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Received: 1 November 2017    Revised: 6 July 2018    Accepted: 13 July 2018

DOI: 10.1111/bioe.12515

S P E C I A L I S S U E : E M B RYO D O N AT I O N

Embryo donation or embryo adoption? Conceptual and

normative issues

Oliver Hallich

Correspondence
Oliver Hallich, Institute for Philosophy, Abstract
University Duisburg‐Essen, A central question in the ethical debate on the practice of relinquishing in vitro
Universitätsstraße 12, 45117 Essen,
Germany. fertilization surplus embryos for family building is whether we ought to think of it
Email: oliver.hallich@uni-due.de more in terms of donating these embryos or in terms of having them adopted. Deciding
between these two alternatives is more than a matter of mere terminology. It has an
impact on normative questions, e.g., on the question of what criteria for parent
selection ought to be applied to the recipients of the embryos, and on the moral
evaluation of the act of ‘donating’ the embryo or ‘having it adopted’. In this article, I
defend the view that we should conceptualize the relinquishment of spare embryos
according to the adoption model, not as a donation. Section 2 sketches the outline of
the argument by making clear how we may ground a defense of the adoption model in
a theory of parental responsibility without implicitly elevating the moral status of the
embryo. Section 3 contains a preliminary defense of the adoption model that draws on
geneticism as what seems to me the most persuasive theory of parental responsibility.
In section 4, I examine three objections to geneticism and either rebut them or, insofar
as they are justified, try to accommodate them into my view. In section 5, I point out
some features that distinguish embryo adoption from the adoption of (born) children.
I contend, however, that these differences are compatible with the adoption model.
Section 6 is concerned with the normative ramifications of this view.

KEYWORDS
adoption, embryo donation, parental responsibility

1 |  I NTRO D U C TI O N
A central question in the ethical debate on the practice of relinquish-
ing in vitro fertilization (IVF) surplus embryos for family building is
whether we ought to think of it more in terms of donation or more in
terms of adoption.1 Deciding between these two alternatives is more
than a matter of mere terminology. It has an impact on normative
questions, for example, on the question of what criteria for parent se-
lection ought to be applied to the recipients of the embryos, and on
the moral evaluation of the act of ʻdonating’ the embryo or ʻhaving it
adopted’. Whereas ʻdonating’ highlights the altruistic nature of the act,
1
I follow E. Blyth and colleagues in using ʻembryo relinquishment’ as a term that is neutral
with regard to the adoption and the donation model. See Blyth, E., Paul, M., Berger, R., &
Frith, L. (2011). Embryo relinquishment for family building: How should it be conceptual-
ised? International Journal of Law, Policy & the Family, 25, 261.
ʻhaving the embryo adopted’ conveys the idea of the genetic parents
transferring their rights and responsibilities to the adopting couple.2
2
Due to these different normative and evaluative overtones of the terms ʻembryo dona-
tion’ and ʻembryo adoption’, it is unfortunate to use the first term to designate the transfer
of IVF embryos from the perspective of the relinquishing couple and the second to desig-
nate it from the perspective of the receiving couple (or individual). This is how the German
Ethics Council employs both terms. See Deutscher Ethikrat. (2016). Embryonenspende,
Embryoadoption und elterliche Verantwortung. Stellungnahme. 22 März 2016. Berlin: 13.
When it comes to deciding normative and evaluative questions, we have to take a stand on
whether the relinquishment of IVF embryos is either a donation or a relinquishment for
adoption. Furthermore, using these two terms perspective-dependently leads to concep-
tual problems: ʻA donates X to B’ conceptually implies ʻB receives X as a donation’, but
adopting X is different from receiving X as a donation. Unlike the German Council, the
Ethics Committee of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine is unambiguous in
rejecting the use of the term ʻadoption’ as ʻinaccurate’ and ʻmisleading’. See Ethics
Commitee of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine. (2016). Defining embryo
donation: An ethics committee opinion. Fertility & Sterility, 106, 56.

Bioethics. 2018;1–8. © 2018 John Wiley & Sons Ltd |  1

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In what follows, I will defend the view that we should conceptu-
alize the relinquishment of spare embryos according to the adoption
model, not as a donation. Section 2 sketches the outline of the ar-
gument by making clear how we may ground a defense of the adop-
tion model in a theory of parental responsibility. Section 3 contains a
preliminary defense of the adoption model that draws on geneticism
as what seems to me the most persuasive theory of parental respon-
sibility. In section 4, I examine three objections to geneticism and
either rebut them or, insofar as they are justified, try to accommo-
date them into my view. In section 5, I point out some features that
distinguish embryo adoption from the adoption of (born) children. I
contend, however, that these differences are compatible with the
adoption model. Section 6 is concerned with the normative ramifi-
cations of this view.
2 |  A N O U TLI N E O F TH E A RG U M E NT
Those who oppose the model of embryo adoption often raise the
worry that it is a mere disguise for elevating the status of the em-
bryo.3 They also object that the adoption model implicitly decides
normative questions concerning abortion and other issues pertain-
ing to the status of the embryo, such as embryo selection following
prenatal diagnostic testing (PND) or preimplantation genetic diagno-
sis (PGD).4 These concerns need to be taken seriously. They point to
the fact that it is important to avoid ʻcrypto‐normativism’ that smug-
gles in substantive normative decisions under the disguise of con-
ceptual clarifications. Therefore, my aim in this paper is to defend
the adoption model in a way that takes into account these worries.
That is, I attempt to defend it without simply presupposing that the
embryo has a right to life and without implicitly elevating the moral
status of the embryo. Rather, I will draw on theories of parental re-
sponsibility to support the adoption model.
How, then, do theories of parental responsibility relate to the
decision between the adoption and the donation model? To clarify
this relation, let me sketch the outline of the argument that I intend
to develop in section 3. I take three premises as granted without
further argument:
1. I assume as self‐evident that we have parental responsibilities
towards our (born) children. ʻResponsibility’ here means that
we have obligations towards our children, and the term ʻpa-
rental’ specifies these obligations in a way that makes them
distinguishable from those obligations that others, who are not
parents, have towards these children. Parental obligations typ-
ically comprise the obligations to raise and nurture a child, to
provide a socially and emotionally stable environment and a
long‐term loving and caring relationship.
3
For example, the American Society for Reproductive Medicine argues: ʻ[The] use of the
term ʻadoption’ in this context is misleading because it reinforces a conceptualization of
the embryo as a fully entitled legal being. … Embryos … should not be accorded the same
legal or moral status as persons.’ (Ibid., pp. 56–57).
4
Cf. Blyth et al., op. cit. note 1, pp. 265, 279.
HALLICH
2. I also take it for granted that this includes that we do not own
our children. Having parental responsibility towards our children
is different from having responsibilities with regard to our chil-
dren,5 i.e., from the kind of responsibility we may also have
with regard to objects that we own. We may be responsible
regarding a valuable object that we possess, but not towards it.
The responsibility we have towards our children is part of a
relationship that is distinct from the relationship of ownership
and that excludes the option of treating our children as objects
of possession.
3. Donation normally presupposes ownership.6 I may donate my
money to a charity organization but not yours because I own
my money but not yours. Therefore, the fact that we are not
in a relation of ownership towards our children entails that
we may not donate them in the way we may donate things
we own. Children are not our property; therefore we cannot
donate them in the way we can donate our money.7
Taking these three premises for granted, my aim in the next section is
to answer the question of what is the reason that grounds our parental
responsibilities towards our children. The principle of the universaliz-
ability of moral judgements demands that, if we apply a moral judge-
ment to one case because of a reason‐giving descriptive property, we
also have to apply it to all other cases that have this reason‐giving prop-
erty.8 Thus, if it turns out that the reason that generates parental re-
sponsibility towards our children also generates parental responsibilities
towards the embryos we brought into existence—and I will argue that
this is the case—then we are, by pain of logical inconsistency, commit-
ted to accepting the view that we have parental responsibilities to-
wards these embryos. If that is the case, it follows that embryos are not
mere objects that we own and that they, like born children, cannot be
donated but merely relinquished for adoption.
3 | TH EO R I E S O F PA R E NTA L
R E S P O N S I B I LIT Y
Answering the question of what the reason for our parental re-
sponsibility is requires examining various theories of parental
5
This distinction draws on Kant’s differentiation between ‘obligations towards’ (Pflichten
gegen) and ‘obligations with regard to’ (Pflichten in Ansehung von) in his Metaphysik der
Sitten (Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Tugendlehre). See Kant, I. (2017). The Metaphysics
of morals. Revised edition. The doctrine of virtue, §§ 16, 17 (pp. 206–208). L. Denis (Ed.).
Trans. M. Gregor. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
6
ʻNormally’ because in some contexts the assumption that donation requires ownership is
doubtful. For example, the right to donate organs can, but need not be based on the model
of self‐ownership. See Wilkinson, M. (2011). Ethics and the acquisition of organs (pp. 24–
25). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
7
For this conception of ownership and property rights, see, for example, Nozick, R. (1974).
Anarchy, state, and utopia (p. 171). New York, NY: Basic Books: ʻThe central core of the
notion of a property right in X, relative to which other parts of the notion are to be ex-
plained, is the right to determine what shall be done with X.’ For a critique of ʻproprietari-
anism’ in respect of children, see Archard, D. (2010). The obligations and responsibilities of
parenthood. In D. Archard & D. Benatar (Eds.), Procreation and parenthood. The ethics of
bearing and rearing children (p. 109). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
8
See Hare, R. M. (1963). Freedom and reason (pp. 10–21, sect. 2.2–2.5). Oxford, UK: Oxford
University Press.
HALLICH
responsibility, for these are the theories that aim at providing an-
swers to this question.
3.1 | Intentionalism
Perhaps the most attractive theory of parental responsibility at
first sight is intentionalism. According to intentionalism, those who
intend to raise and nurture a child are parentally responsible for it.9
Though the basic idea of intentionalism—a theory that is often
brought forward with the aim of defending surrogacy and the pa-
rental rights of the surrogate mother—has some plausibility, it suf-
fers from various defects. First, the mere intention to raise a child
can hardly be sufficient for generating parental responsibility. My
mere intention to raise my sister’s child does not make me paren-
tally responsible for it—the minimum that is additionally required
for this to happen is that my sister consent to my being a parent.
Second, intentions are time‐dependent and may change quickly,
whereas parental responsibility stretches over a longer period of
time and is usually thought to exist regardless of whimsical changes
of preferences. Assume that I sincerely intend to raise a child but,
when seeing it for the first time in the hospital (or when getting
tired of rearing it), change my intentions and decide that I would
prefer not to be a parent. This change of intentions would hardly
warrant the claim that I am thereby freed from parental responsibil-
ity. Third, intentions are opaque to a certain degree. It is sometimes
hard to determine whether one intends to raise a child or not,
sometimes one ʻlets conception happen’ without clearly intending
it but also without clearly not intending it. It would be odd to take
this as excluding parental responsibility.10 Fourth, one may suspect
that intentionalism derives its plausibility from conflating the nor-
mative force of intentions with the normative force of a contract.
For example, in the case of surrogacy, it is plausible to argue that
the contract between the gestating mother and the social mother
has normative significance because it yields responsibility on the
part of the social mother. But parental responsibility is then trans-
ferred to the rearing couple because of the normative force of the
contract, not because the social mother intends to raise the child.
The normative force of contracts must not be equated with the
normative force of the intention to enter a contract.11
9 gacy arrangements. Journal of Social Philosophy, 21, 40–56.
Cf. Shultz, M. (1990). Reproductive technology and intent‐based parenthood: An oppor-
tunity for gender neutrality. Wisconsin Law Review, 297–398; Hill, J. (1991). What does it
mean to be a ʻparent’? The claims of biology as the basis for parental rights. New York
University Law Review, 353, 388–417; Wiesemann, C. (2006). Von der Verantwortung, ein
Kind zu bekommen. Eine Ethik der Elternschaft (chap. 6, esp., pp. 99–100). Munich: Beck;
Brake, E. (2010). Willing parents. A voluntarist account of parental role obligations. In D.
Archard & D. Benatar (Eds.), Procreation and parenthood. The ethics of bearing and rearing
children (pp. 151–177). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. For a helpful overview on
theories of parental responsibility, see Bayne, T., & Kolers, A. (2003). Toward a pluralist
account of parenthood. Bioethics, 17, 221–241; Brake, E., & Millum, J. (2016). Parenthood
and procreation. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Spring 2016
Edition, pp. 13–17). Retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/
parenthood/; Millum, J. (2018). The moral foundations of parenthood (pp. 38–43). Oxford,
UK: Oxford University Press.
10
For these points, see also Roberts, M. (1993). Good intentions and a great divide. Having
babies by intending them. Law & Philosophy, 12, 292–298; Weinberg, R. (2008). The moral
complexity of sperm donation. Bioethics, 22, 168.
11
See Millum, op. cit. note 9, p. 42.
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3.2 | Gestationalism
Only a few words need to be said about gestationalism, i.e., the view
that gestation generates parental responsibility.12 This view is wrong
for the simple reason that it cannot accommodate parental responsi-
bilities of fathers. Fathers do not gestate, nevertheless they are pa-
rentally responsible for their children. Gestationalism simply leaves
fathers out of the picture.13
3.3 | Causalism
According to causalism, parental responsibility stems from the fact
that parents are causally responsible for the existence of the child.
They brought it into being, and those who caused its existence in the
sense that without their activity the child would not have come into
existence are parentally responsible for it.14
Though it is highly plausible to assume that parental responsibil-
ities originate from the fact that parents are causally responsible for
the existence of the child, causalism is problematic because it
stretches the limits of parental responsibility too far. Without my
grandmother’s dancing teacher I would not have come into existence
because had he not arranged things so neatly my grandmother
would never have met my grandfather, as a result of which I would
not have been born. But my grandmother’s dancing teacher is not,
and never was, parentally responsible for me. Thus, if action A is said
to contribute causally to the child’s coming into existence if A is a
necessary condition for the child’s coming into existence, then the
claim that P, by performing A, incurs parental responsibility is im-
plausible because it leads to an inflationary account of parental re-
sponsibility.15 If, by contrast, we demand that A be a sufficient
condition for the child coming into existence in order to generate
parental responsibility, it leads to a deflationary account of parental
responsibility because then no one is parentally responsible, since
no action is a sufficient condition for the child coming into existence.
Even cohabitation is not sufficient for the existence of a child since it
might not lead to pregnancy. If it leads to a pregnancy, the pregnancy
might not be brought to term and if it is brought to term, still other
conditions must obtain to bring the child into existence, e.g., the
12
Cf. Tong, R. (1990). The overdue death of a feminist chameleon: Taking a stand on surro-
13
For this critique of gestationalism, see also Bayne & Kolers, op. cit. note 9, pp. 225–229;
Weinberg, op. cit. note 10, p. 169.
14
Cf. Nelson, J. L. (1991). Parental obligations and the ethics of surrogacy: A causal per-
spective. Public Affairs Quarterly, 5, 49–61; Nelson, J. L. (2014). Special responsibilities of
parents using technologically assisted reproduction. In F. Baylis & C. McLeod (Eds.),
Family‐making. Contemporary ethical challenges (pp. 185–197). Oxford, UK: Oxford
University Press; Bluestein, J. (1997). Procreation and parental responsibility. Journal of
Social Philosophy, 28, 79–86. Fuscaldo and Archard offer refined versions of causalism.
According to Fuscaldo, parental responsibilities are generated whenever the birth of a
child is a reasonably foreseeable consequence of voluntary actions. Fuscaldo. G. (2006).
Genetic ties: Are they morally binding? Bioethics, 20, 64–76. According to Archard, ʻthose
who may be identified as the “proximate and primary causes” of a child᾽s existence and
whose causal role is intentional, negligent or reckless incur an obligation to ensure that the
child is parented.’ (Archard, op. cit. note 7, p. 119).
15
Cf. Weinberg, op. cit. note 10, p. 168. The point is made in a slightly different context by
Ripstein, A. (1998). Equality, responsibility, and the law (pp. 35–36). Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press.
 |
4       HALLICH
doctors must pay their due in order for the child to come into exis-
tence etc. Causalism either implausibly widens the realm of persons
that are parentally responsible or implausibly narrows it (to zero).
3.4 | Geneticism
In a first approach (which will still have to be refined), geneticism can
be characterized as the view that we incur parental responsibility if
our gametes contribute to creating a human being.16 Geneticism can
be understood as a specific version of causalism. While remaining
loyal to the intuitively plausible assumption that causing the exis-
tence of a child generates parental responsibility, it avoids stretching
the boundaries of parental responsibility too far (or reducing it to
zero) by singling out a specific cause that generates parental respon-
sibility. My grandmother’s dancing teacher is not parentally respon-
sible for me because, although he causally contributed to my
existence, he did not provide his gametes to create me. But a person
is parentally responsible for a child if her gametes are causally in-
volved in bringing about the existence of that child.
If geneticism is true, the final step of the argument is easy to
make. The reason for our having parental responsibility towards our
offspring is the fact that we are genetically related to it. Embryos,
too, are genetically related to their progenitors. Therefore, the rea-
son that generates parental responsibilities towards our children
also generates parental responsibilities towards IVF surplus em-
bryos. Since the necessary and sufficient criteria for ascribing paren-
tal responsibilities are fulfilled in both cases, nothing speaks against
concluding that we have parental responsibilities not only towards
our born children, but also towards the embryos we helped to bring
17
into being by means of our gametes. Having responsibilities to-
wards these embryos, whatever it may mean concretely, implies that
we do not own them and that they are not mere objects of posses-
sion. The relationship we have towards them is one of parenthood,
not one of ownership. Therefore, these embryos cannot be ʻdonated’
in a way that money can be donated to a charity organization.
However, geneticism is exposed to various objections, with which I
will deal in the next section.
16
Cf. Page, E. (1985). Donation, surrogacy and adoption. Journal of Applied Philosophy, 2,
161–172; Hall, B. (1999). The origin of parental rights. Public Affairs Quarterly, 13, 73–82;
Moschella, M. (2014). Rethinking the moral permissibility of gamete donation. Theoretical
Medicine & Bioethics, 35, 421–440. Though not a full‐fledged geneticism, Weinberg᾽s
ʻHazmat theory’, according to which parental responsibility is derived from our possession
of and control over hazardous material, namely our own gametes, comes close to geneti-
cism (Weinberg, op. cit. note 10, p. 172). Similarly, Benatar, though he does not call himself
a geneticist, claims that ʻin the normal course of events, one is responsible for rearing any
of one᾽s genetic offspring’. See Benatar, D. (1999). The unbearable lightness of bringing
into being. Journal of Applied Philosophy, 16, 175.
17
I do not claim that geneticism is the only theory of parental responsibility according to
which we are parentally responsible for IVF surplus embryos, but that it is the only correct
theory of parental responsibility that leads to this conclusion. If causalism were true, the
reason for our parental responsibility towards our children would carry over to IVF em-
bryos as well—but causalism, or so I argued, is wrong. By contrast, if intentionalism or
gestationalism were true, we would not be parentally responsible for surplus IVF embryos
since we do not intend their existence and no one has gestated them.
4 | A D E FE N S E O F G E N E TI C I S M
A first objection to geneticism is that its implication that we have pa-
rental responsibility towards the embryo is conceptually confused.
One could claim that there is a conceptual tie between being a par-
ent and having a (born) child. Consequently, the term ʻparental re-
sponsibility’ would apply only to the responsibility we have towards
our born children, not towards embryos. Furthermore, we usually say
that someone ʻbecomes’ a father or a mother at exactly the point of
time his or her child is born; therefore, one might argue, parental
responsibility can only be incurred at the point of time a child is born.
This objection is a non‐starter. It is a claim rather than an argu-
ment. It consists in a dogmatic reference to ʻhow we talk’, but merely
pointing to linguistic conventions—the way we use certain words—is
unpersuasive as an argument. There is little doubt that we have some
kind of responsibility towards the embryo and that we have certain
kinds of moral obligations in the way we treat it. For example, a preg-
nant woman is morally required not to harm the child to which she
gives birth by consuming alcohol during pregnancy. Doing so would be
a grave wrong because it would cause a setback to the interests of the
child that, under normal circumstances, will be born. If geneticism is
correct, it is appropriate to call this kind of responsibility ʻparental re-
sponsibility’. However, whether we do so or not is a question of minor
terminological importance. Similarly, it is hardly important whether we
call a pregnant woman a ʻmother’ or a ʻbecoming mother’ as long as we
agree on the moral duties she has towards the unborn child.
A second objection is more challenging. It says that conceding that
we have parental responsibilities towards embryos prejudges an an-
swer to the question of whether abortion is morally legitimate or
not.18 If a pregnant woman is parentally responsible towards the em-
bryo, this imposes on her moral obligations like the obligation to ab-
stain from drinking alcohol during pregnancy. Since killing is worse
than inflicting prenatal injury, does it not follow a fortiori that she is
also morally obliged not to kill the embryo? If this were the case, pos-
tulating parental responsibilities towards the embryo would commit us
to a ʻconservative’ view about abortion. According to the objection,
this would discredit geneticism because the question of whether abor-
tion is morally legitimate or not should be regarded as an open ques-
tion. Since parental responsibility towards the embryo would include
that it is morally prohibited to kill it, assuming that we are parentally
responsible towards the embryo, the objector says, would wrongly
predetermine that all acts of abortion are morally illegitimate.
Though intriguing, the objection is flawed. It is true that, accord-
ing to the argument I defended, parental responsibility towards the
embryo entails that we do not own the embryo and therefore can-
not treat it as we wish. However, this does not mean that the thesis
of parental responsibility commits us to a conservative view about
abortion. It is neutral with regard to the question of whether abor-
tion is morally legitimate or not.
To make this point clearer, it is helpful to frame the argument in
terms of interests. According to my argument, a woman who
18
Cf. Blyth et al., op. cit note 1, p. 279.
HALLICH
consumes alcohol during her pregnancy harms the interests of the
child that will be born if the pregnancy is brought to term and the child
is brought into existence. She violates her parental responsibilities to-
wards the embryo because she causes a setback to the interests of
the born child; she prevents this child from developing normal cogni-
tive abilities and having a healthy and normal life. But if she aborts and
decides to kill the embryo, she prevents these interests from coming
into being in the first place. There is no inconsistency in saying that it
is morally prohibited to harm the interests of the child that will be
born by consuming alcohol during pregnancy, whereas it is not morally
prohibited to prevent these interests from coming into being in the
first place, i.e., to kill the fetus.19 Thus, the claim that we have parental
obligations towards the embryo with regard to the welfare of the child
that will be born if the pregnancy is brought to term is compatible with
the claim that we have no obligation to bring this child into existence.
In sum, postulating parental responsibilities towards the embryo sits
well with taking a liberal view on abortion. The objection that by de-
fending these parental responsibilities we commit ourselves to a ʻcon-
servative’ view about abortion does not hold.
Another argument that is leveled against geneticism appeals to
cases of an involuntary use of one’s genetic material. It has been ar-
gued that it is difficult to see how one could be responsible for a
wholly involuntary use of one’s genetic material, e.g., in a case of
rape or in the case of armed gamete robbery. 20 Let me distinguish
two readings of the argument.
On a first reading, geneticism is wrong because it leads to cases of
unintended parental responsibility. I do not think this is a compelling
counter‐argument for at least two reasons. First, nothing speaks against
accepting the view that some kinds of responsibilities are not chosen.21
Assume that after a long tiring day you come home and find a baby in
your flat. (Someone, perhaps a mother in despair, must have left it
there.) Surely you cannot go your merry way and simply leave it unat-
tended. This may not be a case of parental responsibility, but it is a case
of responsibility nonetheless. And if you see a child (not your own) run-
ning on the street, are you not responsible for protecting it from being
run over by a car? Surely your responsibility would be considerably
weaker than the parents’ responsibility, but still yours would exist. This
suffices to show that we may have some responsibilities that are unin-
tended, and some that run against our express will. Gamete robbery or
rape—which can be seen as a kind of gamete robbery—could be ways of
bringing about unintended parental responsibility. Second, the parental
responsibility towards the being that comes into existence with the
help of one’s genetic material is no more than an initial responsibility. It
can be transferred to others who are willing (or more competent) to
rear the child.22 Ascribing parental responsibility to the victim of gam-
ete robbery does not mean that he would have to feel responsible for
19
For a detailed analysis of the argument and its implications, see McMahan, J. (2006).
Paradoxes of abortion and prenatal injury. Ethics, 116, 625–655.
20
Cf. Weinberg, op. cit. note 10, p. 169.
21
For this point, see also Nelson (2014), op. cit. note 14, pp. 186, 189.
22
For a detailed defense of this view, see Archard, op. cit. note 7. Archard puts this point
slightly differently by saying that, by engaging in the risky procreative act, we incur a pa-
rental obligation to ensure that someone (not necessarily the procreative agent) acts as a
parent and cares for the child (Ibid., 117).
      5|
his offspring for the rest of his life. Thus, the mere fact that, according
to geneticism, some responsibilities are unwanted does not provide a
counterargument to geneticism.
On a second reading, the cases of rape and gamete robbery are a
challenge to geneticism for a different reason. On this reading, geneti-
cism is wrong not because it leads to cases of involuntary parental re-
sponsibility, but because it ignores the crucial distinction between
ʻcausing X’ and ʻbeing a causal factor in the bringing about of X’. The
rape victim does not cause the existence of the child by means of her
gametes. Rather, she is used as a causal factor in bringing about its ex-
istence. ʻA causes X’ implies that there is (at least) one description of
what A does under which it is intentional.23 But in the case of the rape
victim there is no such description. Although her gametes are used as a
causal factor in bringing about the existence of a child (if, as we assume,
the rape leads to pregnancy), she does not cause its existence by means
of her gametes. By contrast, a sperm donor (or an oocyte donor respec-
tively) does cause the existence of a child by means of his (or her) gam-
etes. This is the case because there is (at least) one description for what
the sperm donor does—donating his gametes—under which what he
does is intentional (while there is no corresponding description for ʻbe-
ing a rape victim’); by donating he intends to help others to have a child.
It seems to me that in this reading the objection is sound. The dis-
tinction it points to really is a crucial one. It would be bizarre if geneti-
cism had to claim that the rape victim, as regards parental responsibility,
is on a par not only with a gamete donor but also with a ʻnormal’ parent
who voluntarily decides to bring a being into existence by means of his
gametes. But nothing hinders geneticism from simply integrating the
distinction it is accused of ignoring. According to geneticism, in a re-
fined version, one incurs parental responsibility not merely by oneself
or one’s gametes being a causal factor in bringing a child into existence
but by causing the existence of a child by means of one’s gametes. This
means that geneticism acknowledges the importance of intentions for
the ascription of parental responsibility, since ʻA causes the existence of
a child by means of his gametes’ conceptually implies that A does some-
thing intentionally.24
It is important to stress that ʻA causes the existence of a child by
means of his gametes’ does not imply that A intends the existence of
that child. A may intend something completely different from its exis-
tence. For example, A may simply intend to spend a pleasant evening
in agreeable company and have some fun. As the world goes, having
fun may then turn out to be an instance of ʻcausing the existence of a
child’. Similarly, a couple who undergoes IVF treatment may cause the
existence of surplus embryos without intending their existence; they
may simply intend to have a child. So, in contrast to intentionalism, I
do not claim that the intention to have or to rear a child is a necessary
23
See Davidson, D. (2001). Agency. In Essays on actions and events (2nd ed., pp. 47–50).
Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Of course, the conceptual tie between causation
and intention applies only to agent‐causality, not to all kinds of causality (e.g., in ʻthe rain
caused the street to be wet’, there is no reference to intentions).
24
This refined version of geneticism also implies that it is not the case that for every child
there is someone who (if he or she is still alive) has parental responsibility towards the
child. For example, in the case of double gamete robbery, there would be no one who has
parental responsibility towards the child. Of course, in these cases society might still ap-
point persons who are responsible for the well‐being of the child, though not parentally
responsible towards the child.
 |
6       HALLICH
condition for parental responsibility. Only I claim that without any in-
tention in the process of bringing about the existence of a child there
can be no parental responsibility. This allows us to differentiate be-
tween the rape victim, who does not have parental responsibility, and
the sperm donor, who does have it.
Another objection to geneticism invokes the case of a testicle
transplant. Assume that A’s testicles are transplanted to B, who then
becomes the father of a child. It has been argued that, although the
genetic material after the transplantation belongs to A, it is plausible
25
to regard B, not A, as the child’s father. Does that speak against
geneticism? I do not think that this is the case. Two scenarios can be
distinguished:
1. If the transplantation takes place without A’s consent and
against his will, A does not cause the existence of a child by
means of his gametes. His gametes are then merely causally
involved in bringing about its existence. A is then in the same
position as a rape victim and, for the same reason, he is not
parentally responsible.
2. If the transplantation takes place voluntarily and with A’s con-
sent, A thereby transfers his gametes to B who thereby be-
comes the owner of the gametes. The genetic material then
belongs to B who, after the transplantation, has property claims
over the gametes. 26 If B then becomes the father of a child,
he causes its existence by means of his, B᾽s, gametes. The
child is then genetically related to B, not to A. This is why
B, not A, is parentally responsible for the child. This is in tune
with the claim that we incur parental responsibility by causing
the existence of a child by means of our gametes (which, in
this scenario, B, not A, does).
In sum, geneticism can be upheld in view of the objections I discussed.
Therefore, there is no need to abandon the argument I defended at the
end of section 3. Since we do not only cause the existence of born chil-
dren by means of our gametes but also those of surplus IVF embryos,
we are parentally responsible for these embryos as well, and we may
not donate them as we may donate our property.
5 | E M B RYO A D O P TI O N A N D C H I LD
A D O P TI O N
In the preceding sections, I argued in defense of the adoption model
by attempting to undermine the donation model. However, it would
25
See Bayne, T. (2003). Gamete donation and parental responsibility. Journal of Applied
Philosophy, 20, 77–87.
26
Ibid., p. 79. I disagree with Weinberg᾽s interpretation of the case of a testicle transplant
as a ‘mass sperm donation’ (Weinberg, op. cit. note 10, p. 169, note 19). We would not say
that a woman who becomes pregnant with the help of a donor’s sperm uses her sperm in
order to become pregnant but rather that she uses his, the donor’s, sperm. This is why we
would continue to regard the sperm donor as the genetic father of the child. By contrast,
A᾽s gametes, in the case of a voluntary testicle transplant, cease to be his gametes as they
become part of B’s body. Therefore, the sperm donor ʻcauses the existence of the child by
means of his gametes’, whereas A, in the scenario described above, does not ʻcause the
existence of a child by means of his gametes’. Rather, B, after the transplant, does so.
certainly be bizarre to equate embryo adoption with the adoption of
born children. No doubt there are important differences between
these two kinds of adoption. 27 Three of them come to mind
immediately.
1. First, there is the evident difference of a gestational link. In
the case of embryo adoption, the recipient of the embryo is
the biological mother (though not the genetic mother) of the
child that will be born. This is not the case with child adoption.
Consequently, embryo adoption goes along with the possibility
of building up an emotional link between the mother and the
child during pregnancy, whereas the emotional link between
the social parents and the adopted child needs to be estab-
lished after adoption.
2. Second, child adoption consists of adopting a being with needs
that is already there, whereas embryo adoption consists of adopt-
ing a human being that, though potentially a person with needs
and wishes, still has no such needs and wishes.
3. Third, embryo adoption and child adoption differ in the way the
existence of the child can be traced back to the parents᾽ inten-
tions. In the case of embryo adoption, the child is born but for the
wishes of the adopting parents that it exist. Without this wish, it
would not come into existence at all. In the case of a ʻnormal’
adoption, by contrast, the child already exists independently of
the wishes of the parents.
These are undeniable differences between embryo adoption and
child adoption, but all of them are compatible with my views on
embryo adoption and parental responsibility. As to (1), the possi-
bility of building up an emotional relationship with the child even
before birth, insofar as it is normatively relevant at all, speaks in
favor of rather than against extending parental responsibilities to
responsibilities we have towards embryos. It points to the fact that
the relation a pregnant woman may have towards the embryo is, in
one important respect, similar to the one a woman may have to-
wards a born child. As to (2), the difference between adopting a
being with needs that is already there and adopting a being that
only potentially has these needs is normatively relevant in that it
implies that we have different parental obligations towards em-
bryos and towards (born) children. Our obligation towards children
comprises, amongst others, the obligation to satisfy their needs
and wishes, whereas our obligation towards embryos is not to sat-
isfy the needs or interests of the embryo, for, as I surmised, the
embryo has no such needs to be satisfied. But conceding that we
have different parental obligations in both cases is compatible with
contending that we do have parental obligations in both cases, i.e.,
towards the embryo as well as towards the born child. Parental
responsibilities always vary depending on the developmental stage
of the being towards whom we have this responsibility. For
27
Cf. MacCallum, F., & Widdows, H. (2012). Ethical issues in embryo donation. In M.
Richards, G. Pennings, & J. B. Appleby (Eds.), Reproductive donation. Practice, policy and
bioethics (pp. 272–276). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press; Deutscher Ethikrat,
op. cit. note 2, pp. 92–100.
HALLICH
example, my parental obligations towards my new‐born child com-
prise, amongst others, the obligations to feed him and to nurture
him. By contrast, if my son is aged 14, I still have parental respon-
sibilities towards him, but these do not include feeding and nurtur-
ing him. Accordingly, parental responsibilities vary dependent on
whether they relate to an embryo or to a born child. As to (3), the
difference in the way the existence of the child can be traced back
to parental intentions does not alter the fact that, on the part of
the recipients, there is no basic difference with regard to their fu-
ture intentions. The intentions of couples adopting children and of
couples receiving a surplus IVF embryo are basically the same—to
rear children. 28 So even those who find intentionalism plausible
will find it hard to prove that the intentional difference with regard
to the existence of the child is of any normative relevance for the
ascription of parental responsibility to couples adopting children
and those receiving a spare IVF embryo.
6 | N O R M ATI V E R A M I FI C ATI O N S
What, then, are the normative consequences of classifying the re-
linquishment of IVF spare embryos for family building as a way of
having them adopted by their social parents?
First, if my argument is correct, embryo transfer is similar to
child adoption in that it is a transfer of parental responsibility. This
does not mean that both practices are always normatively on a par.
Under normal circumstances, we would say that if a couple has the
choice between adopting an orphaned child and a surplus embryo,
they should ceteris paribus adopt the child. But it does mean that
in some cases, we have reason to abstain from morally censoring
those who prefer embryo donation to child adoption. In particular,
characterizing child adoption as ʻan altruistic act’ in contradistinc-
tion to the ʻself‐regarding’ choice to receive a donated spare IVF
embryo and bring it to birth would be misleading. This evaluative
distinction is parasitical on the distinction between adoption and
donation. It is guided—and misled—by the connotations of the
terms ʻadoption’ and ʻdonation’. The assumption underlying it is
that adoption is necessarily altruistic, whereas receiving a surplus
embryo, i.e., receiving a donation, is necessarily self‐regarding.
But according to my argument, receiving a surplus IVF embryo and
bringing it to birth is adopting it. If the distinction between ʻrelin-
quishing for adoption’ and ʻdonating’ breaks down in the case of
IVF surplus embryos, the plausibility of the correlated distinction
between the altruistic act of adoption and the self‐regarding act of
receiving a spare embryo breaks down as well. Both practices are
on a par with regard to their altruistic and self‐regarding nature.
Therefore, a woman who prefers the adoption of a surplus embryo
to the adoption of an orphaned child on the ground that the ex-
perience of pregnancy is important to her as a means for building
up a stable emotional relationship with the child should not be
28
Cf. MacCallum & Widdows, op. cit. note 27, p. 273.
|
      7
blamed for being more self‐centered than a woman who prefers
the adoption of a born child.
Second, the argument I defended has a bearing on the criteria for
parent selection.29 If embryo adoption and child adoption, both being
kinds of adoption, are similar in being transfers of parental responsibil-
ity, they should receive the same safeguards. Would‐be parents should
have to meet the same demands in both cases. Currently, the criteria
that determine parenthood in the case of child adoption are predomi-
nately social criteria. They pertain to the well‐being of the child and to
the likelihood of an emotionally stable relationship between the adop-
tee and the adopting couple. Prospective parents have to undergo a
very thorough ʻsocial screening’ to make sure that the child will be
brought up in a socially secure and emotionally stable environment. By
contrast, the criteria for assigning parenthood in the case of ʻembryo
donation’ (to adopt the traditional terminology) are almost purely med-
ical, relating to factors such as blood group compatibility and the likeli-
hood of the pregnancy being carried to term successfully.
If embryo adoption is similar to child adoption in that it is a trans-
fer of parental responsibilites, we ought to minimize this disparity.
In order to be allowed to carry out a pregnancy with an IVF surplus
embryo, a couple should conform to social standards very similar to
the ones with which a couple has to comply in order to adopt a child.
Consequently, before the embryo is transferred to the uterus of its
biological mother, there should be a ʻsocial screening’ for the pro-
spective parents similar to the one that is in practice for prospective
adopting parents. We should make sure that couples that want to
adopt an embryo provide a socially and emotionally stable environ-
ment for the child.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, my argument has a bearing
on the role the progenitors of IVF embryos ought to play in the dis-
position decision concerning the treatment of these embryos.
Currently, there are four different options for what may happen to
IVF surplus embryos: they may be discarded, they may (in some
countries) be used for research purposes, they may be adopted by
another couple or they may be shock‐frozen and cryopreserved. The
fourth of these options, the cryopreservation, is tantamount to a
postponement of the decision between the first three options. In
fact, it often happens that, as long as the embryos are cryopreserved,
parents remain passive with regard to the decision of what will hap-
pen to them after the maximum storage time (usually 10 years). Some
couples actively avoid the decision between the first three options
by not staying in contact with the clinic and refusing to answer enqui-
ries about what they wish to do with the embryos.30 In this case,
clinics have no information about the parents᾽ preferences.
Therefore, it sometimes happens that shock‐frozen embryos remain
in the fertility clinic until the maximum storage time is expired, after
which the clinics themselves have to decide what happens to them.
29
For this point, see also ibid: 271–272.
30
For details, see Blyth et al., op. cit. note 1, p. 267; MacCallum & Widdows, op. cit. note 27,
p. 279; Provoost, V., & Pennings, G. (2014). Frozen symbols of relatedness: Belgian infer-
tility patients and their decisions about unused cryopreserved embryos. In T. Freeman, S.
Graham, F. Ebtehaj, & M. Richards (Eds.), Relatedness in assisted reproduction. Families, ori‐
gins and identities (pp. 185–187). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
 |
8       HALLICH
Subscribing to the argument in favor of an (initial) parental re-
sponsibility towards these embryos, we have good reason not to
allow genetic parents of IVF embryos to remain passive with regard
to the future treatment of the embryos they brought into existence.
This parental responsibility comprises the concrete moral obligation
to abstain from harming the child that will be born if the pregnancy
is brought to term, but it also comprises a decisional responsibility.
In the case of our born children, it is fairly evident that our paren-
tal responsibility towards them includes the responsibility to make
decisions on their behalf as long as they are unable to do so. For
the same reason, progenitors of IVF embryos, if they are parentally
responsible towards them, are also responsible for making decisions
with regard to the treatment of these embryos. That is, as long as the
embryo is cryopreserved, its genetic parents cannot simply evade
exercising their responsibility for determining what will happen to
the embryo after the lapse of the maximum storage time.
Concretely, this would mean that in the IVF contract between
the couple and the fertility clinic, the couple, before undergoing the
IVF treatment, would have to voice its current preference as to what
should happen to the cryopreserved embryos after the maximum
storage time. Given that, as I argued above, the thesis of parental
responsibility towards the embryo does not commit us to the view
that we have an obligation to bring the child into existence, the range
of decisional options that are open to the couple might also include
discarding the embryo or relinquishing it for research purposes.
Deciding between these options would leave open the possibility
of revoking or altering this decision during the time of storage. For
example, if the couple declares that after the maximum storage time
their surplus embryos should be discarded, it may still change its
mind and decide that they should be used for research purposes.
(After all, the point of cryopreserving embryos is just to leave open
this possibility, and attitudes towards embryos may change with the
experience of pregnancy.) Perhaps parents should even be obliged
or at least encouraged to renew their preferences at regular inter-
vals. After, say, 1 year, they would then again have to declare their
wishes concerning the treatment of the cryopreserved embryos.
The procedure might be repeated after 2 years. After the maximum
storage time span is elapsed, parents would then definitely have to
decide what happens to the remaining cryopreserved embryos. In
the absence of a valid revocation, the preferences the parents wrote
down in the IVF contract before treatment should then be regarded
as binding, and clinics should act accordingly. In sum, if my argument
is right, the genetic parents should not be ‘let off the hook’ in exer-
cising their decisional responsibility concerning the treatment of the
surplus embryos they brought into existence.
AC K N OW L E D G E M E N T
I wish to thank two anonymous reviewers for extremely helpful
comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
C O N FL I C T O F I N T E R E S T
The author declares no conflict of interest.
ORCID
Oliver Hallich  http://orcid.org/0000-0003-1080-4224
Oliver Hallich is Professor for Practical Philosophy at the
University of Duisburg‐Essen, Germany. His research areas are
bioethics (particularly ethics of gamete donation), philosophy
of punishment, philosophy of forgiveness and the philosophy
of Schopenhauer. His publications include ‘Selbstbindungen
und medizinischer Paternalismus’ in Zeitschrift für philosophische
Forschung (2011), ‘A plea against apologies’ in Philosophia (2016)
and ‘Sperm donation and the right to privacy’ in The New Bioethics
(2017).
How to cite this article: Hallich O. Embryo donation or
embryo adoption? Conceptual and normative issues.
Bioethics. 2018;00:1–8. https://doi.org/10.1111/bioe.12515