Cecilio de Villa vs. CA [G.R. No. 87416.

April 08, 1991]

Ponente: PARAS, J.

FACTS:

[P]etitioner Cecilio S. de Villa was charged before the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital
Judicial Region (Makati, Branch 145) with violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. Petitioner
moved to dismiss the Information on the following grounds: (a) Respondent court has no
jurisdiction over the offense charged; and (b) That no offense was committed since the check
involved was payable in dollars, hence, the obligation created is null and void pursuant to
Republic Act No. 529 (An Act to Assure Uniform Value of Philippine Coin and Currency). A
petition for certiorari seeking to declare the nullity of the RTC ruling was filed by the petitioner in
the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition with costs against the
petitioner. A motion for reconsideration of the said decision was filed by the petitioner but the
same was denied by the Court of Appeals, thus elevated to the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:

Whether or not:

(1) The Regional Trial Court of Makati City has jurisdiction over the case; and,

(2) The check in question, drawn against the dollar account of petitioner with a foreign bank, is
covered by the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22).

HELD:

YES on both cases. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

RATIO:

For the first issue: The trial court’s jurisdiction over the case, subject of this review, can not be
questioned, as Sections 10 and 15(a), Rule 110 of the Rules of Court specifically provide. The
information under consideration specifically alleged that the offense was committed in Makati,
Metro Manila and therefore, the same is controlling and sufficient to vest jurisdiction upon the
Regional Trial Court of Makati. The Court acquires jurisdiction over the case and over the person
of the accused upon the filing of a complaint or information in court which initiates a criminal
action (Republic vs. Sunga, 162 SCRA 191 [1988]).

For the second issue: Exception in the Statute. It is a cardinal principle in statutory construction
that where the law does not distinguish courts should not distinguish. Parenthetically, the rule is
that where the law does not make any exception, courts may not except something unless
compelling reasons exist to justify it (Phil. British Assurance Co., Inc. vs. IAC, 150 SCRA 520
[1987]). The records of the Batasan, Vol. III, unmistakably show that the intention of the
lawmakers is to apply the law to whatever currency may be the subject thereof. The discussion
on the floor of the then Batasang Pambansa fully sustains this view.
RULING:The Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit.

I. WON RTC has jurisdiction

The RTC has jurisdiction over the case.Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the
statute in force at the time of commencement of the action.The Rules of Court provide that in
all criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of themunicipality or
territory where the offense was committed or any of the essential ingredients thereof took
place.The court also stated that jurisdiction or venue is determined by the allegations in the
information.In this particular case, the information filed against petitioner specifically alleged
that the offense was committed in Makati,and therefore, the same is controlling and sufficient to
vest jurisdiction upon the RTC of Makati. The Court acquires jurisdictionover the case and over
the person of the accused upon the filing of a complaint or information in court which initiates
acriminal action.Moreover, in the case of Que v. People of the Philippines, the court held that
the determinative factor in determining venue isthe place of the issuance of the check.On the
matter of venue for violation of BP 22, the Ministry of Justice laid down the following guidelines
the pertinent portion of which reads:

(1)Venue of the offense lies at the place where the check was executed and delivered;

It is a cardinal principle in statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish courts
should not distinguish. Parenthetically, the rule is that where the law does not make any
exception, courts may not except something unless compelling reasons exist to justify it. Under
the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22), foreign checks, provided they are either drawn and
issued in the Philippines though payable outside thereof, or made payable and dishonored in the
Philippines though drawn and issued outside thereof, are within the coverage of said law. The
law likewise applied to checks drawn against current accounts in foreign currency.

[I]t is well established that courts may avail themselves of the actual proceedings of the
legislative body to assist in determining the construction of a statute of doubtful meaning
(citation omitted). Thus, where there is doubts as to what a provision of a statute means, the
meaning put to the provision during the legislative deliberation or discussion on the bill may be
adopted (citation omitted). The records of the Batasan, Vol. III, unmistakably show that the
intention of the lawmakers is to apply the law to whatever currency may be the subject thereof.
Courts may avail themselves of the actual proceedings of the legislative body to assist in
determining the construction of a statute of doubtful meaning.
Colgate-Palmolive Phils. Inc. vs. Hon. Gimenez [G.R. No. L-14787 January 28 1961]

Ponente: GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.

FACTS:

The petitioner Colgate-Palmolive Philippines imported from abroad various materials such as
irish moss extract, sodium benzoate, sodium saccharinate precipitated calcium carbonate and
dicalcium phosphate, for use as stabilizers and flavoring of the dental cream it manufactures. For
every importation made of these materials, the petitioner paid to the Central Bank of the
Philippines the 17% special excise tax on the foreign exchange used for the payment of the cost,
transportation and other charges incident thereto, pursuant to Republic Act No. 601, as
amended, commonly known as the Exchange Tax Law. The petitioner filed with the Central Bank
three applications for refund of the 17% special excise tax it had paid. The auditor of the Central
Bank, refused to pass in audit its claims for refund fixed by the Officer-in-Charge of the Exchange
Tax Administration, on the theory that toothpaste stabilizers and flavors are not exempt under
section 2 of the Exchange Tax Law.

Petitioner appealed to the Auditor General, but the latter affirmed the ruling of the auditor of
the Central Bank, maintaining that the term “stabilizer and flavors” mentioned in section 2 of the
Exchange Tax Law refers only to those used in the preparation or manufacture of food or food
products. Not satisfied, the petitioner brought the case to the Supreme Court thru the present
petition for review.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the foreign exchange used by petitioner for the importation of dental cream
stabilizers and flavors is exempt from the 17% special excise tax imposed by the Exchange Tax
Law (Republic Act No. 601).

HELD:

YES. The decision under review was reversed.

RATIO:

General and special terms. The ruling of the Auditor General that the term “stabilizer and
flavors” as used in the law refers only to those materials actually used in the preparation or
manufacture of food and food products is based, apparently, on the principle of statutory
construction that “general terms may be restricted by specific words, with the result that the
general language will be limited by the specific language which indicates the statute’s object and
purpose.” The rule, however, is applicable only to cases where, except for one general term, all
the items in an enumeration belong to or fall under one specific class (ejusdem generis). In the
case at bar, it is true that the term “stabilizer and flavors” is preceded by a number of articles
that may be classified as food or food products, but it is likewise true that the other items
immediately following it do not belong to the same classification.

The rule of construction that general and unlimited terms are restrained and limited by
particular recitals when used in connection with them, does not require the rejection of general
terms entirely. It is intended merely as an aid in ascertaining the intention of the legislature and
is to be taken in connection with other rules of construction.
BELLIS v. BELLIS
20 SCRA 358

FACTS
Mr. Bellis was a citizen and resident of Texas at the time of his death. He had five (5)
legitimate children with his first wife, Mary Mallen, whom he divorced. He had three (3)
legitimate daughters with his second wife, Violet, who survived him, and another three (3)
illegitimate children with another woman. Before he died, he executed two (2) wills, disposing of
his Texas properties, the other disposing his Philippine properties. In both wills, he recognized his
illegitimate children but they were not given anything. Under Texas law, there are no compulsory
heirs or legitime reserved to illegitimate children.
Naturally, the illegitimate children, Maria Cristina and Merriam Palma, opposed the wills on the
ground that they were deprived of their legitime as illegitimate children. Under Philippine law,
they are entitled to inherit even if they are illegitimate children. They claim that Philippine law
should be applied.

ISSUE
What law should be applied, the Philippine law or the Texas law? May the illegitimate
daughters inherit?

HELD
What applies is the Texas law. Mr. Bellis is a national and domicile of Texas at the time of his
death. Hence, both the intrinsic validity of the will (substance or successional rights) and the
extrinsic validity (forms of the will) are governed by Texas law. Since under Texas law, the
decedent may dispose of his property as he wishes, the Will should be respected. The
illegitimate daughters are not entitled to any legitime.

Assuming that Texas law is in conflict of law rule providing that the domiciliary system (law of
domicile) should govern, the same should not result in a reference back (renvoi) to the Philippine
law since Mr. Bellis was both a national and domicile of Texas at the time of his death.
Nonetheless, if Texas law has a conflict rule, renvoi would not arise, since the properties covered
by the second will are found in the Philippines. The renvoi doctrine applied in the case of Aznar
v. Garcia cannot be applied since said doctrine is pertinent where the decedent is a national of
one country and domiciliary of another country. Moreover, it has been pointed out that the
decedent executed two (2) wills- one to govern his Texas properties and the other his Philippine
estate; the latter being the basis of the argument of illegitimate children that he intended
Philippine law to govern. Assuming that such was the intention of the decedent in executing a
separate Philippine will, it would not alter the law. As rule in Miciano v. Brimo, a provision of
foreigner’s will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine
law and not with the national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored.

The said illegitimate children are not entitled to their legitimes under the Texas
Law(which is the national law of the deceased), here are no legitimes. The renvoi
doctrinecannot be applied. Said doctrine is usually pertinent where the decedent is a
national of one country ad a domiciliary of another. In the said case, it is not disputed that
the deceased was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his death.

Article 16, Paragraph 2 of Civil code render applicable the national law of the decedent,
in intestate and testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of
succession, (b) the amount of successional rights, (c) the intrinsic validity of provisions of
will, and (d) the capacity to succeed.

They provide that

ART.16 Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country to
where it is situated.However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to
the order of successions and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic
validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person
whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.
Mutuc vs. COMELEC
AMELITO R. MUTUC, petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

G.R. NO. L-32717

November 26, 1970

FERNANDO, J.:

FACTS:

The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) prohibited petitioner Amelito Mutuc, a candidate for
the position of a delegate to the Constitutional Convention, from using “jingles in his mobile
units equipped with sound systems and loud speakers” on 22 October 1970. Petitioner
impugned the act of respondent as violative of his right to free speech. Respondent however
contended that the prohibition was premised on a provision of the Constitutional Convention
Act, which made it unlawful for candidates “to purchase, produce, request or distribute sample
ballots, or electoral propaganda gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature),
flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, cigarettes, and
the like, whether of domestic or foreign origin.” It was its contention that the jingle proposed to
be used by petitioner is the recorded or taped voice of a singer and therefore a tangible
propaganda material, under the phrase “and the like.”

ISSUE:
Whether “jingles” falls down on the prohibited electoral propaganda gadgets of R.A. No. 6132.

RULING:

For respondent Commission, the last three words sufficed to justify such an order. We view the
matter differently. What was done cannot merit our approval under the well-known principle of
ejusdem generis, the general words following any enumeration being applicable only to things of
the same kind or class as those specifically referred to. It is quite apparent that what was
contemplated in the Act was the distribution of gadgets of the kind referred to as means of
inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the candidate responsible for distribution.