Cities 39 (2014) 50–57

Rapid urban development and national master planning in Arab Gulf

countries. Qatar as a case study
Agatino Rizzo ⇑
Department of Civil, Environmental and Natural Resources Engineering, Division of Architecture and Water, Research Group of Architecture, Lulea University of Technology,
971 87 Lulea, Sweden

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: In this article we review past and current master planning efforts in Qatar, highlighting the country’s
Received 24 March 2013 inability to manage rapid urban development. We will argue that the failure to implement sound urban
Received in revised form 23 January 2014 planning in Qatar – and by extension, in the rest of the Arab Gulf Region – is the result of a detachment
Accepted 17 February 2014
between the master planning phase – usually sub-contracted to external consultants that are insensitive
Available online 15 March 2014
to Gulf dynamics – and the implementation phase – usually carried out by incapable and redundant local
government agencies – all in absence of a serious discussion of ongoing mega-projects.
Keywords:
Rapid urbanization
Arab Gulf Region
Doha
Qatar National Development Framework
Mega-projects

Introduction
Among countries of the Arabian Peninsula, the State of Qatar – a
narrow peninsula located in the center of the Persian Gulf between
Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates – is emerging
as a regional and global powerhouse. Qatar’s ruling class’s geopo-
litical ambitions (e.g., Qatar’s active role in both NATO’s interven-
tion in Libya and in shaping public opinion through its Al Jazeera
news channel) and appetite for prestigious high-profile events
(e.g., 2006 Asian Olympic Games, 2022 FIFA World Cup) have gar-
nered the country attention from the media and the international
community. Thanks to its vast gas reserves and associated eco-
nomic growth, according to the latest economic and demographic
figures (2010), Qatar’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita
is the highest in the world (US $179,000),1 although wealth is un-
evenly distributed between Qataris and the burgeoning expatriate
community (Financial Times, 2011). In addition, due to migration in-
flow of workers mainly from South, South-East Asia, and the Middle
East and North Africa (MENA) region, between 2004 and 2010
Qatar’s population has more than doubled (from 750,000 to 1.7
million inhabitants – Qatar Statistics Authority, 2010).
⇑ Address: Luleå University of Technology, SBN, AVA, Research Group of
Architecture, Room F 241, 971 87 Luleå, Sweden. Tel.: +46 (0) 920 49 3438.
E-mail address: agatino.rizzo@ltu.se
1
Luxembourg is second in the world rank with US$ 82,600 per capita (CIA World
Factbook, 2010).
Prior to the discovery of oil, the population of Qatar did not
reach 30,000; Doha, the capital of Qatar, had a population of
12,000 inhabitants (Adham, 2008: 222). However, with the influx
of petrodollars starting from the 1950s, urban patterns in the coun-
try began to change towards more uncontrolled growth (Adham,
2008: 223). The dramatic urban revolution was further accelerated
due to increased oil revenues after 1971. Today, metropolitan Doha
is a sprawling conurbation of 1.4 million inhabitants expanding
over the municipalities of Doha, Al Wakra, Al Rayyan, Umm Salal
and Al Dayeen (Rizzo, 2013).
In recent years, the government of Qatar has implemented sev-
eral megaprojects that have provided for modern urban facilities
and increased tourism (Rizzo, 2013: 540). However, the implemen-
tation of such large-scale projects in the absence of a national plan-
ning framework has contributed to Doha’s urban primacy (Rizzo,
2013) and therefore to more traffic congestion, localized environ-
mental impacts, affordable housing shortages, and land value infla-
tion (Al Buainain, 1999: 406). To confront these issues, since 2005,
the Ministry of Municipality and Urban Planning (MMUP) has
worked on a new Qatar National Development Framework (QNDF):
a strategic document to be followed by a more detailed national
master plan.
In the following sections, we will see that despite the many ambi-
tious attempts to manage rapid urban growth (Section 2) and to pro-
vide Doha with modern urban standards – in line with recent
planning experiences carried out in the region (Section 3) – urban
planning in Qatar has failed to be enforced. Based on our analysis

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cities.2014.02.005
 A. Rizzo / Cities 39 (2014) 50–57
of available planning documents and ongoing developments in Qa-
tar and the Gulf Region, we will argue in Section 4 that the inability
to implement sound urban planning in Qatar - and by extension, in
the rest of the Arab Gulf Region – is the result of a detachment be-
tween the master planning phase – usually sub-contracted to exter-
nal consultants that are insensitive to Gulf dynamics – and the
implementation phase – usually carried out by incapable and redun-
dant local government agencies – all in the absence of a serious dis-
cussion of ongoing megaprojects. In the conclusion, we summarize
results and highlight the importance of the education and training
of local planners as a crucial component of sound urban planning
implementation in the Gulf Region.
Urban development and master planning in Qatar and the Gulf
Region between post-colonialism and globalization
Similarly to Pacione’s (2005: 259–260) and Elsheshtawy’s
(2004: 178–179) accounts of Dubai, Khaled Adham (2008: 225)
suggests four different phases for Doha between 1949 and the
early 1990s: urbanity of ‘‘transition’’, ‘‘necessity’’, ‘‘modernization’’,
and ‘‘stagnation’’ (see Fig. 1). In a recent paper, Rizzo (2013) has
introduced a newer stage of urban development called the ‘‘mega-
project phase’’ to highlight the government tendency to build
large, themed urban projects in an effort to emulate similar, popu-
lar developments taking shape in the rest of the Gulf region (e.g.,
Dubai and Abu Dhabi). In the following paragraphs, we will discuss
urban development and planning in Qatar and the Gulf Region
since their independence from the British Empire (1971).
Urban development and planning in post-colonial Qatar: the
‘‘modernization’’ and ‘‘stagnation’’ phases
The 1960s and 1970s marked the beginning of extensive oil
exploitation and increasing allocation of government revenues to
fund major urban projects for modernizing Doha (Adham, 2008:
225). According to Adham (2008: 225), the phase ‘‘urbanity of
modernization’’ (1972–1984) denotes major urban developments
in the city, particularly with the implementation of large projects
to locate the ministries and other government buildings of the
newly independent State of Qatar.
Fig. 1. Urban Growth Phases in Doha: 1947 – Urban Development Prior to Oil
Exploitation; 1966 – Modernization Phase; 1988 – Petro-Urbanism Phase; 2010 –
Megaproject Phase. Source: our elaboration based on MMUP data.
51
Among these projects, the most important for the future devel-
opment of the city is the implementation of a large urban reclama-
tion project known as the New District of Doha, comprising the
areas of Al Corniche and Al Dafna. To deliver this massive develop-
ment, in 1972, the central government invited the British planning
firm Llewellyn-Davies to prepare the first master plan for the cap-
ital region (Nagy, 2000: 130). Llewellyn-Davies and the central
government developed a proposal to decentralize urban areas
within Doha’s A ring (i.e. the old city center) while re-organizing
it with large demolition programs to make space for roads and
other basic public infrastructures (Adham, 2008: 228). Concur-
rently with this strategy was the suggestion to reclaim the shallow
waters to the north of Doha in order to locate major government
buildings (e.g., ministries and national bank-headquarters). During
the 1970s, the American firm Pereira Architects shaped the new
waterfront of Doha with the characteristic convex-like profile it
maintains today. At the end of this super-imposed waterfront,
the new Sheraton Hotel dominated the skyline of the city. The most
popular areas of Doha (see Fig. 1) therefore ‘‘emerged’’ from the sea
and are known today as Al Corniche (the promenade), West Bay
(the central business district) and Al Dafna (location of the diplo-
matic district and several other prime developments). These major
projects allowed the government to develop better urban stan-
dards to be used as examples for the rest of the city.
After a decade of strong economic growth triggered by in-
creased oil revenues, plans had to be updated to allocate more
space for the increasing expatriate community, which consisted
mainly of Arabs, Indians, Pakistanis, and a small number of west-
erners (Adham, 2008: 225). Riad (1981: 7) labeled this phase ‘‘pet-
ro-urbanism’’ to describe the rapid change that ‘‘undermined, with
unparalleled suddenness, the roots of an ecosystem [the Gulf’s one]
which reflected a perfect adaptation to an environment many gen-
erations old’’. Thus, in 1979, to update Llewellyn-Davies’ master
plan, Shankland Cox Partnership was hired to propose urban strat-
egies for the next 20-year period (Al Buainain, 1999: 210). During
this period, the first systematic information archive for the capital
city, the Qatar Area Referencing System, was established together
with a planning database and an interim structure plan plus sev-
eral action plans (Al Buainain, 1999).
Between the 1980s and 1990s, the country also engaged in a
long series of consultancy projects with other foreign firms such
as the 1983 Doha Landscape Master Plan, prepared by the global
American planning firm HOK; the 1985 planning study of Doha’s
city center, prepared by Lebanese Dar Al-Handasah consultants;
and the 1993–1997 Physical Development Plan, prepared by Louis
Berger & HOK to propose new strategies for regulated urban devel-
opment. Some of these plans differed in approach and scope. For
example, HOK’s plans addressed the provision of urban infrastruc-
ture to keep pace with Doha’s rapid urban growth, while Dar Al-
Handasah’s plan focused on the conservation of the remaining
building heritage in Doha’s city center.
Due to plummeting oil prices in the 1980s and the subsequent
political instability as result of the first Gulf War in the 1990s, none
of these plans were ever implemented; Adham (2008: 225) calls
this period the ‘‘urbanity of stagnation’’. However, Lockerbie
(2010) argues that these exercises helped develop some capacity
within government agencies. Despite that, they still continue to
be dependent on foreign input for planning and implementation
(see Section 4).
Urban development in Qatar through the globalization age: the
‘‘megaproject’’ phase
To start to grasp Qatar’s current ‘‘megaproject phase’’ (Rizzo,
2013), we need to examine contemporary developments in the
Arab Gulf Region. In this context, several terms have been used
52
to label the recent extraordinary urban growth of Arab capitals of
the Persian Gulf. Bagaeen (2007: 174) described Gulf cities with
the term ‘‘instant urbanism’’ to differentiate the rapid process of
urbanization from Western, long term urban evolution. This is,
for instance, the case of Dubai, Abu Dhabi, and Doha, which have
all transformed from small port cities to sprawling metropolitan
areas in just two decades (Pacione, 2005; Ponzini, 2011; Rizzo,
2013). Recently, the term ‘‘Dubaization’’ or ‘‘Dubaification’’
(Elsheshtawy, 2010: 250) has come to the foreground of the
academic literature to describe cities’ emulation of Dubai’s urban
megaprojects agenda. Other authors have further developed this
term in specific case studies such as in Doha (Adham, 2008:
247); Bahrain (Dayaratne, 2012: 322); Baku, Azerbaijan (Valiyev,
2012: 632); Khartoum, Sudan; and Nouakchott, Mauritania
(Choplin & Franck, 2010).
Since the end of the 1990s, inspired by Dubai’s and Abu Dhabi’s
urban agendas (Koolhaas, Bouman, & Wigley, 2007 and 2010;
Elsheshtawy, 2004 and Elsheshtawy, 2008), Qatar has embarked
on a vast megaprojects campaign to provide the country with urban
development that will attract global firms as well as high skilled
professionals and tourists (Rizzo, 2013: 540). This mammoth effort
has resulted in massive government-sponsored investments in
infrastructures across Doha such as new airports, highways, ports,
football stadiums, swimming complexes, and hotels (see Fig. 2).
The New Doha International Airport, the Metro and National
Railway, the Doha Port Project, the Qatar-Bahrain Bridge, and the
new Doha expressways are but a sampling of the large undertaking
that Qatar aims to deliver in the next 20 years (see Table 1).
However, while these megaprojects have brought new useful
infrastructures to cater to the country’s ambitious goals, due to
the poor planning regulations and in the absence of democratic
processes (Ponzini, 2011), they have been responsible for impor-
tant physical and social fractures within the city (i.e., between
who can and who cannot access those infrastructures) (Rizzo,
2013; Rizzo, 2012).
From a political-economic point of view, Gulf cities in general
deploy (Ponzini, 2011: 251) ‘‘the political and economic engine
of urban development projects’’ to compete for Foreign Direct
Investments (FDI), skilled labor, and international tourists. As
Ponzini (2011: 252) discussed in the Abu Dhabi context, however,
large scale projects are neither a new formula nor immune to
uncertainties and imbalanced effects.2 In the Gulf Region, megapro-
jects involve the participation of a limited number of actors – usually
government-linked companies – and their implications are never
discussed with the public. In Qatar as in Abu Dhabi, ‘‘the separation
between public and private sectors [...] is practically nonexistent be-
cause the actors have key positions in public decision making and in
the management of private companies‘‘ (Ponzini, 2011: 254). For in-
stance, in Qatar, members of the royal family are on the boards of
many commercial enterprises such as Ezdan Properties and Msher-
eib Properties.
At the same time, the Gulf is home to a highly diverse popula-
tion composed of temporary workers (Nagy, 2006) which, in the
cases of Qatar and the UAE, outnumber nationals five to one.
According to recent statistics (US State Department, 2008), Qataris
account for 20% of the peninsula’s total population, while South
Asians and South East Asians account for 55%. In the UAE, these
proportions are 15% and 67%, respectively (US State Department,
2009). Due to foreign immigration, from 2004 to 2010, Metro
Doha’s population has more than doubled from nearly 700,000 to
1.4 million inhabitants. MMUP forecasts that by 2032, Metro
2
In 2008 Emaar, a private conglomerate established by the Dubai Government,
nearly risked bankruptcy over the construction of the world’s tallest building (Burji
Khalifa), which was then completed with capital offered by Abu Dhabi’s ruler (Sheik
Khalifa Al Nahyan).
A. Rizzo / Cities 39 (2014) 50–57
Doha’s population will be 1.8 million inhabitants (Rizzo, 2013). In
the last 15 years, Doha has grown from a small, port city to a bus-
tling capital region with global ambitions by increasing its pre-
independence population by 30 times. Today, almost 90% of Qatar’s
total population (1.4 out of 1.7 million inhabitants) live in metro-
politan Doha. The population growth between the last two general
surveys (2004 and 2010) was 128%, at the country level, and 93% in
Doha. During the same period, in other Gulf emirates, the popula-
tion grew 11% in Abu Dhabi, 21% in Dubai, and 16% in the whole
UAE.
In response to some of these issues, MMUP contracted the Jap-
anese engineering conglomerate ‘‘Oriental Consultants’’ in 2005 to
develop a new Qatar National Master Plan. To establish a planning
framework that would be compatible with the Qatar National Vi-
sion 2030 (QNV) and the recently launched National Development
Strategy (NDS) 2011–2016 (March 2011), the planning team is now
finalizing a Qatar National Development Framework (QNDF) for
‘‘managing growth, change, land use and development in Qatar
to 2032’’ (MMUP, 2011: 10). In the following section, we highlight
QNDF’s main features and contextualize them with similar plan-
ning documents being developed in the region.
Planning in the megaproject phase: the Qatar National
Development Framework and relevant experiences in the
region
Based on the General Secretariat for Development Planning’s
guidelines and vision, the Qatar National Development Frame-
work (QNDF) includes directives for the ongoing National Master
Plan and Municipal Structure Plans related to the following na-
tional plans for the environment, transportation and utilities,
structure plans for Metropolitan Doha and other municipalities,
action area plans for cities’ and towns’ centers, and, finally, zon-
ing regulations, planning codes, and urban design guides (MMUP,
2011: 11).
The implementation of the QNDF is based on three phases
(MMUP, 2011: 10): immediate actions (to be implemented by
2012), short-medium term (by 2017), and medium-long term (by
2032). Plans and regulations are to be adopted by MMUP after con-
sulting relevant government stakeholders. The first part of the
QNDF provides the background for Qatar’s major urban challenges,
while the second part underpins the envisioned national spatial
strategy through 17 objectives. The third part details hundreds of
policy actions to be implemented by stakeholders specified in the
fourth part. All of the processes will be regulated by a common reg-
ulatory framework specified in the fifth part of the document.
The QNDF highlights the main urban challenges that should be
taken into account in the future comprehensive national master
plan. These challenges are mainly related to rapid urban growth
and declining living standards caused by air pollution (prevalent
car-based mobility), congestion (lack of efficient public transporta-
tion), and urban segregation (lack of affordable housing). In addi-
tion, the QNDF aims to confront declining small settlements,
environmental impacts particularly around large industrial com-
plexes (e.g., Ras Laffan and other Qatar Petroleum administered
industrial cities), inefficient use of energy (particularly in residen-
tial areas) and associated greenhouse emissions, food security, and
eroding natural/urban landscape quality.
The QNDF suggests 17 strategies to address current urban
growth issues and historical planning problems. In Table 2, we
arrange the strategies by areas of action (Doha, Metro Doha, and
Qatar) and by focus (Integrated Development and Public Transport
(D&T); Environment Sustainability (ENV); Governance and Imple-
mentation (GOV); Identity (IDE); Quality of Urban Development
(QUA); and Social Justice (SOC)).
 A. Rizzo / Cities 39 (2014) 50–57 53

Fig. 2. Existing and future megaprojects in Metropolitan Doha (*QEZ = Qatar Enterprise Zone).

Table 1 The document anticipates a population growth of 1.8 million in

Infrastructure projects. Source: OBG, 2011: 124. Metropolitan Doha (presently approximately 1.4 million3) and
Project Estimated cost Estimated date of 2.3 million in Qatar by 2032 (presently approximately 1.7 million).
(US$ bn) completion According to MMUP, approximately 800,000 construction workers
National Railway 40 2020 will leave the country by 2017; therefore, the effective additional
New Doha International 14.5 2012 (moved to 2014) population between now and 2032 will be approximately 1 million,
Airport many of whom will be new arrivals. The departure of construction
New Doha Port Project 5.5 2014
workers, however, is highly improbable as more manpower will be
Qatar–Bahrain Causeway 4 2014–2015
(postponed) needed to provide infrastructure services for the 2022 FIFA Football
Doha expressway 2 2012 World Cup. The demographics for this additional and diverse popu-
lation in a future knowledge-based economy will, understandably,
be different. Such changing demographics will create new demands
for housing, transport, infrastructure, and social amenities (MMUP,
The table shows that most of the ‘‘hard strategies’’ (i.e., invest- 2011).
ments in urban infrastructure and development) apply to Doha and Finally, the QNDF Spatial Strategy envisions a classic hierarchy
its metropolitan area to correct the current path of urban growth – of urban centers in which the West Bay area, Airport City, and
by delivering public transport, transit-oriented development, and the government district in the city center are at the core of Metro
urban livability – while only five, ‘‘softer’’ strategies, apply to the Doha while other dense, transit-oriented metropolitan and town
country as a whole: rehabilitation of existing rural communities centers connect to them by orbital, transit corridors. Urban growth
to preserve their traditional character; mitigation of environmental in the capital region is controlled with an agricultural ‘belt’ (also to
impacts; other risk mitigation policies; planning implementation; achieve food security), while integration between transportation
and governance. It is worth mentioning that the QNDF places a and land use plan is seen as a priority to reduce congestion and
special focus on the issue of identity enhancement and protection provide opportunities for more and better public transport.
to counteract decades of rapid urban change.
A particularly important aspect of the QNDF is population
growth forecast versus housing demand (see Fig. 3 and Table 3). 3
Source: Qatar Statistics Authority, 2010.
54 A. Rizzo / Cities 39 (2014) 50–57

Table 2
QNDF strategies. Source: our elaboration from Qatar National Development Framework.

ID Strategy Area of Theme

implementation

1 Promote a high quality capital city precinct that is on par with other major international cities Doha QUA
2 Develop transit-oriented development and mixed-use developments Metro Doha D&T
3 Retain cultural identity of rural communities and enhance their livability Qatar IDE
4 Establish a high quality public transportation network to achieve modal shift from cars to buses, subways and railways while Metro Doha D&T
recognizing the desire of Qataris for choices in transportation
5 Ensure radial routes act as transit corridors to reduce traffic while promoting orbit routes to balance growth Metro Doha D&T
6 Ensure that mega projects are integrated into the wider community Metro Doha SOC
7 Promote equitable accessibility to community facilities by co-locating them with key transport centers Metro Doha D&T
8 Develop a unique and high quality public realm Doha/Metro Doha QUA
9 Promote connectivity and a vibrant public realm through block size Metro Doha QUA
10 Promote a wide range of densities and building types that are affordable to all Metro Doha SOC
11 Create high quality neighborhoods that appeal to Qatari’s identities and lifestyles Metro Doha IDE
12 Develop a distinctive identity for Doha based upon Qatari values Doha IDE
13 Protect and enhance the natural, cultural, and built environment Qatar ENV
14 Ensure that risks from climate change are evaluated and mitigation measures are developed for land use and infrastructure Qatar ENV
development
15 Plan, coordinate, upgrade, and deliver infrastructure services in a timely and cost-effective manner Qatar GOV
16 Establish urban growth boundaries around metropolitan Doha Metro Doha D&T
17 Develop a plan that supports development change processes through appropriate institutional governance framework Qatar GOV

addition, in 2007, Abu Dhabi, UAE, adopted its Urban Structure

Fig. 3. Population and forecasts (our elaboration, data: MMUP, 2011).
Livability, identity, and integration of existing and planned megap-
rojects are amongst the main policy priorities indicated in the plan,
while density, mixed-use-development and hierarchy of centers
are the main spatial concepts that should deliver the vision. A ma-
jor issue highlighted in the plan is the better use of undeveloped
land within the metropolitan area in order to achieve a compact
urban form.
Relevant planning experiences in Asian emerging metropolises
Similar efforts have been, or are being, implemented in the rest
of the Gulf Region. For example, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, is now
implementing MEDSTAR 2030 (Metropolitan Development Strategy
for 2030), a strategic master plan that began in 1996 and aims to
re-orient urban development in the capital region towards a
high-density, sustainable urban form (Garba, 2004: 602). In
Framework Plan, to be followed by detailed land use plans, that
would provide ‘‘a strong and comprehensive foundation for the
development of the city of Abu Dhabi in a strategic and coordi-
nated way [...] while building a global capital with its own rich cul-
tural heritage’’ (UPC, 2007:21).
Outside the Gulf Region but within the West Asia Region (i.e.
the Middle East), the city of Amman, capital of the Kingdom of Jor-
dan, has already developed an innovative master plan (the Amman
2025), that merges land use, transportation and strategic planning
to ‘‘create forms of civic engagement, drastically reduce the
distance between planning and implementation, [...] and meet
national development objectives’’ (Beauregard & Marpillero-
Colomina, 2011: 62).
From West Asia to the South-East Asia region, the Iskandar
Malaysia Corridor, a metropolitan master-plan inserted in the
wider national economic planning strategy of Malaysia, is re-
inventing the role of Johor Bahru, capital of the state of Johor, as
a Malaysian southern gateway. Through five flagship projects, the
plan designs the future structure of the metropolis (the second
largest in Malaysia after Kuala Lumpur) to be more polycentric,
transit-oriented, and sustainable (Rizzo & Glasson, 2012: 418;
Rizzo & Khan, 2013: 154). In addition, actions to improve connec-
tivity with neighboring Singapore through public transportation
infrastructures are considered to be crucial for the success of the
master plan.
While MEDSTAR addresses urban form, Abu Dhabi’s Urban
Structure Framework Plan addresses the strategic planning ap-
proach. Amman 2025 and Iskandar Malaysia, however, focus on
transit-oriented development to deliver sustainable urban growth.
Moreover, in Iskandar Malaysia, both regional-transnational inte-
gration between Johor Bahru and neighboring Singapore and coun-
try-wide polycentric development strategies are of extreme
importance to improving Malaysia’s competitive edge against
other countries in the region (Rizzo & Glasson, 2012; Rizzo & Khan,

Table 3
Population and forecasts. Source: Qatar Statistics Authority and Qatar National Master Plan.

Totals 1986 1997 2004 2010 2017 2032

Qatar 345,046 523,540 745,918 1,699,138 1,916,000 2287000

Metro Doha 337,051 475,464 673,703 1,400,608 1,564,000 1871000
Metro/Qatar 98% 91% 90% 82% 82% 82%
 A. Rizzo / Cities 39 (2014) 50–57
2013). Similarly, Toksoz (2010: 202) argues that the impacts of the
2008 global financial crisis on countries of the Gulf Cooperation
Council4 (GCC) have shown the need ‘‘to speed up regional economic
integration and create a functioning regional domestic market’’.
Although the financial crisis has affected the implementation of
several megaprojects in the Arab Gulf Region (and in particularly
in UAE; see Bloch, 2010: 947), strategic, publicly funded projects
are still continuing (e.g., the North–South pan-GCC railway link from
Kuwait City to Muscat in Oman) (Toksoz, 2010: 200).
A closer examination of these development documents, unfor-
tunately, reveals a lack of consistency between the vision and pol-
icy assessment, urban regulations enforcement, influence of the
plan over the massive real estate speculation, and public participa-
tion, which will hinder the implementation of these master plans
(Ponzini, 2011: 254; Garba, 2004: 605; Mubarak, 2004: 585;
Beauregard & Marpillero-Colomina, 2011: 69; Rizzo & Glasson,
2011: 156; Rizzo & Khan, 2013: 155). Similar issues can be found
in Qatar’s master plans, which will be discussed in the next section.
Factors hindering the implementation of urban planning in
Qatar and their relevance for the QNDF and future municipal
structure plans
While Qatar’s master plans have been useful for introducing the
notion of planning in a relatively young country (Lockerbie, 2010),
only small portions of these plans have been partially imple-
mented. Undoubtedly, the first master plans by Llewellyn-Davies
and Pereira have contributed to the application of modern urban
standards in Doha regarding plot sizes and coverage, parking,
and heights, which were applied throughout the city.
We argue that the inability to implement sound urban planning
in Qatar, and by extension in the rest of the Gulf Region, is the re-
sult of a detachment between the master planning and implemen-
tation phases. Among the main causes to have hindered the
implementation of urban planning in Qatar were: little under-
standing of Gulf dynamics (Nagy, 2000) by international consul-
tants during the master planning phase (e.g., budget constraints,
immigration waves, and local culture); poor government capacity
(Al Buainain, 1999); and lack of coordination between government
agencies (MMUP, 2011) in the implementation phase – all in the
absence of a serious discussion of ongoing megaprojects (Ponzini,
2011).
Lack of understanding of Gulf dynamics by international consultants
In her analysis of planning agencies in Qatar, Sharon Nagy
(2000: 133) has reported that ‘‘[the] failure to accurately estimate
population growth, planners’ unfamiliarity and insensitivity to lo-
cal social patterns, and budgetary constraints are the reasons most
commonly offered to explain why neither the Lewellyn-Davies nor
the Shankland Cox plan were implemented’’. As we shall see below,
similar issues have also affected the current QNDF.
First, the lack of economic understanding of oil-dominated
economies makes planners unable to forecast incoming migration
waves and thus unable to provide affordable housing in unsegre-
gated areas. The QNDF, for example, suggests that 80–85% of future
populations in Qatar should be located in Doha’s conurbation. Un-
der these conditions, it seems reasonable to speculate that higher
rents will reinforce spatial/social segregation in Doha while fuel-
ling high inflation.
Second, the QNDF does very little to counter Doha urban pri-
macy. Al Buainain (1999: 406) notes that Qatar’s poor polycentric
development is responsible for chronically causing affordable
4
The GCC includes: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE, and Oman.
55
housing shortages, land value inflation, and localized environmen-
tal impacts. Currently, the bulk of future urban developments in
Qatar are assumed to take place within the capital metropolitan
boundaries. Losail City, the nine new stadiums for the 2022 FIFA
Football World Cup, and the planned infrastructures for the 2020
Olympics5 bids are all to be located within metropolitan Doha. How-
ever, the environmental impacts of allocating such developments in
a small part of the country are currently unknown. By concentrating
its efforts on the capital region, the QNDF is once again confirming
the primacy of Doha over other cities in the country, thus reinforcing
urban primacy (Fig. 4).
Third, despite Gulf countries’ dependence on oil revenues as
their primary economic resource, the fluctuation of oil prices in re-
sponse to either regional conflicts (e.g., the Iraq Wars and most re-
cently the Syrian Civil War) or to oversupply (see recent
development in shale gas technology in the USA) or to reduced de-
mand (see the effects of austerity in some European countries) is
never taken into consideration in the master planning phase, pos-
sibly undermining the ability of the government to finance future
urban spending (see the ‘‘urbanity of stagnation’’ phase in Qatar
– Adham, 2011).
Finally, insensitivity to local social patterns is also visible in the
QNDF that mentions, without seriously addressing, social related
problems such as the lack of affordable housing, increased urban
segregation, and poor living standards for low-wage workers (usu-
ally from South Asian countries such as India, Pakistan, and Nepal).
Qatar, like many Gulf States, ‘‘still adheres to an archaic sponsor-
ship system in which workers are forbidden from leaving a com-
pany without its permission’’ (Financial Times, 2011). The
average basic salary for a worker in Qatar is approximately QAR
600 (US$165) a month,6 plus a QAR 200 food allowance (Ibid.).
Workers usually spend more than QAR 4,000 to immigrate to Qatar
(agency expenses, trips, and VISA).
By 2022, in Qatar, more luxury hotels will open to cater to
Westerners and westernized Arabs who can afford to enjoy exclu-
sive services (e.g., spa treatments, gourmet restaurants, and fancy
bars or pubs serving alcoholic drinks), while problems such as spa-
tial segregation, gentrification of redeveloped areas, and affordable
housing remain unsolved (Rizzo, 2013; Rizzo, 2012).
Poor government capacity and lack of coordination between
government agencies
While Llewellyn-Davies’s and Pereira’s master plans were par-
tially implemented, none of the plans after the 1980s were ever
adopted by the government. In the first decades after indepen-
dence, one of the main factors that hindered sound urban planning
in Doha was a government-staff’s lack of capacity to implement
complex master plans developed by Western consultants (Al
Buainain, 1999; Lockerbie, 2010). A similar problem still persists
today in modern Qatar where the main urban planning agencies
(e.g., MMUP and the Public Works Department), together with
local government-linked developers (e.g., Msheireb Properties
and Qatar Railway), are propped up by armies of international
consultants in the daily implementation and management of
projects.
While municipalities in Qatar have very little power,7 the lack of
coordination between central government agencies has further con-
tributed to the failure to adopt the master plans. Until the 1990s, in
fact, planning affairs in Qatar fell under the jurisdictions of: the
5
Although the bid for the Olympic Games was not actually realized.
6
The Qatari Riyal is pegged to the US dollar at a fixed exchange rate of USD 1 = QAR
3.64.
7
Since 2004, Qatar has been divided into seven municipalities: Doha, Al Dayyan, Al
Khor, Al Rayyan, Al Shamal, Al Wakra, and Umm Salal.
56 A. Rizzo / Cities 39 (2014) 50–57
Fig. 4. New developments (black outline) and urban development phases (our
elaboration, data: MMUP, 2011).
Ministry of Finance and Petroleum Affairs (which promote projects
that increase or support oil and gas revenues); the Ministry of Public
Works (roads, utilities, public buildings), the Ministry of Municipal
Affairs (planning and building regulations), the Ministry of Justice
(land registration), the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (public
housing for nationals), the Emiri Diwan (sponsors and developers
of many prestigious urban projects); and the military (development
of some transportation infrastructures and several development pro-
jects) (Lockerbie, 2010).
More recently, a major streamlining of ministries has been
implemented to improve coordination, assigning to MMUP and
its sub-agencies most of the planning (e.g., the powerful Public
Work Department ‘‘Ashgal’’ and the Urban Planning Depart-
ment), while the Emiri Diwan retains its powers over special
projects (e.g., Mshereib – Rizzo, 2013: 542). This streamlining,
however, has not stopped the duplication of efforts or the lack
of coordination. It is worth mentioning that the QNDF is working
on a ‘‘policy matrix’’ which identifies relevant stakeholders for
each policy to be implemented, but it is not available to the
public at this time.
Lack of discussion of ongoing megaprojects
Currently, government institutions are pushing for more
‘world-class’ developments to improve Doha’s competitive edge
over Dubai, Abu Dhabi and other centers (OBG, 2011: 119). At
the same time, an oversupply of luxury hotels/residences and a
shortage of affordable housing, high-end megaprojects continue
to be provided by government-linked companies. In an effort to
compete with similar developments in Abu Dhabi (e.g., Yas Marina
and Saadiyat Island – see Ponzini & Nastasi, 2011: 46, 53) and
Dubai (e.g., Dubai Marina and Burji Khalifa area), Qatari Diar is
working on a 38 square kilometer Losail City for 450,000 residents,
Mshereib Properties (a subsidiary of QF) is about to deliver a 35 ha
redevelopment project in the central district of Mshereib, and UDC
(a private consortium recently bailed out by the government) has
already completed 50% of The Pearl – a 400-ha manmade island
for 41,000 ‘‘international residents’’.8
The QNDF does little to address these ongoing developments or
to, perhaps, reallocate some of the resources to more needed infra-
structures (e.g., affordable housing, better health clinics, or public
amenities). Mendis (2007: 320) has observed for Education City
that megaprojects are both ‘‘resources’’ for the country’s needs
and ‘‘commodities’’ to brand Qatar through its distinctive architec-
ture similar to Abu Dhabi’s Masdar City and Dubai’s Palms
(Pacione, 2005: 265; Ponzini, 2011: 254). A public discussion beyond
a mere presentation of projects is not encouraged in the current,
socio-political climate of the Gulf (Colombo, 2012: 3); therefore,
‘‘Collecting Spectacular Architecture in an Urban and Democratic
Vacuum’’ is, in the words of Ponzini and Nastasi (2011: 45, IX), ‘‘
the device for shaping the attention of consumerist media, while
speculative real-estate projects are pursued’’.
Implications for ongoing and future municipal structure plans
The three issues mentioned above have had and will continue to
have a direct impact on the implementation of spatial plans in the
Metro Doha region. First, if the lack of understanding of Gulf
dynamics by international consultants will not be addressed and
opportunities to build capacity amongst local planners will be
missed, more spatial segregation will occur in the periphery of Me-
tro Doha, gentrification will persist in the regenerated areas of the
city center, and unreferenced architecture and urban space will
further erode opportunities to implement sustainable develop-
ment. Moreover, poor government capacity and lack of coordina-
tion between government agencies will generate redundant
developments: some large luxury residential and shopping com-
plexes in The Pearl areas (e.g., the shopping carousel in Port Arabia)
and West Bay (e.g., The Gate Mall) are already underutilized and
financially unsustainable.9 Finally, if the lack of discussion of ongo-
ing megaprojects is not addressed soon, much of the planned infra-
structures for the FIFA Football World Cup (e.g., athlete’s villages,
subway lines, and retail locations) could be underutilized after
2022 and not serve the general interests of the community.
Conclusion
The abundance of energy resources has transformed the small
principality of Qatar into a center for economic and urban develop-
ment in West Asia. This form of ‘‘petro-urbanism’’ (Riad, 1981) has
brought to Doha modern urban infrastructures, but it has also con-
tributed to decreased urban living standards due to the lack of
clear and comprehensive planning strategies. Moreover, since the
1970s, with the help of western consultants, Qatar has attempted
to implement urban planning in an effort to manage rapid urban
growth, though with little success.
Since the end of the 1990s, Qatar has implemented several meg-
aprojects to attract global firms, high-skilled workers, and tourists
in an effort to compete with rising regional centers such as Dubai
and Abu Dhabi. Once again, and in line with similar experiences in
other Asian emerging countries, the Ministry of Municipality and
Urban Planning (MMUP) is working on a new national master plan
and national development framework (QNDF) to implement sus-
tainable and rational urban development. While the QNDF ad-
dresses new urban challenges, it has not resolved crucial issues
hindering the implementation of sound urban planning in Qatar
and, by extension, in the rest of the Gulf region.
8
Citation from The Pearl website – www.thepearlqatar.com.
9
UDC, the main developer of The Pearl, was recently bailed out by the Qatar
government.
 A. Rizzo / Cities 39 (2014) 50–57
In this article, we have discussed Qatar’s inability to deliver ur-
ban planning as the result of a detachment between (1) the master
planning phase – usually sub-contracted to external consultants
who are insensitive to Gulf dynamics – and (2) the implementation
phase – usually carried out by incapable and redundant local gov-
ernment agencies, (3) all in the absence of a serious discussion of
ongoing megaprojects. We have also indicated the likely repercus-
sions that these three issues have had and will have in the imple-
mentation of spatial plans in the Metro Doha region (e.g.,
underutilized infrastructures, duplicate projects, spatial segrega-
tion, and gentrification).
Education and training of local planners are crucial aspects for
bridging the gap between the master planning and implementa-
tion phases in the Gulf Region. Although Gulf planners have tradi-
tionally sought to receive education and training in the West (e.g.,
the UK and USA), today a combination of strict visa regulations, lo-
cal investments in tertiary education, and the internationalization
of higher education (Wilkins, 2011) has allowed nationals to find
education opportunities in loco. In this sense, the recently launched
graduate programs in urban planning and design in Qatar’s na-
tional universities as well as the proliferation of urban-related pro-
grams in the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and other Gulf countries are to be
regarded, in our view, as positive steps towards a more capable, or-
ganized, participatory, and perhaps more integrated Gulf planning
system.
Although we argue for the importance of local planning edu-
cation in the Gulf with a focus on the urban challenges and is-
sues of in the region, more studies should be conducted to
highlight the pedagogic qualities of ongoing urban planning pro-
grams and their effects in practice. To date, urban planning edu-
cation is not mandatory for nationals applying for jobs in Qatar’s
MMUP. Aside from the Society-of-Engineers and the Saudi Umran
Society of Architects – and despite the rate of urbanization in the
region – no professional association of planners that could lobby
for better planning knowledge can be found in the Gulf. To our
knowledge, only Abu Dhabi has recently taken major steps to
provide opportunities for updated, urban planning knowledge
to its staff in the Abu Dhabi Urban Planning Council.10 The plan-
ning professional landscape in the Gulf continues to be dominated
by international consultants who have the ability and resources to
obtain and deliver large commissions. How locally educated plan-
ners can contribute to or even compete in this context remains
to be seen.
Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank John Lockerbie, Nadine Macauley,
and three anonymous reviewers for constructive comments on
earlier drafts. This paper was made possible by NPRP grant # 5-
074-5-015 from the Qatar National Research Fund (a member of
Qatar Foundation). The statements made herein are solely the
responsibility of the author.
10
From 2013 Abu Dhabi Urban Planning council is collaborating with the
International Society of City and Regional Planners to organize professional
workshops for its employees.
57
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