Journal of Management and Governance

https://doi.org/10.1007/s10997-020-09510-4

The influence of family‑related factors on intellectual

capital performance in family businesses

Gianluca Ginesti1 · Mario Ossorio2

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2020

Abstract
This study explores the impact of family-related factors on intellectual capital (IC)
performance. Leveraging hand-collected data from a sample of 85 Italian listed fam-
ily companies during the period 2015–2017 (255 firm-year observations), we inves-
tigate whether three main family-related factors, i.e. family involvement in owner-
ship, family leadership and the generational stage, affect IC performance. Based on
the resource-based view and prior literature we assume that all these three family-
related factors enhance IC performance. The results confirm our predictions and pro-
vide evidence that family firms managed by a family leader and with a higher level
of family involvement in ownership exhibit a greater IC performance. Moreover, the
later generational stage of the family business is found to be positively related to
IC performance. These results enrich the extant literature by introducing two main
determinants of IC performance, i.e. family leadership and the generational stage.

Keywords  Intellectual capital · Company performance · Family business · Family

leadership · Generational stage · Corporate governance

We are grateful to the Editor prof. Lino Cinquini and two anonymous referees for their valuable
comments and suggestions. We thank Salvatore Sciascia and Andrea Calabrò for the helpful
discussions, as well as the participants at the 10th International Research Meeting in Business and
Management 2019 (Nice, France).

Electronic supplementary material  The online version of this article (https​://doi.org/10.1007/s1099​

7-020-09510​-4) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

* Gianluca Ginesti
gianluca.ginesti@unina.it
1
Department of Management, Economics, Institutions (DEMI), University of Naples “Federico
II”, Monte S. Angelo University Campus, Naples, Italy
2
Department of Economics, University of Campania “Luigi Vanvitelli”, Caserta, Italy

13
Vol.:(0123456789)
 G. Ginesti, M. Ossorio

1 Introduction

Intellectual capital (IC) brings relevant benefits for the value creation process of
firms and is critical to gain a competitive advantage (Kujansivu and Lönnqvist
2007; Nadeem et  al. 2018). Over time, scholars have emphasised the dynamic
aspect of IC (Dumay 2014), often suggesting broadened definitions that include—
but are not limited to—intangible assets, intellectual properties and all knowl-
edge-based resources owned by an organisation (Bontis 1998; Kaufmann and
Schneider 2004). Alongside these theoretical efforts, a number of studies have
examined the association between IC and firm performance, but little research
has been carried out to investigate the impact of the family-related antecedents on
IC performance (Greco et al. 2014; Claver-Cortés et al. 2015).
This is of fundamental importance because family businesses are relevant for
economy growth (Cirillo et al. 2018) and IC assets have a crucial role in the long-
term value creation of family firms (Grimaldi et al. 2016; Sun et al. 2019). Com-
pared to other organisational forms, family businesses have a distinctive nature
(Gomez-Mejia et  al. 2011) because they are characterised by the presence of
families’ concentrated ownership and operate with one or more members active
in business decisions (Chen et al. 2008). These features tilt family firms toward
specific preferences that affect resource allocation (Sirmon and Hitt 2003) and the
propensity of risk-taking activities, as well as the investment horizons (Anderson
and Reeb 2003). Lastly, scholars point out that family firms are rich in intangible
assets (Habbershon and Williams 1999) and resources of a “tacit” nature (Claver-
Cortés et al. 2015).
This study investigates three main family-related antecedents that may help the
understanding of variations in IC performance among family firms: (i) the degree
of family ownership; (ii) the family generation involved in management; and (iii)
the presence of family leadership on a corporate board.
Our hypotheses rely on literature that contends that the presence of family in
the firm via ownership is a source of inimitable knowledge, skills and values that
positively affect long-term value creation (Chen and Hsu 2009; Berrone et  al.
2012; Zellweger et  al. 2012). Moreover, we draw positive predictions on the
impact of family leadership on the basis of a theoretical perspective suggesting
that family CEOs are more likely to adopt actions that increase the long-term
competitiveness of the firm and maintain solid relationships among managers and
external parties (Horton 1986; Miller 2003; Miller and Le Breton-Miller 2006).
Finally, we test the hypothesis that at later generational stages, family firms
increase their valuable experiences and disseminate among family members a
tacit knowledge that improves business practices (Liebeskind 1996; Bracci and
Vagnoni 2011; Chen et al. 2014).
The research hypotheses are tested on a sample of 85 Italian listed family com-
panies during the period 2015–2017 (255 firms-year observations). This is in line
with a number of academic contributions that have considered Italy to be an ideal
setting to analyse issues related to family businesses (Cascino et al. 2010; Cam-
popiano and De Massis 2015).

13
The influence of family‑related factors on intellectual capital…

To measure a company’s IC performance, we use the Value Added Intellectual

Coefficient (VAIC), developed by Pulic (2000) and adopted, as well as modified, in
empirical studies (Pew Tan et al. 2007; Maditinos et al. 2011; Ginesti et al. 2018;
Nadeem et al. 2019).
The results show that all the proposed family-related factors are significant pre-
dictors of VAIC, suggesting that family owners, family leaders and later generation
stage of family businesses are more likely to increase their IC performance.
By providing an investigation of the impact of family-related components on IC
performance, we offer several important contributions. First, this work is of inter-
est to the family business literature, which has mainly investigated the impact of
family-related antecedents on accounting and financial performance (Anderson and
Reeb 2003; Sacristán-Navarro et al. 2011; Poutziouris et al. 2015), overlooking the
issues of IC performance. More precisely, Greco et al. (2014) addressed the issue of
IC performance in family business only considering family involvement in manage-
ment and ownership. Unlike Greco et  al. (2014) we investigate the impact of the
family leadership and family generation on IC performance. Second, we also extend
recent studies that analysed only single components of IC and adopt the case study
methodology (Claver-Cortés et al. 2015; Grimaldi et al. 2016). Finally, we respond
to the recent call of researchers to grasp how governance structure can influence IC
performance to increasing the wealth of a family firm (Zambon et al. 2019).
With respect to practical implications, this study increases the current knowledge
of the internal governance factors that may lead to family firms improving their IC
performance, thereby enhancing non-family shareholders’ wealth. At the same time,
this article calls for unlisted, small and medium family firms to be more aware of the
importance of IC efficiency, suggesting they take into account specific managerial
actions.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section reports the
literature review examining research on IC performance and the family business lit-
erature, followed by a set of three hypotheses. Section  3 describes the methodol-
ogy, including the sample, data collection, variables and empirical models. This is
followed by Sect.  4, which illustrates the results, offering additional analyses and
robustness tests. Section 5 discusses the findings and their implications while Sect. 6
presents the conclusions.

2 Literature and hypotheses development

2.1 Intellectual capital model and measurement

The field of IC is an attractive topic in the academic and business consultant com-
munities because investments in intangible assets and knowledge-based resources
are pivotal for the wealth creation process of companies and even for countries’
economic growth (Stewart 1997; Ståhle and Bounfour 2008; Pucci et  al. 2015;
Roos 2017). However, the extant research lacks a common approach for defining
and measuring IC (Marr et  al. 2003; Inkinen 2015). This has occurred because
the elements of IC (i.e. knowledge, skills, relationship with external parties, etc.)

13
 G. Ginesti, M. Ossorio

are mainly qualitative in nature and are not easily translated into monetary values
(Kujansivu and Lönnqvist 2007; Nazari and Herremans 2007).
Despite this, the definition of IC is a matter of a lively academic debate. The
insights offered by scholars lead to a conceptualization of IC as an umbrella under
which exist the intangible assets, relationships (internal and external), knowledge
(tacit and codified), experiences and cultural values that allow an organization to
have a better competitive position and create value (Edvinsson and Malone 1997;
Bontis 1998; Sydler et al. 2014).
Over time, academic research has promoted a number of methodological strate-
gies to determine the value of IC and its constituents. For instance, some scholars
have made use of a balanced scorecard framework to link IC with business strat-
egy (Edvinsson and Malone 1997; Sveiby 1997). Albeit the scorecard framework
combines the single elements that drive a company’s competitive success, it lacks a
measurement for the financial value of IC (Forte et al. 2017) that could be used for
large scale data.
Using a “market-based approach” some scholars have instead gone beyond the
financial reporting to determine IC value, suggesting that the difference between
firms’ market value and book value expresses the ability of a company to generate
IC value (Ghosh and Maji 2015). However, these market-based measures may be
affected by factors, including market events and related phenomena, that cannot be
connected exclusively to the intangible resources (Dženopoljac et al. 2017).
Based on an “investment-related approach” many empirical studies have adopted
the VAIC methodology developed by Pulic (2000) in an attempt to assign a mon-
etary value to IC. The VAIC procedure relies on data reported in financial state-
ments and measures IC by taking into account three primary components (Pulic
2000): (i) Human Capital Efficiency, which measures the ability of creating value
from investments in human capital; (ii) Capital Employed Efficiency, which captures
how much value is created by the combination of physical and financial capital; and
(iii) Structural Capital Efficiency, which identifies the contribution of structural cap-
ital (i.e. patents, brand and process infrastructure) in generating value. Unlike other
approaches, the VAIC has the advantage of calculating a value for any corporation’s
IC, and does not suffer from the impact of market confounding events. It also signifi-
cantly increases comparability between empirical studies.
However, there are studies claiming that the VAIC methodology suffers from sev-
eral weaknesses. These relate mainly to the use of historical accounting data and the
lack of consideration of relational and innovation capital (Dženopoljac et al. 2017;
Nadeem et al. 2019).
Many studies have used the VAIC methodology to analyze the impact of IC on
corporate performance, often providing contrasting results. For instance, using a
sample of 75 South African listed companies, Firer and Williams (2003) failed to
find a strong association between VAIC components and firm performance, while
Chen et al. (2005) reported that IC had a positive impact on the market value and
financial performance of firms listed on the Taiwan stock exchange. In this respect,
Pew Tan et  al. (2007) documented that firms that increase their IC efficiency are
more likely to show superior financial performance. A number of international stud-
ies have confirmed the positive influence of IC on corporate performance (Zeghal

13
The influence of family‑related factors on intellectual capital…

and Maaloul 2010; Clarke et  al. 2011; Nadeem et  al. 2018), suggesting that the
VAIC is also an appropriate technique to determine IC value.
Despite a plethora of studies employing the VAIC to investigate the influence of
IC on corporate performance, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, there is little
research on the family-related antecedents of IC performance. With the aim of fill-
ing this gap in the literature, this study analyses the impact of family-related factors
on the VAIC of a sample of family firms.

2.2 Family business and intellectual capital

While scholars have deeply explored IC by focusing on several type of organisa-

tions, there is still little research in the field of family businesses (Greco et al. 2014;
Claver-Cortés et al. 2013, 2015; Grimaldi et al. 2016) and most of early studies rely
on case study methodology (Trevinyo-Rodríguez and Bontis 2007; Su and Carney
2013). With a focus on large family firms, Claver-Cortés et  al. (2013) identified
intangible assets into the three categories: human capital, structural capital and rela-
tional capital. The authors employed multiple case-studies based on 13 firms and
provided academic research with an IC model to apply to any family firm. Greco
et  al. (2014) explored the family-related antecedents of IC performance by focus-
ing on a sample of 136 Italian listed family companies. The authors pointed out that
while family ownership positively affects IC performance, family involvement in the
management of the firm shows a non-linear effect. In particular, when the number of
family members in managerial positions is low or moderate, the IC of a firm benefits
from the presence of family members in the managerial positions. Overall, in cases
of a high level of family involvement, the positive relationship reverses and becomes
negative.
Based on a case study of four small family firms and drawing on a constructiv-
ist epistemology, Grimaldi et al. (2016) shed light on how the benefits and costs of
IC assets are perceived by managers and senior employees. More specifically, the
authors outlined that most small family firms are confident in their internal processes
and human resources competencies and knowledge. In addition, they highlighted an
internal misalignment relative to the expected investment in IC assets, referring to
firms operating in fast-changing markets.
Alongside the aforementioned studies, a substantial body of empirical literature
has focused on the specific components of IC, with a particular emphasis on human
capital resources. Indeed, the simultaneous presence of family members in both
family and business presents a unique context (both positive and negative) for family
businesses’ human capital relative to non-family businesses (Sirmon and Hitt 2003).
Dawson (2012) offers an interesting perspective beyond the traditional taxonomy
of human capital, outlining that some conditions, such as more flexible job design
and a stronger socialisation system, permit family businesses to achieve a superior
alignment of interests between individual human capital and organisational goals
than non-family businesses. The issue of human capital is also a central theme in
the work of Claver-Cortés et al. (2015), which is based on a study of 25 large family
firms operating in several sectors. In this regard, the authors widened the intangible

13
 G. Ginesti, M. Ossorio

assets measured in the previous studies investigating human capital and identify the
tacit nature of the human capital of family firms, such as the emotional family com-
ponent, capabilities acquired from family members and parent–child relationships.
Moreover, a recent study of Manzaneque et al. (2017) finds that family involvement
in management improves the efficiency of human and structural capital in obtaining
technological innovation outcomes.
Overall, IC research in the field of family firms is still in its infancy and, to
the best of the authors’ knowledge, few academic contributions have explored the
impact of family-related antecedents on IC performance.

2.2.1 Family ownership

Family firms have been depicted as singularly complex, dynamic and rich in intan-
gible resources, with a high potential to generate IC value (Cabrera-Suárez and De
Saá Pérez 1996; Cabrera-Suárez et al. 2001). The bundle of idiosyncratic resources
and capabilities controlled by family firms is referred to as familiness and originates
in the interaction between family, individual family members and the business (Hab-
bershon and Williams 1999; Sharma 2004). This unique bundle of resources is char-
acterised by its intangible and tacit nature because it has been developed during a
firm’s life (Claver-Cortés et al. 2015).
The Resource Based View (henceforth, RBV) of the firm is an influential theo-
retical framework that highlights the relevance of intangible assets in firm competi-
tiveness (Wernefelt 1984; Barney 1991; Nadeem et al. 2018). Hence, it appears to
be a useful perspective through which to investigate the behaviours of family firms
relative to IC issues.
Based on RBV, the achievement of long-lasting competitive advantage derives
from the integration of resources in a unique combination that competitors find diffi-
cult to imitate (Barney 1991; Eisenhardt and Martin 2000). The resources that allow
firms to generate a competitive advantage must possess four features: (i) they must
be valuable; (ii) scarce; (iii) inimitable and (iv) non-substitutable (Barney1991;
Rodríguez and Rodríguez 2005).
If, on the one hand, it is possible that all kinds of assets may represent a driver
of higher-than-normal profits, on the other hand, intangible resources, generated by
a unique history and social complexity, are frequently identified to achieve sustain-
able competitive advantages (Barney 1986; Fang et al. 2012). They are impossible
to imitate or to substitute and difficult to transfer due to their uncodifiable nature
(Lippman and Rumelt 1982; Peteraf 1993).
When the generation of IC is investigated within the family business context,
scholars have pointed out that familiness may affect the three components of IC:
human, relational and structural capital (Grimaldi et al. 2016).
Under RBV, human capital is the most precious and difficult kind of resource to
duplicate, because it is the result of complex social structures that have been real-
ised over the years (Barney 1991; Dawson 2012). Family members show close-knit
bonds and a share family history—linking family and business subsystems—that
make them precious, rare and inimitable (Barney 1991; Sirmon and Hitt 2003).

13
The influence of family‑related factors on intellectual capital…

Scholars identify family human capital as the knowledge, skills and abilities of
individual family members (Carney 2005; Salvato and Melin 2008; Claver-Cortés
et  al. 2015). Family members acquire it by learning-by-doing and apprenticeships
that differ from those developed in non-family firms, such as at home, through sum-
mer jobs and so on (Memili et al. 2011; Dawson 2012). This leads to the generation
of tacit and specific knowledge, which is difficult to imitate (Sirmon and Hitt 2003).
In addition, the sense of destiny (Berrone et al. 2012) and the desire to relay the
firm to future generations pushes family owners to develop and sustain long-term
relationships with banks, suppliers or important clients in order to access relevant
resources (Chen and Hsu 2009). For instance, social capital is essential to knowl-
edge and information acquisition through linkages with social network members
(Houghton et al. 2009) and a close relationship with financial institutions may allow
a firm to gain access to financial capital (Miller and Le Breton-Miller 2005).
Because of family members’ strong identification with the organisation (Dyer and
Whetten 2006), they display high interest alignment with the family business (Meyer
and Herscovitch 2001; Dawson 2012) and a high degree of commitment and dedica-
tion (Horton 1986; Ali et al. 2007). This implies that the risk of opportunistic behav-
iours is low and so stimulates family firms to concentrate on a long-term horizon
business strategy to benefit shareholders (Zahra 2003; Chen and Hsu 2009).
Furthermore, by increasing control over company shares, families give further
legitimate reasons for stakeholders to believe that they aim to increase their firms’
wealth (Zellweger et al. 2012). Thus, considering that family owners may increase
the wealth of shareholders, this study proposes the following baseline hypothesis:

H1  Family ownership positively affects IC performance in family firms.

2.2.2 Family leadership

Literature highlights that family leadership is a central dimension for interpreting the
behaviour of family firms and performance (Miller et al. 2013; Binacci et al. 2016;
Catuogno et al. 2018; Ahrens et al. 2019). When family owners are at the helm of
management, they possess the power, incentive and knowledge to run the business
effectively (Miller and Le Breton-Miller 2006). In particular, it should be noted that
family CEOs generally have a longer time horizon than CEOs of non-family firms
(Le Breton-Miller et al. 2004). This implies that family CEOs are more likely to be
committed to the business and inclined to adopt managerial actions to increase firm
competitiveness (Donaldson and Davis 1991), leading to superior returns.
Hence, it can be expected that the long-term horizon of family CEOs may stim-
ulate IC to be managed in different ways. First, a long CEO horizon leads to the
undertaking of farsighted investments (James 1999), even to the detriment of short-
term profitability (e.g. investment in R&D, training and information technology).
Second, a CEO’s stability allows family firms to undertake long-run investments in
core competencies to develop an inimitable firm learning trajectory (Prahalad and
Hamel 1990; Miller 2003; Miller and Le Breton-Miller 2006).
Another focal boost for improving IC is rooted in the relationship between fam-
ily leadership and identification with the business. When a family member holds the

13
 G. Ginesti, M. Ossorio

CEO position, the identification of the family with the business becomes stronger
(Zellweger et  al. 2010) and encourages family members’ commitment to establish
a positive reputation (Donnelly 1964; Horton 1986). A greater reputation is a fac-
tor that may increase the firm’s attractiveness to employees with higher levels of
competencies (Turban and Cable 2003) and reduces the turnover rate (Miller and
Le Breton-Miller 2003). Consequently, knowledge and experience remain within the
organisation for a longer period of time (Huybrechts et al. 2011).
Lastly, the presence of a family CEO stimulates solid relationships among man-
agers of different lines (Cirillo et al. 2018; Danes et al. 2009), increases family social
capital and may preserve socioemotional wealth (Naldi et al. 2013). Hence, a com-
mon language, values and beliefs featuring in family firms contribute to a strength-
ened social capital and improves the likelihood of family firms’ survival (Arregle
et al. 2007) and ability to compete in a business environment.
Thus, given that family leaders lead to increased value enhancing investments and
reinforce the relationship among managers, the following hypothesis is formulated:

H2  Family leadership positively affects IC performance in family firms.

2.2.3 Family generation

Members of different generations display disparities concerning interests, manage-

ment styles and objectives (Okorafo 1999), as well as the development stage of the
firm (Gersick et  al. 1997; Miller et  al. 2007; Muñoz-Bullón et  al. 2017). The lit-
erature suggests that the transmission of tacit knowledge is more effective within
family businesses than within non-family businesses (Cabrera-Suárez et  al. 2001).
In particular, a firm’s resources tend to depreciate over time and, consequently, they
need to be replaced, augmented and upgraded (Grant 1991). The implementation
of this strategic process requires a kind of knowledge that contains a tacit compo-
nent (Cabrera-Suárez et al. 2001). Tacit knowledge is embedded in uncodified rou-
tines and in the social context in which it is developed (Liebeskind 1996); its “tacit-
ness” obstructs its mobility. More specifically, its transmission is characterised by
several difficulties and is feasible only through learning-by-doing during a process
that is long and wasteful (Szulanski 1996; Brown and Duguid 1998). The transmis-
sion of tacit knowledge is more effective in a family business because of the distinct
relationship between the successor and predecessor that is not limited to the work
context but involves family and social aspects. This knowledge is often embedded
in collaborative working relationships within the organisation (Nelson and Winter
1982). These working relationships are widespread in a family and are likely trans-
mitted to the family business (Chen et  al. 2014). In addition, family members are
usually involved in the business from an early age in order to gain hands-on expe-
rienced (Dyer 1986). For instance, early involvement in firms represents a valuable
experience that increases the successor’s acquisition of business-related capabilities
and competencies (Cabrera-Suárez et al. 2001) and leads to smooth succession with
the future generation (Bracci and Vagnoni 2011). Thus, the early involvement of
young family members in the business provides family firms with deeper levels of
tacit knowledge than non-family firms (Lane and Lubatkin 1998; Danes et al. 2009).

13
The influence of family‑related factors on intellectual capital…

Fig. 1  Conceptual model

The tacit knowledge may be transferred while at home, providing the successor with
the absorption capacity needed to acquire knowledge throughout the succession pro-
cess (Cohen and Levinthal 1990; Cabrera-Suárez et al. 2001).
Given that at later generational stages of family businesses, an increase in firms’
knowledge and competencies is expected, our prediction is as follows:

H3  Later generational stages positively affect IC performance in family firms.

The conceptual model used in this study is illustrated in Fig. 1.

3 Methodology

3.1 Data and sample selection

The dataset comprises a sample of Italian listed family companies for the period
2015–2017 and is created by merging information and data from various sources.
The information on corporate governance characteristics—i.e. ownership structure
and board composition—were gathered from the Italian Security Stock Exchange
Commission (CONSOB), as well as annual and governance reports. The informa-
tion on family generation were retrieved from Google and by using the Lexis/Nexis
database. Finally, financial data were extracted from the AIDA Bureau van Dijk.
The sample selection started by considering AIDA’ list of 256 listed Italian non-
financial companies. From the 256 listed Italian non-financial companies, we first
excluded firms (79), in which accounting and governance data were not available.
Next, we excluded firms that were not identified as family business (92). These

13
 G. Ginesti, M. Ossorio

criteria lead to a final sample of 85 Italian listed family companies over the period
2015–2017 (255 firms-year observations).
The definition of family business has long been under academic scrutiny (Astra-
chan et al. 2002; Villalonga and Amit 2006) and scholars have promoted a variety
of thresholds to identify the category of family firms. Since the classification pro-
cedures are vital in increasing the comparability of family business studies (Mazzi
2011), this study employs the criteria used by Cascino et  al. (2010). We used the
definition of family business proposed in Cascino et  al. (2010), since we focused
on the same empirical scenario of nonfinancial listed Italian firms, characterized by
higher levels of ownership concentration compared to other countries’ firms (Drago
et  al 2018). Based on this, we classified a family company as those companies in
which the family holds at least 50% of the outstanding shares and one or more of its
members are on the board of directors.

3.1.1 Dependent variable

3.1.1.1  IC performance measurement  Following the stream of research on “invest-

ment-based approach” we use the VAIC methodology to measure IC performance
in a company (Clarke et al. 2011; Dženopoljac et al. 2017; Manzaneque et al. 2017;
Cenciarelli et al. 2018, Nadeem et al. 2018).
As reported in prior empirical research (Chen et al. 2005; Pew Tan et al. 2007;
Clarke et al. 2011), VAIC is computed as the sum of the following three components:

1. Human Capital Efficiency (HCE) measured as Value Added (VA)/Total Salary

and Wage Costs (HC);
2. Capital Employed Efficiency (CEE) calculated as VA/(Total Assets − Intangible
Assets);
3. Structural Capital Efficiency (SCE) computed as (VA − HC)/VA.

The VAIC methodology assumes that the better the utilisation of these three com-
ponents of company resources (i.e. higher VAIC), the higher the efficiency of the
company in creating value for the IC.

3.1.2 Independent variables

3.1.2.1  Family‑related factors  To test the hypotheses, this study used a number of
family-related variables which have been considered to be critical in understanding
the performance dynamics among family firms. More precisely, the measure of fam-
ily involvement in ownership (F_OWN) is calculated in terms of the percentage of
outstanding shares held by the family members (Sciascia and Mazzola 2008). Sec-
ond, to take into account the role of family members (F_LEAD), this study assumes
that the roles of chief executive officer (Anderson and Reeb 2003) or executive chair-
man are leadership positions. Finally, the generational stage of family businesses is
determined by identifying the generation of the family members involved as directors
in the corporate board (F_GEN) (Sciascia et al. 2014).

13
The influence of family‑related factors on intellectual capital…

3.1.2.2  Control variables  We include a set of control variables that may influence
corporate IC performance. Specifically, we control for firm size (SIZE), since scholars
claim that larger firms have more ability to increase their performance (Greco et al.
2014; Poutziouris et al. 2015) and for profitability (PROFIT), because it is plausible
that firms’ profitability is related to the IC value (Clarke et  al. 2011; Dženopoljac
et al. 2017). Another control variable that influences IC performance is firms’ lever-
age (LEV). Prior research suggested that more leveraged firms face higher monitor-
ing levels by lenders and therefore they may be prompted to focus on the better utili-
sation of IC assets (Goebel 2015; Ghosh and Maji 2015). Finally, firm age (F_AGE)
is included in the analysis to establish whether expertise in business competition and
managing company resources influences the IC performance (Forte et al. 2017).
All the variables (both family-related factors and control) used in the analysis are
described in Table 1.

3.2 Empirical model

To analyse the panel data, this study employed both the Hausman and Breusch-
Pagan Lagrange Multiplier tests to correctly choose among the fixed-effects model,
the random-effects model or the pooled OLS model (Onali et al. 2017). The results
of these tests suggested that the random-effects model is more appropriate. Thus,
several random-effects (RE) regression models were employed.
First, the following estimation model tests the baseline hypothesis:
VAIC = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 F_OWN + 𝛽2 SIZE + 𝛽3 PROFIT
(1)
+ 𝛽4 LEV + 𝛽5 F_AGE + 𝜀

Thereafter, the impact of family leadership and family generation are tested by
introducing these variables into Models (2) and (3):
VAIC = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 F_OWN + 𝛽2 F_LEAD + 𝛽3 SIZE
(2)
+ 𝛽4 PROFIT + 𝛽5 LEV + 𝛽6 F_AGE + 𝜀

VAIC = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 F_OWN + 𝛽2 F_LEAD + 𝛽3 F_GEN

(3)
+ 𝛽4 SIZE + 𝛽5 PROFIT + 𝛽6 LEV + 𝛽7 F_AGE + 𝜀

4 Results

Table  2 presents the descriptive statistics of the sample. The mean value of the
VAIC is 2.44, which is in the range of values reported in prior international
research (Chen et al. 2005; Clarke et al. 2011). With reference to the Italian set-
ting, the average value of the VAIC is slightly lower than that reported in the
study of Greco et al. (2014), possibly due to the sample composition in terms of

13


Table 1  Definition of variables and data sources

Variables Definition(s) Sources

AIDA Bureau Van Dijk

13
VAIC Sum of
HCE (value added/total costs of employees)
CEE ((value added/(total assets – intangible assets))
SCE ((value added – total costs of employees)/value
added)
F_OWN (family involvement in ownership) Percentage of family held shares Annual reports, Governance reports, CONSOB database
F_LEAD (family leadership) Dummy variable equals to 1 (one) when the CEO or Annual reports, Governance reports, CONSOB database
Executive Chairman is from the owning family, and 0
(zero) otherwise
F_GEN (Generation that manages the family business) Number of family generation that manages the business Lexis/Nexis database
Google
SIZE (size) Natural logarithm of total assets at the end of the fiscal AIDA Bureau Van Dijk
year
PROFIT (profitability) Net income to total assets at the end of the fiscal year AIDA Bureau Van Dijk
LEV (leverage) Long-term debt to total assets at the end of the fiscal AIDA Bureau Van Dijk
year
F_AGE (firm age) Natural logarithm of years of firm’s foundation AIDA Bureau Van Dijk
Robustness analysis
 VAIC modified version Sum of AIDA Bureau Van Dijk
HCE (value added/total costs of employees)
CEE ((value added/(total assets – intangible assets))
INV (R&D expenses/value added)
 INTA_INT Intangible assets to total assets at the end of the fiscal AIDA Bureau Van Dijk
year
 R&D R&D expenses to total assets at the end of the fiscal AIDA Bureau Van Dijk
year
G. Ginesti, M. Ossorio
 Table 1  (continued)
Variables Definition(s) Sources

 KIBS Dummy variable equals to 1 (one) if the company AIDA Bureau Van Dijk
operates in the knowledge intensive business service,
and 0 (zero) otherwise
 INNOV Natural logarithm of inventions at the end of the fiscal ORBIS Bureau Van Dijk
year
 SALES_GR Annual variation of Sales divided by total assets at the AIDA Bureau Van Dijk
end of the fiscal year
 B_SIZE Total number of directors on corporate board Annual reports, Governance reports, CONSOB database
e
 CEO_Duality Dummy variable equals to 1 (one) when the Chief Annual reports, Governance reports, CONSOB database
Executive Officer (CEO) is also the Chair of the
Board, 0 (zero) otherwise
 %_IND_DIR Percentage of independent directors on corporate board Annual reports, Governance reports, CONSOB database
The influence of family‑related factors on intellectual capital…

13
 G. Ginesti, M. Ossorio

Table 2  Descriptive statistics Variable # of obser- Mean Std. dev. Min Max

vations

VAIC 255 2.44 3.23 − 12.54 24.93

F_OWN 255 64.11 9.83 50.03 93.53
F_LEAD 255 0.68 0.46 0 1
F_GEN 255 2.05 0.66 1 4
SIZE 255 12.23 1.66 8.41 15.69
PROFIT 255 0.003 0.48 − 7.56 0.57
LEV 255 0.51 0.22 0.01 1.57
F_AGE 255 3.62 0.78 1.09 5.03

Variables are described in Table 1

Table 3  Correlation matrix
VAIC F_OWN F_LEAD F_GEN SIZE PROFIT LEV F_AGE

VAIC –
F_OWN 0.089 –
F_LEAD 0.005 0.061 –
F_GEN 0.226* − 0.079 − 0.107 –
SIZE 0.136* − 0.406* − 0.154* 0.427* –
PROFIT 0.382* 0.067 − 0.045 0.152* 0.098 –
LEV − 0.033 − 0.079 − 0.051 − 0.043 0.000 − 0.083 –
F_AGE 0.056 − 0.122 − 0.163* 0.687* 0.367* 0.107 0.072 –

Variables are described in Table 1

*Denotes significance at 5%

the identification of family firms and of the period of analysis. The maximum
value of the VAIC is 24.93, which is fairly similar to prior studies (Zeghal and
Maaloul 2010; Maditinos et al. 2011).
Table 2 also shows that family involvement in company ownership is, on aver-
age, 64%, and the firms are generally managed by second-generation family mem-
bers. Finally, the sample is composed of the relevant number of family members
involved on corporate boards with a leadership role.
The findings from pairwise correlations matrix are reported in Table 3. Among
the family variables, F_GEN is positively correlated with VAIC, meaning that
later generational stages are more likely to improve IC performance. However,
F_OWN and F_LEAD are not correlated with VAIC. The correlation results for
the control variables are generally in line with the authors’ expectations.
The results of the regression analysis, reported in Table  4, demonstrate that
the coefficients of family-related factors, namely F_OWN, F_LEAD and F_GEN,
are significantly and positively associated with the VAIC across all models. In
term of economic significance, the estimated regression coefficients reported in
Table  4 (model 4) and the standard deviations reported in Table  2 imply that a

13
The influence of family‑related factors on intellectual capital…

Table 4  Regression results
Dependent variable Dependent variable Dependent variable
VAIC VAIC VAIC
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)

F_OWN 0.060* 0.059* 0.056*

(0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
F_LEAD 1.094* 1.037*
(0.535) (0.527)
F_GEN 1.179*
(0.524)
SIZE 0.405* 0.431* 0.329
(0.193) (0.193) (0.195)
PROFIT 1.646*** 1.655*** 1.628***
(0.276) (0.273) (0.273)
LEV 2.078* 1.885* 2.131*
(0.924) (0.925) (0.924)
F_AGE − 0.171 − 0.084 − 0.715
(0.401) (0.403) (0.485)
INTERCEPT − 6.846* − 8.091* − 6.850*
(3.219) (3.265) (3.259)
# of observations 255 255 255
R-squared (overall) 0.11 0.12 0.15
Wald Chi-square 49.17*** 54.17*** 59.68***

Standard errors are in parenthesis. Variables are described in Table 1

*P < 0.05; **P < 0.01; ***P < 0.001

one standard deviation increase of  F_OWN is associated to a 17.04%  standard

deviation increase of VAIC, while a one standard deviation increase of F_LEAD
is associated to a 14.77% standard deviation increase of VAIC, and a one stand-
ard deviation increase of  F_GEN is associated to a 24.03%  standard deviation
increase of VAIC.
These results for F_OWN are in line with the theoretical predictions included
in the Hypothesis 1, meaning that firms with higher levels of family ownership
are more likely to increase their IC performance. Further, the findings for _LEAD
and F_GEN support Hypotheses 2 and 3, suggesting that family leaders and later
generations of family members display more ability to increase IC performance.
Table 4 also presents an increase in R-squared (from 0.11 to 0.15) from Model (1)
to Model (3). In general, all these findings are consistent with the stream of research
advocating that family influence on business activities is able to improve corporate
performance and create wealth effects for stakeholders (McConaughy et  al. 1998;
Anderson and Reeb 2003; Poutziouris et al. 2015). Concerning the control variables,
Table 4 illustrates that across all models, PROFIT and LEV are positively and sig-
nificantly associated with the VAIC, confirming that more profitable and leveraged
family companies show a higher level of efficiency in managing their IC (Goebel
2015). The coefficient of SIZE is significant in two of the three models, suggest-
ing that larger family firms are more likely to have better IC performance. Finally,
F_AGE is found to have no significant impact on the VAIC across all models.

13
 G. Ginesti, M. Ossorio

4.1 Additional checks

To increase the robustness of the results we implemented additional tests. First, we

added further firm-level characteristics to Model (3): variables related to the inten-
sity of innovations (INNOV), intangible assets (INTA) and research costs (R&D).
This is because these elements may increase the ability of a company to generate
value from its IC (Villalonga 2004). In addition, we controlled whether a family firm
operates in a knowledge intensive business service (KIBS) sector (Forte et al. 2017)
and whether growth opportunities exist (SALES_GR) (Maditinos et al. 2011; Sardo
and Serrasqueiro 2017). The results reported in Table  5 remain similar to those
reported in Table 4 (i.e. Model 3), confirming the significant explanatory power of
the proposed family-related factors.
Second, in line with the family business literature (Greco et al. 2014; Poutziouris
et al. 2015), this work controls for a possible non-linear influence of family-related
factors on the IC performance. The analysis carried out excludes any non-linear
effects of the non-dummy variables, i.e. FAM_OWN and GEN, on the VAIC.
Third, we also included in the model (8) board size (B_SIZE), CEO duality
(CEO_Duality) and the percentage of independent directors (%_IND_DIR), to con-
trol for the impact of corporate governance characteristics on the ability to manage
IC performance. As shown in Table 6 (models 9–11), our main results continue to
hold. Moreover, one could argue that that there is a connection between the variable
PROFIT and VAIC that may influence the reliability of the model. Hence, we run
the regression model (12) without considering the impact of PROFIT. Even in this
case, our main results remain unaltered.
Finally, we attempted to address some of some of limitations of the VAIC model.
In particular, recent studies suggest that introducing innovation capital (i.e. con-
sidering research and development [R&D] investments) into the VAIC model may
capture better the value of IC performance (Bayraktaroglu et  al. 2019; Naadeem
et  al. 2019).1 Therefore, we replaced the SCE component with innovation capi-
tal (measured by [R&D] expenses to value added). In a nutshell, in the regression
model where the dependent variable is a modified version of VAIC, our main results
remain substantially similar, albeit the coefficient of the F_LEAD shows a lower but
significance level.2

5 Discussion

In the modern economy, the essential asset for a firm’s competitiveness is IC (Clarke
et al. 2011) and, therefore, a firm’s value often depends to the performance generated
by its intangible assets (Marr et al. 2003). Based on this assertation, our study focuses

1
 We are aware that the use of market-based measures (e.g. market value/book value or Tobin’s Q)
instead of the VAIC may lead to different results.
2
 For the sake of homogeneity, in this latter robustness test we used all the independent variables
included in model (12). We report the regression results in the Appendix A not for publication.

13
 Table 5  Regression (robustness) results for firm-level characteristics
Dependent variable Dependent variable Dependent variable Dependent variable Dependent variable
VAIC VAIC VAIC VAIC VAIC
Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) Model (7) Model (8)

F_OWN 0.058* 0.058* 0.060* 0.060* 0.060*

(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
F_LEAD 1.071* 1.077* 1.117* 1.119* 1.120*
(0.505) (0.505) (0.508) (0.510) (0.511)
F_GEN 1.187* 1.163* 1.187* 1.184* 1.189*
(0.502) (0.503) (0.505) (0.510) (0.509)
SIZE 0.344 0.337 0.366 0.369 0.368
(0.187) (0.187) (0.190) (0.194) (0.195)
PROFIT 1.622*** 1.625*** 1.616*** 1.617*** 1.617***
(0.262) (0.262) (0.262) (0.263) (0.263)
LEV 2.592** 2.619** 2.625** 2.623** 2.633**
(0.091) (0.893) (0.894) (0.898) (0.900)
F_AGE − 0.496 − 0.491 − 0.419 − 0.418 − 0.426
The influence of family‑related factors on intellectual capital…

(0.466) (0.466) (0.474) (0.476) (0.478)

INTA 4.965*** 5.012*** 4.857*** 4.851*** 4.864***
(1.051) (1.054) (1.069) (1.077) (1.080)
R&D − 0.364 − 0.283 − 0.272 − 0.266
(0.550) (0.557) (0.570) (0.571)
KIBS 0.754 0.744 0.735
(0.821) (0.840) (0.843)
INNOV − 0.110 − 0.012
(0.148) (0.148)
SALES_GR − 0.000
(0.000)

13


Table 5  (continued)
Dependent variable Dependent variable Dependent variable Dependent variable Dependent variable
VAIC VAIC VAIC VAIC VAIC

13
Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) Model (7) Model (8)

INTERCEPT − 8.874** − 8.870** − 9.656** − 9.661** − 9.637**

(3.153) (3.164) (3.331) (3.342) (0.023)
# of observations 255 255 255 255 255
R-squared (overall) 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.25 0.25
Wald Chi-square 87.05*** 87.26*** 86.10*** 87.78*** 87.52***

Standard errors are in parenthesis. Variables are described in Table 1

*P < 0.05; **P < 0.01; ***P < 0.001
G. Ginesti, M. Ossorio
The influence of family‑related factors on intellectual capital…

Table 6  Regression (robustness) results for corporate governance characteristics

Dependent variable Dependent variable Dependent variable Dependent variable
VAIC VAIC VAIC VAIC
Model (9) Model (10) Model (11) Model (12)

F_OWN 0.059* 0.058* 0.055* 0.062*

(0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.026)
F_LEAD 1.013* 1.198* 1.203* 1.179*
(0.515) (0.568) (0.568) (0.596)
F_GEN 1.304* 1.317* 1.283** 1.436**
(0.517) (0.519) (0.522) (0.545)
SIZE 0.594* 0.591 0.640* 0.692*
(0.244) (0.244) (0.260) (0.272)
PROFIT 1.609*** 1.602*** 1.601***
(0.263) (0.263) (0.264)
LEV 2.550** 2.526** 2.527** 2.272*
(0.897) (0.899) (0.900) (0.955)
F_AGE − 0.398 − 0.415 − 0.389 − 0.363
(0.482) (0.484) (0.485) (0.503)
INTA 4.632*** 4.561*** 4.567*** 4.519***
(1.079) (1.085) (1.086) (1.152)
R&D 5.923 6.467 6.303 6.857
(9.447) (9.475) (9.492) (10.175)
KIBS 0.895 0.945 0.949 1.181
(0.840) (0.845) (0.843) (0.869)
INNOV − 0.371 − 0.033 − 0.029 0.009
(0.146) (0.146) (0.147) (0.151)
SALES_GR − 0.000 − 0.000 − 0.000 − 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
B_SIZE − 0.176 − 0.184 − 0.190 − 0.202
(0.127) (0.127) (0.128) (0.135)
CEO_Duality − 0.421 − 0.427 − 0.530
(0.541) (0.542) (0.570)
%_IND_DIR − 0.757 − 0.947
(1.425) (1.515)
INTERCEPT − 11.024** − 10.867** − 10.983** − 12.159**
(3.410) (3.423) (3.429) (3.603)
# of observations 255 255 255 255
R-squared (overall) 0.25 0.25 0.26 0.19
Wald Chi-square 90.11*** 90.61*** 90.56*** 47.23***

Standard errors are in parenthesis. Variables are described in Table 1

*P < 0.05; **P < 0.01; ***P < 0.001

on family businesses since they are rich in intangible resources (Habbershon and Wil-
liams 1999) and these “may be more than the sum of resource endowments because
resources may be combined in different ways in varying circumstances” (Danes et al.
2009, p. 4). In particular, we have provided evidence that the governance characteristics
of family firms have a significant impact on IC performance. More precisely, we have

13
 G. Ginesti, M. Ossorio

argued that family ownership imbues a firm with unique features that, taken in all, sup-
port its ability to extract value from its IC. This is consistent with the resource-based
view (RBV) theory that considers family firms as possessing many specific intangible
resources, such as commitment, shared values, reputation and so on (Cabrera-Suárez
and De Saá Pérez 1996; Habbershon and Williams 1999).
Secondly, the prediction of the positive impact of family leaders on IC perfor-
mance is due to the fact that they act from a long-term perspective, assume good
stewardship of resources, and possess better oversight of managerial actions
(Miller and Le Breton-Miller 2005; Chen and Hsu 2009). Hence, family leaders
may encourage value-enhancing investments, improve reputation and inspire com-
mitment toward business goals. They can also help to cultivate close relationships
between the different levels of a firm’s structure, thereby increasing collaborative
family human capital.
Thirdly, our investigation documents that later family generations have a positive
effect on the VAIC. This result occurs because the early involvement of younger
family members in the business acts as a mechanism that creates a link between
family values and business goals. It gives family managers a “tacit” knowledge of
resource management (Sirmon et  al. 2007) through familiarity with business rou-
tines. This is consistent with the view of scholars who claim that at later genera-
tional stages in family businesses, family members are qualified and more likely to
improve corporate performance (Sonfield and Lussier 2004; Fernández and Nieto
2005).
All these results make an important contribution to the current academic debate.
For instance, previous studies mainly focused on the methods for measuring IC
(Marr et al. 2003; Nazari and Herremans 2007), without distinguishing the behav-
iour of family firms. Although the relevance of family businesses in the world’s
economies has been noted (Gòmez-Mejìa et  al. 2011), few studies have shed any
light on the relationship between family businesses and IC performance. In this
regard, our study supports the view that the features of family firms are different
from those of non-family firms, and points out the need to consider the effect of
family-related variables for understanding IC performance.
Furthermore, unlike prior IC research that has investigated the impact of the
VAIC and its components on corporate performance, this study devotes specific
attention to the impact of family-governance factors on IC performance. In doing
so, we also contribute to the family business literature, in which empirical studies
have hitherto concentrated on the relationship between family-related factors and
firm performance or on innovation outputs (e.g. numbers of patents and investment
in R&D), thus overlooking the issue of IC performance.

6 Conclusions

This study has investigated the impact of family ownership, family leadership and
family generation on IC performance. Using a sample of 85 Italian listed family
firms and adopting the VAIC methodology, the empirical results confirm the predic-
tions of our hypotheses.

13
The influence of family‑related factors on intellectual capital…

Our study contains several important implications. Firstly, external investors

should be more aware of the impact of characteristics of family governance on IC,
when deciding to invest in family businesses. Consequently, potentially excluding
family members from management should be carefully evaluated. Secondly, the
results of our study would be of interest to scholars interested in understanding the
IC performance of family businesses in other countries with a large presence of
companies that are controlled by a family.
This research is subject to a number of limitations. Firstly, the sample is com-
posed only of Italian listed family companies and, therefore, our results should be
interpreted with caution. More specifically, in the Italian setting, majority sharehold-
ers use pyramidal structures and dual-class shares, which guarantee them greater
control of the firm (Faccio and Lang 2002). Secondly, despite identifying three main
family-related factors, the authors acknowledge that others family components can
affect firms’ ability to manage IC performance. Thirdly, this study is not free from
the limitations of the VAIC methodology.
Future research could be devoted to analyzing the impact of other family-related
characteristics on IC performance (e.g. family members’ external connections, pro-
fessional experience and cultural background and the role of non-family managers)
or using a different theoretical perspective or methodology (as was touched on in
footnote 1). In addition, it would be interesting to extend the empirical analysis to
family firms of different countries to verify whether country-level factors can act as
moderating variables on the relationship between family involvement and IC perfor-
mance. Finally, an analysis of the variation in the economic consequences of IC per-
formance among family and non-family companies would be of value, for example
in terms of assessing the potential capital market outcomes.

References
Ahrens, J. P., Calabrò, A., Huybrechts, J., & Woywode, M. (2019). The enigma of the family successor–
firm performance relationship: A methodological reflection and reconciliation attempt. Entrepre-
neurship Theory and Practice, 43(3), 437–474.
Ali, A., Chen, T.-Y., & Radhakrishnan, S. (2007). Corporate disclosures by family firms. Journal of
Accounting & Economics, 44(1/2), 238–286.
Anderson, R. C., & Reeb, D. M. (2003). Founding-family ownership and firm performance: Evidence
from the S&P 300. Journal of Finance, 58, 1301–1328.
Arregle, J. L., Hitt, M. A., Sirmon, D. G., & Very, P. (2007). The development of organizational social
capital: Attributes of family firms. Journal of Management Studies, 44(1), 73–95.
Astrachan, J., Klein, S., & Smyrnios, K. (2002). The F PEC scale of family influence: A proposal for
solving the family business definition problem. Family Business Review, 15, 45–65.
Barney, J. B. (1986). Organizational culture: Can it be a source of sustained competitive advantage?
Academy of Management Review, 11(3), 656–665.
Barney, J. B. (1991). Firms resources and sustained competitive advantage. Journal of Management,
17(1), 99–120.
Bayraktaroglu, A. E., Calisir, F., & Baskak, M. (2019). Intellectual capital and firm performance: an
extended VAIC model. Journal of Intellectual Capital, 20(3), 406–425.
Berrone, P., Cruz, C., & Gomez-Mejia, L. R. (2012). Socioemotional wealth in family firms: Theoreti-
cal dimensions, assessment approaches, and agenda for future research. Family Business Review,
25(3), 258–279.

13
 G. Ginesti, M. Ossorio

Binacci, M., Peruffo, E., Oriani, R., & Minichilli, A. (2016). Are all non-family managers (NFMs) equal?
The impact of NFMs characteristics and diversity on family firm performance. Corporate Govern-
ance: An international Review, 24(6), 569–583.
Bontis, N. (1998). Intellectual capital: an exploratory study that develops measures and models. Manage-
ment Decision, 36(2), 63–76.
Bracci, E., & Vagnoni, E. (2011). Understanding small family business succession in a knowledge man-
agement perspective. The IUP Journal of Knowledge Management, IX(1), 7–36.
Brown, J. S., & Duguid, P. (1998). Organizing knowledge. California Management Review, 40(3),
90–111.
Cabrera-Suárez, K., & De Saá Pérez, P. (1996). La empresa familiar desde la perspectiva de la teoría de
recursos y capacidades. La Empresa en una Economía Globalizada: Retos y Cambios. In Proceed-
ings of the Xth National Congress of AEDEM. Granada, Spain.
Cabrera-Suárez, K., De Saá Pérez, P., & García-Almeida, D. (2001). The succession process from a
resource- and knowledge-based view of the family firm. Family Business Review, 14(1), 37–47.
Campopiano, G., & De Massis, A. (2015). Corporate social responsibility reporting: A content analysis in
family and non-family firms. Journal of Business Ethics, 129(3), 511–534.
Carney, M. (2005). Corporate governance and competitive advantage in family-controlled firms. Entre-
preneurship Theory & Practice, 29(3), 249–265.
Cascino, S., Pugliese, A., Mussolino, D., & Sansone, C. (2010). The influence of family ownership on the
quality of accounting information. Family Business Review, 23(3), 246–265.
Catuogno, S., Arena, C., Cirillo, A., & Pennacchio, L. (2018). Exploring the relation between family
ownership and incentive stock options: The contingency of family leadership, board monitoring
and financial crisis. Journal of Family Business Strategy, 9(1), 59–72.
Cenciarelli, V. G., Greco, G., & Allegrini, M. (2018). Does intellectual capital help predict bankruptcy?
Journal of Intellectual Capital, 19(2), 321–337.
Chen, S., Chen, X., & Cheng, Q. (2008). Do family firms provide more or less voluntary disclosure?
Journal of Accounting Research, 46, 499–536.
Chen, M. C., Cheng, S. J., & Hwang, Y. (2005). An empirical investigation of the relationship between
intellectual capital and firms’ market value and financial performance. Journal of Intellectual Cap-
ital, 6(2), 159–176.
Chen, H. L., & Hsu, W. T. (2009). Family ownership, board independence, and R&D investment. Family
Business Review, 22(4), 347–362.
Chen, H. L., Hsu, W. T., & Chang, C. Y. (2014). Family ownership, institutional ownership, and interna-
tionalization of SMEs. Journal of Small Business Management, 52(4), 771–789.
Cirillo, A., Ossorio, M., & Pennacchio, L. (2018). Family ownership and R&D investment: the moderat-
ing role of banks and private equity. Management Decision, forthcoming.
Clarke, M., Seng, D., & Whiting, R. H. (2011). Intellectual capital and firm performance in Australia.
Journal of Intellectual Capital, 12(4), 505–530.
Claver-Cortés, E., Molina-Manchón, H., & Zaragoza-Sáez, P. (2013). Intellectual capital model for fam-
ily firms. Knowledge Management Research & Practice, 11(2), 184–195.
Claver-Cortés, E., Zaragoza-Sáez, P. C., Molina-Manchón, H., & Úbeda-García, M. (2015). Intellectual
capital in family firms: Human capital identification and measurement. Journal of Intellectual
Capital, 16(1), 199–223.
Cohen, W. M., & Levinthal, D. (1990). Absortive capacity: A new perspective on learning and innova-
tion. Administrative Science Quarterly, 35(1), 128–152.
Danes, S. M., Stafford, K., Haynes, G., & Amarapurkar, S. S. (2009). Family capital of family firms:
Bridging human, social, and financial capital. Family Business Review, 22(3), 199–216.
Dawson, A. (2012). Human capital in family businesses: Focusing on the individual level. Journal of
Family Business Strategy, 3(1), 3–11.
Donaldson, L., & Davis, J. (1991). Stewardship theory or agency theory. Australian Journal of Manage-
ment, 16(1), 49–64.
Donnelly, R. G. (1964). The family business. Harvard Business Review, 42(1), 93–105.
Drago, C., Ginesti, G., Pongelli, C., & Sciascia, S. (2018). Reporting strategies: What makes family firms
beat around the bush? Family-related antecedents of annual report readability. Journal of Family
Business Strategy, 9(2), 142–150.
Dumay, J. (2014). 15 years of the journal of intellectual capital and counting: A manifesto for transforma-
tional IC research. Journal of Intellectual Capital, 15(1), 2–37.
Dyer, W. G., Jr. (1986). Cultural change in family firms. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

13
The influence of family‑related factors on intellectual capital…

Dyer, W. G., & Whetten, D. A. (2006). Family firms and social responsibility: Preliminary evidence from
the S&P 500. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 30(6), 785–802.
Dženopoljac, V., Yaacoub, C., Elkanj, N., & Bontis, N. (2017). Impact of intellectual capital on corporate
performance: Evidence from the Arab region. Journal of Intellectual Capital, 18(4), 884–903.
Edvinsson, L., & Malone, M. S. (1997). Intellectual capital: Realizing your company’s true value by find-
ing its hidden brainpower. New York, NY: Harper Business.
Eisenhardt, K. M., & Martin, J. A. (2000). Dynamic capabilities: What are they? Strategic Management
Journal, 21(10–11), 1105–1121.
Faccio, M., & Lang, L. H. P. (2002). The ultimate ownership of Western European corporations. Journal
of Financial Economics, 65(3), 365–395.
Fang, H., Memili, E., Chrisman, J. J., & Welsh, D. H. B. (2012). Family firms’ professionalization:
Institutional theory and resource-based view perspectives. Small Business Institute Journal, 8(2),
12–34.
Fernández, Z., & Nieto, M. J. (2005). Internationalization strategy of small and medium-sized family
businesses: Some influential factors. Family Business Review, 18(1), 77–90.
Firer, S., & Williams, S. M. (2003). Intellectual capital and traditional measures of corporate perfor-
mance. Journal of Intellectual Capital, 4(3), 348–360.
Forte, W., Tucker, J., Matonti, G., & Nicolò, G. (2017). Measuring the intellectual capital of Italian listed
companies. Journal of Intellectual Capital, 18(4), 710–732.
Gersick, K. E., Davis, J. A., Hampton, M. M., & Lansberg, I. (1997). Generation to generation: Life
cycles of the family business. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press.
Ghosh, S. K., & Maji, S. G. (2015). Empirical validity of value added intellectual coefficient model in
Indian knowledge-based sector. Global Business Review, 16(6), 947–962.
Ginesti, G., Caldarelli, A., & Zampella, A. (2018). Exploring the impact of intellectual capital on com-
pany reputation and performance. Journal of Intellectual Capital., 19(5), 915–934.
Goebel, V. (2015). Estimating a measure of intellectual capital value to test its determinants. Journal of
Intellectual Capital, 16(1), 101–120.
Gomez-Mejia, L. R., Cruz, C., Berrone, P., & De Castro, J. (2011). The bind that ties: Socioemotional
wealth preservation in family firms. Academy of Management Annals, 5, 653–707.
Grant, R. M. (1991). The resource-based theory of competitive advantage: Implications for strategy for-
mulation. California Management Review, 33(3), 114–135.
Greco, G., Ferramosca, S., & Allegrini, M. (2014). Exploring intellectual capital in family firms. An
empirical investigation. International Journal of Learning and Intellectual Capital, 11(2), 91–106.
Grimaldi, M., Cricelli, L., & Greco, M. (2016). Perceived benefits and costs of intellectual capital in
small family firms. Journal of Intellectual Capital, 17(2), 351–372.
Habbershon, T., & Williams, M. (1999). A resource based framework for assessing the strategic advan-
tages of family firms. Family Business Review, 12(1), 1–25.
Horton, T. P. (1986). Managing in a family way. Management Review, 75(2), 3.
Houghton, S. M., Smith, A. D., & Hood, J. N. (2009). The influence of social capital on strategic choice:
An examination of the effects of external and internal network relationships on strategic complex-
ity. Journal of Business Research, 62(12), 1255–1261.
Huybrechts, J., Voordeckers, W., Vandemaele, S., & Lybaert, N. (2011). The distinctiveness of family-
firm intangibles: A review and suggestions for future research. Journal of Management and Organ-
ization, 17(2), 268–287.
Inkinen, H. (2015). Review of empirical research on intellectual capital and firm performance. Journal of
Intellectual Capital, 16(3), 518–565.
James, H. S. (1999). What can the family contribute to business? Examining contractual relationship.
Family Business Review, 12(1), 61–71.
Kaufmann, L., & Schneider, Y. (2004). Intangibles: A synthesis of current research. Journal of Intellec-
tual Capital, 5(3), 366–388.
Kujansivu, P., & Lönnqvist, A. (2007). Investigating the value and efficiency of intellectual capital. Jour-
nal of Intellectual Capital, 8(2), 272–287.
Lane, P. J., & Lubatkin, M. (1998). Relative absorptive capacity and interorganizational learning. Strate-
gic Management Journal, 19(5), 461–477.
Le Breton-Miller, I., Miller, D., & Steier, L. (2004). Toward an integrative model of effective FOB suc-
cession. Entrepreneurship Theory & Practice, 28(4), 305–328.
Liebeskind, J. (1996). Knowledge, strategy and the theory of the firm. Strategic Management Journal,
7(Special Issue), 93–107.

13
 G. Ginesti, M. Ossorio

Lippman, S. A., & Rumelt, R. P. (1982). Uncertain imitability: An analysis of interfirm differences in
efficiency under competition. Bell Journal of Economics, 13(2), 418–438.
Maditinos, D., Chatzoudes, D., Tsairidis, C., & Theriou, G. (2011). The impact of intellectual capital on
firms’ market value and financial performance. Journal of Intellectual Capital, 12(1), 132–151.
Manzaneque, M., Ramírez, Y., & Diéguez-Soto, J. (2017). Intellectual capital efficiency, technological
innovation and family management. Innovation, 19(2), 167–188.
Marr, B., Gray, D., & Neely, A. (2003). Why do firms measure their intellectual capital? Journal of Intel-
lectual Capital, 4(4), 441–464.
Mazzi, C. (2011). Family business and financial performance: Current state of knowledge and future
research challenges. Journal of Family Business Strategy, 2, 166–181.
McConaughy, D. L., Walker, M. C., Henderson, G. V., Jr., & Mishra, C. S. (1998). Founding family con-
trolled firms: Efficiency and value. Review of Financial Economics, 7(1), 1–19.
Memili, E., Chrisman, J. J., Chua, J. H., Chang, E. P. C., & Kellermanns, F. W. (2011). The determinants
of family firms’ subcontracting: A transaction cost perspective. Journal of Family Business Strat-
egy, 2(1), 26–33.
Meyer, J. P., & Herscovitch, L. (2001). Commitment in the workplace. Toward a general model. Human
Resource Management Review, 11(3), 299–326.
Miller, D. (2003). An asymmetry-based view of competitive advantage. Strategic Management Journal,
24(10), 961–976.
Miller, D., & Le Breton-Miller, I. (2003). Challenge versus advantage in family business. Strategic
Organization, 1(1), 127–134.
Miller, D., & Le Breton-Miller, I. (2005). Managing for the long run: Lessons in competitive advantage
from great family businesses. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press.
Miller, D., & Le Breton-Miller, I. (2006). Family governance and firm performance: Agency, steward-
ship, and capabilities. Family Business Review, 19(1), 73–87.
Miller, D., Le Breton-Miller, I., Lester, R. H., & Cannella, A. A. (2007). Are family firms really superior?
Journal of Corporate Finance, 13(5), 829–858.
Miller, D., Minichilli, A., & Corbetta, G. (2013). Is family leadership always beneficial? Strategic Man-
agement Journal, 34(5), 553–571.
Muñoz-Bullón, F., Sanchez-Bueno, M., & Suárez-González, I. (2017). Diversification decisions among
family firms: The role of family involvement and generational stage. BRQ Business Research
Quarterly, 21(1), 39–52.
Nadeem, M., Dumay, J., & Massaro, M. (2019). If you can measure it, you can manage it: A case of intel-
lectual capital. Australian Accounting Review, 29(2), 395–407.
Nadeem, M., Gan, C., & Nguyen, C. (2018). The importance of intellectual Capital for firm performance:
evidence from Australia. Australian Accounting Review, 28(3), 334–344.
Naldi, L., Cennamo, C., Corbetta, G., & Gomez-Mejia, L. (2013). Preserving socioemotional wealth in
family firms: Asset or liability? The moderating role of business context. Entrepreneurship Theory
and Practice, 37(6), 1341–1360.
Nazari, J., & Herremans, I. (2007). Extended VAIC model: Measuring intellectual capital components.
Journal of Intellectual Capital, 8(4), 595–609.
Nelson, R. R., & Winter, S. (1982). An evolutionary theory of economic change. Cambridge, MA: Har-
vard University Press.
Okorafo, S. C. (1999). Internationalization of family businesses: Evidence from Northwest Ohio, USA.
Family Business Review, 12(2), 147–158.
Onali, E., Ginesti, G., & Vasilakis, C. (2017). How should we estimate value-relevance models? Insights
from European data. The British Accounting Review, 49(5), 460–473.
Peteraf, M. A. (1993). The cornerstones of competitive advantage: A resource-based view. Strategic
Management Journal, 14(3), 179–191.
Pew Tan, H., Plowman, D., & Hancock, P. (2007). Intellectual capital and financial returns of companies.
Journal of Intellectual Capital, 8(1), 76–95.
Poutziouris, P., Savva, C. S., & Hadjielias, E. (2015). Family involvement and firm performance: Evi-
dence from UK listed firms. Journal of Family Business Strategy, 6(1), 14–32.
Prahalad, C. K., & Hamel, G. (1990). The core competence of the firm. Harvard Business Review, 68(3),
79–91.
Pucci, T., Simoni, C., & Zanni, L. (2015). Measuring the relationship between marketing assets, intel-
lectual capital and firm performance. Journal of Management and Governance, 19(3), 589–616.

13
The influence of family‑related factors on intellectual capital…

Pulic, A. (2000). VAIC™—An accounting tool for IC management. International Journal of Technology
Management, 20(5–8), 702–714.
Rodríguez, J. L., & Rodríguez, R. M. G. (2005). Technology and export behavior: A resource based view
approach. International Business Review, 14(5), 539–557.
Roos, G. (2017). Knowledge management, intellectual capital, structural holes, economic complexity and
national prosperity. Journal of Intellectual Capital, 18(4), 745–770.
Sacristán-Navarro, M., Gómez-Ansón, S., & Cabeza-García, L. (2011). Family ownership and control,
the presence of other large shareholders, and firm performance: Further evidence. Family Business
Review, 24(1), 71–93.
Salvato, C., & Melin, L. (2008). Creating value across generations in family-controlled businesses: The
role of family social capital. Family Business Review, 21(3), 259–276.
Sardo, F., & Serrasqueiro, Z. (2017). A European empirical study of the relationship between firms’ intel-
lectual capital, financial performance and market value. Journal of Intellectual Capital, 18(4),
771–788.
Sciascia, S., & Mazzola, P. (2008). Family involvement in ownership and management: Exploring nonlin-
ear effects on performance. Family Business Review, 21(4), 331–345.
Sciascia, S., Mazzola, P., & Kellermanns, F. W. (2014). Family management and profitability in private
family-owned firms: Introducing generational stage and the socioemotional wealth perspective.
Journal of Family Business Strategy, 5(2), 131–137.
Sharma, P. (2004). An overview of the field of family business studies: Current status and directions for
future. Family Business Review, 17(1), 1–36.
Sirmon, D. G., & Hitt, M. A. (2003). Managing resources: Linking unique resources, management, and
wealth creation in family firms. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 27(4), 339–358.
Sirmon, D. G., Hitt, M. A., & Ireland, R. D. (2007). Managing firm resources in dynamic environments
to create value: Looking inside the black box. Academy of Management Review, 32(1), 273–292.
Sonfield, M., & Lussier, R. (2004). First-, second-, and third-generation family firms: A comparison.
Family Business Review, 17(3), 189–202.
Ståhle, P., & Bounfour, A. (2008). Understanding dynamics of intellectual capital of nations. Journal of
Intellectual Capital, 9(2), 164–177.
Stewart, T. A. (1997). Intellectual capital . New York: Doubleday-Currency.
Su, E., & Carney, M. (2013). Can China’s family firms create intellectual capital? Asia Pacific Journal of
Management, 30(3), 657–675.
Sun, X., Lee, S. H., & Phan, P. H. (2019). Family firm R&D investments in the 2007–2009 great reces-
sion. Journal of Family Business Strategy, forthcoming.
Sveiby, K. E. (1997). The new organizational wealth—Managing and measuring knowledge- based
assets. San Francisco, CA: Barrett-Kohler.
Sydler, R., Haefliger, S., & Pruksa, R. (2014). Measuring intellectual capital with financial figures: Can
we predict firm profitability? European Management Journal, 32(2), 244–259.
Szulanski, G. (1996). Exploring internal stickiness: Impediments to the transfer of best practice within
the firm. Strategic Management Journal, 17(Special Issue), 27–44.
Trevinyo-Rodríguez, R. N., & Bontis, N. (2007). The role of intellectual capital in Mexican family-based
businesses: Understanding their soul, brain and heart. Journal of Information & Knowledge Man-
agement, 6(03), 189–200.
Turban, D. B., & Cable, D. M. (2003). Firm reputation and applicant pool characteristics. Journal of
Organizational Behavior, 24(6), 733–751.
Villalonga, B. (2004). Intangible resources, Tobin’sq, and sustainability of performance differences.
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 54(2), 205–230.
Villalonga, B., & Amit, R. (2006). How do family ownership, control and management affect firm value?
Journal of Financial Economics, 80(2), 385–417.
Wernerfelt, B. (1984). A resource based view of the firm. Strategic Management Journal, 5(2), l71–180.
Zahra, S. A. (2003). International expansion of U.S. manufacturing family businesses: The effect of own-
ership and involvement. Journal of Business Venturing, 18(4), 495–512.
Zambon, S., Marasca, S., & Chiucchi, M. S. (2019). Special issue on “The role of intellectual capital and
integrated reporting in management and governance: a performative perspective”. Journal of Man-
agement and Governance, 1–7.
Zeghal, D., & Maaloul, A. (2010). Analysing value added as an indicator of intellectual capital and its
consequences on company performance. Journal of Intellectual Capital, 11(1), 39–60.

13
 G. Ginesti, M. Ossorio

Zellweger, T. M., Eddlestone, K. A., & Kellermanns, F. W. (2010). Exploring the concept of familiness:
Introducing family firm identity. Journal of Family Business Strategy, 1(1), 54–63.
Zellweger, T. M., Kellermanns, F., Chrisman, J. J., & Chua, J. H. (2012). Family control and family firm
valuation by family CEOs: The importance of intentions for transgenerational control. Organiza-
tion Science, 23(3), 851–868.

Publisher’s Note  Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published
maps and institutional affiliations.

Gianluca Ginesti  PhD, is Senior Lecturer in Accounting at the Department of Economics, Management,
Institutions (DEMI) of the University of Naples Federico II (Italy). Dr. Ginesti has published papers in
international journals such as Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, The British Accounting Review,
European Management Review, Journal of Family Business Strategy, Journal of Intellectual Capital. His
research interests focus on financial reporting, corporate governance and family businesses.

Mario Ossorio  is Assistant professor in Management at University of Campania “Luigi Vanvitelli”. He

earned his MSc in Economics and Finance from University of Naples “Federico II” and his PhD in
Entrepreneurship and Innovation from University of Campania “Luigi Vanvitelli”. His primary research
interests include innovation, family businesses and corporate governance. Recently, he published in Man-
agement Decision, Career Development International, EuroMed Journal of Business and International
Journal of Managerial and Financial Accounting.

13