#62

CIPRIANO PRIMICIAS VS. FELICISIMO OCAMPO

GR. NO. L-6120 June 30, 1953
TOPIC: Substantive Law distinguished from Remedial Law

FACTS:
Petitioner was charged before the CFI with two statutory offenses
namely, (1) with a violation of Commonwealth Act No. 606, that he knowingly
chartered a vessel of Philippine registry to an alien without the approval of
the President of the Philippines and (2) with a violation of section 129 in
relation to section 2713 of the Revised Administrative Code, that he failed to
submit to the Collector of Customs the manifests and certain authenticated
documents for the vessel "Antarctic" and failed to obtain the necessary
clearance from the Bureau of Customs prior to the departure of said vessel
for a foreign port.
Petitioner filed a motion praying that assessors be appointed to assist
the court in considering the questions of fact involved in said cases as
authorized by section 49 of Republic Act No. 409, otherwise known as
Revised Charter of the City of Manila, which provides that "the aid of
assessors in the trial of any civil or criminal action in the Municipal Court, or
the Court of First Instance, within the City, may be invoked in the manner
provided in the Code of Civil Procedure." This motion was opposed by the
City Fiscal.
 The court issued an order denying the motion. Believing that this
order is erroneous, petitioner now comes to this court imputing abuse of
discretion to the respondent Judge.

ISSUE/S:
WON the right of the petitioner to a trial with the aid of assessor is an
absolute substantive right and the duty of the court to provide assessors is
mandatory.

RULING:
Yes, a trial with the aid of assessors is an absolute substantive right.
The trial with the aid of assessors as granted by section 154 of
the Code of Civil Procedure and section 2477 of the old Charter of Manila are
parts of substantive law and as such are not embraced by the rule-making
power of the Supreme Court. The aid may be invoked in the manner
provided in the Code of Civil Procedure, and this right has been declared
absolute and substantial by this Court in several cases where the aid of
assessors had been invoked. The intervention of the assessors is not an
empty formality which may be disregarded without violating either the letter
or the spirit of the law. It is another security given by the law to the litigants,
and as such, it is a substantial right of which they cannot be deprived
without vitiating all the proceedings
 The contention of respondents is predicated on the assumption that
the provisions on assessors of the Code of Civil Procedure had been impliedly
repealed. Such is not the case. We have already pointed out that the basic
provisions on the matter partake of the nature of substantive law and as
such they were left intact by the Supreme Court. It is therefore our opinion
that the respondent Judge acted with abuse of discretion in denying
petitioner his right to the aid of assessors in the trial of the two criminal
cases now pending in the Court of First Instance of Manila.

#101
TODD VS UNITED STATES
158 US 278 May 20, 1895
TOPIC: Court distinguished from a Judge

FACTS:
#140
MR. & MRS. RONNIE DAR, MR. & MRS. RANDY ANGELES, MR. & MRS.
JOY CONSTANTINO, MR. & MRS. LIBERTY CRUZ VS. HON. ROSE MARIE
ALONZO-LEGASTO AND NENITA CO BAUTISTA
GR. NO. 143016 August 30, 2000
TOPIC: Liberal Interpretation of the Rules on the Signing of the
Certification against Forum shopping

FACTS:
Respondent Nenita Co filed a case for unlawful detainer against the
petitioners in the MTC. The petitioners were sued as Mr. and Mrs. The trial
court decided adversely against the petitioners.
CA issued a resolution dismissing the petitioners’ petition for review
and certiorari for failure to comply with the Rule on Certification of Non-
Forum Shopping. The petitioners Ronnie, Randy, Joy and Liberty signed the
Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping while their spouses did not.
The petitioners’ contended that since what is involved in the instant
case is their common rights and interest of abode under the system of
absolute community of property, either of the spouses can sign the petition.
CA dismissed the petition. Thus, this case in the SC.

ISSUE/S:
WON the petition is dismissible for violation of the Rule on Certification
of Non-Forum Shopping requiring all petitioners to certify it under oath

RULING:
No. With respect to the contents of the certification, the rule of
substantial compliance maybe availed of. In the instant case, CA should have
taken into consideration the fact that petitioners were sued jointly as Mr. and
Mrs. over a property in which they have common interest. Such being the
case, the signing of one of them in the certification substantially complies
with the rule on certification of non-forum shopping.
While the said rule requires that it be strictly complied with, it merely
underscores the mandatory nature that the certification or the requirement
cannot be altogether be dispensed with. It does not prevent the substantial
compliance therewith under justifiable circumstances. Circular No. 28-91 was
designed to serve as an instrument to promote and facilitate the orderly
administration of justice and should not be interpreted with such absolute
literalness as to subvert the ultimate objective of all rules and procedure.

#179
BARANGAY PIAPI VS. IGNACIO TALIP
GR. NO. 138248 September 7, 2005
TOPIC: Allegations of the Complaint also determine the Nature of
the Cause of Action

FACTS:
Barangay Piapi filed with the RTC of Digos, Davao del Sur, a complaint
for Reconveyance and Damages for a parcel of land covered by Original
Certificate of Title issued in the name of Juan Jayag and has a market value
of P15,000. They alleged that they have openly possessed such land for 30
years in the concept of owner, and that respondent Talip, fraudulently
obtained from the said Registry of Deeds a TCT under his name.
Respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the RTC has
no jurisdiction over the case as considering that the assessed value of the
land is P6,030. Under Section 33 (3) of BP Bilang 129, as amended by RA No.
7691, MCTC has exclusive jurisdiction. Petitioners alleged that jurisdiction is
vested in the RTC as the total assessed value of the property is P41,890, as
shown by Real Property Field Appraisal and Assessment Sheet.
RTC Davao dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction hence this
certiorari petition alleging that Section 19 (1) of BP Bilang 129, as amended,
gives the RTC jurisdiction over the complaint for reconveyance since it is
incapable of pecuniary estimation.

ISSUE:
WON RTC has jurisdiction over the complaint for reconveyance.

RULING:
Supreme Court ruled that the nature of an action is not determined by
the caption of the complaint but by the allegations of the complaint and the
reliefs prayed for.
When the ultimate objective of the petitioners, is to obtain title to real
property, it should be filed in the proper court having jurisdiction over the
assessed value of the property subject thereof. The Rule requires that the
assessed value of the property, or if there is none, the estimated value
thereof, shall be alleged by the claimant. It bears reiterating that what
determines jurisdiction is the allegations in the complaint and the reliefs
prayed for. Petitioners' complaint is for reconveyance of a parcel of land.
Considering that their action involves the title to or interest in real property,
they should have alleged therein its assessed value. However, they only
specified the market value or estimated value, which is P15,000.00. Pursuant
to the provisions of Section 33 (3), it is the Municipal Circuit Trial Court and
not the RTC, which has jurisdiction over the case.

#218
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. COURT OF APPEALS
GR NO. 122269 September 30, 1999
TOPIC: In Personam and In Rem Actions

FACTS:
The late Zenaida Bustria [daughter of Isidro Bustria] filed a complaint
against Morado in the RTC for ownership and possession over the lot in
question. The Republic of the Philippines, was not made a party to that suit.
Bustria claimed absolute ownership and quiet and peaceful possession of
several lots. She further asserted that said Morado maliciously applied for a
fishpond permit with the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources over Lot
3 thereof (the subject lot), well-knowing that said lot had always been
occupied, possessed and worked by her and her predecessors-in-interest.
Morado denied the allegations in the complaint, claiming that the lot in
question is part of the public domain which he developed and converted into
a fishpond.
Respondent Judge rendered a decision declaring the plaintiff as the
exclusive and absolute owner of the land in question. The Republic filed with
the CA a petition for the annulment of the trial court’s decision. Petitioner
alleged that the land in question is within the classified/zonified alienable
and disposable land for fishpond development and that since the land
formed part of the public domain, the BFAR has jurisdiction over its
disposition in accordance with P.D. No. 704. CA rendered a decision
dismissing the petition. Hence, this petition for review.

ISSUE/S:
WON petitioner has the personality to bring the action.
RULING:
To begin with, an action to recover a parcel of land is in personam. As
such, it is binding only between the parties thereto. The appellate court is in
error when it ruled that petitioner was not a real party in interest and
therefore has no personality to bring the action for the annulment of
judgment rendered.
The State clearly stands to be adversely affected by the trial court’s
disposition of inalienable public land. The land involved in this case was
classified as public land suitable for fishpond development. In controversies
involving the disposition of public land, the burden of overcoming the
presumption of state ownership of lands of the public domain lies upon the
private claimant. Private respondents have not discharged this burden.
The fact that the land in dispute was transformed into a “fully
developed fishpond” does not mean that it has lost its character as one
declared “suitable for fishpond purposes” under the decree. By applying for
a fishpond permit with BFAR, Isidro Bautista admitted the character of the
land as one suitable for fishpond development since the disposition of such
lands is vested in the BFAR. Consequently, private respondents, as his
successors-in-interests, are estopped from claiming otherwise.
Since the disposition of lands declared suitable for fishpond purposes
fall within the jurisdiction of the BFAR, in accordance with P.D. No 704, the
trial court’s decision is null and void. The trial court has no jurisdiction to
make a disposition of inalienable public land.

#257
TYSON’S SUPER CONCRETE, INC. VS CA
GR. NO. 140081 June 23, 2005
TOPIC: How jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred

FACTS:
Romana Dela Cruz is the registered owner of several parcels of land
located at P. Dela Cruz St., Sta. Quiteria, Caloocan City and covered by
Transfer Certificates of Title all of the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City.
Dela Cruz entered into a contract of lease with Tyson’s where it was agreed
that the latter shall occupy the property as lessee for a period of 20 years
beginning January 1, 1993 until December 31, 2012.
SEC issued an order creating a Management Committee to undertake
the management of Tyson’s, to take custody of and control over all the
existing assets, funds and records of the corporation, and to determine the
best way to protect the interest of the stockholders and creditors.
Sometime on February 1996, Dela Cruz filed a complaint for ejectment
against Tyson’s with the MeTC of Caloocan City for the alleged failure of
Tyson’s to pay its rentals despite repeated written demands for such
payment. Tyson’s failed to file the required answer to the Complaint. MeTC
ruled in favor of Dela Cruz. MeTC ordered the issuance of writ of execution,
the judgment having become final and executory. Tyson’s filed with the RTC
a petition for certiorari and preliminary injunction and TRO seeking to stop
the judgment of the MeTC. However, RTC dismissed the petition for certiorari
and prohibition filed by Tyson’s. Hence, the elevation of the case to CA
where CA ruled in favor of Tyson’s and rendered the decision of MeTC and
RTC as null and void however this was reversed by CA and reinstated the
decision of MeTC and RTC. Here, petitioner contended

ISSUE/S:
WON MeTC was ousted of its jurisdiction when the SEC created the
management committee.

RULING:
Settled is the rule that the jurisdiction of a court is conferred by the
Constitution and by the laws in force at the time of the commencement of
the action. Under the amendatory provisions of Republic Act 7691, which is
the law in force at the time, Dela Cruz filed the ejectment case, it is clearly
provided that Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible
entry and unlawful detainer. The fact that a management committee had
already been created by the SEC does not divest the first level courts of their
exclusive jurisdiction. Under P.D. No. 902-A, the existence of an executive
committee merely suspends the proceedings in civil actions.
While there may be merit in petitioners’ contention that the action for
ejectment filed with the MeTC should have been suspended on the ground
that the SEC has already created a management committee under P.D. No.
902-A, considering the peculiar circumstances of the case and in the higher
interest of substantial justice, we do not find any cogent reason or useful
purpose to nullify all the proceedings taken in the courts below and order the
suspension of the complaint for ejectment at this stage of the proceedings.
#296
SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION VS SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. Nos. 104637-38, G.R. No. 109797   September 14, 2000
TOPIC: Doctrine of Continuity

FACTS:
Coconut Industry Investment Fund Holding Companies (CIIF) sold it
shares of the outstanding capital stock of San Miguel Corporation to Andres
Soriano III of the SMC Group payable in 4 installments. Andres Soriano III paid
the initial P500M to the UCPB (CIIF’s administrator). The sale was transacted
through the stock exchange and the shares were registered in the name of
Anscor-Hagedorn Securities, Inc. (AHSI).
PCGG then led by the former President of the Senate, the Honorable
Jovito R. Salonga, sequestered the shares of stock subject of the sale. Due to
the sequestration, the SMC Group suspended payment of the balance of the
purchase price of the subject stocks. In retaliation, the UCPB Group
rescinded the sale. UCPB and CIIF Holding Companies went to court. They
filed a complaint with the RTC of Makati against SMC for confirmation of
rescission of sale with damages. SMC assailed in the SC the jurisdiction of
the Makati RTC on the ground that primary jurisdiction was vested with the
PCGG since the SMC shares were sequestered shares. SC ordered, among
others, the dismissal of the rescission case filed in the Makati RTC without
prejudice to the ventilation of the parties' claims before the Sandiganbayan.
SMC and the UCPB group signed a Compromise Agreement and Amicable
Settlement.
SMC and the UCPB Group filed with the Sandiganbayan a Joint Petition
for Approval of the Compromise Agreement and Amicable Settlement. The
same SMC shares are the subject of Civil Case No. 0033 and alleged as part
of the alleged ill-gotten wealth of former President Marcos and his "cronies."
The Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), opposed the Compromise Agreement and Amicable
Settlement. It contended that the involved coco-levy funds, whether in the
form of earnings or dividends therefrom, or in the form of the value of
liquidated corporate assets represented by all sequestered shares (like the
value of assets sold/mortgaged to finance the P500M first installment), or in
the form of cash, or, as in the case of subject "Settlement," in the form of
"proceeds" of sale or of "payments" of certain alleged obligations are public
funds. As public funds, the coco-levy funds, in any form or transformation,
are beyond or "outside the commerce," and perforce not within the private
disposition of private individuals.
PCGG filed its Manifestation attaching a copy of the Resolution of the
Commission
en banc dated June 15, 1990. PCGG joined the Solicitor General in praying
that the Joint Petition for Approval of Compromise Agreement should be
treated as an incident of Case No. 0033. PCGG, however, interposed no
objection to the implementation of the Compromise Agreement subject to
the incorporation. SMC moved for early resolution of the Joint Petition for
Approval of the Compromise Agreement and Amicable Settlement together
with its pending incidents. The Sandiganbayan issued an Order integrating
Case No. 0102 as an incident of Civil Case No. 0033.
Sandiganbayan issued two (2) Orders. The first was to hear the
defendants in Civil Case No. 0033 on the matter of the Compromise
Agreement whether under Civil Case No. 0102 or as an incident to Civil Case
No. 0033.37 The second required the petitioners and the UCPB Group as well
as PCGG to formally state in writing the different holders of the SMC shares
subject of the compromise agreement. The Sandiganbayan further ordered
PCGG to indicate on the face of the subject shares their sequestered
character.
The Sandiganbayan noted the Manifestations of the PCGG, the
petitioners and the UCPB group that the certificates of stock for the subject
SMC shares which are intended to form part of the corporation's treasury
shares have been marked "sequestered" by SMC and are in the custody of
the PCGG. SMC filed a Manifestation and Motion stating that the SMC shares
have reverted to the SMC treasury as treasury shares and are not entitled to
dividend.
The Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution allowing COCOFED, et al. to
intervene. It denied the separate motions for reconsideration filed by the
petitioners and the UCPB Group. The Sandiganbayan issued another
Resolution requiring SMC to deliver the 25.45 million SMC treasury shares to
the PCGG. It denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration and further
ordered SMC to pay dividends on the said treasury shares and to deliver
them to the PCGG.
Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss Intervention and/or Motion for
Clarification with Ad Cautelam Motion to Suspend Time. The motion was
denied in the Sandiganbayan's Resolution dated March 17, 1993.

ISSUE/S:
GR 104637-38 WON Sandiganbayan over-reached its jurisdiction and with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
in the case.
GR 109797 WON Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in the case.

RULING:
GR 104637-38
NO. SC found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
Sandiganbayan when it ordered the petitioners to deliver the treasury shares
to PCGG and pay their corresponding dividends for the following reasons:

(1) The cases at bar do not merely involve a compromise agreement

dealing with private interest. The Compromise Agreement here
involves sequestered shares of stock now worth more than nine (9)
billions of pesos, per estimate given by COCOFED. Their ownership
is still under litigation. It is not yet known whether the shares are
part of the alleged ill-gotten wealth of former President Marcos and
his "cronies." Any Compromise Agreement concerning these
sequestered shares falls within the unquestionable jurisdiction of
and has to be approved by the Sandiganbayan. The parties
themselves recognized this jurisdiction. In the Compromise
Agreement itself, the petitioners and the UCPB Group expressly
acknowledged the need to obtain the approval by the
Sandiganbayan of its terms and conditions
(2) Given its undisputed jurisdiction, the Sandiganbayan ordered that
the treasury shares should be delivered to PCGG and that their
dividends should be paid pending determination of their real
ownership which is the key to the question whether they are part of
the alleged ill-gotten wealth of former President Marcos and his
"cronies." SC cannot condemn and annul this order as capricious. In
 the exercise of its discretion, the Sandiganbayan can require a
party-litigant to deliver a sequestered propertyto the PCGG.

GR 109797
NO. SC had the occasion to categorically draw the distinctions between
(i) the Sandiganbayan's exclusive jurisdiction to determine the judicial
question of ownership over sequestered properties and (ii) the incidents of
the exercise by the PCGG of its purely administrative and executive functions
as conservator of sequestered properties. The Court never said that orders of
sequestration, seizure or take-over of the PCGG or other acts done in the
exercise of its so-called 'primary administrative jurisdiction' are beyond
judicial review, or beyond the power of the courts to reverse or nullify.
It is true that those acts are entitled to much respect, the findings and
conclusions motivating and justifying them should be accorded great weight,
'like the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts,' and such findings
and conclusions of the PCGG may not be superseded and substituted by the
judgment of the courts. But obviously the principle does not and cannot
sanction arbitrary, whimsical, capricious or oppressive exercise of power and
discretion on the part of the PCGG, or its performance of acts without or in
excess of its authority and competence under the law. And in accordance
with applicable law, review of those acts, and correction or invalidation
thereof, when called for, can only be undertaken by the Sandiganbayan,
which has exclusive original jurisdiction over all cases regarding 'the funds,
moneys, assets and properties illegally acquired or misappropriated by
former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, their
close relatives, subordinates, business associates, dummies, agents or
nominees.

(sorry guys, this is the digest I can make like digested na gyud , duha gud ni
ka case so taas ang facts 33 pages )
#335
MAKATI DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION VS PEDRO C. TANJUATCO
GR NO. L-26443 March 25, 1969
TOPIC: Actions incapable of pecuniary estimation

FACTS:
Makati Dev’t Corp and Tanjuatco entered into a contract whereby the
latter bound himself to construct a reinforced concrete covered water
reservoir, office and pump house and water main at Forbes Park, furnishing
the materials necessary therefor. Before making the final payment of the
consideration agreed upon, plaintiff inquired from the suppliers of materials,
who had called its attention to unpaid bills of Tanjuatco, whether the latter
had settled his accounts with them.
In response to this inquiry, Concrete Aggregates, Inc. (supplier) made a
claim in the sum of P5,198.75, representing the cost of transit-mixed
concrete allegedly delivered to Tanjuatco. With his consent, plaintiff withheld
said amount from the final payment made to him and, in view of his
subsequent failure to settle the issue thereon with the Supplier, plaintiff
instituted the present action against Tanjuatco and the Supplier, to compel
them "to interplead their conflicting claims."
Tanjuatco moved to dismiss the case, upon the ground that the court
had no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the litigation, the amount
involved therein being less than P10,000.00. The lower court granted the
same and dismissed the case.

ISSUE/S:
WON the CFI has jurisdiction over the case.

RULING:
No. Plaintiff may compel the defendants to interplead among
themselves concerning the aforementioned sum of P5,198.75. The issue of
who among the defendants is entitled to collect the same is the object of the
action and is not within the jurisdiction of the CFI. The plaintiff in asserting
the jurisdiction of the CFI relies upon Rule 63 of the present Rules of Court,
prescribing the procedure in cases of interpleading, and section 19 of Rule 5,
which omits the Rules on Interpleading among those made applicable to
inferior courts.
However, the jurisdiction of our courts over the subject-matter of
justiciable controversies is governed by Rep. Act No. 296, as amended,
pursuant to which municipal courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction
in all civil cases "in which the demand, exclusive of interest, or the value of
the property in controversy", amounts to not more than PHP10,000.
Secondly, "the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of
the various courts" belongs to Congress and is beyond the rule-making
power of the Supreme Court, which is limited to matters concerning
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the
practice of law. Thirdly, the failure of said section 19 of Rule 5 of the present
Rules of Court to make its Rule 63, on interpleading, applicable to inferior
courts, merely implies that the same are not bound to follow Rule 63 in
dealing with cases of interpleading, but may apply thereto the general rules
on procedure applicable to ordinary civil action in said courts.

#374
MARINO BAUTISTA VS HON. JUAN DE BORJA and G.A MACHINERIES,
INC.
GR. NO. L-20600 October 28 1966
TOPIC: Stipulations on Venue

FACTS:
G. A. Machineries, Inc., commenced said case No. 2486 alleging that
defendant purchased from plaintiff certain personal properties all valued at
P83,800.00, for which the former made a down payment of P12,570.00 and
agreed to pay the balance of P71,230.00 in 11 monthly installments starting
from 28 February 1960, as evidenced by the sales contract attached therein;
that defendant executed a chattel mortgage contract over the same
personal properties to secure the payment of the unpaid balance of the
purchase price, covered by several promissory notes; that plaintiff applied to
the Sheriff of Cotabato for the extrajudicial foreclosure of said mortgage but
the latter could not proceed with the auction sale because defendant failed
and refused, despite demands made therefor, to deliver and surrender said
personal properties.
Bautista filed a motion to dismiss the above-mentioned complaint, on
the grounds that(a) there is another action pending between the same
parties for the same cause and (b) that the filing of the complaint by G. A.
Machineries, Inc., in Bulacan constitutes multiplicity of suits, which is not
allowed by the Rules of Court. Bautista also joined a supplemental motion to
dismiss, setting forth as additional ground therefor that venue was
improperly laid, since plaintiff and defendant have expressly stipulated in
their sales and chattel mortgage contracts that "in case of any litigation
arising therefrom or in connection therewith, the venue of action shall be in
the City of Manila, Philippines."

ISSUE/S:
WON the trial court committed any grave abuse of discretion in
denying petitioner's motion to dismiss.
RULING:
The parties do not dispute that, in the written contracts sued upon, it
was expressly stipulated that "in case of any litigation arising (t)herefrom or
in connection (t)herewith, the venue of action shall be in the City of Manila,
Philippines". We note that neither party to the contracts reserved the right to
choose the venue of action as fixed by as is usually done if the parties
purported to retain that right of election granted by the Rules. Such being
the case, it can reasonably be inferred that the parties intended to definitely
fix the venue of action, in connection with the written contracts sued upon,
in the proper courts of the City of Manila only, notwithstanding that neither
party is a resident of Manila.
It appearing that the action was brought in a place other than that
fixed by the parties in their valid written contracts; that the ground of
improper venue is clear and patent on the record of the case, the written
contracts having been attached and made an integral part of the complaint;
that the impropriety of the venue was properly and timely raised in the
motion to dismiss; and that a writ of prohibition is a proper remedy when a
trial court erroneously denies a motion to dismiss based on the ground of
improper venue; SC ruled that the trial court acted with grave abuse of
discretion in denying petitioner's motions to dismiss based on the above-
stated ground.
#413
SANTIAGO LAND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION VS CA &HEIRS OF
NORBERTO QUISUMBING
GR. NO. 106194 January 28, 1997
TOPIC: Distinction between an indispensable and a necessary party

FACTS:
Quisumbing brought an action against the Philippine National Bank to
enforce an alleged right to redeem certain real properties foreclosed by PNB.
Quisumbing brought the suit as assignee of the mortgagor, Komatsu
Industries (Phils.), Incorporated. With notice of pending civil action, Santiago
Land Dev’t Corp purchased from PNB one of the properties subject to
litigation for 90 million.
SLDC filed a motion to intervene, alleging that it was the transferee
pendente lite of the property and that any adverse ruling or decision, which
might be rendered against PNB, would necessarily affect it.
Quisumbing opposed SLDC's motion for intervention. He argued that
SLDC's interest in the subject property was a mere contingency or
expectancy, which was dependent on any judgment which might be
rendered for or against PNB as transferor. The court then granted
petitioner’s motion for intervention and directed the substitution of heirs in
view of Norberto Quisumbing’s demise and submitted for resolution PNBs
motion to dismiss.
ISSUE/S:
WON SLDC, as transferee pendente lite of the property in litigation has
a right to intervene.

RULING:
While it may be that respondent SLDC has a legal interest in the
subject matter of the litigation, its interest as transferee pendente lite is
different from that of an intervenor. Section 2 of Rule 12 refers to all other
persons or entities whose legal interests stand to be affected by a litigation,
but it does not cover a transferee pendente lite because such transferee is
already specifically governed by Section 20 of Rule 3. Since it specifically
covers transferees pendente lite, any such transferee cannot just disregard
said provision and instead, opt to participate as an intervenor when it is
more convenient for it to do so.
It has been consistently held that a transferee pendente lite stands in
exactly the same position as its predecessor-in-interest, that is, the original
defendant. However, should the transferee pendente lite choose to
participate in the proceedings, it can only do so as a substituted defendant
or as a joint party-defendant. The transferee pendente lite is a proper but not
an indispensable party as it would in any event be bound by the judgment
against his predecessor-in-interest. This would be true even if respondent
SLDC is not formally included as a party defendant through an amendment
of the complaint. As such, the transferee pendente lite is bound by the
proceedings already had in the case before the property was transferred to
it.