Republic of the Philippines on a matter within its jurisdiction shall, as a rule, not be reviewed by this Court . . .
SUPREME COURT the power granted to the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete and excludes
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 92191-92             July 30, 1991
ANTONIO Y. CO, petitioner,  upon a determination that the Tribunal’s decision or resolution was rendered
vs.
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE
ONG, JR., respondents.
G.R. Nos. 92202-03             July 30, 1991
SIXTO T. BALANQUIT, JR., petitioner,  pp. 785-786)
vs.
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE
ONG, JR., respondents.
Hechanova & Associates for petitioner Co.
Brillantes, Nachura, Navarro and Arcilla Law Offices for respondent Ong, Jr.
Election Law; Election Contests; Electoral Tribunals; Judgments of electoral tribunal
are beyond judicial interference save only in the exercise of the Court’s so-called
extraordinary jurisdiction.—The Constitution explicitly provides that the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET)
shall be the sole judges of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective members. (See Article VI, Section 17, Constitution)
The authority conferred upon the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete. The
use of the word sole emphasizes the exclusivity of the jurisdiction of these
Tribunals. The Supreme Court in the case of Lazatin v. HRET (168 SCRA 391
[1988]) stated that under the 1987 Constitution, the jurisdiction of the Electoral
Tribunal is original and exclusive, viz: “The use of the word `sole’ emphasizes the
exclusive character of the jurisdiction conferred (Angara v. Electoral Commission,
supra at p. 162). The exercise of power by the Electoral Commission under the
1935 Constitution has been described as `intended to be as complete and
unimpaired as if it had originally remained in the legislature.’ (id., at p. 175) Earlier
this grant of power to the legislature was characterized by Justice Malcolm as `full,
clear and complete; (Veloso v. Board of Canvassers of Leyte and Samar, 39 Phil.
886 [1919]) Under the amended 1935 Constitution, the power was unqualifiedly
reposed upon the Electoral Tribunal and it remained as full, clear and complete as
that previously granted the Legislature and the Electoral Commission, (Lachica v.
Yap, 25 SCRA 140 [1968]) The same may be said with regard to the jurisdiction of
the Electoral Tribunal under the 1987 Constitution.” (p. 401) The Court continued
further, “. . . so long as the Constitution grants the HRET the power to be the sole
judge of all contests relating to election, tives, any final action taken by the HRET
the exercise of any authority on the part of this Court that would in any wise
restrict it or curtail it or even affect the same.” (pp. 403-404) When may the Court
inquire into acts of the Electoral Tribunals under our constitutional grants of
power? In the later case of Robles v. HRET (181 SCRA 780 [1990]) the Supreme
Court stated that the judgments of the Tribunal are beyond judicial interference
save only “in the exercise of this Court’s so-called extraordinary jurisdiction, x x x
without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion or
paraphrasing Morrero, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use
by the Tribunal of its power as constitutes a denial of due process of law, or upon a
demonstration of a very clear unmitigated ERROR, manifestly constituting such
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION that there has to be a remedy for such abuse.” (at
Same; Same; Same; In the absence of a showing that the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal has committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, the Court cannot exercise its corrective power. —
The Supreme Court under the 1987 Constitution, has been given an expanded
jurisdiction, so to speak, to review the decisions of the other branches and
agencies of the government to determine whether or not they have acted within
the bounds of the Constitution. (See Article VIII, Section 1, Constitution) Yet, in the
exercise thereof, the Court is to merely check whether or not the governmental
branch or agency has gone beyond the Constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not
that it erred or has a different view. In the absence of a showing that the HRET
has committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is
no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power; it will not decide a
matter which by its nature is for the HRET alone to decide. (See Marcos v.
Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668 [1989])
Statutory Construction; The spirit and intendment of the law must prevail over the
letter thereof, especially where adherence to the latter would result in absurdity
and injustice.—It should be noted that in construing the law, the Courts are not
always to be hedged in by the literal meaning of its language. The spirit and
intendment thereof, must prevail over the letter, especially where adherence to the
latter would result in absurdity and injustice. (Casela v. Court of Appeals, 35 VOL.
199, JULY 30, 1991 SCRA 279 [1970]) A Constitutional provision should be
construed so as to give it effective operation and suppress the mischief at which it
is aimed, hence, it is the spirit of the provision which should prevail over the letter
thereof. (Jarrolt v. Mabberly, 103 U.S. 580) In the words of the Court in the case of
J.M. Tuason v. LTA (31 SCRA 413 [1970]: “To that primordial intent, all else is
subordinated. Our Constitution, any constitution is not to be construed narrowly or
pedantically, for the prescriptions therein contained, to paraphrase Justice Holmes,
are not mathematical formulas having their essence in their form but are organic
living institutions, the significance of which is vital not formal. . . . .” (p. 427)
Political Law; Citizenship; Natural-born Citizen; The exercise of the right of suffrage
and the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of
1
Philippine citizenship.—In the case of In Re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45
[1974]), the Court held that the exercise of the right of suffrage and the
participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine
citizenship. In the exact pronouncement of the Court, we held: Esteban’s exercise
of the right of suffrage when he came of age, constitutes a positive act of election
of Philippine citizenship”. (p. 52; emphasis supplied) The private respondent did
more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his life here in
the Philippines. For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who cannot be
expected to have elected citizenship as they were already citizens, we apply the In
Re Mallare rule.
Same; Same; Same; Any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of private
respondent Jose Ong, Jr. would not only have been superfluous but would also
have resulted in absurdity considering that it was the law itself that had already
elected Philippine citizenship for him.—The respondent was born in an outlying
rural town of Samar where there are no alien enclaves and no racial distinctions.
The respondent has lived the life of a Filipino since birth. His father applied for
naturalization when the child was still a small boy. He is a Roman Catholic. He has
worked for a sensitive government agency. His profession requires citizenship for
taking the examinations and getting a license. He has participated in political
exercises as a Filipino and has always considered himself a Filipino citizen. There is
nothing in the records to show that he does not embrace Philippine customs and
values, nothing to indicate any tinge of alien-ness, no acts to show that this
country is not his natural homeland. The mass of voters of Northern Samar are
fully aware of Mr. Ong’s parentage. They should know him better than any member
of this Court will ever know him. They voted by overwhelming numbers to have
him represent them in Congress. Because of his acts since childhood, they have
considered him as a Filipino. The filing of a sworn statement or formal declaration
is a requirement for those who still have to elect citizenship. For those already
Filipinos when the time to elect came up, there are acts of deliberate choice which
cannot be less binding. Entering a profession open only to Filipinos, serving in
public office where citizenship is a qualification, voting during election time,
running for public office, and other categorical acts of similar nature are
themselves formal manifestations of choice for these persons. An election of
Philippine citizenship presupposes that the person electing is an alien. Or his status
is doubtful because he is a national of two countries. There is no doubt in this case
about Mr. Ong’s being a Filipino when he turned twenty-one (21). We repeat that
any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of the private respondent would
not only have been superfluous but it would also have resulted in an absurdity.
How can a Filipino citizen elect Philippine citizenship? The respondent HRET has an
interesting view as to how Mr. Ong elected citizenship. It observed that “when
protestee was only nine years of age, his father, Jose Ong Chuan became a
naturalized Filipino. Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Act squarely applies its
benefit to him for he was then a minor residing in this country. Concededly, it was
the law itself that had already elected Philippine citizenship for protestee by
declaring him as such.” (Emphasis supplied)
Same; Same; An attack on a person’s citizenship may only be done through a
direct action for its nullity, not through a collateral approach. —The petitioners
question the citizenship of the father through a collateral approach. This can not be
done. In our jurisdiction, an attack on a person’s citizenship may only be done
through a direct action for its nullity. (See Queto v. Catolico, 31 SCRA 52 [1970])
To ask the Court to declare the grant of Philippine citizenship to Jose Ong Chuan as
null and void would run against the principle of due process. Jose Ong Chuan has
already been laid to rest. How can he be given a fair opportunity to defend himself.
A dead man cannot speak. To quote the words of the HRET: “Ong Chuan’s lips
have long been muted to perpetuity by his demise and obviously he could not rise
beyond where his mortal remains now lie to defend himself were this matter to be
made a central issue in this case.”
Same; Same; The term “residence” has been understood as synonymous with
domicile not only under the previous Constitutions but also under the 1987
Constitution.—The petitioners lose sight of the meaning of “residence” under the
Constitution. The term “residence” has been understood as synonymous with
domicile not only under the previous Constitutions but also under the 1987
Constitution. xxx The framers of the Constitution adhered to the earlier definition
given to the word “residence” which regarded it as having the same meaning as
domicile. The term “domicile” denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when
absent for business or pleasure, one intends to return. (Ong Huan Tin v. Republic,
19 SCRA 966 [1967]) The absence of a person from said permanent residence, no
matter how long, notwithstanding, it continues to be the domicile of that person.
In other words, domicile is characterized by animus revertendi. (Ujano v. Republic,
17 SCRA 147 [1966])
Same; Same; It is not required that a person should have a house in order to
establish his residence and domicile. —Even assuming that the private respondent
does not own any property in Samar, the Supreme Court in the case of De los
Reyes v. Solidum (61 Phil. 893 [1935]) held that it is not required that a person
should have a house in order to establish his residence and domicile. It is enough
that he should live in the municipality or in a rented house or in that of a friend or
relative. (Emphasis supplied)
Same; Same; Absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or
registration as a voter other than in the place where one is elected, does not
constitute loss of residence.—It has also been settled that absence from residence
to pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter other than in
the place where one is elected, does not constitute loss of residence. (Faypon v.
Quirino, 96 Phil. 294 [1954]) As previously stated, the private respondent stayed in
Manila for the purpose of finishing his studies and later to practice his profession.
There was no intention to abandon the residence in Laoang, Samar. On the
contrary, the periodical journeys made to his home province reveal that he always
had the animus revertendi.
PADILLA, J.: Dissenting
Election Law; Election Contests; Electoral Tribunals; The Court has the jurisdiction
and competence to review the questioned decision of the electoral tribunal and to
decide the present controversy involving the question of private respondent’s
2
qualifications as member of the House of Representatives. —On the question of this
Court’s jurisdiction over the present controversy, I believe that, contrary to the
respondents’ contentions, the Court has the jurisdiction and competence to review
the questioned decision of the tribunal and to decide the present controversy. xxx
The Constitution, it is true, constitutes the tribunal as the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of Members of the House of
Representatives. But as early as 1938, it was held in Morrero vs. Bocar, construing
Section 4, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution which provided that “x x x The
Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of the Members of the National Assembly,” that: “The
judgment rendered by the (electoral) commission in the exercise of such an
acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference, except, in any event, ‘upon a
clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of the power as will constitute
a denial of due process of law.’ (Barry vs. US ex rel. Cunningham, 279 US 597; 73
Law, ed., 867; Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 35 Off. Gaz., 23.)” And then under
the afore-quoted provisions of Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, this
Court is duty-bound to determine whether or not, in an actual controversy, there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. The present
controversy, it will be observed, involves more than perceived irregularities in the
conduct of a congressional election or a disputed appreciation of ballots, in which
cases, it may be contended with great legal force and persuasion that the decision
of the electoral tribunal should be final and conclusive, for it is, by constitutional
directive, made the sole judge of contests relating to such matters. The present
controversy, however, involves no less than a determination of whether the
qualifications for membership in the House of Representatives, as prescribed by
the Constitution, have been met. Indeed, this Court would be unforgivably remiss
in the performance of its duties, as mandated by the Constitution, were it to allow
a person, not a naturalborn Filipino citizen, to continue to sit as a Member of the
House of Representatives, solely because the House Electoral Tribunal has declared
him to be so. In such a case, the tribunal would have acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as to require the exercise by
this Court of its power of judicial review.
Political Law; Citizenship; Private respondent is not a natural-born Filipino citizen,
as defined in the 1987 Constitution, he having been born a Chinese citizen by
virtue of the Chinese citizenship of his father at the time of his birth. —The records
show that private respondent was born on 19 June 1948 to the spouses Jose Ong
Chuan, a Chinese citizen, and Agrifina E. Lao, a natural-born Filipino citizen, in
Laoang, Northern Samar. In other words, at birth, private respondent was a
Chinese citizen (not a natural-born Filipino citizen) because his father was then a
Chinese citizen (not a naturalized Filipino citizen). Under the 1935 Constitution
which was enforced at the time of private respondent’s birth on 19 June 1948, only
those whose fathers were citizens of the Philippines were considered Filipino
citizens. Those whose mothers were citizens of the Philippines had to elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, in order to be considered
Filipino citizens. Following the basic definition in the 1987 Constitution of a natural-
born citizen, in relation to the 1935 Constitution; private respondent is not a
natural-born Filipino citizen, having been born a Chinese citizen by virtue of the
Chinese citizenship of his father at the time of his birth, although from birth,
private respondent had the right to elect Philippine citizenship, the citizenship of
his mother, but only upon his reaching the age of majority.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside and reversal of a
decision of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).
The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen
and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes. The sole issue
before us is whether or not, in making that determination, the HRET acted with
grave abuse of discretion.
On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern
Samar was held.
Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second
legislative district of Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and
Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr.
Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second
district of Northern Samar.
The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent premised on
the following grounds:
1) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and
2) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar.
The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found for the private
respondent.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners on November 12, 1989.
This was, however, denied by the HRET in its resolution dated February 22, 1989.
Hence, these petitions for certiorari.
We treat the comments as answers and decide the issues raised in the petitions.
ON THE ISSUE OF JURISDICTION
The first question which arises refers to our jurisdiction.
The Constitution explicitly provides that the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET) and the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole judges of
all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualificationsof their respective
members. (See Article VI, Section 17, Constitution)
The authority conferred upon the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete. The
use of the word soleemphasizes the exclusivity of the jurisdiction of these
Tribunals.
The Supreme Court in the case of Lazatin v. HRET (168 SCRA 391 [1988]) stated
that under the 1987 Constitution, the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal is original
and exclusive, viz:
The use of the word "sole" emphasizes the exclusive character of the
jurisdiction conferred (Angara v. Electoral Commission, supra at p. 162).
The exercise of power by the Electoral Commission under the 1935
Constitution has been described as "intended to be as complete and
3
 unimpaired as if it had originally remained in the legislature." ( id., at p.
175) Earlier this grant of power to the legislature was characterized by
Justice Malcolm as "full, clear and complete; (Veloso v. Board of
Canvassers of Leyte and Samar, 39 Phil. 886 [1919]) Under the amended
1935 Constitution, the power was unqualifiedly reposed upon the Electoral
Tribunal and it remained as full, clear and complete as that previously
granted the Legislature and the Electoral Commission, (Lachica v. Yap, 25
SCRA 140 [1968]) The same may be said with regard to the jurisdiction of
the Electoral Tribunal under the 1987 Constitution. (p. 401)
The Court continued further, ". . . so long as the Constitution grants the HRET the
power to be the sole judge of all contests relating to election, returns and
qualifications of members of the House of Representatives, any final action taken
by the HRET on a matter within its jurisdiction shall, as a rule, not be reviewed by
this Court . . . the power granted to the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and
complete and excludes the exercise of any authority on the part of this Court that
would in any wise restrict it or curtail it or even affect the same." (pp. 403-404)
When may the Court inquire into acts of the Electoral Tribunals under our
constitutional grants of power?
In the later case of Robles v. HRET (181 SCRA 780 [1990]) the Supreme Court
stated that the judgments of the Tribunal are beyond judicial interference save only
"in the exercise of this Court's so-called extraordinary jurisdiction, . . . upon a
determination that the Tribunal's decision or resolution was rendered without or in
excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion or paraphrasing Morrero,
upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use by the Tribunal of its
power as constitutes a denial of due process of law, or upon a demonstration of a
very clear unmitigated ERROR, manifestly constituting such GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION that there has to be a remedy for such abuse." (at pp. 785-786)
In the leading case of Morrero v. Bocar (66 Phil. 429 [1938]) the Court ruled that
the power of the Electoral Commission "is beyond judicial interference except, in
any event, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of power as
will constitute a denial of due process." The Court does not venture into the
perilous area of trying to correct perceived errors of independent branches of the
Government, It comes in only when it has to vindicate a denial of due process or
correct an abuse of discretion so grave or glaring that no less than the Constitution
calls for remedial action.
The Supreme Court under the 1987 Constitution, has been given an expanded
jurisdiction, so to speak, to review the decisions of the other branches and
agencies of the government to determine whether or not they have acted within
the bounds of the Constitution. (See Article VIII, Section 1, Constitution)
Yet, in the exercise thereof, the Court is to merely check whether or not the
governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the Constitutional limits of its
jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view. In the absence of a showing
that the HRET has committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power; it
will not decide a matter which by its nature is for the HRET alone to decide.
(See Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668 [1989]) It has no power to look into
what it thinks is apparent error.
As constitutional creations invested with necessary power, the Electoral Tribunals,
although not powers in the tripartite scheme of the government, are, in the
exercise of their functions independent organs — independent of Congress and the
Supreme Court. The power granted to HRET by the Constitution is intended to be
as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature.
(Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 [1936])
In passing upon petitions, the Court with its traditional and careful regard for the
balance of powers, must permit this exclusive privilege of the Tribunals to remain
where the Sovereign authority has place it. ( See Veloso v. Boards of Canvassers of
Leyte and Samar, 39 Phil. 886 [1919])
It has been argued that under Article VI, Section 17 of the present Constitution,
the situation may exist as it exists today where there is an unhealthy one-sided
political composition of the two Electoral Tribunals. There is nothing in the
Constitution, however, that makes the HRET because of its composition any less
independent from the Court or its constitutional functions any less exclusive. The
degree of judicial intervention should not be made to depend on how many
legislative members of the HRET belong to this party or that party. The test
remains the same-manifest grave abuse of discretion.
In the case at bar, the Court finds no improvident use of power, no denial of due
process on the part of the HRET which will necessitate the exercise of the power of
judicial review by the Supreme Court.
ON THE ISSUE OF CITIZENSHIP
The records show that in the year 1895, the private respondent's grandfather, Ong
Te, arrived in the Philippines from China. Ong Te established his residence in the
municipality of Laoang, Samar on land which he bought from the fruits of hard
work.
As a resident of Laoang, Ong Te was able to obtain a certificate of residence from
the then Spanish colonial administration.
The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905.
He was brought by Ong Te to Samar in the year 1915.
Jose Ong Chuan spent his childhood in the province of Samar. In Laoang, he was
able to establish an enduring relationship with his neighbors, resulting in his easy
assimilation into the community.
As Jose Ong Chuan grew older in the rural and seaside community of Laoang, he
absorbed Filipino cultural values and practices. He was baptized into Christianity.
As the years passed, Jose Ong Chuan met a natural born-Filipino, Agripina Lao.
The two fell in love and, thereafter, got married in 1932 according to Catholic faith
and practice.
The couple bore eight children, one of whom is the private respondent who was
born in 1948.
The private respondent's father never emigrated from this country. He decided to
put up a hardware store and shared and survived the vicissitudes of life in Samar.
The business prospered. Expansion became inevitable. As a result, a branch was
set-up in Binondo, Manila. In the meantime, the father of the private respondent,
4
unsure of his legal status and in an unequivocal affirmation of where he cast his life
and family, filed with the Court of First Instance of Samar an application for
naturalization on February 15, 1954.
On April 28, 1955, the CFI of Samar, after trial, declared Jose Ong Chuan a Filipino
citizen.
On May 15, 1957, the Court of First Instance of Samar issued an order declaring
the decision of April 28, 1955 as final and executory and that Jose Ong Chuan may
already take his Oath of Allegiance.
Pursuant to said order, Jose Ong Chuan took his Oath of Allegiance;
correspondingly, a certificate of naturalization was issued to him.
At the time Jose Ong Chuan took his oath, the private respondent then a minor of
nine years was finishing his elementary education in the province of Samar. There
is nothing in the records to differentiate him from other Filipinos insofar as the
customs and practices of the local populace were concerned.
Fortunes changed. The house of the family of the private respondent in Laoang,
Samar was burned to the ground.
Undaunted by the catastrophe, the private respondent's family constructed another
one in place of their ruined house. Again, there is no showing other than that
Laoang was their abode and home.
After completing his elementary education, the private respondent, in search for
better education, went to Manila in order to acquire his secondary and college
education.
In the meantime, another misfortune was suffered by the family in 1975 when a
fire gutted their second house in Laoang, Samar. The respondent's family
constructed still another house, this time a 16-door apartment building, two doors
of which were reserved for the family.
The private respondent graduated from college, and thereafter took and passed
the CPA Board Examinations.
Since employment opportunities were better in Manila, the respondent looked for
work here. He found a job in the Central Bank of the Philippines as an examiner.
Later, however, he worked in the hardware business of his family in Manila. In
1971, his elder brother, Emil, was elected as a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional
Convention. His status as a natural born citizen was challenged. Parenthetically, the
Convention which in drafting the Constitution removed the unequal treatment given
to derived citizenship on the basis of the mother's citizenship formally and solemnly
declared Emil Ong, respondent's full brother, as a natural born Filipino. The
Constitutional Convention had to be aware of the meaning of natural born
citizenship since it was precisely amending the article on this subject.
The private respondent frequently went home to Laoang, Samar, where he grew
up and spent his childhood days.
In 1984, the private respondent married a Filipina named Desiree Lim.
For the elections of 1984 and 1986, Jose Ong, Jr. registered himself as a voter of
Laoang, Samar, and correspondingly, voted there during those elections.
The private respondent after being engaged for several years in the management
of their family business decided to be of greater service to his province and ran for
public office. Hence, when the opportunity came in 1987, he ran in the elections for
representative in the second district of Northern Samar.
Mr. Ong was overwhelmingly voted by the people of Northern Samar as their
representative in Congress. Even if the total votes of the two petitioners are
combined, Ong would still lead the two by more than 7,000 votes.
The pertinent portions of the Constitution found in Article IV read:
SECTION 1, the following are citizens of the Philippines:
1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of
the Constitution;
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
SECTION 2, Natural-born Citizens are those who are citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or
perfect their citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in
accordance with paragraph 3 hereof shall be deemed natural-born
citizens.
The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as applying not only to those
who elect Philippine citizenship after February 2, 1987 but also to those who,
having been born of Filipino mothers, elected citizenship before that date.
The provision in Paragraph 3 was intended to correct an unfair position which
discriminates against Filipino women. There is no ambiguity in the deliberations of
the Constitutional Commission, viz:
Mr. Azcuna: With respect to the provision of section 4, would this refer
only to those who elect Philippine citizenship after the effectivity of the
1973 Constitution or would it also cover those who elected it under the
1973 Constitution?
Fr. Bernas: It would apply to anybody who elected Philippine citizenship
by virtue of the provision of the 1935 Constitution whether the election
was done before or after January 17, 1973 . (Records of the Constitutional
Commission, Vol. 1, p. 228; Emphasis supplied)
x x x           x x x          x x x
Mr. Trenas: The Committee on Citizenship, Bill of Rights, Political Rights
and Obligations and Human Rights has more or less decided to extend the
interpretation of who is a natural-born citizen as provided in section 4 of
the 1973 Constitution by adding that persons who have elected Philippine
Citizenship under the 1935 Constitution shall be natural-born? Am I right
Mr. Presiding Officer?
Fr. Bernas: yes.
x x x           x x x          x x x
Mr. Nolledo: And I remember very well that in the Reverend Father
Bernas' well written book, he said that the decision was designed merely
to accommodate former delegate Ernesto Ang and that the definition on
natural-born has no retroactive effect. Now it seems that the Reverend
5
 Father Bernas is going against this intention by supporting the
amendment?
Fr. Bernas: As the Commissioner can see, there has been an evolution in
my thinking. (Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 189)
x x x           x x x          x x x
Mr. Rodrigo: But this provision becomes very important because his
election of Philippine citizenship makes him not only a Filipino citizen but a
natural-born Filipino citizen entitling him to run for Congress. . .
Fr. Bernas: Correct. We are quite aware of that and for that reason we
will leave it to the body to approve that provision of section 4.
Mr. Rodrigo: I think there is a good basis for the provision because it
strikes me as unfair that the Filipino citizen who was born a day before
January 17, 1973 cannot be a Filipino citizen or a natural-born citizen.
(Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 231)
x x x           x x x          x x x
Mr. Rodrigo: The purpose of that provision is to remedy an inequitable
situation.1avvphi1 Between 1935 and 1973 when we were under the 1935
Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers but alien mothers were natural-
born Filipinos. However, those born of Filipino mothers but alien fathers
would have to elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority; and if they do elect, they become Filipino citizens but not
natural-born Filipino citizens. (Records of the Constitutional Commission,
Vol. 1, p. 356)
The foregoing significantly reveals the intent of the framers. To make the provision
prospective from February 3, 1987 is to give a narrow interpretation resulting in an
inequitable situation. It must also be retroactive.
It should be noted that in construing the law, the Courts are not always to be
hedged in by the literal meaning of its language. The spirit and intendment thereof,
must prevail over the letter, especially where adherence to the latter would result
in absurdity and injustice. (Casela v. Court of Appeals, 35 SCRA 279 [1970])
A Constitutional provision should be construed so as to give it effective operation
and suppress the mischief at which it is aimed, hence, it is the spirit of the
provision which should prevail over the letter thereof. (Jarrolt v. Mabberly, 103 U.S.
580)
In the words of the Court in the case of J.M. Tuason v. LTA (31 SCRA 413 [1970]:
To that primordial intent, all else is subordinated. Our Constitution, any
constitution is not to be construed narrowly or pedantically for the
prescriptions therein contained, to paraphrase Justice Holmes, are not
mathematical formulas having their essence in their form but are organic
living institutions, the significance of which is vital not formal. . . . (p. 427)
The provision in question was enacted to correct the anomalous situation where
one born of a Filipino father and an alien mother was automatically granted the
status of a natural-born citizen while one born of a Filipino mother and an alien
father would still have to elect Philippine citizenship. If one so elected, he was not,
under earlier laws, conferred the status of a natural-born.
Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers and those born of
Filipino mothers with an alien father were placed on equal footing. They were both
considered as natural-born citizens.
Hence, the bestowment of the status of "natural-born" cannot be made to depend
on the fleeting accident of time or result in two kinds of citizens made up of
essentially the same similarly situated members.
It is for this reason that the amendments were enacted, that is, in order to remedy
this accidental anomaly, and, therefore, treat equally all those born before the
1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship either before or after the
effectivity of that Constitution.
The Constitutional provision in question is, therefore curative in nature. The
enactment was meant to correct the inequitable and absurd situation which then
prevailed, and thus, render those acts valid which would have been nil at the time
had it not been for the curative provisions. ( See Development Bank of the
Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 96 SCRA 342 [1980])
There is no dispute that the respondent's mother was a natural born Filipina at the
time of her marriage. Crucial to this case is the issue of whether or not the
respondent elected or chose to be a Filipino citizen.
Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution
accords natural born status to children born of Filipino mothers before January 17,
1973, if they elect citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when he
came of age is to ask for the unnatural and unnecessary. The reason is obvious. He
was already a citizen. Not only was his mother a natural born citizen but his father
had been naturalized when the respondent was only nine (9) years old. He could
not have divined when he came of age that in 1973 and 1987 the Constitution
would be amended to require him to have filed a sworn statement in 1969 electing
citizenship inspite of his already having been a citizen since 1957. In 1969, election
through a sworn statement would have been an unusual and unnecessary
procedure for one who had been a citizen since he was nine years old.
We have jurisprudence that defines "election" as both a formal and an informal
process.
In the case of In Re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]), the Court held that
the exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises
constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. In the exact
pronouncement of the Court, we held:
Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age,
constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship  (p. 52;
emphasis supplied)
The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has
established his life here in the Philippines.
For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who cannot be expected to
have elected citizenship as they were already citizens, we apply the In Re
Mallare rule.
The respondent was born in an outlying rural town of Samar where there are no
alien enclaves and no racial distinctions. The respondent has lived the life of a
6
Filipino since birth. His father applied for naturalization when the child was still a
small boy. He is a Roman Catholic. He has worked for a sensitive government
agency. His profession requires citizenship for taking the examinations and getting
a license. He has participated in political exercises as a Filipino and has always
considered himself a Filipino citizen. There is nothing in the records to show that he
does not embrace Philippine customs and values, nothing to indicate any tinge of
alien-ness no acts to show that this country is not his natural homeland. The mass
of voters of Northern Samar are frilly aware of Mr. Ong's parentage. They should
know him better than any member of this Court will ever know him. They voted by
overwhelming numbers to have him represent them in Congress. Because of his
acts since childhood, they have considered him as a Filipino.
The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirement for those who
still have to elect citizenship.For those already Filipinos  when the time to elect
came up, there are acts of deliberate choice which cannot be less binding. Entering
a profession open only to Filipinos, serving in public office where citizenship is a
qualification, voting during election time, running for public office, and other
categorical acts of similar nature are themselves formal manifestations of choice for
these persons.
An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the person electing is an
alien. Or his status is doubtful because he is a national of two countries. There is
no doubt in this case about Mr. Ong's being a Filipino when he turned twenty-one
(21).
We repeat that any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of the private
respondent would not only have been superfluous but it would also have resulted
in an absurdity. How can a Filipino citizen elect Philippine citizenship?
The respondent HRET has an interesting view as to how Mr. Ong elected
citizenship. It observed that "when protestee was only nine years of age, his
father, Jose Ong Chuan became a naturalized Filipino. Section 15 of the Revised
Naturalization Act squarely applies its benefit to him for he was then a minor
residing in this country. Concededly, it was the law itself that had already elected
Philippine citizenship for protestee by declaring him as such ." (Emphasis supplied)
The petitioners argue that the respondent's father was not, validly, a naturalized
citizen because of his premature taking of the oath of citizenship.
The Court cannot go into the collateral procedure of stripping Mr. Ong's father of
his citizenship after his death and at this very late date just so we can go after the
son.
The petitioners question the citizenship of the father through a collateral approach.
This can not be done. In our jurisdiction, an attack on a person's citizenship may
only be done through a direct action for its nullity. ( See Queto v. Catolico, 31 SCRA
52 [1970])
To ask the Court to declare the grant of Philippine citizenship to Jose Ong Chuan as
null and void would run against the principle of due process. Jose Ong Chuan has
already been laid to rest. How can he be given a fair opportunity to defend himself.
A dead man cannot speak. To quote the words of the HRET "Ong Chuan's lips have
long been muted to perpetuity by his demise and obviously he could not use
beyond where his mortal remains now lie to defend himself were this matter to be
made a central issue in this case."
The issue before us is not the nullification of the grant of citizenship to Jose Ong
Chuan. Our function is to determine whether or not the HRET committed abuse of
authority in the exercise of its powers. Moreover, the respondent traces his natural
born citizenship through his mother, not through the citizenship of his father. The
citizenship of the father is relevant only to determine whether or not the
respondent "chose" to be a Filipino when he came of age. At that time and up to
the present, both mother and father were Filipinos. Respondent Ong could not
have elected any other citizenship  unless he first formally renounced Philippine
citizenship in favor of a foreign nationality. Unlike other persons faced with a
problem of election, there was no foreign nationality of his father which he could
possibly have chosen.
There is another reason why we cannot declare the HRET as having committed
manifest grave abuse of discretion. The same issue of natural-born citizenship has
already been decided by the Constitutional Convention of 1971 and by the
Batasang Pambansa convened by authority of the Constitution drafted by that
Convention. Emil Ong, full blood brother of the respondent, was declared and
accepted as a natural born citizen by both bodies.
Assuming that our opinion is different from that of the Constitutional Convention,
the Batasang Pambansa, and the respondent HRET, such a difference could only be
characterized as error. There would be no basis to call the HRET decision so
arbitrary and whimsical as to amount to grave abuse of discretion.
What was the basis for the Constitutional Convention's declaring Emil Ong a natural
born citizen?
Under the Philippine Bill of 1902, inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish
subjects on the 11th day of April 1899 and then residing in said islands and their
children born subsequent thereto were conferred the status of a Filipino citizen.
Was the grandfather of the private respondent a Spanish subject?
Article 17 of the Civil Code of Spain enumerates those who were considered
Spanish Subjects, viz:
ARTICLE 17. The following are Spaniards:
1. Persons born in Spanish territory.
2. Children born of a Spanish father or mother, even though they were
born out of Spain.
3. Foreigners who may have obtained naturalization papers.
4. Those without such papers, who may have acquired domicile in any
town in the Monarchy. (Emphasis supplied)
The domicile of a natural person is the place of his habitual residence. This
domicile, once established is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost
until a new one is established. (Article 50, NCC; Article 40, Civil Code of Spain;
Zuellig v. Republic, 83 Phil. 768 [1949])
As earlier stated, Ong Te became a permanent resident of Laoang, Samar around
1895. Correspondingly, a certificate of residence was then issued to him by virtue
of his being a resident of Laoang, Samar. (Report of the Committee on Election
7
Protests and Credentials of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, September 7,
1972, p. 3)
The domicile that Ong Te established in 1895 continued until April 11, 1899; it
even went beyond the turn of the 19th century. It is also in this place were Ong Te
set-up his business and acquired his real property.
As concluded by the Constitutional Convention, Ong Te falls within the meaning of
sub-paragraph 4 of Article 17 of the Civil Code of Spain.
Although Ong Te made brief visits to China, he, nevertheless, always returned to
the Philippines. The fact that he died in China, during one of his visits in said
country, was of no moment. This will not change the fact that he already had his
domicile fixed in the Philippines and pursuant to the Civil Code of Spain, he had
become a Spanish subject.
If Ong Te became a Spanish subject by virtue of having established his domicile in
a town under the Monarchy of Spain, necessarily, Ong Te was also an inhabitant of
the Philippines for an inhabitant has been defined as one who has actual fixed
residence in a place; one who has a domicile in a place. (Bouvier's Law Dictionary,
Vol. II) Apriori, there can be no other logical conclusion but to educe that Ong Te
qualified as a Filipino citizen under the provisions of section 4 of the Philippine Bill
of 1902.
The HRET itself found this fact of absolute verity in concluding that the private
respondent was a natural-born Filipino.
The petitioners' sole ground in disputing this fact is that document presented to
prove it were not in compliance with the best the evidence rule. The petitioners
allege that the private respondent failed to present the original of the documentary
evidence, testimonial evidence and of the transcript of the proceedings of the body
which the aforesaid resolution of the 1971 Constitutional Convention was
predicated.
On the contrary, the documents presented by the private respondent fall under the
exceptions to the best evidence rule.
It was established in the proceedings before the HRET that the originals of the
Committee Report No. 12, the minutes of the plenary session of 1971
Constitutional Convention held on November 28, 1972 cannot be found.
This was affirmed by Atty. Ricafrente, Assistant Secretary of the 1971
Constitutional Convention; by Atty. Nolledo, Delegate to the 1971 Constitutional
Convention; and by Atty. Antonio Santos, Chief Librarian of the U.P Law Center, in
their respective testimonies given before the HRET to the effect that there is no
governmental agency which is the official custodian of the records of the 1971
Constitutional Convention. (TSN, December 12, 1988, pp. 30-31; TSN, January 17,
1989, pp. 34-35; TSN, February 1, 1989, p. 44; TSN, February 6, 1989, pp. 28-29)
The execution of the originals was established by Atty. Ricafrente, who as the
Assistant Secretary of the 1971 Constitutional Convention was the proper party to
testify to such execution. (TSN, December 12, 1989, pp. 11-24)
The inability to produce the originals before the HRET was also testified to as
aforestated by Atty. Ricafrente, Atty. Nolledo, and Atty. Santos. In proving the
inability to produce, the law does not require the degree of proof to be of sufficient
certainty; it is enough that it be shown that after a bona fide diligent search, the
same cannot be found. (see Government of P.I. v. Martinez, 44 Phil. 817 [1918])
Since the execution of the document and the inability to produce were adequately
established, the contents of the questioned documents can be proven by a copy
thereof or by the recollection of witnesses.
Moreover, to erase all doubts as to the authenticity of the documentary evidence
cited in the Committee Report, the former member of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention, Atty. Nolledo, when he was presented as a witness in the hearing of
the protest against the private respondent, categorically stated that he saw the
disputed documents presented during the hearing of the election protest against
the brother of the private respondent. (TSN, February 1, 1989, pp. 8-9)
In his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Sarmiento, a vice-president of the
Constitutional Convention, states that he was presiding officer of the plenary
session which deliberated on the report on the election protest against Delegate
Emil Ong. He cites a long list of names of delegates present. Among them are Mr.
Chief Justice Fernan, and Mr. Justice Davide, Jr. The petitioners could have
presented any one of the long list of delegates to refute Mr. Ong's having been
declared a natural-born citizen. They did not do so. Nor did they demur to the
contents of the documents presented by the private respondent. They merely relied
on the procedural objections respecting the admissibility of the evidence presented.
The Constitutional Convention was the sole judge of the qualifications of Emil Ong
to be a member of that body. The HRET by explicit mandate of the Constitution, is
the sole judge of the qualifications of Jose Ong, Jr. to be a member of Congress.
Both bodies deliberated at length on the controversies over which they were sole
judges. Decisions were arrived at only after a full presentation of all relevant
factors which the parties wished to present. Even assuming that we disagree with
their conclusions, we cannot declare their acts as committed with grave abuse of
discretion. We have to keep clear the line between error and grave abuse.
ON THE ISSUE OF RESIDENCE
The petitioners question the residence qualification of respondent Ong.
The petitioners lose sight of the meaning of "residence" under the Constitution.
The term "residence" has been understood as synonymous with domicile not only
under the previous Constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution.
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the meaning of
residence vis-a-vis the qualifications of a candidate for Congress continues to
remain the same as that of domicile, to wit:
Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the 1971
Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt to require residence in
the place not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the
elections. So my question is: What is the Committee's concept of
residence of a candidate for the legislature? Is it actual residence or is it
the concept of domicile or constructive residence?
Mr. Davide: Madame President, in so far as the regular members of the
National Assembly are concerned, the proposed section merely provides,
among others, and a resident thereof, that is, in the district, for a period
of not less than one year preceding the day of the election. This was in
8
 effect lifted from the 1973 Constitution, the interpretation given to it was
domicile. (Records of the 1987 Constitutional Convention, Vol. 11, July 22,
1986. p. 87)
x x x           x x x          x x x
Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on Section 7, page 2. I think
Commissioner Nolledo has raised the same point that "resident" has been
interpreted at times as a matter of intention rather than actual residence.
Mr. De los Reyes: Domicile.
Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentlemen consider at the proper
time to go back to actual residence rather than mere intention to reside?
Mr. De los Reyes: But we might encounter some difficulty especially
considering that a provision in the Constitution in the Article on Suffrage
says that Filipinos living abroad may vote as enacted by law. So, we have
to stick to the original concept that it should be by domicile and not
physical and actual residence. (Records of the 1987 Constitutional
Commission, Vol. 11, July 22, 1986, p. 110)
The framers of the Constitution adhered to the earlier definition given to the word
"residence" which regarded it as having the same meaning as domicile.
The term "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for
business or pleasure, one intends to return. (Ong Huan Tin v. Republic, 19 SCRA
966 [1967]) The absence of a person from said permanent residence, no matter
how long, notwithstanding, it continues to be the domicile of that person. In other
words, domicile is characterized by animus revertendi (Ujano v. Republic, 17 SCRA
147 [1966])
The domicile of origin of the private respondent, which was the domicile of his
parents, is fixed at Laoang, Samar. Contrary to the petitioners' imputation, Jose
Ong, Jr. never abandoned said domicile; it remained fixed therein even up to the
present.
The private respondent, in the proceedings before the HRET sufficiently established
that after the fire that gutted their house in 1961, another one was constructed.
Likewise, after the second fire which again destroyed their house in 1975, a
sixteen-door apartment was built by their family, two doors of which were reserved
as their family residence. (TSN, Jose Ong, Jr., November 18,1988, p. 8)
The petitioners' allegation that since the private respondent owns no property in
Laoang, Samar, he cannot, therefore, be a resident of said place is misplaced.
The properties owned by the Ong Family are in the name of the private
respondent's parents. Upon the demise of his parents, necessarily, the private
respondent, pursuant to the laws of succession, became the co-owner thereof (as a
co- heir), notwithstanding the fact that these were still in the names of his parents.
Even assuming that the private respondent does not own any property in Samar,
the Supreme Court in the case of De los Reyes v. Solidum (61 Phil. 893 [1935])
held that it is not required that a person should have a house in order to establish
his residence and domicile. It is enough that he should live in the municipality or in
a rented house or in that of a friend or relative. (Emphasis supplied)
To require the private respondent to own property in order to be eligible to run for
Congress would be tantamount to a property qualification. The Constitution only
requires that the candidate meet the age, citizenship, voting and residence
requirements. Nowhere is it required by the Constitution that the candidate should
also own property in order to be qualified to run. ( see Maquera v. Borra, 122 Phil.
412 [1965])
It has also been settled that absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a
profession or registration as a voter other than in the place where one is elected,
does not constitute loss of residence. (Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294 [1954])
As previously stated, the private respondent stayed in Manila for the purpose of
finishing his studies and later to practice his profession, There was no intention to
abandon the residence in Laoang, Samar. On the contrary, the periodical journeys
made to his home province reveal that he always had the animus revertendi.
The Philippines is made up not only of a single race; it has, rather, undergone an
interracial evolution. Throughout our history, there has been a continuing influx of
Malays, Chinese, Americans, Japanese, Spaniards and other nationalities. This
racial diversity gives strength to our country.
Many great Filipinos have not been whole-blooded nationals, if there is such a
person, for there is none. To mention a few, the great Jose Rizal was part Chinese,
the late Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee was part Chinese, and of course our own
President, Corazon Aquino is also part Chinese. Verily, some Filipinos of whom we
are proud were ethnically more Chinese than the private respondent.
Our citizens no doubt constitute the country's greatest wealth. Citizenship is a
special privilege which one must forever cherish.
However, in order to truly revere this treasure of citizenship, we do not, on the
basis of too harsh an interpretation, have to unreasonably deny it to those who
qualify to share in its richness.
Under the overly strict jurisprudence surrounding our antiquated naturalization laws
only the very affluent backed by influential patrons, who were willing to suffer the
indignities of a lengthy, sometimes humiliating, and often corrupt process of
clearances by minor bureaucrats and whose lawyers knew how to overcome so
many technical traps of the judicial process were able to acquire citizenship. It is
time for the naturalization law to be revised to enable a more positive, affirmative,
and meaningful examination of an applicant's suitability to be a Filipino. A more
humane, more indubitable and less technical approach to citizenship problems is
essential.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED. The questioned decision of the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal is AFFIRMED. Respondent Jose Ong,
Jr. is declared a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and a resident of Laoang,
Northern Samar.
SO ORDERED.
Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
Fernan, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano and Gancayco, JJ., took no part
EN BANC
9
[G.R. No. 161434. March 3, 2004]
MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR., petitioners,
vs. The COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE
(a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR.) and VICTORINO X.
FORNIER, respondents.
[G.R. No. 161634. March 3, 2004]ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ, petitioner, vs.
RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE, a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR., respondent.
[G. R. No. 161824. March 3, 2004]
VICTORINO X. FORNIER, petitioner, vs. HON. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE, ALSO KNOWN AS
FERNANDO POE JR., respondents.
DECISION
Election Law; Disqualification Cases; Jurisdiction; Decisions of the COMELEC on
disqualification cases may be reviewed by the Supreme Court per Rule 64 in an
action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court; COMELEC’s
decision on a disqualification case involving a presidential candidate could be
elevated to, and could well be taken cognizance of by, the Supreme Court. —
Decisions of the COMELEC on disqualification cases may be reviewed by the
Supreme Court per Rule 64 in an action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 7, Article IX, of the 1987 Constitution also reads
—“Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or
matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for
decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or
resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum, required by
the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself.
Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or
ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by
the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.” Additionally,
Section 1, Article VIII, of the same Constitution provides that judicial power is
vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by
law which power “includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.” It is sufficiently clear that the petition brought up in G.R. No. 161824
was aptly elevated to, and could well be taken cognizance of by, this Court. A
contrary view could be a gross denial to our people of their fundamental right to be
fully informed, and to make a proper choice, on who could or should be elected to
occupy the highest government post in the land.
Same; Same; Same; Presidential Electoral Tribunal; The omission in the 1935 and
1973 Constitution to designate any tribunal to be the sole judge of presidential and
vice-presidential contests, has constrained the Supreme Court to declare as “not
(being) justiciable” controversies and disputes involving contests on the elections,
returns and qualifications of the President or Vice President; The statutory set-up
under Republic Act No. 1793 would now be deemed revived under the present
Section 4, paragraph 7 of the 1987 Constitution. —Petitioners Tecson, et al., in G.R.
No. 161434, and Velez, in G.R. No. 161634, invoke the provisions of Article VII,
Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution in assailing the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC when it took cognizance of SPA No. 04-003 and in urging the Supreme
Court to instead take on the petitions they directly instituted before it. The
Constitutional provision cited reads: “The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be
the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.” The
provision is an innovation of the 1987 Constitution. The omission in the 1935 and
the 1973 Constitution to designate any tribunal to be the sole judge of presidential
and vice-presidential contests, has constrained this Court to declare, in Lopez vs.
Roxas, as “not (being) justiciable” controversies or disputes involving contests on
the elections, returns and qualifications of the President or Vice President. The
constitutional lapse prompted Congress, on 21 June 1957, to enact Republic Act
No. 1793, “An Act Constituting an Independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal to
Try, Hear and Decide Protests Contesting the Election of the President-Elect and
the Vice-President-Elect of the Philippines and Providing for the Manner of Hearing
the Same.” Republic Act 1793 designated the Chief Justice and the Associate
Justices of the Supreme Court to be the members of the tribunal. Although the
subsequent adoption of the parliamentary form of govern ment under the 1973
Constitution might have implicitly affected Republic Act No. 1793, the statutory set-
up, nonetheless, would now be deemed revived under the present Section 4,
paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Election Contests; Quo Warranto; Words and Phrases;
Ordinary usage would characterize a “contest” in reference to a post-election
scenario; Election contests consist of either an election protest or a quo warranto
which, although two distinct remedies, would have one objective in view, i.e., to
dislodge the winning candidate from office. —Ordinary usage would characterize a
“contest” in reference to a postelection scenario. Election contests consist of either
an election protest or a quo warranto which, although two distinct remedies, would
have one objective in view, i.e.,to dislodge the winning candidate from office. A
perusal of the phraseology in Rule 12, Rule 13, and Rule 14 of the “Rules of the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal” promulgated by the Supreme Court en banc on 18
April 1992, would support this premise.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
defined by Sec. 4, par. 7, of the 1987 Constitution, does not include cases directly
brought before it questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or
vice-presidency before the elections are held; A quo warranto proceeding is
generally defined as being an action against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or
unlawfully holds or exercises a public office. —The rules categorically speak of the
jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the “President” or “Vice-President”, of the Philippines, and not of
“candidates” for President or Vice-President. A quo warranto proceeding is
generally defined as being an action against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or
unlawfully holds or exercises a public office. In such context, the election contest
10
can only contemplate a post-election scenario. In Rule 14, only a registered
candidate who would have received either the second or third highest number of
votes could file an election protest. This rule again presupposes a post-election
scenario. It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined
by Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, would not include cases
directly brought before it questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the
presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held.
Citizenship; Words and Phrases; Perhaps, the earliest understanding of citizenship
was that given by Aristotle, who, sometime in 384 to 322 B.C., described the
“citizen” to refer to a man who shared in the administration of justice and in the
holding of an office.—Perhaps, the earliest understanding of citizenship was that
given by Aristotle, who, sometime in 384 to 322 B.C., described the “citizen” to
refer to a man who shared in the administration of justice and in the holding of an
office. Aristotle saw its significance if only to determine the constituency of the
“State”, which he described as being composed of such persons who would be
adequate in number to achieve a self-sufficient existence. The concept grew to
include one who would both govern and be governed, for which qualifications like
autonomy, judgment and loyalty could be expected. Citizenship was seen to deal
with rights and entitlements, on the one hand, and with concomitant obligations,
on the other. In its ideal setting, a citizen was active in public life and
fundamentally willing to submit his private interests to the general interest of
society.
Same; Same; The concept of citizenship had undergone changes over the
centuries, from simply being limited to civil citizenship and then expanding to
include political citizenship, social citizenship, and an ongoing and final stage of
development might well be the internationalization of citizenship. —The concept of
citizenship had undergone changes over the centuries. In the 18th century, the
concept was limited, by and large, to civil citizenship, which established the rights
necessary for individual freedom, such as rights to property, personal liberty and
justice. Its meaning expanded during the 19th century to include political
citizenship, which encompassed the right to participate in the exercise of political
power. The 20th century saw the next stage of the development of social
citizenship, which laid emphasis on the right of the citizen to economic well-being
and social security. The idea of citizenship has gained expression in the modern
welfare state as it so developed in Western Europe. An ongoing and final stage of
development, in keeping with the rapidly shrinking global village, might well be the
internationalization of citizenship.
Same; Same; There was no such term as “Philippine citizens” during the Spanish
regime but “subjects of Spain” or “Spanish subjects.” —There was no such term as
“Philippine citizens” during the Spanish regime but “subjects of Spain” or “Spanish
subjects.” In church records, the natives were called ‘indios’, denoting a low regard
for the inhabitants of the archipelago. Spanish laws on citizenship became highly
codified during the 19th century but their sheer number made it difficult to point to
one comprehensive law. Not all of these citizenship laws of Spain however, were
made to apply to the Philippine Islands except for those explicitly extended by
Royal Decrees.
Same; Same; Treaty of Paris; Upon the ratification of the Treaty of Paris, and
pending legislation by the United States Congress on the subject, the native
inhabitants of the Philippines ceased to be Spanish subjects, and although they did
not become American citizens, they, however, also ceased to be “aliens”under
American laws and were thus issued passports describing them to be citizens of
the Philippines entitled to the protection of the United States. —The year 1898 was
another turning point in Philippine history. Already in the state of decline as a
superpower, Spain was forced to so cede her sole colony in the East to an
upcoming world power, the United States. An accepted principle of international
law dictated that a change in sovereignty, while resulting in an abrogation of all
political laws then in force, would have no effect on civil laws, which would remain
virtually intact. The Treaty of Paris was entered into on 10 December 1898
between Spain and the United States. Under Article IX of the treaty, the civil rights
and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories ceded to the United
States would be determined by its Congress—x x x Upon the ratification of the
treaty, and pending legislation by the United States Congress on the subject, the
native inhabitants of the Philippines ceased to be Spanish subjects. Although they
did not become American citizens, they, however, also ceased to be “aliens” under
American laws and were thus issued passports describing them to be citizens of
the Philippines entitled to the protection of the United States.
Same; Same; Philippine Bill of 1902; The term “citizens of the Philippine Islands”
appeared for the first time in the Philippine Bill of 1902, also commonly referred to
as the Philippine Organic Act of 1902, the first comprehensive legislation of the
Congress of the United States in the Philippines. —The term “citizens of the
Philippine Islands” appeared for the first time in the Philippine Bill of 1902, also
commonly referred to as the Philippine Organic Act of 1902, the first
comprehensive legislation of the Congress of the United States on the Philippines
—“. . . . that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein,
who were Spanish subjects on the 11th day of April, 1891, and then resided in said
Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed end held to
be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the
United States, except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the
Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between
the United States and Spain, signed at Paris, December tenth eighteen hundred
and ninety eight.” Under the organic act, a “citizen of the Philippines” was one who
was an inhabitant of the Philippines, and a Spanish subject on the 11th day of April
1899. The term “inhabitant” was taken to include 1) a native-born inhabitant, 2) an
inhabitant who was a native of Peninsular Spain, and 3) an inhabitant who
obtained Spanish papers on or before 11 April 1899.
Same; Jus Soli Principle; With respect to the status of children born in the
Philippines from 11 April 1899 to 01 July 1902, during which period no citizenship
law was extant in the Philippines, weight was given to the view that the common
law principle of jus soli, otherwise known as the principle of territoriality, governed.
—Controversy arose on to the status of children born in the Philippines from 11
April 1899 to 01 July 1902, during which period no citizenship law was extant in the
Philippines. Weight was given to the view, articulated in jurisprudential writing at
11
the time, that the common law principle of jus soli, otherwise also known as the
principle of territoriality, operative in the United States and England, governed
those born in the Philippine Archipelago within that period.
Same; Philippine Bill of 1902; Jones Laws (Philippine Autonomy Act); Words and
Phrases; With the adoption of the Philippine Bill of 1902, the concept of “Philippine
citizens” had for the first time crystallized; The word “Filipino” was used by William
H. Taft, the first Civil Governor General in the Philippines when he initially made
mention of it in his slogan, “The Philippines for the Filipinos”; Under the Jones Law,
a native-born inhabitant of the Philippines was deemed a citizen of the Philippines
as of 11 April 1899 if he was (1) a subject of Spain on 11 April 1899, (2) residing in
the Philippines on said date, and, (3) since that date, not a citizen of some other
country.—With the adoption of the Philippine Bill of 1902, the concept of “Philippine
citizens” had for the first time crystallized. The word “Filipino” was used by William
H. Taft, the first Civil Governor General inthe Philippines when he initially made
mention of it in his slogan, “The Philippines for the Filipinos.” In 1916, the
Philippine Autonomy Act, also known as the Jones Law restated virtually the
provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902, as so amended by the Act of Congress in
1912—x x x Under the Jones Law, a native-born inhabitant of the Philippines was
deemed to be a citizen of the Philippines as of 11 April 1899 if he was 1) a subject
of Spain on 11 April 1899, 2) residing in the Philippines on said date, and, 3) since
that date, not a citizen of some other country.
Same; Jus Sanguinis Principle; 1935 Constitution; The 1935 Constitution brought to
an end to any such link to the common law principle of jus soli by adopting, once
and for all, jus sanguinis or blood relationship as the basis of Filipino citizenship. —
While there was, at one brief time, divergent views on whether or not jus soli was
a mode of acquiring citizenship, the 1935 Constitution brought to an end to any
such link with common law, by adopting, once and for all, jus sanguinis or blood
relationship as being the basis of Filipino citizenship.
Same; Same; 1973 and 1987 Constitutions; Seeking to correct the anomaly of
women automatically losing their Filipino citizenship and acquiring that of their
foreign husbands, resulting in discriminatory situations that effectively
incapacitated the women from transmitting their Filipino citizenship to their
legitimate children and requiring such children to still elect Filipino citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority, as well as fully cognizant of the newly found status of
Filipino women as equals to men, the framers of the 1973 Constitution crafted the
provisions of the new Constitution on citizenship to reflect such concerns. —
Subsection (4), Article III, of the 1935 Constitution, taken together with existing
civil law provisions at the time, which provided that women would automatically
lose their Filipino citizenship and acquire that of their foreign husbands, resulted in
discriminatory situations that effectively incapacitated the women from transmitting
their Filipino citizenship to their legitimate children and required illegitimate
children of Filipino mothers to still elect Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age
of majority. Seeking to correct this anomaly, as well as fully cognizant of the newly
found status of Filipino women as equals to men, the framers of the 1973
Constitution crafted the provisions of the new Constitution on citizenship to reflect
such concerns—x x x The 1987 Constitution generally adopted the provisions of the
1973 Constitution, except for subsection (3) thereof that aimed to correct the
irregular situation generated by the questionable proviso in the 1935 Constitution.
Same; Evidence; Public Documents; Birth Certificates; Marriage Certificates; Death
Certificates; Being public documents, the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou, the
marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelly, and the birth certificate of
Fernando Poe, Jr., constitute prima facie proof of their contents. —Being public
documents, the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou, the marriage certificate of Allan F.
Poe and Bessie Kelly, and the birth certificate of FPJ, constitute prima facie proof of
their contents. Section 44, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides: “ Entries in
official records. Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a
public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty
specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.” The
trustworthiness of public documents and the value given to the entries made
therein could be grounded on 1) the sense of official duty in the preparation of the
statement made, 2) the penalty which is usually affixed to a breach of that duty, 3)
the routine and disinterested origin of most such statements, and 4) the publicity
of record which makes more likely the prior exposure of such errors as might have
occurred.
Same; Parent and Child; Paternity; Filiation; Acknowledgment; Under the Civil
Code of Spain, which was in force in the Philippines from 8 December 1889 to 30
August 1950 when the Civil Code of the Philippines took effect, acknowledgment
was required to establish filiation or paternity. —Under the Civil Code of Spain,
which was in force in the Philippines from 08 December 1889 up until the day prior
to 30 August 1950 when the Civil Code of the Philippines took effect,
acknowledgment was required to establish filiation or paternity. Acknowledgment
was either judicial (compulsory) or voluntary. Judicial or compulsory
acknowledgment was possible only if done during the lifetime of the putative
parent; voluntary acknowledgment could only be had in a record of birth, a will, or
a public document. Complementary to the new code was Act No. 3753 or the Civil
Registry Law expressing in Section 5 thereof, that—“In case of an illegitimate child,
the birth certificate shall be signed and sworn to jointly by the parents of the infant
or only by the mother if the father refuses. In the latter case, it shall not be
permissible to state or reveal in the document the name of the father who refuses
to acknowledge the child, or to give therein any information by which such father
could be identified.” In order that the birth certificate could then be utilized to
prove voluntary acknowledgment of filiation or paternity, the certificate was
required to be signed or sworn to by the father. The failure of such requirement
rendered the same useless as being an authoritative document of recognition.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Legitimate and Illegitimate Children; The 1950
Civil Code categorized the acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate children
into voluntary, legal or compulsory; Unlike an action to claim legitimacy which
would last during the lifetime of the child, and might pass exceptionally to the heirs
of the child, an action to claim acknowledgment could only be brought during the
lifetime of the presumed parent. —The 1950 Civil Code categorized the
acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate children into voluntary, legal or
compulsory. Voluntary recognition was required to be expressedly made in a record
12
of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or in any authentic writing.
Legal acknowledgment took place in favor of full blood brothers and sisters of an
illegitimate child who was recognized or judicially declared as natural. Compulsory
acknowledgment could be demanded generally in cases when the child had in his
favor any evidence to prove filiation. Unlike an action to claim legitimacy which
would last during the lifetime of the child, and might pass exceptionally to the heirs
of the child, an action to claim acknowledgment, however, could only be brought
during the lifetime of the presumed parent.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; The growing trend
to liberalize the acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate children is an
attempt to break away from the traditional idea of keeping well apart legitimate
and non-legitimate relationships within the family in favor of the greater interest
and welfare of the child; There is little, if any, to indicate that the legitimate or
illegitimate civil status of the individual would also affect his political rights or, in
general, his relationship to the State; Civil law has been defined as the mass of
precepts which determine and regulate the relations of assistance, authority and
obedience among members of a family, and those which exist among members of
society for the protection of private interests. —It should be apparent that the
growing trend to liberalize the acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate
children is an attempt to break away from the traditional idea of keeping well apart
legitimate and non-legitimate relationships within the family in favor of the greater
interest and welfare of the child. The provisions are intended to merely govern the
private and personal affairs of the family. There is little, if any, to indicate that the
legitimate or illegitimate civil status of the individual would also affect his political
rights or, in general, his relationship to the State. While, indeed, provisions on
“citizenship” could be found in the Civil Code, such provisions must be taken in the
context of private relations, the domain of civil law; particularly—Civil Law is that
branch of law which has for its double purpose the organization of the family and
the regulation of property. It has thus [been] defined as the mass of precepts
which determine and regulate the relations of assistance, authority and obedience
among members of a family, and those which exist among members of a society
for the protection of private interests.”
Same; The relevance of “citizenship” or “nationality” to Civil Law is best
exemplified in Article 15 of the Civil Code. —The relevance of “citizenship” or
“nationality” to Civil Law is best exemplified in Article 15 of the Civil Code, stating
that—“Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and
legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though
living abroad”—that explains the need to incorporate in the code a reiteration of
the Constitutional provisions on citizenship. Similarly, citizenship is significant in
civil relationships found in different parts of the Civil Code, such as on successional
rights and family relations. In adoption, for instance, an adopted child would be
considered the child of his adoptive parents and accorded the same rights as their
legitimate child but such legal fiction extended only to define his rights under civil
law and not his political status.
Same; Legitimate and Illegitimate Children; Civil law provisions point to an obvious
bias against illegitimacy; The distinctions between legitimacy and illegitimacy
should remain only in the sphere of civil law and not unduly impede or impinge on
the domain of political law—the proof of filiation or paternity for purposes of
determining a child’s citizenship should be deemed independent from and not
inextricably tied up with that prescribed for civil law purposes. —Civil law provisions
point to an obvious bias against illegitimacy. This discriminatory attitude may be
traced to the Spanish family and property laws, which, while defining proprietary
and successional rights of members of the family, provided distinctions in the rights
of legitimate and illegitimate children. In the monarchial set-up of old Spain, the
distribution and inheritance of titles and wealth were strictly according to bloodlines
and the concern to keep these bloodlines uncontaminated by foreign blood was
paramount. These distinctions between legitimacy and illegitimacy were codified in
the Spanish Civil Code, and the invidious discrimination survived when the Spanish
Civil Code became the primary source of our own Civil Code. Such distinction,
however, remains and should remain only in the sphere of civil law and not unduly
impede or impinge on the domain of political law. The proof of filiation or paternity
for purposes of determining his citizenship status should thus be deemed
independent from and not inextricably tied up with that prescribed for civil law
purposes. The Civil Code or Family Code provisions on proof of filiation or paternity,
although good law, do not have preclusive effects on matters alien to personal and
family relations. The ordinary rules on evidence could well and should govern. For
instance, the matter about pedigree is not necessarily precluded from being
applicable by the Civil Code or Family Code provisions.
Same; Same; Evidence; Acts or Declarations About Pedigree; Requisites. —Section
39, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides—“ Act or Declaration about pedigree.
The act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable totestify, in respect to the
pedigree of another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in
evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between
the two persons is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word
‘pedigree’ includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates
when and the places where these facts occurred, and the names of the relatives. It
embraces also facts of family history intimately connected with pedigree.” For the
above rule to apply, it would be necessary that (a) the declarant is already dead or
unable to testify, (b) the pedigree of a person must be at issue, (c) the declarant
must be a relative of the person whose pedigree is in question, (d) declaration
must be made before the controversy has occurred, and (e) the relationship
between the declarant and the person whose pedigree is in question must be
shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.
Same; Paternity; Filiation; DNA Testing; In case proof of filiation or paternity would
be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would be difficult to obtain, DNA testing,
which examines genetic codes obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child and
any physical residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to. —In case proof
of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would be
difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from body
cells of the illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long dead parent could
be resorted to. A positive match would clear up filiation or paternity. In Tijing vs.
Court of Appeals,this Court has acknowledged the strong weight of DNA testing
13
—“Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the
modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and
expertise in using DNA test for identification and parentage testing. The University
of the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis
Laboratory has now the capability toconduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat
(STR) analysis. The analysis is based on the fact that the DNA or a child/person
has two (2) copies, one copy from the mother and the other from the father. The
DNA from the mother, the alleged father and the child are analyzed to establish
parentage. Of course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as
evidence is still open to challenge. Eventually, as the appropriate case comes,
courts should not hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was
said, that courts should apply the results of science when competently obtained in
aid of situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny progress.”
Same; Same; Legitimate and Illegitimate Children; Where jurisprudence regarded
an illegitimate child as taking after the citizenship of its mother, it did so for the
benefit of the child; Providing neither conditions nor distinctions, the 1935
Constitution states that among the citizens of the Philippines are “those whose
fathers are citizens of the Philippines.” —Where jurisprudence regarded an
illegitimate child as taking after the citizenship of its mother, it did so for the
benefit the child. It was to ensure a Filipino nationality for the illegitimate child of
an alien father in line with the assumption that the mother had custody, would
exercise parental authority and had the duty to support her illegitimate child. It
was to help the child, not to prejudice or discriminate against him. The fact of the
matter—perhaps the most significant consideration—is that the 1935 Constitution,
the fundamental law prevailing on the day, month and year of birth of respondent
FPJ, can never be more explicit than it is. Providing neither conditions nor
distinctions, the Constitution states that among the citizens of the Philippines are
“those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.” There utterly is no cogent
justification to prescribe conditions or distinctions where there clearly are none
provided.
Same; Same; Same; The 1935 Constitution confers citizenship to all persons whose
fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or
illegitimate.—In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether grave abuse of
discretion has been committed by the COMELEC, it is necessary to take on the
matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn,
depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have
himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged
illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of
his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could
only be drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old,
Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines
was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence
upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have well been
his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited
from the “en masse Filipinization” that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That
citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F.
Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime
respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers
are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or
illegitimate.
Same; Election Law; Cancellation of Certificates of Candidacy; While the totality of
the evidence may not establish conclusively that Fernando Poe, Jr. is a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his
favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in
relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code. —But while the totality of the
evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor
enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in
relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code. Petitioner has utterly failed to
substantiate his case before the Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity
given to the parties to present their position and evidence, and to prove whether or
not there has been material misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-
Marcos vs. COMELEC, must not only be material, but also deliberate and willful.
DAVIDE, JR., C.J., Separate Opinion:
Election Law; Election Contests; Presidential Electoral Tribunal; The actions
contemplated in Sec. 4, Art. VII of the Constitution are post-election remedies,
namely, regular election contests and quo warranto. —Both the petitions of Tecson
and Velez invoke the jurisdiction of this Court as provided for in the last paragraph
of Section 4 of Article VII of the Constitution, and raise the issue of the ineligibility
of a candidate for President on the ground that he is not a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines. The actions contemplated in the said provision of the Constitution
are postelection remedies, namely, regular election contests and quo warranto. The
petitioner should have, instead, resorted to pre-election remedies, such as those
prescribed in Section 68 (Disqualifications), in relation to Section 72; Section 69
(Nuisance candidates); and Section 78 (Petition to deny course to or cancel a
certificate of candidacy), in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code,
which are implemented in Rules 23, 24 and 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
These pre-election remedies or actions do not, however, fall within the original
jurisdiction of this Court.
Citizenship; For purposes of the citizenship of an illegitimate child whose father is a
Filipino and whose mother is an alien, proof of paternity or filiation is enough for
the child to follow the citizenship of his putative father. —Petitioner Fornier never
alleged that Allan Poe was not the father of FPJ. By revolving his case around the
illegitimacy of FPJ, Fornier effectively conceded paternity or filiation as a non-issue.
For purposes of the citizenship of an illegitimate child whose father is a Filipino and
whose mother is an alien, proof of paternity or filiation is enough for the child
tofollow the citizenship of his putative father, as advanced by Fr. Joaquin Bernas,
one of the amici curiae. Since paternity or filiation is in fact admitted by petitioner
Fornier, the COMELEC committed no grave abuse of discretion in holding that FPJ
14
is a Filipino citizen, pursuant to paragraph 3 of Section 1 of Article IV of the 1935
Constitution, which reads: Section 1. The following are citizens of the
Philippines: . . . (3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
PUNO, J., Separate Opinion:
Election Law; Election Contests; Presidential Electoral Tribunal; Words and
Phrases; The word “contest” in Art. VII, Section 4, par. 7 of the Constitution means
that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court can only be invoked after the election
and proclamation of a President or Vice President—there can be no “contest”
before a winner is proclaimed.—The Court is unanimous on the issue of
jurisdiction. It has no jurisdiction on the Tecson and Valdez petitions. Petitioners
cannot invoke Article VII, Section 4, par. 7 of the Constitution which provides: The
Supreme Court, sitting en banc shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of the President or Vice President and may
promulgate its rules for the purpose. The word “contest” in the provision means
that the jurisdiction of this Court can only be invoked after the election and
proclamation of a President or Vice President. There can be no “contest” before a
winner is proclaimed.
Same; Certiorari; The Supreme Court can only reverse or change the COMELEC
decision on the ground that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion. —
We start with the elementary proposition that the certiorari power of this Court to
review decisions of the COMELEC is a limited one. This Court can only reverse or
change the COMELEC decision on the ground that the COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion has a well defined meaning in our
jurisprudence. It means despotic, arbitrary or capricious. A decision supported by
substantial evidence is not despotic, arbitrary or capricious. Neither is a decision
interpreting a novel or difficult question of law with logical reasons. A mere
disagreement with COMELEC on the weight it gave to certain evidence or on its
interpretation of some difficult provisions of law is no basis to strike down the
COMELEC decision as despotic, arbitrary or whimsical. More so when the case
involves election law where the expertise of COMELEC ought to be conceded.
Same; Disqualification Cases; Cancellation of Certificates of Candidacy; In order
that a certificate of candidacy may be denied due course or cancelled on the
ground of material misrepresentation, the misrepresentation must not only be
material but also deliberate and willful. —To stress again, the petition of Fornier
was treated by the COMELEC as a petition to deny due course or cancel the
certificate of candidacy of respondent Poe on the ground of material
misrepresentation under B.P. Blg. 881, Section 78. Allegedly, respondent Poe
misrepresented himself as a natural-born Filipino citizen. In Romualdez-Marcos vs.
COMELEC we held that the misrepresentation must not only be material but also
deliberate and willfull. Petitioner, therefore, has the burden to prove by substantial
evidence the following facts: (1) that respondent Poe made a misrepresentation in
his Certificate of Candidacy; (2) that the misrepresentation is material to the
position of which he is a candidate; and (3) that the material misrepresentation
was made deliberately and willfully.
Same; Same; Same; Administrative Law; Evidence; The COMELEC is a quasi-
judicial body and hence is not bound by the technical rules of evidence—it can
accept evidence which cannot be admitted in a judicial proceeding where the rules
of court on evidence are strictly observed. —These sworn statements were
submitted to the COMELEC en banc by the respondent Poe. Instead of traversing
them, petitioner merely contended that they should not be considered on the
technical grounds that they were not formally offered in evidence before the
COMELEC and that they cannot be the subject of judicial notice. Petitioner,
however, overlooks that the COMELEC is a quasi-judicial body and hence is not
bound by the technical rules of evidence. It can accept evidence which cannot be
admitted in a judicial proceeding where the rules of court on evidence are strictly
observed. It can accord weight to such evidence depending on its trustworthiness.
In any event, petitioner cannot complain they are hearsay for he was given an
opportunity to challenge the credibility of the witnesses who executed the
foregoing sworn statements.
Same; Same; Same; Burden of Proof; For failure of petitioner Fornier to discharge
the burden of proof, respondent Poe is entitled to an outright dismissal of the
petition—Poe need not present any contrary evidence for the burden of proof has
not shifted to him.—These are all the evidence presented by the petitioner. Even a
sweep eye contact both with these evidence will show that petitioner failed
todischarge the burden of proving that respondent Poe is not a natural-born
citizen. Petitioner was more dismal in trying to prove that respondent Poe
willfullyand deliberately misrepresented himself as a natural-born citizen. For one,
the Manapat evidence appears to have been manufactured evidence. For another,
these and the other evidence are irrelevant evidence and there is no proof that
they ever crossed the attention of respondent Poe. On the other hand, the
evidence unerringly show that respondent Poe, from the time of his involuntary
birth here, has always conducted himself as a Filipino. He is a registered voter, he
owns land, he is married to a Filipina, he carries a Filipino passport—he has always
lived the life of a Filipino (Exhibits “16,” “17” to “19”). Thus, there is no iota of
doubt that petitioner miserably failed to discharge his burden of proving that
respondent Poe deliberately misrepresented that he is a natural-born citizen. For
failure of petitioner to discharge the burden of proof, respondent Poe is entitled to
an outright dismissal of the Fornier petition. Respondent Poe need not present any
contrary evidence for the burden of proof has not shifted to him. Prescinding from
these premises, this Court cannot hold that the COMELEC committed grave abuse
of discretion when it ruled that no substantial evidence was offered by petitioner to
disqualify respondent Poe.
Same; Same; Same; The Court must be above politics for in the temples of justice,
we do not follow any political god. —In light of these erudite opinions of our amici
curiae, it is daylight clear that petitioner Fornier is not only wrong with his facts but
also wrong with his law. Considering that petitioner is wrong both with his facts
and the law, the Court has no option but to dismiss the petition at bar which
espouses nothing but errors. This Court will be compounding the wrongs
committed by petitioner Fornier with another wrong if it remands the petition at
bar to the COMELEC. A remand means a new round of litigation in the COMELEC
when its proceedings have long been closed and terminated. Remand means the
petitioner will be gifted with another chance to prove facts which he have failed to
15
prove before. Remand means the petitioner will be given the extra-ordinary
privilege of correcting his erroneous understanding of the law on who are natural-
born Filipino citizens. These are favors which cannot be extended to a litigant
without shattering the Court’s stance of political neutrality. The Court must be
above politics for in the temples of justice, we do not follow any political god.
Same; Same; Same; Election Contests; Quo Warranto; Citizenship; The complex
issue of natural-born citizenship may not be finally litigated and can still be raised
in an appropriate proceeding such as a quo warranto proceeding after election—
the citizenship issue in a quo warranto proceeding will be determined in full length
proceedings.—The Fornier petition was treated by the COMELEC as a petition to
deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy under B.P. Blg. 881, Section
78. The principal issue on a Section 78 petition is whether the respondent
deliberately made a material misrepresentation in his Certificate of Candidacy. In
the particular petition at bar, the issue is whether respondent Poe deliberately
misrepresented that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen. The issue of whether
respondent Poe is in truth a natural-born citizen is considered only because it is
necessary to determine the deliberateness and the willfulness of the material
misrepresentation. The proceedings are summary in character for the central issue
to be resolved is the deliberateness of the material misrepresentation, as the issue
of natural-born citizenship is a mere incident. In fine, the complex issue of natural-
born citizenship may not be finally litigated and can still be raised in an appropriate
proceeding such as a quo warranto proceeding after election. The citizenship issue
in a quo warranto proceeding will be determined in full-length proceedings.
Same; Same; Same; Separation of Powers; The Supreme Court cannot change the
nature of a Section 78 proceeding without usurping legislative power. —The remand
of the case to the COMELEC will change the character of a Section 78 proceeding.
The citizenship ofrespondent Poe will no longer be inquired into as a mere incident
necessary to determine whether he deliberately made a material misrepresentation
that he is a natural-born citizen. It will now be determined as if it is the main issue
in a Section 78 proceeding. This Court cannot change the nature of a Section 78
proceeding without usurping legislative power. It is Congress by law that defined
the nature of a Section 78 proceeding and it is only Congress that can change it by
another law. We cannot engage in judicial legislation.
Same; Same; Same; Remand of Cases; Due Process; The COMELEC is composed
of seven commissioners all of whom must be independent, and unbiased—the right
to due process is the right to be heard by seven unbiased COMELEC
commissioners.—There is a more compelling reason why the petition, at bar should
not be remanded to the COMELEC for relitigation. The COMELEC that will resolve
the issue of whether respondent Poe is a natural-born Filipino has ceased to be an
impartial tribunal. Three of its members, Commissioners Tuazon, Barcelona and
Garcellano, submitted separate Comments to this Court expressing the firm view
that respondent Poe is not a natural-born Filipino. Their views are contrary to the
decision of the COMELEC under review by this Court. It is improper enough for
individual commissioners to assail the decision of the COMELEC of which they are
members. It is worse in the case of Commissioners Barcelona and Garcellano, who
are not even sitting commissioners when the COMELEC promulgated its decision
under review. This is plain and simple prejudgment and it is not even disguised
prejudgment that needs to be unmasked . The COMELEC is composed of seven
commissioners all of whom must be independent, and unbiased. The right to due
process of respondent Poe is the right to be heard by sevenunbiased COMELEC
commissioners—not 1, not 2, not 3, not 4, but by 7unbiased members. We do not
have such a COMELEC.
Same; Equal Protection Clause; The right to run for public office includes the right
to equal chance to compete—any failure to equalize the chances of all candidates
is to insure the defeat of the disfavored. —It cannot be gainsaid that any doubt on
the qualification of respondent Poe to run as President is prejudicial to his
presidential bid and favorable to his political opponents. The right to run for a
public office includes the right to equal chance to compete. The right to run is
empty if the chance to win is diminished or denied a candidate. This chance to win
may amount to a mere chimera if the disqualification of respondent Poe will be left
hanging in the air for a long time. It is the solemn duty of this Court to equalize
the chances of winning of all candidates to a public office. Any failure to equalize
the chances of all candidates is to insure the defeat of the disfavored.
Citizenship; Parent and Child; Paternity; Filiation; Jus Sanguinis Principle; Proof
that Allan F. Poe, a Filipino citizen, is the father of Fernando Poe, Jr. is proof that
the blood of Allan F. Poe flows in the veins of FPJ—no other proof is required for
the principle of jus sanguinis to apply, no need for other proofs such as proofs of
acknowledgment, for such proofs are only used in civil law for the purpose of
establishing the legitimation of illegitimate children. —We follow the principle of jus
sanguinis, the rule of blood relationship. Proof that Allan F. Poe, a Filipino citizen, is
the father of respondent Poe is proof that the blood of Allan F. Poe flows in the
veins of respondent Poe. No other proof is required for the principle of jus
sanguinis to apply. There is no need for other proofs such as proofs of
acknowledgment, for such proofs are only used in civil law for the purpose of
establishing the legitimation of illegitimate children. Our Constitutions from 1935
merely state—“those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.” The ineluctable
conclusion is that the only proof required for the principle of jus sanguinis to
operate is filiation, i.e.,that one’s father is a citizen of the Philippines. No other kind
of proof is required. In fine, the quantity and quality of proof or the standard of
proof is provided by the Constitution itself. We cannot alter this standard by
suggesting either a strict or liberal approach.
Same; Same; Same; Legitimate and Illegitimate Children; Convention on the Rights
of the Child; A milestone treaty, the Convention on the Rights of the Child
abolished all discriminations against children including discriminations on account
of “birth or other status.” —The Convention on the Rights of the Child was adopted
by the General Assembly of the United Nations on November 20, 1989. The
Philippines was the 31st state to ratify the Convention in July 1990 by virtue of
Senate Resolution 109. The Convention entered into force on September 2, 1990.
A milestone treaty, it abolished all discriminations against children including
discriminations on account of “birth or other status.” x x x The Convention protects
in the most comprehensive way all rights of children: political rights, civil rights,
social rights, economic rights and cultural rights. It adopted the principle of
16
interdependence and indivisibility of children’s rights. A violation of one right is
considered a violation of the other rights. It also embraced the rule that all actions
of a State concerning the child should consider the “best interests” of the child.
Same; Same; Same; Same; International Law; Pacta Sunct Servanda; We shall be
violating the Convention on the Rights of the Child if we disqualify FPJ just because
he happened to be an illegitimate child—it is our bounden duty to comply with our
treaty obligation pursuant to the principle of pacta sunct servanda. —Pursuant to
Article VII, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution, this Convention on the Rights of
the child became valid and effective on us in July 1990 upon concurrence by the
Senate. We shall be violating the Convention if we disqualify respondent Poe just
because he happened to be an illegitimate child. It is our bounden duty to comply
with our treaty obligation pursuant to the principle of pacta sunct servanda.
Same; Same; Same; Same; To disqualify FPJ due to his illegitimacy is against the
trend in civil law towards equalizing the civil rights of an illegitimate child with that
of a legitimate child.—Moreover to disqualify respondent Poe due to his illegitimacy
is against the trend in civil law towards equalizing the civil rights of an illegitimate
child with that of a legitimate child. Called originally as nullius filius or no one’s
child, an illegitimate child started without any birthright of significance. The
passage of time, however, brought about the enlightenment that an illegitimate
should not be punished for the illicit liaison of his parents of which he played no
part. No less than our Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr ., then a Commissioner of
the Constitutional Commission, proposed the adoption of the following radical
provision in the 1987 Constitution, viz.: “All children regardless of filiations shall
enjoy thesame social protection.”
Election Law; Political Questions; On political questions, the Supreme Court may
err but the sovereign people will not—to be sure, the Constitution did not grant to
the unelected members of this Court the right to elect in behalf of the people. —
Whether respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. is qualified to run for President involves a
constitutional issue but its political tone is no less dominant. The Court is split down
the middle on the citizenship of respondent Poe, an issue of first impression made
more difficult by the interplay of national and international law. Given the
indecisiveness of the votes of the members of this Court, the better policy
approach is to let the people decide who will be the next President. For on political
questions, this Court may err but the sovereign people will not. To be sure, the
Constitution did not grant to the unelected members of this Court the right to elect
in behalf of the people.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J., Concurring Opinion:
Election Law; Suffrage; Judicial Review; Political Questions; While the campaign for
the Presidency is on, the Supreme Court may not exercise its “judicial power” to
disqualify a candidate.—I submit that while the campaign for the Presidency is on,
this Court may not exercise its “judicial power” to disqualify a candidate. That
would definitely wreck the constitutional right of the people to choose their
candidate. Only after the election is over and a winner is proclaimed and the result
of the election is contested, may this Court participate and decide the contest. How
is the President elected? Only by “direct vote of the people.” He shall not be
chosen by the incumbent President. He shall not be elected by Congress nor by the
Commission on Elections. And neither by this Court. Only by “direct vote of the
people.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Constitution does not allow the intervention of the
Supreme Court to intrude into the right of the voters to elect by “direct vote” the
President by removing Fernando Poe, Jr. from among those whom they may vote
for President, thereby constricting or limiting the “candidates,” and consequently,
the right of the people to vote (or not to vote) for FPJ. —Petitioner Fornier would
have this Court, in the exercise of its “judicial power,” intrude into the right of the
voters to elect by “direct vote” the President by removing respondent Fernando
Poe, Jr. from among those whom they may vote for President, thereby constricting
or limiting the “candidates,” and consequently, the right of the people to vote (or
not to vote) for respondent Poe. The Constitution does not allow such intervention.
Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, a retired member of this Court, in his Separate
Opinion in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC,said, “In my view, the issue in this
case is whether the Commission on Elections has the power to disqualify
candidates on the ground that they lack eligibility for the office to which they seek
to be elected. I think that it has none and that the qualifications of candidates may
be questioned only in the event they are elected, by filing a petition for quo
warranto or an election protest in the appropriate forum.” The assailed ruling of
the COMELEC dismissing Fornier’s petition is consistent with the above view.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Intrusion into a campaign for President, and worse, in
the right of the people to choose their candidate, is an intrusion into their vested
right to elect by “direct vote” the President. —What is at stake is not just the
candidacy of respondent Poe or the right of the “masses” to vote for him. Equally
at stake is the credibility of this Court. It should not enter the “political thicket.”
Intrusion into a campaign for President, and worse, in the right of the people to
choose their candidate, is an intrusion into their vested right to elect by “direct
vote” the President.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The right to choose is the single factor that controls
the ambitions of those who would impose—through force or stealth—their will on
the majority of citizens.—Let it not be forgotten that the historic core of our
democratic system is political liberty, which is the right and opportunity to choose
those who will lead the governed with their consent. This right to choose cannot be
subtly interfered with through the elimination of the electoral choice. The present
bid to disqualify respondent Poe from the presidential race is a clear attempt to
eliminate him as one of the choices. This Court should resist such attempt. The
right to choose is the single factor that controls the ambitions of those who would
impose—through force or stealth—their will on the majority of citizens. We should
not only welcome electoral competition, we should cherish it. Disqualifying a
candidate, particularly the popular one, on the basis of doubtful claims does not
result to a genuine, free and fair election. It results to violence. In some countries,
incumbents have manipulated every resource at their disposal to eliminate
electoral choice. The result is a frustrated and angry public; a public that has no
place to express this anger because the electoral system is rigged to guarantee the
17
re-election of the incumbents in office. We have seen Edsa I and Edsa II, thus, we
know that when democracy operates as intended, an aroused public can replace
those who govern in a manner beyond the parameters established by public
consent.
Same; The Supreme Court, as the last guardian of democracy, has the duty to
protect the right of our nation to a genuine, free and fair election. —This Court, as
the last guardian of democracy, has the duty to protect the right of our nation to a
genuine, free and fair election. Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights guarantees that “every citizen shall have the right and the
opportunity . . .to vote and be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be
by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the
free expression of the will of the electors. ”There can be no genuine, free and fair
election when the people’s right to choose, is manipulated or eliminated. Political
liberty cannot be subverted to the personal ambitions of some politicians. This
Court should take an active stance in crushing the devious ploy, for in the last
analysis, its handling of the electoral issues is the fundamental measure of the
present government’s credibility.
Same; Disqualification Cases; Cancellation of Certificates of Candidacy; Burden of
Proof; He who asserts, not he who denies, must prove—petitioner has the burden
of establishing his allegations of respondent’s material misrepresentation in his
Certificate of Candidacy.—It bears stressing that petitioner has the burden of
establishing his allegations of respondent’s material misrepresentation in his
Certificate of Candidacy. Ei incumbit probation qui dicit, non que negat, otherwise
stated, “he who asserts, not he who denies, must prove.”What I observe from his
allegations is a misconception as to whom the burden of proof lies.
Same; Statutory Construction; Legitimate and Illegitimate Children; The
ascertainment of the meaning of the provision of the Constitution begins with the
language of the document itself, the words to be understood, as much as possible,
in the sense they have in common use and given their ordinary meaning—the
Constitution is not primarily a lawyer’s document but essentially that of the people;
As Sec. 3, Art. IV of the 1935 Constitution does not distinguish between a
legitimate child and an illegitimate child of a Filipino father, we should not make a
distinction.—The ascertainment of the meaning of the provision of the Constitution
begins with the language of the document itself. The words of the Constitution
should as much as possible be understood in the sense they have in common use
and given their ordinary meaning. The reason for this is because the Constitution is
not primarily a lawyer’s document but essentially that of the people, in whose
consciousness is should even be present as an important condition for the rule of
law to prevail. Section 3, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution is very clear. As the
provision does not distinguish between a legitimate child and an illegitimate child
of a Filipino father, we should not make a distinction.
CARPIO, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Election Law; Disqualification Cases; Jurisdiction; The conduct of an election
necessarily includes the initial determination of who are qualified under existing
laws to run for public office in an election. —The Comelec has jurisdiction to
determine initially the qualifications of all candidates. Under Section 2(1), Article
IX-C of the Constitution, the Comelec has the power and function to “[E]nforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election .” The
initial determination of who are qualified to file certificates of candidacies with the
Comelec clearly falls within this all-encompassing constitutional mandate of the
Comelec. The conduct of an election necessarily includes the initial determination
of who are qualified under existing laws to run for public office in an election.
Otherwise, the Comelec’s certified list of candidates will be cluttered with
unqualified candidates making the conduct of elections unmanageable. For this
reason, the Comelec weeds out every presidential election dozens of candidates for
president who are deemed nuisance candidates by the Comelec.
Same; Same; Same; The power to decide “all questions affecting elections”
necessarily includes the power to decide whether a candidate possesses the
qualifications required by law for election to public office. —Section 2(3), Article IX-
C of the Constitution also empowers the Comelec to “[D]ecide, except those
involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections x x x.” The power to
decide “all questions affecting elections” necessarily includes the power to decide
whether a candidate possesses the qualifications required by law for election to
public office. This broad constitutional power and function vested in the Comelec is
designed precisely to avoid any situation where a dispute affecting elections is left
without any legal, remedy. If one who is obviously not a natural-born Philippine
citizen, like Arnold Schwarzenneger, runs for President, the Comelec is certainly not
powerless to cancel the certificate of candidacy of such candidate. There is no need
to wait until after the elections before such candidate may be disqualified.
Same; Same; The Comelec En Banc allowed a candidate for President to run in the
coming elections without being convinced that the candidate is a natural-born
Philippine citizen.—However, the Comelec En Banc, in its scanty resolution, failed
to state the factual bases of its ruling. The Comelec En Banc also failed to rule
conclusively on the issue presented—whether FPJ is a natural-born Philippine
citizen. The Comelec En Banc affirmed the First Division ruling that “[W]e feel we
are not at liberty to finally declare whether or not the respondent is a natural-born
citizen.” In short, the Comelec En Banc allowed a candidate for President to run in
the coming elections without being convinced that the candidate is a natural-born
Philippine citizen. Clearly, the Comelec En Banc acted with grave abuse of
discretion. Under Section 1, Article VIII, as well as Section 5, Article VIII, of the
Constitution, the Court has jurisdiction to hear and decide the issue in a petition for
certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65.
Same; Same; Presidential Electoral Tribunal; To hold that the Court acquires
jurisdiction to determine the qualification of a candidate for President only after the
elections would lead to an absurd situation—the issue of whether a candidate for
President is a natural-born Philippine citizen must be decided before the election. —
To hold that the Court acquires jurisdiction to determine the qualification of a
candidate for President only after the elections would lead to an absurd situation.
The Court would have to wait for an alien to be elected on election day before he
could be disqualified to run for President. If the case is not decided immediately
after the election, an alien who wins the election may even assume office as
President before he is finally disqualified. Certainly, this is not what the Constitution
18
says when it provides that “ [N]o person may be elected President unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines .” The clear and specific language of the
Constitution prohibits the election of one who is not a natural-born citizen. Thus,
the issue of whether a candidate for President is a natural-born Philippine citizen
must be decided before the election.
Citizenship; Natural-Born Citizens; A person’s citizenship at the time of his birth
depends on the Constitution and statutes in force at the time of his birth—any
subsequent legislation cannot change the citizenship at birth of a person born in
1939 because such legislation would violate the constitutional definition of a
natural-born citizen as one who is a Philippine citizen from birth. —Since FPJ was
born on 20 August 1939, his citizenship at the time of his birth depends on the
Constitution and statutes in force at the time of his birth. FPJ’s citizenship at the
time of his birth in 1939, applying the laws in force in 1939, determines whether
he is a natural-born Philippine citizen. Natural-born Philippine citizens are “those
who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship.” If a person has to perform an act,
such as proving in an administrative or judicial proceeding, that an event
subsequent to his birth transpired thus entitling him to Philippine citizenship, such
person is not a natural born citizen. The 1935 Constitution and the Spanish Civil
Code, the laws in force in 1939, are the governing laws that determine whether a
person born in 1939 is a Philippine citizen at the time of his birth in 1939. Any
subsequent legislation cannot change the citizenship at birth of a person born in
1939 because such legislation would violate the constitutional definition of a
natural-born citizen as one who is a Philippine citizen from birth. In short, one who
is not a Philippine citizen at birth in 1939 cannot be declared by subsequent
legislation a natural-born citizen.
Same; Parent and Child; Legitimate and Illegitimate Children; Acknowledgment;
Statutory provisions on retroactivity of acknowledgment cannot be given effect
because they would be contrary to the constitutional definition of natural-born
citizens as those who are Philippine citizens at birth without having to perform any
act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. —If the Filipino father
acknowledges the child after birth, the child is a Philippine citizen as of the time of
the acknowledgment. In this case, the child does not possess all the qualifications
to be a Philippine citizen at birth because an act—the acknowledgement of the
Filipino father—is required for the child to acquire or perfect his Philippine
citizenship. Statutory provisions on retroactivity of acknowledgment cannot be
given effect because they would be contrary to the constitutional definition of
natural-born citizens as those who are Philippine citizens at birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship.
Same; Same; Same; If the illegitimacy of a child is established, there is no
presumption that the child has the blood of any man who is supposed to be the
father—there is only a conclusive presumption that the child has the blood of the
mother.—If the illegitimacy of a child is established, there is no presumption that
the child has the blood of any man who is supposed to be the father. There is only
a conclusive presumption that the child has the blood of the mother. If an
illegitimate child claims to have the blood of a man who is supposed to be the
child’s father, such blood relation must be established in accordance with proof of
filiation as required by law.
Same; Same; Same; Burden of Proof; Where the illegitimate child of an alien
mother claims to follow the citizenship of the putative father, the burden is on the
illegitimate child to establish a blood relation to the putative Filipino father since
there is no presumption that an illegitimate child has the blood of the putative
father; Citizenship, being a matter of public and State interest, cannot be conferred
on an illegitimate child of an alien mother on the mere say so of the putative
Filipino father.—Where the illegitimate child of an alien mother claims to follow the
citizenship of the putative father, the burden is on the illegitimate child to establish
a blood relation to the putative Filipino father since there is no presumption that an
illegitimate child has the blood of the putative father. Even if the putative father
admits paternity after the birth of the illegitimate child, there must be an
administrative or judicial approval that such blood relation exists upon proof of
paternity as required by law. Citizenship, being a matter of public and State
interest, cannot be conferred on an illegitimate child of an alien mother on the
mere say so of the putative Filipino father. The State has a right to examine the
veracity of the claim of paternity. Otherwise, the grant of Philippine citizenship to
an illegitimate child of an alien mother is left to the sole discretion of the putative
Filipino father. For example, a Philippine citizen of Chinese descent can simply
claim that he has several illegitimate children in China. The State cannot be
required to grant Philippine passports to these supposed illegitimate children born
in China of Chinese mothers just because the putative Filipino father acknowledges
paternity of these illegitimate children. There must be either an administrative or
judicial determination that the claim of the putative Filipino father is true.
Same; Same; Same; Natural-Born Citizens; The rationale behind requiring that only
natural-born citizens may hold certain high public offices is to ensure that the
holders of these high public offices grew up knowing they were at birth citizens of
the Philippines; The constitutional definition of a natural-born Philippine citizen
would lose its meaning and efficacy if one who was at birth recognized by law as
an alien were declared forty years later a natural-born Philippine citizen just
because his alleged Filipino father subsequently admitted his paternity. —The
rationale behind requiring that only natural-born citizens may hold certain high
public offices is to insure that the holders of these high public offices grew up
knowing they were at birth citizens of the Philippines . In their formative years they
knew they owed from birth their allegiance to the Philippines. In case any other
country claims their allegiance, they would be faithful and. loyal to the Philippines
of which they were citizens from birth. This is particularly true to the President who
is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. The President of the Philippines
must owe, from birth, allegiance to the Philippines and must have grown up
knowing that he was a citizen of the Philippines at birth. The constitutional
definition of a natural-born Philippine citizen would lose its meaning and efficacy if
one who was at birth recognized by law as an alien were declared forty years later
a natural-born Philippine citizen just because his alleged Filipino father
subsequently admitted his paternity.
19
Same; Same; Same; Same; Acknowledgment; An acknowledgment executed after
birth does not make one a citizen at birth but a citizen from the time of such
acknowledgment since the acknowledgment is an act done after birth to acquire or
perfect Philippine citizenship.—To establish his Philippine citizenship at birth, FPJ
must present either an acknowledgement in a record of birth, or an
acknowledgment in some other public document executed at the time of his birth.
An acknowledgment executed after birth does not make one a citizen at birth but a
citizen from the time of such acknowledgment since the acknowledgment is an act
done after birth to acquire or perfect Philippine citizenship.
Same; Private party litigants cannot stipulate on the Philippine citizenship of a
person because citizenship is not a private right or property, but a matter of public
and State interest.—Private party litigants cannot stipulate on the Philippine
citizenship of a person because citizenship is not a private right or property, but a
matter of public and State interest. Even if petitioner Fornier admits that FPJ,
although illegitimate, is the son of Allan F. Poe, such admission cannot bind the
State for the purpose of conferring on FPJ the status of a natural-born Philippine
citizen or even of a naturalized citizen. Certainly, the Court will not recognize a
person as a natural-born Philippine citizen just because the private party litigants
have admitted or stipulated on such a status. In the present case, the Solicitor
General, as representative of the Government, is strongly disputing the status of
FPJ as a natural-born Philippine citizen.
Same; Parent and Child; Legitimation; Under Article 123 of the Spanish Civil Code,
legitimation took effect as of the date of marriage—there was no retroactivity of
the effects of legitimation on the rights of the legitimated child. —Under Article 123
of the Spanish Civil Code, legitimation took effect as of the date of marriage. There
was no retroactivity of the effects of legitimation on the rights of the legitimated
child. Thus, a legitimated child acquired the rights of a legitimate child only as of
the date of marriage of the natural parents. Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were
married on 16 September 1940 while FPJ was born more than one year earlier on
20 August 1939. Assuming that Allan F. Poe was FPJ’s natural father, the effects of
legitimation did not retroact to the birth of FPJ on 20 August 1939. Besides,
legitimation vests only civil, not political rights, to the legitimated child.
Same; Same; Convention on the Rights of the Child; Obviously, FPJ cannot invoke
the Convention on the Rights of the Child since he is not a child as defined in the
Convention, and he was born half a century before the Convention came into
existence.—The Philippines signed the Convention on the Rights of the Child on 26
January 1990 and ratified the same on 21 August 1990. The Convention defines a
child to mean “every human being below the age of eighteen years unless, under
the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier.” Obviously, FPJ cannot
invoke the Convention since he is not a child as defined in the Convention, and he
was born half a century before the Convention came into existence. FPJ’s
citizenship at birth in 1939 could not in any way be affected by the Convention
which entered into force only on 2 September 1990.
Same; Same; Same; Natural-Born Citizens; The Convention cannot amend the
definition in the Constitution of who are natural-born citizens. —The Convention has
the status of a municipal law and its ratification by the Philippines could not have
amended the express requirement in the Constitution that only natural-born
citizens of Philippines are qualified to be President. While the Constitution
apparently favors natural-born citizens over those who are not, that is the explicit
requirement of the Constitution which neither the Executive Department nor the
Legislature, in ratifying a treaty, could amend. In short, the Convention cannot
amend the definition in the Constitution that natural-born citizens are “those who
are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Convention does not guarantee a child a
citizenship at birth, but merely “the right to acquire a nationality” in accordance
with municipal law.—In any event, the Convention guarantees a child “the right to
acquire a nationality,” and requires States Parties to “ensure the implementation”
of this right, “in particular where the child would otherwise be stateless.” Thus, as
far as nationality or citizenship is concerned, the Conventionguarantees the right of
the child to acquire a nationality so that he may not be stateless . The Convention
does not guarantee a child a citizenship at birth, but merely “the right to acquire a
nationality” in accordance with municipal law. When FPJ was born in 1939, he was
apparently under United States law an American citizen at birth. After his birth FPJ
also had the right to acquire Philippine citizenship by proving his filiation to his
alleged Filipino father in accordance with Philippine law. At no point in time was
FPJ in danger of being stateless. Clearly, FPJ cannot invoke the Convention to claim
he is a natural-born Philippine citizen.
Same; Same; Legitimate and Illegitimate Children; The inexorable direction of the
law, both international and domestic in the last 100 years, is to eliminate all forms
of discrimination between legitimate and illegitimate children. —Nevertheless, I
believe that it is now time to abandon the Ching Leng doctrine. The inexorable
direction of the law, both international and domestic in the last 100 years, is to
eliminate all forms of discrimination between legitimate and illegitimate children.
Where the Constitution does not distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate
children, we should not also distinguish, especially when private rights are not
involved as in questions of citizenship. Abandoning the Ching Leng doctrine
upholds the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Abandoning the Ching Leng
doctrine is also in compliance with our treaty obligation under the Covenant on the
Rights of Children mandating States Parties to eliminate all forms of discrimination
based on the status of children, save of course those distinctions prescribed in the
Constitution itself like the reservation of certain high public offices to natural-born
citizens.
VITUG, J.:
Citizenship is a treasured right conferred on those whom the state
believes are deserving of the privilege. It is a precious heritage, as well
as an inestimable acquisition,[1]that cannot be taken lightly by anyone -
either by those who enjoy it or by those who dispute it.
Before the Court are three consolidated cases, all of which raise a single
question of profound importance to the nation. The issue of citizenship is brought
20
up to challenge the qualifications of a presidential candidate to hold the highest
office of the land. Our people are waiting for the judgment of the Court with bated
breath. Is Fernando Poe, Jr., the hero of silver screen, and now one of the main
contenders for the presidency, a natural-born Filipino or is he not?
The moment of introspection takes us face to face with Spanish and American
colonial roots and reminds us of the rich heritage of civil law and common law
traditions, the fusion resulting in a hybrid of laws and jurisprudence that could be
no less than distinctly Filipino.
Antecedent Case Settings
On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as
Fernando Poe, Jr. (hereinafter "FPJ"), filed his certificate of candidacy for the
position of President of the Republic of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng
Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the forthcoming national elections. In his
certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his
date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila.
Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner in G.R. No. 161824, entitled "Victorino X.
Fornier, Petitioner, versus Hon. Commission on Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley
Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondents," initiated, on 09 January
2004, a petition docketed SPA No. 04-003 before the Commission on Elections
("COMELEC") to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of
candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his
certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in
truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley
Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the
son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan
F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship
to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Petitioner based the
allegation of the illegitimate birth of respondent on two assertions - first, Allan F.
Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to
Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe,
married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of respondent.
In the hearing before the Third Division of the COMELEC on 19 January 2004,
petitioner, in support of his claim, presented several documentary exhibits - 1) a
copy of the certificate of birth of FPJ, 2) a certified photocopy of an affidavit
executed in Spanish by Paulita Poe y Gomez attesting to her having filed a case for
bigamy and concubinage against the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, after
discovering his bigamous relationship with Bessie Kelley, 3) an English translation
of the affidavit aforesaid, 4) a certified photocopy of the certificate of birth of Allan
F. Poe, 5) a certification issued by the Director of the Records Management and
Archives Office, attesting to the fact that there was no record in the National
Archives that a Lorenzo Poe or Lorenzo Pou resided or entered the Philippines
before 1907, and 6) a certification from the Officer-In-Charge of the Archives
Division of the National Archives to the effect that no available information could be
found in the files of the National Archives regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe.
On his part, respondent, presented twenty-two documentary pieces of
evidence, the more significant ones being - a) a certification issued by Estrella M.
Domingo of the Archives Division of the National Archives that there appeared to
be no available information regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe in the registry of
births for San Carlos, Pangasinan, b) a certification issued by the Officer-In-Charge
of the Archives Division of the National Archives that no available information about
the marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez could be found, c) a certificate of
birth of Ronald Allan Poe, d) Original Certificate of Title No. P-2247 of the Registry
of Deeds for the Province of Pangasinan, in the name of Lorenzo Pou, e) copies of
Tax Declaration No. 20844, No. 20643, No. 23477 and No. 23478 in the name of
Lorenzo Pou, f) a copy of the certificate of death of Lorenzo Pou, g) a copy of the
purported marriage contract between Fernando Pou and Bessie Kelley, and h) a
certification issued by the City Civil Registrar of San Carlos City, Pangasinan, stating
that the records of birth in the said office during the period of from 1900 until May
1946 were totally destroyed during World War II.
On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA No. 04-003 for lack of
merit. Three days later, or on 26 January 2004, Fornier filed his motion for
reconsideration. The motion was denied on 06 February 2004 by the COMELEC en
banc. On 10 February 2004, petitioner assailed the decision of the COMELEC before
this Court conformably with Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure. The petition, docketed G. R. No. 161824, likewise prayed for a
temporary restraining order, a writ of preliminary injunction or any other resolution
that would stay the finality and/or execution of the COMELEC resolutions.
The other petitions, later consolidated with G. R. No. 161824, would include
G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr.,
vs. The Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan Kelley Poe ( a.k.a. Fernando Poe,
Jr.), and Victorino X. Fornier," and the other, docketed G. R. No. 161634, entitled
"Zoilo Antonio G. Velez, vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.," both
challenging the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and asserting that, under Article VII,
Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Court had
original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the case.
Jurisdiction of the Court
In G. R. No. 161824
In seeking the disqualification of the candidacy of FPJ and to have the
COMELEC deny due course to or cancel FPJs certificate of candidacy for alleged
misrepresentation of a material fact ( i.e., that FPJ was a natural-born citizen)
before the COMELEC, petitioner Fornier invoked Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code
Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy.  --- A
verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy
may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material
representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false
in consonance with the general powers of COMELEC expressed in Section 52 of the
Omnibus Election Code -
Section 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections. In addition to
the powers and functions conferred upon it by the Constitution, the Commission
21
shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws
relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and
honest elections -
and in relation to Article 69 of the Omnibus Election Code which would authorize
"any interested party" to file a verified petition to deny or cancel the certificate of
candidacy of any nuisance candidate.
Decisions of the COMELEC on disqualification cases may be reviewed by the
Supreme Court per Rule 64[2] in an action for certiorari  under Rule 65[3] of the
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 7, Article IX, of the 1987 Constitution also
reads
"Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or
matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for
decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or
resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum, required by
the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided
by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission
may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within
thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof."
Additionally, Section 1, Article VIII, of the same Constitution provides that
judicial power is vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law which power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
It is sufficiently clear that the petition brought up in G. R. No. 161824 was
aptly elevated to, and could well be taken cognizance of by, this Court. A contrary
view could be a gross denial to our people of their fundamental right to be fully
informed, and to make a proper choice, on who could or should be elected to
occupy the highest government post in the land.
In G. R. No. 161434 and G. R. No. 161634
Petitioners Tecson, et al., in G. R. No. 161434, and Velez, in G. R. No.
161634, invoke the provisions of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987
Constitution in assailing the jurisdiction of the COMELEC when it took cognizance of
SPA No. 04-003 and in urging the Supreme Court to instead take on the petitions
they directly instituted before it. The Constitutional provision cited reads:
"The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and
may promulgate its rules for the purpose."
The provision is an innovation of the 1987 Constitution. The omission in the 1935
and the 1973 Constitution to designate any tribunal to be the sole judge of
presidential and vice-presidential contests, has constrained this Court to declare, in
Lopez vs. Roxas,[4] as not (being) justiciable controversies or disputes involving
contests on the elections, returns and qualifications of the President or Vice-
President. The constitutional lapse prompted Congress, on 21 June 1957, to enact
Republic Act No. 1793, "An Act Constituting an Independent Presidential Electoral
Tribunal to Try, Hear and Decide Protests Contesting the Election of the President-
Elect and the Vice-President-Elect of the Philippines and Providing for the Manner
of Hearing the Same."  Republic Act 1793 designated the Chief Justice and the
Associate Justices of the Supreme Court to be the members of the
tribunal. Although the subsequent adoption of the parliamentary form of
government under the 1973 Constitution might have implicitly affected Republic Act
No. 1793, the statutory set-up, nonetheless, would now be deemed revived under
the present Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution.
Ordinary usage would characterize a "contest" in reference to a post-
election scenario. Election contests consist of either an election protest or a quo
warranto which, although two distinct remedies, would have one objective in
view, i.e., to dislodge the winning candidate from office. A perusal of the
phraseology in Rule 12, Rule 13, and Rule 14 of the "Rules of the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal," promulgated by the Supreme Court en banc on 18 April 1992,
would support this premise -
Rule 12. Jurisdiction. - The Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President of
the Philippines.
Rule 13. How Initiated. - An election contest is initiated by the filing of an election
protest or a petition for quo warranto against the President or Vice-President. An
election protest shall not include a petition for quo warranto. A petition for quo
warranto shall not include an election protest.
Rule 14. Election Protest. - Only the registered candidate for President or for Vice-
President of the Philippines who received the second or third highest number of
votes may contest the election of the President or the Vice-President, as the case
may be, by filing a verified petition with the Clerk of the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal within thirty (30) days after the proclamation of the winner.
The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-
President", of the Philippines, and not of "candidates" for President or Vice-
President. A quo warranto proceeding is generally defined as being an action
against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a
public office.[5] In such context, the election contest can only contemplate a post-
election scenario. In Rule 14, only a registered candidate who would have received
either the second or third highest number of votes could file an election
protest. This rule again presupposes a post-election scenario.
It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by
Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, would not include cases directly
brought before it, questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the presidency
or vice-presidency before the elections are held.
Accordingly, G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, et al., vs.
Commission on Elections et al.," and G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio
Velez vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr." would have to be
dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
The Citizenship Issue
22
 Now, to the basic issue; it should be helpful to first give a brief historical
background on the concept of citizenship.
Perhaps, the earliest understanding of citizenship was that given by Aristotle,
who, sometime in 384 to 322 B.C., described the "citizen" to refer to a man who
shared in the administration of justice and in the holding of an office. [6] Aristotle
saw its significance if only to determine the constituency of the "State," which he
described as being composed of such persons who would be adequate in number
to achieve a self-sufficient existence.[7] The concept grew to include one who would
both govern and be governed, for which qualifications like autonomy, judgment
and loyalty could be expected. Citizenship was seen to deal with rights and
entitlements, on the one hand, and with concomitant obligations, on the other. [8] In
its ideal setting, a citizen was active in public life and fundamentally willing to
submit his private interests to the general interest of society.
The concept of citizenship had undergone changes over the centuries. In the
18th century, the concept was limited, by and large, to civil citizenship, which
established the rights necessary for individual freedom, such as rights to property,
personal liberty and justice.[9] Its meaning expanded during the 19th century to
include political citizenship, which encompassed the right to participate in the
exercise of political power. [10] The 20th century saw the next stage of the
development of social citizenship, which laid emphasis on the right of the citizen to
economic well-being and social security.[11] The idea of citizenship has gained
expression in the modern welfare state as it so developed in Western Europe. An
ongoing and final stage of development, in keeping with the rapidly shrinking
global village, might well be the internationalization of citizenship.[12]
The Local Setting - from Spanish
Times to the Present
There was no such term as "Philippine citizens" during the Spanish regime but
"subjects of Spain" or "Spanish subjects." [13] In church records, the natives were
called 'indios', denoting a low regard for the inhabitants of the archipelago. Spanish
laws on citizenship became highly codified during the 19th century but their sheer
number made it difficult to point to one comprehensive law. Not all of these
citizenship laws of Spain however, were made to apply to the Philippine Islands
except for those explicitly extended by Royal Decrees. [14]
Spanish laws on citizenship were traced back to the Novisima
Recopilacion, promulgated in Spain on 16 July 1805 but as to whether the law was
extended to the Philippines remained to be the subject of differing views among
experts;[15] however, three royal decrees were undisputably made applicable to
Spaniards in the Philippines - the Order de la Regencia of 14 August 1841,
[16]
 the Royal Decree  of 23 August 1868 specifically defining the political status of
children born in the Philippine Islands, [17] and finally, the Ley Extranjera de
Ultramar of 04 July 1870, which was expressly made applicable to the Philippines
by the Royal Decree of 13 July 1870.[18]
The Spanish Constitution of 1876 was never extended to the Philippine
Islands because of the express mandate of its Article 89, according to which the
provisions of the Ultramaramong which this country was included, would be
governed by special laws.[19]
It was only the Civil Code of Spain, made effective in this jurisdiction on 18
December 1889, which came out with the first categorical enumeration of who
were Spanish citizens. -
(a) Persons born in Spanish territory,
(b) Children of a Spanish father or mother, even if they were born
outside of Spain,
(c) Foreigners who have obtained naturalization papers,
(d) Those who, without such papers, may have become domiciled
inhabitants of any town of the Monarchy.[20]
The year 1898 was another turning point in Philippine history. Already in the
state of decline as a superpower, Spain was forced to so cede her sole colony in
the East to an upcoming world power, the United States. An accepted principle of
international law dictated that a change in sovereignty, while resulting in an
abrogation of all political laws then in force, would have no effect on civil laws,
which would remain virtually intact.
The Treaty of Paris was entered into on 10 December 1898 between Spain
and the United States. [21] Under Article IX of the treaty, the civil rights and political
status of the native inhabitants of the territories ceded to the United States would
be determined by its Congress -
"Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory over which
Spain by the present treaty relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty may remain in
such territory or may remove therefrom, retaining in either event all their rights of
property, including the right to sell or dispose of such property or of its proceeds;
and they shall also have the right to carry on their industry, commerce, and
professions, being subject in respect thereof to such laws as are applicable to
foreigners. In case they remain in the territory they may preserve their allegiance
to the Crown of Spain by making, before a court of record, within a year from the
date of the exchange of ratifications of this treaty, a declaration of their decision to
preserve such allegiance; in default of which declaration they shall be held to have
renounced it and to have adopted the nationality of the territory in which they
reside.
Thus
"The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories
hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by the Congress." [22]
Upon the ratification of the treaty, and pending legislation by the United States
Congress on the subject, the native inhabitants of the Philippines ceased to be
Spanish subjects. Although they did not become American citizens, they, however,
also ceased to be "aliens" under American laws and were thus issued passports
describing them to be citizens of the Philippines entitled to the protection of the
United States.
The term "citizens of the Philippine Islands" appeared for the first time in the
Philippine Bill of 1902, also commonly referred to as the Philippine Organic Act of
1902, the first comprehensive legislation of the Congress of the United States on
the Philippines -
".... that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein, who
were Spanish subjects on the 11th day of April, 1891, and then resided in said
23
Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held
to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the protection
of the United States, except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance
to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace
between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris, December tenth eighteen
hundred and ninety eight."[23]
Under the organic act, a citizen of the Philippines was one who was an inhabitant
of the Philippines, and a Spanish subject on the 11 th day of April 1899. The term
inhabitant was taken to include 1) a native-born inhabitant, 2) an inhabitant who
was a native of Peninsular Spain, and 3) an inhabitant who obtained Spanish
papers on or before 11 April 1899.[24]
Controversy arose on to the status of children born in the Philippines from 11
April 1899 to 01 July 1902, during which period no citizenship law was extant in the
Philippines. Weight was given to the view, articulated in jurisprudential writing at
the time, that the common law principle of jus soli, otherwise also known as the
principle of territoriality, operative in the United States and England, governed
those born in the Philippine Archipelago within that period.[25] More about this later.
In 23 March 1912, the Congress of the United States made the following
amendment to the Philippine Bill of 1902 -
"Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to provide by law for
the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands
who do not come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of other insular
possession of the United States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine
Islands who would become citizens of the United States, under the laws of the
United States, if residing therein." [26]
With the adoption of the Philippine Bill of 1902, the concept of "Philippine
citizens" had for the first time crystallized. The word "Filipino" was used by William
H. Taft, the first Civil Governor General in the Philippines when he initially made
mention of it in his slogan, "The Philippines for the Filipinos." In 1916, the
Philippine Autonomy Act, also known as the Jones Law restated virtually the
provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902, as so amended by the Act of Congress in
1912 -
That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects
on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then
resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequently thereto,
shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands , except
such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in
accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States
and Spain, signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight and
except such others as have since become citizens of some other country; Provided,
That the Philippine Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby authorized to provide
for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands
who do not come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of the insular
possessions of the United States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine
Islands who are citizens of the United States, or who could become citizens of the
United States under the laws of the United States, if residing therein."
Under the Jones Law, a native-born inhabitant of the Philippines was deemed
to be a citizen of the Philippines as of 11 April 1899 if he was 1) a subject of Spain
on 11 April 1899, 2) residing in the Philippines on said date, and, 3) since that
date, not a citizen of some other country.
While there was, at one brief time, divergent views on whether or not jus
soli was a mode of acquiring citizenship, the 1935 Constitution brought to an end
to any such link with common law, by adopting, once and for all, jus sanguinis or
blood relationship as being the basis of Filipino citizenship -
Section 1, Article III, 1935 Constitution. The following are citizens of the Philippines
-
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of
this Constitution
(2) Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign parents who, before the
adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine
Islands.
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon reaching the age
of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
Subsection (4), Article III, of the 1935 Constitution, taken together with
existing civil law provisions at the time, which provided that women would
automatically lose their Filipino citizenship and acquire that of their foreign
husbands, resulted in discriminatory situations that effectively incapacitated the
women from transmitting their Filipino citizenship to their legitimate children and
required illegitimate children of Filipino mothers to still elect Filipino citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority. Seeking to correct this anomaly, as well as fully
cognizant of the newly found status of Filipino women as equals to men, the
framers of the 1973 Constitution crafted the provisions of the new Constitution on
citizenship to reflect such concerns -
Section 1, Article III, 1973 Constitution - The following are citizens of the
Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution.
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.
(3) Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five.
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
For good measure, Section 2 of the same article also further provided that
"A female citizen of the Philippines who marries an alien retains her Philippine
citizenship, unless by her act or omission she is deemed, under the law to have
renounced her citizenship."
The 1987 Constitution generally adopted the provisions of the 1973
Constitution, except for subsection (3) thereof that aimed to correct the irregular
situation generated by the questionable proviso in the 1935 Constitution.
Section I, Article IV, 1987 Constitution now provides:
The following are citizens of the Philippines:
24
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution.
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
The Case Of FPJ
Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses:
"No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age
on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years
immediately preceding such election."
The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who are citizens
of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect
their Philippine citizenship."[27]
The date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August 1939
during the regime of the 1935 Constitution. Through its history, four modes of
acquiring citizenship - naturalization, jus soli, res judicata and jus sanguinis[28] had
been in vogue. Only two, i.e., jus soli  and jus sanguinis, could qualify a person to
being a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.J us soli, per Roa vs. Collector of
Customs[29] (1912), did not last long. With the adoption of the 1935 Constitution
and the reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor [30] (1947), jus
sanguinis or blood relationship would now become the primary basis of citizenship
by birth.
Documentary evidence adduced by petitioner would tend to indicate that the
earliest established direct ascendant of FPJ was his paternal grandfather Lorenzo
Pou, married to Marta Reyes, the father of Allan F. Poe. While the record of birth of
Lorenzo Pou had not been presented in evidence, his death certificate, however,
identified him to be a Filipino, a resident of San Carlos, Pangasinan, and 84 years
old at the time of his death on 11 September 1954. The certificate of birth of the
father of FPJ, Allan F. Poe, showed that he was born on 17 May 1915 to an Espaol
father, Lorenzo Pou, and a mestiza Espaol mother, Marta Reyes. Introduced by
petitioner was an uncertified copy of a supposed certificate of the alleged marriage
of Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez on 05 July 1936. The marriage certificate of
Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley reflected the date of their marriage to be on 16
September 1940. In the same certificate, Allan F. Poe was stated to be twenty-five
years old, unmarried, and a Filipino citizen, and Bessie Kelley to be twenty-two
years old, unmarried, and an American citizen. The birth certificate of FPJ, would
disclose that he was born on 20 August 1939 to Allan F. Poe, a Filipino, twenty-four
years old, married to Bessie Kelly, an American citizen, twenty-one years old and
married.
Considering the reservations made by the parties on the veracity of some of
the entries on the birth certificate of respondent and the marriage certificate of his
parents, the only conclusions that could be drawn with some degree of certainty
from the documents would be that -
1. The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley;
2. FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939;
3. Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on 16
September, 1940;
4. The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and
5. At the time of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84
years old.
Would the above facts be sufficient or insufficient to establish the fact that
FPJ is a natural-born Filipino citizen? The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and
Bessie Kelley, the birth certificate of FPJ, and the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou
are documents of public record in the custody of a public officer. The documents
have been submitted in evidence by both contending parties during the
proceedings before the COMELEC.
The birth certificate of FPJ was marked Exhibit "A" for petitioner and Exhibit
"3" for respondent. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley was
submitted as Exhibit "21" for respondent. The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou was
submitted by respondent as his Exhibit "5." While the last two documents were
submitted in evidence for respondent, the admissibility thereof, particularly in
reference to the facts which they purported to show, i.e., the marriage certificate in
relation to the date of marriage of Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley and the death
certificate relative to the death of Lorenzo Pou on 11 September 1954 in San
Carlos, Pangasinan, were all admitted by petitioner, who had utilized those material
statements in his argument. All three documents were certified true copies of the
originals.
Section 3, Rule 130, Rules of Court states that -
Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When the subject of inquiry is
the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original
document itself, except in the following cases:
x x x x x x x x x
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public office or is
recorded in a public office.
Being public documents, the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou, the marriage
certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelly, and the birth certificate of
FPJ, constitute prima facie proof of their contents. Section 44, Rule 130, of the
Rules of Court provides:
Entries in official records. Entries in official records made in the performance of his
duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a
duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
The trustworthiness of public documents and the value given to the entries
made therein could be grounded on 1) the sense of official duty in the preparation
of the statement made, 2) the penalty which is usually affixed to a breach of that
duty, 3) the routine and disinterested origin of most such statements, and 4) the
publicity of record which makes more likely the prior exposure of such errors as
might have occurred.[31]
The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou would indicate that he died on 11
September 1954, at the age of 84 years, in San Carlos, Pangasinan. It could thus
be assumed that Lorenzo Pou was born sometime in the year 1870 when the
25
Philippines was still a colony of Spain. Petitioner would argue that Lorenzo Pou was
not in the Philippines during the crucial period of from 1898 to 1902 considering
that there was no existing record about such fact in the Records Management and
Archives Office. Petitioner, however, likewise failed to show that Lorenzo Pou was
at any other place during the same period. In his death certificate, the residence of
Lorenzo Pou was stated to be San Carlos, Pangasinan. In the absence of any
evidence to the contrary, it should be sound to conclude, or at least to presume,
that the place of residence of a person at the time of his death was also his
residence before death. It would be extremely doubtful if the Records Management
and Archives Office would have had complete records of all residents of the
Philippines from 1898 to 1902.
Proof of Paternity and Filiation
Under Civil Law.
Petitioner submits, in any case, that in establishing filiation (relationship or
civil status of the child to the father [or mother]) or paternity (relationship or civil
status of the father to the child) of an illegitimate child, FPJ evidently being an
illegitimate son according to petitioner, the mandatory rules under civil law must be
used.
Under the Civil Code of Spain, which was in force in the Philippines from 08
December 1889 up until the day prior to 30 August 1950 when the Civil Code of
the Philippines took effect, acknowledgment was required to establish filiation or
paternity. Acknowledgment was either judicial (compulsory) or voluntary. Judicial
or compulsory acknowledgment was possible only if done during the lifetime of the
putative parent; voluntary acknowledgment could only be had in a record of birth,
a will, or a public document. [32] Complementary to the new code was Act No. 3753
or the Civil Registry Law expressing in Section 5 thereof, that -
In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be signed and sworn to
jointly by the parents of the infant or only by the mother if the father refuses. In
the latter case, it shall not be permissible to state or reveal in the document the
name of the father who refuses to acknowledge the child, or to give therein any
information by which such father could be identified.
In order that the birth certificate could then be utilized to prove voluntary
acknowledgment of filiation or paternity, the certificate was required to be signed
or sworn to by the father. The failure of such requirement rendered the same
useless as being an authoritative document of recognition. [33] In Mendoza vs. Mella,
[34]
 the Court ruled -
"Since Rodolfo was born in 1935, after the registry law was enacted, the question
here really is whether or not his birth certificate (Exhibit 1), which is merely a
certified copy of the registry record, may be relied upon as sufficient proof of his
having been voluntarily recognized. No such reliance, in our judgment, may be
placed upon it. While it contains the names of both parents, there is no showing
that they signed the original, let alone swore to its contents as required in Section
5 of Act No. 3753. For all that might have happened, it was not even they or either
of them who furnished the data to be entered in the civil register. Petitioners say
that in any event the birth certificate is in the nature of a public document wherein
voluntary recognition of a natural child may also be made, according to the same
Article 131. True enough, but in such a case, there must be a clear statement in
the document that the parent recognizes the child as his or her own."
In the birth certificate of respondent FPJ, presented by both parties, nowhere
in the document was the signature of Allan F. Poe found. There being no will
apparently executed, or at least shown to have been executed, by decedent Allan
F. Poe, the only other proof of voluntary recognition remained to be "some other
public document." In Pareja vs. Pareja,[35] this Court defined what could constitute
such a document as proof of voluntary acknowledgment:
"Under the Spanish Civil Code there are two classes of public documents,
those executed by private individuals which must be authenticated by
notaries, and those issued by competent public officials by reason of their
office. The public document pointed out in Article 131 as one of the means by
which recognition may be made belongs to the first class."
Let us leave it at that for the moment.
The 1950 Civil Code categorized the acknowledgment or recognition of
illegitimate children into voluntary, legal or compulsory. Voluntary recognition was
required to be expressedly made in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a
court of record or in any authentic writing. Legal acknowledgment took place in
favor of full blood brothers and sisters of an illegitimate child who was recognized
or judicially declared as natural. Compulsory acknowledgment could be demanded
generally in cases when the child had in his favor any evidence to prove
filiation. Unlike an action to claim legitimacy which would last during the lifetime of
the child, and might pass exceptionally to the heirs of the child, an action to claim
acknowledgment, however, could only be brought during the lifetime of the
presumed parent.
Amicus Curiae Ruben F. Balane defined, during the oral argument, "authentic
writing," so as to be an authentic writing for purposes of voluntary recognition,
simply as being a genuine or indubitable writing of the father. The term would
include a public instrument (one duly acknowledged before a notary public or other
competent official) or a private writing admitted by the father to be his.
The Family Code has further liberalized the rules; Article 172, Article 173, and
Article 175 provide:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved
by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or
her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during
minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of
five years within which to institute the action.
The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death
of either or both of the parties.
26
x x x x x x x x x.
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same
way and on the same, evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except
when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the
action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
The provisions of the Family Code are retroactively applied; Article 256 of the
code reads:
"Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or
impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
Thus, in Vda. de Sy-Quia vs. Court of Appeals,[36] the Court has ruled:
"We hold that whether Jose was a voluntarily recognized natural child should be
decided under Article 278 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Article 2260 of that
Code provides that 'the voluntary recognition of a natural child shall take place
according to this Code, even if the child was born before the effectivity of this body
of laws' or before August 30, 1950. Hence, Article 278 may be given retroactive
effect."
It should be apparent that the growing trend to liberalize the
acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate children is an attempt to break away
from the traditional idea of keeping well apart legitimate and non-legitimate
relationships within the family in favor of the greater interest and welfare of the
child. The provisions are intended to merely govern the private and personal affairs
of the family. There is little, if any, to indicate that the legitimate or illegitimate civil
status of the individual would also affect his political rights or, in general, his
relationship to the State. While, indeed, provisions on "citizenship" could be found
in the Civil Code, such provisions must be taken in the context of private relations,
the domain of civil law; particularly -
"Civil Law is that branch of law which has for its double purpose the organization of
the family and the regulation of property. It has thus [been] defined as the mass of
precepts which determine and regulate the relations of assistance, authority and
obedience among members of a family, and those which exist among members of
a society for the protection of private interests." [37]
In Yaez de Barnuevo vs. Fuster,[38] the Court has held:
"In accordance with Article 9 of the Civil Code of Spain, x x x the laws relating to
family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons,
govern Spaniards although they reside in a foreign country; that, in consequence,
'all questions of a civil nature, such as those dealing with the validity or nullity of
the matrimonial bond, the domicile of the husband and wife, their support, as
between them, the separation of their properties, the rules governing property,
marital authority, division of conjugal property, the classification of their property,
legal causes for divorce, the extent of the latter, the authority to decree it, and, in
general, the civil effects of marriage and divorce upon the persons and properties
of the spouses, are questions that are governed exclusively by the national law of
the husband and wife."
The relevance of "citizenship" or "nationality" to Civil Law is best exemplified
in Article 15 of the Civil Code, stating that -
"Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though
living abroad" -
that explains the need to incorporate in the code a reiteration of the Constitutional
provisions on citizenship. Similarly, citizenship is significant in civil relationships
found in different parts of the Civil Code, [39] such as on successional rights and
family relations.[40] In adoption, for instance, an adopted child would be considered
the child of his adoptive parents and accorded the same rights as their legitimate
child but such legal fiction extended only to define his rights under civil law [41] and
not his political status.
Civil law provisions point to an obvious bias against illegitimacy. This
discriminatory attitude may be traced to the Spanish family and property laws,
which, while defining proprietary and successional rights of members of the family,
provided distinctions in the rights of legitimate and illegitimate children. In the
monarchial set-up of old Spain, the distribution and inheritance of titles and wealth
were strictly according to bloodlines and the concern to keep these bloodlines
uncontaminated by foreign blood was paramount.
These distinctions between legitimacy and illegitimacy were codified in the
Spanish Civil Code, and the invidious discrimination survived when the Spanish Civil
Code became the primary source of our own Civil Code. Such distinction, however,
remains and should remain only in the sphere of civil law and not unduly impede or
impinge on the domain of political law.
The proof of filiation or paternity for purposes of determining his citizenship
status should thus be deemed independent from and not inextricably tied up with
that prescribed for civil law purposes. The Civil Code or Family Code provisions on
proof of filiation or paternity, although good law, do not have preclusive effects on
matters alien to personal and family relations. The ordinary rules on evidence could
well and should govern. For instance, the matter about pedigree is not necessarily
precluded from being applicable by the Civil Code or Family Code provisions.
Section 39, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides -
Act or Declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of a person deceased, or
unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by
birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where it occurred before the
controversy, and the relationship between the two persons is shown by evidence
other than such act or declaration. The word `pedigree includes relationship, family
genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these
facts occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family
history intimately connected with pedigree.
For the above rule to apply, it would be necessary that (a) the declarant is
already dead or unable to testify, (b) the pedigree of a person must be at issue, (c)
the declarant must be a relative of the person whose pedigree is in question, (d)
declaration must be made before the controversy has occurred, and (e) the
relationship between the declarant and the person whose pedigree is in question
must be shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.
Thus, the duly notarized declaration made by Ruby Kelley Mangahas, sister of
Bessie Kelley Poe submitted as Exhibit 20 before the COMELEC, might be accepted
27
to prove the acts of Allan F. Poe, recognizing his own paternal relationship with
FPJ, i.e, living together with Bessie Kelley and his children (including respondent
FPJ) in one house, and as one family -
"I, Ruby Kelley Mangahas, of legal age and sound mind, presently residing in
Stockton, California, U.S.A., after being sworn in accordance with law do hereby
declare that:
1. I am the sister of the late Bessie Kelley Poe.
2. Bessie Kelley Poe was the wife of Fernando Poe, Sr.
3. Fernando and Bessie Poe had a son by the name of Ronald Allan Poe,
more popularly known in the Philippines as `Fernando Poe, Jr.,
or `FPJ.
4. Ronald Allan Poe `FPJ was born on August 20, 1939 at St. Luke's
Hospital, Magdalena Street, Manila.
x x x x x x x x x
7. Fernando Poe Sr., and my sister Bessie, met and became engaged
while they were students at the University of the Philippines in
1936. I was also introduced to Fernando Poe, Sr., by my sister
that same year.
8. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister Bessie had their first child in 1938.
9. Fernando Poe, Sr., my sister Bessie and their first three children,
Elizabeth, Ronald, Allan and Fernando II, and myself lived
together with our mother at our family's house on Dakota St.
(now Jorge Bocobo St.), Malate until the liberation of Manila in
1945, except for some months between 1943-1944.
10. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister, Bessie, were blessed with four (4)
more children after Ronald Allan Poe.
x x x x x x x x x
18. I am executing this Declaration to attest to the fact that my nephew,
Ronald Allan Poe is a natural born Filipino, and that he is the
legitimate child of Fernando Poe, Sr.
Done in City of Stockton, California, U.S.A., this 12th day of January
2004.
Ruby Kelley Mangahas
Declarant
DNA Testing
In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily
establish or would be difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes
obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child and any physical residue of the
long dead parent could be resorted to. A positive match would clear up filiation or
paternity. In Tijing vs. Court of Appeals,[42] this Court has acknowledged the strong
weight of DNA testing -
"Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the
modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and
expertise in using DNA test for identification and parentage testing. The University
of the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis
Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short tandem
repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of a
child/person has two (2) copies, one copy from the mother and the other from the
father. The DNA from the mother, the alleged father and the child are analyzed to
establish parentage. Of course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA
test as evidence is still open to challenge. Eventually, as the appropriate case
comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence. For
it was said, that courts should apply the results of science when competently
obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny
progress."
Petitioners Argument For
Jurisprudential Conclusiveness
Petitioner would have it that even if Allan F. Poe were a Filipino citizen, he
could not have transmitted his citizenship to respondent FPJ, the latter being an
illegitimate child. According to petitioner, prior to his marriage to Bessie Kelley,
Allan F. Poe, on July 5, 1936, contracted marriage with a certain Paulita Gomez,
making his subsequent marriage to Bessie Kelley bigamous and respondent FPJ an
illegitimate child. The veracity of the supposed certificate of marriage between
Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez could be most doubtful at best. But the
documentary evidence introduced by no less than respondent himself, consisting of
a birth certificate of respondent and a marriage certificate of his parents showed
that FPJ was born on 20 August 1939 to a Filipino father and an American mother
who were married to each other a year later, or on 16 September 1940. Birth to
unmarried parents would make FPJ an illegitimate child. Petitioner contended that
as an illegitimate child, FPJ so followed the citizenship of his mother, Bessie Kelley,
an American citizen, basing his stand on the ruling of this Court in Morano vs. Vivo,
[43]
 citing Chiongbian vs. de Leon[44]  and Serra vs. Republic.[45]
On the above score, the disquisition made by amicus curiae Joaquin G.
Bernas, SJ, is most convincing; he states -
"We must analyze these cases and ask what the lis mota was in each of them. If
the pronouncement of the Court on jus sanguinis was on the lis mota, the
pronouncement would be a decision constituting doctrine under the rule of stare
decisis. But if the pronouncement was irrelevant to the lis mota, the
pronouncement would not be a decision but a mere obiter dictum which did not
establish doctrine. I therefore invite the Court to look closely into these cases.
First, Morano vs. Vivo. The case was not about an illegitimate child of a Filipino
father. It was about a stepson of a Filipino, a stepson who was the child of a
Chinese mother and a Chinese father. The issue was whether the stepson followed
the naturalization of the stepfather. Nothing about jus sanguinis there. The stepson
did not have the blood of the naturalized stepfather.
Second, Chiongbian vs. de Leon. This case was not about the illegitimate son of a
Filipino father. It was about a legitimate son of a father who had become Filipino
by election to public office before the 1935 Constitution pursuant to Article IV,
Section 1(2) of the 1935 Constitution. No one was illegitimate here.
Third, Serra vs. Republic. The case was not about the illegitimate son of a Filipino
father. Serra was an illegitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino
mother. The issue was whether one who was already a Filipino because of his
28
mother who still needed to be naturalized. There is nothing there about
invidious jus sanguinis.
Finally, Paa vs. Chan.[46] This is a more complicated case. The case was about the
citizenship of Quintin Chan who was the son of Leoncio Chan. Quintin Chan claimed
that his father, Leoncio, was the illegitimate son of a Chinese father and a Filipino
mother. Quintin therefore argued that he got his citizenship from Leoncio, his
father. But the Supreme Court said that there was no valid proof that Leoncio was
in fact the son of a Filipina mother. The Court therefore concluded that Leoncio
was not Filipino. If Leoncio was not Filipino, neither was his son Quintin. Quintin
therefore was not only not a natural-born Filipino but was not even a Filipino.
The Court should have stopped there. But instead it followed with an obiter
dictum. The Court said obiter that even if Leoncio, Quintin's father, were Filipino,
Quintin would not be Filipino because Quintin was illegitimate. This statement
about Quintin, based on a contrary to fact assumption, was absolutely unnecessary
for the case. x x x It was obiter dictum, pure and simple, simply repeating the
obiter dictum in Morano vs. Vivo.
x x x x x x x x x
"Aside from the fact that such a pronouncement would have no textual foundation
in the Constitution, it would also violate the equal protection clause of the
Constitution not once but twice. First, it would make an illegitimate distinction
between a legitimate child and an illegitimate child, and second, it would make an
illegitimate distinction between the illegitimate child of a Filipino father and the
illegitimate child of a Filipino mother.
The doctrine on constitutionally allowable distinctions was established long ago by
People vs. Cayat.[47] I would grant that the distinction between legitimate children
and illegitimate children rests on real differences. x x x But real differences alone
do not justify invidious distinction. Real differences may justify distinction for one
purpose but not for another purpose.
x x x What is the relevance of legitimacy or illegitimacy to elective public
service? What possible state interest can there be for disqualifying an illegitimate
child from becoming a public officer. It was not the fault of the child that his
parents had illicit liaison. Why deprive the child of the fullness of political rights for
no fault of his own? To disqualify an illegitimate child from holding an important
public office is to punish him for the indiscretion of his parents. There is neither
justice nor rationality in that. And if there is neither justice nor rationality in the
distinction, then the distinction transgresses the equal protection clause and must
be reprobated.
The other amici curiae, Mr. Justice Vicente Mendoza (a former member of this
Court), Professor Ruben Balane and Dean Martin Magallona, at bottom, have
expressed similar views.The thesis of petitioner, unfortunately hinging solely on
pure obiter dicta, should indeed fail.
Where jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate child as taking after the
citizenship of its mother, it did so for the benefit the child. It was to ensure a
Filipino nationality for the illegitimate child of an alien father in line with the
assumption that the mother had custody, would exercise parental authority and
had the duty to support her illegitimate child. It was to help the child, not to
prejudice or discriminate against him.
The fact of the matter perhaps the most significant consideration is that the
1935 Constitution, the fundamental law prevailing on the day, month and year of
birth of respondent FPJ, can never be more explicit than it is. Providing neither
conditions nor distinctions, the Constitution states that among the citizens of the
Philippines are those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines. There utterly is
no cogent justification to prescribe conditions or distinctions where there clearly are
none provided.
In Sum
(1) The Court, in the exercise of its power of judicial review, possesses
jurisdiction over the petition in G. R. No. 161824, filed under Rule 64, in relation to
Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. G.R. No. 161824 assails the
resolution of the COMELEC for alleged grave abuse of discretion in dismissing, for
lack of merit, the petition in SPA No. 04-003 which has prayed for the
disqualification of respondent FPJ from running for the position of President in the
10th May 2004 national elections on the contention that FPJ has committed material
representation in his certificate of candidacy by representing himself to be a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
(2) The Court must dismiss, for lack of jurisdiction and prematurity, the
petitions in G. R. No. 161434 and No. 161634 both having been directly elevated to
this Court in the latters capacity as the only tribunal to resolve a presidential and
vice-presidential election contest under the Constitution. Evidently, the primary
jurisdiction of the Court can directly be invoked only after, not before, the elections
are held.
(3) In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether grave abuse of discretion
has been committed by the COMELEC, it is necessary to take on the matter of
whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended
on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been
a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of
respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative
father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be
drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo
would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was under
Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his
death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have well been his
place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from
the en masse Filipinization that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That
citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F.
Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime
respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers
are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or
illegitimate.
(4) But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that
respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand
still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty
29
of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in
violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code.
Petitioner has utterly failed to substantiate his case before the Court,
notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties to present their position
and evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been material
misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC,[48] must
not only be material, but also deliberate and willful.
WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to DISMISS
1. G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson and Felix B.
Desiderio, Jr., Petitioners, versus Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan Kelley Poe
(a.k.a. "Fernando Poe, Jr.,) and Victorino X. Fornier, Respondents," and G. R. No.
161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez, Petitioner, versus Ronald Allan Kelley
Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondent," for want of jurisdiction.
2. G. R. No. 161824, entitled Victorino X. Fornier, Petitioner, versus Hon.
Commission on Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as Fernando
Poe, Jr., for failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent
Commission on Elections in dismissing the petition in SPA No. 04-003.
No Costs.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 135083. May 26, 1999]

ERNESTO S. MERCADO, petitioner, vs. EDUARDO BARRIOS MANZANO and

the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.

30
Remedial Law; Election Law; Parties; Certainly, petitioner had, and still has, an
interest in ousting private respondent from the race at the time he sought to
intervene; The rule in Labo v. COMELEC, reiterated in several cases, only applies to
cases in which the election of the respondent is contested, and the question is
whether one who placed second to the disqualified candidate may be declared the
winner.—Private respondent argues that petitioner has neither legal interest in the
matter in litigation nor an interest to protect because he is “a defeated candidate
for the vice-mayoralty post of Makati City [who] cannot be proclaimed as the Vice-
Mayor of Makati City even if the private respondent be ultimately disqualified by
final and executory judgment.” The flaw in this argument is it assumes that, at the
time petitioner sought to intervene in the proceedings before the COMELEC, there
had already been a proclamation of the results of the election for the vice
mayoralty contest for Makati City, on the basis of which petitioner came out only
second to private respondent. The fact, however, is that there had been no
proclamation at that time. Certainly, petitioner had, and still has, an interest in
ousting private respondent from the race at the time he sought to intervene.
The rule in Labo v. COMELEC,reiterated in several cases,only applies to cases in
which the election of the respondent is contested, and the question is whether one
who placed second to the disqualified candidate may be declared the winner. In
the present case, at the time petitioner filed a “Motion for Leave to File
Intervention” on May 20, 1998, there had been no proclamation of the winner, and
petitioner’s purpose was precisely to have private respondent disqualified “from
running for [an] elective local position” under §40(d) of R.A. No. 7160. If Ernesto
Mamaril (who originally instituted the disqualification proceedings), a registered
voter of Makati City, was competent to bring the action, so was petitioner since the
latter was a rival candidate for vice mayor of Makati City.
Same; Same; Same; That petitioner had a right to intervene at that stage of the
proceedings for the disqualification against private respondent is clear from §6 of
Republic Act No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987. —
Nor is petitioner’s interest in the matter in litigation any less because he filed a
motion for intervention only on May 20, 1998, after private respondent had been
shown to have garnered the highest number of votes among the candidates for
vice mayor. That petitioner had a right to intervene at that stage of the
proceedings for the disqualification against private respondent is clear from §6 of
R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Lawof 1987.
Same; Same; Same; Intervention may be allowed in proceedings for
disqualification even after election if there has yet been no final judgment
rendered.—Intervention may be allowed in proceedings for disqualification even
after election if there has yet been no final judgment rendered.
Same; Same; Same; Failure of the COMELEC en banc to resolve petitioner’s motion
for intervention was tantamount to a denial of the motion, justifying petitioner in
filing the instant petition for certiorari. —The failure of the COMELEC enbanc to
resolve petitioner’s motion for intervention was tantamount to a denial of the
motion, justifying petitioner in filing the instant petition for certiorari. As the
COMELEC enbanc instead decided the merits of the case, the present petition
properly deals not only with the denial of petitioner’s motion for intervention but
also with the substantive issues respecting private respondent’s alleged
disqualification on the ground of dual citizenship.
Constitutional Law; Citizenship; Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. —
Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a
result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a
person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states.For instance, such
a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which
adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the
doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his
part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states.
Same; Same; Instances where it is possible for certain classes of citizens of the
Philippines to possess dual citizenship. —Considering the citizenshipclause (Art. IV)
of our Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens of the
Philippines to possess dual citizenship: (1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or
mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli; (2) Those born in
the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers’
country such children are citizens of that country; (3) Those who marry aliens if by
the laws of the latter’s country the former are considered citizens, unless by their
act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship. Dual
allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person
simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While
dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual’s
volition.
Same; Same; The phrase “dual citizenship” in Republic Act No. 7160, §40(d) and in
Republic Act No. 7854, §20 must be understood as referring to “dual allegiance.” —
In including §5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional
Commission was not with dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who
maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization.
Hence, the phrase “dual citizenship” in R.A. No. 7160, §40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854,
§20 must be understood as referring to “dual allegiance.” Consequently, persons
with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with
dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to
the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice
if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship
to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their
condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano
were candidates for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998
elections. The other one was Gabriel V. Daza III.The results of the election were as
follows:
31
Eduardo B. Manzano 103,853
Ernesto S. Mercado 100,894
Gabriel V. Daza III 54,275[1]
The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in view of a pending
petition for disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that
private respondent was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.
In its resolution, dated May 7, 1998, [2] the Second Division of the COMELEC
granted the petition of Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the certificate of
candidacy of private respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen and, under
40(d) of the Local Government Code, persons with dual citizenship are disqualified
from running for any elective position. The COMELECs Second Division said:
What is presented before the Commission is a petition for disqualification of
Eduardo Barrios Manzano as candidate for the office of Vice-Mayor of Makati City in
the May 11, 1998 elections. The petition is based on the ground that the
respondent is an American citizen based on the record of the Bureau of
Immigration and misrepresented himself as a natural-born Filipino citizen.
In his answer to the petition filed on April 27, 1998, the respondent admitted that
he is registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of Immigration under Alien
Certificate of Registration No. B-31632 and alleged that he is a Filipino citizen
because he was born in 1955 of a Filipino father and a Filipino mother. He was
born in the United States, San Francisco, California, on September 14, 1955, and is
considered an American citizen under US Laws. But notwithstanding his registration
as an American citizen, he did not lose his Filipino citizenship.
Judging from the foregoing facts, it would appear that respondent Manzano is both
a Filipino and a US citizen. In other words, he holds dual citizenship.
The question presented is whether under our laws, he is disqualified from the
position for which he filed his certificate of candidacy. Is he eligible for the office he
seeks to be elected?
Under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, those holding dual citizenship
are disqualified from running for any elective local position.
WHEREFORE, the Commission hereby declares the respondent Eduardo Barrios
Manzano DISQUALIFIED as candidate for Vice-Mayor of Makati City.
On May 8, 1998, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration. [3] The
motion remained pending even until after the election held on May 11, 1998.
Accordingly, pursuant to Omnibus Resolution No. 3044, dated May 10, 1998,
of the COMELEC, the board of canvassers tabulated the votes cast for vice mayor
of Makati City but suspended the proclamation of the winner.
On May 19, 1998, petitioner sought to intervene in the case for
disqualification.[4] Petitioners motion was opposed by private respondent.
The motion was not resolved. Instead, on August 31, 1998, the COMELEC en
banc rendered its resolution. Voting 4 to 1, with one commissioner abstaining, the
COMELEC en banc reversed the ruling of its Second Division and declared private
respondent qualified to run for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998
elections.[5] The pertinent portions of the resolution of the COMELEC en banc read:
As aforesaid, respondent Eduardo Barrios Manzano was born in San Francisco,
California, U.S.A. He acquired US citizenship by operation of the United States
Constitution and laws under the principle of jus soli.
He was also a natural born Filipino citizen by operation of the 1935 Philippine
Constitution, as his father and mother were Filipinos at the time of his birth.  At the
age of six (6), his parents brought him to the Philippines using an American
passport as travel document. His parents also registered him as an alien with the
Philippine Bureau of Immigration. He was issued an alien certificate of
registration. This, however, did not result in the loss of his Philippine citizenship, as
he did not renounce Philippine citizenship and did not take an oath of allegiance to
the United States.
It is an undisputed fact that when respondent attained the age of majority, he
registered himself as a voter, and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998,
which effectively renounced his US citizenship under American law. Under
Philippine law, he no longer had U.S. citizenship.
At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the Second Division,
adopted on May 7, 1998, was not yet final. Respondent Manzano obtained the
highest number of votes among the candidates for vice-mayor of Makati City,
garnering one hundred three thousand eight hundred fifty three (103,853) votes
over his closest rival, Ernesto S. Mercado, who obtained one hundred thousand
eight hundred ninety four (100,894) votes, or a margin of two thousand nine
hundred fifty nine (2,959) votes. Gabriel Daza III obtained third place with fifty
four thousand two hundred seventy five (54,275) votes. In applying election laws,
it would be far better to err in favor of the popular choice than be embroiled in
complex legal issues involving private international law which may well be settled
before the highest court (Cf. Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections, 257 SCRA 727).
WHEREFORE, the Commission en banc hereby REVERSES the resolution of the
Second Division, adopted on May 7, 1998, ordering the cancellation of the
respondents certificate of candidacy.
We declare respondent Eduardo Luis Barrios Manzano to be QUALIFIED as a
candidate for the position of vice-mayor of Makati City in the May 11, 1998,
elections.
ACCORDINGLY, the Commission directs the Makati City Board of Canvassers, upon
proper notice to the parties, to reconvene and proclaim the respondent Eduardo
Luis Barrios Manzano as the winning candidate for vice-mayor of Makati City.
Pursuant to the resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the board of canvassers,
on the evening of August 31, 1998, proclaimed private respondent as vice mayor of
the City of Makati.
This is a petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the aforesaid resolution of
the COMELEC en banc and to declare private respondent disqualified to hold the
office of vice mayor of Makati City.Petitioner contends that
[T]he COMELEC en banc ERRED in holding that:
A. Under Philippine law, Manzano was no longer a U.S. citizen when he:
1. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he attained the age of majority when he
was already 37 years old; and,
32
2. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he (merely) registered himself as a voter
and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998.
B. Manzano is qualified to run for and or hold the elective office of Vice-Mayor of
the City of Makati;
C. At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the Second Division
adopted on 7 May 1998 was not yet final so that, effectively, petitioner may not be
declared the winner even assuming that Manzano is disqualified to run for and hold
the elective office of Vice-Mayor of the City of Makati.
We first consider the threshold procedural issue raised by private respondent
Manzano whether petitioner Mercado has personality to bring this suit considering
that he was not an original party in the case for disqualification filed by Ernesto
Mamaril nor was petitioners motion for leave to intervene granted.
I. PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO BRING THIS SUIT
Private respondent cites the following provisions of Rule 8 of the Rules of
Procedure of the COMELEC in support of his claim that petitioner has no right to
intervene and, therefore, cannot bring this suit to set aside the ruling denying his
motion for intervention:
Section 1. When proper and when may be permitted to intervene . Any person
allowed to initiate an action or proceeding may, before or during the trial of an
action or proceeding, be permitted by the Commission, in its discretion to intervene
in such action or proceeding, if he has legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in
the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or when he is so
situated as to be adversely affected by such action or proceeding.
....
Section 3. Discretion of Commission. In allowing or disallowing a motion for
intervention, the Commission or the Division, in the exercise of its discretion, shall
consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the
adjudication of the rights of the original parties and whether or not the intervenors
rights may be fully protected in a separate action or proceeding.
Private respondent argues that petitioner has neither legal interest in the matter in
litigation nor an interest to protect because he is a defeated candidate for the vice-
mayoralty post of Makati City [who] cannot be proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of
Makati City even if the private respondent be ultimately disqualified by final and
executory judgment.
The flaw in this argument is it assumes that, at the time petitioner sought to
intervene in the proceedings before the COMELEC, there had already been a
proclamation of the results of the election for the vice mayoralty contest for Makati
City, on the basis of which petitioner came out only second to private
respondent. The fact, however, is that there had been no proclamation at that
time. Certainly, petitioner had, and still has, an interest in ousting private
respondent from the race at the time he sought to intervene. The rule in Labo v.
COMELEC,[6] reiterated in several cases, [7] only applies to cases in which the
election of the respondent is contested, and the question is whether one who
placed second to the disqualified candidate may be declared the winner. In the
present case, at the time petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to File Intervention on
May 20, 1998, there had been no proclamation of the winner, and petitioners
purpose was precisely to have private respondent disqualified from running for [an]
elective local position under 40(d) of R.A. No. 7160. If Ernesto Mamaril (who
originally instituted the disqualification proceedings), a registered voter of Makati
City, was competent to bring the action, so was petitioner since the latter was a
rival candidate for vice mayor of Makati City.
Nor is petitioners interest in the matter in litigation any less because he filed a
motion for intervention only on May 20, 1998, after private respondent had been
shown to have garnered the highest number of votes among the candidates for
vice mayor. That petitioner had a right to intervene at that stage of the
proceedings for the disqualification against private respondent is clear from 6 of
R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which
provides:
Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not
be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a
candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified
and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the
Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry,
or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the
pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate
whenever the evidence of guilt is strong.
Under this provision, intervention may be allowed in proceedings for
disqualification even after election if there has yet been no final judgment
rendered.
The failure of the COMELEC en banc to resolve petitioners motion for
intervention was tantamount to a denial of the motion, justifying petitioner in filing
the instant petition for certiorari. As the COMELEC en banc instead decided the
merits of the case, the present petition properly deals not only with the denial of
petitioners motion for intervention but also with the substantive issues respecting
private respondents alleged disqualification on the ground of dual citizenship.
This brings us to the next question, namely, whether private respondent
Manzano possesses dual citizenship and, if so, whether he is disqualified from
being a candidate for vice mayor of Makati City.
II. DUAL CITIZENSHIP AS A GROUND FOR DISQUALIFICATION
The disqualification of private respondent Manzano is being sought under 40
of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), which declares as
disqualified from running for any elective local position: . . . (d) Those with dual
citizenship. This provision is incorporated in the Charter of the City of Makati.[8]
Invoking the maxim dura lex sed lex, petitioner, as well as the Solicitor
General, who sides with him in this case, contends that through 40(d) of the Local
Government Code, Congress has command[ed] in explicit terms the ineligibility of
persons possessing dual allegiance to hold local elective office.
To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former
arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or
more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states.
[9]
 For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are
citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state
33
which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any
voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both
states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible
for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship:
(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which
follow the principle of jus soli;
(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the
laws of their fathers country such children are citizens of that country;
(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latters country the former
are considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have
renounced Philippine citizenship.
There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may,
without performing any act, be also a citizen of another state; but the above cases
are clearly possible given the constitutional provisions on citizenship.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person
simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While
dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individuals volition.
With respect to dual allegiance, Article IV, 5 of the Constitution provides: Dual
allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by
law. This provision was included in the 1987 Constitution at the instance of
Commissioner Blas F. Ople who explained its necessity as follows: [10]
. . . I want to draw attention to the fact that dual allegiance is not dual
citizenship. I have circulated a memorandum to the Bernas Committee according to
which a dual allegiance  and I reiterate a dual allegiance  is larger and more
threatening than that of mere double citizenship which is seldom intentional and,
perhaps, never insidious. That is often a function of the accident of mixed
marriages or of birth on foreign soil. And so, I do not question double citizenship at
all.
What we would like the Committee to consider is to take constitutional cognizance
of the problem of dual allegiance. For example, we all know what happens in the
triennial elections of the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce
which consists of about 600 chapters all over the country. There is a Peking ticket,
as well as a Taipei ticket. Not widely known is the fact that the Filipino-Chinese
community is represented in the Legislative Yuan of the Republic of China in
Taiwan. And until recently, the sponsor might recall, in Mainland China in the
Peoples Republic of China, they have the Associated Legislative Council for
overseas Chinese wherein all of Southeast Asia including some European and Latin
countries were represented, which was dissolved after several years because of
diplomatic friction. At that time, the Filipino-Chinese were also represented in that
Overseas Council.
When I speak of double allegiance, therefore, I speak of this unsettled kind of
allegiance of Filipinos, of citizens who are already Filipinos but who, by their acts,
may be said to be bound by a second allegiance, either to Peking or Taiwan. I also
took close note of the concern expressed by some Commissioners yesterday,
including Commissioner Villacorta, who were concerned about the lack of
guarantees of thorough assimilation, and especially Commissioner Concepcion who
has always been worried about minority claims on our natural resources.
Dual allegiance can actually siphon scarce national capital to Taiwan, Singapore,
China or Malaysia, and this is already happening. Some of the great commercial
places in downtown Taipei are Filipino-owned, owned by Filipino-Chinese it is of
common knowledge in Manila. It can mean a tragic capital outflow when we have
to endure a capital famine which also means economic stagnation, worsening
unemployment and social unrest.
And so, this is exactly what we ask that the Committee kindly consider
incorporating a new section, probably Section 5, in the article on Citizenship which
will read as follows: DUAL ALLEGIANCE IS INIMICAL TO CITIZENSHIP AND SHALL
BE DEALT WITH ACCORDING TO LAW.
In another session of the Commission, Ople spoke on the problem of these
citizens with dual allegiance, thus:[11]
. . . A significant number of Commissioners expressed their concern about dual
citizenship in the sense that it implies a double allegiance under a double
sovereignty which some of us who spoke then in a freewheeling debate thought
would be repugnant to the sovereignty which pervades the Constitution and to
citizenship itself which implies a uniqueness and which elsewhere in the
Constitution is defined in terms of rights and obligations exclusive to that
citizenship including, of course, the obligation to rise to the defense of the State
when it is threatened, and back of this, Commissioner Bernas, is, of course, the
concern for national security. In the course of those debates, I think some noted
the fact that as a result of the wave of naturalizations since the decision to
establish diplomatic relations with the Peoples Republic of China was made in 1975,
a good number of these naturalized Filipinos still routinely go to Taipei every
October 10; and it is asserted that some of them do renew their oath of allegiance
to a foreign government maybe just to enter into the spirit of the occasion when
the anniversary of the Sun Yat-Sen Republic is commemorated. And so, I have
detected a genuine and deep concern about double citizenship, with its attendant
risk of double allegiance which is repugnant to our sovereignty and national
security. I appreciate what the Committee said that this could be left to the
determination of a future legislature. But considering the scale of the problem, the
real impact on the security of this country, arising from, let us say, potentially great
numbers of double citizens professing double allegiance, will the Committee
entertain a proposed amendment at the proper time that will prohibit, in effect, or
regulate double citizenship?
Clearly, in including 5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the
Constitutional Commission was not with dual citizens per se but with naturalized
citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their
naturalization. Hence, the phrase dual citizenship in R.A. No. 7160, 40(d) and in
R.A. No. 7854, 20 must be understood as referring to dual
allegiance. Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this
disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject
to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with
dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy,
34
they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual
citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of
conflicting laws of different states. As Joaquin G. Bernas, one of the most
perceptive members of the Constitutional Commission, pointed out: [D]ual
citizenship is just a reality imposed on us because we have no control of the laws
on citizenship of other countries. We recognize a child of a Filipino mother. But
whether or not she is considered a citizen of another country is something
completely beyond our control.[12]
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear
allegiance to the other country of which they are also citizens and thereby
terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of the
foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced his
foreign citizenship. That is of no moment as the following discussion on 40(d)
between Senators Enrile and Pimentel clearly shows:[13]
SENATOR ENRILE. Mr. President, I would like to ask clarification of line 41,
page 17: Any person with dual citizenship is disqualified to run for any
elective local position. Under the present Constitution, Mr. President,
someone whose mother is a citizen of the Philippines but his father is a
foreigner is a natural-born citizen of the Republic. There is no requirement
that such a natural born citizen, upon reaching the age of majority, must
elect or give up Philippine citizenship.
On the assumption that this person would carry two passports, one belonging
to the country of his or her father and one belonging to the Republic of
the Philippines, may such a situation disqualify the person to run for a
local government position?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. To my mind, Mr. President, it only means that at the
moment when he would want to run for public office, he has to repudiate
one of his citizenships.
SENATOR ENRILE. Suppose he carries only a Philippine passport but the
country of origin or the country of the father claims that person,
nevertheless, as a citizen? No one can renounce. There are such countries
in the world.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Well, the very fact that he is running for public office
would, in effect, be an election for him of his desire to be considered as a
Filipino citizen.
SENATOR ENRILE. But, precisely, Mr. President, the Constitution does not
require an election. Under the Constitution, a person whose mother is a
citizen of the Philippines is, at birth, a citizen without any overt act to
claim the citizenship.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes. What we are saying, Mr. President, is: Under the
Gentlemans example, if he does not renounce his other citizenship, then
he is opening himself to question. So, if he is really interested to run, the
first thing he should do is to say in the Certificate of Candidacy that: I am
a Filipino citizen, and I have only one citizenship.
SENATOR ENRILE. But we are talking from the viewpoint of Philippine law, Mr.
President. He will always have one citizenship, and that is the citizenship
invested upon him or her in the Constitution of the Republic.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. That is true, Mr. President. But if he exercises acts that
will prove that he also acknowledges other citizenships, then he will
probably fall under this disqualification.
This is similar to the requirement that an applicant for naturalization must
renounce all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or
sovereignty[14] of which at the time he is a subject or citizen before he can be
issued a certificate of naturalization as a citizen of the Philippines.  In Parado v.
Republic,[15] it was held:
[W]hen a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that he
renounces his loyalty to any other country or government and solemnly declares
that he owes his allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the condition
imposed by law is satisfied and complied with. The determination whether such
renunciation is valid or fully complies with the provisions of our Naturalization Law
lies within the province and is an exclusive prerogative of our courts. The latter
should apply the law duly enacted by the legislative department of the Republic. No
foreign law may or should interfere with its operation and application. If the
requirement of the Chinese Law of Nationality were to be read into our
Naturalization Law, we would be applying not what our legislative department has
deemed it wise to require, but what a foreign government has thought or intended
to exact. That, of course, is absurd. It must be resisted by all means and at all
cost. It would be a brazen encroachment upon the sovereign will and power of the
people of this Republic.
III. PETITIONER'S ELECTION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP
The record shows that private respondent was born in San Francisco,
California on September 4, 1955, of Filipino parents. Since the Philippines adheres
to the principle of jus sanguinis, while the United States follows the doctrine of jus
soli, the parties agree that, at birth at least, he was a national both of the
Philippines and of the United States. However, the COMELEC en banc held that, by
participating in Philippine elections in 1992, 1995, and 1998, private respondent
effectively renounced his U.S. citizenship under American law, so that now he is
solely a Philippine national.
Petitioner challenges this ruling. He argues that merely taking part in
Philippine elections is not sufficient evidence of renunciation and that, in any event,
as the alleged renunciation was made when private respondent was already 37
years old, it was ineffective as it should have been made when he reached the age
of majority.
In holding that by voting in Philippine elections private respondent renounced
his American citizenship, the COMELEC must have in mind 349 of the Immigration
and Nationality Act of the United States, which provided that A person who is a
national of the United States, whether by birth or naturalization, shall lose his
nationality by: . . . (e) Voting in a political election in a foreign state or participating
in an election or plebiscite to determine the sovereignty over foreign territory. To
be sure this provision was declared unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court
35
in Afroyim v. Rusk[16] as beyond the power given to the U.S. Congress to regulate
foreign relations. However, by filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his
present post, private respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in effect
renounced his American citizenship. Private respondents certificate of candidacy,
filed on March 27, 1998, contained the following statements made under oath:
6. I AM A FILIPINO CITIZEN (STATE IF NATURAL-BORN OR
NATURALIZED) NATURAL-BORN
....
10. I AM A REGISTERED VOTER OF PRECINCT NO. 747-A, BARANGAY
SAN LORENZO, CITY/MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, PROVINCE OF
NCR .
11. I AM NOT A PERMANENT RESIDENT OF, OR IMMIGRANT TO, A
FOREIGN COUNTRY.
12. I AM ELIGIBLE FOR THE OFFICE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED. I WILL
SUPPORT AND DEFEND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES
AND WILL MAINTAIN TRUE FAITH AND ALLEGIANCE THERETO;
THAT I WILL OBEY THE LAWS, LEGAL ORDERS AND DECREES
PROMULGATED BY THE DULY CONSTITUTED AUTHORITIES OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND THAT I IMPOSE THIS
OBLIGATION UPON MYSELF VOLUNTARILY, WITHOUT MENTAL
RESERVATION OR PURPOSE OF EVASION. I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT
THE FACTS STATED HEREIN ARE TRUE AND CORRECT OF MY OWN
PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE.
The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American
citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual
citizen. Thus, in Frivaldo v. COMELEC  it was held:[17]
It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an American. Would
the retroactivity of his repatriation not effectively give him dual citizenship, which
under Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code would disqualify him from running for
any elective local position? We answer this question in the negative, as there is
cogent reason to hold that Frivaldo was really STATELESS at the time he took said
oath of allegiance and even before that, when he ran for governor in 1988.  In his
Comment, Frivaldo wrote that he had long renounced and had long abandoned his
American citizenshiplong before May 8, 1995. At best, Frivaldo was stateless in
the interimwhen he abandoned and renounced his US citizenship but before he
was repatriated to his Filipino citizenship.
On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution dated December 19, 1995:
By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost his American citizenship
when he took his oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government when he ran for
Governor in 1988, in 1992, and in 1995.Every certificate of candidacy contains an
oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government.
These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign nationality long before the
elections of 1995 have not been effectively rebutted by Lee. Furthermore, it is
basic that such findings of the Commission are conclusive upon this Court, absent
any showing of capriciousness or arbitrariness or abuse.
There is, therefore, no merit in petitioners contention that the oath of
allegiance contained in private respondents certificate of candidacy is insufficient to
constitute renunciation of his American citizenship. Equally without merit is
petitioners contention that, to be effective, such renunciation should have been
made upon private respondent reaching the age of majority since no law requires
the election of Philippine citizenship to be made upon majority age.
Finally, much is made of the fact that private respondent admitted that he is
registered as an American citizen in the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation
and that he holds an American passport which he used in his last travel to the
United States on April 22, 1997. There is no merit in this. Until the filing of his
certificate of candidacy on March 21, 1998, he had dual citizenship. The acts
attributed to him can be considered simply as the assertion of his American
nationality before the termination of his American citizenship. What this Court said
in Aznar v. COMELEC[18]  applies mutatis mutandis to private respondent in the case
at bar:
. . . Considering the fact that admittedly Osmea was both a Filipino and an
American, the mere fact that he has a Certificate stating he is an American does
not mean that he is not still a Filipino. . . . [T]he Certification that he is an
American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino, possessed as he is, of both
nationalities or citizenships. Indeed, there is no express renunciation here of
Philippine citizenship; truth to tell, there is even no implied renunciation of said
citizenship. When We consider that the renunciation needed to lose Philippine
citizenship must be express, it stands to reason that there can be no such loss of
Philippine citizenship when there is no renunciation, either express or implied.
To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino
citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that
he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith
and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private
respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively
repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as
a dual citizen.
On the other hand, private respondents oath of allegiance to the Philippines,
when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received
his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections
in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking
made under oath. Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for
declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in appropriate
proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago,[19] we sustained the denial of entry into
the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized
citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in
commercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A
similar sanction can be taken against any one who, in electing Philippine
citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act
constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
36
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

37
 Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such public office as required by
Supreme Court
the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of
Manila
candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
 
citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
EN BANC
Same; Same; Garnering the most number of votes does not validate the
EUSEBIO EUGENIO K. LOPEZ, G.R. No. 182701
election of a disqualified candidate because the application of the constitutional
Petitioner,
and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of popularity. —While it
Present:
is true that petitioner won the elections, took his oath and began to discharge the
 
functions of Barangay Chairman, his victory can not cure the defect of his
PUNO, C.J.,
candidacy. Garnering the most number of votes does not validate the election of a
QUISUMBING,
disqualified candidate because the application of the constitutional and statutory
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
provisions on disqualification is not a matter of popularity.
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
RESOLUTION
- versus - CARPIO MORALES,
 
AZCUNA,
 
TINGA,
REYES, R.T., J.:
CHICO-NAZARIO,
 
VELASCO, JR.,
 
NACHURA,
REYES, A Filipino-American or any dual citizen cannot run for any elective public position in
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
and the Philippines unless he or she personally swears to a renunciation of all foreign
BRION, JJ.
citizenship at the time of filing the certificate of candidacy.
 
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS Promulgated:  
and TESSIE P. VILLANUEVA,
Respondents. July 23, 2008  
 
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, in relation to Rule 64 of the Rules on
x -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
  Civil Procedure assailing the (1) Resolution [1] and (2) Omnibus Order[2] of the
Election Law; Citizenship; Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of
2003 (Republic Act No. 9225); The case of Valles v. Commission on Elections, 337 Commission on Elections (COMELEC), Second Division, disqualifying petitioner from
SCRA 543 (2000), has been superseded by the enactment of Republic Act No. 9225
running as Barangay Chairman.
or the Dual Citizenship Act in 2003—R.A. No. 9225 expressly provides for the
conditions before those who re-acquired Filipino citizenship may run for a public  
office in the Philippines, i.e., that they make a personal and sworn renunciation of
any and all foreign citizenship. —The Court’s 2000 ruling in Valles has been Petitioner Eusebio Eugenio K. Lopez was a candidate for the position of
superseded by the enactment of R.A. No. 9225 in 2003. R.A. No. 9225 expressly
Chairman of Barangay Bagacay, San Dionisio, Iloilo City in the synchronized
provides for the conditions before those who re-acquired Filipino citizenship may
run for a public office in the Philippines. Section 5 of the said law states: Section 5. Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections held on October 29, 2007.
Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. —Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine
citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to  
all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and
the following conditions: x x x x (2) Those seeking elective public office in the

38
 On October 25, 2007, respondent Tessie P. Villanueva filed a  His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner resorted to the
[3]
petition  before the Provincial Election Supervisor of the Province of Iloilo, praying present petition, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC

for the disqualification of petitioner on the ground that he is an American citizen, for disqualifying him from running and assuming the office of Barangay Chairman.

hence, ineligible from running for any public office. In his Answer,  petitioner
[4]
 

argued that he is a dual citizen, a Filipino and at the same time an American, by We dismiss the petition.

virtue of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship  

Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003. [5] He returned to the Philippines and Relying on Valles v. Commission on Elections,[8] petitioner argues that his

resided in Barangay Bagacay. Thus, he said, he possessed all the qualifications to filing of a certificate of candidacy operated as an effective renunciation of foreign

run for Barangay Chairman. citizenship.

   

After the votes for Barangay Chairman were canvassed, petitioner emerged as the We note, however, that the operative facts that led to this Courts ruling

winner. [6]
in Valles are substantially different from the present case. In Valles, the candidate,

  Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, was a dual citizen by accident of birth on foreign soil.

On February 6, 2008, COMELEC issued the assailed Resolution granting [9]

 Lopez was born of Filipino parents in Australia, a country which follows the

the petition for disqualification, disposing as follows: principle of jus soli. As a result, she acquired Australian citizenship by operation of

  Australian law, but she was also considered a Filipino citizen under Philippine

  law. She did not perform any act to swear allegiance to a country other than

  the Philippines.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition
for Disqualification is GRANTED and respondent Eusebio Eugenio  
K. Lopez is DISQUALIFIED from running as Barangay Chairman In contrast, petitioner was born a Filipino but he deliberately sought
of Barangay Bagacay, San Dionisio, Iloilo.
  American citizenship and renounced his Filipino citizenship. He later on became a
SO ORDERED.[7]
dual citizen by re-acquiring Filipino citizenship.
 
 
In ruling against petitioner, the COMELEC found that he was not able to
More importantly, the Courts 2000 ruling in Valles has been superseded by
regain his Filipino citizenship in the manner provided by law. According to the poll
the enactment of R.A. No. 9225[10] in 2003. R.A. No. 9225 expressly provides for
body, to be able to qualify as a candidate in the elections, petitioner should have
the conditions before those who re-acquired Filipino citizenship may run for a
made a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship. This,
public office in the Philippines. Section 5 of the said law states:
petitioner failed to do.
 
39
 Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and citizenship for it to be effective. In the instant case,
Liabilities.  Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship respondent Lopezs failure to renounce his American
under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be citizenship as proven by the absence of an affidavit that
subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under will prove the contrary leads this Commission to believe
existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions: that he failed to comply with the positive mandate of
  law. For failure of respondent to prove that he abandoned his
x x x x allegiance to the United States, this Commission holds him
  disqualified from running for an elective position in
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines.[11] (Emphasis added)
the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such
public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws  
and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of While it is true that petitioner won the elections, took his oath and began to
candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any
and all foreign citizenship before any public officer discharge the functions of Barangay Chairman, his victory can not cure the defect
authorized to administer an oath.(Emphasis added)
of his candidacy.Garnering the most number of votes does not validate the election
 
of a disqualified candidate because the application of the constitutional and
Petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the cited law. This new
statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of popularity. [12]
law explicitly provides that should one seek elective public office, he should first
 
make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before
In sum, the COMELEC committed no grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying
any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
petitioner as candidate for Chairman in the Barangay elections of 2007.
 
 
Petitioner failed to comply with this requirement. We quote with approval
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
the COMELEC observation on this point:
 
  SO ORDERED.
While respondent was able to regain his Filipino  
Citizenship by virtue of the Dual Citizenship Law when he took
his oath of allegiance before the Vice Consul of the Philippine
Consulate Generals Office in Los Angeles, California, the same is
not enough to allow him to run for a public office. The above-
quoted provision of law mandates that a candidate with dual
citizenship must make a personal and sworn renunciation of any
and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath. There is no evidence presented that will
show that respondent complied with the provision of R.A.
No. 9225. Absent such proof we cannot allow respondent to run
for Barangay Chairman of Barangay Bagacay.
For the renunciation to be valid, it must be contained in an
affidavit duly executed before an officer of law who is authorized
to administer an oath. The affiant must state in clear and
unequivocal terms that he is renouncing all foreign

40
EN BANC —Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225 requires that natural-born citizens of the
  Philippines, who are already naturalized citizens of a foreign country, must take the
  following oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines to reacquire or retain
NESTOR A. JACOT,   their Philippine citizenship: SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship.—Any
Petitioner, provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the
G.R. No. 179848
  Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their
Present:
  naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have
 
  reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the
PUNO, C.J.,
  Republic.
QUISUMBING,
  Same; Same; Election Law; The law categorically requires persons seeking
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
  elective public office, who either retained their Philippine citizenship or those who
CARPIO,
  reacquired it, to make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
  citizenship before a public officer authorized to administer an oath simultaneous
CORONA,
  with or before the filing of the certificate of candidacy. —The law categorically
CARPIO MORALES,
- versus - requires persons seeking elective public office, who either retained their Philippine
AZCUNA,
  citizenship or those who reacquired it, to make a personal and sworn renunciation
TINGA,
  of any and all foreign citizenship before a public officer authorized to administer an
CHICO-NAZARIO,
  oath simultaneous with or before the filing of the certificate of candidacy.
VELASCO, JR.,
  Same; Same; Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural-born Filipinos,
NACHURA,
  who have been naturalized as citizens of a foreign country, but who reacquired or
REYES,
  retained their Philippine citizenship (1) to take the oath of allegiance under Section
DE CASTRO,* and
  3 of Republic Act No. 9225 and (2) for those seeking elective public offices in the
BRION,** JJ.
  Philippines, to additionally execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and
 
  all foreign citizenship.—Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural-born
 
ROGEN T. DAL and COMMISSION Filipinos, who have been naturalized as citizens of a foreign country, but who
Promulgated:
ON ELECTIONS, reacquired or retained their Philippine citizenship (1) to take the oath of allegiance
  under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, and (2) for those seeking elective public
November 27, 2008
offices in the Philippines, to additionally execute a personal and sworn renunciation
Respondents. of any and all foreign citizenship before an authorized public officer prior or
simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates
in Philippine elections. Clearly Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 (on the
making of a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship)
requires of the Filipinos availing themselves of the benefits under the said Act to
accomplish an undertaking other than that which they have presumably complied
with under Section 3 thereof (oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines).
This is made clear in the discussion of the Bicameral Conference Committee on
Disagreeing Provisions of House Bill No. 4720 and Senate Bill No. 2130 held on 18
August 2003 (precursors of Republic Act No. 9225), where the Hon. Chairman
Franklin Drilon and Hon. Representative Arthur Defensor explained to Hon.
Representative Exequiel Javier that the oath of allegiance is different from the
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x renunciation of foreign citizenship.
 
Same; Election Law; To qualify as a candidate in Philippine elections,
Constitutional Law; Citizenship and Naturalization; Section 3 of Republic Act Filipinos must only have one citizenship, namely, Philippine citizenship. —There is
No. 9225 requires that natural-born citizens of the Philippines, who are already little doubt, therefore, that the intent of the legislators was not only for Filipinos
naturalized citizens of a foreign country, must take the following oath of allegiance reacquiring or retaining their Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 to
to the Republic of the Philippines to reacquire or retain their Philippine citizenship. take their oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, but also to explicitly

41
renounce their foreign citizenship if they wish to run for elective posts in the
Philippines. To qualify as a candidate in Philippine elections, Filipinos must only
have one citizenship, namely, Philippine citizenship.
Appeals; As a rule, no question will be entertained on appeal unless it has
been raised in the proceedings below.—As a rule, no question will be entertained
on appeal unless it has been raised in the proceedings below. Points of law,
theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court,
administrative agency or quasi-judicial body need not be considered by a reviewing
court, as they cannot be raised for the first time at that late stage. Basic
considerations of fairness and due process impel this rule. Courts have neither the
time nor the resources to accommodate parties who chose to go to trial
haphazardly.
Same; Civil Procedure; Pleadings and Practice; The piecemeal presentation of
evidence is not in accord with orderly justice .—Section 1 of Rule 43 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides that “In the absence of any applicable
provisions of these Rules, the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court in the
Philippines shall be applicable by analogy or in suppletory character and effect.”
Section 34 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court categorically enjoins the
admission of evidence not formally presented: SEC. 34. Offer of evidence.—The
court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose
for which the evidence is offered must be specified. Since the said Affidavit was not
formally offered before the COMELEC, respondent had no opportunity to examine
and controvert it. To admit this document would be contrary to due process.
Additionally, the piecemeal presentation of evidence is not in accord with orderly
justice.
Attorneys; Pleadings and Practice; The only exceptions to the general rule—
that a client is bound by the mistakes of his counsel—which this court finds
acceptable are when the reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client
of due process of law, or when the application of the rule results in the outright
deprivation of one’s property through a technicality. —It is a well-settled rule that a
client is bound by his counsel’s conduct, negligence, and mistakes in handling the
case, and the client cannot be heard to complain that the result might have been
different had his lawyer proceeded differently. The only exceptions to the general
rule—that a client is bound by the mistakes of his counsel—which this Court finds
acceptable are when the reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client
of due process of law, or when the application of the rule results in the outright
deprivation of one’s property through a technicality. These exceptions are not
attendant in this case.
Same; Same; Mistakes of attorneys as to the competency of a witness, the
sufficiency, relevancy or irrelevancy of certain evidence, the proper defense or the
burden of proof, failure to introduce evidence, to summon witnesses and to argue
the case—unless they prejudice the client and prevent him from properly
presenting his case—do not constitute gross incompetence or negligence, such that
clients may no longer be bound by the acts of their counsel. —The Court cannot
sustain petitioner’s averment that his counsel was grossly negligent in deciding
against the presentation of the Affidavit of 7 February 2007 during the proceedings
before the COMELEC. Mistakes of attorneys as to the competency of a witness; the
sufficiency, relevancy or irrelevancy of certain evidence; the proper defense or the
burden of proof, failure to introduce evidence, to summon witnesses and to argue
the case—unless they prejudice the client and prevent him from properly
presenting his case—do not constitute gross incompetence or negligence, such that
clients may no longer be bound by the acts of their counsel.
Same; Same; The wrongful insistence of the lawyer in filing a demurrer to
evidence had totally deprived De Guzman of any chance to present documentary
evidence in his defense.—Petitioner cites De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan, 256 SCRA
171 (1996), where therein petitioner De Guzman was unable to present a piece of
evidence because his lawyer proceeded to file a demurrer to evidence, despite the
Sandiganbayan’s denial of his prior leave to do so. The wrongful insistence of the
lawyer in filing a demurrer to evidence had totally deprived De Guzman of any
chance to present documentary evidence in his defense. This was certainly not the
case in the Petition at bar.
Same; Same; A case lost due to an untenable legal position does not justify
a deviation from the rule that clients are bound by the acts and mistakes of their
counsel.—Petitioner was in no way deprived of due process. His counsel actively
defended his suit by attending the hearings, filing the pleadings, and presenting
evidence on petitioner’s behalf. Moreover, petitioner’s cause was not defeated by a
mere technicality, but because of a mistaken reliance on a doctrine which is not
applicable to his case. A case lost due to an untenable legal position does not
justify a deviation from the rule that clients are bound by the acts and mistakes of
their counsel.
Constitutional Law; Election Law; The rules on citizenship qualifications of a
candidate must be strictly applied .—Petitioner also makes much of the fact that he
received the highest number of votes for the position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman
during the 2007 local elections. The fact that a candidate, who must comply with
the election requirements applicable to dual citizens and failed to do so, received
the highest number of votes for an elective position does not dispense with, or
amount to a waiver of, such requirement. The will of the people as expressed
through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly
believed that the candidate was qualified. The rules on citizenship qualifications of
a candidate must be strictly applied. If a person seeks to serve the Republic of the
Philippines, he must owe his loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing
all fealty and fidelity to any other state. The application of the constitutional and
statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of popularity.
42
DECISION
   
  On 2 May 2007, respondent Rogen T. Dal filed a Petition for
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
  Disqualification[8] before the COMELEC Provincial Office in Camiguin against
 
petitioner, arguing that the latter failed to renounce his US citizenship, as required
Petitioner Nestor A. Jacot assails the Resolution[1] dated 28 September
under Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225, which reads as follows:
2007 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc in SPA No. 07-361,
 
affirming the Resolution dated 12 June 2007 of the COMELEC Second Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities.Those
who retain or reacquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall
Division  disqualifying
[2]
him from running for the position of Vice-Mayor enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant
of Catarman, Camiguin, in the 14 May 2007 National and Local Elections, on the liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the
Philippines and the following conditions:
ground that he failed to make a personal renouncement of his United States (US)  
x x x x
citizenship.  
  (2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines
shall meet the qualifications for holding such public office as
Petitioner was a natural born citizen of the Philippines, who became a required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of
the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and
naturalized citizen of the US on 13 December 1989. [3] sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any
  public officer authorized to administer an oath.
 
Petitioner sought to reacquire his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act  
No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act. He In his Answer[9] dated 6 May 2007 and Position Paper[10] dated 8 May
filed a request for the administration of his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of 2007, petitioner countered that his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines with the Philippine Consulate General (PCG) of Los the Philippines made before the Los Angeles PCG and the oath contained in his
Angeles, California. The Los Angeles PCG issued on 19 June 2006 an Order of Certificate of Candidacy operated as an effective renunciation of his foreign
Approval[4] of petitioners request, and on the same day, petitioner took his Oath of citizenship.
Allegiance to the Republic of thePhilippines before Vice Consul Edward  
C. Yulo. [5] On 27 September 2006, the Bureau of Immigration issued Identification In the meantime, the 14 May 2007 National and Local Elections were
Certificate No. 06-12019 recognizing petitioner as a citizen of the Philippines. [6]
held. Petitioner garnered the highest number of votes for the position of Vice
  Mayor.
Six months after, on 26 March 2007, petitioner filed his Certificate of  
Candidacy for the Position of Vice-Mayor of On 12 June 2007, the COMELEC Second Division finally issued its
the Municipality of Catarman, Camiguin.  [7]
Resolution[11] disqualifying the petitioner from running for the position of Vice-

43
Mayor of Catarman,Camiguin, for failure to make the requisite renunciation of States and Any and All Foreign Citizenship [17] dated 7 February 2007. He avers that
his US citizenship. The COMELEC Second Division explained that the reacquisition he executed an act of renunciation of his US citizenship, separate from the Oath of

of Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 does not automatically bestow Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines he took before the Los Angeles PCG

upon any person the privilege to run for any elective public office. It additionally and his filing of his Certificate of Candidacy, thereby changing his theory of the

ruled that the filing of a Certificate of Candidacy cannot be considered as a case during the appeal. He attributes the delay in the presentation of the affidavit

renunciation of foreign citizenship. The COMELEC Second Division did not to his former counsel, Atty. Marciano Aparte, who allegedly advised him that said

consider Valles v. COMELEC[12] and Mercado v.Manzano[13] applicable to the instant piece of evidence was unnecessary but who, nevertheless, made him execute an

case, since Valles and Mercado were dual citizens since birth, unlike the petitioner identical document entitled Oath of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States

who lost his Filipino citizenship by means of naturalization. The COMELEC, thus, and Renunciation of Any and All Foreign Citizenship on 27 June 2007 after he had

decreed in the aforementioned Resolution that: already filed his Certificate of Candidacy.[18]

   
ACCORDINGLY, NESTOR ARES
JACOT is DISQUALIFIED to run for the position of Vice-Mayor Petitioner raises the following issues for resolution of this Court:
of Catarman, Camiguin for the May 14, 2007 National and Local  
Elections. If proclaimed, respondent cannot thus assume the I
Office of Vice-Mayor of said municipality by virtue of such  
disqualification.[14] WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT EXERCISED GRAVE
  ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT HELD THAT PETITIONER
  FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE PROVISIONS OF R.A. 9225,
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on 29 June 2007 reiterating his OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE CITIZENSHIP RETENTION AND RE-
ACQUISITION ACT OF 2003, SPECIFICALLY SECTION 5(2) AS TO
position that his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the Los THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THOSE SEEKING ELECTIVE PUBLIC
OFFICE;
Angeles PCGand his oath in his Certificate of Candidacy sufficed as an effective  
renunciation of his US citizenship. Attached to the said Motion was an Oath of II
 
Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States and Renunciation of Any and All WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT EXERCISED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT HELD THAT PETITIONER
Foreign Citizenship dated 27 June 2007, wherein petitioner explicitly renounced FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE COMELEC
his US citizenship.[15] The COMELEC en banc dismissed petitioners Motion in a RULES OF PROCEDURE AS REGARDS THE PAYMENT OF THE
NECESSARY MOTION FEES; AND
Resolution[16] dated 28 September 2007 for lack of merit.  
III
   
Petitioner sought remedy from this Court via the present Special Civil WHETHER OR NOT UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF PUBLIC
RESPONDENT WOULD RESULT IN THE FRUSTRATION OF THE
Action for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, where he WILL OF THE PEOPLE OF CATARMAN, CAMIGUIN.[19]
 
presented for the first time an Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United
44
  
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after
The Court determines that the only fundamental issue in this case is the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country
whether petitioner is disqualified from running as a candidate in the 14 May shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid
oath.
2007 local elections for his failure to make a personal and sworn renunciation of  
 
his US citizenship.
By the oath dictated in the afore-quoted provision, the Filipino swears allegiance to
 
the Philippines, but there is nothing therein on his renunciation of foreign
This Court finds that petitioner should indeed be disqualified.
citizenship.Precisely, a situation might arise under Republic Act No. 9225 wherein
 
said Filipino has dual citizenship by also reacquiring or retaining his Philippine
Contrary to the assertions made by petitioner, his oath of allegiance to the
citizenship, despite his foreign citizenship.
Republic of the Philippines made before the Los Angeles PCG and his Certificate of
 
Candidacy do not substantially comply with the requirement of a personal and
The afore-quoted oath of allegiance is substantially similar to the one
sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship because these are distinct requirements to
contained in the Certificate of Candidacy which must be executed by any
be complied with for different purposes.
person who wishes to run for public office in Philippine elections. Such an oath
 
reads:
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225 requires that natural-born
 
citizens of the Philippines, who are already naturalized citizens of a foreign I am eligible for the office I seek to be elected. I will
country, must take the following oath of allegiance to the Republic of support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that I will obey the
the Philippines to reacquire or retain their Philippine citizenship: laws, legal orders and decrees promulgated by the duly
constituted authorities of the Republic of the Philippines; and
  that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily, without
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship.Any provision mental reservation or purpose of evasion. I hereby certify that
of law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the facts stated herein are true and correct of my own personal
the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by knowledge.
reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are  
hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon  
taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic:
  Now, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 specifically provides that:
I __________ solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will
support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the  
Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities.Those
the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby who retain or reacquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall
declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant
Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the
and that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily, without Philippines and the following conditions:
mental reservation or purpose of evasion.  

45
 x x x x
  Disagreeing Provisions of House Bill No. 4720 and Senate Bill No. 2130 held on 18
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines August 2003 (precursors of Republic Act No. 9225), where the Hon. Chairman
shall meet the qualifications for holding such public office as
required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of Franklin Drilon and Hon. Representative Arthur Defensor explained to Hon.
the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any Representative Exequiel Javier that the oath of allegiance is different from the
public officer authorized to administer an oath. renunciation of foreign citizenship:
 
   
CHAIRMAN DRILON. Okay. So, No. 2. Those seeking
The law categorically requires persons seeking elective public office, who elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the
either retained their Philippine citizenship or those who reacquired it, to make a qualifications for holding such public office as required by the
Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before a public certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation
of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer
officer authorized to administer an oath simultaneous with or before the filing of authorized to administer an oath. I think its very good, ha? No
the certificate of candidacy.[20] problem?
 
 Hence, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural- REP. JAVIER. I think its already covered by the oath.
 
born Filipinos, who have been naturalized as citizens of a foreign CHAIRMAN DRILON. Renouncing foreign citizenship.
country, but who reacquired or retained their Philippine citizenship (1) to  
REP. JAVIER. Ah but he has taken his oath already.
take the oath of allegiance under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, and  
CHAIRMAN DRILON. Nono, renouncing foreign citizenship.
(2) for those seeking elective public offices in the Philippines, to  
additionally execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign x x x x
 
citizenship before an authorized public officer prior or simultaneous to the filing of CHAIRMAN DRILON. Can I go back to No. 2. Whats your
problem, Boy? Those seeking elective office in
their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine the Philippines.
elections.  
REP. JAVIER. They are trying to make him renounce his
  citizenship thinking that ano
 
Clearly Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 (on the making of a CHAIRMAN DRILON. His American citizenship.
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship) requires of the  
REP. JAVIER. To discourage him from running?
Filipinos availing themselves of the benefits under the said Act to accomplish an  
CHAIRMAN DRILON. No.
undertaking other than that which they have presumably complied with under
 
Section 3 thereof (oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines).  This is REP. A.D. DEFENSOR. No. When he runs he will only have
one citizenship. When he runs for office, he will have only
made clear in the discussion of the Bicameral Conference Committee on one. (Emphasis ours.)
 

46

There is little doubt, therefore, that the intent of the legislators was not
only for Filipinos reacquiring or retaining their Philippine citizenship under Republic
Act No. 9225 to take their oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, but
also to explicitly renounce their foreign citizenship if they wish to run for elective
posts in the Philippines.To qualify as a candidate in Philippine elections, Filipinos
must only have one citizenship, namely, Philippine citizenship.
 
By the same token, the oath of allegiance contained in the Certificate of
Candidacy, which is substantially similar to the one contained in Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 9225, does not constitute the personal and sworn renunciation
sought under Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225. It bears to emphasize that the
said oath of allegiance is a general requirement for all those who wish to run as
candidates in Philippine elections; while the renunciation of foreign citizenship is an
additional requisite only for those who have retained or reacquired Philippine
citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 and who seek elective public posts,
considering their special circumstance of having more than one citizenship.
Petitioner erroneously invokes the doctrine in Valles [21]
 and Mercado,
[22]
 wherein the filing by a person with dual citizenship of a certificate of candidacy,
containing an oath of allegiance, was already considered a renunciation of foreign
citizenship. The ruling of this Court in Valles  and Mercado  is not applicable to the
present case, which is now specially governed by Republic Act No. 9225,
promulgated on 29 August 2003.
 
In Mercado, which was cited in Valles, the disqualification of therein
private respondent Manzano was sought under another law, Section 40(d) of the
Local Government Code, which reads:
SECTION 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are
disqualified from running for any elective local position:
x x x x
 
(d) Those with dual citizenship.
 
The Court in the aforesaid cases sought to define the term dual citizenship vis--
vis the concept of dual allegiance. At the time this Court decided the cases
of Valles  and Mercadoon 26 May 1999 and 9 August 2000, respectively, the more
explicitly worded requirements of Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 were not
yet enacted by our legislature.[23]
 
Lopez v. Commission on Elections [24] is the more fitting precedent for this
case since they both share the same factual milieu. In Lopez, therein petitioner
Lopez was a natural-born Filipino who lost his Philippine citizenship after he
became a naturalized US citizen. He later reacquired his Philippine citizenship by
virtue of Republic Act No.9225. Thereafter, Lopez filed his candidacy for a local
elective position, but failed to make a personal and sworn renunciation of his
foreign citizenship. This Court unequivocally declared that despite having garnered
the highest number of votes in the election, Lopez is nonetheless disqualified as a
candidate for a local elective position due to his failure to comply with the
requirements of Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225.
 
Petitioner presents before this Court for the first time, in the instant Petition
for Certiorari, an Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States and
Any and All Foreign Citizenship,[25] which he supposedly executed on 7 February
2007, even before he filed his Certificate of Candidacy on 26 March 2007. With the
said Affidavit, petitioner puts forward in the Petition at bar a new theory of his
casethat he complied with the requirement of making a personal and sworn
renunciation of his foreign citizenship before filing his Certificate of Candidacy. This
47
new theory constitutes a radical change from the earlier position he took before the
COMELECthat he complied with the requirement of renunciation by his oaths of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines made before the Los Angeles PCG and
in his Certificate of Candidacy, and that there was no more need for a separate act
of renunciation.
 
As a rule, no question will be entertained on appeal unless it has been
raised in the proceedings below. Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not
brought to the attention of the lower court, administrative agency or quasi-judicial
body need not be considered by a reviewing court, as they cannot be raised for the
first time at that late stage.Basic considerations of fairness and due process impel
this rule. [26]
 Courts have neither the time nor the resources to accommodate parties
who chose to go to trial haphazardly.[27]
 
Likewise, this Court does not countenance the late submission of
evidence. [28]
 Petitioner should have offered the Affidavit dated 7 February
2007 during the proceedings before the COMELEC.
Section 1 of Rule 43 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides that In
the absence of any applicable provisions of these Rules, the pertinent provisions of
the Rules of Court in the Philippines shall be applicable by analogy or
in suppletory character and effect. Section 34 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of
Court categorically enjoins the admission of evidence not formally presented:
 
SEC. 34. Offer of evidence. - The court shall consider no
evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for
which the evidence is offered must be specified.
 
Since the said Affidavit was not formally offered before the COMELEC,
respondent had no opportunity to examine and controvert it. To admit this
document would be contrary to due process.  [29] Additionally, the piecemeal
presentation of evidence is not in accord with orderly justice.[30]
 
The Court further notes that petitioner had already presented before the
COMELEC an identical document, Oath of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United
States and Renunciation of Any and All Foreign Citizenship executed on 27 June
2007, subsequent to his filing of his Certificate of Candidacy on 26 March
2007. Petitioner attached the said Oath of 27 June 2007 to his Motion for
Reconsideration with the COMELEC en banc. The COMELEC en banc eventually
refused to reconsider said document for being belatedly executed. What was
extremely perplexing, not to mention suspect, was that petitioner did not submit
the Affidavit of 7 February 2007 or mention it at all in the proceedings before the
COMELEC, considering that it could have easily won his case if it was actually
executed on and in existence before the filing of his Certificate of Candidacy, in
compliance with law.
The justification offered by petitioner, that his counsel had advised him
against presenting this crucial piece of evidence, is lame and unconvincing. If the
Affidavit of 7 February 2007 was in existence all along, petitioners counsel, and
even petitioner himself, could have easily adduced it to be a crucial piece of
evidence to prove compliance with the requirements of Section 5(2) of Republic Act
No. 9225. There was no apparent danger for petitioner to submit as much evidence
as possible in support of his case, than the risk of presenting too little for which he
could lose.
And even if it were true, petitioners excuse for the late presentation of the
Affidavit of 7 February 2007 will not change the outcome of petitioners case.
48
   counsel, despite the formers incongruous allegations that the latter has been
It is a well-settled rule that a client is bound by his counsels conduct, grossly negligent.

negligence, and mistakes in handling the case, and the client cannot be heard to  

complain that the result might have been different had his lawyer proceeded Petitioner himself is also guilty of negligence. If indeed he believed that

differently.[31] The only exceptions to the general rule -- that a client is bound by his counsel was inept, petitioner should have promptly taken action, such as

the mistakes of his counsel -- which this Court finds acceptable are when the discharging his counsel earlier and/or insisting on the submission of his Affidavit of

reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law, or 7 February 2007 to the COMELEC, instead of waiting until a decision was rendered

when the application of the rule results in the outright deprivation of ones property disqualifying him and a resolution issued dismissing his motion for reconsideration;

through a technicality.[32] These exceptions are not attendant in this case. and, thereupon, he could have heaped the blame on his former counsel. Petitioner

  could not be so easily allowed to escape the consequences of his former counsels

The Court cannot sustain petitioners averment that his counsel was acts, because, otherwise, it would render court proceedings indefinite, tentative,

grossly negligent in deciding against the presentation of the Affidavit of 7 February and subject to reopening at any time by the mere subterfuge of replacing

2007 during the proceedings before the COMELEC. Mistakes of attorneys as to the counsel. [34]

competency of a witness; the sufficiency, relevancy or irrelevancy of certain  

evidence; the proper defense or the burden of proof, failure to introduce evidence, Petitioner cites De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan,[35] where therein petitioner

to summon witnesses and to argue the case -- unless they prejudice the client and De Guzman was unable to present a piece of evidence because his lawyer

prevent him from properly presenting his case -- do not constitute gross proceeded to file a demurrer to evidence, despite the Sandiganbayans denial of his

incompetence or negligence, such that clients may no longer be bound by the acts prior leave to do so. The wrongful insistence of the lawyer in filing a demurrer to

of their counsel.[33] evidence had totally deprived De Guzman of any chance to present documentary

  evidence in his defense. This was certainly not the case in the Petition at bar.

Also belying petitioners claim that his former counsel was grossly  

negligent was the fact that petitioner continuously used his former counsels theory Herein, petitioner was in no way deprived of due process. His counsel

of the case. Even when the COMELEC already rendered an adverse decision, he actively defended his suit by attending the hearings, filing the pleadings, and

persistently argues even to this Court that his oaths of allegiance to the Republic of presenting evidence on petitioners behalf. Moreover, petitioners cause was not

the Philippines before the Los Angeles PCG and in his Certificate of Candidacy defeated by a mere technicality, but because of a mistaken reliance on a doctrine

amount to the renunciation of foreign citizenship which the law requires.  Having which is not applicable to his case. A case lost due to an untenable legal position

asserted the same defense in the instant Petition, petitioner only demonstrates his does not justify a deviation from the rule that clients are bound by the acts and

continued reliance on and complete belief in the position taken by his former mistakes of their counsel.[36]
49
  
Petitioner also makes much of the fact that he received the highest

number of votes for the position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman during the 2007 local

elections. The fact that a candidate, who must comply with the election

requirements applicable to dual citizens and failed to do so, received the highest

number of votes for an elective position does not dispense with, or amount to a

waiver of, such requirement. [37] The will of the people as expressed through the

ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed that

the candidate was qualified. The rules on citizenship qualifications of a candidate

must be strictly applied. If a person seeks to serve the Republic of thePhilippines,

he must owe his loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and

fidelity to any other state. [38] The application of the constitutional and statutory

provisions on disqualification is not a matter of popularity. [39]

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The Resolution dated 28

September 2007 of the COMELEC en banc in SPA No. 07-361, affirming the

Resolution dated 12 June 2007 of the COMELEC Second Division,

is AFFIRMED. Petitioner is DISQUALIFIED to run for the position of Vice-Mayor

of Catarman, Camiguin in the 14 May 2007National and Local Elections, and if

proclaimed, cannot assume the Office of Vice-Mayor of said municipality by virtue

of such disqualification. Costs against petitioner.

 
SO ORDERED.
 

50
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 170603             January 29, 2007
EDISON SO, Petitioner,  that there is a need to liberalize the naturalization law of the Philippines, there is
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
Citizenship; Naturalization; Commonwealth Act No. 473; Republic Act No. 9139;
Under current and existing laws, there are three ways by which an alien may
become a citizen by naturalization: (a) administrative naturalization pursuant to
R.A. No. 9139; (b) judicial naturalization pursuant to C.A. No. 473, as amended;
and (c) legislative naturalization in the form of a law enacted by Congress
bestowing Philippine citizenship to an alien. —Naturalization signifies the act of
formally adopting a foreigner into the political body of a nation by clothing him or
her with the privileges of a citizen. Under current and existing laws, there are three
ways by which an alien may become a citizen by naturalization: (a) administrative
naturalization pursuant to R.A. No. 9139; (b) judicial naturalization pursuant to
C.A. No. 473, as amended; and (c) legislative naturalization in the form of a law
enacted by Congress bestowing Philippine citizenship to an alien.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The qualifications and disqualifications of an applicant
for naturalization by judicial act are set forth in Sections 2 and 4 of C.A. No. 473
while Sections 3 and 4 of R.A. No. 9139 provide for the qualifications and
disqualifications of an applicant for naturalization by administrative act. —
Petitioner’s contention that the qualifications an applicant for naturalization should
possess are those provided for in R.A. No. 9139 and not those set forth in C.A. No.
473 is barren of merit. The qualifications and disqualifications of an applicant for
naturalization by judicial act are set forth in Sections 2 and 4 of C.A. No. 473. On
the other hand, Sections 3 and 4 of R.A. No. 9139 provide for the qualifications and
disqualifications of an applicant for naturalization by administrative act. Indeed,
R.A. No. 9139 was enacted as a remedial measure intended to make the process of
acquiring Philippine citizenship less tedious, less technical and more encouraging. It
likewise addresses the concerns of degree holders who, by reason of lack of
citizenship requirement, cannot practice their profession, thus promoting “brain
gain” for the Philippines. These however, do not justify petitioner’s contention that
the qualifications set forth in said law apply even to applications for naturalization
by judicial act.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Although the legislature believes that there is a need
to liberalize the naturalization law of the Philippines, there is nothing from which it
can be inferred that C.A. No. 473 was intended to be amended or repealed by R.A.
No. 9139—what the legislature had in mind was merely to prescribe another mode
of acquiring Philippine citizenship which may be availed of by native born aliens. —
C.A. No. 473 and R.A. No. 9139 are separate and distinct laws—the former covers
all aliens regardless of class while the latter covers native-born aliens who lived
here in the Philippines all their lives, who never saw any other country and all
along thought that they were Filipinos; who have demonstrated love and loyalty to
the Philippines and affinity to the customs and traditions. To reiterate, the intention
of the legislature in enacting R.A. No. 9139 was to make the process of acquiring
Philippine citizenship less tedious, less technical and more encouraging which is
administrative rather than judicial in nature. Thus, although the legislature believes
nothing from which it can be inferred that C.A. No. 473 was intended to be
amended or repealed by R.A. No. 9139. What the legislature had in mind was
merely to prescribe another mode of acquiring Philippine citizenship which may be
availed of by native born aliens. The only implication is that, a native born alien
has the choice to apply for judicial or administrative naturalization, subject to the
prescribed qualifications and disqualifications.
Same; Same; Same; Witnesses; Character witnesses in naturalization proceedings
stand as insurers of the applicant’s conduct and character—they ought to testify on
specific facts and events justifying the inference that the applicant possesses all
the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided by law. —Petitioner
failed to prove that the witnesses he presented were competent to vouch for his
good moral character, and are themselves possessed of good moral character. It
must be stressed that character witnesses in naturalization proceedings stand as
insurers of the applicant’s conduct and character. Thus, they ought to testify on
specific facts and events justifying the inference that the applicant possesses all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided by law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Within the purview of the
naturalization law, a “credible person” is not only an individual who has not been
previously convicted of a crime; who is not a police character and has no police
record; who has not perjured in the past; or whose affidavit or testimony is not
incredible—what must be credible is not the declaration made but the person
making it.—In naturalization proceedings, it is the burden of the applicant to prove
not only his own good moral character but also the good moral character of his/her
witnesses, who must be credible persons. Within the purview of the naturalization
law, a “credible person” is not only an individual who has not been previously
convicted of a crime; who is not a police character and has no police record; who
has not perjured in the past; or whose affidavit or testimony is not incredible. What
must be credible is not the declaration made but the person making it. This implies
that such person must have a good standing in the community; that he is known to
be honest and upright; that he is reputed to be trustworthy and reliable; and that
his word may be taken on its face value, as a good warranty of the applicant’s
worthiness. The records likewise do not show that the character witnesses of
petitioner are persons of good standing in the community; that they are honest
and upright, or reputed to be trustworthy and reliable. The most that was
established was the educational attainment of the witnesses; however, this cannot
be equated with their credibility. In fine, petitioner focused on presenting evidence
tending to build his own good moral character and neglected to establish the
credibility and good moral character of his witnesses.
Same; Same; A naturalization proceeding is not a judicial adversary proceeding,
and the decision rendered therein does not constitute res judicata—a certificate of
51
naturalization may be cancelled if it is subsequently discovered that the applicant
obtained it by misleading the court upon any material fact. —We do not agree with
petitioner’s argument that respondent is precluded from questioning the RTC
decision because of its failure to oppose the petition. A naturalization proceeding is
not a judicial adversary proceeding, and the decision rendered therein does not
constitute res judicata. A certificate of naturalization may be cancelled if it is
subsequently discovered that the applicant obtained it by misleading the court
upon any material fact. Law and jurisprudence even authorize the cancellation of a
certificate of naturalization upon grounds or conditions arising subsequent to the
granting of the certificate. If the government can challenge a final grant of
citizenship, with more reason can it appeal the decision of the RTC within the
reglementary period despite its failure to oppose the petition before the lower
court.
Same; Same; Citizenship is one of the highest privileges that the Republic of the
Philippines can confer upon an alien.—It must be stressed that admission to
citizenship is one of the highest privileges that the Republic of the Philippines can
confer upon an alien. It is a privilege that should not be conferred except upon
persons fully qualified for it, and upon strict compliance with the law.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari is the Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 80437 which reversed the Decision 2 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 8, in Naturalization Case No. 02-102984.
Likewise assailed is the appellate court’s Resolution denying the Motion for
Reconsideration of its Decision.
Antecedents
On February 28, 2002, petitioner Edison So filed before the RTC a Petition for
Naturalization3 under Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 473, otherwise known as the
Revised Naturalization Law, as amended. He alleged the following in his petition:
He was born on February 17, 1982, in Manila; he is a Chinese citizen who has lived
in No. 528 Lavezares St., Binondo, Manila, since birth; as an employee, he derives
an average annual income of around P100,000.00 with free board and lodging and
other benefits; he is single, able to speak and write English, Chinese and Tagalog;
he is exempt from the filing of Declaration of Intention to become a citizen of the
Philippines pursuant to Section 6 of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 473, as
amended, because he was born in the Philippines, and studied in a school
recognized by the Government where Philippine history, government and culture
are taught; he is a person of good moral character; he believes in the principles
underlying the Philippine constitution; he has conducted himself in a proper and
irreproachable manner during the entire period of his residence in the Philippines in
his relation with the constituted government as well as with the community in
which he is living; he has mingled socially with the Filipinos and has evinced a
sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs, traditions and ideals of the
Filipino people; he has all the qualifications provided under Section 2 and none of
the disqualifications under Section 4 of C.A. No. 473, as amended; he is not
opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of
persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized governments; he is
not defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault or
assassination for the success or predominance of men’s ideas; he is not a
polygamist or a believer in the practice of polygamy; he has not been convicted of
any crime involving moral turpitude; he is not suffering from any incurable
contagious diseases or from mental alienation; the nation of which he is a citizen is
not at war with the Philippines; it is his intention in good faith to become a citizen
of the Philippines and to renounce absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity
to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty, and particularly to China;
and he will reside continuously in the Philippines from the time of the filing of the
petition up to the time of his admission as citizen of the Philippines. The petition
was docketed as Naturalization Case No. 02-102984.
Attached to the petition were the Joint Affidavit 4 of Atty. Artemio Adasa, Jr. and
Mark B. Salcedo; and petitioner’s Certificate of Live Birth, 5 Alien Certificate of
Registration,6 and Immigrant Certificate of Residence.7
On March 22, 2002, the RTC issued an Order 8 setting the petition for hearing at
8:30 a.m. of December 12 and 17, 2002 during which all persons concerned were
enjoined to show cause, if any, why the petition should not be granted. The entire
petition and its annexes, including the order, were ordered published once a week
for three consecutive weeks in the Official Gazette and also in a newspaper of
general circulation in the City of Manila. The RTC likewise ordered that copies of
the petition and notice be posted in public and conspicuous places in the Manila
City Hall Building.9
Petitioner thus caused the publication of the above order, as well as the entire
petition and its annexes, in the Official Gazette on May 20, 2002 10 and May 27,
2002,11 and in Today, a newspaper of general circulation in the City of Manila, on
May 25, 2002 and June 1, 2002.
No one opposed the petition. During the hearing, petitioner presented Atty. Adasa,
Jr. who testified that he came to know petitioner in 1991 as the legal consultant
and adviser of the So family’s business. He would usually attend parties and other
social functions hosted by petitioner’s family. He knew petitioner to be obedient,
hardworking, and possessed of good moral character, including all the
qualifications mandated by law. Atty. Adasa, Jr. further testified that petitioner was
gainfully employed and presently resides at No. 528 Lavezares Street, Binondo,
Manila; petitioner had been practicing Philippine tradition and those embodied in
the Constitution; petitioner had been socially active, mingled with some of his
neighbors and had conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner
during his entire stay in the Philippines; and petitioner and his family observed
Christmas and New Year and some occasions such as fiestas. According to the
witness, petitioner was not disqualified under C.A. No. 473 to become a Filipino
citizen: he is not opposed to organized government or believes in the use of force;
he is not a polygamist and has not been convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude; neither is he suffering from any mental alienation or any incurable
disease.12
52
Another witness for petitioner, Mark Salcedo, testified that he has known petitioner
for ten (10) years; they first met at a birthday party in 1991. He and petitioner
were classmates at the University of Santo Tomas (UST) where they took up
Pharmacy. Petitioner was a member of some school organizations and mingled well
with friends.13Salcedo further testified that he saw petitioner twice a week, and
during fiestas and special occasions when he would go to petitioner’s house. He
has known petitioner to have resided in Manila since birth. Petitioner is intelligent,
a person of good moral character, and believes in the principles of the Philippine
Constitution. Petitioner has a gainful occupation, has conducted himself in a proper
and irreproachable manner and has all the qualifications to become a Filipino
citizen.
Petitioner also testified and attempted to prove that he has all the qualifications
and none of the disqualifications to become a citizen of the Philippines.
At the conclusion of his testimonial evidence, petitioner offered in evidence the
following documents: (1) Certificate of Live Birth; 14 (2) Alien Certificate of
Registration;15 (3) Immigrant Certificate of Residence;16 (4) Elementary
Pupil’s17 and High School Student’s18 Permanent Record issued by Chang Kai Shek
College; (5) Transcript of Record issued by the University of Santo Tomas; 19 (6)
Certification of Part-Time Employment dated November 20, 2002; 20 (7) Income Tax
Returns and Certificate of Withholding Tax for the year 2001; 21 (8) Certification
from Metrobank that petitioner is a depositor; 22 (9) Clearances that he has not
been charged or convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude; 23 and (10)
Medical Certificates and Psychiatric Evaluation issued by the Philippine General
Hospital.24 The RTC admitted all these in evidence.
The RTC granted the petition on June 4, 2003.25 The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition and declaring
that petitioner EDISON SO has all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications to become a Filipino citizen and he is hereby admitted as citizen of
the Philippines, after taking the necessary oath of allegiance, as soon as this
decision becomes final, subject to payment of cost of P30,000.00.
SO ORDERED.26
The trial court ruled that the witnesses for petitioner had known him for the period
required by law, and they had affirmed that petitioner had all the qualifications and
none of the disqualifications to become a Filipino citizen. Thus, the court concluded
that petitioner had satisfactorily supported his petition with evidence.
Respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), appealed the decision to the CA on the following grounds:
I.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR NATURALIZATION
DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE TWO (2) CHARACTER WITNESSES, NAMELY:
ARTEMIO ADASA, JR. AND MARK SALCEDO WERE NOT QUALIFIED CHARACTER
WITNESSES.
II.
PETITIONER IS NOT QUALIFIED TO BE ADMITTED AS CITIZEN OF THE
PHILIPPINES.27
Respondent contended that based on the evidence on record, appellee failed to
prove that he possesses all the qualifications under Section 2 and none of the
disqualifications under Section 4 of C.A. No. 473. It insisted that his two (2)
character witnesses did not know him well enough to vouch for his fitness to
become a Filipino citizen; they merely made general statements without giving
specific details about his character and moral conduct. 28The witnesses did not even
reside in the same place as petitioner. 29 Respondent likewise argued that petitioner
himself failed to prove that he is qualified to become a Filipino citizen because he
did not give any explanation or specific answers to the questions propounded by
his lawyer. He merely answered "yes" or "no" or gave general statements in
answer to his counsel’s questions. Thus, petitioner was unable to prove that he had
all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications required by law to be a
naturalized Filipino citizen.30
On the other hand, petitioner averred that he graduated cum laude from the UST
with the degree of Bachelor of Science in Pharmacy. He is now on his second year
as a medical student at the UST Medicine and Surgery. He avers that the
requirements for naturalization under C.A. No. 473, as amended by LOI 270, in
relation to Presidential Decree Nos. 836 and 1379, had been relaxed after the
Philippine government entered into diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic
of China; the requirements were further relaxed when Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9139
was signed into law.31 Petitioner pointed out that the petition, with all its annexes,
was published in the official gazette and a newspaper of general circulation; notices
were likewise sent to the National Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice,
Department of Foreign Affairs, and the OSG. But none from these offices came
forward to oppose the petition before the lower court. 32 Petitioner insisted that he
has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to become Filipino. This
was clearly established by his witnesses.
In its Reply Brief, respondent alleged that R.A. No. 9139 applies to administrative
naturalization filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization. It insisted that
even in the absence of any opposition, a petition for naturalization may be
dismissed.
In its Decision33 dated August 4, 2005, the CA set aside the ruling of the RTC and
dismissed the petition for naturalization without prejudice. 34 According to the CA,
petitioner’s two (2) witnesses were not credible because they failed to mention
specific details of petitioner’s life or character to show how well they knew him;
they merely "parroted" the provisions of the Naturalization Act without clearly
explaining their applicability to petitioner’s case. 35 The appellate court likewise ruled
that petitioner failed to comply with the requirement of the law that the applicant
must not be less than 21 years of age on the day of the hearing of the petition;
during the first hearing on December 12, 2002, petitioner was only twenty (20)
years, nine (9) months, and twenty five (25) days old, falling short of the
requirement.36 The CA stated, however, that it was not its intention to forever close
the door to any future application for naturalization which petitioner would file, and
that it believes that he would make a good Filipino citizen in due time, a decided
asset to this country.37
53
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration 38 was denied in a Resolution39 dated
November 24, 2005; hence, the present petition grounded on the sole issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT REVERSED THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF MANILA.40
In support of his petition, petitioner reiterates the arguments he set forth in the
Brief filed before the CA.
In its Comment41 on the petition, respondent countered that R.A. No. 9139 (which
took effect on August 8, 2001 and where the applicant’s age requirement was
lowered to eighteen (18) years old), refers only to administrative naturalization
filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization; it does not apply to judicial
naturalization before the court, as in the present case. 42 Respondent, through the
OSG, avers that its failure to oppose the petition before the court a quo does not
preclude it from appealing the decision of the RTC to the CA; it is even authorized
to question an already final decision by filing a petition for cancellation of
citizenship.43 Lastly, respondent reiterates its argument that petitioner’s character
witnesses are not qualified to prove the former’s qualifications.
In determining whether or not an applicant for naturalization is entitled to become
a Filipino citizen, it is necessary to resolve the following issues: (1) whether or not
R.A. No. 9139 applies to petitions for naturalization by judicial act; and (2) whether
or not the witnesses presented by petitioner are "credible" in accordance with the
jurisprudence and the definition and guidelines set forth in C.A. No. 473.
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
Naturalization signifies the act of formally adopting a foreigner into the political
body of a nation by clothing him or her with the privileges of a citizen. 44 Under
current and existing laws, there are three ways by which an alien may become a
citizen by naturalization: (a) administrative naturalization pursuant to R.A. No.
9139; (b) judicial naturalization pursuant to C.A. No. 473, as amended; and (c)
legislative naturalization in the form of a law enacted by Congress bestowing
Philippine citizenship to an alien.45
Petitioner’s contention that the qualifications an applicant for naturalization should
possess are those provided for in R.A. No. 9139 and not those set forth in C.A. No.
473 is barren of merit. The qualifications and disqualifications of an applicant for
naturalization by judicial act are set forth in Sections 246 and 447 of C.A. No. 473.
On the other hand, Sections 348 and 449 of R.A. No. 9139 provide for the
qualifications and disqualifications of an applicant for naturalization
by administrative act.
Indeed, R.A. No. 9139 was enacted as a remedial measure intended to make the
process of acquiring Philippine citizenship less tedious, less technical and more
encouraging.50 It likewise addresses the concerns of degree holders who, by reason
of lack of citizenship requirement, cannot practice their profession, thus promoting
"brain gain" for the Philippines.51 These however, do not justify petitioner’s
contention that the qualifications set forth in said law apply even to applications for
naturalization by judicial act.
First. C.A. No. 473 and R.A. No. 9139 are separate and distinct laws – the former
covers all aliens regardless of class while the latter covers native-born aliens who
lived here in the Philippines all their lives, who never saw any other country and all
along thought that they were Filipinos; who have demonstrated love and loyalty to
the Philippines and affinity to the customs and traditions. 52 To reiterate, the
intention of the legislature in enacting R.A. No. 9139 was to make the process of
acquiring Philippine citizenship less tedious, less technical and more encouraging
which is administrative rather than judicial in nature. Thus, although the legislature
believes that there is a need to liberalize the naturalization law of the Philippines,
there is nothing from which it can be inferred that C.A. No. 473 was intended to be
amended or repealed by R.A. No. 9139. What the legislature had in mind was
merely to prescribe another mode of acquiring Philippine citizenship which may be
availed of by native born aliens. The only implication is that, a native born alien has
the choice to apply for judicial or administrative naturalization, subject to the
prescribed qualifications and disqualifications.
In the instant case, petitioner applied for naturalization by judicial act, though at
the time of the filing of his petition, administrative naturalization under R.A. No.
9139 was already available. Consequently, his application should be governed by
C.A. No. 473.
Second. If the qualifications prescribed in R.A. No. 9139 would be made applicable
even to judicial naturalization, the coverage of the law would be broadened since it
would then apply even to aliens who are not native born. It must be stressed that
R.A. No. 9139 applies only to aliens who were born in the Philippines and have
been residing here.
Third. Applying the provisions of R.A. No. 9139 to judicial naturalization is contrary
to the intention of the legislature to liberalize the naturalization procedure in the
country. One of the qualifications set forth in R.A. No. 9139 is that the applicant
was born in the Philippines and should have been residing herein since birth. Thus,
one who was born here but left the country, though resided for more than ten (10)
years from the filing of the application is also disqualified. On the other hand, if we
maintain the distinct qualifications under each of the two laws, an alien who is not
qualified under R.A. No. 9139 may still be naturalized under C.A. No. 473.
Thus, absent a specific provision expressly amending C.A. No. 473, the law stands
and the qualifications and disqualifications set forth therein are maintained.
In any event, petitioner failed to prove that the witnesses he presented were
competent to vouch for his good moral character, and are themselves possessed of
good moral character. It must be stressed that character witnesses in naturalization
proceedings stand as insurers of the applicant’s conduct and character. Thus, they
ought to testify on specific facts and events justifying the inference that the
applicant possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided
by law.53
Petitioner’s witnesses, Atty. Adasa and Salcedo, did not testify on his specific acts;
they did not elaborate on his traits. Their testimonies do not convince the Court
that they personally know petitioner well and are therefore in a position to vouch
for his qualifications. As correctly found by the CA, the witnesses’ testimonies
consisted mainly of general statements in answer to the leading questions
propounded by his counsel. What they conveniently did was to enumerate the
54
qualifications as set forth in the law without giving specific details. The pertinent
portion of Atty. Adasa’s testimony follows:
q Do you know the petitioner Edison So?
a Yes, Sir.
q Will you please tell us how did you come to know him?
a Well I came to know him[,] the petitioner[,] when I was the legal consultant and
adviser of their family business and I used to ah (sic) me[e]t him during my visit to
their place way back in 1991 to 1992.
q From that day of 1991 up to the present, is your relationship with the petitioner
more or less contin[u]ous?
a Yes, sir, because aside from the usual professional visit that I did to their family
some social function was sponsored normally and I am (sic) invited and I used to
attend.
q During the birthday party of the petitioner, did you usually attend petitioner’s
birthday?
a On several occasions I attend the birthday.
q Will you please tell us where the petitioner resides at present?
a At present the petitioner resides at No. 528 Lavezares Street, Binondo, Manila.
q Do you know for how long the petitioner resides in the Philippines?
a As far as I personally known (sic) Your Honor is that since birth.
q During all the times that you have know[n] the petitioner, what is your
impression of his conduct?
a Well ah (sic) I have personally known him to be obedient and hard working
individual and ah (sic) he has a good moral character and he has been ah (sic) no
adverse report concerning the character of the petitioner.
q In your opinion does the petitioner has the qualifications necessary to become
[a] citizen of the Philippines?
a Yes.
q Can you tell us why do you say so?
a I would say Your Honor that petitioner has posses (sic) all the qualifications
mandated by law and presently he is more than 21 years old and he has resided in
the Philippines particularly in the City of Manila contin[u]ously for more than ten
(10) years and that since his birth; and that he has good moral character and I
have observed that ah (sic) he has been practicing Philippine traditions and ah (sic)
those embodied in the Philippine constitution and he has been socially active and
meddle (sic) some of his neighbors and ah (sic) I am sure he has desire to
embrace and learn the customs and ideas and traditions in the Philippine[s] and as
I earlier mentioned that he conducted himself in proper and approachable (sic)
manner during his entire residence in our country and he has a gainful occupation.
q Will you please tell us what are these customs which the petitioner embraced?
a Well I have observed that ah (sic) together with his family they used to ah
observed (sic) the usual Filipino celebration during Christmas and new year and
some occasions such as fiestas.
q And do you know whether petitioner is not disqualified under Commonwealth Act
to become Filipino citizen of the Philippines (sic)?
a Ah there has been no incident or occasion which I learned that would disqualify
of coming (sic) the citizen of the Republic of the Philippines. I have noticed that ah
(sic) he is qualified under Commonwealth Act 473 as amended because he is not
opposed to ah (sic) organized government. His family and himself does not
believed (sic) in the use of force in the success of his ideas and ah (sic) he is not a
poligamist (sic) or believer in the practice of illegal and he has not been convicted
in any crime involving him in any crime (sic). and he is not suffering from any
mental alienation or any incurable contidious (sic) disease. as provided for.
q Will you please tell us why you know all these stage?
a Because of ah (sic) the personal attachment with his family we have continuously
having ah (sic) the usual contact with his family. 54
It can thus be inferred that Atty. Adasa is close to petitioner’s family, but not
specifically to petitioner. Atty. Adasa’s statements refer to his observations on the
family’s practices and not to petitioner in particular. Nothing in his testimony
suggests that he was close to petitioner and knew him well enough to vouch for his
qualifications.
Salcedo, on the other hand, testified thus:
q Now do you know the petitioner in this case Edison So?
a Yes, Sir.
q Are you personally acquainted with him?
a Yes, Sir.
q How long have you known the petitioner?
a I have known him for about ten (10) years, Sir.
q Will you please inform the Honorable court under what circumstances did you
come to know the petitioner?
a I met him in a birthday party in 1991, Sir.
q And from 1991 up to the present is your relationship with the petitioner more or
less contin[u]ous?
a Yes, Sir.
q How often did you see the petitioner?
a I see him twice a week, Sir.
q And during this time that you met the petitioner, what did you usually do?
a We play some games, Sir. We play Patentero (sic).
q Do you go to church together?
a Yes, Sir.
q During fiestas in your place, did the petitioner go?
a Yes, Sir.
q How about during fiestas in the place where the petitioner reside[s], did you also
go during fiestas?
a Yes, Sir.
q During occasion in the house of the petitioner, are you invited?
a Yes, Sir.
q How many time[s] did you go to his (sic) residence of the petitioner?
a Twice a week, sir.
q Will you please tell us where the petitioner resides?
a The petitioner resides at 528 Lavezares Street, Tondo, Manila, Sir.
55
q For how long does the petitioner reside in that address? a Sharmaine Santos, Sir.
a Since birth, Sir. q You said the petitioner is of good moral character?
q During all the times that you have known the petitioner, will you please tell us a Yes, Sir.
your impression of his conduct? q Why do you know that?
a He is a person of good moral, sir, and he believed in the principles of the a As a classmate I can see him I go with him and ah (sic) I can see that he has ah
Philippines (sic) Constitution. better approached (sic) with other people and I can see that he mixed very well
q Will you please cite one or two of these principles underlined the principles (sic) with friends.
of the Philippines (sic) Constitution? q So during school days you see him everyday?
a Ah the Philippines is a Republican of the (sic) state, sovereignty preside (sic) over a Yes, Sir.
the people and the government authority emanate from within; and the other one q When there are no classes during the vacation you see the petitioner twice a
is the civilian government is not supreme over the military. week?
q Now in your opinion does the petitioner have all the qualifications necessary to a Yes, Sir.
become a citizen of the Philippines? q Does the petitioner (sic), do you think the petitioner is not disqualified to become
a Yes, Sir. the citizen of the Republic of the Philippines?
q What are these qualifications? a Yes, Sir, he is not disqualified, Sir.
a He is at least 21 years old, he is a person of good moral and has been residing in q Why do you say that he is not disqualified?
the Philippines since birth. a Because he abide [by] any law in the government, sir, ah (sic) he is not
q What else? polygamus and he is not convicted of any crime, Sir.
a He must be a Filipino and ah must practice the traditions and customs, Sir. q Do you know ever the petitioner oppose to any organized government?
q Do you know whether the petitioner conducted himself in a proper and a No, Sir.
appraochable (sic) manner during the period of his residence in the Philippines? q Do you know whether he believe[s] in the use of force in any such ideas?
a Yes, Sir. a No, Sir.
q Do you know if the petitioner has a gainful occupation? q Do you know if the petitioner is a believer in the practice of polygamy?
a Yes, Sir. a No, Sir.
q What is the occupation of the petitioner? q Do you know whether the petitioner suffer[s] from mental alienation or incurable
a Ah (sic) he is the secretary in a wood factory in Commonwealth, Sir. disease illnesses?
q And aside from being the secretary, what else did the petitioner do? a No, Sir.
a He help (sic) in the factory cargo, Sir. q Why do you know?
q Is the petitioner still a student? a I know him personally, sir, I have been with him as my classmate, sir and ah
a Yes, Sir. (sic) he is a very intelligent person, Sir.
q Where is he studying? q Is the petitioner a member also of any organization or association in your school?
a In UST, Sir. a Yes, Sir.
q Is he your classmate? q What organization?
a Yes, Sir. a He is a member of Wishten and a member of starget, Sir.
q What was his course? q What does starget means?
a Pharmacy, Sir. a Starget is an organization of Chinese community in UST, Sir.
q So when you said he was the secretary he only works as part time secretary? q How about the other one which you mentioned?
a Yes, Sir. a Ah (sic) these are twisting, sir he represents the ah the (sic) school
q You said the petitioner meddle (sic) socially with the Filipinos? intercollegiate, Sir.55
a Yes, Sir. Again, Salcedo did not give specific details on petitioner’s qualifications.
q Will you please name at least one of those Filipinos the petitioner meddle (sic) In sum, petitioner’s witnesses clearly did not personally know him well enough;
with? their testimonies do not satisfactorily establish that petitioner has all the
a Samuel Falmera, Sir, Marlon Kahocom, Sir. qualifications and none of the disqualifications prescribed by law.
q Who else? In naturalization proceedings, it is the burden of the applicant to prove not only his
a Elmer Ramos, Sir. own good moral character but also the good moral character of his/her witnesses,
q Who else? who must be credible persons. 56 Within the purview of the naturalization law, a

56
"credible person" is not only an individual who has not been previously convicted of
a crime; who is not a police character and has no police record; who has not
perjured in the past; or whose affidavit or testimony is not incredible. What must
be credible is not the declaration made but the person making it. This implies that
such person must have a good standing in the community; that he is known to be
honest and upright; that he is reputed to be trustworthy and reliable; and that his
word may be taken on its face value, as a good warranty of the applicant’s
worthiness.57
The records likewise do not show that the character witnesses of petitioner are
persons of good standing in the community; that they are honest and upright, or
reputed to be trustworthy and reliable. The most that was established was the
educational attainment of the witnesses; however, this cannot be equated with
their credibility. In fine, petitioner focused on presenting evidence tending to build
his own good moral character and neglected to establish the credibility and good
moral character of his witnesses.58
We do not agree with petitioner’s argument that respondent is precluded from
questioning the RTC decision because of its failure to oppose the petition. A
naturalization proceeding is not a judicial adversary proceeding, and the decision
rendered therein does not constitute res judicata. A certificate of naturalization may
be cancelled if it is subsequently discovered that the applicant obtained it by
misleading the court upon any material fact. Law and jurisprudence even authorize
the cancellation of a certificate of naturalization upon grounds or conditions arising
subsequent to the granting of the certificate. 59 If the government can challenge a
final grant of citizenship, with more reason can it appeal the decision of the RTC
within the reglementary period despite its failure to oppose the petition before the
lower court.
Thus, petitioner failed to show full and complete compliance with the requirements
of naturalization law. For this reason, we affirm the decision of the CA denying the
petition for naturalization without prejudice.
It must be stressed that admission to citizenship is one of the highest privileges
that the Republic of the Philippines can confer upon an alien. It is a privilege that
should not be conferred except upon persons fully qualified for it, and upon strict
compliance with the law.60
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

57
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 87193 June 23, 1989
JUAN GALLANOSA FRIVALDO, petitioner,  mother. Once rejected, it is not quick to welcome back with eager arms its prodigal
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES,
SORSOGON CHAPTER, HEREIN REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT,
SALVADOR NEE ESTUYE, respondents.
J.L. Misa & Associates for petitioner.
Lladoc, Huab & Associates for private respondent.
Constitutional Law; Citizenship; Naturalization; Repatriation; Petitioner’s loss of his
naturalized American citizenship did not and could not have the effect of automatic
restoration of his Philippine citizenship.— While Frivaldo does not invoke either of
the first two methods, he nevertheless claims he has reacquired Philippine
citizenship by virtue of a valid repatriation. He claims that by actively participating
in the elections in this country, he automatically forfeited American citizenship
under the laws of the United States. Such laws do not concern us here. The alleged
forfeiture is between him and the United States as his adopted country. It should
be obvious that even if he did lose his naturalized American citizenship, such
forfeiture did not and could not have the effect of automatically restoring his
citizenship in the Philippines that he had earlier renounced. At best, what might
have happened as a result of the loss of his naturalized citizenship was that he
became a stateless individual.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Mere filing of certificate of candidacy wherein
Petitioner claimed that he is a natural born Filipino citizen, not a sufficient act of
repatriation.—Frivaldo’s contention that he could not have repatriated himself
under LOI 270 because the Special Committee provided for therein had not yet
been constituted seems to suggest that the lack of that body rendered his
repatriation unnecessary. That is far-fetched if not specious. Such a conclusion
would open the floodgates, as it were. It would allow all Filipinos who have
renounced this country to claim back their abandoned citizenship without formally
rejecting their adopted state and reaffirming their allegiance to the Philippines. It
does not appear that Frivaldo has taken these categorical acts. He contends that
by simply filing his certificate of candidacy he had, without more, already
effectively recovered Philippine citizenship. But that is hardly the formal declaration
the law envisions—surely, Philippine citizenship previously disowned is not that
cheaply recovered. If the Special Committee had not yet been convened, what that
meant simply was that the petitioner had to wait until this was done, or seek
naturalization by legislative or judicial proceedings.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Repatriation requires an express and
unequivocal act.—It is true as the petitioner points out that the status of the
natural-born citizen is favored by the Constitution and our laws, which is all the
more reason why it should be treasured like a pearl of great price. But once it is
surrendered and renounced, the gift is gone and cannot be lightly restored. This
country of ours, for all its difficulties and limitations, is like a jealous and possessive
if repentant children. The returning renegade must show, by an express and
unequivocal act, the renewal of his loyalty and love.
Same; Administrative Law; Election Law; Public Officers; Qualifications for public
office are continuing requirements which must be possessed not only at the time of
appointment or election or assumption of office, but also during the entire tenure.
—The argument that the petition filed with the Commission on Elections should be
dismissed for tardiness is not well-taken. The herein private respondents are
seeking to prevent Frivaldo from continuing to discharge his office of governor
because he is disqualified from doing so as a foreigner. Qualifications for public
office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of
appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer’s entire
tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably
challenged. If, say, a female legislator were to marry a foreigner during her term
and by her act or omission acquires his nationality, would she have a right to
remain in office simply because the challenge to her title may no longer be made
within ten days from her proclamation? It has been established, and not even
denied, that the evidence of Frivaldo’s naturalization was discovered only eight
months after his proclamation and his title was challenged shortly thereafter.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Vice of ineligibility cannot be cured by the will
of the people as expressed through the ballot— This Court will not permit the
anomaly of a person sitting as provincial governor in this country while owing
exclusive allegiance to another country. The fact that he was elected by the people
of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public
office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The qualifications
prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of
the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility,
especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was
qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the deficiency is lack
of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must
owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and
fidelity to any other state.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., Concurring Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Election Law; Election Contest; Quo Warranto; The period fixed
for the filing of a protest whether quo warranto or election contest is mandatory
and jurisdictional.—I concur in the pragmatic approach taken by the Court. I agree
that when the higher interests of the State are involved, the public good should
58
supersede any procedural infirmities which may affect a petition filed with the
Commission on Elections. I fail to see how the Court could allow a person who by
his own admissions is indubitably an alien to continue holding the office of
Governor of any province. It is an established rule of long standing that the period
fixed by law for the filing of a protest—whether quo warranto or election contest—
is mandatory and jurisdictional.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The ten-day period for filing quo warranto petition
against a public officer must be strictly applied.— As a rule, the quo warranto
petition seeking to annul the petitioner’s election and proclamation should have
been filed within ten days after the proclamation of election results. The purpose of
the law in not allowing the filing of protests beyond the period fixed by law is to
have a certain and definite time within which petitions against the results of an
election should be filed and to provide summary proceedings for the settlement of
such disputes. The Rules of Court allow the Republic of the Philippines to file quo
warranto proceedings against any public officer who performs an act which works a
forfeiture of his office. However, where the Solicitor General or the President feel
that there are no good reasons to commence quo warranto proceedings, the Court
should allow a person like respondent Estuye or his league to bring the action. I
must emphasize, however, that my concurrence is limited to a clear case of an
alien holding an elective public office. And perhaps in a clear case of disloyalty to
the Republic of the Philippines. Where the disqualification is based on age,
residence, or any of the many grounds for ineligibility, I believe that the ten-day
period should be applied strictly.
CRUZ, J.:
Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of
Sorsogon on January 22, 1988, and assumed office in due time. On October 27,
1988, the League of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter (hereafter, League),
represented by its President, Salvador Estuye, who was also suing in his personal
capacity, filed with the Commission on Elections a petition for the annulment of
Frivaldo; election and proclamation on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen,
having been naturalized in the United States on January 20, 1983. In his answer
dated May 22, 1988, Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in the United States
as alleged but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he had sought
American citizenship only to protect himself against President Marcos. His
naturalization, he said, was "merely forced upon himself as a means of survival
against the unrelenting persecution by the Martial Law Dictator's agents abroad."
He added that he had returned to the Philippines after the EDSA revolution to help
in the restoration of democracy. He also argued that the challenge to his title
should be dismissed, being in reality a quo warranto petition that should have been
filed within ten days from his proclamation, in accordance with Section 253 of the
Omnibus Election Code. The League, moreover, was not a proper party because it
was not a voter and so could not sue under the said section.
Frivaldo moved for a preliminary hearing on his affirmative defenses but the
respondent Commission on Elections decided instead by its Order of January 20,
1988, to set the case for hearing on the merits. His motion for reconsideration was
denied in another Order dated February 21, 1988. He then came to this Court in a
petition for certiorari and prohibition to ask that the said orders be set aside on the
ground that they had been rendered with grave abuse of discretion. Pending
resolution of the petition, we issued a temporary order against the hearing on the
merits scheduled by the COMELEC and at the same time required comments from
the respondents.
In their Comment, the private respondents reiterated their assertion that Frivaldo
was a naturalized American citizen and had not reacquired Philippine citizenship on
the day of the election on January 18, 1988. He was therefore not qualified to run
for and be elected governor. They also argued that their petition in the Commission
on Elections was not really for quo warranto under Section 253 of the Omnibus
Election Code. The ultimate purpose was to prevent Frivaldo from continuing as
governor, his candidacy and election being null and void ab initio because of his
alienage. Even if their petition were to be considered as one for quo warranto, it
could not have been filed within ten days from Frivaldo's proclamation because it
was only in September 1988 that they received proof of his naturalization. And
assuming that the League itself was not a proper party, Estuye himself, who was
suing not only for the League but also in his personal capacity, could nevertheless
institute the suit by himself alone.
Speaking for the public respondent, the Solicitor General supported the contention
that Frivaldo was not a citizen of the Philippines and had not repatriated himself
after his naturalization as an American citizen. As an alien, he was disqualified from
public office in the Philippines. His election did not cure this defect because the
electorate of Sorsogon could not amend the Constitution, the Local Government
Code, and the Omnibus Election Code. He also joined in the private respondent's
argument that Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code was not applicable
because what the League and Estuye were seeking was not only the annulment of
the proclamation and election of Frivaldo. He agreed that they were also asking for
the termination of Frivaldo's incumbency as governor of Sorsogon on the ground
that he was not a Filipino.
In his Reply, Frivaldo insisted that he was a citizen of the Philippines because his
naturalization as an American citizen was not "impressed with voluntariness." In
support he cited the Nottebohm Case, [(1955 I.C.J. 4; 49 A.J.I.L. 396 (1955)]
where a German national's naturalization in Liechtenstein was not recognized
because it had been obtained for reasons of convenience only. He said he could
not have repatriated himself before the 1988 elections because the Special
Committee on Naturalization created for the purpose by LOI No. 27C had not yet
been organized then. His oath in his certificate of candidacy that he was a natural-
born citizen should be a sufficient act of repatriation. Additionally, his active
59
participation in the 1987 congressional elections had divested him of American authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General
citizenship under the laws of the United States, thus restoring his Philippine in San Francisco, California, U.S.A.
citizenship. He ended by reiterating his prayer for the rejection of the move to
disqualify him for being time-barred under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election OFFICE OF THE CLERK
Code. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
Considering the importance and urgency of the question herein raised, the Court
has decided to resolve it directly instead of allowing the normal circuitous route September 23, 1988
that will after all eventually end with this Court, albeit only after a, long delay. We
cannot permit this delay. Such delay will be inimical to the public interest and the
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
vital principles of public office to be here applied.

Our records show that JUAN GALLANOSA FRIVALDO, born on

It is true that the Commission on Elections has the primary jurisdiction over this
October 20, 1915, was naturalized in this Court on January 20,
question as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
1983, and issued Certificate of Naturalization No. 11690178.
qualifications of the members of the Congress and elective provincial and city
officials. However, the decision on Frivaldo's citizenship has already been made by
the COMELEC through its counsel, the Solicitor General, who categorically claims Petition No. 280225.
that Frivaldo is a foreigner. We assume this stance was taken by him after
consultation with the public respondent and with its approval. It therefore Alien Registration No. A23 079 270.
represents the decision of the COMELEC itself that we may now review. Exercising
our discretion to interpret the Rules of Court and the Constitution, we shall
Very truly yours,
consider the present petition as having been filed in accordance with Article IX-A
Section 7, of the Constitution, to challenge the aforementioned Orders of the
COMELEC.  

The basic question we must resolve is whether or not Juan G. Frivaldo was a WILLIAM L. WHITTAKER
citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election on January 18, 1988, as
provincial governor of Sorsogon. All the other issues raised in this petition are Clerk
merely secondary to this basic question.
by:
The reason for this inquiry is the provision in Article XI, Section 9, of the
Constitution that all public officials and employees owe the State and the (Sgd.)
Constitution "allegiance at all times" and the specific requirement in Section 42 of
the Local Government Code that a candidate for local elective office must be inter
alia a citizen of the Philippines and a qualified voter of the constituency where he is  
running. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter
must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an ARACELI V. BAREN
indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the
Constitution. Deputy Clerk

In the certificate of candidacy he filed on November 19, 1987, Frivaldo described
himself as a "natural-born" citizen of the Philippines, omitting mention of any
subsequent loss of such status. The evidence shows, however, that he was
naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983 per the following certification
from the United States District Court, Northern District of California, as duly
This evidence is not denied by the petitioner. In fact, he
expressly admitted it in his answer. Nevertheless, as earlier
noted, he claims it was "forced" on him as a measure of
60
protection from the persecution of the Marcos government
through his agents in the United States.
The Court sees no reason not to believe that the petitioner was
one of the enemies of the Marcos dictatorship. Even so, it cannot
agree that as a consequence thereof he was coerced into
embracing American citizenship. His feeble suggestion that his
naturalization was not the result of his own free and voluntary
choice is totally unacceptable and must be rejected outright.
There were many other Filipinos in the United States similarly
situated as Frivaldo, and some of them subject to greater risk
than he, who did not find it necessary — nor do they claim to
have been coerced — to abandon their cherished status as
Filipinos. They did not take the oath of allegiance to the United
States, unlike the petitioner who solemnly declared "on oath,
that I absolutely and entirely renounce and abjure all allegiance
and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty
of whom or which I have heretofore been a subject or citizen,"
meaning in his case the Republic of the Philippines. The martyred
Ninoy Aquino heads the impressive list of those Filipinos in exile
who, unlike the petitioner, held fast to their Philippine citizenship
despite the perils of their resistance to the Marcos regime.
The Nottebohm case cited by the petitioner invoked the
international law principle of effective nationality which is clearly
not applicable to the case at bar. This principle is expressed in
Article 5 of the Hague Convention of 1930 on the Conflict of
Nationality Laws as follows:
Art. 5. Within a third State a person having
more than one nationality shall be treated as if
he had only one. Without prejudice to the
application of its law in matters of personal
status and of any convention in force, a third
State shall, of the nationalities which any such
person possesses, recognize exclusively in its
territory either the nationality of the country in
which he is habitually and principally resident
or the nationality of the country with which in
the circumstances he appears to be in fact
most closely connected.
Nottebohm was a German by birth but a resident of Guatemala
for 34 years when he applied for and acquired naturalization in
Liechtenstein one month before the outbreak of World War II.
Many members of his family and his business interests were in
Germany. In 1943, Guatemala, which had declared war on
Germany, arrested Nottebohm and confiscated all his properties
on the ground that he was a German national. Liechtenstein
thereupon filed suit on his behalf, as its citizen, against
Guatemala. The International Court of Justice held Nottebohm to
be still a national of Germany, with which he was more closely
connected than with Liechtenstein.
That case is not relevant to the petition before us because it
dealt with a conflict between the nationality laws of two states as
decided by a third state. No third state is involved in the case at
bar; in fact, even the United States is not actively claiming
Frivaldo as its national. The sole question presented to us is
whether or not Frivaldo is a citizen of the Philippines under our
own laws, regardless of other nationality laws. We can decide
this question alone as sovereign of our own territory,
conformably to Section 1 of the said Convention providing that "it
is for each State to determine under its law who are its
nationals."
It is also worth noting that Nottebohm was invoking his
naturalization in Liechtenstein whereas in the present case
Frivaldo is rejecting his naturalization in the United States.
If he really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and
reacquire Philippine citizenship, the petitioner should have done
so in accordance with the laws of our country. Under CA No. 63
as amended by CA No. 473 and PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship
may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or
by repatriation.
While Frivaldo does not invoke either of the first two methods, he
nevertheless claims he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by
virtue of a valid repatriation. He claims that by actively
participating in the elections in this country, he automatically
forfeited American citizenship under the laws of the United
States. Such laws do not concern us here. The alleged forfeiture
is between him and the United States as his adopted country. It
should be obvious that even if he did lose his naturalized
American citizenship, such forfeiture did not and could not have
the effect of automatically restoring his citizenship in the
Philippines that he had earlier renounced. At best, what might
61
have happened as a result of the loss of his naturalized
citizenship was that he became a stateless individual.
Frivaldo's contention that he could not have repatriated himself
under LOI 270 because the Special Committee provided for
therein had not yet been constituted seems to suggest that the
lack of that body rendered his repatriation unnecessary. That is
far-fetched if not specious Such a conclusion would open the
floodgates, as it were. It would allow all Filipinos who have
renounced this country to claim back their abandoned citizenship
without formally rejecting their adoptedstate and reaffirming
their allegiance to the Philippines.
It does not appear that Frivaldo has taken these categorical acts.
He contends that by simply filing his certificate of candidacy he
had, without more, already effectively recovered Philippine
citizenship. But that is hardly the formal declaration the law
envisions — surely, Philippine citizenship previously disowned is
not that cheaply recovered. If the Special Committee had not yet
been convened, what that meant simply was that the petitioner
had to wait until this was done, or seek naturalization by
legislative or judicial proceedings.
The argument that the petition filed with the Commission on
Elections should be dismissed for tardiness is not well-taken. The
herein private respondents are seeking to prevent Frivaldo from
continuing to discharge his office of governor because he is
disqualified from doing so as a foreigner. Qualifications for public
office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not
only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of
office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the
required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably
challenged. If, say, a female legislator were to marry a foreigner
during her term and by her act or omission acquires his
nationality, would she have a right to remain in office simply
because the challenge to her title may no longer be made within
ten days from her proclamation? It has been established, and not
even denied, that the evidence of Frivaldo's naturalization was
discovered only eight months after his proclamation and his title
was challenged shortly thereafter.
This Court will not permit the anomaly of a person sitting as
provincial governor in this country while owing exclusive
allegiance to another country. The fact that he was elected by
the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of
the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to
the citizens of this country. The qualifications prescribed for
elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will
of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the
vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in
this case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule
requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of
citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the
Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country only,
abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state.
It is true as the petitioner points out that the status of the
natural-born citizen is favored by the Constitution and our laws,
which is all the more reason why it should be treasured like a
pearl of great price. But once it is surrendered and renounced,
the gift is gone and cannot be lightly restored. This country of
ours, for all its difficulties and limitations, is like a jealous and
possessive mother. Once rejected, it is not quick to welcome
back with eager arms its prodigal if repentant children. The
returning renegade must show, by an express and unequivocal
act, the renewal of his loyalty and love.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and petitioner JUAN G.
FRIVALDO is hereby declared not a citizen of the Philippines and
therefore DISQUALIFIED from serving as Governor of the
Province of Sorsogon. Accordingly, he is ordered to vacate his
office and surrender the same to the duly elected Vice-Governor
of the said province once this decision becomes final and
executory. The temporary restraining order dated March 9, 1989,
is LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Feliciano,
Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado,
JJ., concur.
Sarmiento, J., took no part.
Cortes J., concurs in the result.
62
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 142840. May 7, 2001]
ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and TEODORO C. CRUZ, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Citizenship; There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by
birth and (2) by naturalization; A person who at the time of his birth is a citizen of
a particular country, is a natural-born citizen thereof. —There are two ways of
acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by naturalization. These ways of
acquiring citizenship correspond to the two kinds of citizens: the natural-born
citizen, and the naturalized citizen.
A person who at the time of his birth is a citizen of a particular country, is a
natural-born citizen thereof.
Same; Same; Naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens
through naturalization generally under Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 473. —On the
other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens
through naturalization, generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise
known as the Revised Naturalization Law, which repealed the former Naturalization
Law (Act No. 2927), and by Republic Act No. 530. To be naturalized, an applicant
has to prove that he possesses all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications provided by law to become a Filipino citizen.
Same; Same; Modes by Which Philippine Citizenship may be Reacquired by a
Former Citizen.—Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however
reacquire the same in the manner provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. 63 (CA
No. 63), enumerates the three modes by which Philippine citizenship may be
reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by
direct act of Congress.
Same; Same; Same; Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality.
—Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a
naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a
naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born
citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former
status as a natural-born Filipino.
Same; Same; Same; A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to
undergo the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is
a natural-born Filipino; As respondent Cruz was not required by law to go through
naturalization proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a
natural-born Filipino.—Consequently, only naturalized Filipinos are considered not
natural-born citizens. It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under
the present Constitution that there are only two classes of citizens: (1) those who
are natural-born and (2) those who are naturalized in accordance with law. A
citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the process of
naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born Filipino.
Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of a separate category for persons
who, after losing Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The reason
therefor is clear: as to such persons, they would either be natural-born or
naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of their citizenship and the mode
prescribed by the applicable law for the reacquisition thereof. As respondent Cruz
was not required by law to go through naturalization proceedings in order to
reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such, he
possessed all the necessary qualifications to be elected as member of the House of
Representatives.
Remedial Law; Certiorari; The Court’s jurisdiction over the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) is merely to check “whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction”
on the part of the latter; There is no showing of grave abuse of discretion in this
case.—The HRET has been empowered by the Constitution to be the “sole judge”
of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of
the House. The Court’s jurisdiction over the HRET is merely to check “whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction” on the part of the latter. In the absence thereof, there is no occasion
for the Court to exercise its corrective power and annul the decision of the HRET
nor to substitute the Court’s judgment for that of the latter for the simple reason
that it is not the office of a petition for certiorari to inquire into the correctness of
the assailed decision. There is no such showing of grave abuse of discretion in this
case.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
The citizenship of respondent Teodoro C. Cruz is at issue in this case, in view
of the constitutional requirement that "no person shall be a Member of the House
of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen." [1]
Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in
San Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law
then applicable was the 1935 Constitution.[2]
On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United
States Marine Corps and, without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines,
took an oath of allegiance to the United States. As a consequence, he lost his
Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act No. 63, Section 1(4), a Filipino
citizen may lose his citizenship by, among others, "rendering service to or
accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country." Said provision of
law reads:
Section 1. How citizenship may be lost.  -- A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship
in any of the following ways and/or events:
xxx
(4) By rendering services to, or accepting commission in, the armed forces of a
foreign country: Provided, That the rendering of service to, or the acceptance of
such commission in, the armed forces of a foreign country, and the taking of an
oath of allegiance incident thereto, with the consent of the Republic of the
63
Philippines, shall not divest a Filipino of his Philippine citizenship if either of the
following circumstances is present:
(a) The Republic of the Philippines has a defensive and/or offensive pact of alliance
with said foreign country; or
(b) The said foreign country maintains armed forces on Philippine territory with the
consent of the Republic of the Philippines: Provided, That the Filipino citizen
concerned, at the time of rendering said service, or acceptance of said commission,
and taking the oath of allegiance incident thereto, states that he does so only in
connection with his service to said foreign country; And provided, finally, That any
Filipino citizen who is rendering service to, or is commissioned in, the armed forces
of a foreign country under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph (a) or
(b), shall not be permitted to participate nor vote in any election of the Republic of
the Philippines during the period of his service to, or commission in, the armed
forces of said country. Upon his discharge from the service of the said foreign
country, he shall be automatically entitled to the full enjoyment of his civil and
political rights as a Filipino citizen x x x.
Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was
erased by his naturalization as a U.S. citizen on June 5, 1990, in connection with
his service in the U.S. Marine Corps.
On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship
through repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630. [3] He ran for and was elected as
the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998
elections. He won by a convincing margin of 26,671 votes over petitioner Antonio
Bengson III, who was then running for reelection.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with
respondent House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) claiming that
respondent Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the House of
Representatives since he is not a natural-born citizen as required under Article VI,
Section 6 of the Constitution.[4]
On March 2, 2000, the HRET rendered its decision[5] dismissing the petition
for quo warranto and declaring respondent Cruz the duly elected Representative of
the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 1998 elections. The HRET likewise
denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the decision in its resolution dated
April 27, 2000.[6]
Petitioner thus filed the present petition for certiorari assailing the HRET's
decision on the following grounds:
1. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to
excess of jurisdiction, when it ruled that private respondent is a natural-born citizen
of the Philippines despite the fact that he had ceased being such in view of the loss
and renunciation of such citizenship on his part.
2. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to
excess of jurisdiction, when it considered private respondent as a citizen of the
Philippines despite the fact that he did not validly acquire his Philippine citizenship.
3. Assuming that private respondent's acquisition of Philippine citizenship was
invalid, the HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it dismissed the petition despite the fact
that such reacquisition could not legally and constitutionally restore his natural-
born status.[7]
The issue now before us is whether respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino
who became an American citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino
upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
Petitioner asserts that respondent Cruz may no longer be considered a
natural-born Filipino since he lost his Philippine citizenship when he swore
allegiance to the United States in 1995, and had to reacquire the same by
repatriation. He insists that Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution expressly states
that natural-born citizens are those who are citizens from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect such citizenship.
Respondent on the other hand contends that he reacquired his status as a
natural-born citizen when he was repatriated since the phrase "from birth" in
Article IV, Section 2 refers to the innate, inherent and inborn characteristic of being
a natural-born citizen.
The petition is without merit.
The 1987 Constitution enumerates who are Filipino citizens as follows:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption
of this Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.[8]
There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by
naturalization. These ways of acquiring citizenship correspond to the two kinds of
citizens: the natural-born citizen, and the naturalized citizen. A person who at the
time of his birth is a citizen of a particular country, is a natural-born citizen thereof.
[9]
As defined in the same Constitution, natural-born citizens "are those citizens
of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect
his Philippine citizenship."[10]
On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino
citizens through naturalization, generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473,
otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, which repealed the
former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and by Republic Act No. 530. [11] To be
naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possesses all the qualifications [12] and
none of the disqualifications [13] provided by law to become a Filipino citizen. The
decision granting Philippine citizenship becomes executory only after two (2) years
from its promulgation when the court is satisfied that during the intervening period,
the applicant has (1) not left the Philippines; (2) has dedicated himself to a lawful
calling or profession; (3) has not been convicted of any offense or violation of
Government promulgated rules; or (4) committed any act prejudicial to the interest
of the nation or contrary to any Government announced policies. [14]
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the
same in the manner provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. 63 (C.A. No. 63),
enumerates the three modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by
64
a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of
Congress.[15]
Naturalization is a mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship. As a mode of initially acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is
governed by Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. On the other hand,
naturalization as a mode for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by
Commonwealth Act No. 63.[16] Under this law, a former Filipino citizen who wishes
to reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess certain qualifications [17] and none of
the disqualifications mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473. [18]
Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those
who lost their citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces; [19] (2) service in
the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II; [20] (3) service in the Armed
Forces of the United States at any other time; [21] (4) marriage of a Filipino woman
to an alien;[22] and (5) political and economic necessity.[23]
As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation
simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where
the person concerned resides or last resided.
In Angat v. Republic,[24] we held:
xxx. Parenthetically, under these statutes [referring to RA Nos. 965 and 2630], the
person desiring to reacquire Philippine citizenship would not even be required to
file a petition in court, and all that he had to do was to take an oath of allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines and to register that fact with the civil registry in
the place of his residence or where he had last resided in the Philippines. [Italics in
the original.][25]
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality.
[26]
 This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to
his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was
originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be
restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered
service in the Armed Forces of the United States. However, he subsequently
reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 2630, which provides:
Section 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service
to, or accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after
separation from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States
citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines and registering the same with Local Civil Registry in
the place where he resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of
allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other citizenship.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having
registered the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance
with the aforecited provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to have recovered his
original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the
son of a Filipino father. [27] It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him
torecover, or return  to, his original status  before he lost his Philippine
citizenship.
Petitioner's contention that respondent Cruz is no longer a natural-born citizen
since he had to perform an act to regain his citizenship is untenable. As correctly
explained by the HRET in its decision, the term "natural-born citizen" was first
defined in Article III, Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution as follows:
Sec. 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.
Two requisites must concur for a person to be considered as such: (1) a
person must be a Filipino citizen from birth and (2) he does not have to perform
any act to obtain or perfect his Philippine citizenship.
Under the 1973 Constitution definition, there were two categories of Filipino
citizens which were not considered natural-born: (1) those who were naturalized
and (2) those born before January 17, 1973, [28] of Filipino mothers who, upon
reaching the age of majority, elected Philippine citizenship. Those "naturalized
citizens" were not considered natural-born obviously because they were not
Filipinos at birth and had to perform an act to acquire Philippine citizenship. Those
born of Filipino mothers before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution were
likewise not considered natural-born because they also had to perform an act to
perfect their Philippine citizenship.
The present Constitution, however, now considers those born of Filipino
mothers before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the majority age as natural-born. After defining who are
natural-born citizens, Section 2 of Article IV adds a sentence: "Those who elect
Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be
deemed natural-born citizens." Consequently, only naturalized Filipinos are
considered not natural-born citizens. It is apparent from the enumeration of who
are citizens under the present Constitution that there are only two classes of
citizens: (1) those who are natural-born and (2) those who are naturalized in
accordance with law. A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to
undergo the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is
a natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of a
separate category for persons who, after losing Philippine citizenship, subsequently
reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear: as to such persons, they would either be
natural-born or naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of their
citizenship and the mode prescribed by the applicable law for the reacquisition
thereof. As respondent Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization
proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born
Filipino. As such, he possessed all the necessary qualifications to be elected as
member of the House of Representatives.
A final point. The HRET has been empowered by the Constitution to be the
"sole judge" of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
members of the House. [29] The Court's jurisdiction over the HRET is merely to check
"whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the latter. [30] In the absence thereof, there is
no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power and annul the decision of
65
the HRET nor to substitute the Court's judgment for that of the latter for the simple
reason that it is not the office of a petition for certiorari to inquire into the
correctness of the assailed decision.[31] There is no such showing of grave abuse of
discretion in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

66

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 163256. November 10, 2004]
CICERON P. ALTAREJOS, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
JOSE ALMIE and VERNON VERSOZA, respondents.
Actions; Moot and Academic Questions; Courts will decide a question otherwise
moot and academic if it is capable of repetition, yet evading review. —As stated by
the Office of the Solicitor General, where the issues have become moot and
academic, there is no justiciable controversy, thereby rendering the resolution of
the same of no practical use or value. Nonetheless, courts will decide a question
otherwise moot and academic if it is capable of repetition, yet evading review.
Citizenship; Repatriation; In addition to taking the Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines, the registration of the Certificate of Repatriation in the
proper civil registry and the Bureau of Immigration is a prerequisite in effecting the
repatriation of a citizen.—The law is clear that repatriation is effected “by taking
the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registration in the
proper civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration.” Hence, in addition to taking
the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the registration of the
Certificate of Repatriation in the proper civil registry and the Bureau of Immigration
is a prerequisite in effecting the repatriation of a citizen.
Same; Same; While Republic Act No. 8171 has impliedly repealed Presidential
Decree No. 725, the Court’s ruling in Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, 257
SCRA 727 (1996), that repatriation retroacts to the date of filing of one’s
application for repatriation subsists and applies to repatriation under R.A. No.
8171.—Republic Act No. 8171 has impliedly repealed Presidential Decree No. 725.
They cover the same subject matter: Providing for the repatriation of Filipino
women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and of
natural-born Filipinos. The Court’s ruling in Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections
that repatriation retroacts to the date of filing of one’s application for repatriation
subsists for the same reasons quoted above. Accordingly, petitioner’s repatriation
retroacted to the date he filed his application in 1997. Petitioner was, therefore,
qualified to run for a mayoralty position in the government in the May 10, 2004
elections. Apparently, the COMELEC was cognizant of this fact since it did not
implement the assailed Resolutions disqualifying petitioner to run as mayor of San
Jacinto, Masbate.
Same; Same; Election Law; It is incumbent upon candidates for an elective office,
who are repatriated citizens, to be ready with sufficient evidence of their
repatriation in case their Filipino citizenship is questioned. —The Court cannot fault
the COMELEC en banc for affirming the decision of the COMELEC, First Division,
considering that petitioner failed to prove before the COMELEC that he had
complied with the requirements of repatriation. Petitioner submitted the necessary
documents proving compliance with the requirements of repatriation only during
his motion for reconsideration, when the COMELEC en banc could no longer
consider said evidence. As the COMELEC en banc correctly stated: The Comelec
Rules of Procedure provides that insufficiency of evidence to justify the decision is
a ground for a motion for reconsideration ( Rule 19, Section 1). The evidence
referred to in the above provision and to be considered in the Motion for
Reconsideration are those which were submitted during the hearing and attached
to the respective Memoranda of the parties which are already part of the records of
the case. In this regard, the evidence of the respondent were not able to overcome
the evidence of the petitioners. It is, therefore, incumbent upon candidates for an
elective office, who are repatriated citizens, to be ready with sufficient evidence of
their repatriation in case their Filipino citizenship is questioned to prevent a
repetition of this case.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or a writ of prohibitory and mandatory injunction, to set aside
the Resolution promulgated by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), First
Division, on March 22, 2004 disqualifying petitioner Ciceron P. Altarejos from
running as mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate, and another resolution of the
COMELEC en banc promulgated on May 7, 2004 denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
Petitioner Altarejos was a candidate for mayor in the Municipality of San
Jacinto, Masbate in the May 10, 2004 national and local elections.
On January 15, 2004, private respondents Jose Almie Altiche and Vernon
Versoza, registered voters of San Jacinto, Masbate, filed with the COMELEC, a
petition to disqualify and to deny due course or cancel the certificate of candidacy
of petitioner on the ground that he is not a Filipino citizen and that he made a false
representation in his certificate of candidacy that [he] was not a permanent
resident of or immigrant to a foreign country.
Private respondents alleged that based on a letter[1] from the Bureau of
Immigration dated June 25, 2001, petitioner was a holder of a permanent U.S.
resident visa, an Alien Certificate of Registration No. E139507 issued on November
3, 1997, and an Immigration Certificate of Residence No. 320846 issued on
November 3, 1997 by the Bureau of Immigration.[2]
On January 26, 2004, petitioner filed an Answer[3] stating, among others,
that he did not commit false representation in his application for candidacy as
mayor because as early as December 17, 1997, he was already issued a Certificate
of Repatriation by the Special Committee on Naturalization, after he filed a petition
for repatriation pursuant to Republic Act No. 8171. Thus, petitioner claimed that his
Filipino citizenship was already restored, and he was qualified to run as mayor in
the May 10, 2004 elections. Petitioner sought the dismissal of the petition.
On the date of the hearing, the parties were required to submit their
Memoranda within three days. Private respondents filed their Memorandum, while
67
petitioner did not file one within the required period.[4] Petitioner, however, filed a
Reply Memorandum[5] subsequently.
Atty. Zacarias C. Zaragoza, Jr., regional election director for Region V and
hearing officer of this case, recommended that petitioner Altarejos be disqualified
from being a candidate for the position of mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate in the
May 10, 2004 national and local elections. He found, thus:
xxx
The provisions of law governing the qualifications and disqualifications of elective
local officials are found in Sections 39 and 40 of Republic Act No. 7160 otherwise
known as the Local Government Code of 1991, which provide as follows:
SEC. 39. Qualifications. (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the
Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city or province or,
in the case of member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod,
or sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident
therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and
able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
xxx.
(c) Candidates for the position of mayor or vice-mayor of independent component
cities, component cities or municipalities must be at least twenty-one (21) years of
age on election day.
[SEC. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for
any elective position:]
xxx.
(d) Those with dual citizenship.
xxx.
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right
to reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this
Code; xxx
Under the terms of the above quoted statutory provisions, it is required that an
elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines, and he must not have a
dual citizenship; must not be a permanent resident in a foreign country or must not
have acquired the right to reside abroad.
In the present case, it has been established by clear and convincing evidence that
respondent is a citizen of the United States of America. Such fact is proven by his
Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) No. E139507 issued on 3 November 1997
and Immigration Certificate of Residence (ICR) with No. 320846 issued on 3
November 1997 by the Alien Registration Division, Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation. This was further confirmed in a letter dated 25 June 2001 of then
Commissioner ANDREA D. DOMINGO of the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation.
Although respondent had petitioned for his repatriation as a Filipino citizen under
Republic Act No. 8171 on 17 December 1997, this did not restore to respondent his
Filipino citizenship, because Section 2 of the aforecited Republic Act No. 8171
specifically provides that repatriation shall be effected by taking the
necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and
registration in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration.
It appears from the records of this case that respondent failed to prove that he has
fully complied with requirements of the above-quoted Section 2 of Republic Act
8171 to perfect his repatriation and reacquire his Filipino citizenship. Respondent
has not submitted any document to prove that he has taken his oath of allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines and that he has registered his fact of repatriation
in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration. In fact, in a letter date
25 June 2001, Commissioner ANDREA DOMINGO stated that RESPONDENT is still a
holder of visa under Section 13 (g) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 as
amended, with an indefinite authorized stay in the Philippines, implying that
respondent did not register his supposed Certificate of Repatriation with the Bureau
of Immigration otherwise his Alien Visa would have already been cancelled. The
rule is that in case of doubt concerning the grant of citizenship, such doubt should
be resolved in favor of the State and against the applicant (Cheng vs. Republic, L-
16999, 22 June 1965).
xxx
Not having been able to prove that he has fully reacquired his Filipino citizenship
after being naturalized as a citizen of the United States, it is clear that respondent
is not qualified to be candidate for the position of Mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate,
in the 10 May 2004 National and Local Elections, pursuant to the aforequoted
Sections 39 and 40 of the Local Government Code of 1991.
As a further consequence of his not being a Filipino citizen, respondent has also
committed false representation in his certificate of candidacy by stating therein that
he is a natural-born Filipino citizen, when in fact, he has not yet even perfected the
reacquisition of Filipino citizenship. Such false representation constitutes a material
misrepresentation as it relates to his qualification as a candidate for public office,
which could be a valid ground for the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy
under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code x x x. [6]
In its Resolution promulgated on March 22, 2004, the COMELEC, First
Division, adopted the findings and recommendation of Director Zaragoza. The
dispositive portion of said Resolution stated, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent CICERON PEREZ ALTAREJOS is
hereby disqualified to run as Mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate. Accordingly, his
certificate of candidacy for the position of Municipal Mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate
is denied due course and cancelled and his name deleted from the certified list of
candidates for the May 10, 2004 elections.[7]
On March 25, 2004, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and attached
the following documents to prove that he had completed all the requirements for
repatriation which thus entitled him to run for an elective office, viz:
(1) Oath of Allegiance dated December 17, 1997;
(2) Identification Certificate No. 116543 issued by the Bureau of Immigration
on March 1, 2004;
(3) Certification from the City Civil Registration Office, Makati City, that the
Certificate of Repatriation and Oath of Allegiance of petitioner was received by said
office and registered, with the corresponding fee paid, on February 18, 2004;
(4) A letter dated December 17, 1997 from the Special Committee on
Naturalization to the Bureau on Immigration and Deportation that it was furnishing
68
said office with the Oath of Allegiance and Certificate of Repatriation of petitioner
for the cancellation of petitioners registration in said office as an alien, and the
issuance to him of the corresponding Identification Card as Filipino citizen;
(5) A letter dated December 17, 1997 from the Special Committee on
Naturalization to the Local Registrar of San Jacinto, Masbate that it was sending
petitioners Oath of Allegiance and Certificate of Repatriation for registration in their
records and for petitioners reacquisition of his former Philippine citizenship.
On May 7, 2004, the COMELEC en banc promulgated a resolution denying the
motion for reconsideration, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission (En Banc) RESOLVED as it
hereby RESOLVES to DENY the Motion for Reconsideration for UTTER LACK OF
MERIT and AFFIRMS the Resolution of the First Division.[8]
The Comelec en banc held, thus:
The Comelec Rules of Procedure provides that insufficiency of evidence to justify
the decision is a ground for a motion for reconsideration (Rule 19, Section 1).
The evidence referred to in the above provision and to be considered in the Motion
for Reconsideration are those which were submitted during the hearing and
attached to the respective Memoranda of the parties which are already part of the
records of the case. In this regard, the evidence of the respondent were not able to
overcome the evidence of the petitioners.
When the entire records of the case was forwarded to the Commission (First
Division) the respondents only evidence was his Certificate of Repatriation dated
17 December 1977 and marked as Annex 1 of his answer. This piece of evidence
was not enough to controvert the evidence of the petitioners which consist of the
letter of the then Bureau of Immigration Commissioner Andrea Domingo dated 25
June 2001 which stated that as of the even date respondent is a holder of
permanent resident visa (page 15 of the records) and the certification of
Josephine C. Camata dated 28 January 2004 certifying, that the name of the
respondent could not be found in the records of repatriation. (page 42 of the
records) The questioned resolution, is therefore, in order as the evidence
submitted by the respondent were insufficient to rebut the evidence of the
petitioner.
Now, the respondent, in his Motion for Reconsideration, attempted to introduce to
the record new pieces of evidence, which introduction is not anymore allowed in a
Motion for Reconsideration. These are the following a) Annex 2 Oath of Allegiance;
b) Annex 3 Bureau of Immigration Identification Certificate ; c) Annex
4 Certification of the City Civil Registrar of Makati City ; d) Annex 5 Letter addressed
to the Local Civil Registrar of San Jacinto, Masbate  by Aurora P. Cortes of Special
Committee on Naturalization; and e) Annex 6 Letter addressed to the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation by Aurora P. Cortes of Special Committee on
Naturalization.
Assuming that the new evidence of the respondent are admitted, with more reason
should we cancel his certificate of candidacy for his act of [misrepresenting]
himself as a Filipino citizen when at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy, he
has not yet perfected the process of repatriation. He failed to comply with the
requirements under Section 2 of [Republic Act No.] 8171 which provides that
repatriation shall be effected by taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry and in
the Bureau of Immigration.
The certification was issued by the same Ms. Josephine C. Camata, City Civil
Registrar, dated February 18, 2004. This time, she certifies that Ciceron Perez
Altarejos was registered under Registry No. 1, Page 19, Book No. 1, Series of 2004
and paid under OR nos. 88325/8833256 dated February 18, 2004. (page 65 of
the records). Obviously, he was able to register in the proper civil registry only on
February 18, 2004.
The respondent was able to register with the Bureau of Immigration only on March
1, 2004 as evidenced by the Bureau of Immigration Identification Certificate
attached to the Motion as Annex 3.
This fact confirms the finding of the Commission (First Division) that at the time
respondent filed his certificate of candidacy he is yet to complete the requirement
under section two (2) of RA 8171.
As a consequence of not being a Filipino citizen, he has committed false
representation in his certificate of candidacy. Such false representation constitutes
a material misrepresentation as it relates to his qualification as a candidate. As
such the certificate of candidacy may be cancelled on such ground. (Ycain vs.
Caneja, 18 Phil. 778)[9]
On May 10, 2004, the election day itself, petitioner filed this petition praying
that: (1) The petition be given due course and a temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction be issued ex parte restraining the respondents
and all persons acting on their behalf, from fully implementing the questioned
COMELEC Resolutions promulgated on March 22, 2004 and May 7, 2004; (2) a writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction be issued ordering the COMELEC and all
persons acting on its behalf to allow petitioner to run as Mayor of San Jacinto,
Masbate in the May 10, 2004 elections, and to count and canvass the votes cast in
his favor and to proclaim him as the winning mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate; and
(3) after proper proceedings, judgment be rendered declaring null and void and
setting aside the COMELEC Resolutions promulgated on March 22, 2004 and May 7,
2004 and other related Orders of the COMELEC or its representatives which have
the effect of illegally preventing petitioner from running as Mayor of San Jacinto,
Masbate.
In its Comment,[10] the Office of the Solicitor General stated that, based on
the information relayed to it by the COMELEC, petitioners name, as a mayoralty
candidate in San Jacinto, Masbate, was retained in the list of candidates voted
upon by the electorate in the said municipality. Hence, the cancellation of
petitioners certificate of candidacy was never implemented. The COMELEC also
informed the Office of the Solicitor General that petitioners opponent, Dr. Emilio
Aris V. Espinosa, was already proclaimed duly elected Mayor of San Jacinto,
Masbate.
The Office of the Solicitor General contends that said supervening event has
rendered the instant petition moot and academic, and it prayed for the dismissal of
the petition.
69
 In his Reply,[11] petitioner opposed the dismissal of his petition. He claims
that the COMELEC resolutions disqualifying him from running as a mayoralty
candidate adversely affected his candidacy, since his supporters were made to
believe that his votes would not be counted. Moreover, he stated that said
COMELEC resolutions cast a doubt on his Philippine citizenship.
Petitioner points out that he took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines on December 17, 1997. In view thereof, he ran and was even elected as
Mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate during the 1998 elections. He argues that if there
was delay in the registration of his Certificate of Repatriation with the Bureau of
Immigration and with the proper civil registry, the same was brought about by the
inaction on the part of said offices since the records of the Special Committee on
Naturalization show that his Certificate of Repatriation and Oath of Allegiance have
long been transmitted to said offices.
Petitioner also asserts that the subsequent registration of his Certificate of
Repatriation with the Bureau of Immigration and with the Civil Registry of Makati
City prior to the May 10, 2004 elections has the effect of curing the defect, if any,
in the reacquisition of his Filipino citizenship as his repatriation retroacted to the
date of his application for repatriation as held inFrivaldo v. Comelec.
The pertinent issues raised are the following: (1) Is the registration of
petitioners repatriation with the proper civil registry and with the Bureau of
Immigration a prerequisite in effecting repatriation; and (2) whether or not the
COMELEC en banc committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or
lack of jurisdiction in affirming the Resolution of the COMELEC, First Division.
As stated by the Office of the Solicitor General, where the issues have
become moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy, thereby rendering
the resolution of the same of no practical use or value.[12] Nonetheless, courts will
decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it is capable of repetition, yet
evading review.[13]
First Issue: Is the registration of petitioners repatriation
with the proper civil registry and with the Bureau of
Immigration a prerequisite in effecting repatriation?
The provision of law applicable in this case is Section 2 of Republic Act No.
8171,[14] thus:
SEC. 2. Repatriation shall be effected by taking the necessary oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry and in the
Bureau of Immigration. The Bureau of Immigration shall thereupon cancel the
pertinent alien certificate of registration and issue the certificate of identification as
Filipino citizen to the repatriated citizen.
The law is clear that repatriation is effected by taking the oath of allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry and in
the Bureau of Immigration. Hence, in addition to taking the Oath of Allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines, the registration of the Certificate of Repatriation in
the proper civil registry and the Bureau of Immigration is a prerequisite in effecting
the repatriation of a citizen.
In this case, petitioner took his Oath of Allegiance on December 17, 1997, but
his Certificate of Repatriation was registered with the Civil Registry of Makati City
only after six years or on February 18, 2004, and with the Bureau of Immigration
on March 1, 2004. Petitioner, therefore, completed all the requirements of
repatriation only after he filed his certificate of candidacy for a mayoralty position,
but before the elections.
When does the citizenship qualification of a candidate for an elective office
apply?
In Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections,[15]  the Court ruled that the
citizenship qualification must be construed as applying to the time of proclamation
of the elected official and at the start of his term. The Court, through Justice
Artemio V. Panganiban,  discussed, thus:
Under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code, (a)n elective local official must
be:
* a citizen of the Philippines;
* a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province x x x
where he intends to be elected;
* a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the
day of the election;
* able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
* In addition, candidates for the position of governor x x x must be at
least twenty-three (23) years of age on election day.
From the above, it will be noted that the law does not specify any particular date or
time when the candidate must possess citizenship, unlike that for residence (which
must consist of at least one years residency immediately preceding  the day of
election) and age (at least twenty three years of age on election day).
Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public
office, and the purpose of the citizenship qualification is none other than to ensure
that no alien, i.e., no person owing allegiance to another nation, shall govern our
people and our country or a unit of territory thereof. Now, an official begins to
govern or to discharge his functions only upon his proclamation and on the day the
law mandates his term of office to begin. Since Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship
on June 30, 1995the very day the term of office of governor (and other elective
officials) beganhe was therefore already qualified to be proclaimed, to hold such
office and to discharge the functions and responsibilities thereof as of said date. In
short, at that time, he was already qualified to govern his native Sorsogon. This is
the liberal interpretation that should give spirit, life and meaning to our law on
qualifications consistent with the purpose for which such law was enacted. x x x
Paraphrasing this Courts ruling in Vasquez v. Giap and Li Seng Giap & Sons , if the
purpose of the citizenship requirement is to ensure that our people and country do
not end up being governed by aliens, i.e., persons owing allegiance to another
nation, that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but instead achieved  by
construing the citizenship qualification as applying to the time of
proclamation of the elected official and at the start of his term.[16]
(Emphasis supplied.)
Moreover, in the case of Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections,  the Court ruled
that the repatriation of Frivaldo RETROACTED to the date of the filing of his
application. In said case, the repatriation of Frivaldo was by virtue of Presidential
70
Decree No. 725, which took effect on June 5, 1975. The Court therein declared that submitted the necessary documents proving compliance with the requirements of
Presidential Decree No. 725 was a curative statute, which is retroactive in nature. repatriation only during his motion for reconsideration, when the COMELEC en
The retroactivity of Frivaldos repatriation to the date of filing of his application was banc could no longer consider said evidence. As the COMELEC en banc correctly
justified by the Court, thus: stated:
xxx The Comelec Rules of Procedure provides that insufficiency of evidence to justify
The reason for this is simply that if, as in this case, it was the intent of the the decision is a ground for a motion for reconsideration (Rule 19, Section 1).
legislative authority that the law should apply to past  eventsi.e., situations and The evidence referred to in the above provision and to be considered in the Motion
transactions existing even before the law came into being in order to benefit the for Reconsideration are those which were submitted during the hearing and
greatest number of former Filipinos possible thereby enabling them to enjoy and attached to the respective Memoranda of the parties which are already part of the
exercise the constitutionally guaranteed right of citizenship, and such legislative records of the case. In this regard, the evidence of the respondent were not able to
intention is to be given the fullest effect and expression, then there is all the more overcome the evidence of the petitioners.[19]
reason to have the law apply in a retroactive or retrospective manner to situations, It is, therefore, incumbent upon candidates for an elective office, who are
events and transactions subsequent to the passage of such law. That is, the repatriated citizens, to be ready with sufficient evidence of their repatriation in case
repatriation granted to Frivaldo x x x can and should be made to take effect as of their Filipino citizenship is questioned to prevent a repetition of this case.
date of his application. As earlier mentioned, there is nothing in the law that would WHEREFORE, the petition seeking the nullification of the Resolution of the
bar this or would show a contrary intention on the part of the legislative authority; COMELEC en banc of May 7, 2004, affirming the Resolution of its First Division
and there is no showing that damage or prejudice to anyone, or anything unjust or dated March 22, 2004, is hereby DENIED. No costs.
injurious would result from giving retroactivity to his repatriation. Neither has Lee SO ORDERED.
shown that there will result the impairment of any contractual obligation,
disturbance of any vested right or breach of some constitutional guaranty.
xxx
Another argument for retroactivity to the date of filing is that it would prevent
prejudice to applicants. If P.D. 725 were not to be given retroactive effect, and the
Special Committee decides not to act, i.e., to delay the processing of applications
for any substantial length of time, then the former Filipinos who may be stateless,
as Frivaldohaving already renounced his American citizenshipwas, may be
prejudiced for causes outside their control. This should not be. In case of doubt in
the interpretation or application of laws, it is to be presumed that the law-making
body intended right and justice to prevail.[17]
Republic Act No. 8171[18] has impliedly repealed Presidential `Decree No.
725. They cover the same subject matter: Providing for the repatriation of Filipino
women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and of
natural-born Filipinos. The Courts ruling in Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections  that
repatriation retroacts to the date of filing of ones application for repatriation
subsists for the same reasons quoted above.
Accordingly, petitioners repatriation retroacted to the date he filed his
application in 1997. Petitioner was, therefore, qualified to run for a mayoralty
position in the government in the May 10, 2004 elections. Apparently, the
COMELEC was cognizant of this fact since it did not implement the assailed
Resolutions disqualifying petitioner to run as mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate.
Second Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC en banc
gravely abused its discretion in affirming the
Resolution of the COMELEC, First Division?
The Court cannot fault the COMELEC en banc for affirming the decision of the
COMELEC, First Division, considering that petitioner failed to prove before the
COMELEC that he had complied with the requirements of repatriation. Petitioner

71
 allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost Philippine
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country. On its
face, it does not recognize dual allegiance. By swearing to the supreme authority of
EN BANC the Republic, the person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship. Plainly, from
Section 3, Rep. Act No. 9225 stayed clear out of the problem of dual allegiance and
AASJS (ADVOCATES AND ADHERENTS OF SOCIAL G.R. No. 160869 shifted the burden of confronting the issue of whether or not there is dual
JUSTICE FOR SCHOOL TEACHERS AND ALLIED   allegiance to the concerned foreign country. What happens to the other citizenship
WORKERS) MEMBER HECTOR GUMANGAN CALILUNG, Present: was not made a concern of Rep. Act No. 9225.
Petitioner,   Same; Same; Same; Congress was given a mandate to draft a law that would set
  PUNO, C.J., specific parameters of what really constitutes dual allegiance; Until this is done, it
  QUISUMBING, would be premature for the judicial department including this Court to rule on
  YNARES-SANTIAGO, issues pertaining to dual allegiance .—To begin with, Section 5, Article IV of the
Constitution is a declaration of a policy and it is not a self-executing provision. The
  SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
legislature still has to enact the law on dual allegiance. In Sec tions 2 and 3 of Rep.
  CARPIO,
Act No. 9225, the framers were not concerned with dual citizenship per se, but
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,*
with the status of naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their
countries of origin even after their naturalization. Congress was given a mandate
CORONA,* to draft a law that would set specific parameters of what really constitutes dual
allegiance. Until this is done, it would be premature for the judicial department,
CARPIO MORALES, including this Court, to rule on issues pertaining to dual allegiance.
Same; Same; Same; The case of Mercado did not set the parameters of what
constitutes dual allegiance but merely made a distinction between dual allegiance
AZCUNA, and dual citizenship.—Neither can we subscribe to the proposition of petitioner that
a law is not needed since the case of Mercado had already set the guidelines for
TINGA, determining dual allegiance. Petitioner misreads Mercado. That case did not set the
CHICO-NAZARIO, parameters of what constitutes dual allegiance but merely made a distinction
GARCIA, between dual allegiance and dual citizenship.
VELASCO, JR., and Same; Same; Same; Court cannot arrogate the duty of setting the parameters of
NACHURA, JJ. what constitutes dual allegiance when the Constitution itself has clearly delegated
  the duty of determining what acts constitute dual allegiance for study and
THE HONORABLE SIMEON DATUMANONG, in Promulgated:
legislation by Congress.—In Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 369 SCRA 394 (2001), we
said that the courts must assume that the legislature is ever conscious of the
his official capacity as the Secretary of Justice,  
borders and edges of its plenary powers, and passed laws with full knowledge of
Respondent. May 11, 2007
the facts and for the purpose of promoting what is right and advancing the welfare
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ---------------
of the majority. Hence, in determining whether the acts of the legislature are in
-x tune with the fundamental law, we must proceed with judicial restraint and act
with caution and forbearance. The doctrine of separation of powers demands no
Constitutional Law; Citizenship; Dual Allegiance; What Rep. Act No. 9225 does is less. We cannot arrogate the duty of setting the parameters of what constitutes
allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who has lost Philippine dual allegiance when the Constitution itself has clearly delegated the duty of
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country; On its determining what acts constitute dual allegiance for study and legislation by
face, it does not recognize dual allegiance; By swearing to the supreme authority Congress.
of the Republic, the person implicitly renounces his foreign citizen-ship .—From the
excerpts of the legislative record, it is clear that the intent of the legislature in
DECISION
drafting Rep. Act No. 9225 is to do away with the provision in Commonwealth Act
No. 63 which takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who
become naturalized citizens of other countries. What Rep. Act No. 9225 does is

72

QUISUMBING, J.:
This is an original action for prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure.
Petitioner filed the instant petition against respondent, then Secretary of
Justice Simeon Datumanong, the official tasked to implement laws governing
citizenship.[1]Petitioner prays that a writ of prohibition be issued to stop
respondent from implementing Republic Act No. 9225, entitled An Act Making the
Citizenship of Philippine Citizens Who Acquire Foreign Citizenship Permanent,
Amending for the Purpose Commonwealth Act No. 63, As Amended, and for Other
Purposes. Petitioner avers that Rep. Act No. 9225 is unconstitutional as it violates
Section 5, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution that states, Dual allegiance of citizens
is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law.
Rep. Act No. 9225, signed into law by President Gloria M. Arroyo
on August 29, 2003, reads:
SECTION 1. Short Title.This Act shall be known as the
Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003.
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.It is hereby declared the
policy of the State that all Philippine citizens who become citizens
of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their
Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act.
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship.Any provision
of law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of
the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by
reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are
hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon
taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic:
I ___________________________, solemnly
swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend
the Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders
promulgated by the duly constituted authorities
of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I
recognize and accept the supreme authority of
the Philippines and will maintain true faith and
allegiance thereto; and that I impose this
obligation upon myself voluntarily without
mental reservation or purpose of evasion.
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after
the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country
shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid
oath.
SEC. 4. Derivative Citizenship. The unmarried child, whether
legitimate, illegitimate or adopted, below eighteen (18) years of
age, of those who reacquire Philippine citizenship
upon effectivityof this Act shall be deemed citizens of the
Philippines.
SEC. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities . Those who retain
or reacquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full
civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities
and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the
following conditions:
(1) Those intending to exercise their right of
suffrage must meet the requirements under Section
1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189,
otherwise known as The Overseas Absentee Voting
Act of 2003 and other existing laws;
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the
Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding
such public office as required by the Constitution and
existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before
any public officer authorized to administer an oath;
(3) Those appointed to any public office shall
subscribe and swear to an oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines and its duly constituted
authorities prior to their assumption of
office: Provided, That they renounce their oath of
allegiance to the country where they took that oath;
(4) Those intending to practice their profession in
the Philippines shall apply with the proper authority
for a license or permit to engage in such practice; and
(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed
to any public office in the Philippines cannot be
exercised by, or extended to, those who:
(a) are candidates for or are occupying
any public office in the country of which they
are naturalized citizens; and/or
73
 (b) are in the active service as
commissioned or noncommissioned officers in
the armed forces of the country which they are
naturalized citizens.
SEC. 6. Separability Clause. If any section or provision
of this Act is held unconstitutional or invalid, any other section or
provision not affected thereby shall remain valid and effective.
SEC. 7. Repealing Clause. All laws, decrees, orders,
rules and regulations inconsistent with the provisions of this Act
are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
SEC. 8. Effectivity Clause. This Act shall take effect after
fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Official
Gazette  or two (2) newspapers of general circulation.
In this petition for prohibition, the following issues have been raised: (1)
Is Rep. Act No. 9225 unconstitutional? (2) Does this Court have jurisdiction to pass
upon the issue of dual allegiance?
We shall discuss these issues jointly.
Petitioner contends that Rep. Act No. 9225 cheapens Philippine
citizenship. He avers that Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, together, allow
dual allegiance and not dual citizenship. Petitioner maintains that Section 2 allows
all Filipinos, either natural-born or naturalized, who become foreign citizens, to
retain their Philippine citizenship without losing their foreign citizenship. Section 3
permits dual allegiance because said law allows natural-born citizens of
the Philippines to regain their Philippine citizenship by simply taking an oath of
allegiance without forfeiting their foreign allegiance.[2] The Constitution, however,
is categorical that dual allegiance is inimical to the national interest.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) claims that Section 2 merely declares as a
state policy that Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be
deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship. The OSG further claims that
the oath in Section 3 does not allow dual allegiance since the oath taken by the
former Filipino citizen is an effective renunciation and repudiation of his foreign
citizenship. The fact that the applicant taking the oath recognizes and accepts the
supreme authority of the Philippines is an unmistakable and categorical affirmation
of his undivided loyalty to the Republic.[3]
In resolving the aforecited issues in this case, resort to the deliberations
of Congress is necessary to determine the intent of the legislative branch in
drafting the assailed law. During the deliberations, the issue of whether Rep. Act
No. 9225 would allow dual allegiance had in fact been the subject of debate. The
record of the legislative deliberations reveals the following:
x x x x
Pursuing his point, Rep. Dilangalen noted that under the
measure, two situations exist - - the retention of foreign
citizenship, and the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. In this
case, he observed that there are two citizenships and therefore,
two allegiances. He pointed out that under the Constitution, dual
allegiance is inimical to public interest. He thereafter asked
whether with the creation of dual allegiance by reason of
retention of foreign citizenship and the reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship, there will now be a violation of the Constitution
Rep. Locsin underscored that the measure does not seek to
address the constitutional injunction on dual allegiance as
inimical to public interest. He said that the proposed law
aims to facilitate the reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship by speedy means. However, he said that in
one sense, it addresses the problem of dual citizenship by
requiring the taking of an oath. He explained that the
problem of dual citizenship is transferred from the
Philippines to the foreign country because the latest oath
that will be taken by the former Filipino is one of
allegiance to the Philippines and not to the United States,
as the case may be. He added that this is a matter which the
Philippine government will have no concern and competence
over.
Rep. Dilangalen asked why this will no longer be the countrys
concern, when dual allegiance is involved.
Rep. Locsin clarified that this was precisely his objection to the
original version of the bill, which did not require an oath of
allegiance. Since the measure now requires this oath, the
problem of dual allegiance is transferred from
the Philippines to the foreign country concerned, he
explained.
74
 x x x x
Rep. Dilangalen asked whether in the particular case, the person country. On its face, it does not recognize dual allegiance. By swearing to the
did not denounce his foreign citizenship and therefore still owes supreme authority of the Republic, the person implicitly renounces his foreign
allegiance to the foreign government, and at the same time,
owes his allegiance to the Philippine government, such that there citizenship. Plainly, from Section 3, Rep. Act No. 9225 stayed clear out of the
is now a case of dual citizenship and dual allegiance. problem of dual allegiance and shifted the burden of confronting the issue of
Rep. Locsin clarified that by swearing to the supreme
authority of the Republic, the person implicitly renounces whether or not there is dual allegiance to the concerned foreign country. What
his foreign citizenship. However, he said that this is not a
happens to the other citizenship was not made a concern of Rep. Act No. 9225.
matter that he wishes to address in Congress because he is not a
member of a foreign parliament but a Member of the House. Petitioner likewise advances the proposition that although Congress has
x x x x
not yet passed any law on the matter of dual allegiance, such absence of a law
Rep. Locsin replied that it is imperative that those who have dual
allegiance contrary to national interest should be dealt with by should not be justification why this Court could not rule on the issue. He further
law. However, he said that the dual allegiance problem is not
addressed in the bill. He then cited the Declaration of Policy in contends that while it is true that there is no enabling law yet on dual allegiance,
the bill which states that It is hereby declared the policy of the the Supreme Court, throughMercado v. Manzano,[6] already had drawn up the
State that all citizens who become citizens of another country
shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship guidelines on how to distinguish dual allegiance from dual citizenship.[7]
under the conditions of this Act. He stressed that what the bill
For its part, the OSG counters that pursuant to Section 5, Article IV of the 1987
does is recognize Philippine citizenship but says nothing
about the other citizenship. Constitution, dual allegiance shall be dealt with by law. Thus, until a law on dual
Rep. Locsin further pointed out that the problem of dual
allegiance is enacted by Congress, the Supreme Court is without any jurisdiction to
allegiance is created wherein a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines takes an oath of allegiance to another country entertain issues regarding dual allegiance.[8]
and in that oath says that he abjures and absolutely renounces
all allegiance to his country of origin and swears allegiance to To begin with, Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a
that foreign country. The original Bill had left it at this stage, he policy and it is not a self-executing provision. The legislature still has to enact the
explained. In the present measure, he clarified, a person is
required to take an oath and the last he utters is one of law on dual allegiance. In Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, the framers were
allegiance to the country. He then said that the problem not concerned with dual citizenship per se,  but with the status of naturalized
of dual allegiance is no longer the problem of
the Philippines but of the other foreign country. citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their
[4] (Emphasis supplied.)
naturalization.[9] Congress was given a mandate to draft a law that would set
From the above excerpts of the legislative record, it is clear that the intent
specific parameters of what really constitutes dual allegiance.[10] Until this is done,
of the legislature in drafting Rep. Act No. 9225 is to do away with the provision in
it would be premature for the judicial department, including this Court, to rule on
Commonwealth Act No. 63[5] which takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-
issues pertaining to dual allegiance.
born Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other countries. What Rep. Act
Neither can we subscribe to the proposition of petitioner that a law is not
No. 9225 does is allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who have
needed since the case of Mercado  had already set the guidelines for determining
lost Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign
dual allegiance. Petitioner misreads Mercado.  That case did not set the parameters
75
of what constitutes dual allegiance but merely made a distinction between dual
allegiance and dual citizenship.

Moreover, in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,[11] we said that the courts must

assume that the legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges of its

plenary powers, and passed laws with full knowledge of the facts and for the

purpose of promoting what is right and advancing the welfare of the

majority. Hence, in determining whether the acts of the legislature are in tune with

the fundamental law, we must proceed with judicial restraint and act with caution

and forbearance.[12] The doctrine of separation of powers demands no less. We

cannot arrogate the duty of setting the parameters of what constitutes dual

allegiance when the Constitution itself has clearly delegated the duty of

determining what acts constitute dual allegiance for study and legislation by

Congress.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Poe-Lllamanzares vs. Comelec GR221697 March 8, 2016 (See Declaration

of Principles and State Policies)

76