MET ASCI ENTIFIC QUERIES 29
as a system of tentatively established ideas (scientific
[2]
WHAT IS SCIENCE?
1 . Introduction
WHEREAS TUE lower ani mals just belong to the
world, man tries (0 understand it; and, on the basis of
his imperfect but improvable understanding of the world.
man seeks to master it in order to add comfort to his
dwell ing place. In this process he builds an artificial
world: that growing body of ideas called 'sc ience,' which
may be characterised as rat ional, systematic, exact, vcrifi·
a.b~e. a nd therefore fallible knowledge. Through scien.
tlflc r esearch man has altain ed an increasingly wider,
deeper and more accurate reconstruction of the world in
terms of concepts.
One world js given to man; his glory is not so much
to . b e~r the world or to despise it, but to enrich it by
building further universes. H e (ames and remodels na-
tme to suit his own needs; he builds society and is in
turn built by it; he tries thereafter to remodel this artifi-
cial environment in order to adapt it to his own animal
and spiritual needs and dreams: he creates the world of
artifacts and the world of cu lture. Science as an activity
-as research- belongs to social life; applied to the im-
provement of our n atural and artificial environment, to
the invention and manufacture of goods both material and
cultural, science goes over into technology. However, sci-
ence looks most sparkling and startling among the stars
of culture when viewed as a good in itself: that is, both
28
knowledge) , and as an activity producing furth er ideas
(scientific research). Let us try to characterize both sci-
entific knowledge and scienti fic r esearch such as they are
at the present time.
2. Factual and Formal Science
Not every scientific research seeks objective knowl-
edge. Thus, logic and mathematics-that is, the various
systems of formal logic and the various chapters of pure
mathematics-are rationa l, systematic, and verifiable, but
they are not objective, they do not give us informations
about r eal ity : they are just not concerned with matters
of fact. Logic and ma thematics deal with ideal entities;
these entities, whether abstract or interpreted, exist in
human mind alone. Logicians and mathematicians are
nOt given objects to study: they bu ild th eir own objects.
True, they often do it th rough abstraction from real (nat-
ural or socia l) objects; moreover, the work of the logician
or the mathematician frequent ly meet the needs of the
scientist and the technologist, and this is why society tol-
erates and now even encourages th em. But the raw ma-
terial empl oyed by logicians and mathematicians is n ot
faClua l: it is ideal.
For exampl e, the concept of abstract number was
certainly born from the coordi nation (one-to·one corre-
spondence) of sets of ma terial objects, such as fingers on
the one hand, and stones on the other; yet, that concept
is not thereby reduced to this manual operation, nor to
the tokens employed to designate it. Numbers do not
exist outside our skulls, and even therein they exist at
the conceptual level, not at the physiological one. Ma-
ter ial objects are denumerable provided they are discrete;
30 METASCIENTIFIC QUERIES
but they are not numbers; neither their qualities and re-
lations are pure (abstract) numbers. In the world of ac-
tuals we find 3 books, in the world of fiCl ion we build
3 flying saucers; but who ever saw a 3, a plain 3?
Logic and mathematics. concerned as they are with
inventi ng formal entities and with establ ishing relations
among them, are often called jormai.scictlces, just because
their objects are neither things nor processes but-to speak
a pictorial language-forms that can be filled with an un·
limited assortment of contents, both fac tual and empiri-
cal. That is, we can establ ish correspondences between
th ese forms (or formal objects), on the one hand, and
things and processes at any level of reality, on the other.
This is how physics, chemistry, physiology, psychology,
economy, and other sciences come to employ mathematics
as a tool for the most precise reconstruction of the com-
plex re lations that are found among facts and among the
d iffe rent features of facts: nOt by identifying ideal patterns
with concrete objects, but by interpreting the former
(equally well: by fonnai ising factual statements).
The same applies to formal logic: some of its parts
(notably, but not excl usively, the two·valued proposition-
al logic) can be made to correspond to those psychical
entities we call thoughts. Such an application of the sci-
ences of pure form to the understanding of the world of
facts is performed by assigning d ifferent interpretations to
the forma l Objects. These interpretations are, within
li mits, ar bitrary; that is, they are justified by success, con·
venience. or ignorance. In other words. the factual or
empirical meaning assigned to formal objects is not an
intrinsic property of theirs. In this way, the formal sci-
ences never come to grips with reality; this explains the
paradox that. being formal, they "apply" to reality: ac-
METASOENTlFIC QUERIES
'I
w ally they do not apply, but are instead employed in or-
dinary language and in factua l science provided adequate
ru les of correspondence are superimposed on them. In
short, logic and mathematics keep in touch with r eality
through the bridge of language, both ordinary and
scientific.
We th us have a first great division of the sciences.
viz., into fon nal (or ideal) and factual (or material).
Th is prel iminary bra,nching takes care of the object or
theme of the respecth;e disciplines; it also accoun ts for the
di ffe rence in kind between the statements which the fo r-
mal and the faclUal sciences try to establish: whereas fo r-
mal sta tements consist in relations among signs, the state·
ments of the factual sciences refer in most cases to extra-
scienti(ic entities: to events and processes. Our division
answers also to the difference in method whereby verifi.
able statements are checked: whereas the formal sciences
are contented with logic for the rigorolls demonstrations
of their theorems (which may, however. have been guessed
by ordinary induction or other ways) • the factua l sciences
. need more than formal logic: they need observation
and / or experiment to secure the confinnation of their
conjectures. In other words. the factual sciences have to
look at things and, whenever possible, they have to change
them deli berate ly in attempting to ascertain to what de·
gree thei r hypotheses fit the facts.
In order to demonstrate a theorem of logic or mathe·
mat ics no appeal to experience is made: the set of postu·
lates, definitions, rules of formation of meaningful ex·
press ions, and rules of deductive inference-in short, the
basis of the given theory-is necessary and sufficient for
that purpose. The demonstration of theorems is just
deduction: it is an operation confined within the the-

" METASCIENTIFIC QUERIES
orelical sphere, even though at times the theorems them-
selves (not their proof) aTC suggested in some extra·
mathematical sphere, and even though their proof (hut
not their first hint) can be perfonnw with the help of
electronic computers. For example, any rigorous proof of
the Pythagorean theorem dispenses with measurement,
and employs figures on ly as a psychological aid to the de-
ductive process; that the Pythagorean theorem was the
outcome of a long process of induction tied to practical
operations of land measuring is true, but is another
story, to be told by the history, sociology, and psychology
of knowledge.
Mathematics and logic are, in ShOft, deductive sci.
ences. The constructive process, in which experience
plays a great suggestive role, is limited to the fonnulation
of the points of departure (axioms). In mathematics
truth consists. therefore, in the coherence of the given
statement with a previously admitted system of ideas:
therefore mathematical truth is not absolute. but is rela-
tive to that system. in the sense that a proposition valid
in one theory may cease to be logically true in another
theory. (For example, in the system of arithmetics we
employ to reckon hours, the proposition 12+ 1- 1 is true.)
Even more: abstract mathematical theories, that is. the-
ories containing uninterpreted terms (signs that are not
attributed a fixed meaning and can therefore be given
severa l different meanings) can be developed without pay_
ing attention to the problem of truth .
Consider the following a.xiom of a certain abstract
(un interpreted) theory: "There is at least one x such that
x is F." An unlimited number of interpretations (mod-
els) of this axiom can be framed, by giving 'x' and 'F'
different meanings. Should we decide that 'F' desig-
METASCIENTIFIC QUERIES
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nates point, we would obtain one such model, another
one if we mean number, and so on. As soon as we "fill"
the empty fonn with a specific (but still mathematical)
content, we get a system of logical entities that have the
privilege of being true or false within the given system
of propositions: from then on we have to clinch the prob-
lem of mathematical truth. Even so, only the conclu-
sions (theorems) will have to be true: the axioms we may
choose at will. The round will be won if logical con-
sistency is respected-I.e., if the laws of the system of logic
that has been agreed upon are not violated.
The situation is entirely different in the factua l sci-
cnces. Firstly, they do not contain empty symbols (logi-
cal variables), but only interpreted signs; for example,
they do not involve express ions such as'x is F,' which are
neither true nor false. Secondly, rationality-that is, co-
herence with a previously accepted system of ideas-is
necessary but not sufficient with regard to factual state-
ments; in particular. abidance by some system of logic is,
though necessary, not a guarantee for the obtainment of
truth. Besides rationality we require from the statements
of the factual sciences that they be verifiable in exIH:ri-
ellce, whether indirectly (in the case of general hypoth-
eses) or directly (in the case of singular conseq uences
of them). Only after passing tests of empirical verifica-
tion will a statement be regarded as adequate to its ob-
ject. i.e., as true-until new notice. This is why verifi-
able factual knowledge is oftcn ca ll ed eml)irical sciellce.
To sum up: logical consistency is necessary but not
sufficient in the field of the sciences of fact; in order to
maintain that a statement is (probably) true, empirical
data. (propositions about observation or experiment) are
reqUired. In the last instance, only experience may tell
 METASCIENTIFIC QUERIES
us whether an hypothesis relative to a certain group of
material facts is adequate or not. The best ground for
this methodological TUle is, that previous experience has
shown mankind that knowledge of fact is not convention.
ai, that if understanding and control of facts are sought,
experience must be r elied on. But experience will not
warrant that the concerned hypothes is be the tTUe one: it
will only tell us that our hypothesis is probably adequate,
without thereby excluding the possibility that furth er
study could provide better approximations to the concep-
tual reconstruction of the given piece of reali ty. Factual
knowledge, though rationa l, is essent ially probable; to put
it in other words: scientific inference is a net of both de-
ductive (demonstrative) and probable (inconclusive) in-
ferences.
The formal sciences demonstrate or prove; the fa c-
tual sciences verify (confirm or infirm) hypotheses that
are for the most part provisional. Demonstration is com-
plete and final ; verification is incomplete and therefore
temporary. The very natu re of the scientific method pre-
cludes the final confirmation of factual hypotheses. In·
deed, scientists seek not only to accumulate evidence for
their assumptions by multiplying their instances: they also
try to obtain evidences against their hypotheses, on the log.
ical principle that a single conclus ion that is not found to
agree wi th facts has more weight than one thousand can·
firmation s. Therefore, while fonnal theories are amen·
able to a state of perfection (or stagnation), theoretical
systems about [acts are, on the other hand, essent ially de·
fective: they meet the n ecessary condition for perfectibili.
ty. Consequently, if the study of the formal sciences may
invigorate the habit of rigor, the study of the factual sci.
ences may induce us to regard the world as inexhausti.
!\IETASCIENTIFIC QUERIES 35
hIe, and man as an unfinished and endless enterprise.
The differences in method, kind of statements, and
referents that separate the facLUai fTom the formal sci.
ences precludes their joint examination after a certain
paint. Being serious, rigorous and orten useful fiction,
but fi ction at last, fonnal science requires a special treat·
ment. In the following we shall concentrate on factua l
science-which is, after all, what is usually meant by 'sc i.
ence' in English. Let us take a glance at the peculiar
characteristics of (he sciences of nature and cu lLUre in their
present state, hoping that future sc ience will enrich its
qualities-Dr, at least, that future civil izations will make
a better use of sc ientific knowledge.
The essential traits of th e kind of knowledge at·
ta ined by the sciences of nalure and soc iety arc ratiollality
and objectivity. By 'rational knowledge' is meant:
(a) that it is mad e of concepts, judgments, and rea~
sonings, not of sensations, images, pattern s of behavior,
etc. The scientist certai nly perceives, fram es picLUres
(e.g., visualizable models), and makes operations; but
both the starting point of his work and the end product
o( it are ideas;
(b) that these ideas ca n be comb ined in accord·
ance with some set of logical rules, so as to prod uce new
ideas (deductive inference); these are not new from a
strictly logica l point of view, since they are entail ed by
the premises of the deduction: but they are epistemologic-
all y new, in so far as they express knowledge that was not
realised prior to the deduction;
(c) that those ideas do not pile up chaotically or
just chronOlogically, but are organized in systems of ideas,
lInt is, in ordered sets of propositions (theories);
" METASCIENTlflC QUERIES
That the scicmi(ic knowledge of reality is objective,
means:
(a) that it agrees approximately with its object:
i.e., that it seeks the attainment of factual truth;
(b) that it verifies the adaptation of ideas to facts
by r esorti ng to a peculiar commerce with facts (observa-
tion and experiment). an intercourse that is both COIl-
trallable and rcproducib\ to a certain extent.
Both fcatures of f tual science, rationality and ob-
jectivity, arc intimate~ welded to each other. Thus, [or
instance, what is IIsna Iy verified by means of experiment
is some conscq lienee drawn in a deductive way-from
an hypothesis; again, calc ulus not only fo llows observa-
tion but is always indispensable in planning and record-
ing it. The rationality and objectivity of scient ific knowl-
edge ca n be analysed illlo a host of characteristics that
shall be reviewed in the following.
3. Au iuventory of the l\Jnin Features
of Factual Science
( I) Sciellafic kllowledge is factual: it starts from
facts, respects them up to a certain point, and goes al-
ways back to them. &ience seeks to describe and explain
facts as they are, independently from their emotional or
commercial valuc: science neither poetizes nor sells facts.
although its exploits are a source of poetry and business.
In all fields. sc ience begins by establishing the facts; this
requires impersonal curiosity. distrust of prevailing op in-
ion. and sensitivity to newness.
Confirmed statements about facts are usually called
'empirical data'; they are obtained with the help of theo-
ries (however sketchy) and are in tum the raw material
METASCIENTIFIC QUERIES
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for theoretical elaboration. A subclass of empirical data
is of a quantitative kind; numerical and metrical data
arc ohen arranged in tabl es. the most important of them
being the tables of constants (such as the melting points
of di[ferenc subsLances). But the gathering of data and
their subsequent arrangement in tables is not the main
target of research: such infonnation has to be el~bodied
in theories if it is to become a tool {or understandmg and
application. What i.s the use of knowing the speci.fic
gravity of iron if we have no formula by means of whIch
we can relate it to other quantities?
It is not always possibl e, or even desirabl e. to respect
facts enti rely when analysing them, and there is no science
without analysis. even though analysis is but the way of
reconstructing wholes. The atomic physicist disturbs the
atOm he wishes to peep into; the biologist changes and
may even kill the Jiving being he is analysing; the anthro-
pologist engaged in a field study of a community provokes
in it certa in modifications. Ne ither oE them grasps his
object such as it is, but as modified by his OW11 opera-
tions; however, in every case such changes are objective,
and it is presumed that they are understandable in terms
of laws: they are nOt arbi trarily conjured lip by th e ex-
perimenter. Moreover, in every case the investigator
tries to describe the characteristics and the amount of the
disturbance he produces in the act of experiment; he
seeks, in short. to estimate the deviation or "error" pro-
duced by his active intervention. Because sc ientists act
on the tacit assumption that the world would exist even
in their absence-though, of course, not exacliy alike.
(2) Scientific lwowledge goes beyond facts: it dis-
cards fa cts, produces fresh facts. and explains facts. Com·
man sense starts from facts and sticks to them: it ohen
" METASCIENTIFIC QUERIES
confines itself to the isolated fact, it does not go very far
in correlating it with other facts or in its explanation. Sci-
entific research, on the other hand. does not limit itself
to observed facts: scientists squeeze reality in order to get
beyond appearances; they reject the bulk of perceived
facts as being a mass of accidents, they select what they
regard as the relevant facts, they control and, whenever
possible, they reproduce fa cts in experiment. They even
produce new things. from instruments to elementary par-
ticles; they make new chemicals, new vegetal and animal
varieties and, at least in principle. th ey create new pat-
terns of individual and social behavior.
Moreover, scientists do not lIsua lly accept new factS
unless they can somehow certify their authenticity; and
this is done, not so milch by contrasti ng them to other
facts, but by Showing that they are consistent with what
is known. Scientists dismiss fakes and magic tricks be-
cause they do not fit very general and safe hypotheses
that have been tried countless times. That is, scientistS
do not regard their own individual experience as an un-
appealable court: they rely, instead, both on collective
experien~e and on theory.
Furthermore, sc ientific knowledge rationalises expe-
rience instead of confining itself to describing it: the sci-
ent ific account of facu does not consist in their inventory
but in their expla nation by means of hypotheses (not-
ably, law statements) and systems of hypotheses (theo.
ries). Scientists conjecture what is behind obsen'ed facts,
and they continually invent conceptS (such as those of
atom, field, mass, energy, adaptation, integration, selec-
tion, soc ial class, or historical trend) that have no em-
pirical counterpart, i.e., that do not correspond to per-
c~Pts, although they are supposed to refer to objective-
) ~fETASCIENTIFIC QUER I ES
"
Iy existent things, qualities or relations. (We do not per-
ceive electric fields or social classes, but infer their exist-
ence from experientiable facts, and such concepts are
meaningful only in certain theoretical contexts.)
This going beyond immediate experience, this jump
[rom the obsen'ational to the theoretical level enables sci-
ence to regard with suspicion statements suggested by
mere coincidences; it enables science to predict the ac-
tual existence of things and processes at first sight occult,
but which more powerful instruments (ma terial or con-
cepwal) may disclose. Discrepancies between theoretical
expectations and empirical findi ngs are among th e strong.
est st imuli for the framing of new theories and the design
o( new experimellls. Not facts by themselves, but. their
theoretical processi ng and the comparison o( the conse-
quences of such theories with observational data, are per-
haps the main source of discovery of new [acts.
(3) Science is analytic: scientific research attacks
circumscribed problems one at a time and attempts LO
decompose everything illlo elcmCIllS (not necessari ly ulti-
mate or even real). Scienti£ic research does not pose it-
self questions such as "How is the world at large?", or
··H ow is knowledge pOssible?" It tries instead to under-
stand every total situation in terms of its components; it
tries to disclose the elements that make up every whole,
and to discover the interconnections that expla in its in-
tegrality.
The problems of science are partial; moreover, in
the beginning they are narrow or have to be narrowed.
But as research proceeds its scope is widened. T he re-
sults of science are general, both in the sense that thcy
refer to classes of objecu (e.g., rain) and that they are,
or tend to become, embodied in conceptual syntheses
 METASCIE~TIFIC QUERIES
called theories. Analysis, both of questions and of things,
is not so much a goal in itself as a tool for building the-
Ot'clical syntheses. Genuine science is neither atomistic
nor wholistic.
Research begins by decomposing its object in order
to discover the inner "mechanism" responsible for the
obscrved phenomena. But the dismantling of the "mech-
anism" does not stop when the nature of its p.:1.rts has
been invest igated: the inquiry into their interdepend-
ence is the next step, and the final stage is the tentative
reconstitution of the whole in tcnn of its interconnected
parts. Analysis does not involve the neglect of wholeness;
far from dissolving integration, analysis is the sole known
way of discovering how wholes emerge, subsist, and dis-
solve. Science docs not ignore synthesis; what it does re-
ject is lhe irrationa list claim that syntheses can be grasped
by a special intuition without previous analysis.
(1) Scientijic research is specialized: A conse-
quence of the analytic approach to problems is specialisa-
lion. NOlwi thstanding the unity of scientific method, its
application depends, to a large ex.tent, on the subject
mauer; this explains the multiplicity of techniques, and
the relative independence of the various sections of science.
Thc diversity of sciences should not, however, be ex-
aggerated to the point of obscuring their methodological
unity. The old dualism mauer/ spirit suggested the divi-
sion of science between Nalurwisse1lSchajten and Geistes-
wisse1lScJUljtell; however, these genera differ as LO subject
maller, technique, and level of development, but not as
regards aim, method, and scope. The dualism reason / ex-
perience has in tum suggested the division of science
into rational and empirical, which is not adequate ei ther,
because factual science is both rational and empirical.
METASCIENTIFIC QUERIES 41
Even less tenable is the dichotomy deductive/ inductive,
as every scientific pursuit (even in the formal sciences) is
both deductive and inductive, not to speak of further
types of inference.
Specialisation has not prevented the formation of in-
tcrdisc ipl inary fields, such as biophysics, biochemistry,
psychophysiology, social psychology, theory of informa-
tion, or cybernetics. However. specialisation does tend to
narrow the outlook of the individual scientist; a single
remedy has proved helpful against professional onesided-
ness (whidl often degenerates into professional short-
sightedness) , and that is a dose of philosophy.
(5) Scientijic knowledge is clear (md precise: its
probl ems are distinct, its res u Its accurate. Ordinary
knowledge, on the other hand, is usua lly vague and in-
accurate: in evcryday liEe we care liLLIe for precise defi-
nitions, accurate descriptions, or ex.act measurements: if
we ca red too much we would not be able to keep the
p..1.ce of life. Science renders precise what is known to
common sense in a hazy way; but, of course, sc ience is far
more than organized common sense: although it stems
from common sense, science const itutes a revolt against
its superficiality and vagueness. Scientific knowledge
seeks precision; it is never entirely free from vagueness,
but it manages to improve accuracy; it is never altogether
free from error, but it possesses a unique technique for
detecting mistakes and for taking advantage of them.
Clarity and precision are obta ined in science in the
following ways:
(a) Questions are stated in a clear, definite way;
the first and sometimes most difficult problem is to dis-
tinguish what the problems are; no analytic or experi-
 METASCIENTIFIC QUERIES
mental artillery can be eEfective if the enemy IS not ac-
curately located.
(b) Science starts &om notions that seem clear to
the non initi ated, and complicates, purifies, and eventual-
ly rejects them ; the progress ive transformation of ordi-
nary notions is done by including them in theoretical
schemes. Thus, 'distance' acquires a precise meaning by
being included in metrica l geometry and in physics.
(c) Science defines most of ilS concepts: some of
them in terms of primitive or undefined concepts, others
in an implicit way-that is, by the function they perform
in a theoretical syste m (contexwal definition). Defini-
tions are conventional, but th ey are not capriciously chos-
en: th ey must be convenient and fertil e. Once a defini-
tion is chose n, th e remaining discourse must remain faith-
fulto it if inconsistencies are to be avoided.
(d) Sc ience creates artificial languages by invent-
ing symbols (words, math ematical signs, chemical sym-
bols, etc.); definite meanings are attached to th ese signs
through rules of designation (such as "In the present con-
text 'H' designates hydrogen"). The basic symbols are
as simple as possible, but they can be combined in ac-
cordance wi th definite rules to yield arrangements as
complex as necessary. (The laws of combination of signs
to produce complex expressions arc the rules of forma-
tion.)
(c) Science seeks always to measure and record phe-
nomena. Numbers and geom etrical patterns are instru-
mental in the accurate record, description, and under-
stand ing of cvents and processes. 1£ possibl e, such data
should be arranged in tables or summed up in mathe-
METASCIE~TIFIC QUERI ES
matical formula e. However, mathematical formulation,
desirable as it is, is not an indispensable condition for
knowledge to be scientific: what characterizes scientific
knowledge is accuracy in a general sense rather than nu-
merical or metrical accuracy-which are usel ess against a
background of conceptual vagueness. Moreover. scienti f-
ic research employs more and morc basically non-num eri.
cal and non-metrical chapters o( mathematics (e.g., topol-
ogy, group theory, algebra of classes), which are not sci-
ences of number and shape, but of relation.
(6) Scie'l/i/ic knowledge is commtm icable: it is not
ineHable but utterable, not private but public. Sc ientif·
ic language conveys information to whomsoever has been
trained to understand it. There certainly are obscure
feelin gs and misty notions, even in scientific develop-
ments (as contrasted to the final presentation of scientif-
ic work); blll they have to be clarified before their ade·
quacy can be estimated. What is ineffable may be the
subject of poetry or music, not of science. (In effability
itsel( is, on the other hand, a subject of sc ientific-psy-
Chological and linguistic-research.)
Communicability is rendered possible by precision ;
and it is in tum a necessary condition for the verifica-
tion of empirical data and scientific hypotheses. Even if,
for commercial or political "reasons," certain pieces of
knowledge are kept under secret during a certain period,
they must in principle be communicable if they are to be
regarded as scientific. Communication of scientific re-
sults and techniques not only improves general educa·
tion but multiplies the possibilities of their infirmation
or confirmation. Independent verification affords the
maximum technical and moral guarantees, and is now
possible on an international scale in many subjects.
44 f>IETASC I ENTLFIC QUERIES
Therefore scientists regard secrecy in scientific matters
as inimical to scientific progress; the policy of scientific
secrecy is, in fact, the most effective producer of stagna-
t ion in culture. technology. and economics. as well as a
source of moral corruption.
(7) Scientific knowledge is verifiable: it must pass
the test of experience. In order to explain a set of phe-
nomena, the scient ist [Tames conjectures somehow ground.
cd on prev iolls knowledge. His assumptions may be cau-
tious or audaciolls, si mple or complex; at any rate, they
have to be tested. T he lest of factual hypotheses is em-
pirical, that is, observational or experimental. The rea li-
sation of this now trite truth is the imperishable contribu-
tion of Hell enistic science. In this sense, scient ific ideas
(in cluded law state mentS) stand not higher than tools or
garments: if they fai l in practice, they fai l altogether.
Experiment may go deeper than observation, be-
calise it effccts changes instead of merely recording varia-
tions: it isolates and comrols the sensitive variables. How-
evcr, experimental results are seldom interpretable in a
si ngle way; moreover, experiment is not possible in all
factual sciences; and a high degTee of accuracy can be
atlai ned in chapters of astronomy and economics without
the help of experiment. FaClUal science is therefore em-
pirical in the sense that the tcst of its hypotheses involves
experience; but it need not be experimerltal and, in par-
t icul ar, it is not exha usted by laboratory sciences sllch as
physics.
The prescription that scienti fic hypotheses must be
capable of passing the test of experience is one of the rules
of the scienti fi c method; the application of this rule de-
pends on the kind of subject, on the type of the concerned
METASCIENTIFIC QUERl ES 45
hypothesis, and on ~e avai.l~ble. me~ns. A multitude of
techniques of empi n cal venbcauon IS thcrefore necessary.
The verification of the fonnula of a chemical compound
is made along lines very different from the ~erification
of an astronomical compmation, or a hypothesIs concern-
ing the past of rocks or of men. Vcrificati~n t~hniq~les
c\'olve in time; however, they always conSIst III lesung
particular consequences of general hypotheses (among
them, law statemen tS) . . They always boi l down to show-
ing that there is-or that there is not-somc ground to
believe that the given assumptions fit the observed facts
or th e meas llred values.
Verifiability belongs to thc esscnce oE sc ientific
knowledge: were it not, it could not be sai d that scien-
tists try to obtai n objective knowledge.
(8) Scicntific research is methodicfll: it is not cr-
ratic but planned. Research workers do not grope in
the dark: they know what they are after :md how to find
it. The planning of research docs not exclude chance;
only, in making room for unforeseen even ts, it is possible
to lake advantage from chance interfercnce and from un-
expected novelLy. Moreover, chance is sometimes delib-
erately produced by th e investigator. Thus, in order to
ensure uniformity in the sample under considera tion, and
to prevent unconscious bias in the selection of its mem-
bers, the technique of randomisation is of len employed,
in which the decision abollt th e individuals that are to
enter a certain group is left to co ins or other devices.
Thereby, the investigator puts chance in the service of or-
derliness_in which there is no paradox, because random-
ness works at the individ ual level, whereas orderliness
operates in the group as a whole.
Every research work is based on previous knowledge,
 METASCIENTIFIC QUERIES
and p.1.rticularly on reasonably well confirmed conjec-
tures. (O ne of th e mai n problems of methodology is pre-
cisely to investigate what are the criteria for deciding
whether a given hypothesis can be regarded as reasonably
well confirmed: that is. whether the weight from induc-
tive and other grou nds is enough to keep the hypothe-
sis.) Research proceeds, moreover, on rules and tech-
niques that have proved successful in the past, but which
are cont inuall y being improved. not only in the light of
new ex perience. but also as a resu lt of mathematical and
philosophica l examination. One such rule of procedure
oC faCLUal scie nce is the followi ng: The relevant variables
(or those suspected to be sensi tive) should be varied one
at a time.
Factual science empl oys the experimental method, as
conceived in a large sense. This meth od consists in the
empirical test of particular conclusions drawn from gen-
eral hy(Xltheses (such as "Gases exp.1.nd when heated," or
"Men revolt when oppressed") . This kind of verifica-
tion requires th e handling, observation, and record of
phenomena; it further requires the control of the rele-
vant variables or factors; whenever possible it should in-
clude the deliberate anificial production of the con-
cerned ph enomena, and in all cases it demands the analy-
sis of the data found in the course of the empirical proce-
dures. Raw isolated data are unreliable and useless:
they have to be processed, organized, and confronted with
th eoretical conclusions.
Scientific method does not provide infallible recipes
for the finding of truth: it just conta ins a set of falli ble
(improvable) prescriptions for the plann ing of observa-
tions and experiments, for the interpretation of their re-
sults, and for the very posing of questions. It is, in short,
MET ..\SCIE:>:TIFIC QUERIES 47
the way science inquires into the unknown. Subordinat-
ed to the general rules of scientific method, and at the
same time supporting them, we find the various tech-
niques employed in the special sciences: techniques [or
weighing, for observing through the microscope. for an-
alysing chemical compounds. (or drawing charts summa-
rizing empirical data, for gathering data about customs,
etc. Science is, then, the slave of its own methods and
techn iques while these are successful; but it is free to
multiply and change its rul es at any time, for the sa ke
of greater rationality and greater objectivity.
(9) Scientific knowledge is systematic: a science is
not an aggregate of disconnected informations but a sys-
tem of ideas iogirally conn ected among each oth er. Ev-
ery system of ideas, characterized by a certain peculiar
basic (but r ejectable) set of hypotheses, and intended to
fit a certain class of facts, is a theory. Every chapter of a
special science contains theories or systems of ideas logic-
all y related to each other, that is. ordered by means of
the relation "entai ls." This connection among ideas may
be termed organ ic, in the sense that the replacement of
any of the basic assumptions prod uces an overa ll change
in the theory or set of theories.
The foundations of a given theory is not a set of
facts but rather a set of principles, or hypotheses of some
degree of generality (hence, of certa in logical fertility).
The conclusions (of theorems) may be drawn from the
principl es eith er in the ordinary way or with the help of
special techniques involving mathematical operations.
The systematic character of scientific knowledge-
that is, the fact that it is founded, ordered, and internally
consistent- is what makes it rational. Rationality eu-
. ;\IETASCIENTIFIC QU£RJES
abies scientific progress to be effected not only through
gradual accumulation of resu lts, but also through revolu-
tions. Scientific revolutions afC not discoveries of new
isolated facts, nor arc they improvements in the accuracy
of observation, but consist in lhe replacement of compre-
hens ive hypotheses (principles) by new axioms, and in the
substitution of new theoretical systems for entire theo-
ri es. Such revolutions arc, however, often elicited by the
discovery of new facts that were not accounted for by the
o lder th eories, though somet imes fou nd in the process of
their checking; and new theories become testable, in many
cases, thanks to the invention of new, morc precise tech·
niqucs of measurement.
(10) SciClltific Iwowledge is general : it places si n-
gular facts in general patterns, and p.1.rticular statements
in comprehensive schemes. The scien tist deals with the
singular fact to the extent to which it is a member of a
class, or an instance of a law; moreover, he assumes ev-
ery fact to be classifiable and lawfu l. It is not that sci-
ence ignores the individual thing or the unrepeatable
event: what it ignores is the isol ated fact. This is why
science has no lise for empirical data (which are always
singular) as stich; they are dumb as long as they arc not
manipulated ·and converted into pieces of theoreLical
frameworks.
An ontOlogical principle underlying scientific re-
search is, indeed, that variety and even uniqueness in
some respect..s are consistent with unifonnity and gen erali-
ty in a dler respects. The chemist is not interested in th is
or that fire, but in the process of combustion in general;
he tries to disclose that which all singulars share. The
scient ist attempts to disclose the universals hiding in the
;\[£TASCIENTIFIC QUERJES 49
bosom of the singulars themselves; that is, he does not re-
gard the universals ante rem nor post rem, but in reo
A medieval schoolman would classify the modern scien-
tist as an immancntist r ealist: because. by brushing ir-
rel evances aside, by trying to discover the traits common
to individuals unique in other respects, by seeking the rel-
evant variables (or essential qua lities) a nd the constant
relations among them (the laws), the sc ientist attempts to
discover the essen tial nature of things natural and human.
Scientific language contains not only terms desig-
nating si ngu lar facts and individual experiences but also
general terms referring to cl asses of facts. The generality
of the language of science is nOt, however, designed to
estrange sc ience from concrCte reali ty: generali;mlion is,
all the contrary, the sole known method for gctting
closer to concreteness, for grasping the essence oE things
(their essential qualities and laws). The scientist there-
by avoids to some extent the confusions and dece its pro-
,'oked by the dazzling flux of phenomena. Nor is useful-
ness drowned in generality: on the contrary, the general
schemes of science fit an unlimited number of specific
instances, providing widely embracing laws subsuming
and con ecl ing all the valid recipes of common sense a nd
o[ prescienti[ic lechniqu e.
( II ) Scientific knowledge is lawful: it seeks Jaws
(of nature a nd of culture) and appli es them. Scient ific
know ledge inserts singular facts in general patterns ca ll ed
'laws o( nature' or 'laws of society.' Behind the disorder
and fluidity of appea.rances factual sc ience discovers the
regular patterns of structure and process, of being and be-
comi ng. To the extent to which science is lawful , it is
esscllli alistic: it a ttempts to go to thc root of things. 1t
 METASCIENTIf'IC QUERIES
finds essence in the relevant variables and III the invar-
iant relations among them,
There are laws of facts and laws by means of which
other laws can be explained . Archimedes' principle b e-
longs to the former class; but it can in, tum be d~rived
fro m the general principles of mechamcs: hence It has
ceased being an independem principle and is now a the-
orem deducible from highcr-level hypotheses. The laws
of physics afford the basis of the law~ of ch~mical c~m­
binatiolls; the laws of physiology explalll certam psycillcal
phenomena; and the laws of econom ics belong to the foun-
dations of sociology. Law statements are lherefore or-
ganized in a level structure.
Law statements are certai nly transitory; bllt are the
laws th emselves immutable? If laws are regarded as the
very patterns of being and becoming. then th~y should
change alongside things themselves; at least, It should
be conceded that, when n ew levels emerge, their pecu-
liar qualities are related by new laws. Thus, the laws
of economics have emerged in the course of history on
the basis of other laws (biological and psychological pat-
terns) and, moreover. some of them change with the type
of socia l organ ization.
Of course, not every single fact known to science has
already been converted into a particular case of a general
law; particularly, events and processes in the higher levels
have been legalized but to a small extent. But this is partly
due to the anciel1l prejudice that things human are not law-
Eul, and also to the ancient Pythagorean belief that only
numerical relationships deserve being called 'scientific
laws'. The entire stock of conceptual tools should be em-
ployed in the search for the laws of mind and cu lture;
moreover, maybe the available stock is insufficient and
METASCI ENTIFIC QUERJES 51
requires the invention of radically new tools to cope with
Illen tal and cultural phenomena, just as the birth of modern
mechanics should have been impossible without the differ-
ential calculus.
But further progress in the legalization of non-physical
phenomena requires, above all , a n ew attitude towards the
very concept of scielllific law. In the first place, it must be
realised that there are many types of laws (even within a
single science), none of Lbem being necessarily better than
the remaining types. ]n the second place, it should become
common knowledge among culture scientists that laws are
not found just by observation and recording. but by testing
hypotheses: law statements are, indeed, nothing but con·
firmed hypotheses. And how should we set out to frame
scielllific hypotheses if we did not entertain the presump-
tion that every single fact is legal?
(12) S,;e'lce is expfa'lalory: it attempts to expla in
facts in terms of laws, and laws in terms of principles_ &i-
enlists are not satisfied with detai led descriptions: besides
inquiring how things are, scientists try to answer whys:
why events happen as they do and not othenvise. Science
deduces propositions referring to singular facts from general
laws. and laws from still more general nomological state-
men ts (principles). For instance, Kepler's laws explained
a collection of observed facts about planetary motion; and
Newton explained those laws bydcriving them from general
principles-which explanation enabled other astronomers
to account for irregularities in the planets' orbits that were
unknown to Kepler.
Jt used to be believed that to explain means to point
OUt the cause, but it is now bei ng recognized that causal
explanation is just one type of scientific explanation. Sci-

52 METASCIENTIFIC QUERIES
eutiHc explanation is always performed in terms of laws. and
causal Jaws are only a subclass of scientific laws. There are
various types of scientific law a nd, conscque~1l1y, ~ varietr
of types of scientific explanation: morpholo~lcal, klnema,tl-
cal, dynamical, of composition. of conservation, of associa-
tion, of overall trends. dialectical, teleological, etc.
The history of science teaches us that scientific explana-
tions are unceasingly corrected or discarded. Does it mean
that they are all false? In faclUai science truth and error are
not entirely alien to each other: there are parlial truths and
partial errors, good and poor approximations. Science does
not proceed like Penelope, but can find a use f,or the cloth
that was woven yesterday. Scientific explanatlons are not
final but they are improvable.
( 13) Scielltific kllowledge is fnediclive: it goes be-
yond the mass of experienced facts by figuring out how l~le
past may have been and how the future may look. PrediC-
tion is, in the first place, an dfective way of testing hypothe-
ses; but it is also the key to the control or even the modifi-
cation of the course of events. Scientific prediction, in
COlllrast with prophecy, is based on laws and on specific
reliable informations regarding the present (or past) state
oEaffairs. It is not of the type oE"E wil l occur," but rather
of this type: "E, will occur provided C I happens, because
whenever C occurs it is followed by or associated with E."
('C' and 'E' designate kinds of events, whereas 'C I ' and 'E, '
denote the specific events that are predicted on the basis
of the statement (s) linking C and E in general.)
Scientific prediction is characterized by its perfecti-
bility rather than b y its certainty. Moreover, predictions
made with the help of empirical rules of thumb are some-
times more accurate than predictions painfully contrived
METASCIENTIFIC QUERIES
"
with scientific tools (laws, specific informations, and deduc-
tions) ; such as is often the case with weather forecast, medi-
cal prognosis, and political prophecy. But, whereas proph-
ecy is not perfectible and cannot be used to test hypotheses,
prediction is perfectible and, if unsuccessful, it forces us to
correct our assumptions, thereby attaining a deeper under-
standing. This is why successful prophecy does not add to
theoretica l knowledge, whereas unsuccessful scientific pre-
.
diction may contribute to it.
Since sciemi Eic prediction depends on laws and on
items of specific information, it Illay fail for want of accu-
racy in the law statements or in the available information.
(It may, of course, fail on account of some mistake in the
logica l or mathemati ca l process of inference leading from
the premises [laws and informations] to the conclusion
[predictive sta tement].) A major source of failure in predic-
tion is the set of assu mptions about the nature of the object
(physical systcm, living organism, socia l group, etc.) the be-
havior of which is to be predicted. \Ve may, for instance,
believe that th e concerned system is isolated enough from
external disturbances, while these actually Count in the long
run; isol ati on being a necessary condit ion for the descrip-
tion of the system with a hand ful of law statements, it
should not be surprising why it is so difficult to predict
the behavior of open systems such as the ocean, the atmos-
phere, the living thing, or the human being.
Since scientific prediction is based on scientific laws,
there are as many kinds of predictions as kinds of law state-
ments. Some laws enable us to predict individual resul ts-
not without some error if the prediction is about the value
of .some quantity. Other laws, while unable to tell us any-
tiling about the behavior of individuals (atoms, person s,
Ctc.) , arc the basis for the prediction of some general trends

54 METASCIENTIFIC QUERIES
and collective properties of large collections of similar ele·
ments: they are the statistical laws. The laws of history are
of this typc; this is wby prediction of individual events is
almost impossible in the field of history: only the general
course of events can be foreseen.
( 14) Science is open: it acknowledges no a priori
barriers to knowledge. 1£ a piece of factual knowledge is
not in principle refutable, then it does not belong to science
but to some other fi eld. The notions about Ollr natural and
social environment, or about the self, are not final: they
are all in a state of flux, they arc all fallible. It is always
conceivable that a new situat ion (new infonnation or new
thcafetic., l work) may arise in which our ideas, however
established, can be shown to be inadequate in some respect.
&ience has no se lf-ev ident axioms; even the most general
and safe principles of sc ience are postula tes that can be
corrected or replaced. As a consequence of the hypothetical
character of law statements, and of the improvable nature
of empirical data, science is not a closed dogmatic system
but an open controvertible one. Or, ra ther, science is open
as a system because it is fallible and consequclllly capable
of making progress. On the other hand. it may be argued
that science is methodologically closed, not in the sense that
the rules of scientific method are final, but in the sense that
it is self-correcting: the sale req uirement of the verifiability
of scientific hypotheses is sufficient to ensure scientific
progress.
As soon as a sc ientific theory has been established, it
is in danger of being refuted or, at least, of its range being
circumscribed. A closed system of factual knowledge. with-
out further research, may be called wisdom-but is actually
a detritus of science. The modem sage, unlike the ancient
METASCI ENTIFIC QUERIES
"
one, is not SO much an accumulator of knowledge as a gene-
rator of problems. He therefore prefers the latest issues of
the specialized journals to the textbooks, even though the
latter are vaster a nd more reliable deposits of truth than
the [onner. The modern research worker cherishes truth
bu t is not interested in ilTefutable theories. A theory may
have remained untouched not so much because of its high
truth content as because nobody could find any use for it.
No empirical investigation is needed in order to prove the
tautology that not even' scientists marry spinsters.
Modern systems oE sc ienti fic knowledge are like grow-
ing organisms: while alive, they change wi thout pause.
(Th is is one o[ the reasons why science is ethically valuabl e:
because it reminds us that correcti ng mistakes is as valuab le
as making none, a nd trying new uncerLa in things is prefer-
able to worshipping old guaranteed on es.) &ience, like
the organism, changes both innerl y and owi ng to its con·
tacts with its neighbors: by solving its specific problems and
by being useful in other fields.
( 15) Science is useful: because it seeks tTuth , science
is effective in providing tools for both good and evil. Or.
dinary knowledge is usually concerned with achieving
results capable of being immediately a pplied ; thereby it is
not true enough, whereby it cannot be efficient enough.
When adequate knowledge of things is avai lable, it is pos-
sible to handle them successfully. The usefulness of science
is a consequence of its objecti vity: without necessarily at-
tempting to achieve resu lts having an applica tion, research
provides them whether in the short or in the long run.
Modern society pays research because it has learned that
research " pays off." It is th erefore redundant to admonish
sciemisl'i to produce applicable knowledge: they cannot

METASCIENTIFIC QUERIES
help producing it. It is up to the technicians to. e~ploy
scientific knowledge for practical purposes, and It IS the
responsibility of politicians to employ science and tech-
nology in the benefit of mankind. Scientists can at most
advise how to make rational, eHective, and good use of
science.
Prescient ific technique was essentially a collection of
pragmatic non understood recipes, many of them having
the [unction of magic rituals. Modern technique is, to an
increasing extent, though not exclusively, applied science.
Engineering is applied physics and chemistry, medicine is
applied biology, psych iatry is applied psychology and neu-
rology; and th e day should come [or politics to become
applied sociology.
nut techno logy is more than applied science: in the
fi rst place, because it has its own procedures of research,
adapted to concrete circumstances that are far from the pure
cases studied by science. In the second place, because every
branch of technology contains a host of rules of thumb
discovered ahead of the scientific principles in which, if
confirmed, they ultimately become absorbed. Technology
is not merely the result of applying available scientific
knowledge to practical problems: living technology is, essen-
tially, the scientific approach to practical problems, that is,
the hand ling of such problems with a background of scien-
tific knowledge and with the help of scientific method. This
is why technology. whether of things or of men, is a source
of fresh knowledge.
The connection between science and technology is
not, therefore. unsymmetrical. Every technological <ttl-
vance raises scientific problems, the solut ion of which may
consist in the inven tion of new theories or new techniques
of research leading to a more adequate knowledge and
META5CIF..t~TIFIC QUERIES 57
mastering of the concerned subject. Science and technology
Plake a loop of interacting systems that feed each other.
Scientists render intelligible what technicians do, these in
tUrn provide tests and instruments for science and-what is
equ ally important-they keep asking questio ~s to scie~ tists,
thereby adding an external mover to the lOner drive of
scientific progress. The continuation of life on earth de-
pends on the carbon cycle: animals feed on ~ l ants. which
in turn obtain their carbon from what allimais exhale.
Analogously, the continuation of modern civilization de-
pends to a large extent on the knowledge cycle: modern
technology draws from science, and modern science depends
in its turn on the equipment and stimulus provided by a
high ly technified ind ustry.
Bllt science is useful in more than one way. Besides
being the foundation of technology, science is usefu l to th e
extent to which it is employed in building world views in
agreement with facts, and in creating the habit of adopting
an altitude of free and fearless question ing. in accustoming
people to put their assertions to the test and to argue in a
cogent way. Last, but not least. science is useful as a deep
well of passionating phi losophic puzzles, and as a model for
ph ilosophic research.
] n short. science is valuable as a tool for harnessing
nature and remodeling society; it is valuable in itself, as a
cl ue for understanding the world and the self; and it is effec-
tive in enriching, disciplining and liberating our mi nds.