STATCON

Chapter 3. September 3, 2015

1. Taada vs. Yulo

FACTS:
Petitioner is a Justice of Peace appointed by the Gov. Gen. with the
consent by the Philippine Commission, assigned to Alabat, Tayabas.
Later in his service, he was transferred to Perez, Tayabas. He reached
his 65th birthday on October 5, 1934, subsequent to the approval of
Act No. 3899 which makes mandatory the retirement of all justices who
have reached 65 years of age at the time said Act takes effect on
January 1, 1933. The judge of First instance, acting upon the directive
of the Secretary of Respondent Justice, directed Petitioner to cease
holding office pursuant to Act No. 3899.
ISSUE:
1. W/N Petitioner should cease to hold office.
2. W/N his transfer is considered a new transfer and requires
confirmation by the Philippine Commission.
HELD:
1. The natural and reasonable meaning of the language used in Act
No. 3899, leaves room for no other deducting than that a justice of the
peace appointed prior to the approval of the Act and who completed
sixty-five years of age on September 13, 1934, subsequent to the
approval of the Act, which was on November 16, 1931, and to the date
fixed for cessation from office which was on January 1, 1933, is not
affected by the said Act.
A justice of the peace like the petitioner who became sixty-five years of

age on October 5, 1934, was not included in a law which required

justice of the peace sixty-five years of age to cease to hold office on
January 1, 1933.
2. It is to be deduced that according to the United States Supreme
Court, the transfer simply amounted to an enlargement or change of
jurisdiction grounded on the original appointment and thus did not
require a new appointment. Whatever our view is might have been to
the contrary, it now becomes our duty to follow the decision of the
higher court. It also seems evident that a transfer as applied to officers
amounts merely to a change of position or to another grade of service.
Discussion:
(Liberal construction v Judicial Legislation)
Courts are bound to follow the plain words of a statute as to which
there is no room for construction regardless of the consequences.
In this case, the counsel urges us to adopt a liberal construction of the
statute. That in this instance, as in the past, we aim to do.
But counsel in his memorandum concedes "that the language of the
proviso in question is somewhat defective and does not clearly convey
the legislative intent", and at the hearing in response to questions
was finally forced to admit that what the Government desired was
for the court to insert words and phrases in the law in order to supply
an intention for the legislature. That we cannot do.
By liberal construction of statutes, courts are able to find their true
meaning. Courts take into account the language use, the subject
matter, and the purposes of those framing them .There is a sharp
distinction, however, between construction of this nature and the act of
a court in engrafting upon a law something that has been omitted
which someone believes ought to have been embraced. The
former is liberal construction and is a legitimate exercise of
judicial power. The latter is judicial legislation forbidden by the

tripartite division of powers among the three departments of

government, the executive, the legislative, and the judicial.
It is fundamental that the determination of the legislative
intent is the primary consideration. However, it is equally
fundamental that that legislative intent must be determined from
the language of the statute itself.
This principle must be adhered to even though the court be
convinced by extraneous circumstances that the Legislature
intended to enact something very different from that which it did
enact. An obscurity cannot be created to be cleared up by construction
and hidden meanings at variance with the language used cannot be
sought out.
2. Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp v NLRC and Salazar
FACTS:
In 1982, Imelda Salazar was employed as a general systems analyst
as well as Delfin Saldivar by GMCR. In 1984, reports of missing
company equipment and spare parts under the custody of Saldivar
were prevalent. This prompted GMCR to conduct an investigation
regarding the activities of the latter.
According to the report, Saldivar had entered a partnership with
Yambao, owner and manager of Elecon Engineering Services, a
supplier of equipment and spare parts of petitioner. Salazar signed as
witness to the partnership between Saldivar and Yambao and it
appeared that she had knowledge of the whereabouts of the aircon
units that Saldivar had taken. Unfortunately, Salazar failed to inform
her employer.

Salazar was placed under preventive suspension for one month. But
instead of submitting a letter of explanation, Salazar filed a complaint
against GMCR for illegal suspension. Subsequently, she amended her
complaint. After due hearing, the Labor Arbiter ordered the petitioner to
reinstate Salazar to her formal position. On appeal, NLRC, limited the
back wages to a period of two years and deleted award for moral
damages.
ISSUES:
1. WON Salazars dismissal is legal
2. WON Salazar is entitled to backwages
HELD:
1. YES. Salazar was suspended. P.S. does not mean that employee
was guilty, she was asked to explain. Si it is erroneous to conclude that
GMCR had violated her right to due process. She even ignored the
memo to give her side on the matter.
2. In this case, there was no evidence which clearly showed a cause
for the dismissal. She had every right, not only to reinstatement, to full
backwages. The Labor Code is clear and unambiguous in the
statement that those employees that are wrongfully dismissed are
entitled to backwages and reinstatement. An exception to
reinstatement is strained relationship. To qualify, one must be in a
position of trust and loyalty but Salazar is not in the position
mentioned, she can be reinstated. An employee must be terminated
because of mere presumptions.
Discussion:
Under the principles of statutory construction, if a statute is
clears plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its
literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This

plain meaning rule or verbal legis derived from the maxim index animi
sermo est(speech is the index of intention) rests on the valid
presumption that the words employed by, the legislature in a statute
correctly express its intent or will and preclude the court from
construing it differently

3. ALonzo v IAC
FACTS:
5 brothers and sisters inherited in pro indiviso a parcel of land
registered in the name of their deceased parents. One of them,
Celestino Padua, transferred his undivided share to the petitioners by
way of absolute sale. A year later, Eustaquia, his sister, sold her own
share to the same petitioners. The petitioners occupied an area
corresponding to 2/5 of the said lot which represented the portions sold
to them.
In 1976, Mariano Padua, one of the 5 co-heirs, sought to redeem the
area sold to the spouses Alonzo but his complaint was dismissed when
it appeared that he was an American citizen. In 1977, Tecla Padula,
another co-heir, filed her own complaint invoking her right of
redemption.

problem of alleged delays. The instant case presents no such problem

because the right of redemption was invoked not days, but years after
the sales were made. T.P filed the case 13years after the first sale and
14years after the second sale. The co-heirs in this case were
undeniably informed of the sales although no notice in writing was
given to them.
Discussion:
The spirit, rather than the letter of a statute determines its construction,
hence, a statute must be read according to its spirit or intent. For what
is within the spirit is within the letter but although it is not within
the letter thereof, and that which is within the letter but not
within the spirit is not within the statute. Stated differently, a thing
which is within the intent of the lawmaker is as much within the statute
as if within the letter; and a thing which is within the letter of the statute
is not within the statute unless within the intent of the lawmakers
4. Salvacion v Central Bank

HELD:

FACTS: Greg Bartelli, an American tourist, was arrested for committing

four counts of rape and serious illegal detention against Karen
Salvacion. Police recovered from him several dollar checks and a
dollar account in the China Banking Corp. He was, however, able to
escape from prison. In a civil case filed against him, the trial court
awarded Salvacion moral, exemplary and attorneys fees amounting to
almost P1,000,000.00.

In requiring written notice, Art. 1088 seeks to ensure that the

redemptioner is properly notified of the sale and to indicate such notice
as the starting time of the 30-day redemption period. Considering the
shortness of the period, it is really necessary, as a general rule, to
pinpoint the precise date it is supposed to begin, to do away with any

Salvacion tried to execute the judgment on the dollar deposit of Bartelli

with the China Banking Corp. but the latter refused arguing that
Section 11 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 exempts foreign currency
deposits from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process
of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative

ISSUE: WON written notice is required in relation to Art. 1088 of Civil

Code

body whatsoever.
Salvacion therefore filed this action for declaratory relief in the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Should Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and
Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426, as amended by PD 1246,
otherwise known as the Foreign Currency Deposit Act be made
applicable to a foreign transient?
HELD: The provisions of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960
and PD No. 1246, insofar as it amends Section 8 of Republic Act No.
6426, are hereby held to be INAPPLICABLE to this case because of its
peculiar circumstances. Respondents are hereby required to comply
with the writ of execution issued in the civil case and to release to
petitioners the dollar deposit of Bartelli in such amount as would satisfy
the judgment.
RATIO: Supreme Court ruled that the questioned law makes futile the
favorable judgment and award of damages that Salvacion and her
parents fully deserve. It then proceeded to show that the economic
basis for the enactment of RA No. 6426 is not anymore present; and
even if it still exists, the questioned law still denies those entitled to due
process of law for being unreasonable and oppressive. The intention of
the law may be good when enacted. The law failed to anticipate the
iniquitous effects producing outright injustice and inequality such as the
case before us.
The SC adopted the comment of the Solicitor General who argued that
the Offshore Banking System and the Foreign Currency Deposit
System were designed to draw deposits from foreign lenders and
investors and, subsequently, to give the latter protection. However, the
foreign currency deposit made by a transient or a tourist is not the kind

of deposit encouraged by PD Nos. 1034 and 1035 and given

incentives and protection by said laws because such depositor stays
only for a few days in the country and, therefore, will maintain his
deposit in the bank only for a short time. Considering that Bartelli is just
a tourist or a transient, he is not entitled to the protection of Section
113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246 against
attachment, garnishment or other court processes.
Further, the SC said: In fine, the application of the law depends on the
extent of its justice. Eventually, if we rule that the questioned Section
113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 which exempts from attachment,
garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative
body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever, is
applicable to a foreign transient, injustice would result especially to a
citizen aggrieved by a foreign guest like accused Greg Bartelli. This
would negate Article 10 of the New Civil Code which provides that in
case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed
that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.
Discussion:
In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is
presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to
prevail (Art. 10, Civil Code)
5. People v Purisima
FACTS:
These twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review filed by the People of the
Philippines represented, respectively, by the Office of the City Fiscal of
Manila, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Samar, and joined by the
Solicitor General, are consolidated in this one Decision as they involve
one basic question of law.

The respondent-courts are: CFI of Manila Branches VII and XVIII and
CFI of Samar
Several informations were filed before the abovementioned courts
charging the accused of Illegal Possession of Deadly Weapon in
violation of Presidential Decree #9. The counsel of the defense filed
motions to quash the said informations after which the respondentcourts passed their own orders quashing the said informations on
common ground that the informations did not allege facts constituting
ang offense penalized until PD#9 for failure to state an essential
element of the crime, which is, that the carrying outside of the
accuseds residence of a bladed, pointed, or blunt weapon is in
furtherance or on the occasion of, connected with, or related to to
subversion, insurrection, or rebellion, organized lawlessness or public
disorder.
The respondent courts stand that PD#9 should be read in the context
ofProc.1081 which seeks to maintain law and order in the country as
well as the prevention and suppression of all forms of lawless violence.
The non-inclusion of the aforementioned element may not be
distinguished from other legislation related to the illegal possession of
deadly weapons. Judge Purisima, in particular, reasoned that the
information must allege that the purpose of possession of the weapon
was intended for the purposes of abetting the conditions of criminality,
organized lawlessness, public disorder. The petitioners said that the
purpose of subversion is not necessary in this regard because the
prohibited act is basically a malum prohibitum or is an action or
conduct that is prohibited by virtue of a statute. The City Fiscal also
added in cases of statutory offenses, the intent is immaterial and that
the commission of the act is voluntary is enough.
ISSUE: Are the informations filed by the people sufficient in form and
substance to constitute the offense of Illegal possession of deadly
weapon penalized under Presidential Decree No. 9?

HELD
1. It is the constitutional right of any person who stands charged in a
criminal prosecution to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him.
2. Under Sec. 5 Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, for a complaint or
information to be sufficient, it must state the designation of the offense
by the statute and the acts or omissions complained of as constituting
the offense. This is essential to avoid surprise on the accused and to
afford him the opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly.
3. The supreme court says that the preamble of PD#9 states that the
intention of such decree is to penalize the acts which are related
to Proc.1081 which aim to suppress lawlessness, rebellion, subversive
acts, and the like. While the preamble is not a part of the statute, it
implies the intent and spirit of the decree. The preamble and whereas
clauses also enumerate the facts or events which justify the
promulgation of the decree and the stiff sanctions provided.
The petition is DISMISSED.

Discussion:
The problem of determining what acts fall within the purview of
a statute, it becomes necessary to inquire into the intent and
spirit of the decree. This can be found among others in the
preamble or, whereas" clauses which enumerate the facts or events
which justify the promulgation of the decree and the stiff sanctions
stated therein.

It is a salutary principle in statutory construction that there exists

a valid presumption that undesirable consequences were never
intended by a legislative measure, and that a construction of which
the statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all
objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil, and injurious
consequence
6. Matabuena v Cervantes
FACTS:
Felix Matabuena cohabitated with Respondent. During this period,
Felix Matabuena donated to Respondent a parcel of land. Later the
two were married. After the death of Felix Matabuena, his sister,
Petitioner, sought the nullification of the donation citing Art.133 of the
Civil Code Every donation between the spouses during the marriage
shall be void.
The trial court ruled that this case was not covered by the prohibition
because the donation was made at the time the deceased and
Respondent were not yet married and were simply cohabitating.
ISSUE:
W/N the prohibition applies to donations between live-in partners.
HELD:
Yes. It is a fundamental principle in statutory construction that what is
within the spirit of the law is as much a part of the law as what is
written. Since the reason
for the ban on donations between spouses during the marriage is
to prevent the possibility of undue influence and improper pressure
being exerted by one spouse on the other, there is no reason why this
prohibition shall not apply also to common-law relationships. The
court, however, said that the lack of the donation made by
the deceased to Respondent does not necessarily mean that the

Petitioner will have exclusive rights to the disputed property because

the relationship between Felix and Respondent were legitimated by
marriage
The lack of validity of the donation made by the deceased to defendant
Petronila Cervantes does not necessarily result in plaintiff having
exclusive right to the disputed property. Prior to the death of Felix
Matabuena, the relationship between him and the defendant was
legitimated by their marriage on March 28, 1962. She is therefore his
widow. As provided for in the Civil Code, she is entitled to one-half of
the inheritance and the plaintiff, as the surviving sister, to the other
half.
Discussion:
Supplying the legislative omission, the court ruled that the ban of
donation between spouses applies to a common-law relationship.
Other view: While Art. 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a
"donation between the spouses during the marriage", policy
considerations of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of
morality require that the same prohibition should apply to a commonlaw relationship.
Principle
The Law prohibits donations in favor of the other consort and his
descendants because of fear and undue and improper pressire
and influence upon the donor, a prejudice deeply rooted in
ancient law. Whatever omission may be apparent in an
interpretation purely literal of the language used must be
remedied by an adherence to its avowed objective. It is a principle
of statutory construction that what is within the spirit of the law is

as much a part of it as what is written. Otherwise, the basic

purpose discernible in such codal provision would not be
attained.
7. Del Mar v PAGCOR
FACTS:
These two consolidated petitions concern the issue of whether the
franchise granted to the Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation (PAGCOR) includes the right to manage and operate jaialai.
The Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation is a
government-owned and controlled corporation organized and existing
under Presidential Decree No. 1869 which was enacted on July 11,
1983. Pursuant to Sections 1 and 10 of P.D. No. 1869, respondent
PAGCOR requested for legal advice from the Secretary of Justice as
to whether or not it is authorized by its Charter to operate and manage
jai-alai frontons in the country. In its Opinion No. 67, Series of 1996
dated July 15, 1996, the Secretary of Justice opined that the authority
of PAGCOR to operate and maintain games of chance or gambling
extends to jai-alai which is a form of sport or game played for
bets and that the Charter of PAGCOR amounts to a legislative
franchise for the purpose.[1] Similar favorable opinions were received
by PAGCOR from the Office of the Solicitor General per its letter
dated June 3, 1996 and the Office of theGovernment Corporate
Counsel under its Opinion No. 150 dated June 14, 1996Thus,
PAGCOR started the operation of jai-alai frontons.
On May 6, 1999, petitioner Raoul B. del Mar initially filed in G.R.
No. 138298 a Petition for Prohibition to prevent respondent
PAGCOR from managing and/or operating the jai-alai or Basque
pelota games, by itself or in agreement with Belle Corporation, on the

ground that the controverted act is patently illegal and devoid of any
basis either from the Constitution or PAGCORs own Charter.
However, on June 17, 1999, respondent PAGCOR entered into
an Agreement with private respondents Belle Jai Alai Corporation
(BELLE) and Filipinas Gaming Entertainment Totalizator Corporation
(FILGAME) wherein it was agreed that BELLE will make available to
PAGCOR the required infrastructure facilities including the main
fronton, as well as provide the needed funding for jai-alai operations
with no financial outlay from PAGCOR, while PAGCOR handles the
actual management and operation of jai-alai
Thus, on August 10, 1999, petitioner Del Mar filed a Supplemental
Petition for Certiorari questioning the validity of said Agreement on
the ground that PAGCOR is without jurisdiction, legislative franchise,
authority or power to enter into such Agreement for the opening,
establishment, operation, control and management of jai-alai games.
A little earlier, or on July 1, 1999, petitioners Federico S. Sandoval
II and Michael T. Defensor filed a Petition for Injunction, docketed as
G.R. No. 138982, which seeks to enjoin respondent PAGCOR from
operating or otherwise managing the jai-alai or Basque pelota games
by itself or in joint venture with Belle Corporation, for being patently
illegal, having no basis in the law or the Constitution, and in usurpation
of the authority that properly pertains to the legislative branch of the
government. In this case, a Petition in Intervention was filed by Juan
Miguel Zubiri alleging that the operation by PAGCOR of jai-alai is
illegal because it is not included in the scope of PAGCORs franchise
which covers only games of chance.
Petitioners Raoul B. del Mar, Federico S. Sandoval II, Michael T.
Defensor, and intervenor Juan Miguel Zubiri, are suing as taxpayers
and in their capacity as members of the House of
Representatives representing the First District of Cebu City, the Lone
Congressional District of Malabon-Navotas, the Third Congressional

District of Quezon City, and the Third Congressional District of

Bukidnon, respectively.

ISSUE
PAGCOR filed a motion for reconsideration seeking to reverse the
decision of the court which enjoined(cease and desist order; prohibit)
PAGCOR from managing, maintaining and operating jai-alai games
andfrom enforcing the agreement entered into by them for
that purpose.Whether or not PAGCOR has a franchise to operate jai-alai.
HELD
The SC denied the motions for reconsideration due to lack of required
number of votes because only 7 justices voted to grant the
motions.Opinions of Justices:PUNO Justice Puno denied the motion for
reconsideration of PAGCOR. PD 1869 is an express amendment of
PDs1067-A, 1067-B, 1067-C, 1399 and 1622. It is clear in the
PAGCOR charter that it does not include thosegames of chance
covered by an existing franchise. Since Jai Alai has an existing
franchise to operate. Itcould not have been the intent of Congress to
grant franchises to operate jai-alai to 2 entities within thesame
jurisdiction. PD 1869 suffers from the vice of vagueness since
PAGCOR had to seek the legalopinions of not just 1 but several
government agencies. To begin with, PAGCOR was not authorized
tocentralize and integrate all games of chance that have existing
franchises. And the repeal of PD 810 didnot have any effect on the
franchise of PAGCOR. In contending that jai-alai is impliedly included
in Section10 of PD 1869, PAGCOR is suggesting that
an illegal act may be legalized by mere implication of law
.MELO Justice Melo granted the motion for
reconsideration. PAGCORs charter states that it is allowed to
establishand operate clubs and casinos, for amusement and recreation,

including sports, gaming pools (basketball,football, lotteries, etc) and

such other forms of amusement and recreation
including games of chance,which may be allowed by law within the
territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines.In construing a statute, courts
have to take the thought conveyed by the statute as a whole; construe
theconstituent parts together, ascertain the legislative intent from
the whole act, consider each and everyprovision thereof in the light of
the general purpose of the statute; and
endeavor to make every part effective, harmonious and sensible
.Verga legis non est recendum from the words of a statute there
should be no departure.Petitioners Raoul Del Mar contends that they
have brought the present suit in their capacity as taxpayersand
legislators. For a taxpayers suit to prosper, the petitioners (del mar)
must have
locus standi
(legalstanding). No public fund raised by taxation is involved in this
case. No spending powers of Congress areinvolved nor is there an
allegation of illegal disbursement of funds. Taxpayers suit the
act complained directly involves the illegal disbursement of public
funds derived fromtaxation.VITUG Justice Vitug grant the petition to
enjoin PAGCOR from operating jai-alai through BELLE and FILGAME
orthrough any other agency and denies the petition to
prohibit PAGCOR from itself managing or operatingthose
games. PAGCORs charter states to establish and operate clubs and casinos for
amusement andrecreation, including games of chance is broad enough
to allow PAGCOR to operate all kinds of sports andgaming pools,
inclusive of jai-alai BUT NOT in joint ventre agreement with BELLE and
FILGAME. The grantof a franchise is a purely legislative act that
cannot be delegated to PAGCOR without violating theConstitution.DE
LEON Justice de Leon granted the petition filed by PAGCOR.Section
10 of PD 1869Section 10. Nature and term of franchise x x x
authority to operate and maintain gambling casinos,clubs and other
recreation or amusement places, sports,

gaming pools
, i.e. basketball, football, lotteries,
etc.
x x xGaming the act or practice of playing games for stakesEt cetera
(etc) depends largely on the context of the instrument, description
and enumeration of thematters preceeding the term and subject to
which it is applied. When used in a statute, the words shouldbe given
their usual and natural signication

duties were levied and imposed upon petitioner.

2. On May 23, 1955, a motion to dismiss was filed at the Court of Tax
Appeal but was dismissed on the ground that it had no jurisdiction to
review decisions of the Collector of Customs of Manila, citing section 7
of Republic Act No. 1125, creating said tax court
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 11 of RA 1125 allows the respondent court to
review decisions of the Collector of Customs?

Discussion:

HELD:
The court holds that under the law, particularly, the Customs Law and
Republic Act No. 1125, the Court of Tax Appeals has no jurisdiction to
review by appeal, decisions of the Collector of Customs. The
Commissioner of Customs is purely administrative, whereas, appeal to
the Court of Tax Appeal is manifestly judicial. And it is a sound rule
that before one resorts to the Courts, the administrative remedy
provided by law should first be exhausted. In the second place, the two
remedies suggested by the petitioner would result in confusion
because a person adversely affected by a decision of a Collector of
Customs could not be sure where to seek the remedy, whether with
the Commissioner of Customs or with the Court of Tax Appeals, and it
might even be difficult for him to decide because, if he took the appeal
directly to the Tax Court, that would ordinarily cut off his remedy before
the Commissioner of Customs for the reason that, should the Court of
Tax Appeals decide against him, he may not appeal said decision to
the Commissioner of Customs because the Commissioner as an
administrative officer may not review the decision of the Court. On the
other hand, if the person affected by a decision of a Collector of
Customs took his appeal to the Commissioner of Customs, and there
receives an adverse decision, he may yet appeal wherefrom to the
Court of Tax Appeals. Furthermore, even if the person affected by an
adverse ruling of the Collector of Customs took his appeal to the Court
of Tax Appeals, as advocated by counsel for the petitioner, under the

The fact that the statute admits of different interpretations is the

best evidence that the statute is vague and ambiguous. It is
widely acknowledged that a statute is ambiguous when it is capable of
being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in either of two
or more senses.
In the cases at bar, it is difficult to see how a literal reading of
the statutory text would unerringly reveal the legislative intent.
Sutherland tells us that a statute is ambiguous, and so open to
explanation by extrinsic aids, not only when its abstract meaning or the
connotation of its terms is uncertain, but also when it is uncertain in its
application to, or effect upon, the fact-situation of the case at bar
8. Lopez & Sons v CTA
FACTS:
1. Lopez & Sons imported hexagonal wire netting from Hamburg,
Germany. The Manila Collector of Customs assessed the
corresponding customs duties on the importation on the basis of
consular and supplies invoices. Said customs duties were paid and the
shipments were released. Subsequently, however, and freight of said
wire netting and as a result of the reassessment, additional customs

literal meaning of section 11, the Tax Court may refuse to entertain
said appeal, as was done in the present case, on the ground that
under section 7 of Republic Act No. 1125, it had no jurisdiction to
review a decision of the Collector of Customs, section 7 clearly limiting
its appellate jurisdiction to review decisions of the Commissioner of
Customs.
Discussion:
Who has jurisdiction to review decisions of Collector of Customs

Some weird sh*t

Latin Maxims
1.
Falsa demonstratio non nocet, cum de corpore constat
False description does not preclude construction nor vitiate the
meaning of the statute; False description does not preclude
construction nor vitiate the meaning of the statute which is
otherwise unclear.
2.
Favorabilia sunt amplianda, adiosa restringenda; Favores
ampliandi sunt; odia restringenda Penal laws which are
favorable to the accused are given retroactive effect.
3.
Fiat justicia, ruat coelom Let right be done, though the
heavens fall.
4.
Generale dictum generaliter est interpretandum A
general statement is understood in a general sense.
5.
Hoc quidem perquam durum est, sed ita lex scripta est It
is exceedingly hard but so the law is written.
6.
Ibi quid generaliter conceditur; inest haec exceptio, si non
aliquid sit contras jus basque Where anything is granted
generally, this exception is implied; that nothing shall be contrary
to law and right.
7.
Impossibilium nulla obligatio est There is no obligation to
do an impossible thing.
8.
In eo quod plus sit, semper inest et minus The greater
includes the lesser.
9.
In pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis (in the book,
this maxim appears to mean No man should be allowed to take
advantage of his own wrong, but that is also the meaning of
Nullus commodum potest de injuria propriasua)
10.
Interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium The interest of the
State demands that there be an end to litigation; Public interest
requires that by the very nature of things there must be an end to
a legal controversy.

11.
Interpretatio talis in ambiguis semper fienda est ut evitetur
inconveniens et absurdum; Interpretato talis in ambiguis semper
frienda est, ut evitatur inconveniens et absurdum Where there
is ambiguity, such interpretation as will avoid inconvenience and
absurdity is to be adopted.
12.
Jure naturae aequum est neminem cum alterius
detrimento et injuria fieri locupletiorem The fact that a statute is
silent, obscure, or insufficient with respect to a question before
the court will not justify the latter from declining to render
judgment thereon.
13.
Leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant Later
statute repeals prior ones which are repugnant thereto; A later
law repeals a prior law on the same subject which is repugnant
thereto.
14.
Maledicta est expositio quae corrumpit textum It is
dangerous construction which is against the text.
15.
Nemo tenetur ad impossibile The law obliges no one to
perform an impossibility.
16.
Nova constitutio futuris formam imponere debet non
praeteritis A new statute should affect the future, not the past.
17.
Nullum crimen sine poena, nulla poena sine legis There
is no crime without a penalty, and there is no penalty without a
law.
18.
Nullum tempus occurrit regi; Nullum tempus occurit
There can be no legal right as against the authority that makes
the law on which the right depends.
19.
Nullus commodum potest de injuria propriasua; Nullus
commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria No man should
be allowed to take advantage of his own wrong.
20.
Obiter dictum An opinion expressed by a court on some
question of law which is not necessary to the decision of the case
before it.

21.
Optimus interpres rerum usus The best interpreter of the
law is usage.
22.
Potior est in tempore, potior est in jure He who is first in
time is preferred in right.
23.
Privilegia recipiunt largam interpretationem voluntati
consonam concedentis; Privilegia reciprint largan
interpretationem voluntate consonan concedentis Privileges are
to be interpreted in accordance with the will of him who grants
them.
24.
Quando aliquid prohibetur ex directo, prohibetur et per
obliquum What is prohibited directly is prohibited indirectly;
What cannot, by law, be done directly cannot be done indirectly.
25.
Ratihabito mandato aquiparatur; Ratihabitio mandato
aequiparatur Legislative ratification is equivalent to a mandate.
26.
Ratio legis est anima legis; Ratio legis est anima The
reason of the law is its soul.
27.
Salus populi est suprema lex The voice of the people is
the supreme law.
28.
Statuta pro publico commodo late interpretantur Statutes
enacted for the public good are to be construed liberally.
29.
Summum jus, summa injuria The rigor of the law would
become the highest injustice.
30.
Surplusagium non nocet; Surplusagium non noceat
Surplusage does not vitiate a statute.
31.
Ubi jus, ubi remedium Where there is a right, there is a
remedy; Where there is a right, there is a remedy for violation
thereof.
32.
Utile per inutile non vitiatur The useful is not vitiated by
the non-useful.
33.
Verba accipienda sunt secundum subjectam materiam;
Verba accipienda sunt secundum materiam A word is to be
understood in the context in which it is used.

34.
Verba intentioni, non e contra, debent inservire Words
ought to be more subservient to the intent and not the intent to
the words.
35.
Vigilantibus et non dormientibus jura subveniunt The
laws aid the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights.