committed in our internal waters thus the Philippine courts have a
right of jurisdiction over the said offense. The Court said that having the opium smoked within our
territorial waters even though aboard a foreign merchant ship is a breach of the public order because it
causes such drugs to produce pernicious effects within our territory. Therefore, the demurrer is revoked
and the Court ordered further proceedings.
FACTS: Appellee is accused of having illegally smoked opium, aboard the merchant vessel Changsa of
English nationality while said vessel was anchored in Manila Bay two and a half miles from the shores of
the city. The demurrer filed by said appellee alleged lack of jurisdiction on the part of the lower court,
which so held and dismissed the case.
ISSUE: Whether the courts of the Philippines have jurisdiction over crime, like the one herein involved,
committed aboard merchant vessels anchored in our jurisdiction waters.
HELD: There are two fundamental rules on this particular matter in connection with International Law;
to wit, the French rule, according to which crimes committed aboard a foreign merchant vessels should
not be prosecuted in the courts of the country within whose territorial jurisdiction they were
committed, unless their commission affects the peace and security of the territory; and the English rule,
based on the territorial principle and followed in the United States, according to which, crimes
perpetrated under such circumstances are in general triable in the courts of the country within territory
they were committed. Of this two rules, it is the last one that obtains in this jurisdiction, because at
present the theories and jurisprudence prevailing in the United States on this matter are authority in the
Philippines which is now a territory of the United States (we were still a US territory when this was
decided in 1922).
We have seen that the mere possession of opium aboard a foreign vessel in transit was held by this
court not triable by or courts, because it being the primary object of our Opium Law to protect the
inhabitants of the Philippines against the disastrous effects entailed by the use of this drug, its mere
possession in such a ship, without being used in our territory, does not being about in the said territory
those effects that our statute contemplates avoiding. Hence such a mere possession is not considered a
disturbance of the public order.
But to smoke opium within our territorial limits, even though aboard a foreign merchant ship, is
certainly a breach of the public order here established, because it causes such drug to produce its
pernicious effects within our territory. It seriously contravenes the purpose that our Legislature has in
mind in enacting the aforesaid repressive statute.
Remanded to the lower court for further proceedings in accordance with law.
Facts:Appellee is accused of having illegally smoked opium, aboard the merchant vessel Changsa
ofEnglish nationality while said vessel was anchored in Manila Bay two and a half miles from theshores
of the city.Lower court dismissed the case.Issue: Whether or not the courts of the Philippines have
jurisdiction over crime committed aboard merchant vessels anchored in our jurisdiction watersRuling:
The order appealed from is revoked and the cause ordered remanded to the court of origin forfurther
proceedings in accordance with law, without special findings as to costs.YES.Two (2) fundamental rules
on this particular matter in connection with International Law:French rule-according to which crimes
committed aboard a foreign merchant vessels should not be prosecuted in the courts of the country
within whose territorial jurisdiction they were committedUNLESS: their commission affects the peace
and security of the territoryEnglish rule-based on the territorial principle and followed in the United
States-according to which crimes perpetrated under such circumstances are in general triable in
thecourts of the country within territory they were committed.As to whether the United States has ever
consented by treaty or otherwise to renouncing such jurisdiction or a part thereof, we find nothing to
this effect so far as England is concerned, to which nation the ship where the crime in question was
committed belongs.Mere possession of opium aboard a foreign vessel in transit was held by this court
not triable byor courts, because it being the primary object of our Opium Law to protect the inhabitants
of
the Philippines against the disastrous effects entailed by the use of this drug, its mere possession in such
a ship, without being used in our territory, does not being about in the said territory those effects that
our statute contemplates avoiding. Hence such a mere possession is not considered a disturbance of the
public order.To smoke opium within our territorial limits, even though aboard a foreign merchant ship,
iscertainly a breach of the public order here established, because it causes such drug to produceits
pernicious effects within our territory. It seriously contravenes the purpose that
ourLegislature has in mind in enacting the aforesaid repressive statute

• People vs. Look Chaw, 18 Phil. 573

Lesson: Crimes NOT involving a breach of public order committed on board a public vessel is NOT triable
by our courts

Laws Applicable: Art. 2 RPC, Opium Law

FACTS:
Ø Upon arrival of steamship Erroll of English nationality, that it came from Hongkong, and that it was
bound for Mexico, via the call ports of Manila and Cebu, 2 sacks of opium where found during the
inspection and search of the cargo.
o Smaller sack of opium on the cabin near the saloon
o larger sack in the hold
o Later on, there was also 4 cans of opium found on the part of the ship where the firemen habitually
sleep
§ the firemen and crew of foreign vessels, pursuant to the instructions he had from the Manila custom-
house, were permitted to retain certain amounts of opium, always provided it should not be taken shore
so it was returned

Ø 2 charges were filed against Look Chaw at the Court of First Instance of Cebu:
o unlawful possession of opium
o unlawful sale of opium
Ø Look Chaw admitted that he had bought these sacks of opium, in Hongkong with the intention of
selling them as contraband in Mexico or Vera Cruz, and that, as his hold had already been searched
several times for opium, he ordered two other Chinamen to keep the sack.
Ø The court ruled that it did not lack jurisdiction, inasmuch as the crime had been committed within its
district, on the wharf of Cebu. The court sentenced him to5 years imprisonment, to pay a fine of
P10,000, with additional subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvencyxxx It further ordered the
confiscation, in favor of the Insular Government.

ISSUE: W/N the Philippine court has jurisdiction.

HELD: YES. Modified by reducing the imprisonment and the fine imposed to six months and P1,000
· GR: mere possession of a thing of prohibited use in these Islands, aboard a foreign vessel in transit,
in any of their ports, does NOT constitute a crime triable by the courts of this country, on account of
such vessel being considered as an extension of its own nationality

· EX: when the article, whose use is prohibited within the Philippine Islands, in the present case a
can of opium, is landed from the vessel upon Philippine soil, thus committing an open violation of the
laws of the land with respect to which, as it is a violation of the penal law in force at the place of the
commission of the crime, only the court established in that said place itself had competent jurisdiction,
in the absence of an agreement under an international treaty.
Facts:

Between 11 and 12 o'clock a.m. in August 19, 1909, the Port of Cebu and internal revenue agent of
Cebu, respectively, went aboard the steamship Erroll to inspect and search its cargo, and found two
sacks containing opium. The defendant stated freely and voluntarily that he had bought these sacks of
opium in Hong Kong with the intention of selling them as contraband in Mexico or Vera Cruz, and that as
his hold had already been searched several times for opium he ordered two other chinamen to keep the
sack. All the evidence found properly constitutes corpus delicti.

It was established that the steamship Erroll was of English nationality, that it came from Hong Kong, and
that it was bound for Mexico, via the call ports in Manila and Cebu.

Issue:

Whether or not courts of local state can exercise its jurisdiction over foreign vessels stationed in its port.

Held:

Yes. The Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the matter. The mere possession of a thing of
prohibited use in these Islands, aboard a foreign vessel in transit, in any of their ports, does not, as a
general rule, constitute a crime triable by the courts of this country, on account of such vessel being
considered as an extension of its own nationality. However, the same rule does not apply when the
article, whose use is prohibited within the Philippines, in the present case, a can of opium, is landed
from the vessel upon the Philippine soil, thus committing an open violation of the penal law in force at
the place of the commission of the crime. Only the court established in the said place itself has
competent jurisdiction, in the absence of an agreement under an international treaty.

• People vs. Lol-lo and Saraw, 43 Phil. 19

FACTS:
• 2 boats of Dutch possession left matuta. In 1 of the boats was 1 individual, a Dutch subject, and in
the other boat 11 men, women, and children, subjects of Holland. The 2nd boat arrived between the
Islands of Buang and Bukid in the Dutch East Indies. There the boat was surrounded by 6 vintas manned
by 24 Moros all armed. The Moros first asked for food, but once on the Dutch boat, too for themselves
all of the cargo, attacked some of the men, and brutally violated 2 of the women. All of the persons on
the Dutch boat, except the 2 young women, were again placed on it and holes were made in it, the idea
that it would submerge. The Moros finally arrived at Maruro, a Dutch possession. 2 of the Moro
marauder were Lol-lo, who also raped one of the women, and Saraw. At Maruro the 2 women were able
to escape.
• Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Philippine Islands.
There they were arrested and were charged in the Court of First Instance of Sulu with the crime of piracy

• All of the elements of the crime of piracy are present. Piracy is robbery or forcible depredation on
the high seas, without lawful authority and done animo furandi, and in the spirit and intention of
universal hostility.
• Pirates are in law hostes humani generis.
• Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but against all mankind. It may be punished in the
competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or into which he may be carried.
The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes has no territorial limits.
• As it is against all so may it be punished by all. Nor does it matter that the crime was committed
within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state, "for those limits, though neutral to war, are not
neutral to crimes."

ISSUE: W/N the provisions of the Penal Code dealing with the crime of piracy are still in force.

HELD: In accordance with provisions of Act No. 2726, the defendant and appellant Lol-lo, who is found
guilty of the crime of piracy and is sentenced therefor to be hung until dead.

YES.
Ø Penal code dealing with the crime of piracy, notably articles 153 and 154, to be still in force in the
Philippines.
Ø The crime of piracy was accompanied by (1) an offense against chastity and (2) the abandonment of
persons without apparent means of saving themselves. It is, therefore, only necessary for us to
determine as to whether the penalty of cadena perpetua or death should be imposed.
Ø At least 3 aggravating circumstances, that the wrong done in the commission of the crime was
deliberately augmented by causing other wrongs not necessary for its commission, that advantage was
taken of superior strength, and that means were employed which added ignominy to the natural effects
of the act, must also be taken into consideration in fixing the penalty.

Facts:

On June 30, 1920, sixer vintas intercepted two Dutch boats which were on its way in the midst of the
islands of Buang and Bukid in the Dutch East Indies. The six vintas were manned by 24 armed Moros.
The said Dutch boats were carrying men, women and children. At first, the Moros asked for food. But
when they got on the Dutch boats, they asked for themselves all the vessel’s cargo, attacked nearly all of
the men and brutally violated two of the women by methods too tremendous to be described. All of the
persons on the Dutch boat, except the two young women, were again placed on it and holes were made
in it, the idea that it would submerge. The Moros finally arrived at Maruro, a Dutch possession. Two of
the Moro marauders were Lol-lo, who also raped one of the women, and Saraw. At Maruro, the two
women were able to escape.

Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu. They were arrested there
and were charged in the Court of First Instance of Sulu with the crime of piracy.

Issue:

Whether or not Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the crime of piracy alleged in this case.

Held:

Yes, the Philippine courts have jurisdiction on the case. Piracy is a villainy not against any particular state
but against all mankind. It should be tried and punished in the sufficient tribunal of any country where
the offender may be found or into which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy, unlike all other
crimes, has no territorial limits.

Facts:

On or about June 30, 1920, two boats left Matuta, a Dutch possession, for Peta, another Dutch
possession. In one of the boats was one individual, a Dutch subject, and in the other boat eleven men,
women, and children, likewise subjects of Holland. After a number of days of... navigation, at about 7
o'clock in the evening, the second boat arrived between the Islands of Buang and Bukid in the Dutch
East Indies. There the boat was surrounded by six vintas manned by twenty-four Moros all armed. The
Moros first asked for food, but once on the Dutch... boat, took for themselves all of the cargo, attacked
some of the men, and brutally violated two of the women by methods too horrible to be described. All
of the persons on the Dutch boat, with the exception of the two young women, were again placed on it
and holes were made in... it, with the idea that it would submerge/although as a matter of fact, these
people, after eleven days of hardship and privation, were succored. Taking the two women with them,
and repeatedly violating them, the Moros finally arrived at Maruro, a Dutch possession. Two of the

Moro marauders were Lol-lo, who also raped one of the women, and Saraw, At Maruro the two women
were able to escape.

Issues:

the offense charged was not within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, nor of any court of the
Philippine Islands, and that the facts did not constitute a public offense, under the laws in force in the
Philippine

Islands.
Ruling:

the judgment of the trial court as to the defendant and appellant Saraw is affirmed, and is reversed as to
the defendant and... appellant Lol-lo, who is found guilty of the crime of piracy and is sentenced
therefor to be hung until dead, at such time and place as shall be fixed by the judge of first instance of
the Twenty-sixth Judicial District.

Facts:

On or about June 30, 1920, two boats left matuta, a Dutch possession, for Peta, another Dutch
possession. In one of the boats was one individual, a Dutch subject, and in the other boat eleven men,
women, and children, likewise subjects of Holland. After a number of days of navigation, at about 7
o’clock in the evening, the second boat arrived between the Islands of Buang and Bukid in the Dutch
East Indies. There the boat was surrounded by six vintas manned by twenty-four Moros all armed.

The Moros first asked for food, but once on the Dutch boat, too for themselves all of the cargo, attacked
some of the men, and brutally violated two of the women by methods too horrible to the described. All
of the persons on the Dutch boat, with the exception of the two young women, were again placed on it
and holes were made in it, the idea that it would submerge, although as a matter of fact, these people,
after eleven days of hardship and privation, were succored violating them, the Moros finally arrived at
Maruro, a Dutch possession. Two of the Moro marauders were Lol-lo, who also raped one of the
women, and Saraw. At Maruro the two women were able to escape.

Issue:

W/N the appellants are guilty of piracy,

W/N the Philippine courts has jurisdiction over the case.

Held:

FIRST ISSUE: Yes. The proven facts are not disputed. All of the elements of the crime of piracy are
present. Piracy is robbery or forcible depredation on the high seas, without lawful authority and done
animo furandi, and in the spirit and intention of universal hostility.

SECOND ISSUE: Yes. It cannot be contended with any degree of force as was done in the lower court and
as is again done in this court, that the Court of First Instance was without jurisdiction of the case. Pirates
are in law hostes humani generis. Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but against all
mankind. It may be punished in the competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be found
or into which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes has no territorial limits.
As it is against all so may it be punished by all. Nor does it matter that the crime was committed within
the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state, “for those limits, though neutral to war, are not neutral
to crimes.

FACTS:

On or about June 30, 1920, two boats left Matuta, a Dutch possession. In the second boat were eleven
men, women, and children, all subjects of Holland.

At about 7 o’clock in the evening, between the Islands of Buang and Bukid in the Dutch East Indies, the
said boat was surrounded by six vintas manned by twenty-four Moros, all armed.

The Moros first asked for food, but once on the Dutch boat, they took all of the cargo, attacked some of
the men, and brutally violated two of the women.

Holes were made in the boat in order to submerge it.

Two of the Moros were Lol-lo, who also raped one of the women, and Saraw.

Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, where they were arrested and
charged in the Court of First Instance of Sulu with the crime of piracy.

The trial court rendered judgment finding the two defendants guilty and sentencing each of them to life
imprisonment.

A demurrer was interposed by counsel de officio for the Moros, on the grounds that the offense charged
was not within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, nor of any court of the Philippine Islands,
and that the facts did not constitute a public offense, under the laws in force in the Philippine Islands.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Philippine Courts has jurisdiction over the crime?

RULING:

All of the elements of the crime of piracy are present. Piracy is robbery or forcible depredation on the
high seas, without lawful authority and done animo furandi (intention to steal), and in the spirit and
intention of universal hostility.

Pirates are in law hostes humani generis (“enemy of mankind”). Piracy is a crime not against any
particular state but against all mankind. It may be punished in the competent tribunal of any country
where the offender may be found or into which he may be carried.

The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes has no territorial limits. As it is against all so may it be
punished by all. Nor does it matter that the crime was committed within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of
a foreign state, “for those limits, though neutral to war, are not neutral to crimes.” (U.S. vs. Furlong
[1820], 5 Wheat., 184.)