Sarmiento vs. Agana 129 scra 122 owner of the building.

owner of the building. But he cannot, as respondents here did, refuse both to pay for the
Facts:
ERNESTO was still courting his wife, the latter's mother had told him the couple
could build a RESIDENTIAL HOUSE whom Ernesto did construct a RESIDENTIAL HOUSE
on the LAND at a cost of P8,000.00 to P10,000.00 who probably assumed that the wife's
mother was the owner of the LAND and that, it would be transferred to the spouses.
Subsequently turned out that the LAND had been titled in the name of Mr. & Mrs. Jose C.
Santo, Jr. who, sold the same to petitioner SARMIENTO. SARMIENTO filed an Ejectment
suit against them. In the evidentiary hearings before the Municipal Court, SARMIENTO
submitted the deed of sale of the LAND in her favor, which showed the price to be
P15,000.00. On the other hand, ERNESTO testified that the then cost of the RESIDENTIAL
HOUSE would be from P30,000.00 to P40,000.00.Sarmiento refuse to pay and give option to
buy the property.
building and to sell the land and compel the owner of the building to remove it from the land
where it is erected. He is entitled to such remotion only when, after having chosen to sell his
land, the other party fails to pay for the same.
We hold, therefore, that the order of Judge Natividad compelling defendants-
petitioners to remove their buildings from the land belonging to plaintiffs-
respondents only because the latter chose neither to pay for such buildings
nor to sell the land, is null and void, for it amends substantially the judgment
sought to be executed and is, furthermore, offensive to articles 361 (now
Article 448) and 453 (now Article 546) of the Civil Code. (Ignacio vs. Hilario,
76 Phil. 605, 608 [1946]).
Disposition: WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is hereby ordered dismissed,
without pronouncement as to costs.

Issue: 1.Whether or not Ernesto was in good faith.

2.Whether or not Sarmiento could exercise both refusal to pay the spouses and give
option to purchase.

Held:

1.Yes. We agree that ERNESTO and wife were builders in good faith in view of the
peculiar circumstances under which they had constructed the RESIDENTIAL HOUSE. As far
as they knew, the LAND was owned by ERNESTO's mother-in-law who, having stated they
could build on the property, could reasonably be expected to later on give them the LAND.

In regards to builders in good faith, Article 448 of the Code provides:têñ.£îhqwâ£

ART. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or
planted in good faith,shall have the rightto appropriate as his own the works,
sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in articles 546
and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land,
and the one who sowed, the proper rent.However, the builder or planter
cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of
the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner
of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper
indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of
disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof.

2.No. The owner of the building erected in good faith on a land owned by another, is
entitled to retain the possession of the land until he is paid the value of his building, under
article 453 (now Article 546). The owner, of the land. upon, the other hand, has the option,
under article 361 (now Article 448), either to pay for the building or to sell his land to the
SPOUSES DEL CAMPO V. ABESIA 160 SCRA 379

Facts:
This case involves a parcel of land, situated at the corner of F. Flores and Cavan Streets,
Cebu City. An action for partition was filed by plaintiffs in the CFI of Cebu. Plaintiffs and
defendants are co-owners pro indiviso of this lot in the proportion of and 1/3 share each,
respectively. The trial court appointed a commissioner in accordance with the agreement of
the parties. ,the Id commissioner conducted a survey, prepared a sketch plan and submitted
a report to the trial court on May 29, 1976, recommending that the property be divided into
two lots: Lot 1161-A with an area of 30 square meters for plaintiffs and Lot No. 1161-B with
an area of 15 square meters for the defendants. The houses of plaintiffs and defendants were
surveyed and shown on the sketch plan. The house of defendants occupied the portion with
an area of 5 square meters of Lot 1161-A of plaintiffs. The parties manifested their conformity
to the report and asked the trial court to finally settle and adjudicate who among the parties
should take possession of the 5 square meters of the land in question.
Issue: Whether or Not Article 448 of the Civil Code is applicable to a builder in good faith
when the property involved is owned in common.
Held: When the co-ownership is terminated by the partition and it appears that the house of
defendants overlaps or occupies a portion of 5 square meters of the land pertaining to
plaintiffs which the defendants obviously built in good faith, then the provisions of Article 448
of the new Civil Code should apply. Manresa and Navarro Amandi agree that the said
provision of the Civil Code may apply even when there was co-ownership if good faith has
been established. 
Applying the aforesaid provision of the Civil Code, the plaintiffs have the right to appropriate
said portion of the house of defendants upon payment of indemnity to defendants as provided
for in Article 546 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, the plaintiffs may oblige the defendants to pay
the price of the land occupied by their house. However, if the price asked for is considerably
much more than the value of the portion of the house of defendants built thereon, then the
latter cannot be obliged to buy the land. The defendants shall then pay the reasonable rent to
the plaintiff upon such terms and conditions that they may agree. In case of disagreement,
the trial court shall fix the terms thereof. Of course, defendants may demolish or remove the
said portion of their house, at their own expense, if they so decide.
Article 448 of the New Civil Code provides as follows:
Art. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown, or planted in good
faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after
payment of the indemnity provided for in articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built
or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the
builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that
of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land
does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall
agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms
thereof.
IGNAO V. IAC
When co-ownership is terminated by division of land, Art 448 applies to parties in good faith.
The party whose land is encroached upon has the sole right to choose whether to sell his
land encroached or to appropriate that which encroaches his land.

FACTS:

The case involves Petitioner Florencio Ignao and his Uncles Juan and Isidro Ignao as
Respondents. Both Petitioner and Respondents co-owned land with 534 sqm (about the size
of an Olympic swimming pool.) in Cavite. The parties had a falling out (maybe the uncles had
bad breath) and so attempted to partition the land, with 133 going to the uncles and 266
going to Petitioner. The attempt failed. Later, Petitioner discovered that the two houses of
Respondent uncles encroached his land. Juan ate 42 sqm and Isidro ate 59 sqm… for the
grand total of 101 sqm. He complained.
The RTC said that uncles built in good faith therefore that exempts them from damages. Art
448 therefore applies But things didn’t go to well for the Petitioner. The RTC said that if
Petitioner opted to appropriate the sections of the encroaching houses, the Uncles will be left
with worthless hovels. Hence, RTC ordered Petitioner to just sell his land which was
encroached. “No Good!” cried Petitioner and he appealed to the IAC. He lost again. Petitioner
trooped to the SC for vindication

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not Petitioner has the right to choose whether to appropriate the house
encroaching his land or to sell his land.
2. Whether or not the courts and respondents can rob Petitioner of the options provided for
under Art 448.

HELD: Petitioner has the right whether to appropriate the houses or to sell his land! The
ruling of the RTC and IAC contravened the explicit provisions of Art 448 which granted him
the explicit right to choose. The law is clear when it bestows choice upon the aggrieved land
owner and not upon the builders or the courts.
Technogas vs CA
FACTS
Petitioner bought a lot together with the building and improvements including the wall which
encroached that of the defendant. Upon learning of such encroachment, petitioner offered to
buy the land but defendant refused.
After 2 years, through an agreement, petitioner agreed to demolish the wall (but the case did
not state what happened to this agreement, my assumption is that it did not happen due to
conflicts that arose after)
B. Where one derives title to the property from another, the act, declaration, or omission of
the latter, while holding the title, in relation to the property, is evidence against the former.
And possession in good faith does not lose this character except when the possessor is
aware of this impropriety.
C. The encroachment was very narrow which can be considered as a mere error. Remedy –
the  petitioner, despite being a purchaser of the original builder, can compel the landowner to
either buy the property or sell the piece of land because:

1.
Defendant dug a canal along the wall which caused a portion of it to collapse. Petitioner filed
a supplemental complaint re the action and a separate criminal action of malicious mischief 2.
(which the wife was convicted of) RTC decided for the petitioners and the CA reversed. Note
that respondent wants to have the wall demolished.
He was really unaware of the encroachment basing on the fact presented by both
sides.
When the petitioner bought the land, he has stepped into the rights of the original
owner (hence, the right to compel the LO to buy or sell is also transferred)

ISSUES: Estoppel – Petitioner is not considered in estoppel only because it has previously agreed to
demolish a part of the wall. Rather, it was to be negotiated by the parties concern. In the
A. Whether or not petitioner is a builder in bad faith because it is 'presumed to know the
meantime, petitioner has to pay the rent for the property occupied by its building only up to
metes and bounds of his property.'
the date when respondent serves notice of their option. Case remanded back to the trial court
B. Whether or not amicable settlement was a proper remedy
for determination of the value of the land and the number of days to allot for the respondent to
C. Whether or not respondent can opt to demolish the structure without exercising the option
choose an option.
to sell the land to the petitioner and the latter cannot do buy the same

RULING: Petition was granted.

Good faith or Bad Faith – No such doctrinal statement that supports that the knowledge of
metes and bounds of a land due to the Torrens system would amount to bad faith if there was
encroachment on the land of another.

A. When the petitioner purchased the lot, the wall was already built. Even the respondent did
not knew about the encroachment until he has hired a surveyor.
Pleasantville Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et. al.
GR No. 79688 February 1, 1996
Panganiban, J.:
Facts:
Edith Rubillo purchased a lot from the petitioner designated as Lot 9, Phase II, and located at
Taculing Road, Pleasantville Subdivision, Bacolod City. After sometime, Eldred Jardinico
bought rights over the vacant lot from Robillo. Upon completing payments, Jardinico secured
from Register of Deeds of Bacolod City a Transfer of Certificate of Title in his name for the
said lot, but discovered as well that there were improvements introduced on Lot 9 by Wilson
Kee, who had taken possession thereof.
It appears that Wilson Kee bought Lot 8, but there was a misdelivery from petitioner’s agent,
C.T. Torres Enterprises Inc. (CTTEI), when its employee/agent pointed Lot 9 instead of Lot 8
during lot inspection. After the discovery, Jardinico confronted Kee. The parties tried to
amicably settle but it was in vain. Thus, Jardinico’s lawyer wrote a demand letter demanding
Kee to remove improvements and vacate Lot 9. Kee refused.
Jardinico filed with MTCC a complaint for ejectment with damages against Kee. The latter, in
turn, filed a third party complaint against Pleasantville and CTTI.
MTCC ruled in favour of Jardinico holding that there was an erroneous delivery of Lot 9 to
Kee, and attributed it to CTTEI. Thus, Kee has to vacate the property, pay rentals, and
CTTEI and Pleasantvill to pay Jardinico attorney’s fees and cost of litigation.
On appeal to RTC, it ruled that petitioner and CTTEI were not at fault or negligent there being
no preponderant evidence that they directly participated in the delivery of Lot 9 to Kee. Kee
was found a builder in bad faith.
he built improvements on Lot 8, Kee believed that said lot was what he bought from
petitioner. He was not aware that the lot delivered to him was not Lot 8.
Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land he is building on is his and his
ignorance of any defect or flaw in his title. And as good faith is presumed, petitioner has the
burden of proving bad faith on the part of Kee.
“Petitioner next contends that Kee cannot "claim that another lot was erroneously pointed out
to him" because the latter agreed to the following provision in the Contract of Sale on
installment, to wit:
The Vendee hereby declares that prior to the execution of his contract he/she has
personally examined or inspected the property made subject-matter hereof, as to its
location, contours, as well as the natural condition of the lots and from the date
hereof whatever consequential change therein made due to erosion, the said Vendee
shall bear the expenses of the necessary fillings, when the same is so desired by
him/her.
The subject matter of this provision of the contract is the change of the location, contour and
condition of the lot due to erosion. It merely provides that the vendee, having examined the
property prior to the execution of the contract, agrees to shoulder the expenses resulting from
such change.
We do not agree with the interpretation of petitioner that Kee contracted away his right to
recover damages resulting from petitioner's negligence. Such waiver would be contrary to
public policy and cannot be allowed. "Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to
law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with
a right recognized by law."”

After a denied motion for reconsideration, Kee appealed. The appellate court reversed the
assailed decision, declaring Kee a builder in good faith and imputed the erroneous delivery to
petitioner and CTTEI. Petitioner filed the instant petition to SC averring that Kee is a builder
in bad faith.

Issue:

Whether or not Wilson Kee is a builder in good faith

Ruling:

Kee is a builder in good faith. It was CTTEI’s employee, Octaviano, who authoritatively
declared that the land she was pointing to was indeed Lot 8. Having full faith and confidence
in the reputation of CTTEI, and because of the company's positive identification of the
property, Kee saw no reason to suspect that there had been a misdelivery. Thus, at the time
RODOLFO V. ROSALES, (represented by his heirs, Rodolfo, Jr., Romeo Allan, Lillian terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms
Rhodora, Roy Victor, Roger Lyle and Alexander Nicolai, all surnamed Rosales) and thereof.
LILY ROSQUETA-ROSALES,Petitioners,  
- versus -  
 MIGUEL CASTELLTORT, JUDITH CASTELLTORT, and LINA LOPEZ-VILLEGAS, Under the foregoing provision, the landowner can choose between appropriating
assisted by her Attorney-in-Fact, Rene Villegas,Respondents. the building by paying the proper indemnity or obliging the builder to pay the price of
the land, unless its value is considerably more than that of the structures, in which
FACTS: case the builder in good faith shall pay reasonable rent. [34] If the parties cannot come to
Spouses-petitioners Rodolfo V. Rosales and Lily Rosqueta-Rosales (petitioners) are terms over the conditions of the lease, the court must fix the terms thereof.
the registered owners of a parcel of land with an area of approximately 315 square meters,  
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 36856 [4] and designated as Lot 17, Block 1 The choice belongs to the owner of the land, a rule that accords with the principle of
of Subdivision Plan LRC Psd-55244 situated in Los Baos, Laguna. accession, i.e., that the accessory follows the principal and not the other way around. Even
  as the option lies with the landowner, the grant to him, nevertheless, is preclusive. [35] The
On August 16, 1995, petitioners discovered that a house was being constructed on landowner cannot refuse to exercise either option and compel instead the owner of the
their lot, without their knowledge and consent, by respondent Miguel Castelltort (Castelltort). [5] building to remove it from the land.[36]
 
It turned out that respondents Castelltort and his wife Judith had purchased a lot, Lot
16 of the same Subdivision Plan, from respondent Lina Lopez-Villegas (Lina) through her The raison detre for this provision has been enunciated thus:
son-attorney-in-fact Rene Villegas (Villegas) but that after a survey thereof by geodetic  
engineer Augusto Rivera, he pointed to Lot 17 as the Lot 16 the Castelltorts purchased. Where the builder, planter or sower has acted in good faith, a conflict
of rights arises between the owners, and it becomes necessary to protect the
Admittedly, the appellants house erroneously encroached on the property of the owner of the improvements without causing injustice to the owner of the
appellees due to a mistake in the placement of stone monuments as indicated in the survey land. In view of the impracticability of creating a state of forced co-
plan, which error is directly attributable to the fault of the geodetic engineer who conducted ownership, the law has provided a just solution by giving the owner of the
the same. This fact alone negates bad faith on the part of appellant Miguel. land the option to acquire the improvements after payment of the proper
indemnity, or to oblige the builder or planter to pay for the land and the
ISSUE: sower the proper rent. He cannot refuse to exercise either option. It is the
Whether Castelltort is a builder in good faith. owner of the land who is authorized to exercise the option, because his right
is older, and because, by the principle of accession, he is entitled to the
RULING: ownership of the accessory thing.[37]
Yes, The records indicate that at the time Castelltort began constructing his house on
petitioners lot, he believed that it was the Lot 16 he bought and delivered to him by Villegas.
As correctly found by the CA, both parties having acted in good faith at least until
August 21, 1995, the applicable provision in this case is Article 448 of the Civil Code which
reads:
 
Art. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built,
sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own
the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in
Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the
price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the
builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is
considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall
pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate
the building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the
[G.R. No. 141463. August 6, 2002 VICTOR ORQUIOLA and HONORATA ORQUIOLA, petitioners,
vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. VIVENCIO S. BACLIG, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 77, Quezon City, THE SHERIFF OF QUEZON CITY and HIS/HER DEPUTIES and
PURA KALAW LEDESMA, substituted by TANDANG SORA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
Respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Doctrine: No person shall be deprived of property without due process of law. Failure to implead
proper parties- in-interest, they cannot be reached by decision as no man shall be affected by
any proceeding to which he is a stranger who did not have his day in court. Only real parties in
interest in an action are bound by the judgment
Facts:
 Petition for review seeking the reversal of the CA decision which dismissed the petition to prohibit
Judge Vivencio Baclig of the RTC from issuing a writ of demolition against petitioners, and the
sheriff and deputy sheriff from implementing an alias writ of execution.
 Pura Kalaw Ledesma was the registered owner of Lot 689 in Tandang Sora, Quezon City which is
adjacent to certain portions of Lot 707 of the Piedad Estates, registered in the name of Herminigilda
Pedro
 Herminigilda sold the lots to Mariano Lising, registered them in the name of M.B. Lising Realty and
subdivided them into smaller lots. Petitioners, spouses Victor and Honorata Orquiola, purchased a
portion of this Lot 707-A-2
 In 1969, Pura Kalaw Ledesma filed Civil Case against Herminigilda Pedro and Mariano Lising for
allegedly encroaching upon Lot 689. During the pendency of the action, Tandang Sora Development
Corporation replaced Pura Kalaw Ledesma as plaintiff by virtue of an assignment of Lot 689 Trial
continued for three decades.
 On August 21, 1991, the trial court finally adjudged defendants Pedro and Lising jointly and
severally liable for encroaching on plaintiffs land and ordered to remove the house they constructed
on the land they were occupying.
 On April 2, 1998, petitioners received a Special Order to remove, at their expense, all constructions,
including barbed wires and fences, which defendants constructed on plaintiffs property, within fifteen
(15) days from notice otherwise, this Court will issue a writ of demolition against them.
 Petitioners filed with the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer for a restraining order and
preliminary injunction alleging that they bought the subject parcel of land in good faith and for value,
hence, they were parties in interest. Since they were not impleaded in Civil Case, the writ of
demolition issued in connection therewith cannot be enforced against them because to do so would
amount to deprivation of property without due process of law.
 CA dismissed the petition as well as the motion for reconsideration, ruling that petitioners were
considered privies who derived their rights from Lising by virtue of the sale and could be reached by
the execution order in Civil Case
First Issue: Whether the alias writ of execution may be enforced against petitioners
- Petitioners submit that Medina Case*** is not controlling since Medina markedly differs from the
present case on major points.
o Timing of acquisition of subject property – Medina acquired prior commencement and conclusion
of case, while present case, petitioners acquired before the commencement of Civil Case
o Basis of Right over the disputed land of the predecessors-in-interest - In Medina based on Titulo
de Composicion Con El Estado issued by the Spanish Government, while petitioners based on
fully recognized Torrens title.
o In Medina merely relied on the title of her predecessor-in-interest and tax declarations to prove
her alleged ownership of the land, while petitioners acquired the registered title in their own
names, while the petitioner
- In sale of a parcel of land under the Torrens system, person dealing with the registered property
need not go beyond the certificate of title as he can rely solely on the title and annotations on the
title.
Second Issue: Whether petitioners were innocent purchasers for value and builders in good faith
- Buyer in good faith - buys the property of another without notice that some other person has a right
to or interest in such property.
- Buyer for value if he pays a full and fair price at the time of the purchase or before he has notice of
the claim or interest of some other person in the property.
- Determination of whether one is a buyer in good faith is a factual issue which generally is outside
the province of this except if CA failed to take into account certain relevant facts which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion.
- CA failed to consider that petitioners purchased the subject land in 1964 from Mariano Lising and
the civil case commenced sometime in 1969. Petitioners could reasonably rely on Mariano Lisings
Certificate of Title which at the time of purchase was still free from any third party claim. Hence,
petitioners are buyers in good faith and for value.
- Builder in good faith - one who builds with the belief that the land he is building on is his, and is
ignorant of any defect or flaw in his title. Petitioner spouses acquired the land without knowledge of
any defect in the title of Mariano Lising. It was only in 1998, when the sheriff of Quezon City tried to
execute the judgment in Civil Case which cannot serve as notice of such adverse claim to
petitioners since they were not impleaded therein as parties.
- Petitioners have rights over the subject property and hence they are proper parties in interest in any
case, hence they should have been impleaded in civil case.
- Failure to implead proper parties in interest, they cannot be reached by decision as no man shall be
affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger who did not have his day in court. Only real
parties in interest in an action are bound by the judgment
- Demolition of their house on their own titled lot tantamounts to a deprivation of property without due
process of law.
- Petition granted.
***Medina Case
Benedicta Mangahas and Francisco Ramos occupied and built houses on the lot without consent of the
owner of property which is the Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC)
PRC sold the lot to Remedios Magbanua. Mangahas and Ramos opposed and instituted Civil Case to
annul the sale and to compel PRC to execute a contract of sale in their favor. The trial court dismissed
the complaint and ordered Mangahas and Ramos to vacate
When Magbanua sought the execution of the judgment in Civil Case petitioner Medina opposed
contending that she bought the houses from spouses Ricardo and Eufrocinia de Guzman (Mangahas
and Ramos sold the property to spouses de Guzman), relying title from Titulo de Composicion Con El
Estado .Medina argued that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over her, claiming that she was not
a party in first Civil Case .
Court ruled that first civil case could be enforced against petitioner even though she was not a party
thereto. Petitioner was privy to the two judgment debtors Mangahas and Ramos.
BALLATAN v. CA Ching Yao, the AIA and Engineer Quedding. RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner ordering
respondent Go to demolish their improvements and pay damages to Petitioner but dismissing
the third-party complaint. CA affirmed the dismissal of the third party-complaint as to AIA but
-Land Owner in Good faith, Builder in Good faith scenario -The right to choose between
reinstated the the complaint against Yao and the Engineer. CA also affirmed the demolition
appropriating the improvement or selling the land on which the improvement of the builder,
and damages awarded to petitioner and added that Yao should also pay respondent for his
planter or sower stands, is given to the owner.
encroachment of respondent Go’s property. Jose Quedding was also ordered to pay
-If the option chooses is to sell the lot, the price must be fixed at the prevailing market value attorney’s fees for his negligence which caused all this fuzz.
at the time of payment.
ISSUE: What is the proper remedy in this situation (everyone was in good faith)?
FACTS:
RULING:

Eden Ballatan, together with other petitioners, is living in and registered owners of Lot No. 24.
Art 448 is the proper remedy (Lower Courts are wrong in awarding the damages). It was
Respondent Winston Go is living in and registered owners of Lot No. 25 and 26. And Li Ching
established in the case that the parties had no knowledge of the encroachment until Ballatan
Yao is living in and the registered owner of Lot. 27. The Lots are adjacent to each other.
noticed it there all of them were builders in Good faith. In that scenario they have two options.
1st option is that the land owner will buy the improvements and the 2nd option is to oblige the
When Ballatan constructed her house in her lot, she noticed that the concrete fence and side builders to buy the land given that the value of the land is not considerably more than the
pathway of the adjoining house of respondent Winston Go encroached on the entire length of buildings or tree; otherwise the owner may remove the improvements thereon.
the eastern side of her property. She was informed by her contractor of this discrepancy, who
then told respondent Go of the same. Respondent, however, claims that his house was built
The builder, planter or sower, however, is not obliged to purchase the land if its value is
within the parameters of his father’s lot; and that this lot was surveyed by engineer Jose
considerably more than the building, planting or sowing. In such case, the builder, planter or
Quedding, the authorized surveyor of Araneta Institute of Agriculture (AIA). Petitioner called
sower must pay rent to the owner of the land. If the parties cannot come to terms over the
the attention of AIA on the matter and so the latter authorized another survey of the land by
conditions of the lease, the court must fix the terms thereof. The right to choose between
Engineer Quedding. The latter then did the survey twice which led to the conclusion that Lots
appropriating the improvement or selling the land on which the improvement of the builder,
Nos 25, 26 (owned by respondent Go) and 27 (owned by Li Ching Yao) moved westward to
planter or sower stands, is given to the owner. If the option chooses is to sell the lot, the price
the eastern boundary of Lot 24 (owned by petitioner Ballatan.) –(it was later on discovered by
must be fixed at the prevailing market value at the time of payment. Petitioner was given by
the courts that Go encroached 42 square meters from the property of Ballatan and Yao
SC 30 days to decide on what to do or which right to exercise. Likewise, Go was also given
encroached 37 square meters on Go’s property, all of which were in GOOD FAITH) Ballatan
time to do the regarding Yao’s encroachment. Engineer Quedding was still asked to pay
made written demands to the respondent to dismantle and move their improvements and
attorney’s fees.
since the latter wasn’t answering the petitioner filed accion publiciana in court. Go’s filed their
“Answer with Third-Party Complaint” impleading as third party defendants respondents Li
SPS. MACASAET vs SPS. MACASAET G.R. 154391-92 Sept. 30, 2004
Facts:  That Ismael and Teresita had a right to occupy the lots is therefore clear, the issue is the
 Petitioners Ismael and Teresita Macasaet and Respondents Vicente and Rosario duration of possession. In the absence of a stipulation on this point, Art. 1197 of the civil
Macasaet are first-degree relatives. Ismael is the son of respondents and Teresita is his Code allows the courts to fix the duration or the period.
wife.  Article 1197. If the obligation does not fix a period, but from its nature and the
 On December 10, 1997, the parents filed with the MTC of Lipa an ejectment suit against circumstances it can be inferred that a period was intended, the courts may fix the
the children. duration thereof.
 Respondents alleged that they were the owners of 2 parcels of land, situated at Banay-  The courts shall also fix the duration of the period when it depends upon the will of the
banay, Lipa City; that by way of a verbal lease agreement, Ismael and Teresita occupied debtor.
these lots in Mar. 1992 and used them as their residence and the situs of their  Article 1197, however, applies to a situation in which the parties intended a period. Such
construction business; and that despite repeated demands, petitioners failed to pay the qualification cannot be inferred from the facts of the present case.
agreed rental of P500.  The mere failure to fix the duration of their agreement does not necessarily justify or
 Ismael and Teresita denied the existence of any verbal lease agreement. They claimed authorize the courts to do so
that respondents had invited them to construct their residence and business on the  It can be safely concluded that the agreement subsisted as long as the parents and the
subject lots in order that they could all live near one another, employ marivic, the sister of children mutually benefited from the arrangement.
Ismael, and help in resolving the problems of the family.  Effectively, there is a resolutory condition in such an agreement.
 They added that it was the policy of respondents to allot the land they owned as an  Their possession which was originally lawful became unlawful when the reason therefore
advance grant of inheritance in favor of their children. – love and solidarity – ceased to exist between them.
 The MTCC ruled in favor of respondents and ordered petitioners to vacate the premises.
It opined that Ismael and Teresita had occupied the lots, not by virtue of a verbal lease
agreement, but by tolerance of Vicente and Rosario.
 As their stay was merely tolerance, petitioners were necessarily bound by an implied
promise to vacate the lots upon demand.
 On appeal, the regional trial court updheld the findings fo the MTCC. However, the RTC
allowed the respondents to appropriate the building and other improvements introduced
by petitioners, after payment of the indemnity provided for by Art. 448 in relation to Art.
546 and 548 of the NCC.
 The CA sustained the finding of the two lower courts that Ismael and Teresita had been
occupying the subject lots only by the tolerance of Vicente and Rosario. Citing Calubayan
v. pascual, the CA further ruled that petitioners status was analogous to that of a lessee
or a tenant whose term of lease had expired, but whose occupancy continued by
tolerance of the owner.
 Consequently , in ascertaining the right of the petitioners to be reimbursed for the
improvements they had introduced on respondents properties, the appellate court applied
the Civil Codes provisions on lease.

Issue:

W.O.N. the courts should fix the duration of possession.

Held:
ESPINOZA and DE VERA vs. SPOUSES MAYANDOC and ERLINDA MAYANDOC
This is a Complaint for useful expenses under Articles 448 and 546 of the New Civil Code of
the Philippines.
FACTS: A parcel of land originally owned by Eusebio Espinoza was divided among his heirs,
Pastora, Domingo and Pablo, after his death.
Pastora executed a Deed of Sale conveying her share to respondents and Leopoldo
Espinoza. On that same date, a fictitious deed of sale was executed by Domingo Espinoza,
conveying the 3/4 share in favor of respondent Erlinda Cayabyab. Later on, a fictitious deed
of sale was executed by Nemesio Cayabyab, Candida Cruz, Sps. Maximo Espinoza and
Winifreda De Vera and Leopoldo Espinoza over the land in favor of Sps. Antonio and Erlinda
Mayandoc.
As a result, petitioners filed an action for annulment of document in which RTC rendered a
Decision ordering respondents to reconvey the land in dispute. CA affirmed the decision with
modification and has become final.
Thus, respondents filed a complaint for reimbursement for useful expenses, pursuant to
Articles 448 and 546 of the New Civil Code, alleging that the house in question was built on
the disputed land in good faith. The respondents believed themselves to be the owners of the
land with a claim of title thereto and were never prevented by the petitioners in constructing
the house. Petitioners argued that respondents can never be considered as builders in good
faith because the latter were aware that the deeds of sale over the land in question were
fictitious.
Respondents, manifested their option to buy the land where the house stood, but petitioners
expressed that they were not interested to sell the land or to buy the house in question.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents were in bad faith in introducing improvements on the
subject land.
To be deemed a builder in good faith, it is essential that a person asserts title to the land on
which he builds, i.e., that he be a possessor in the concept of owner, and that he be unaware
that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.
The settled rule is bad faith should be established by clear and convincing evidence since the
law always presumes good faith. In this particular case, petitioners were not able to prove
that respondents were in bad faith in constructing the house on the subject land. Bad faith
does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence. It imports a dishonest purpose or some
moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong. It means breach of a known duty through
some motive, interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud. For anyone who claims
that someone is in bad faith, the former has the duty to prove such. Hence, petitioners err in
their argument that respondents failed to prove that they are builders in good faith in spite of
the findings of the RTC and the CA that they are.
As such, Article 448 of the Civil Code must be applied. It applies when the builder believes
that he is the owner of the land or that by some title he has the right to build thereon, or that,
at least, he has a claim of title thereto. InTuatzs v. Spouses Escol, et al.,  this Court ruled that
the seller (the owner of the land) has two options under Article 448: (1) he may appropriate
the improvements for himself after reimbursing the buyer (the builder in good faith) the
necessary and useful expenses under Articles 546 and 548 of the Civil Code; or (2) he may
sell the land to the buyer, unless its value is considerably more than that of the
improvements, in which case, the buyer shall pay reasonable rent, xxx
The rule that the choice under Article 448 of the Civil Code belongs to the owner of the land is
in accord with the principle of accession, i.e., that the accessory follows the principal and not
the other way around. Even as the option lies with the landowner, the grant to him,
nevertheless, is preclusive. The landowner cannot refuse to exercise either option and
compel instead the owner of the building to remove it from the land.
The raison d’etre  for this provision has been enunciated thus: Where the builder, planter or
sower has acted in good faith, a conflict of rights arises between the owners, and it becomes
necessary to protect the owner of the improvements without causing injustice to the owner of
the land. In view of the impracticability of creating a state of forced co-ownership, the law has
provided a just solution by giving the owner of the land the option to acquire the
improvements after payment of the proper indemnity, or to oblige the builder or planter to pay
for the land and the sower the proper rent. He cannot refuse to exercise either option. It is the
owner of the land who is authorized to exercise the option, because his right is older, and
because, by the principle of accession, he is entitled to the ownership of the accessory thing.
Firme vs Bukal Corp. The Court of Appeals held that partial performance of the contract of sale takes the oral
G.R. No. 146608, October 23, 2003 contract out of the scope of the Statute of Frauds. This conclusion arose from the appellate
court’s erroneous finding that there was a perfected contract of sale. The records show that
FACTS:  there was no perfected contract of sale. There is therefore no basis for the application of the
Statute of Frauds. The application of the Statute of Frauds presupposes the existence of a
perfected contract.
Spouses Constante and Azucena Firme are the registered owners of a parcel of land located
on Dahlia Avenue, Fairview Park, Quezon City. Renato de Castro, the vice president of Bukal
Enterprises and Development Corporation authorized his friend, Teodoro Aviles, a broker, to
negotiate with the Spouses Firme for the purchase of the Property. On 28 March 1995, Bukal
Enterprises filed a complaint for specific performance and damages with the trial court,
alleging that the Spouses Firme reneged on their agreement to sell the Property. The
complaint asked the trial court to order the Spouses Firme to execute the deed of sale and to
deliver the title to the Property to Bukal Enterprises upon payment of the agreed purchase
price. On 7 August 1998, the trial court rendered judgment against Bukal Enterprises,
dismissing the case and ordering Bukal Enterprises to pay the Spouses Constante and
Azucena Firme (1) the sum of P335,964.90 as and by way of actual and compensatory
damages; (2) the sum of P500,000.00 as and by way of moral damages; (3) the sum of
P100,000.00 as and by way of attorney’s fees; and (4) the costs of the suit.

The trial court held there was no
establish that the Spouses Firme
Aviles had no valid authority to
Enterprises appealed to the Court
the trial court.
perfected contract of sale as Bukal Enterprises failed to
gave their consent to the sale of the Property; and that
bind Bukal Enterprises in the sale transaction. Bukal
of Appeals, which reversed and set aside the decision of

ISSUES:

1. Whether there was a perfected contract between the Spouses Firme and Bukal
Enterprises, the latter allegedly being represented by Aviles.
2. Whether or not Statute of Frauds may apply?

RULING:

1. There is no perfected contract.

Even the existence of a signed document purporting to be a contract of sale does not
preclude a finding that the contract is invalid when the evidence shows that there was no
meeting of the minds between the seller and buyer. In this case, what were offered in
evidence were mere unsigned deeds of sale which have no probative value. Bukal
Enterprises failed to show the existence of a perfected contract of sale by competent proof.

2. There is no basis for the application of Statute of Frauds.

SPOUSES MARCOS R. ESMAQUEL and VICTORIA SORDEVILLA, Petitioners, v. MARIA attacked by respondent in this case for ejectment. Under Section 48 of PD No. 1529, a
COPRADA, Respondent. certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified or
canceled, except in a direct proceeding for that purpose in accordance with law. The issue of
PERALTA, J.: the validity of the title of the petitioners can only be assailed in an action expressly instituted
for that purpose. Whether or not the respondent has the right to claim ownership over the
FACTS: property is beyond the power of the trial court to determine in an action for unlawful detainer.

On February 24, 1997, spouses Esmaquel filed an ejectment case against Coprada before
the 2nd MCTC Laguna. Petitioners claimed that they are the registered owners of a parcel of
land situated in San Miguel, Majayja. In 1945, Coprada was able to persuade the petitioners
to allow her and her family to use and occupy the land for their residence, under the condition
that they will vacate the premises should petitioners need to use the same. Coprada and her
family were allowed to construct their residential house. Since then, the petitioners never
made an attempt to drive them away out of pity, knowing that respondent and her eight
children have no other place to live in. the a few years later the financial condition of
Copradas family, having acquired her own residential house. This prompted petitioners to
institute an ejectment case against Coprada. Respondent avers that she had already
acquired ownership over the contested lot when she orally purchased it. And further avers
that the claim has already prescribed and thus barred by laches.

MCTC ruled in favor of Coprada, thus the case was dismissed. On appeal to the RTC, the
ruling of the MCTC was reversed. The CA reversed the RTCs decision and reinstated the
MCTCs ruling. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have a valid ground to evict respondent
from the subject property.

HELD:

LAND TITLES

As a registered owner, petitioner has a right to eject any person illegally occupying his
property. This right is imprescriptible and can never be barred by laches.

In the present case, Coprada failed to present evidence to substantiate her allegation that a
portion of the land was sold to her in 1962. Coprada's submission that there was an oral sale
is a mere afterthought. On the other hand, it is undisputed that the subject property is covered
by a title, registered in the name of the petitioners. As against the respondent's unproven
claim that she acquired a portion of the property from the petitioners by virtue of an oral sale,
the Torrens title of petitioners must prevail. Petitioners' title over the subject property is
evidence of their ownership thereof. It is a fundamental principle in land registration that the
certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the
property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. Moreover, the age-old rule is
that the person who has a Torrens title over a land is entitled to possession thereof.

Further, Coprada's argument that petitioners are no longer the owners of a portion of the
subject land because of the sale in her favor is a collateral attack on the title of the
petitioners, which is not allowed. The validity of petitioners' certificate of title cannot be
Aquino vs Aguilar The Sps Aguilar also have no right to refund of any improvement built therein
pursuant to Article 449 and 450 of the Civil Code.
Facts:
However, they may recover the necessary expenses incurred for the preservation of
Sps Aquino are owners of the house and lot. They were residing in the US. the property pursuant to Article 452.

Sps. Aguilar was given consent and approval by the Sps Aquino to stay on the
property.

On said property, a three-story building was built on the lot. Sps Aguilar stayed in the
property for 20 years without rental.

In 2003, Aquino demanded from the Aguilar to vacate the propery to be used by an
immediate family member.

Sps Aguilar alleged that they had made contributions in the construction of the
building.

Issue:

WON Article 448 shall apply. NO.

Ruling:

No. Aguilar is not a builder in good faith on account of their admission that the subject
lot belonged to the Sps Aquino when they constructed the building. They were aware of the
flaw on their title.

Moreover, the SC ruled that although there are some instances that the SC applied
Art. 448 to a builder who has constructed on the land of another with the consent of the
owner, 448 here still does not apply.

In those cases, the SC found out that the owners knew and approved of the
construction of improvements on the property. Hence, they were held in good faith.

However, although the factual circumstances are somewhat similar, there is one
crucial factor here. There was evidence that Aquino prohibited Aguilar from building their own
structure on the property. There was this letter warning in 1983 prohibiting them from
building. They were forewarned that the property is slated to be sold as it was only bought for
investment purposes.

Therefore, the Sps Aguilar were not in good faith. Article 448 does not apply.
 RULING:
VIAJAR v. CA

It was established in the trial that for a period of 40 years the Suague river overflowed its
It is a well settled rule that registration under the Torrens System does not protect the riparian
banks yearly and the property of the defendant gradually received deposits of soil from the
owner against the diminution of the area of his registered land through gradual changes in
effects of the current of the river.
the course of an adjoining stream or river.
It is a well settled rule that registration under the Torrens System does not protect the riparian
FACTS:
owner against the dimunition of the area of his registered land through gradual changes in the
Private respondents Spouses Ladrido are owners of Lot 7511 of the Cadastral Survey of course of an adjoining stream or river. Accretions which the banks of the river may gradually
Pototan Iloilo. Petitioners are owners of the Lot 7340, which they bought from the Te. Viajar receive from the effect of the current become the property of the owners of the banks.
had lot 7340 relocated and found out that the property was in the possession of Ladrido. She
demanded the return but the latter refused. She instituted a civil action for recovery of
possession and damages. She also impleaded Te as defedant for the reason that if Ladrido is
going to be favored then the sale was to be annulled and plaintiff must be reimbursed. During
the trial it was proven that during the cadastral survey in 1926, the two lots were separated by
the Suague River and that a part of the land of Lot 7340 and the old river bed were in the
possession of the defendants and that the plaintiffs have never been in actual physical
possession.

CFI ruled in favor of the defendants which the CA confirmed. There was a mention in the
case that the issue from which the decision of the CFI was not the issue appealed in the CA
so the affirmation made by the CA should be void.

ISSUES:

1) Whether or not the change in the course of the Suague River was gradual or sudden
2) Whether or not the plaintiffs are protected by the Torrens System (in relation to the
dimunition of the area of their land because the plaintiffs are contending that Art 457 must be
interpreted as applicable only to unregistered lands)

Ronquillo vs. CA
 Joint/ Solidary Obligation

Facts

 Ronquillo was one of the four defendants of the Civil case filed by Antonio So (private
respondent) for collection of money amounting to 117M

 The amount sought to be collected represented the value of the checks issued by
defendants in payment for foodstuffs delivered to and received by them

 They entered into a compromise agreement. In said agreement both parties agree
that failure of either party to comply with the terms and conditions stipulated, the innocent
party will be entitled to an execution of the decision based on the compromise agreement and
the defaulting party agrees and hold themselves to reimburse the innocent party for attys fees
and other feesBecause of failure of the other two defendants to pay their obligation, private
respondent filed for the issuance of writ of execution

 A writ of execution was issued for the satisfaction for the claim against the properties
of the defendants including petitioner, single and jointly liable

 The decision of RTC based on the compromise agreement provides that “defendants
individually and agree to pay” within a periods of six months from January 1980 or before
June 30, 1980

Issue

W/N Ronquillo is solidarily liable with the other defendants in the civil case

Ruling

 Yes. The term individually has the same meaning as collectively, separately,
distinctively, respectively or severally.

 An agreement to be individually liable undoubtedly creates a several obligation and a

several obligation is one which binds himself to perform the whole obligation
REYNANTE v. CA
Since the affidavits prove that Reynante has been in possession of these lands for more than
FACTS:
50 years, the SC rightly held that the land belongs to him.
More than 50 years ago, Reynante was taken as tenant by the late Don Cosme Carlos over a
fishpond in Meycauayan, Bulacan. Reynante subsequently built a nipa hut where he and his
family lived and took care of the nipa palms which they planted on lots 1 and 2, which was
located between the fishpond and Liputan River. Reynante’s family sold the nipa palms, and
appropriated the fruits as his own, without interference or complaint from Don Carlos.
Upon Don Carlos’ death, his heirs convinced Reynante to sign an affidavit, relinquishing his
rights as a caretaker of the fishpond. Reynante, however, continued to live in the nipa hut he
had built, and he still took care of the nipa palms, which he continued to sell.

This lead the heirs to file a complaint for forcible entry with preliminary injunction against
Reynante in the MTC. The MTC found for Reynante, but the heirs appealed to the RTC,
where the decision was reversed. The CA merely affirmed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not accretion automatically becomes registered land just because the adjoining
lot is registered in the Torrens System?

HELD:

While it is true that alluvial deposits shall belong to the owner of the lot adjoining such
accretion, it does not automatically bestow an imprescriptibility. If the owners of said land
have not registered this with the proper entity, said land will be subject to acquisition by
prescription, which was what occurred in this case.
ACCRETION
Vda. De Nazareno vs. Court of Appeals, Salasalan, Rabaya, Labis RULING:
GR No. 98045 The Court ruled that the subject land is part of the public domain since the accretion was
June 26, 1996 man-made or artificial. Under Article 457 of the Civil Code:

FACTS: “To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they
Antonio Nazareno is an owner of a titled property situated beside an accretion area gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.”
along the banks of Cagayan River. Jose Salasalan & Leo Rabaya leased parcels of land from
Nazareno. When Salsalan & Rabaya stopped paying rentals, Nazareno filed an ejectment But the Court provides the following requisites of accretion (Rules of Alluvion):
suit. The Municipal Trial Court ruled in favor of Nazareno; the RTC affirmed the decision.
Thus, Nazareno filed an application with the Bureau of Lands to perfect his title over the
accretion area being claimed by him.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject land is a public land?
1. That the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible;
ARGUMENTS:

VDA. DE NAZARENO SALASALAN AND RABAYA

 The subject land is a private land  They contend the public character of
being an accretion to Antonio the subject land.
Nazareno’s titled property.  Mere application of the
 Art. 457 of the Civil Code which Miscellaneous Sales Patent by 2. That it be the result of the action of the waters of the river (or sea); and
provides that “To the owners of lands Nazareno is an admission that the
adjoining the banks of rivers belong land being applied is a public land.
the accretion which they gradually
receive from the effects of the
current of the waters”.
 The accumulation was gradual and
imperceptible, resulting from the
action of the waters or current of the
Balacanas Creek and Cagayan
River.
 3. That the land where the accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers (or
sea coast).
In Republic v. CA, “the requirement that the deposit should be due to the effect of the current
of the river is indispensable”. In Hilario v. City of Manila, “the word “current” indicates the
participation of the body of water in the ebb and flow of waters due to high and low tide”.
Here, the subject land was the direct result of the dumping of sawdust by the Sun Valley
Lumber Co. consequent to its sawmill operations.
DIONISIA P. BAGAIPO vs.  THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and LEONOR LOZANO
G.R. No. 116290.  December 8, 2000
FACTS
Petitioner Dionisia P. Bagaipo is the registered owner of Lot No. 415, a 146,900 square
meter agricultural land situated in Ma-a, Davao City while Respondent Leonor Lozano is the
owner of a registered parcel of land located across and opposite the southeast portion of
petitioner’s lot facing the Davao River. 
On May 26, 1989, Bagaipo filed a complaint for Recovery of Possession with Mandatory
Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Damages against Lozano for:  
(1) the surrender of possession by Lozano of a certain portion of land measuring 29,162
square meters which is supposedly included in the area belonging to Bagaipo under TCT No.
T-15757; and
(2) the recovery of a land area measuring 37,901 square meters which Bagaipo
allegedly lost when the Davao River traversed her property.  
Bagaipo contended that as a result of a change in course of the said river, her property
became divided into three lots, namely:  Lots 415-A, the area presently occupied by Bagaipo,
415-B, which cut across Bagaipo’s land was taken up by the new course of the Davao River
and 415-C, the land presently located across the river and parallel to Bagaipo’s property.
The trial court concluded that the applicable law is Article 457 of the New Civil Code and
not Art. 461and dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the trial court, hence the present case.
ISSUE
Whether the land is owned by Bagaipo due to the changing of the river’s course or by
Lozano by the principle of accretion.
HELD
 The trial court and the appellate court both found that the decrease in land area was
brought about by erosion and not a change in the river’s course.  The decrease in petitioner’s
land area and the corresponding expansion of respondent’s property were the combined
effect of erosion and accretion respectively.  Art. 461 of the Civil Code is
inapplicable.  Petitioner cannot claim ownership over the old abandoned riverbed because
the same is inexistent.  

RACHEL C. CELESTIAL v. JESSE CACHOPERO

               Petitioner Rachel Celestial is the sister of defendant Jesse Cachopero. They had a

dispute over a piece of land which was a dried-up creek, as Cachopero was trying to obtain a
Miscellaneous Sales Application (MSA) to the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) alleging that he had been the owner of that land whereon he built a house
and other improvements. However, Celestial protests that she has preferential right over the
land because it is adjacent to and is the only outlet from her house. According to the Bureau
of Land, the land in dispute was a creek and is therefore outside the commerce of man. The
first MSA was denied by the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) prompting Cachopero to obtain
another MSA which was granted by the DENR. Due to conflicting interests of the parties, the
land in dispute must be sold in a public auction.

          Cachopero then filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against the
DENR with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) but was denied. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC.

            Celestial contends that the RTC had no jurisdiction over Cachopero‘s petition for
certiorari as it is in the nature of an appeal falling within the jurisdiction of the CA and that the
Cachopero has not exhausted all administrative remedies.

ISSUE:

(a) Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over petition for certiorari, mandamus and
prohibition

(b) Whether or not the land in question owned by one of the parties when it is classified as
outside the commerce of man

HELD:
RTCs have concurrent jurisdiction with the CA and SC over original petitions for
certiorari, prohinition and mandamus.
Celestial has apparently confused the separate and distinct remedies of an appeal (i.e.
through a petition for review of a decision of a quasi judicial agency under Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court) and a special civil action for certiorari (i.e. through a petition for review under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court).
Concomitantly, appellate jurisdiction is separate and distinct from the jurisdiction to issue the
prerogative writ of certiorari. An appellate jurisdiction refers to a process which is a
continuation of the original suit and not a commencement of a new action. In contrast, to
invoke a court’s jurisdiction to issue the writ of certiorari requires the commencement of a
new and original action therefore, independent of the proceedings which gave rise to the
questioned decision or order. As correctly held by the Court of Appeals, the RTCs have
concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court over original
petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Section 21 of B.P. 129.
The Court finds no reason to disturb the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the instant case
falls under the recognized exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies,
which provides “that such is inapplicable if (1) it should appear that an irreparable injury or
damage will be suffered by a party if he should await, before taking court action, the final
action of the administrative official concerned on the matter as a result of a
patently illegal order or (2) where appeal would not prove to be speedy and adequate
remedy”.
This requirement of prior exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute, there being
instances when it may be dispensed with and judicial action may be validly resorted to
immediately, among which are: 1) when the question raised is purely legal; 2) when the
administrative body is in estoppel; 3) when the act complained of is patently illegal; 4) when
there is urgent need for judicial intervention; 5) when the claim involved is small; 6) when
irreparable damage will be suffered; 7) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy; 8) when strong public interest is involved; and 9) in quo warranto proceedings.
A dried up creek is property of public dominion and not susceptible to acquisitive
prescription
As for Celestial‘s claim of ownership over the subject land, admittedly a dried-up bed of the
Salunayan Creek, based on (1) her alleged long term adverse possession and that of her
predecessor-in-interest, Marcelina Basadre, even prior to October 22, 1966, when she
purchased the adjoining property from the latter, and (2) the right of accession under Art. 370
of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 and/or Article 461 of the Civil Code, the same must fail.
Since property of public dominion is outside the commerce of man and not susceptible to
private appropriation and acquisitive prescription, the adverse possession which may be the
basis of a grant of title in the confirmation of an imperfect title refers only to alienable or
disposable portions of the public domain. It is only after the Government has declared the
land to be alienable and disposable agricultural land that the year of entry, cultivation and
exclusive and adverse possession can be counted for purposes of an imperfect title.
Calacala vs RP
Facts:
Spouses Camilo Calacala and Conchita Calacala, predecessors-in-interest of the herein
petitioners, are the registered owners of a parcel of land situated at Barangay Balincanaway,
Rosales, Pangasinan and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-21204 of the Registry
of Deeds of Pangasinan.
To secure the provisional release of an accused in a criminal case then pending before the
then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Pangasinan, the spouses offered their aforementioned
parcel of land as a property bond in said case.
For failure of the accused to appear at his scheduled arraignment on 4 November 1981, the
CFI ordered the bond forfeited in favor of the government, and, following the bondman's
failure to produce in court the body of the accused, rendered judgment against the bond in
the amount of P3,500.00.
Thereafter, the court issued a Writ of Execution[1] directing the provincial sheriff to effect a
levy on the subject parcel of land and to sell the same at a public auction to satisfy the
amount of the bond. In compliance with the writ, the deputy provincial sheriff issued on 26
July 1982 a Notice of Levy[2]  addressed to the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan who, on 19
August 1982, caused the annotation thereof on TCT No. T-21204 as Entry No. 83188.
Not long thereafter, a public auction of the subject parcel of land was held on 24 September
1982, at which respondent Republic submitted its bid for P3,500, which is the amount of the
judgment on the bond. Hence, on that same day, a Sheriff's Certificate of Sale[3] was issued
in favor of the Republic as the winning bidder.
On 5 October 1982, the same Certificate of Sale was registered and annotated on TCT No.
T-21204 as Entry No. 83793, thereby giving the spouses Calacala a period of one (1) year
therefrom within which to redeem their property. Unfortunately, they never did up to the time
of their respective deaths on 13 January 1988 and 8 January 1994.
Claiming ownership of the same land as legal heirs of the deceased spouses, petitioners filed
with the Regional Trial Court at Rosales, Pangasinan a complaint[4] for Quieting of Title and
Cancellation of Encumbrance on TCT No. T-21204 against respondents Republic and Sheriff
Juan C. Marquez. In their complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 1239-R and raffled to
Branch 53 of the court, petitioners prayed, inter alia, for the cancellation of Entries No. 83188
and 83793 on TCT No. T-21204 or the declaration of said entries as null and void.
To the complaint, respondent Republic interposed a Motion to Dismiss[5] grounded on the (1)
complaint's failure to state a cause of action and (2) prescription of petitioners' right to
redeem.
Issue: whether the trial court's dismissal of petitioners' complaint for Quieting of Title  was
proper
Held:
Under Article 476 of the New Civil Code, the remedy may be availed of only when, by reason
of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding, which appears valid but is, in
fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable or unenforceable, a cloud is thereby casts on the
complainant's title to real property or any interest therein.
In turn, Article 477 of the same Code identifies the party who may bring an action to quiet
title, thus:
Article 477. The plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in the real property
which is the subject-matter of the action. He need not be in possession of said property.
Verily, for an action to quiet title to prosper, two (2) indispensable requisites must concur,
namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real
property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding claimed
to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite
its prima facieappearance of validity or legal efficacy.
Unfortunately, the foregoing requisites are wanting in this case.
To start with, petitioners base their claim of legal title not on the strength of any independent
writing in their favor but simply and solely on respondent Republic's failure to secure the
Certificate of Final Sale, execute an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership and obtain a writ
of possession over the property in dispute within ten (10) years from the registration of the
Certificate of Sale.
Petitioners' reliance on the foregoing shortcomings or inactions of respondent Republic
cannot stand.
For one, it bears stressing that petitioners' predecessors-in-interest lost whatever right they
had over land in question from the very moment they failed to redeem it during the 1-year
period of redemption. Certainly, the Republic's failure to execute the acts referred to by the
petitioners within ten (10) years from the registration of the Certificate of Sale cannot, in any
way, operate to restore whatever rights petitioners' predecessors-in-interest had over the
same. For sure, petitioners have yet to cite any provision of law or rule of jurisprudence, and
we are not aware of any, to the effect that the failure of a buyer in a foreclosure sale to secure
a Certificate of Final Sale, execute an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership and obtain a
writ of possession over the property thus acquired, within ten (10) years from the registration
of the Certificate of Sale will operate to bring ownership back to him whose property has been
previously foreclosed and sold. As correctly observed by the trial court, the Republic's failure
to do anything within ten (10) years or more following the registration of the Sheriff's
Certificate of Sale cannot give rise to a presumption that it has thereby waived or abandoned
its right of ownership or that it has prescribed, 'for prescription does not lie against the
government', nor could it 'be bound or estopped by the negligence or mistakes of its officials
and employees' .
Moreover, with the rule that the expiration of the 1-year redemption period forecloses the
obligor's right to redeem and that the sale thereby becomes absolute, the issuance thereafter
of a final deed of sale is at best a mere formality and mere confirmation of the title that is
already vested in the purchaser.
With the reality that petitioners are not holders of any legal title over the property subject of
this case and are bereft of any equitable claim thereon, the very first requisite of an action to
quiet title, i.e.,  that the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in
the real property subject matter of the action, is miserably wanting in this case.
For another, and worse, petitioners never put in issue, as in fact they admit in their pleadings,
the validity of the Sheriff's Certificate of Sale duly registered on 5 October 1982. On this
score, the second requisite of an action to quiet title, namely, that the deed, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding alleged to cast cloud on a plaintiff's title is in fact invalid or
inoperative despite itsprima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy, is likewise absent
herein.
 Ownership of Waters

ARTICLE 5. The following belong to the State:

a. Rivers and their natural beds;

b. Continuous or intermittent waters of springs and brooks running in their natural beds and
the beds themselves;

c. Natural lakes and lagoons;

d. All other categories of surface waters such as water flowing over lands, water from rainfall
whether natural or artificial, and water from agriculture runoff, seepage and drainage;

e. Atmospheric water;

f. Subterranean or ground waters; and

g. Seawater.