PHILOSOPHY OF LAW

Case Digest

November 24, 2023

1. Salvacion vs. Central Bank of the Philippines, 278 SCRA 27, August 21, 1997

FACTS:

On February 4, 1989, an American tourist, Greg Bartelli, lured and detained 12-year-old Karen Salvacion
in his apartment, where he raped her multiple times until she was rescued on February 7, 1989. Greg
Bartelli was arrested, but on February 24, 1989, he escaped from jail. In a civil case, Karen Salvacion and
her parents were awarded damages, but they faced challenges in executing the judgment on Bartelli's
dollar deposit with China Banking Corporation as the bank invoked Section 113 of Central Bank Circular
No. 960, which exempted such deposits from attachment or garnishment by court orders. Therefore, the
petitioners sought relief from the court.

ISSUE:

Whether Court entertain the instant petition despite the fact that original jurisdiction in petitions for
declaratory relief rests with the lower court and whether Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960
and Section 8 of R.A. 6426, as amended by P.D. 1246, otherwise known as the Foreign Currency Deposit
Act be made applicable to a foreign transient?

RULINGS:

No. The petitioner seeks to receive the damages awarded by the court following a traumatic incident
where she was raped by an American tourist. The court discusses the limitations imposed by Republic
Act No. 6426 on executing the judgment due to the exemption of foreign currency deposits from
attachment or garnishment, which presents a considerable obstacle to obtaining the awarded damages.
The court notes that while the law may have been enacted for a valid reason, its effects in situations like
this are unjust and oppressive. The court argues that the law should be reconsidered in light of the
country's improved economic situation and the need for justice in cases like this.

Therefore, the Court definitely cannot have both ways and rest in the belief that have served the ends of
justice.

2. People vs. Acierto, 92 Phil.,534, January 30,1953

FACT:

This appeal involves cases of estafa and falsification of a private document, where the accused pleaded
guilty in the estafa cases and faced a varied sentence. The central issues raised include the plea of double
jeopardy, the court's jurisdiction, and the sufficiency of evidence. The accused, formerly a court martial
reporter for the U.S. Army, transitioned to piece-work and was accused of fraudulent claims. Initially
charged under the 94th Article of War, a court martial was convened, but its verdict and sentence were
disapproved, leading to prosecution in the Philippines. The appellant contends double jeopardy, asserting
the court martial's jurisdiction, which hinges on the Bases Agreement granting the U.S. jurisdiction over
certain offenses within military bases. The accused's shifting position on jurisdiction and the examination
of relevant legal provisions form the core of this appeal.

ISSUE:

Was the defendant an employee of the United States Army within the meaning of the United States
Military law

RULING:
No. Defendant worked as he pleased and was not amenable to daily control and disciplines of the Army.

Following a change in employment status, the individual ceased to be an integral part of the Army, losing
associated rights and privileges. No longer a regular employee, he retained the option to record court
martial proceedings when requested by the Army, earning payment based on the work accomplished.
However, as a piece worker, he held no obligation to the Army and had the freedom to choose when to act
as a reporter. Unlike regular employees, he was not compelled to attend work regularly, and his
compensation was distinct from salaries provided to regular employees.

The interpretation of the United States Military Law by the Judge Advocate General deserves great
respect. When it involves a disclaimer of jurisdiction under the Bases Agreement, the Philippines has no
reason to dispute it, as it enhances the country's dignity and promotes its interests.

Irrespective of the correctness of the views of the Military authorities, the defendant was estopped from
demurring to the Philippine court’s jurisdiction and pleading double jeopardy on the strength of his trial
by the court martial. A party will not be allowed to make a mockery of justice by taking inconsistent
positions which if allowed would result in brazen deception.

3. Gomez vs. Palomar, 25 SCRA 827 (1968)

FACTS:

Petitioner Benjamin Gomez mailed a letter at the post office in San Fernando, Pampanga. It did not bear
the special anti-TB stamp required by RA 1635. It was returned to the petitioner. Petitioner now assails
the constitutionality of the statute claiming that RA 1635 otherwise known as the Anti-TB Stamp law is
violative of the equal protection clause because it constitutes mail users into a class for the purpose of the
tax while leaving untaxed the rest of the population and that even among postal patrons the statute
discriminatorily grants exemptions. The law in question requires an additional 5 centavo stamp for every
mail being posted, and no mail shall be delivered unless bearing the said stamp.

ISSUE:

Is the Anti-TB Stamp Law unconstitutional, for being allegedly violative of the equal protection clause?

HELD:

No. It is settled that the legislature has the inherent power to select the subjects of taxation and to grant
exemptions. This power has aptly been described as "of wide range and flexibility." Indeed, it is said that
in the field of taxation, more than in other areas, the legislature possesses the greatest freedom in
classification. The classification of mail users is based on the ability to pay, the enjoyment of a privilege
and on administrative convenience. Tax exemptions have never been thought of as raising revenues under
the equal protection clause.

4. Municipality of Malabang vs. Benito, 27 SCRA 533 (1969)

FACTS:

Petitioner Amer Macaorao Balindong, the mayor of Malabang, Lanao del Sur, filed an action for
prohibition seeking to nullify Executive Order 386, which created the municipality of Balabagan. The
petitioners argued that the creation of municipalities by the President, as allowed by section 68 of the
Administrative Code, is unconstitutional, citing the SC's ruling in Pelaez v. Auditor General. The Pelaez
case held that the delegation of power to create municipalities to the President is unconstitutional due to
its inconsistency with the Constitution's provisions on the President's authority over local governments.
The respondents countered that Balabagan, despite being created under an unconstitutional statute,
functions as a de facto corporation with elected or appointed officers, and its existence cannot be
collaterally attacked.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the municipality of Balabagan is a de facto corporation.

RULING:

NO. A corporation organized under a statute subsequently declared invalid cannot acquire the status of a
‘de facto’ corporation unless there is some other statute under which the supposed corporation may be
validly organized.

The Court ruled that an inquiry into the legal existence of a municipality is reserved to the State in a
proceeding for quo warranto or other direct proceeding, and that only in a few exceptions may a private
person exercise this function of government. But the rule disallowing collateral attacks applies only where
the municipal corporation is at least a de facto corporation.

The mere fact that the municipality was created or organized at a time when the statute had not been
invalidated cannot conceivably make it a de facto corporation, as there is no other valid statute to give
color of authority to its creation.

5. People vs. Artuz, 71 SCRA 116, May 26,1976

FACTS:

Pamfilo Artuz, the appellant, was charged with murder for the death of Dominador Rallonza, whom he
allegedly stabbed while defending himself from an attack. The incident occurred when Rallonza and his
companions attacked Leoncio Panganiban. Panganiban informed Artuz about the situation, prompting
Artuz to report to the police. During a subsequent encounter, Rallonza approached Artuz with a weapon,
resulting in a struggle for possession. Artuz ultimately stabbed Rallonza in the lower chest and back,
claiming self-defense during the altercation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the decision of the lower court of sentencing Artuz of to two years, four months and one
day of prision correccional as minimum, to six years and one day of prision mayor as maximum is
acceptable and whether or not Artuz should be granted to be acquitted.

RULING:

The lower court, acknowledging the appellant's right to self-defense when facing a life-threatening
situation, reversed its earlier decision on February 26, 1964, finding the accused guilty of homicide. The
mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and incomplete self-defense were considered, leading to
the acquittal of the accused.

The legal philosophy observed in this case is leg al interpretivism, emphasizing the interpretation of law
and recognizing the moral aspects necessary for justifying actions or decisions. The judge accepted the
appellant's claim of self-defense, highlighting that the deceased initiated the unlawful aggression, and the
appellant responded to defend himself. However, the court noted that the measures used by the appellant
were deemed unreasonable or disproportionate to the danger he faced when gaining control of the
situation.