Balabagan, Sittie Aina M.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People vs. Jabinal

GR No. L-30061 (February 27, 1974)
#53-56 and 84
FACTS:

G.R. No. L-19650 September 29, 1966 Jabinal was found guilty of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm and

CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC vs. ENRICO PALOMAR, in his capacity Ammunition.

as THE POSTMASTER GENERAL

The accused admitted that on September 5, 1964, he was in possession of
the revolver and the ammunition described in the complaint, without the
FACTS:
requisite license or permit. He, however, claimed to be entitled to

In 1960, Caltex launched their "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest", which called
for participants to estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump at
each Caltex station will dispense during a specified period.Participants were
not required consideration nor pay a fee. No purchase of Caltex products
were also required to be made. Entry forms were to be made available upon
request at each Caltex station where a sealed can would be provided for the
deposit of accomplished entry stubs.
exoneration because, although he had no license or permit, he had an
appointment as Secret Agent from the Provincial Governor of Batangas and
an appointment as Confidential Agent from the PC Provincial Commander,
and the said appointments expressly carried with them the authority to
possess and carry the firearm in question.
The accused contended before the court a quo that in view of his above-

Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails not only as amongst the media for mentioned appointments as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent, with
publicizing the contest but also for the transmission of communications authority to possess the firearm subject matter of the prosecution, he was
relative thereto, representations were made by Caltex with the postal entitled to acquittal on the basis of the Supreme Courts decision in People
authorities for the contest to be cleared in advance for mailing, having in vs. Macarandang(1959) and People vs. Lucero(1958) and not on the basis of
view the Anti-lottery provisions of the Revised Administrative Code.
the latest reversal and abandonment in People vs. Mapa (1967).
Postmaster General Enrico Palomar denied the request, arguing that the
said contest violated the provisions of the law on subject. CALTEX sought
ISSUE:
judicial intervention wherein the trial court ruled in its favor. Respondent
Palomar appealed, posing the same argument that the said contest violated
Whether or not appellant should be acquitted on the basis of the courts
the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law.
rulings in Macarandang and Lucero, or should his conviction stand in view of

Issue: the complete reversal of the MAcarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa.
Whether or not the "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" fell on the purview of the
prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law. RULING:
HELD:
The Postal Law does not allow any lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme for the Decisions of this Court, under Article 8 of the New Civil Code states that
distribution of money, or of any real or personal property by lot, chance, or Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall
drawing of any kind". form a part of the legal system . The settled rule supported by numerous
authorities is a restatement of legal maxim legis interpretatio legis vim
The Court held that the "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" by CALTEX is not a
obtinet the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent
lottery nor a gift enterprise but rather a gratuitous distribution of property
court has the force of law.
by chance, which the law does not prohibit. The term "lottery" extends to all
schemes for the distribution of prizes by chance, such as policy playing, gift
Appellant was appointed as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent and
exhibitions, prize concerts, raffles at fairs, etc., and various forms of
gambling. The three essential elements of a lottery are: First, consideration; authorized to possess a firearm pursuant to the prevailing doctrine
second, prize; and third, chance. The contest in question, lacking the enunciated in Macarandang and Lucero under which no criminal liability
element of consideration, cannot be deemed al lottery. The rules of the would attach to his possession of said firearm in spite of the absence of a
contest made no mention of a valuable consideration of some kind being
license and permit therefor, appellant must be absolved. Certainly, appellant
paid directly or indirectly for the chance to draw a prize. The term gift
may not be punished for an act which at the time it was done was held not to
enterprise also could not embrace the scheme at bar. As already noted,
there is no sale of anything to which the chance offered is attached as an be punishable.
inducement to the purchaser. The contest is open to all qualified contestants
irrespective of whether or not they buy the appellee's products. The appellant was acquitted.

By virtue of noscitur a sociis which Opinion 217 aforesaid also relied upon
although only insofar as the element of chance is concerned it is only Adasa vs. Abalos
logical that the term under a construction should be accorded no other
Bernadette Adasa vs. Cecille Abalos
meaning than that which is consistent with the nature of the word associated
therewith. Hence, if lottery is prohibited only if it involves a consideration, so G.R. No. 168617 February 19, 2007
also must the term "gift enterprise" be so construed. Significantly, there is not Chico-Nazario, J.:
in the law the slightest indication of any intent to eliminate that element of
consideration from the "gift enterprise" therein included.
Facts: Respondent Cecille Abalos alleged in the complaints-affidavits that
petitioner Bernadette Adasa, through deceit, received and encashed two
checks issued in the name of respondent without respondents knowledge
and consent and that despite repeated demands by the latter, petitioner
failed and refused to pay the proceeds of the checks. A resolution was
issued by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan City finding probable
cause against petitioner and ordering the filing of two separate Informations
for Estafa Thru Falsification of Commercial Document by a Private Individual,
under Article 315 in relation to Articles 171 and 172 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended.
Dissatisfied with the finding of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan City,
petitioner later filed a Petition for Review before the DOJ. In a Resolution, the
DOJ reversed and set aside the resolution of the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Iligan City and directed the said office to withdraw the
Information for Estafa against petitioner. The said DOJ resolution prompted
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan City to file a Motion to Withdraw
Information.
Respondent Abalos thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration of said
resolution of the DOJ arguing that the DOJ should have dismissed outright
the petition for review since Section 7 of DOJ Circular No. 70 mandates that
when an accused has already been arraigned and the aggrieved party files a
petition for review before the DOJ, the Secretary of Justice cannot, and
should not take cognizance of the petition, or even give due course thereto,
but instead deny it outright. Respondent claimed Section 12 thereof
mentions arraignment as one of the grounds for the dismissal of the petition
for review before the DOJ.
In another resolution, the DOJ denied the Motion for Reconsideration opining
that under Section 12, in relation to Section 7, of DOJ Circular No. 70, the
Secretary of Justice is not precluded from entertaining any appeal taken to
him even where the accused has already been arraigned in court. This is due
to the permissive language may utilized in Section 12 whereby the
Secretary has the discretion to entertain an appealed resolution
notwithstanding the fact that the accused has been arraigned.
Issue: Is the over-all language of Sections 7 and 12 of Department Circular
No. 70 permissive and directory such that the Secretary of Justice may
entertain an appeal despite the fact that the accused had been arraigned?
Held: No. When an accused has already been arraigned, the DOJ must not
give the appeal or petition for review due course and must dismiss the same.
If the intent of Department Circular No. 70 were to give the Secretary of
Justice a discretionary power to dismiss or to entertain a petition for review
despite its being out rightly dismissible, such as when the accused has
already been arraigned, or where the crime the accused is being charged
with has already prescribed, or there is no reversible error that has been
committed, or that there are legal or factual grounds warranting dismissal,
the result would not only be incongruous but also irrational and even unjust.
For then, the action of the Secretary of Justice of giving due course to the
petition would serve no purpose and would only allow a great waste of time.
Moreover, to give the second sentence of Section 12 in relation to its
paragraph (e) a directory application would not only subvert the avowed
objectives of the Circular, that is, for the expeditious and efficient
administration of justice, but would also render its other mandatory
provisions Sections 3, 5, 6 and 7, nugatory.
Aparri vs CA GR L-30057
Facts:
On January 15, 1960, private respondent approved the following resolution #
13, hereby appointing Mr. Bruno Aparri, as general manager of NARRA, with
all the rights, prerogatives and compensations to take effect on January 116,
1960.
On March 15, 1962, the board of directors approved resolution # 24 which
stating thereat that the incumbent general manager shall perform his duty up
to the close of office hour on March 31, 1962. In accordance with the
provisions of section 8, sub-section 2 of RA 1160. It hereby fixes the term of
office of the incumbent general manager until march 31, 1962. Petitioner file
a mandamus with preliminary injunction with the first instance court. The
petition pray for the annulment of the resolution of NARRA board.
Issue:
Whether or not board resolution No. 24 was a removal or dismissal of
petitioner without cause.
Held:
It was affirmed that the term of office of petitioner expired on March 31, 1962.
It is necessary in each case to interpret the word "Term" with the purview of
the statutes so as to effectuate the statutory scheme pertaining to the office
under examination. In the case at bar, the term of office is not fixed by law.
However, the power to fix the term is rested in the board of directors subject
to the recommendation of the office of economic coordination and the
approval of the president of the philippines. Resolution No. 24 speaks of no
removal but an expiration of the term of office of the petitioner. The statute is
undeniably clear. "It is the rule in statutory construction that if the words and
phrases of a statute are not obscure or ambiguous. Its meaning and intention
of the legislative must be determined from the language employed and
where there is no ambiguity in words, there is no room for construction.
The petitioner in this case was not removed before the expiration of his term
rather, his right to hold office ceased by the expiration on March 31, 1962, of
his term to hold such office.
Party-list Representatives:AMORES v HRETGR 189600,
6/29/2010SUMMARY:
Petition to declare Villanueva as ineligible to hold office as representative of
CIBAC for being overage to representyouth. Change of affiliation must be
made six months before elections. Youth sector is represented by 25
30.
FACTS:


5/14/2009: Petition for certiorari challenging the assumption of office of one

Emmanuel Joel Villanueva asrepresentative of CIBAC in the HoR.

Petitioner argues:

Villanueva was 31 at the time of filing of nomination, beyond the age limit of
30 which was the limitimposed by RA 7941 for "youth sector".
o

Villanueva's change of affiliation from Youth Sector to OFW and families not
affected six months priorto elections.

Respondent argues:

RA 7941 requirement for "age" for youth sector representative only

applicable to first three electionsafter the party list act.

There was no resultant change in affiliation.

ISSUE:

Whether the requirement for youth sector representatives apply to

respondent Villanueva
RULING
:

Villauneva ineligible to hold office as a member of HoR representing CIBAC

HELD:

Villanueva's arguments are invalid. The law is clear. If representative of youth

sector, should be between 25to 30.

Villanueva is ineligible to also represent OFW. Sectoral representation

should be changed SIX MONTHS priorto elections.