Meaning of Criminal Procedure, Kinds

QUETO alias TAN QUETO v. HON. ALFREDO CATOLICO

G.R. Nos. L-25204 & L-25219. January 23, 1970

FACTS:
The instant petition for prohibition 1 was filedin behalf of thirty-seven naturalized citizens, in whose favor the corresponding certificates of naturalization had been issued.

The proceedings complained of began when each one of those affected was served with a uniformly worded mimeographed notice from the Clerk of the Court of First Instance of
Misamis Occidental, presided by herein respondent Judge Alfredo Catolico ordering them to appear before them for the purpose of (in his words) “discussing the ways and means of
how to avoid further ill use of your pretended Philippine Citizenship either by acquiring real properties which is prohibited by the Constitution to aliens like you, or exercising the right
of suffrage”.

As thus spelled out, the Judge took it upon himself to summon herein petitioners, among many others, for a discussion of what to do in connection with the nullity of their
naturalization.

Thus, at one stroke, without any petition from the Solicitor General and without hearing, respondent Judge in effect nullified all the previous proceedings — petition, publication, trial,
judgment, oath taking and issuance of the certificate of naturalization.

ISSUE:
Whether the judge acted in excess of his jurisdiction.

HELD:
YES. As a general rule a court proceeding in our judicial set-up is accusatorial or adversary and not inquisitorial in nature. It contemplates two contending parties before the court,
which hears them impartially and renders judgment only after trial. This basic philosophy would be violated if a judge were permitted to act as inquisitor, pursue his own independent
investigation, arrive at a conclusion ex-parte, and then summon the party affected so as to enable him, if that were still possible, to show that the conclusion thus arrived at is without
justification. The danger in all this is most forcefully demonstrated in the present case, where respondent Judge took "judicial notice," to use his own words, of "news" derogatory to
one of the petitioners, thereby elevating rumors and gossip to the level of incontrovertible proof; and worse, where prejudgment, not to say prejudice, on the part of said respondent
was so blatantly shown by the abusive epithets he used in referring to the same petitioner before he had any chance to be heard.

Judges, in their zeal to uphold the law, should not lose the proper judicial perspective, and should see to it that in the execution of their sworn duties they do not overstep the
limitations of their power as laid down by statute and by the rules of procedure. If they arrogate unto themselves the authority allocated to other officials, there can be no consequence
but confusion in the administration of justice and, in many instances, oppressive disregard of the basic requirements of due process.

Concept of Criminal Jurisdiction, Requisites

Antiporda vs Garchitorena (1999) G.R. 133289
Facts:
Accused Mayor Licerio Antiporda and others were charged for the crime of kidnapping, the case was filed in the first division of Sandiganbayan. Subsequently, the Court ordered the
prosecution to submit amended information, which was complied evenly and the new information contained the place where the victim was brought.

The accused filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying that a reinvestigation be conducted and the issuance of warrants of arrest be deferred but it was denied by the Ombudsman.  

The accused thereafter filed a Motion for New Preliminary investigation and to hold in abeyance and/or recall warrant of arrest issued but the same was also denied. Subsequently,
the accused filed a Motion to Quash Amended Information for lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged, which was ignored for their continuous refusal to submit their selves to the
Court and after their voluntary appearance which invested the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction over their persons, their motion for reconsideration was again denied.

Issue (1): WON the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the offense charged.

Held: No. The original Information filed with the Sandiganbayan did not mention that the offense committed by the accused is office-related. It was only after the same was filed that
the prosecution belatedly remembered that a jurisdictional fact was omitted therein.

However, we hold that the petitioners are estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan for in the supplemental arguments to motion for reconsideration and/or
reinvestigation filed with the same court, it was they who “challenged the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court over the case and clearly stated in their Motion for Reconsideration
that the said crime is work connected.

It is a well-settled rule that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent, and after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate
or question that same jurisdiction.

We therefore hold that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case because of estoppel and it was thus vested with the authority to order the amendment of the Information.

Issue (2): WON reinvestigation must be made anew.

Held: No. A reinvestigation is proper only if the accused’s substantial rights would be impaired. In the case at bar, we do not find that their rights would be unduly prejudiced if the
Amended Information is filed without a reinvestigation taking place. The amendments made to the Information merely describe the public positions held by the accused/petitioners
and stated where the victim was brought when he was kidnapped.

It must here be stressed that a preliminary investigation is essentially inquisitorial, and it is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a
crime, to enable the prosecutor to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has
been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof, and it does not place the persons accused in jeopardy. It is not the occasion for the
full and exhaustive display of the parties’ evidence; it is for the presentation of such evidence only as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and
that the accused is probably guilty thereof.

The purpose of a preliminary investigation has been achieved already and we see no cogent nor compelling reason why a reinvestigation should still be conducted.

People vs. Lagon, G.R. 45815, May 18, 1990

Nature: Petition for Review filed by the People as represented by the Fiscal arguing that the City Court of Roxas City had jurisdiction and that it had erred in issuing its Order
dismissing the case.
Facts:
· Libertad Lagon was charged with estafa under par2(d) RPC 315 in the amount of P4,232.80 as payment for goods or merchandise.
· April 1975 - alleged commission of the crime [arresto mayor max to PC min]
· Oct 22 1975 – PD 818 was enacted increasing the penalty to PM med
· July 1976 –criminal information filed at City Court
· Dec 1976 - City Court dismissed the information because the penalty prescribed by law for the offense charged was beyond the court's authority to impose.
· City Court: at the time of the institution of the action
· OSG: agreed with the City Court

Issues/Ruling:
1. WON the City Court has jurisdiction. Whether the court jurisdiction is determined by the law in force at a) the time of the institution of the action or at b) the time of the commission
of the crime?
· Court jurisdiction is determined by the law at the time of the institution of the action. Therefore, the City Court has no jurisdiction over the case. Petition for review dismissed.
· Section 87 of the Judiciary Act of 1948: jurisdiction of municipal and city courts... offense… in which the penalty… does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for not
more than six (6) years or fine not exceeding P6,000.00 or both . . . ."

2. Would application of the doctrine not result in also applying PD 818, in disregard of the rule against retroactivity of penal laws?
· RPC 22 permits penal laws to have retroactive effect only "insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, . . . "
· Subject-matter jurisdiction is determined by the authority of the court to impose the penalty imposable under the applicable statute given the allegations of a criminal
information.
· In People v.Purisima and People v. Buissan:
o . . . The issue here is one of jurisdiction, of a court's legal competence to try a case ab origine. In criminal prosecutions, it is settled that the jurisdiction of the court is not
determined by what may be meted out to the offender after trial, or even by the result of the evidence that would be presented at the trial, but by the extent of the penalty which the
law imposes for the misdemeanor, crime or violation charged in the complaint…”.

· Should the information be refiled in the RTC, that court may only impose the penalty provided in the law at the time of the commission of the crime.
Palana v. People, GR No. 149995, September 28, 2007
Facts:
On August 19, 1991, petitioner was charged with violation of BP 22. Private complainant Alex B. Carlos testified that sometime in September 1987, petitioner and his wife borrowed
money from him in the amount of P590,000.00. To secure the payment of the loan, petitioner issued a postdated check for the same amount in favor of the complainant. However,
when the check was presented for payment, it was dishonored by the bank for insufficiency of funds. Subsequent demand notwithstanding, petitioner failed to make good the said
dishonored check.

Petitioner alleged that the amounts given to him by private complainant was an investment by the latter who was his business partner. He argued that the subject check was not
issued in September 1987 to guarantee the payment of a loan since his checking account was opened only on December 1, 1987. He claimed that private complainant cajoled him to
issue a check in his favor allegedly to be shown to a textile supplier who would provide the partnership with the necessary raw materials. Petitioner alleged that when the check was
issued sometime in February 1988, complainant knew that the same was not funded.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not petitioner was guilty of violation of BP 22.
(2) Whether or not the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the case.

Ruling:
On the first issue, after a careful review of the records, the Supreme Court sustains petitioner’s conviction for violation of BP 22. Each element of the offense was duly proven by the
prosecution. Petitioner admitted that at the time he issued the subject check, he knew that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for payment of such
check. Consequently, when the check was presented for payment, it was dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds. Thereafter, he received demand letters to pay
the amount of the check from private complainant but he did not comply with it. The issue as to whether the amount of the subject check represents the amount of the money loaned
by private complainant to petitioner or as an investment in the alleged partnership is a factual question involving the credibility of witnesses.

On the second issue, petitioner’s argument that it is the MTC and not the RTC which has jurisdiction over the case pursuant to R.A. 7691 is without merit. It is hornbook doctrine that
jurisdiction to try a criminal action is determined by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action and not during the arraignment of the accused. The Information charging
petitioner with violation of BP 22 was filed on August 19, 1991. At that time, the governing law determinative of jurisdiction is BP 129 which provides “Exclusive original jurisdiction
over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment,
regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount
thereof: Provided, however, that in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction where the imposable fine does not
exceed twenty thousand pesos.”
Violation of BP 22 is punishable with imprisonment of not less than 30 days but not more than one year or by a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the check
which fine shall in no case exceed P200,000.00, or both fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court. In the present case, the fine imposable is P200,000.00 hence, the
Regional Trial Court properly acquired jurisdiction over the case. The Metropolitan Trial Court could not acquire jurisdiction over the criminal action because its jurisdiction is only for
offenses punishable with a fine of not more than P4,000.00. Indeed, R.A. No. 7691 contains retroactive provisions. However, these only apply to civil cases that have not yet reached
the pre-trial stage.  Neither from an express proviso nor by implication can it be construed that R.A. No. 7691 has retroactive application to criminal cases pending or decided by the
Regional Trial Courts prior to its effectivity.
Magno vs. People, G.R. 171542, April 6, 2011

FACTS:

>The Office of the Ombudsman filed an information for multiple frustrated murder and double attempted murder against several accused, including MAGNO, who were public officers
working under the NBI

>Magno, in open court, objected to the formal appearance and authority of Atty. Sitoy, who was there as private prosecutor to prosecute the case for and on behalf of the Office of the
Ombudsman

>The RTC issued an Order, ruling that “the Ombudsman is proper, legal and authorized entity to prosecute this case to the exclusion of any other entity/person other than those
authorized under R.A. 6770. This prompted the respondents to file a petition for certiorari before the CA.

>CA original decision: Declared that the private prosecutor may appear for the petitioner in the case , but only insofar as the prosecution of the civil aspect of the case is concerned.

>CA AMENDED decision: Ruling that the private prosecutor may appear for the petitioner in Criminal Case to intervene in the prosecution of the offense charged in collaboration with
any lawyer deputized by the Ombudsman to prosecute the case . This amended CA decision in turn made Magno file for a review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Procedure before the SC.

PETITIONER”S ARGUMENTS

>CA did not have jurisdiction to entertain the petition for certiorari; the power to hear and decide that question is with the Sandiganbayan

>The private prosecutor cannot be allowed to intervene for the respondents. Section 31 of RA No. 6770 does not allow the Ombudsman to deputize private practitioners to prosecute
cases for and on behalf of the Office of the Ombudsman.

RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

>The Ombudsman did not address the contention that the Sandiganbayan, not the CA, has appellate jurisdiction over the RTC in this case.

>The Ombudsman maintains that Atty. Sitoy may intervene in the case pursuant to Section 16, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court (Where the civil action for recovery of civil liability is
instituted in the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111, the offended party may intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the offense.)

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals has the appellate jurisdiction over the RTC’c decision in not allowing Atty. Sitoy to prosecute the case on behalf of the Ombudsman –
NONE
DECISION:

The Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals, as well as its Resolution is NULL AND VOID for having been issued without jurisdiction

REASON:

> PD No. 1606 created the Sandiganbayan.  Section 4 thereof establishes the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction:

“B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complex with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection of this section in relation
to their office.”

>In the present case, the CA erred when it took cognizance of the petition for certiorari. The OMBUDSMAN SHOULD HAVE FILED THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI WITH THE
SANDIGANBAYAN, which has EXCLUSIVE APPELLATE JURISDICTION over the RTC since the accused are public officials charged of committing crimes in their capacity as
Investigators of the NBI

>JURISDICTION IS CONFERRED BY LAW, and the CA’s judgment, issued without jurisdiction, is VOID. There is no rule in procedural law as basic as the precept that jurisdiction is
conferred by law and any judgment, order or resolution issued without it is void and cannot be given any effect. This rule applies even if the issue on jurisdiction was raised for the first
time on appeal or even after final judgment

G.R. No. 149357. March 04, 2005

MOBILIA PRODUCTS, INC., Petitioners, 
vs.
HAJIME UMEZAWA, Respondent.
G.R. No. 149403. March 04, 2005
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners, 
vs.
HON. JUDGE RUMOLDO R. FERNANDEZ and HAJIME UMEZAWA, Responde
 
Umezawa, then the President and General Manager of MPI, organized another company with his wifeKimiko, and his sister, Mitsuyo Yaguchi, to be  known as Astem Philippines
Corporation, withoutknowledge of the Board of Directors of MPI. The said company would be engaged in the same businessas Mobilia. Umezawa stole products from MPI amounting to P3,219,875.00.MPI and
public prosecutor filed criminal complaints against Umezawa. The trial court asserted that thecontroversy involving the criminal cases was between Umezawa and the other stockholders of MPI. It also held that the
SEC, not the trial court, had jurisdiction over intra-corporate controversies.CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC that the dispute between Umezawa and the other stockholders and officers over the
implementation of the MPI’s standard procedure is intra-corporate in nature; hence,within the exclusive jurisdiction of the SEC. The petitioner MPI filed the instant petition for review
oncertiorari

.ISSUE:WON CA is correct.

HELD:Patently, then, based on the material allegations of the Informations, the courta quo had exclusive jurisdiction over the crimes charged. CA erred in holding that the dispute between it and the
respondentis intra-corporate in nature; hence, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the SEC. As gleaned from thematerial allegations of the Informations, the RTC had exclusive jurisdiction over
the crimescharged. According to Section 20 of B.P. Blg. 129 Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court,
tribunal or body,except those now falling under the exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan which shall hereafter be exclusively taken cognizance of by the latter.Case law has it
that in order to determine the jurisdiction of the court in criminal cases, the complaint orInformation must be examined for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not the facts set out thereinand the prescribed period
provided for by law are within the jurisdiction of the court, and where thesaid Information or complaint is filed. It is settled that the jurisdiction of the court in criminal cases isdetermined by the allegations of the
complaint or Information and not by the findings based on theevidence of the court after trial. Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by the law in forceat the time of the filing
of the Information or complaint. Once jurisdiction is vested in the court, it isretained up to the end of the litigation.

DOCTRINE: Where life or liberty is affected by its proceedings, courts must keep strictly within the limits of the law authorizing them to take jurisdiction and to try the case and render
judgment thereon
 
Trenas vs. People, G. R. 195002, Jan. 25, 2012
FACTS:
 In 1999, Margarita Alocilja wanted to buy a house-and-lot in Iloilo City. It was then mortgaged with Maybank.
 The bank manager Joselito Palma recommended Hector Treñas to Elizabeth, who was an employee and niece of Margarita, for advice regarding the transfer of the title in the
name of Margarita. Hector informed Elizabeth of the expenses for the titling of the property.
 Thereafter, Elizabeth gave P150,000.00 to Hector who issued a corresponding receipt and prepared a Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage.
 Subsequently, Hector gave Elizabeth Revenue Official Receipt worth P120,000. However, when she consulted with the BIR, she was informed that the receipts were fake.
When confronted, Hector admitted to her that the receipts were fake and that he used the P120,000.00 for his other transactions. Elizabeth demanded the return of the
money.
 Hector issued in favor of Elizabeth a Bank of Commerce check in the amount of P120,000.00, deducting from P150,000.00 the P30,000.00 as attorney's fees. When the
check was deposited with the PCI Bank, Makati Branch, the same was dishonored for the reason that the account was closed.
 Notwithstanding repeated formal and verbal demands, appellant failed to pay. Thus, the instant case of Estafa was filed against him.
 During arraignment, Hector, acting as his own counsel, entered a plea of "Not Guilty." Allegedly due to old age and poor health, and the fact that he lives in Iloilo City, he was
unable to attend the pre-trial and trial of the case.
  
 
ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in ruling that the accused had to present evidence in support of the defense of lack of jurisdiction even if it was apparent in the evidence
of the prosecution.

RULING: No, petition is granted.

The overarching consideration in this case is the principle that, in criminal cases, venue is jurisdictional. A court cannot exercise jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense
committed outside its limited territory. In Isip v. People, this Court explained: 

The place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction. It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be
acquired by courts in criminal cases, the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients should have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the
court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus,
it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is
determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during
the trial shows that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.
    
 
It has been consistently held by this Court that it is unfair to require a defendant or accused to undergo the ordeal and expense of a trial if the court has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter or offense or it is not the court of proper venue. Section 15 (a) of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure of 2000 provides that "subject to existing laws, the
criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients occurred." This
fundamental principle is to ensure that the defendant is not compelled to move to, and appear in, a different court from that of the province where the crime was committed as it would
cause him great inconvenience in looking for his witnesses and other evidence in another place. This principle echoes more strongly in this case, where, due to distance constraints,
coupled with his advanced age and failing health, Hector was unable to present his defense in the charges against him.
 
In this case, the prosecution failed to show that the offense of estafa under Section 1, paragraph (b) of Article 315 of the RPC was committed within the jurisdiction of the RTC of
Makati City. There being no showing that the offense was committed within Makati, the RTC of that city has no jurisdiction over the case.
 
Hector asserts that nowhere in the evidence presented by the prosecution does it show that P150,000 was given to and received by petitioner in Makati City. The only time Makati
City was mentioned was with respect to the time when the check provided by petitioner was dishonored by Equitable-PCI Bank in its De la Rosa-Rada Branch in Makati. Hector
asserted that the prosecution witness failed to allege that any of the acts material to the crime of estafa had occurred in Makati City. Thus, the trial court failed to acquire jurisdiction
over the case.

 
Aside from the lone allegation in the Information, no other evidence was presented by the prosecution to prove that the offense or any of its elements was committed in Makati City.
The rule is settled that an objection may be raised based on the ground that the court lacks jurisdiction over the offense charged, or it may be considered motu proprio by the court at
any stage of the proceedings or on appeal. Moreover, jurisdiction over the subject matter in a criminal case cannot be conferred upon the court by the accused, by express waiver or
otherwise. That jurisdiction is conferred by the sovereign authority that organized the court and is given only by law in the manner and form prescribed by law.

COJUANGCO, JR. vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (Quisumbing, December 21, 1998)

no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon a probable cause to be determined  personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
The clause unequivocally means that the judge must make his own determination — independent of that of the prosecutor — of whether there is probable cause to issue a warrant of
arrest, based on the complainant's and his witnesses' accounts, if any. Supporting evidence other than the report and recommendation of the investigators and the special prosecutor
should be examined by the court
FACTS:
1. January 12, 1990, a complaint was filed by the Office of the Solicitor General before the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), petitioner, former
Administrator of the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA), and the former members of the PCA Governing Board, petitioner among them, for violation of Republic Act No. 3019,
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for having conspired and confederated together and taking undue advantage of their public positions and/or using their powers;
authority, influence, connections or relationship with the former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and former First Lady, Imelda Romualdez-Marcos without authority, granted a
donation in the amount of Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) to the Philippine Coconut Producers Federation (COCOFED), a private entity, using PCA special fund, thereby
giving COCOFED unwarranted benefits, advantage and preference through manifest partiality, evident bad faith and gross inexcusable negligence to the grave ( sic) and
prejudice of the Filipino people and to the Republic of the Philippines.  
2. Subsequently, however, the Court ruled that all proceedings in the preliminary investigation conducted by the PCGG were null and void and the PCGG was directed to
transmit the complaints and records of the case to the Office of the Ombudsman for appropriate action.  
3. In a Resolution dated June 2, 1992, the panel of investigators recommended the filling of an Information for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.
4. Resolution dated June 2, 1992 was referred by Assistant Ombudsman Abelardo L. Aportadera, Jr. to the Office of the Special Prosecutor for review and if warranted, for the
preparation of the criminal information.
5. In a memorandum dated July l5, 1992 the Office of the Special Prosecutor affirmed the recommendation as contained in the Resolution dated June 2, 1992.
6. August 19, 1992 then Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez ordered the panel of investigators to discuss the merits of the prejudicial question posed by respondent Lobregat.
7. In a Memorandum dated December 1, 1993 the panel of investigators recommended that the motion to suspend proceedings be granted.
8. On December 3, 1993 then Ombudsman Vasquez referred for comment to the Office of the Special Prosecutors the Memorandum dated December 1, 1993 of the panel of
investigators on the issue of the existence of prejudicial question.
9. On February 17, 1995, an order for the arrest of petitioner was issued by the respondent Sandiganbayan.
10. On February 22, 1995, petitioner posted bail. On the same day he likewise filed, through counsel, a Manifestation stating that he was posting bail without prejudice to the
Opposition To Issuance of Warrant of Arrest with Motion For Leave To File a Motion For Reconsideration of the Ombudsman's Resolution which he filed.
11. In a Resolution dated February 20, 1995, the respondent Sandiganbayan barred petitioner from leaving the country except upon approval of the court.
12. On May 25, 1995, petitioner was conditionally arraigned pleading not guilty to the Information.
 13. In the meantime, in a Memorandum dated October 22, 1995, Special Prosecution Officer Victorio U. Tabanguil found no probable cause to warrant the filing against petitioner
and recommended the dismissal of the case. The recommendation for dismissal was approved by the Honorable Ombudsman on November 15, 1996.
14. On December 13, 1996 petitioner filed an Urgent Motion To Dismiss alleging that with the reversal of the earlier findings of the Ombudsman of probable cause, there was
therefore nothing on record before the respondent Sandiganbayan which would warrant the issuance of a warrant of arrest and the assumption of jurisdiction over the instant
case.
ISSUES:
1. WON the warrant of arrest issued by respondent Sandiganbayan is null and void, or should now be lifted if initially valid? YES
2. WON the Sandiganbayan still acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner? YES
RATIO:
1. Sandiganbayan had two pieces of documents to consider when it resolved to issue the warrant of arrest against the accused:
a. the Resolution dated June 2, 1992 of the Panel of Investigators of the Office of the Ombudsman recommending the filing of the Information and
b. the Memorandum dated June 16, 1995 of the Office of the Special Prosecutor denying the existence of a prejudicial question which will warrant the suspension of the
criminal case. The Sandiganbayan had nothing more to support its resolution.
2. The Sandiganbayan failed to abide by the constitutional mandate of personally determining the existence of probable cause before issuing a warrant of arrest. The 2 cited
document above were the product of somebody else’s determination, insufficient to support a finding of probable cause by the Sandiganbayan.
3. In Roberts vs. Court of Appeals ,  the Court struck down as invalid an order for the issuance of a warrant of arrest which were based only on "the information, amended
information and Joint Resolution", without the benefit of the records or evidence supporting the prosecutor's finding of probable cause.
4. In Ho vs. People, the Court the respondent "palpably committed grave abuse of discretion in ipso facto issuing the challenged warrant of arrest on the sole basis of the
prosecutor's findings and recommendation, and without determining on its own the issue of probable cause based on evidence other than such bare findings and
recommendation. 
5. With regards to jurisdiction, the rule is well-settled that the giving or posting of bail by the accused is tantamount to submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court.   By
posting bail, herein petitioner cannot claim exemption effect of being subject to the jurisdiction of respondent court. While petitioner has exerted efforts to continue disputing
the validity of the issuance of the warrant of arrest despite his posting bail, his claim has been negated when he himself invoked the jurisdiction of respondent court through
the filing of various motions that sought other affirmative reliefs.
6. In La Naval Drug vs. CA , Lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be waived either expressly or impliedly. When a defendant voluntarily appears, he is
deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. If he so wishes not to waive this defense, he must do so seasonably by motion for the purpose of objecting
to the jurisdiction of the court, otherwise, he shall be deemed to have submitted himself to that jurisdiction. Moreover, "[w]here the appearance is by motion for the purpose of
objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person, it must be for the sole and separate purpose of objecting to said jurisdiction. If the appearance is for any other
purpose, the defendant is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. Such an appearance gives the court jurisdiction over the person.  
 
PANGANIBAN, J.,  concurring and dissenting opinion;
As a consequence of the nullity of the warrant of arrest, the Sandiganbayan did not acquire jurisdiction over the petitioner.
The posting of a bail bond by the petitioner despite the nullity or irregularity of the issuance of the warrant for his arrest should not be equated with "voluntary appearance" as to cloak
the respondent court with jurisdiction over his person. Truly, his "appearance" in court was not "voluntary." It should be noted that immediately upon learning of the filling of the
Information and the issuance of the warrant, petitioner filed an "Opposition to [the] Issuance of [a] Warrant of Arrest with Motion for Leave to File Motion for Reconsideration of [the]
Ombudsman['s] Resolutions." Said Opposition was based on the inadequacy of the respondent court's basis for determining probable cause.  It was essentially an express and
continuing objection to the court's jurisdiction over his person . When petitioner posted his bail bond, he expressly manifested at the same time that such was "without prejudice” to his
Opposition. 

Fukuzume vs. People, G. R. 143647, Nov. 11, 2005

Facts:
Sometime in July 1991, Yu, a businessman engaged in buying and selling aluminum scrap wires, accompanied by Jovate, went to the house of Fukuzume in Parañaque. Jovate
introduced Fukuzume to Yu telling the latter that Fukuzume is from Furukawa Electric Corporation and that he has at his disposal aluminum scrap wires. Fukuzume confirmed this
information and told Yu that the scrap wires belong to Furukawa but they are under the care of NAPOCOR. Believing Fukuzume’s representation to be true, Yu agreed to buy the
aluminum scrap wires from Fukuzume. This transaction later turned uneventful as Fukuzume failed to comply his undertaking to return Yu’s money when Yu was refused by
NAPOCOR, thus, prompting Yu to file an estafa case.

Upon arraignment, Fukuzume pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued, finding the accused guilty as charged. Aggrieved by the trial court’s decision, he appealed to CA but CA affirmed the
trial courts’ decision modifying only the penalty, hence, the petition before the SC.

Issue: WON the trial court of Makati has jurisdiction over the offense charged.

Held: SC answered on the negative. We agree with Fukuzume’s contention that the CA erred in ruling that the RTC of Makati has jurisdiction over the offense charged.

The CA ruled on the basis of the sworn statement of Yu filed with the NBI and the affidavit subscribed by Fukuzume. With respect to the sworn statement of Yu, which was presented
in evidence by the prosecution, it is clear that he alleged that he gave Fukuzume the amount of P50,000.00 at the Intercontinental Hotel in Makati. However, we agree with
Fukuzume’s contention that Yu testified during his direct examination that he gave the amount of P50,000.00 to Fukuzume in the latter’s house. It is not disputed that Fukuzume’s
house is located in Parañaque.

Settled is the rule that whenever there is inconsistency between the affidavit and the testimony of a witness in court, the testimony commands greater weight considering that
affidavits taken ex parte are inferior to testimony given in court, the former being almost invariably incomplete and oftentimes inaccurate.

More importantly, we find nothing in the direct or cross-examination of Yu to establish that he gave any money to Fukuzume or transacted business with him with respect to the
subject aluminum scrap wires inside or within the premises of the Intercontinental Hotel in Makati, or anywhere in Makati for that matter. Venue in criminal cases is an essential
element of jurisdiction. Citing Uy vs. Court of Appeals: However, if the evidence adduced during the trial show that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should
dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.
The crime was alleged in the Information as having been committed in Makati. However, aside from the sworn statement executed by Yu, the prosecution presented no other
evidence, testimonial or documentary, to corroborate Yu’s sworn statement or to prove that any of the above-enumerated elements of the offense charged was committed in Makati.
From the foregoing, it is evident that the prosecution failed to prove that Fukuzume committed the crime of estafa in Makati or that any of the essential ingredients of the offense took
place in the said city. Hence, the judgment of the trial court convicting Fukuzume of the crime of estafa should be set aside for want of jurisdiction, without prejudice, however, to the
filing of appropriate charges with the court of competent jurisdiction.

Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, G.R. L-21450, April 15, 1968

FACTS:
The action at bar, which is a suit for collection of a sum of money in the sum of exactly P 1,908.00, exclusive of interest filed by Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog against Spouses
Magdaleno Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio, was originally instituted in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948. A month prior to the filing of the complaint, the Judiciary
Act of 1948 (R.A. 296) took effect depriving the Court of First Instance of original jurisdiction over cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, is not more than P 2,000.00 (Secs.
44[c] and 86[b], R.A. 296.)

The case has already been pending now for almost 15 years, and throughout the entire proceeding the appellant never raised the question of jurisdiction until the receipt of the Court
of Appeals' adverse decision.

Considering that the Supreme Court has the exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases in which jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue, the Court of Appeals certified the case
to the Supreme Court along with the records of the case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appellant's motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance during the pendency of the appeal will prosper.

RULING:
A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of
estoppel by laches.

Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done
earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert
it.

The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public policy which requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the
statute of limitations, is not a mere question of time but is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.
It has been held that a party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a court to sure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or
question that same jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the case just cited, by way of explaining the rule, it was further said that the question whether the court
had jurisdiction either of the subject-matter of the action or of the parties was not important in such cases because the party is barred from such conduct not because the judgment or
order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice can not be tolerated — obviously for reasons of public policy.

Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or
power of the court (Pease vs. Rathbun-Jones etc., 243 U.S. 273, 61 L. Ed. 715, 37 S. Ct. 283; St. Louis etc. vs. McBride, 141 U.S. 127, 35 L. Ed. 659). And in Littleton vs. Burgess,
16 Wyo. 58, the Court said that it is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny
that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.

Upon this same principle is what We said in the three cases mentioned in the resolution of the Court of Appeals of May 20, 1963 (supra) — to the effect that we frown upon the
"undesirable practice" of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse — as well as
in Pindañgan etc. vs. Dans, et al., G.R. L-14591, September 26, 1962; Montelibano, et al., vs. Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc., G.R. L-15092; Young Men Labor Union etc. vs. The
Court of Industrial Relation et al., G.R. L-20307, Feb. 26, 1965, and Mejia vs. Lucas, 100 Phil. p. 277.

The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a quasi-party on July 31, 1948, it could have raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu to take cognizance of the present action by reason of the sum of money involved which, according to the law then in force, was within the original exclusive
jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to do so. Instead, at several stages of the proceedings in the court a quo as well as in the Court of Appeals, it invoked the jurisdiction of said
courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final adjudication on the merits. It was only after an adverse decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally
woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction. Were we to sanction such conduct on its part, We would in effect be declaring as useless all the proceedings had in the present case
since it was commenced on July 19, 1948 and compel the judgment creditors to go up their Calvary once more. The inequity and unfairness of this is not only patent but revolting.

Coming now to the merits of the appeal: after going over the entire record, We have become persuaded that We can do nothing better than to quote in toto, with approval, the
decision rendered by the Court of Appeals x x x granting plaintiffs' motion for execution against the surety x x x

UPON ALL THE FOREGOING, the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant Manila Surety and Fidelity Company, Inc.
People v. Pangilinan, G.R. No. 152662, March 10, 2000
Crim Pro - Rule 110

Facts:
Ma. Theresa Pangilinan, the respondent in this instant case allegedly issued 9 checks with the aggregate amount of P9,658,692 in favor of Virginia Malolos. But, upon
Malolos' presentment of the said checks, they were dishonored. So, on Sept. 16, 1997, Malolos filed an affidavit-complaint for estafa and violation of BP 22 against Pangilinan.

            On December 5, 1997, Pangilinan filed a civil case for accounting, recovery of commercial documents, enforceability and effectivity of contract and specific performance
against Malolos before the RTC of Valenzuela City. Later, Pangilinan also filed on December 10, 1997, a "Petition to Suspend Proceedings on the Ground of Prejudicial Question".

            On March 2, 1998, Assistant City Prosecutor Ruben Catubay recommended Pangilinan's petition which was approved by the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. Malolos, then,
raised the matter before the DOJ.

            On January 5, 1999, Sec. of Justice Serafin Cuevas reversed the resolution of the City Prosecutor and ordered the filing of the informations for violation of BP 22 in
connection with Pangilinan's issuance of two checks, the charges involving the other checks were dismissed. So, two counts of violation for BP 22, both dated Nov. 18, 1999, were
filed against Pangilinan on Feb. 3, 2000 before the MeTC of Quezon City.

            On June 17, 2000, Pangilinan filed an "Omnibus Motion to Quash the Information and to Defer the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest” before MeTC, Branch 31, Quezon City,
alleging that the criminal liability has been extinguished by reason of prescription. The motion was granted. Malolos filed a notice of appeal and the RTC reversed the decision of the
MeTC. According to the RTC, the offense has not yet prescribed "considering the appropriate complaint that started the proceedings having been filed with the Office of the
Prosecutor on 16 September 1997". Dissatisfied, Pangilinan raised the matter to the Supreme Court for review but it was referred to the CA "for appropriate action".

On October 26, 2001, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC and recognized Feb. 3, 2000 as the date of the filing of the informations.

Issue: Whether or not the filing of the affidavit-complaint for estafa and violation of BP Blg. 22 against respondent with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City on 16
September 1997 interrupted the period of prescription of such offense.

Held. Yes. Under Section 1 of Act No. 3326 which is the law applicable to B.P. 22 cases, “[v]iolations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts,
prescribe in accordance with the following rules:… after four years for those punished by imprisonment for more than one month, but less than two years.” Under Section 2 of the
same Act, “[t]he prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons
not constituting jeopardy.
 Since B.P. 22 is a special law that imposes a penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not more than one year or by a fine for its violation, it therefore
prescribes in four (4) years in accordance with the aforecited law. The running of the prescriptive period, however, should be tolled upon the institution of proceedings against the
guilty person.
The affidavit-complaints for the violations were filed against respondent on 16 September 1997.  The cases reached the MeTC of Quezon City only on 13 February 2000
because in the meanwhile, respondent filed a civil case for accounting followed by a petition before the City Prosecutor for suspension of proceedings on the ground of “prejudicial
question”.  The matter was raised before the Secretary of Justice after the City Prosecutor approved the petition to suspend proceedings.   It was only after the Secretary of Justice so
ordered that the informations for the violation of BP Blg. 22 were filed with the MeTC of Quezon City.
Clearly, it was respondent’s own motion for the suspension of the criminal proceedings, which motion she predicated on her civil case for accounting, that caused the filing in
court of the 1997 initiated proceedings only in 2000.
Miranda vs. Tuliao, G. R. 158763, Mar. 31, 2006
Facts:
On 8 March 1996, two burnt cadavers were discovered in Purok Nibulan, Ramon, Isabela, which were later identified as the dead bodies of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao, son of
private respondent Virgilio Tuliao who is now under the witness protection program.

Two informations for murder were filed against SPO1 Wilfredo Leaño, SPO1 Ferdinand Marzan, SPO1 Ruben B. Agustin, SPO2 Alexander Micu, SPO2 Rodel Maderal, and SPO4
Emilio Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santiago City.

The venue was later transferred to Manila. On 22 April 1999, the RTC of Manila convicted all of the accused and sentenced them to two counts of reclusion perpetua except SPO2
Maderal who was yet to be arraigned at that time, being at large. The case was... appealed to this Court on automatic review where we, on 9 October 2001, acquitted the accused
therein on the ground of reasonable doubt.

Sometime in September 1999, SPO2 Maderal was arrested. On 27 April 2001, he executed a sworn confession and identified petitioners Jose C. Miranda, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon, and
SPO3 Alberto P. Dalmacio, a certain Boyet dela Cruz and Amado Doe, as the persons responsible for the deaths... of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao.

Respondent Tuliao filed a criminal complaint for murder against petitioners, Boyet dela Cruz, and Amado Doe, and submitted the sworn confession of SPO2 Maderal. On 25 June
2001, Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan issued warrants of arrest against petitioners and SPO2 Maderal.

On 29 June 2001, petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary investigation, to reinvestigate, and to recall and/or quash the warrants of arrest.

In the hearing of the urgent motion on 6 July 2001, Judge Tumaliuan noted the absence of petitioners and issued a Joint Order denying said urgent motion on the ground that, since
the court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons, the motion cannot be properly heard by... the court. In the meantime, petitioners appealed the resolution of State Prosecutor
Leo T. Reyes to the Department of Justice.

On 17 August 2001, the new Presiding Judge Anastacio D. Anghad took over the case and issued a Joint Order reversing the Joint Order of Judge Tumaliuan. Consequently, he
ordered the cancellation of the warrant of arrest issued against petitioner Miranda. He likewise... applied this Order to petitioners Ocon and Dalmacio in an Order dated 21
September 2001. State Prosecutor Leo S. Reyes and respondent Tuliao moved for the reconsideration of the said Joint Order and prayed for the inhibition of Judge Anghad, but the
motion for reconsideration... was denied in a Joint Order dated 16 October 2001 and the prayer for inhibition was denied in a Joint Order dated 22 October 2001.

Issues: WON an accused can...... seek any judicial relief if he does not submit his person to the... jurisdiction of the court

Ruling: YES. Adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires neither jurisdiction over the person of the accused, nor custody of law over the body of the accused.
Custody of the law is required before the court can act upon the application for bail, but is not required for the... adjudication of other reliefs sought by the defendant where the mere
application therefor constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused.

Custody of the law is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary... surrender,[9] while jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance.

While we stand by our above pronouncement in Pico insofar as it concerns bail, we clarify that, as a general rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to
the jurisdiction of the court.

As we held in the... aforecited case of Santiago, seeking an affirmative relief in court, whether in civil or criminal proceedings, constitutes voluntary appearance.

Principles:

Adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires neither jurisdiction over the person of the accused, nor custody of law over the body of the accused.

There is, however, an exception to the rule that filing pleadings seeking affirmative relief constitutes voluntary appearance, and the consequent submission of one's person to the
jurisdiction of the court. This is in the case of pleadings whose prayer is... precisely for the avoidance of the jurisdiction of the court, which only leads to a special appearance. These
pleadings are: (1) in civil cases, motions to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, whether or not other... grounds for dismissal are included;
[17] (2) in criminal cases, motions to quash a complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused; and (3) motions to quash a warrant of arrest.

The first two are consequences... of the fact that failure to file them would constitute a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person. The third is a consequence of the
fact that it is the very legality of the court process forcing the submission of the person of the accused that is the... very issue in a motion to quash a warrant of arrest.

To recapitulate what we have discussed so far, in criminal cases, jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived by the accused when he files any pleading seeking an
affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by... impugning such jurisdiction over his person. Therefore, in narrow cases involving special
appearances, an accused can invoke the processes of the court even though there is neither jurisdiction over the person nor custody of the law. However, if a person invoking the...
special jurisdiction of the court applies for bail, he must first submit himself to the custody of the law.

In cases not involving the so-called special appearance, the general rule applies, i.e., the accused is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court upon seeking
affirmative relief.
Miranda et al. v. Tuliao, G.R. No. 158763, March 31, 2006
Crim Pro - Jurisdiction

Facts:

On March 1996, two burnt cadavers were discovered in Ramon, Isabela which were later identified as the bodies of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao, son of the private respondent
Virgilio Tuliao who is now under the witness protection program.
            Two Informations for murder were filed against 5 police officers including SPO2 Maderal in the RTC of Santiago City. The venue was later transferred to the RTC of Manila.
The RTC convicted the accused and sentenced them two counts of reclusion perpetua except SPO2 Maderal who was yet to be arraigned at that time being at large. Upon automatic
review, the SC acquitted the accused on the ground of reasonable doubt.
            In Sept. 1999, Maderal was arrested. He executed a sworn confession and identified the petitioners as the ones responsible for the death of the victims, so, Tuliao filed a
criminal complaint for murder against the petitioners. Acting Presiding Judge Tumaliuan issued a warrant of arrest against the petitioners and SPO2 Maderal.
            Then, the petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary investigation, to reinvestigate, and to recall or quash the warrant of arrest. In the hearing of the urgent
motion, Judge Tumaliuan noted the absence of the petitioners and issued a Joint order denying the urgent motion on the ground that since the court did not acquire jurisdiction over
their persons, the motion cannot be properly heard by the court.

Issues: Whether or not an accused can seek judicial relief if he does not submit his person to the jurisdiction of the court.

Whether or not a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires jurisdiction over the person of the accused.

Held. No, one who seeks affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the Jurisdiction of the Court. Adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires neither
jurisdiction over the person of the accused, nor custody of law over the body of the accused.
            Citing Santiago v. Vasquez, there is a distinction between the custody of the law and jurisdiction over the person. Custody of the law is required before the Court can act upon
the application for bail, but is not required for the adjudication of other relief sought by the dependant where by mere application, thereof, constitutes a waiver of the defence of lack of
jurisdiction over the person accused.
BROCKA v ENRILE 1990
November 10, 2010
NATURE: Petition for Habeas Corpus

FACTS:
Jeepney strike called by the Alliance of Concerned Transport Organization (ACTO) à demonstration held in sympathy of this strike,
forcibly and violently dispersed à petitioners arrested by Northern Police District Officers – Jan 28 ’85. Petitioners charged with Illegal Assembly RPC146 par.3 in 3 crim cases
filed before RTC QC 65 all petitioners released on bail – P3,000 each EXCEPT for Lino Brocka, Ben Cervantes, Cosme Garcia and Rodolfo Santos (Brocka, et al.), who were
charged as leaders of the offense of Illegal Assembly for whom no bail was recommended urgent petition for bail filed before the RTC à daily hearings held between Feb.1-7 ’85 à
On Feb. 7 or 9 ’85, RTC QC Judge Miriam Defensor Santiago ordered Brocka, et al’s provisional release; recommended bail at P6,0000 each à Brocka, et al filed respective bail
bonds BUT… Despite service of release order, Brocka, et al remained in detention à respondents-police officers invoked Preventive Detention Action (PDA)
allegedly issued against Brocka, et al on Jan. 28 ’85 . Neither original nor certified true copy of this PDA was shown to Brocka, et al. Feb 11 ’85 – Brocka, et al charged with Inciting to
Sedition in 3 crim cases; hasty and spurious filing of this second offense as follows:

10:30 AM counsel informed by phone that Brocka, et al will be brought before the QC Fiscal at 2:30PM for undisclosed reasons à another phone call subsequently received informing
counsel that appearance of Brocka, et al was to be at 2:00PM

2:00PM Brocka, et al arrived at office of Asst. City Fiscal à complainants’ affidavits had not yet been received

3:00PM representative of the military arrived with alleged statements of complainants against Brocka, et al for alleged inciting to sedition

3:15PM counsel inquired from Records Custodian when the charges against Brocka, et al had been officially received à informed that said charges were never coursed
through the Records Office

ALSO, utterances allegedly constituting Inciting to Sedition under RPC142 are, almost verbatim, the same utterances which are the subject of the crim cases for Illegal Assembly
for which Brocka, et al are entitled to be relased on bail as a matter of Constitutional right à appears that respondents have conspired to deprive Brocka, et al of the right to bail AND,
panel of assistant fiscals demanded that Brocka, et al sign a waiver of their rights under RPC125 as a condition for the grant of the counsel’s request that they be given 7 days within
which counsel may confer with their clients à no such requirement required under the rules. Brocka, et al released provisionally on Feb.14 ’85 on orders of then Pres.Marcos à
release narrated in Court’s resolution in petition for habeas corpus filed by Sedfrey Ordonez in behalf of Brocka, et al:

 In Return of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, respondents said all accused had already been released à four on Feb15 ’85 and one on Feb.8 ’85
  Petitioners, nevertheless, still argue that the petition has not become moot and academic because the accused continue to be in the custody of the law under an invalid
charge of inciting to sedition.

Hence, this petition.

o Brocka, et al contend: bad faith and/or harassment sufficient bases for enjoining their criminal prosecution second offense of Inciting to Sedition manifestly illegal – premised on
one and the same act of participating in the ACTO jeepney strike à matter of defense in sedition charge so, only issue here is…

ISSUE: WON criminal prosecution of a case may be enjoined – YES

RATIO:
GEN. RULE: Criminal prosecution may not be restrained or stayed by injunction, preliminary or final
EXCEPTIONS: To afford adequate protection to the consti rights of the accused
When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions
When there is no prejudicial question which is subjudice
When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority
Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation When double jeopardy is clearly apparent When the court has no jurisdiction over the offense h. Where it is a
case of persecution rather than prosecution
Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by lust for vengeance
When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion
to quash on that ground had been denied
Preliminary injunction has been issued by the SC to prevent the threatened
unlawful arrest of petitioners
à HERE, criminal proceedings had become a case of persecution, have been
undertaken by state officials in bad faith:
1. Respondents invoked a spurious PDA in refusing Brocka, et al’s release
from detention BUT
This PDA was issued on Jan.28 ’85 and invoked only on Feb.9 ’85 upon
receipt of TC’s order of release à violates guideline that PDA shall be
invoked within 24 hrs in MM or 48 hours outside MM (Ilagan v Enrile

Despite subpoenas for PDA’s production, prosecution merely presented a

purported xeerox copy of it à violates Court pronouncement that “individuals
against whom PDAs have been issued should be furnished with the original,
and the duplicate original, and a certified true copy issued by the official
having official custody of the PDA, at the time of the apprehension (Ilagan v
Enrile)
2. SolGen’s manifestation: Brocka, et al should have filed a motion to quash
the information [instead of a petition for HC]
Court Held: such a course of action would have been a futile move,
considering the circumstances then prevailing:
1. spurious and inoperational PDA
2. sham and hasty PI
à clear signals that the prosecutors intended to keep Brocka, et al in detention
until the second offense could be facilitated and justified without need of
issuing a warrant of arrest anew
IF-THEN RULE:
If there is manifest bad faith that accompanies the filing of criminal charges
(as in this case where petitioners were barred from enjoying provisional
release until such time that charges were filed) and where a sham
preliminary investigation was hastily conducted THEN charges that are filed
as a result should lawfully be enjoined.
xx Petition granted. TC permanently enjoined from proceeding in any
manner with the cases subject of the petition.

METROBANK v. REYNADO
G.R. No. 164538; 9 August 2010
Del Castillo, J.

FACTS:
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank) charged respondents Rogelio Reynado and Jose Adrandea with the crime of estafa under Art. 315 parag. 1(b) of the RPC. It was
alleged that the special audit conducted on the cash and lending operations of its Port Area branch uncovered anomalous/fraudulent transactions perpetrated by respondents in
connivance with client Universal Converter Philippines, Inc. (Universal); that respondents were the only voting members of the branch’s credit committee authorized to extend credit
accommodation to clients up to P200,000.00; that through the so-called Bills Purchase Transaction, Universal, which has a paid-up capital of only P125,000.00 and actual
maintaining balance of P5,000.00, was able to make withdrawals totaling P81,652,000.00 against uncleared regional checks deposited in its account at petitioner’s Port Area branch;
that, consequently, Universal was able to utilize petitioner’s funds even before the seven-day clearing period for regional checks expired; that Universal’s withdrawals against
uncleared regional check deposits were without prior approval of petitioner’s head office; that the uncleared checks were later dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason "Account
Closed"; and, that respondents acted with fraud, deceit, and abuse of confidence.

Respondents denied responsibility in the anomalous transactions with Universal and claimed that they only intended to help the Port Area branch solicit and increase its deposit
accounts and daily transactions.

Meanwhile, Metrobank and Universal entered into a Debt Settlement Agreement whereby the latter acknowledged its indebtedness to the former in the total amount of
P50,990,976.27 and undertook to pay the same in bi-monthly amortizations of P300,000.00 as covered by postdated checks, "plus balloon payment of the remaining principal
balance and interest and other charges, if any.”

After preliminary investigation, prosecutor Edad found petitioner’s evidence insufficient to hold respondents liable for estafa. According to her, the execution of the Debt Settlement
Agreement puts Metrobank in estoppel to argue that the liability is criminal. Since the agreement was made even before the filing of this case, the relations between the parties [have]
change[d], novation has set in and prevented the incipience of any criminal liability on the part of respondents. Thus, the dismissal of the case is recommended.

Likewise, the DOJ dismissed the petition averring that no estafa exists in the instant case as it was not clearly shown how respondents misappropriated the P53,873,500.00.
Moreover, fraud is not present considering that the Executive Committee and the Credit Committee of Metrobank were duly notified of these transactions which they approved. Also,
no damage was caused as Metrobank agreed to settle with Universal.

MR was filed by petitioner which was denied. Aggrieved, it went to the CA to file for certiorari and mandamus. CA affirmed the twin resolutions of the DOJ Sec, and accordingly, just
as Universal cannot be held responsible under the bills purchase transactions on account of novation, private respondents, who acted in complicity with the former, cannot be made
liable [for] the same transactions. And since the dismissal of the complaint is founded on legal ground, respondents may not be compelled by mandamus to file an information in
court. Although, the OSG, in sharing the views of petitioner contended that failure to implead other responsible individuals in the complaint does not warrant its dismissal, suggesting
that the proper remedy is to cause their inclusion in the information, nevertheless, CA disposed of the petition.

ISSUE:
Is the non-inclusion of officers of Universal a ground for the dismissal of the complaint?

HELD: No. Section 2, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court mandates that all criminal actions must be commenced either by complaint or information in the name of the People of the
Philippines against all persons who appear to be responsible therefor. Thus, the law makes it a legal duty for prosecuting officers to file the charges against whomsoever the evidence
may show to be responsible for the offense. The proper remedy under the circumstances where persons who ought to be charged were not included in the complaint of the private
complainant is definitely not to dismiss the complaint but to include them in the information. As the OSG correctly suggested, the proper remedy should have been the inclusion of
certain employees of Universal who were found to have been in cahoots with respondents in defrauding petitioner. The DOJ, therefore, cannot seriously argue that because the
officers of Universal were not indicted, respondents themselves should not likewise be charged. Their non-inclusion cannot be perversely used to justify desistance by the public
prosecutor from prosecution of the criminal case just because not all of those who are probably guilty thereof were charged.
Contrary to the conclusion of public respondent, the Debt Settlement Agreement entered into between petitioner and Universal Converter Philippines extinguishes merely the civil
aspect of the latter’s liability as a corporate entity but not the criminal liability of the persons who actually committed the crime of estafa against petitioner Metrobank.

The findings of the Secretary of Justice in sustaining the dismissal of the Complaint are matters of defense best left to the trial court’s deliberation and contemplation after conducting
the trial of the criminal case. To emphasize, a preliminary investigation for the purpose of determining the existence of probable cause is "not a part of the trial. A full and exhaustive
presentation of the parties’ evidence is not required, but only such as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably
guilty thereof." A "finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or
omission complained of constitutes the offense charged."

Where, as in this case, despite the sufficiency of the evidence before the prosecutor, he refuses to file the corresponding information against the person responsible, he abuses his
discretion. His act is tantamount to a deliberate refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. The Secretary of Justice, on the other hand, gravely abused his discretion when, despite the
existence of sufficient evidence for the crime of estafa as acknowledged by the investigating prosecutor, he completely ignored the latter’s finding and proceeded with the questioned
resolution anchored on purely evidentiary matters in utter disregard of the concept of probable cause. Findings of the Secretary of Justice are not subject to review unless shown to
have been made with grave abuse.