SALVACION v.

CENTRAL BANK
G.R. No. 94723 (August 21, 1997)

Facts:
● American tourist Greg Bartelli detained Karen, then 12 years old, for four days and was
able to rape the child at least 10 times. It was only after four days, after policemen and
people living nearby, rescued Karen, that Bartelli was arrested and detained. Two
criminal cases for Serious Illegal Detention and 4 counts of Rape were filed against
Bartelli. Petitioners also filed a civil case for damages with preliminary attachment
against Bartelli. Petitioners applied for the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment
and was issued by the trial court. The Notice of Garnishment was served on China
Banking Corporation. However, China Bank invoked R.A. No. 1405 and Section 113 of
Central Bank Circular No. 960 to the notice of garnishment served on it.

Issue:
(1) WON Sec. 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and the Foreign Currency
Deposit Act be made applicable to a foreign transient.

(2) WON Sec. 113 of Central Bank No. 960 should be applicable to the case.

Ruling:
(1) NO. It is evident from the relevant laws that the Offshore Banking System and the
Foreign Currency Deposit System were designed to draw deposits from foreign
lenders and investors. It is these deposits that are induced by the two laws and
given protection and incentives by them.

Obviously, the foreign currency deposit made by a transient or a tourist is not the
kind of deposit encouraged by PD Nos. 1034 and 1035 and given incentives and
protection by said laws because such depositor stays only for a few days in the
country and, therefore will maintain his deposit in the bank only for a short time.
Respondent Greg Bartelli is just a tourist or a transient. He deposited his dollars
with the respondent bank only for safekeeping during his temporary stay in the
Philippines.

(2) NO. If the Court rules that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank Circular
No. 960 which exempts from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or
process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative
body, is applicable to a foreign transient, injustice would result especially to a
citizen aggrieved by a foreign guest like accused Greg Bartelli. This would negate
Article 10 of the New Civil Code which provides that “in case of doubt in the
interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body
intended right and justice to prevail.”
It would be unthinkable, that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank No. 960
would be used as a device by accused Greg Bartelli for wrongdoing, and in so
doing, acquitting the guilty at the expense of the innocent.
PEOPLE vs ACIERTO
G.R. Nos. L-2708 (January 30, 1953)

Facts:
● Accused was employed by the US Army as court martial reporter on a salary basis in the
Judge Advocate Section. He was then “dropped from the strength report of this section”
and became a reporter on piece-work arrangement where he was paid for so much work
of reporting and transcribing as he performed
● It was when he was working in the latter capacity, in 1948, that he was said to have
made false claims and received compensation for services not rendered.
● Charged with violation of the 94th Article of War, he was placed under arrest by the US
Military authorities and brought to trial before a general court martial
● On arraignment, the defendant interposed a special plea to its jurisdiction but was
overruled, after which, trial proceeded on a plea of not guilty. He was then found guilty of
all the charges
● However, the Commanding General disapproved the former verdict and in an order
stated that “the sentence is disapproved upon the sole ground that this accused was not
subject to military law”
● He was conducted by a US Military office to the City of Attorney of Quezon City for
prosecution under the penal laws of the Philippines, and an information was then filed
which initiated the several cases on appeal
● Appellant states that in all the above seven cases he set up the plea of double jeopardy,

Issue:
WON the Court of First Instance of Quezon City was without jurisdiction of the cases at
bar

Ruling:
NO. The provision of the Bases Agreement is not, and cannot on principle or authority be
construed as a limitation upon the rights of the Philippine Government. If anything, it is
an emphatic recognition and reaffirmation of Philippine sovereignty over the bases and
of the truth that all jurisdiction rights granted to the US and not exercised by the latter are
reserved by the Philippine for itself.

The ten-day requirement is of directory character relating to procedure, inserted merely

for the convenience of the Philippine Government. It cannot and does not pretend to
diminish or impair the fundamental rights of jurisdiction reserved by the treaty for this
Government. It is an obligation imposed on the US precisely with a view to enabling the
Philippine Government the better to exercise its residual authority.
MUNICIPALITY OF MALABANG vs BENITO
G.R. No. L-28113 (March 28, 1969)

Facts:
● Petitioner Balindong is the mayor of Malabang, while the respondent Bonito is the
mayor, and the rest of the respondents are the councilors, of the municipality of
Balabagan
● Balabagan was formerly a part of the municipality of Malabang, having been created by
E.O 386 of the then President Carlos P Garcia, out of barrios and sitios of the latter
municipality
● Petitioners brought this action for prohibition to nullify E.O. 386 and to restrain the
respondent municipal officials from performing the functions of their respective office
relying on the ruling of the Court in Pelaez v Auditor General
● Respondents argue that the rule announced in Pelaez can have no application in this
case because unlike the municipalities involved in Pelaez, the municipality of Balabagan
is at least a de facto corporation

Issue:
WON the municipality of Balabagan is a de facto corporation

Ruling:
NO. There can be no de facto corporation created to take the place of an existing de jure
corporation, as such organization would clearly be a usurper.

In the cases where a de facto municipal corporation was recognized as such despite the fact
that the statute creating it was later invalidated, the decisions could fairly be made to rest on the
consideration that there was some other valid law giving corporate vitality to the organization.
Hence, in the case at bar, the mere fact that Balabagan was organized at a time when the
statute had not been invalidated cannot conceivably make it a de facto corporation, as,
independently of the Administrative Code provision in question, there is no other valid statute to
give color of authority to its creation.

Executive order 386 “created no office.” This is not to say, however, that the acts done by the
municipality of Balabagan in the exercise of its corporate powers are a nullity because the
executive order “is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed.”
For the existence of Executive Order 386 is “ an operative fact which cannot justly be ignored.

THEORY:
The act of Congress, having been found to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was
inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the
challenged decree.
GOMEZ vs. PALOMAR
G.R. No. L-23645 (October 29, 1968)

Facts:
● Petitioner Benjamin Gomez mailed a letter at the post office in San Fernando,
Pampanga which was returned to him since the letter did not bear the special anti-TB
stamp required under R.A. 1635, as amended by R.A. 2631
● Petitioner brought suit for declaratory relief in the Court of First Instance to test the
constitutionality of the statute contending that it violates the equal protection clause of
the Constitution
● The lower court declared the statute and the orders unconstitutional

Issue:
WON R.A. 1635, as amended by R.A. 2631, is unconstitutional for violating the equal protection
clause

Ruling:
NO. The classification of mail users is not without any reason. It is based on ability to pay, let
alone the enjoyment of a privilege, and on administrative convenience. In the allocation of the
tax burden, Congress must have concluded that the contribution to the anti-TB fund can be
assured by those whose who can afford the use of mails.

The classification is likewise based on consideran tions of administrative convenience. For it is

now a settled principle of law that “consideration of practical administrative convenience and
cost in the administration of tax laws afford adequate ground for imposing a tax on a well
recognized and defined class.” In the case of the anti-TB stamps, undoubtedly, the single most
important and influential consideration that led the legislature to select mail users as subjects of
the tax is the relative ease and convenience of collecting the tax through post offices. The small
amount of five centavos does not justify the great expense and inconvenience of collecting
through the regular means of collection. On the other hand, by placing the duty of collection on
postal authorities the tax was made almost self-enforcing, with as little cost and as little
inconvenience as possible.

And then of course it is not accurate to say that the statute constituted mail users into a class.
Mail users were already a class by themselves even before the enactment of the statute and all
that the legislature did was merely to select their class. Legislation is essentially empiric and
Republic Act 1635, as amended, no more than reflects a distinction that exists in fact.

Theory: legal realism

PEOPLE vs. ARTUZ
G.R. No. L-23386 (May 26, 1976)

Facts:
● Accused Artuz, trying to separate and intervene between a fight that ensued between
Panganiban and Rallonza, after which Rallonza rushed at Artuz with a weapon in his
hand. The two grappled for the weapon, but when Artuz was already in possession of
the weapon, Rallonza continued to rush at him. Artuz then stabbed Rallonza
● In its decision, the lower court found the accused guilty of homicide and rejected the
accused's claim of self-defense.

Issue:
WON respondent is entitled to the justifying circumstance of self-defense.

Ruling:
YES. He was attacked by an assailant intent on mayhem and possibly worse. He had
already been wounded; his life was in danger. The peril then to appellant’s life, actual, and
imminent, continued. He had in his hand the only means of self-defense. He did brandish it to
warn the deceased. The response was negative. What else was there left then for appellant
except to act exactly as he did? It would be to disregard the counsel of realism and to rely on
conjectural if on the above facts he would be denied exculpation. The test of rationality is not
what a man should do under normal circumstances and with time for cool reflection present. It
is rather how an individual in such dire situation, with the grim prospect of the loss of life, would
react. The law wisely takes into consideration the well-nigh irresistible force of the instinct of
self-preservation.

Theory: legal realism