Caltex (Phil.), Inc. v. Palomar

Case No. 45
G.R. No. 19650 (September 29, 1966)

Chapter V, Page 137, Footnote No. 211

FACTS:

Petitioner conceived the “Caltex Hooded Pump Contest” where participants have to estimate the actual
number of liters a hooded gas pump can dispense during a specific period of time. There was no fee or consideration
required to be paid, nor any purchase of any Caltex products to be made in order to join the contest. Foreseeing the
extensive use of mail for advertising and communications, Caltex requested clearance for Respondent Postmaster
General but was denied citing said contest is a “gift enterprise” deemed as a non-mailable matter under the anti-
lottery provisions of the Postal Law. Hence, Petitioner filed a petition for declaratory relief.

ISSUE:

W/N the “Caltex Hooded Pump Contest” falls under the term “gift enterprise” which is banned by the
Postal Law.

HELD:

No, said contest is not a gift enterprise. The word “lottery” is defined as a game of chance where the
elements of which are (1) consideration, (2) chance, and (3) prize. The term “gift enterprise” and “scheme” in the
provision of the Postal Law making unmailable “any lottery, gift, enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of money
or any real or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind” means such enterprise as will require
consideration as an element. The intent of the prohibition is to suppress the tendency to inflame the gambling spirit
and to corrupt public morals. There being no element of consideration in said contest, the spirit of the law is
preserved.

LITO CORPUZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES 

G.R. No. 180016 April29 2014 PERALTA J.:
FACTS:
  
Accused Corpuz received from complainant Tangcoy pieces of jewelry with an obligation tosell the same and remit the proceeds of
the sale or to return the same if not sold, after theexpiration of 30 days.
The period expired without Corpuz remitting anything to Tangcoy.
When Corpuz and Tangcoy met, Corpuz promised that he will pay, but to no avail.
Tangcoy filed a case for estafa with abuse of confidence against Corpuz.

Corpuz argued as follows:
a. The proof submitted by Tangcoy (receipt) is inadmissible for being a mere photocopy. b. The information was
defective because the date when the jewelry should be returned andthe date when crime occurred is different from
the one testified to by Tangcoy.c. Fourth element of estafa or demand is not proved.d. Sole testimony of Tangcoy is
not sufficient for conviction

ISSUES and RULING

 
Can the court admit as evidence a photocopy of document without violating the best
evidence rule (only original documents, as a general rule, is admissible as evidence)? 

 Yes. The established doctrine is that when a party failed to interpose a timely objection to evidence at the time they
were offered in evidence, such objection shall be considered as waived.

Here, Corpuz never objected to the admissibility of the said evidence at the time it was identified, marked and
testified upon in court by Tangcoy. Corpuz also failed to raise an
objection in his Comment to the prosecution’s formal offer of evidence and even admitted
having signed the said receipt.

Is the date of occurrence of time material in estafa cases with abuse of confidence? 

  No. It is true that the gravamen of the crime of estafa with abuse of confidence under Article315, paragraph 1,
subparagraph (b) of the RPC is the appropriation or conversion of money or property received to the prejudice of the
owner and that the time of occurrence is not a material ingredient of the crime. Hence, the exclusion of the period
and the wrong date of the occurrence of the crime, as reflected in the Information, do not make the latter fatally
defective.

Further, the following satisfies the sufficiency of information

Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 102858 (July 28, 1997)

Chapter VIII, Page 334, Footnote No. 23

FACTS:

Private Respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registration of a land title. During the
pendency of the said petition, he died and his heirs were represented by Josefa Abistado as a guardian ad litem in
order to continue the petition. The trial court dismissed the petition “for want of jurisdiction”. However, it was found
that the applicant had been in open, continuous and exclusive possession of the subject land since 1938. The reason
for the dismissal is that the applicant failed to publish the notice of Initial Hearing in a newspaper of general
circulation pursuant to a law. The CA set aside the decision of the trial court. Thus, Petitioner brought the case to the
Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether the newspaper publication of the notice of initial hearing in an original land registration case is
mandatory or directory.

HELD:

It is mandatory. The law used the term "shall" in prescribing the work to be done by the Commissioner of
Land Registration upon the latter's receipt of the court order setting the time for initial hearing. The said word
denotes an imperative and thus indicates the mandatory character of a statute. While such literal mandate is not an
absolute rule in statutory construction, as its import ultimately depends upon its context in the entire provision, it is
held that in the present case the term must be understood in its normal mandatory meaning in order to uphold the
norms of due process.

People v Mapa
GR No. L-22301
30 Aug 67

Facts:

On or about August 13, 1962, Mario Mapa was apprehended due to possession of an unlicensed firearm. The
defendant admitted before the trial court that he was carrying the unlicensed firearm and that he does not have a
permit to carry such a weapon. In his defense, he said that he is a secret agent of the Governor of Batangas and that
he is exempt from the requirement of securing a license of firearm. The defendant also showed a certification that he
was appointed as such.
Issue: whether or not an agent of the governor can hold a firearm without a permit issued by the Philippine
Constabulary

Held: In the present case, there is no room for interpretation or construction because the law is clear. The law
provides for the class of people who are not covered in the prohibitive law. No exemption was provided for secret
agents. Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or
inadequate without them."

People v. Amigo
Case No. 201

G.R. No. 116719 (January 18, 1996)

Chapter IV, Page 127, Footnote No.16

FACTS:

The Regional Trial Court rendered a decision finding the Accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of murder, and sentenced to the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Accused-Appellant argues that error was committed by the trial court in imposing or meting out the penalty
of reclusion perpetua against him despite the fact that Sec. 19 (1), Art. 3 of the 1987 Constitution was already in
effect when the offense was committed.
 Accused-Appellant contends that under the 1987 Constitution and prior to the promulgation of RA 7659,
the death penalty had been abolished and hence, the penalty that should have been imposed for the crime of murder
committed by Accused -Appellant should be reclusion temporal in its medium period to 20 years of reclusion
temporal.

ISSUE:

W/N Sec. 19 (1), Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution means to require a corresponding modification in the
other periods as a result of the prohibition against the death penalty.

HELD:

In People vs. Muñoz, the Court held that “A reading of Section 19 (1) of Article III will readily show that
there is really nothing therein which expressly declares the abolition of the death penalty.”
Secretary of DPWH vs Heracleo

Case Digest GR 179334 Apr 21 2015

Facts:

Spouses “Heracleo” are the co-owners of a land which is among the private properties traversed by MacArthur
Highway in Bulacan, a government project undertaken sometime in 1940. The taking was taken without the
requisite expropriation proceedings and without their consent. In 1994, Heracleo demanded the payment of the fair
market value of the property. The DPWH offered to pay 0.70 centavos per sqm., as recommended by the appraiser
committee of Bulacan. Unsatisfied, Heracleo filed a complaint for recovery of possession with damages. Favorable
decisions were rendered by the RTC and the CA, with valuation of P 1,500 per sqm and 6% interest per annum from
the time of filing of the until full payment. The SC Division reversed the CA ruling and held that computation
should be based at the time the property was taken in 1940, which is 0.70 per sqm. But because of the contrasting
opinions of the members of the Division and transcendental importance of the issue, the case was referred to the En
Banc for resolution.

Issue 1: W/N the taking of private property without due process should be nullified

No. The government’s failure to initiate the necessary expropriation proceedings prior to actual taking cannot
simply invalidate the State’s exercise of its eminent domain power, given that the property subject of expropriation
is indubitably devoted for public use, and public policy imposes upon the public utility the obligation to continue its
services to the public. To hastily nullify said expropriation in the guise of lack of due process would certainly
diminish or weaken one of the State’s inherent powers, the ultimate objective of which is to serve the greater good.

Thus, the non-filing of the case for expropriation will not necessarily lead to the return of the property to the
landowner. What is left to the landowner is the right of compensation.

Issue 2: W/N compensation is based on the market value of the property at the time of taking

Yes. While it may appear inequitable to the private owners to receive an outdated valuation, the long-established
rule is that the fair equivalent of a property should be computed not at the time of payment, but at the time of taking.
This is because the purpose of ‘just compensation’ is not to reward the owner for the property taken but to
compensate him for the loss thereof. The owner should be compensated only for what he actually loses, and what he
loses is the actual value of the property at the time it is taken.

Issue 3: W/N the principle of equity should be applied in this case

No. The Court must adhere to the doctrine that its first and fundamental duty is the application of the law according
to its express terms, interpretation being called for only when such literal application is impossible. To entertain
other formula for computing just compensation, contrary to those established by law and jurisprudence, would open
varying interpretation of economic policies – a matter which this Court has no competence to take cognizance of.
Equity and equitable principles only come into full play when a gap exists in the law and jurisprudence.
Velasco Dissent:

The State’s power of eminent domain is not absolute; the Constitution is clear that no person shall be deprived of
life, liberty and property without due process of law. As such, failure of the government to institute the necessary
proceedings should lead to failure of taking an individual’s property. In this case, since the property was already
taken, the complainants must be equitably compensated for the loss thereof.

For purposes of “just” compensation, the value of the land should be determined from the time the property owners
filed the initiatory complaint, earning interest therefrom. To hold otherwise would validate the State’s act as one of
expropriation in spite of procedural infirmities which, in turn, would amount to unjust enrichment on its part. To
continue condoning such acts would be licensing the government to continue dispensing with constitutional
requirements in taking private property.