Sarmiento vs. Agana 129 scra 122
The owner of the land on which anything has
Facts:
ERNESTO was still courting his wife, the latter's mother
had told him the couple could build a RESIDENTIAL HOUSE
whom Ernesto did construct a RESIDENTIAL HOUSE on the
LAND at a cost of P8,000.00 to P10,000.00 who probably
assumed that the wife's mother was the owner of the LAND and
that, it would be transferred to the spouses. Subsequently
turned out that the LAND had been titled in the name of Mr. &
Mrs. Jose C. Santo, Jr. who, sold the same to petitioner
SARMIENTO. SARMIENTO filed an Ejectment suit against
them. In the evidentiary hearings before the Municipal Court,
SARMIENTO submitted the deed of sale of the LAND in her
favor, which showed the price to be P15,000.00. On the other
hand, ERNESTO testified that the then cost of the
RESIDENTIAL HOUSE would be from P30,000.00 to
P40,000.00.Sarmiento refuse to pay and give option to buy the
property.
Issue: 1.Whether or not Ernesto was in good faith.
2.Whether or not Sarmiento could exercise both refusal
to pay the spouses and give option to purchase.
Held:
1.Yes. We agree that ERNESTO and wife were builders
in good faith in view of the peculiar circumstances under which
they had constructed the RESIDENTIAL HOUSE. As far as they
knew, the LAND was owned by ERNESTO's mother-in-law who,
having stated they could build on the property, could reasonably
be expected to later on give them the LAND.
In regards to builders in good faith, Article 448 of the Code
provides:têñ.£îhqwâ£
ART. 448.
been built, sown or planted in good faith,shall have the
rightto appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting,
after payment of the indemnity provided for in articles 546
and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the
price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper
rent.However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy
the land if its value is considerably more than that of the
building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent,
if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the
building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall
agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of
disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof.
2.No. The owner of the building erected in good faith on a
land owned by another, is entitled to retain the possession of
the land until he is paid the value of his building, under article
453 (now Article 546). The owner, of the land. upon, the other
hand, has the option, under article 361 (now Article 448), either
to pay for the building or to sell his land to the owner of the
building. But he cannot, as respondents here did, refuse both to
pay for the building and to sell the land and compel the owner of
the building to remove it from the land where it is erected. He is
entitled to such remotion only when, after having chosen to sell
his land, the other party fails to pay for the same.
We hold, therefore, that the order of Judge
Natividad compelling defendants-petitioners to
remove their buildings from the land belonging to
plaintiffs-respondents only because the latter
chose neither to pay for such buildings nor to sell
the land, is null and void, for it amends
substantially the judgment sought to be executed
and is, furthermore, offensive to articles 361 (now
Article 448) and 453 (now Article 546) of the Civil
Code. (Ignacio vs. Hilario, 76 Phil. 605, 608
[1946]).
Disposition: WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is hereby
ordered dismissed, without pronouncement as to costs.
Prepared by: Jener Barrameda
Spouses Del Campo vs. Abesia
GR No. L49219. April 15, 1988. GANCAYCO, J.:
Facts:
Spouses Concepcion Fernandez Del Campo and Estanislao Del
Campo, plaintiff-appellees and Bernarda Abesia, defendant-appellant
are co-owners pro indiviso of Lot No. 1161, with an area of only about
45 square meters, situated at the corner of F. Flores and Cavan
Streets, Cebu City covered by TCT No. 61850, in the proportion of 2/3
and 1/3 share each, respectively. Then, the spouses filed an action for
partition in the Court of First Instance of Cebu.
The trial court appointed a commissioner in accordance with the
agreement of the parties. The said commissioner conducted a survey,
prepared a sketch plan and submitted a report to the trial court on
May 29, 1976, recommending that the property be divided into two
lots: Lot 1161-A with an area of 30 square meters for plaintiffs and Lot
No. 1161 -B with an area of 15 square meters for the defendants.
The houses of plaintiffs and defendants were surveyed and shown on
the sketch plan, but the house of the latter occupied the portion with
an area of 5 square meters of Lot 1161-A of the former. The parties
manifested their conformity to the report and asked the trial court to
finally settle and adjudicate who among the parties should take
possession of the 5 square meters of the land in question.
Issue: Whether or not the provisions of Article 448 of the Civil Code is
applicable to a builder in good faith when the property involved is
owned in common.
Ruling:
Yes. The court a quo correctly held that Article 448 of the Civil
Code cannot apply where a co-owner builds, plants or sows on the
land owned in common for then he did not build, plant or sow upon
land that exclusively belongs to another but of which he is a co-owner.
The co-owner is not a third person under the circumstances, and the
situation is governed by the rules of co-ownership.
However, when, as in this case, the co-ownership is
terminated by the partition and it appears that the house of
defendants overlaps or occupies a portion of 5 square meters of the
land pertaining to plaintiffs which the defendants obviously built in
good faith, then the provisions of Article 448 of the new Civil Code
should apply. Manresa and Navarro Amandi agree that the said
provision of the Civil Code may apply even when there was co-
ownership if good faith has been established.
Applying the afore-said provision of the Civil Code, the plaintiffs have
the right to appropriate said portion of the house of defendants upon
payment of indemnity to defendants as provided for in Article 546 of
the Civil Code. Otherwise, the plaintiffs may oblige the defendants to
pay the price of the land occupied by their house. However, if the
price asked for is considerably much more than the value of the
portion of the house of defendants built thereon, then the latter cannot
be obliged to buy the land. The defendants shall then pay the
reasonable rent to the plaintiffs upon such terms and conditions that
they may agree. In case of disagreement, the trial court shall fix the
terms thereof. Of course, defendants may demolish or remove the
said portion of their house, at their own expense, if they so decide.
 3. That granting respondents could buy the portion of the land
occupied by them, the priced fixed by the court is unrealistic and pre-
IGNAO v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
war price.
Facts: Petitioner Florencio Ignao and his uncles Private Respondents
Juan Ignao and Isidro Ignao were co-owners of a parcel of land with
an area of 534 sq.m. Petitioner filed for an action for partition and in The Court’s Ruling: MODIFIED.
February 1975, the court ruled allotting 133.5 sq.m. or 2/8 of the land
The records reveal that the land originally belonged to Baltazar
to private respondents Juan and Isidro, and giving the remaining
Ignao who married twice. In the first marriage, he had 4 children:
portion of 266.5 sq.m. (6/8) to petitioner Florencio. However, no actual
Justo (father of petitioner Florencio), Leon, and respondents Juan and
partition was ever effected.
Isidro. In the second marriage, he also had 4 children but the latter
In 1978, petitioner filed a complaint for recovery of possession of real waived their rights over the controverted land in favor of Justo. Thus
property against respondents alleging that the are occupied by the 2 Justo owned 4/8 (waived by other 4 children) plus his 1/8 share
houses built by respondents exceeded the 133.5 sq.m. previously making 5/8. He then acquired Leon’s share of 1/8 for P500 which he
allotted to them. After an ocular inspection and survey, it was later sold to Florencio for the same amount. Justo died and Florencio
disclosed that the house of Juan occupied 42 sq.m. while that of Isidro inherited the 5/8 share of Justo plus the share he bought making it
occupied 59 sq.m. of Florencio’s land or a total of 101 sq.m. The court 6/8. Juan and Isidro have 1/8 share each. Before the February 1975
ruled that pursuant to Art. 448 of the Civil Code, the owner of the land decision in the partition case was promulgated, Florencio sold 134
(Florencio) should have the choice to either appropriate that part of sq.m. of his share to Victa in January 1975.
the house standing on his land after payment of indemnity to
1. Prior to the partition, all the co-owners hold the property in
respondents for the improvements (houses), or oblige the builders in
common dominion but at the same time, each is an owner of a share
good faith to pay the price of the encroached land. However, the court
which is abstract and undetermined until partition is effected. As co-
observed that it would be useless and unsuitable for Florencio to
owners, the parties may have unequal shares in the common
appropriate since this would render the houses of Juan and Isidro
property, quantitatively speaking. But in a qualitative sense, each co-
worthless it effected a “workable solution” (based on Grana v. CA)
owner has the same right as any one of the other co-owners. Art. 448
ordering Florencio to sell to Juan and Isidro those portions of the land
is applicable to land co-owned as in this case when the co-ownership
occupied by them for P40.00 per sq.m. On appeal, the IAC (now CA)
was terminated by a partition and it appears that the house of an
affirmed the decision of the lower court.
erstwhile co-owner has encroached upon a portion pertaining to
Hence, this petition for review filed by Florencio. another co-owner which was however made in good faith.
2. The lower courts erred in adopting the “workable solution” in
Grana v. CA because it deprived Florencio, the landowner, of the right
Issues: 1. The CA erred in considering respondents as builders in
to choose between appropriating the land or obliging the builder to
good faith thus applying Art. 448 of the Civil Code although the land is
buy the land.
still owned by the parties in co-ownership hence the applicable
provision is Art. 486 but it was not applied. 3. The question on the price is premature since Florencio has yet
to exercise his option as owner of the land.
2. That granting that Art 448 is applicable, the Court wrongly
applied the “workable solution” in Grana v. CA, which was just an
opinion in said case, and not the judgment rendered therein.
TECHNOGAS PHILIPPINES vs. CA
G.R. No. 108894 February 10, 1997
PANGANIBAN, J.:
FACTS:
 The parties in this case are owners of adjoining lots in Parañaque, Metro
Manila. It was discovered in a survey, that a portion of a building of
Technogas, which was presumably constructed by its predecessor-in-
interest, encroached on a portion of the lot owned by private respondent
Edward Uy.
 Upon learning of the encroachment or occupation by its buildings and wall
of a portion of private respondent’s land, the petitioner offered to buy
from defendant that particular portion of Uy’s land occupied by portions of
its buildings and wall with an area of 770 square meters, more or less, but
the latter, however, refused the offer
 The parties entered into a private agreement before a certain Col. Rosales
in Malacañang, wherein petitioner agreed to demolish the wall at the back
portion of its land thus giving to the private respondent possession of a
portion of his land previously enclosed by petitioner's wall.
 Uy later filed a complaint before the office of Municipal Engineer of
Parañaque, Metro Manila as well as before the Office of the Provincial Fiscal
of Rizal against Technogas in connection with the encroachment or
occupation by plaintiff's buildings and walls of a portion of its land but said
complaint did not prosper; so Uy dug or caused to be dug a canal along
Technogas’ wall, a portion of which collapsed in June, 1980, and led to the
filing by the petitioner of the supplemental complaint in the above-entitled
case and a separate criminal complaint for malicious mischief against Uy
and his wife which ultimately resulted into the conviction in court Uy's wife
for the crime of malicious mischief;
ISSUE: WON the petitioner is builder in good faith.
HELD: YES.
 We disagree with Respondent Court’s reliance on the cases of J.M. Tuason
& Co., Inc. vs. Vda. de Lumanlan and J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs.
Macalindong, in ruling that the petitioner "cannot be considered in good
faith" because as a land owner, it is "presumed to know the metes and
bounds of his own property, specially if the same are reflected in a properly
issued certificate of title. One who erroneously builds on the adjoining lot
should be considered a builder in (b)ad (f)aith, there being presumptive
knowledge of the Torrens title, the area, and the extent of the boundaries."
There is nothing in those cases which would suggest that bad faith is
imputable to a registered owner of land when a part of his building
encroaches upon a neighbor's land, simply because he is supposedly
presumed to know the boundaries of his land as described in his certificate
of title,
 Article 527 of the Civil Code presumes good faith, and since no proof exists
to show that the encroachment over a narrow, needle-shaped portion of
private respondent's land was done in bad faith by the builder of the
encroaching structures, the latter should be presumed to have built them
in good faith. It is presumed that possession continues to be enjoyed in the
same character in which it was acquired, until the contrary is proved.
 Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land he is building
on is his, and his ignorance of any defect or flaw in his title. Hence, such
good faith, by law, passed on to Pariz's successor, petitioner in this case.
The good faith ceases from the moment defects in the title are made
known to the possessor, by extraneous evidence or by suit for recovery of
the property by the true owner.
 Consequently, the builder, if sued by the aggrieved landowner for recovery
of possession, could have invoked the provisions of Art. 448 of the Civil
Code, which reads:
The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or
planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his
own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the
indemnity provided for in articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the
one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one
who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter
cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more
than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay
reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to
appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The
parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of
disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof.
The obvious benefit to the builder under this article is that, instead of being
outrightly ejected from the land, he can compel the landowner to make a
choice between the two options: (1) to appropriate the building by paying
the indemnity required by law, or (2) sell the land to the builder. The
landowner cannot refuse to exercise either option and compel instead the
owner of the building to remove it from the land
 In view of the good faith of both petitioner and private respondent, their
rights and obligations are to be governed by Art. 448. Hence, his options
are limited to: (1) appropriating the encroaching portion of petitioner's
building after payment of proper indemnity, or (2) obliging the latter to buy
the lot occupied by the structure. He cannot exercise a remedy of his own
liking

Pleasantville Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et. al.
GR No. 79688 February 1, 1996
Facts:
Edith Rubillo purchased a lot from the petitioner designated as Lot 9, Phase
II, and located at Taculing Road, Pleasantville Subdivision, Bacolod City.
After sometime, Eldred Jardinico bought rights over the vacant lot from
Robillo. Upon completing payments, Jardinico secured from Register of
Deeds of Bacolod City a Transfer of Certificate of Title in his name for the
said lot, but discovered as well that there were improvements introduced on
Lot 9 by Wilson Kee, who had taken possession thereof.
It appears that Wilson Kee bought Lot 8, but there was a misdelivery from
petitioner’s agent, C.T. Torres Enterprises Inc. (CTTEI), when its
employee/agent pointed Lot 9 instead of Lot 8 during lot inspection. After the
discovery, Jardinico confronted Kee. The parties tried to amicably settle but it
was in vain. Thus, Jardinico’s lawyer wrote a demand letter demanding Kee
to remove improvements and vacate Lot 9. Kee refused.
Jardinico filed with MTCC a complaint for ejectment with damages against
Kee. The latter, in turn, filed a third party complaint against Pleasantville and
CTTI.
MTCC ruled in favour of Jardinico holding that there was an erroneous
delivery of Lot 9 to Kee, and attributed it to CTTEI. Thus, Kee has to vacate
the property, pay rentals, and CTTEI and Pleasantvill to pay Jardinico
attorney’s fees and cost of litigation.
On appeal to RTC, it ruled that petitioner and CTTEI were not at fault or
negligent there being no preponderant evidence that they directly
participated in the delivery of Lot 9 to Kee. Kee was found a builder in bad
faith.
After a denied motion for reconsideration, Kee appealed. The appellate court
reversed the assailed decision, declaring Kee a builder in good faith and
imputed the erroneous delivery to petitioner and CTTEI. Petitioner filed the
instant petition to SC averring that Kee is a builder in bad faith.
Issue:
Whether or not Wilson Kee is a builder in good faith
Ruling:
Kee is a builder in good faith. It was CTTEI’s employee, Octaviano, who
authoritatively declared that the land she was pointing to was indeed Lot 8.
Having full faith and confidence in the reputation of CTTEI, and because of
the company's positive identification of the property, Kee saw no reason to
suspect that there had been a misdelivery. Thus, at the time he built
improvements on Lot 8, Kee believed that said lot was what he bought from
petitioner. He was not aware that the lot delivered to him was not Lot 8.
Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land he is building on
is his and his ignorance of any defect or flaw in his title. And as good faith is
presumed, petitioner has the burden of proving bad faith on the part of Kee.
“Petitioner next contends that Kee cannot "claim that another lot was
erroneously pointed out to him" because the latter agreed to the following
provision in the Contract of Sale on installment, to wit:
The Vendee hereby declares that prior to the execution of his contract he/she
has personally examined or inspected the property made subject-matter
hereof, as to its location, contours, as well as the natural condition of the lots
and from the date hereof whatever consequential change therein made due
to erosion, the said Vendee shall bear the expenses of the necessary fillings,
when the same is so desired by him/her.
The subject matter of this provision of the contract is the change of the
location, contour and condition of the lot due to erosion. It merely provides
that the vendee, having examined the property prior to the execution of the
contract, agrees to shoulder the expenses resulting from such change.
We do not agree with the interpretation of petitioner that Kee contracted
away his right to recover damages resulting from petitioner's negligence.
Such waiver would be contrary to public policy and cannot be allowed.
"Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order,
public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a
right recognized by law."”
RODOLFO V. ROSALES, versus - MIGUEL CASTELLTORT
FACTS:
Spouses-petitioners Rodolfo V. Rosales and Lily Rosqueta-Rosales
(petitioners) are the registered owners of a parcel of land with an area
of approximately 315 square meters, covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) No. 36856[4] and designated as Lot 17, Block 1 of
Subdivision Plan LRC Psd-55244 situated in Los Baos, Laguna.
On August 16, 1995, petitioners discovered that a house was being
constructed on their lot, without their knowledge and consent, by
respondent Miguel Castelltort (Castelltort).[5]
It turned out that respondents Castelltort and his wife Judith had
purchased a lot, Lot 16 of the same Subdivision Plan, from
respondent Lina Lopez-Villegas (Lina) through her son-attorney-in-
fact Rene Villegas (Villegas) but that after a survey thereof by
geodetic engineer Augusto Rivera, he pointed to Lot 17 as the Lot 16
the Castelltorts purchased.
Admittedly, the appellants house erroneously encroached on the
property of the appellees due to a mistake in the placement of stone
monuments as indicated in the survey plan, which error is directly
attributable to the fault of the geodetic engineer who conducted the
same. This fact alone negates bad faith on the part of appellant
Miguel.
ISSUE:
Whether Castelltort is a builder in good faith.
RULING: Yes, The records indicate that at the time Castelltort
began constructing his house on petitioners lot, he believed that it was
the Lot 16 he bought and delivered to him by Villegas.
As correctly found by the CA, both parties having acted in good faith
at least until August 21, 1995, the applicable provision in this case is
Article 448 of the Civil Code which reads:
Art. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built,
sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his
own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity
provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or
planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the
proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy
the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or
trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the
land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper
indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in
case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof.
Under the foregoing provision, the landowner can choose between
appropriating the building by paying the proper indemnity or obliging
the builder to pay the price of the land, unless its value is considerably
more than that of the structures, in which case the builder in good
faith shall pay reasonable rent.[34] If the parties cannot come to terms
over the conditions of the lease, the court must fix the terms thereof.
The choice belongs to the owner of the land, a rule that accords with
the principle of accession, i.e., that the accessory follows the principal
and not the other way around. Even as the option lies with the
landowner, the grant to him, nevertheless, is preclusive.[35] The
landowner cannot refuse to exercise either option and compel instead
the owner of the building to remove it from the land.[36]
The raison detre for this provision has been enunciated thus:
Where the builder, planter or sower has acted in good faith, a conflict
of rights arises between the owners, and it becomes necessary to
protect the owner of the improvements without causing injustice to the
owner of the land. In view of the impracticability of creating a state of
forced co-ownership, the law has provided a just solution by giving the
owner of the land the option to acquire the improvements after
payment of the proper indemnity, or to oblige the builder or planter to
pay for the land and the sower the proper rent. He cannot refuse to
exercise either option. It is the owner of the land who is authorized to
exercise the option, because his right is older, and because, by the
principle of accession, he is entitled to the ownership of the accessory
thing.[37]
Orquiola v. Tandang Sora Devt. Corp
386 SCRA 201
(2002)
Facts:
Petition for review seeking the reversal of the CA
decision which dismissed the petition to prohibit Judge Vivencio
Baclig of the RTC from issuing a writ of demolition against
petitioners, and the sheriff and deputy sheriff from implementing
an alias writ of execution.
Pura Kalaw Ledesma was the registered owner of Lot
689 in Tandang Sora, Quezon City which is adjacent to certain
portions of Lot 707 of the Piedad Estates, registered in the
name of Herminigilda Pedro  Herminigilda sold the lots to
Mariano Lising, registered them in the name of M.B. Lising
Realty and subdivided them into smaller lots. Petitioners,
spouses Victor and Honorata Orquiola, purchased a portion of
this Lot 707-A-2
In 1969, Pura Kalaw Ledesma filed Civil Case against
Herminigilda Pedro and Mariano Lising for allegedly
encroaching upon Lot 689. During the pendency of the action,
Tandang Sora Development Corporation replaced Pura Kalaw
Ledesma as plaintiff by virtue of an assignment of Lot 689 Trial
continued for three decades.
On August 21, 1991, the trial court finally adjudged
defendants Pedro and Lising jointly and severally liable for
encroaching on plaintiff’s land and ordered to remove the house
they constructed on the land they were occupying.
On April 2, 1998, petitioners received a Special Order to
remove, at their expense, all constructions, including barbed
wires and fences, which defendants constructed on plaintiff’s
property, within fifteen (15) days from notice otherwise, this
Court will issue a writ of demolition against them.
Petitioners filed with the CA a petition for prohibition with
prayer for a restraining order and preliminary injunction alleging
that they bought the subject parcel of land in good faith and for
value, hence, they were parties in interest. Since they were not
impleaded in Civil Case, the writ of demolition issued in
connection therewith cannot be enforced against them because
to do so would amount to deprivation of property without due
process of law.
CA dismissed the petition as well as the motion for
reconsideration, ruling that petitioners were considered privies
who derived their rights from Lising by virtue of the sale and
could be reached by the execution order in Civil Case.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the alias writ of execution may be enforced against
petitioners.
2. Whether petitioners were innocent purchasers for value and
builders in good faith.
Ruling:
 1. Petitioners submit that Medina Case*** is not controlling
since Medina markedly differs from the present case on
major points.
 Timing of acquisition of subject property – Medina
acquired prior commencement and conclusion of
case, while present case, petitioners acquired
before the commencement of Civil Case
 Basis of Right over the disputed land of the
predecessors-in-interest - In Medina based on
Titulo de Composicion Con El Estado issued by
the Spanish Government, while petitioners based
on fully recognized Torrens title.
 In Medina merely relied on the title of her
predecessor-in-interest and tax declarations to
prove her alleged ownership of the land, while
petitioners acquired the registered title in their
own names, while the petitioner
In sale of a parcel of land under the Torrens system, person
dealing with the registered property need not go beyond the
certificate of title as he can rely solely on the title and
annotations on the title.
2. Buyer in good faith - buys the property of another without
notice that some other person has a right to or interest in
such property.
Buyer for value if he pays a full and fair price at the time
of the purchase or before he has notice of the claim or
interest of some other person in the property.
Determination of whether one is a buyer in good faith is a
factual issue which generally is outside the province of this
except if CA failed to take into account certain relevant facts
which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion.
CA failed to consider that petitioners purchased the
subject land in 1964 from Mariano Lising and the civil case
commenced sometime in 1969. Petitioners could reasonably
rely on Mariano Lisings Certificate of Title which at the time
of purchase was still free from any third party claim. Hence,
petitioners are buyers in good faith and for value.
Builder in good faith - one who builds with the belief that
the land he is building on is his, and is ignorant of any defect
or flaw in his title. Petitioner spouses acquired the land
without knowledge of any defect in the title of Mariano Lising.
It was only in 1998, when the sheriff of Quezon City tried to
execute the judgment in Civil Case which cannot serve as
notice of such adverse claim to petitioners since they were
not impleaded therein as parties.
Petitioners have rights over the subject property and
hence they are proper parties in interest in any case, hence
they should have been impleaded in civil case.
Failure to implead proper parties in interest, they cannot
be reached by decision as no man shall be affected by any
proceeding to which he is a stranger who did not have his
day in court. Only real parties in interest in an action are
bound by the judgment.
Demolition of their house on their own titled lot
tantamount to a deprivation of property without due process
of law.
Petition granted. Medina

Eden Ballatan and Sps. Betty Martinez and Chong Chy Ling v. CA
G.R. No. 125683, 02 March 1999, SECOND DIVISION (Puno, J.)
Facts:
In 1985, Eden Ballatan constructed her house on Lot No. 24 in
Araneta University Village, Malabon. During the construction, she
noticed that the concrete fence & side pathway of the adjoining house
of Winston Go encroached upon the entire length of the eastern side
of her property. Her building contractor informed her that the area of
her lot was actually less than that described in the title.
Ballatan informed Go about the discrepancy and
encroachment, but Go claimed that his house (including its fence and
pathway) were built within the parameters of his father’s lot.
The owner-developer of the subdivision, Araneta Insitute of
Agriculture (AIA) authorized a survey of the land by Engr. Jose N.
Quedding. Quedding found that the lot area of Ballatan was less by a
few meters & that of Li Ching Yao (3 lots away), increased by 2
meters. He declared that he made a verification survey of the lots
belonging to Go in 1983, and found the boundaries to be in order.
However he could not explain the reduction in Ballatan’s area.
Engr. Quedding made another relocation survey upon request
of the parties. He found that Lot 24 lost approx.. 25sqm. on its eastern
boundary; that Lot 25 did not lose nor gain any area; that Lot 26 lost
around 3 sqm which were however gained by Lot 27.
On the basis of this survey, Ballatan made a written demand
on Go to remove & dismantle their improvements on Lot No. 24. Go
refused, thus Ballatan brought the issue before the barangay. Go did
not appear.
Ballatan filed a case for recovery of possession before the
RTC of Malabon. The Go’s filed an answer with third-party complaint,
impleading Li Ching Yao, AIA & Engr. Quedding.
The RTC decided in favor of Ballatan, ordering Go to vacate Lot No.
24 and demolish their improvements and to pay Ballatan actual
damages. It also dismissed the third-party complaint against AIA,
Quedding & Li Ching Yao.
On appeal, the CA modified the decision of the RTC. It
ordered Li Ching Yao & Engr. Quedding to pay Ballatan; and Li Ching
Yao to pay Go, a reasonable amount for that portion of the lot which
they encroached – the value to be fixed at the time of taking.
Issues:
1) Is the award of damages proper, despite Go’s failure to specify
the amount prayer for & failure to pay the corresponding additional
filing fees thereon?
2) Given the fact of encroachment on Ballatan’s property, what
are her rights?
Ruling:
1.
YES, the award of damages is proper.
The third-party complaint in the instant case arose from the complaint
of accion publiciana of Ballatan against Go, which is a real action. In
real actions, the docket & filing fees are based on the value of
property & the amount of damages claimed.
Where the fees prescribed for the real action have been paid,
but the fees of certain related damages are not, the court, although
having jurisdiction over the real action, may not have acquired
jurisdiction over the accompanying claim for damages. Accordingly,
the court may expunge those claims for damages, or allow (on
motion) a reasonable time for amendment of the complaint so as to of their land on which the improvement stands. Engr. Quedding was
allege the precise amount of damages & accept payment of the ordered to pay attorney’s fees of P5,000 to Go.
requisite legal fees.
In the instant case, the third-party complaint sought the same
remedy as the principal complaint, but added a prayer for attorney’s
fees & costs without specifying their amounts. The additional filing fee
on this claim is deemed to constitute a lien on the judgment award.
2.
The erroneous survey by Engr. Quedding triggered the discrepancies.
It was upon said erroneous survey that Go relied upon in constructing
his house on his father’s land. Otherwise stated, Go had no
knowledge that they encroached on Ballatan’s lot. They are deemed
builders in good faith.
Li Ching Yao built his house on his lot before any of the other
parties did. There is no evidence, much less, any allegation that Li
Ching Yao was aware that when he built his house he knew that a
portion thereof encroached on Go’s adjoining land. Good faith is
always presumed, & upon him who alleges bad faith on the part of a
possessor rests the burden of proof.
Thus, Ballatan as owner of Lot No. 24, may choose to
purchase the improvement made by Go on their land, or sell to Go the
subject portion.
If buying the improvement is impractical as it may render Go’s
house useless, then Ballatan may sell to Go that portion of Lot No. 24
on which their improvement stands. If the Go’s are unwilling or unable
to buy the lot, then they must vacate the land and, until they vacate,
they must pay rent to Ballatan.
In the event that Ballatan elects to sell to Go the subject
portion of their lot, the price must be fixed at the prevailaing market
value at the time of payment. The time of taking is determinative of
just compensation in expropriation proceedings; clearly the instant
case is not one for expropriation.
Ballatan was ordered to decide within 30 days whether to buy
the portion of Go’s improvement on Lot 24, or to sell to Go the portion

SPS. MACASAET vs SPS. MACASAET G.R. 154391-92 Sept. 30, 2004
Facts:
 Petitioners Ismael and Teresita Macasaet and Respondents Vicente and Rosario
Macasaet are first-degree relatives. Ismael is the son of respondents and
Teresita is his wife.
 On December 10, 1997, the parents filed with the MTC of Lipa an ejectment suit
against the children.
 Respondents alleged that they were the owners of 2 parcels of land, situated at
Banay-banay, Lipa City; that by way of a verbal lease agreement, Ismael and
Teresita occupied these lots in Mar. 1992 and used them as their residence and
the situs of their construction business; and that despite repeated demands,
petitioners failed to pay the agreed rental of P500.
 Ismael and Teresita denied the existence of any verbal lease agreement. They
claimed that respondents had invited them to construct their residence and
business on the subject lots in order that they could all live near one another,
employ marivic, the sister of Ismael, and help in resolving the problems of the
family.
 They added that it was the policy of respondents to allot the land they owned as
an advance grant of inheritance in favor of their children.
 The MTCC ruled in favor of respondents and ordered petitioners to vacate the
premises. It opined that Ismael and Teresita had occupied the lots, not by virtue
of a verbal lease agreement, but by tolerance of Vicente and Rosario.
 As their stay was merely tolerance, petitioners were necessarily bound by an
implied promise to vacate the lots upon demand.
 On appeal, the regional trial court updheld the findings fo the MTCC. However,
the RTC allowed the respondents to appropriate the building and other
improvements introduced by petitioners, after payment of the indemnity provided
for by Art. 448 in relation to Art. 546 and 548 of the NCC.
 The CA sustained the finding of the two lower courts that Ismael and Teresita
had been occupying the subject lots only by the tolerance of Vicente and
Rosario. Citing Calubayan v. pascual, the CA further ruled that petitioners status
was analogous to that of a lessee or a tenant whose term of lease had expired,
but whose occupancy continued by tolerance of the owner.
 Consequently , in ascertaining the right of the petitioners to be reimbursed for the
improvements they had introduced on respondents properties, the appellate
court applied the Civil Codes provisions on lease.
Issue:
W.O.N. the courts should fix the duration of possession.
Held:
 That Ismael and Teresita had a right to occupy the lots is therefore clear, the
issue is the duration of possession. In the absence of a stipulation on this point,
Art. 1197 of the civil Code allows the courts to fix the duration or the period.
 Article 1197. If the obligation does not fix a period, but from its nature and the
circumstances it can be inferred that a period was intended, the courts may fix
the duration thereof.
 The courts shall also fix the duration of the period when it depends upon the will
of the debtor.
 Article 1197, however, applies to a situation in which the parties intended a
period. Such qualification cannot be inferred from the facts of the present case.
 The mere failure to fix the duration of their agreement does not necessarily justify
or authorize the courts to do so
 It can be safely concluded that the agreement subsisted as long as the parents
and the children mutually benefited from the arrangement.
 Effectively, there is a resolutory condition in such an agreement.
 Their possession which was originally lawful became unlawful when the reason
therefore – love and solidarity – ceased to exist between them.

ESPINOZA and DE VERA vs. SPOUSES MAYANDOC and
ERLINDA MAYANDOC
This is a Complaint for useful expenses under Articles 448 and 546 of the
New Civil Code of the Philippines.
FACTS: A parcel of land originally owned by Eusebio Espinoza was divided
among his heirs, Pastora, Domingo and Pablo, after his death.
Pastora executed a Deed of Sale conveying her share to respondents and
Leopoldo Espinoza. On that same date, a fictitious deed of sale was
executed by Domingo Espinoza, conveying the 3/4 share in favor of
respondent Erlinda Cayabyab. Later on, a fictitious deed of sale was
executed by Nemesio Cayabyab, Candida Cruz, Sps. Maximo Espinoza and
Winifreda De Vera and Leopoldo Espinoza over the land in favor of Sps.
Antonio and Erlinda Mayandoc.
As a result, petitioners filed an action for annulment of document in which
RTC rendered a Decision ordering respondents to reconvey the land in
dispute. CA affirmed the decision with modification and has become final.
Thus, respondents filed a complaint for reimbursement for useful expenses,
pursuant to Articles 448 and 546 of the New Civil Code, alleging that the
house in question was built on the disputed land in good faith. The
respondents believed themselves to be the owners of the land with a claim of
title thereto and were never prevented by the petitioners in constructing the
house. Petitioners argued that respondents can never be considered as
builders in good faith because the latter were aware that the deeds of sale
over the land in question were fictitious.
Respondents, manifested their option to buy the land where the house stood,
but petitioners expressed that they were not interested to sell the land or to
buy the house in question.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents were in bad faith in introducing
improvements on the subject land.
To be deemed a builder in good faith, it is essential that a person asserts title
to the land on which he builds, i.e., that he be a possessor in the concept of
owner, and that he be unaware that there exists in his title or mode of
acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.
The settled rule is bad faith should be established by clear and convincing
evidence since the law always presumes good faith. In this particular case,
petitioners were not able to prove that respondents were in bad faith in
constructing the house on the subject land. Bad faith does not simply
connote bad judgment or negligence. It imports a dishonest purpose or some
moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong. It means breach of a known
duty through some motive, interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of
fraud. For anyone who claims that someone is in bad faith, the former has
the duty to prove such. Hence, petitioners err in their argument that
respondents failed to prove that they are builders in good faith in spite of the
findings of the RTC and the CA that they are.
As such, Article 448 of the Civil Code must be applied. It applies when the
builder believes that he is the owner of the land or that by some title he has
the right to build thereon, or that, at least, he has a claim of title thereto.
InTuatzs v. Spouses Escol, et al., this Court ruled that the seller (the owner
of the land) has two options under Article 448: (1) he may appropriate the
improvements for himself after reimbursing the buyer (the builder in good
faith) the necessary and useful expenses under Articles 546 and 548 of the
Civil Code; or (2) he may sell the land to the buyer, unless its value is
considerably more than that of the improvements, in which case, the buyer
shall pay reasonable rent, xxx
The rule that the choice under Article 448 of the Civil Code belongs to the
owner of the land is in accord with the principle of accession, i.e., that the
accessory follows the principal and not the other way around. Even as the
option lies with the landowner, the grant to him, nevertheless, is preclusive.
The landowner cannot refuse to exercise either option and compel instead
the owner of the building to remove it from the land.
The raison d’etre for this provision has been enunciated thus: Where the
builder, planter or sower has acted in good faith, a conflict of rights arises
between the owners, and it becomes necessary to protect the owner of the
improvements without causing injustice to the owner of the land. In view of
the impracticability of creating a state of forced co-ownership, the law has
provided a just solution by giving the owner of the land the option to acquire
the improvements after payment of the proper indemnity, or to oblige the
builder or planter to pay for the land and the sower the proper rent. He
cannot refuse to exercise either option. It is the owner of the land who is
authorized to exercise the option, because his right is older, and because, by
the principle of accession, he is entitled to the ownership of the accessory
thing.
G.R. No. 146608. October 23, 2003]
SPOUSES CONSTANTE FIRME AND AZUCENA E. FIRME, petitioners, vs. BUKAL
ENTERPRISES AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondent.
Facts:
Spouses Firme are the registered owner of a parcel of land. Renato de Castro(Vice President
of Bukal) authorized Aviles to negotiate with the Spouses Firme for the purchase of the
property.
Bukal filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against Spouses Firme
because Spouses Firme refused to execute a Deed of Sale.
During negotiations three drafts of deed of sale were presented to Spouses Firme by Aviles.
None of the three drafts was signed by Spouses Firme. Moreover, Bukal facilitated the
relocation of squatters (relocation fee of 60k-100k per squatter was paid) and fenced the
property despite absence of deed of sale.
RTC: There was no perfected contract of sale.  executed in this case. Despite the refusal of the Spouses Firme to sell the Property, Bukal
CA: There was a perfected contract of sale.
The Issues
1. Whether the court of appeals erred in finding that there was a perfected
contract of sale between petitioners and respondent despite the adduced
evidence patently to the contrary;
2. Whether the court of appeals erred in not finding that the alleged contract
of sale is enforceable despite the fact that the same is covered by the statute
of frauds
3. Whether or not Spouses Firme are builder in good faith
4. Whether or not Spouses Firme are entitled to compensatory or moral damages
The Ruling of the Court
1. Whether there was a perfected contract of sale
There was no perfected contract of sale.
a. There was no consent on the part of the Spouses Firme.
 Spouses Firme flatly rejected the offer of Aviles to buy the Property on behalf
of Bukal Enterprises ( no concurrence of the offer and the acceptance on the
subject matter, consideration and terms of payment as would result in a
perfected contract of sale.)
 they did not consent to the contract of sale is the fact they never signed any
deed of sale.(The offered evidence is unsigned deed of sale which according
to SC have no probative value)
 There was no Board Resolution authorizing Aviles to negotiate and purchase
the property on behalf of Bukal (a corporation)
>>Contracts or acts of a corporation must be made either by the board of directors or by a
corporate agent duly authorized by the board. Absent such valid delegation/authorization, the
rule is that the declarations of an individual director relating to the affairs of the corporation,
but not in the course of, or connected with, the performance of authorized duties of such
director, are held not binding on the corporation.
 Aviles signed the verification and certification of non-forum shopping of the
Complaint filed by Bukal which was not accompanied by a proof that Aviles
was authorized (it is required that the person signing the document must be
duly authorized either by corporate by-laws or by specific act of the BOD)
2. Whether the Statute of Frauds is applicable
There is therefore no basis for the application of the Statute of Frauds. The application
of the Statute of Frauds presupposes the existence of a perfected contract.
3. Whether Bukal Enterprises is a builder in good faith
Bukal Enterprises is not a builder in good faith because. No deed of sale has been
Enterprises still proceeded to introduce improvements on the Property. Bukal Enterprises
introduced improvements on the Property without the knowledge and consent of the Spouses
Firme. When the Spouses Firme learned about the unauthorized constructions made by Bukal
Enterprises on the Property, they advised the latter to desist from further acts of trespass on
their Property.[60]
Bukal Enterprises is not entitled to reimbursement for the expenses incurred in
relocating the squatters. Bukal Enterprises spent for the relocation of the squatters even after
learning that the Spouses Firme were no longer interested in selling the Property. De Castro
testified that even though the Spouses Firme did not require them to remove the squatters,
they chose to spend for the relocation of the squatters since they were interested in
purchasing the Property.[62]
4. Whether the Spouses Firme are entitled to compensatory and moral damages

Spouses Firme are not entitled. It was established that Spouses Firme that they
normally travel more than once a year to visit their children in the Philippines (they are already
US residents) the actual travelling expenses cannot be attributed solely for the attendance of
the hearings in the case. The court deemed it proper that nominal damages must be awarded
because Bukal violated the property rights of the Spouses Firme.
Sunday, June 10, 2018
CASE DIGEST: ESMAQUEL VS. COPRADA
FACTS:On February 24, 1997, spouses Esmaquel filed an ejectment case
against Coprada before the 2nd MCTC Laguna. Petitioners claimed that they
are the registered owners of a parcel of land situated in San Miguel, Majayja.
In 1945, Coprada was able to persuade the petitioners to allow her and her
family to use and occupy the land for their residence, under the condition that
they will vacate the premises should petitioners need to use the same.
Coprada and her family were allowed to construct their residential house.
Since then, the petitioners never made an attempt to drive them away out of
pity, knowing that respondent and her eight children have no other place to
live in. the a few years later the financial condition of Copradas family, having
acquired her own residential house. This prompted petitioners to institute an
ejectment case against Coprada. Respondent avers that she had already
acquired ownership over the contested lot when she orally purchased it. And
further avers that the claim has already prescribed and thus barred by
laches.
MCTC ruled in favor of Coprada, thus the case was dismissed. On appeal to
the RTC, the ruling of the MCTC was reversed. The CA reversed the RTCs
decision and reinstated the MCTCs ruling.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have a valid ground to evict respondent
from the subject property.
prevail. Petitioners' title over the subject property is evidence of their
ownership thereof. It is a fundamental principle in land registration that the
certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible
title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein.
Moreover, the age-old rule is that the person who has a Torrens title over a
land is entitled to possession thereof.
Further, Coprada's argument that petitioners are no longer the owners of a
portion of the subject land because of the sale in her favor is a collateral
attack on the title of the petitioners, which is not allowed. The validity of
petitioners' certificate of title cannot be attacked by respondent in this case
for ejectment. Under Section 48 of PD No. 1529, a certificate of title shall not
be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified or canceled,
except in a direct proceeding for that purpose in accordance with law. The
issue of the validity of the title of the petitioners can only be assailed in an
action expressly instituted for that purpose. Whether or not the respondent
has the right to claim ownership over the property is beyond the power of the
trial court to determine in an action for unlawful detainer.

HELD: Share

LAND TITLES

As a registered owner, petitioner has a right to eject any person illegally

occupying his property. This right is imprescriptible and can never be barred
by laches.

In the present case, Coprada failed to present evidence to substantiate her

allegation that a portion of the land was sold to her in 1962. Coprada's
submission that there was an oral sale is a mere afterthought.

On the other hand, it is undisputed that the subject property is covered by a

title, registered in the name of the petitioners. As against the respondent's
unproven claim that she acquired a portion of the property from the
petitioners by virtue of an oral sale, the Torrens title of petitioners must
Spouse Aquino v. Spouses Aguilar
G.R. No. 182754 |June 29, 2015
Doctrine: By law, one is considered in good faith if he is not aware that there
exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it. The
presence of evidence that petitioners prohibited the respondents from
building their own structure on a portion of the property negates good faith on
the part on the latter. The fact that the petitioners did not thereafter remind
respondents of this is of no moment, what is crucial is that the petitioners left
the respondents clear instructions not to build on the land.
Facts: Spouses Crispin and Teresa Aquino (petitioners) are the owners of a
house and lot. Since 1981, this property has been occupied by Teresa's
sister, Josefina Aguilar and her family (respondents). Respondents stayed on
the property with the consent and approval of petitioners, who were then
residing in the United States.
While respondents were in possession of the property, the house previously
constructed therein was demolished, and a three-storey building built in its
place. Respondents occupied half of the third floor of this new building for the
next 20 years without payment of rental.
Petitioners sent a letter to respondents informing them that an immediate
family member needed to use the premises and demanding the surrender of
the property within 10 days from notice. Respondents failed to heed this
demand, prompting petitioners to file a Complaint for ejectment against them
before the office of the barangay captain of Guadalupe Viejo. The parties
attempted to reach an amicable settlement in accordance with Section 412 of
the Local Government Code, but these efforts proved unsuccessful.
Petitioners filed a Complaint with the MeTC of Makati City praying that
respondents be ordered to (a) vacate the portion of the building they were
then occupying; and (b) pay petitioners a reasonable amount for the use and
enjoyment of the premises from the time the formal demand to vacate was
made.
In their Answer with Counterclaim, respondents claimed that they had
contributed to the improvement of the property and the construction of the
building, both in terms of money and management/supervision services.
Petitioners purportedly agreed to let them contribute to the costs of
construction in exchange for the exclusive use of a portion of the building.
Since they were allegedly co-owners of the building and builders in good
faith, respondents claimed that they had the right to be compensated for the
current value of their contribution. Accordingly, they prayed for the dismissal
of the Complaint and the award of ₱5 million as compensation for their
contributions to the construction of the building, as well as moral damages,
attorney's fees and costs of litigation.
Issue: Whether respondents are builders in good faith?
Held: No, the Spouses Aguilar cannot be considered as builders in good faith
on account of their admission that the subject lot belonged to the Spouses
Aquino when they constructed the building. At the onset, petitioners were
aware of a flaw in their title and a limit to their right to possess the property.
By law, one is considered in good faith if he is not aware that there exists in
his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.
An examination of a letter sent by petitioners to Josefina Aguila abundantly
shows that respondent’s occupancy of the property in question is by
tolerance of the petitioners. Said letter expressly states that the respondents
are advised not to put up a shop, as the petitioners planned on disposing the
property for profit after a period of three or four years, thereby placing the
respondents on notice that their possession of the said property is temporary
in nature and by mere generosity of the petitioners. The letter likewise
advised them to apply for a housing project so that by the time the property in
question is sold, they have a place to transfer to.
Respondents’ contention that pursuant to Article 453 of the Civil Code, they
should be considered builders in good faith even if they have acted in bad
faith, since their act of introducing improvements to one-half of the third floor
of the three storey building was with knowledge and without opposition on
the part of the petitioners, cannot be sustained, principally on the ground that
as stated, they were already forewarned as early not to introduce any
improvements as the property is slated to be sold as it was only bought for
investment purposes. The fact that the petitioners did not thereafter remind
them of this is of no moment, as this letter was not likewise withdrawn by a
subsequent one or modified by the petitioners. That this sale did not
materialize is irrelevant. What is crucial is that petitioners left respondents
clear instructions not to build on the land.
In view of the foregoing, it was held that petitioners, as the owners of the
land, have the right to appropriate what has been built on the property,
without any obligation to pay indemnity therefor, and that respondents have
no right to a refund of any improvement built therein, pursuant to Articles 449
and 450 of the Civil Code.
However, pursuant to Article 452 of the Civil Code, a builder in bad faith is
entitled to recoup the necessary expenses incurred for the preservation of
the land. However, being builders in bad faith, they do not have the right of
retention over the premises. While the evidence presented does not establish
the amount of necessary expenses incurred by respondents during their stay
in the property, the Court noted that even petitioners do not deny that such
expenses were incurred. Accordingly, the case was remanded to the lower
court for the determination of the necessary expenses of preservation of the
land, if any, incurred by respondents which expenses shall be reimbursed to
them by petitioners.
ANGELICA VIAJAR and CELSO VIAJAR, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, LEONOR P. LADRIDO, LOURDES LADRIDO
IGNACIO, EUGENIO P. LADRIDO and L P. LADRIDO, defendants-
appellees.
Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioner.
Miraflores Law Offices for respondents.
Issue: Is registered land protected from ownership by accretion in
accordance with Art. 457?
Doctrine and Held: No, even registered land is covered by Art 457. The trial
court found that the change in the course of the Suague River was gradual
and this finding was affirmed by the respondent Court of Appeals. As a
result, petitioners contend, Article 457 of the New Civil Code must be
construed to limit the accretion mentioned therein as accretion of
unregistered land to the riparian owner, and should not extend to registered
land. Thus, the lot in question having remained the registered land of the
petitioners, then the private respondents cannot acquire title there in
derogation to that of the petitioners, by accretion, for that will defeat the
indefeasibility of a Torrens Title.

MEDIALDEA, J.: The rule that registration under the Torrens System does not protect
the riparian owner against the diminution of the area of his registered land
through gradual changes in the course of an adjoining stream is well settled.
It clearly appearing that the land in question has become part of defendant's
Facts: The spouses Ricardo Y. Ladrido and Leonor P. Ladrido were the
estate as a result of accretion, it follows that said land now belongs to him.
owners of Lot No. 7511 containing an area of 154,267 square meters
The fact that the accretion to his land used to pertain to plaintiffs estate,
situated in barangay Cawayan, Pototan, Iloilo. Spouses Rosendo H. Te and
which is covered by a Torrens Certificate of Title, cannot preclude him
Ana Te were also the registered owners of a parcel of land described in their
(defendant) from being the owner thereof. Registration does not protect the
title as Lot No. 7340. On September 6, 1973, Rosendo H. Te, sold this lot to
riparian owner against the diminution of the area of his land through gradual
Angelica F. Viajar and Celso F. Viajar for P5,000. A Torrens title was later
changes in the course of the adjoining stream. Accretions which the banks of
issued in the names of Angelica F. Viajar and Celso F. Viajar. Later, Angelica
rivers may gradually receive from the effect of the current become the
F. Viajar had Lot No. 7340 relocated and found out that the property was in
property of the owners of the banks (Art. 366 of the Old Civil Code; Art. 457
the possession of Ricardo Y. Ladrido. Consequently, she demanded its
of the New). Such accretions are natural incidents to land bordering on
return but Ladrido refused.
running streams and the provisions of the Civil Code in that respect are not
On February 15, 1974, Angelica F. Viajar and Celso F. Viajar instituted a civil affected by the Registration Act.
action for recovery of possession and damages against Ricardo Y. Ladrido.

The facts admitted by the parties during the pre-trial show that the piece of
real property which used to be Lot No. 7340 of the Cadastral Survey of
Pototan was located in barangay Guibuanogan Pototan, Iloilo; that it
consisted of 20,089 square meters; that at the time of the cadastral survey in
1926, Lot No. 7511 and Lot No. 7340 were separated by the Suague River;
that the area of 11,819 square meters of what was Lot No. 7340 has been in
the possession of the defendants; that the area of 14,036 square meters,
which was formerly the river bed of the Suague River per cadastral survey of
1926, has also been in the possession of the defendants; and that the
plaintiffs have never been in actual physical possession of Lot No. 7340.
ART. 1207. THE CONCURRENCE OF TWO OR MORE CREDITORS OR OF TWO OR MORE
DEBTORS IN ONE AND THE SAME OBLIGATION DOES NOT IMPLY THAT EACH ONE OF
THE FORMER HAS A RIGHT TO DEMAND, OR THAT EACH ONE OF THE LATTER IS BOUND
TO RENDER, ENTIRE COMPLIANCE WITH THE PRESTATION. THERE IS A SOLIDARY
LIABILITY ONLY WHEN THE OBLIGATION EXPRESSLY SO STATES, OR WHEN THE LAW
OR THE NATURE OF THE OBLIGATION REQUIRES SOLIDARITY. (1137A)
RONQUILLO V. COURT OF APPEALS
132 SCRA 274
Facts: INDIVIDUALLY AND JOINTLY IS SOLIDARY CASE
Ernesto Ronquillo (“Ronquillo”) was one of four defendants in a Civil Case filed
by respondent Antonio So (“So”) for the collection of P118,498.98, the value of
the check issued by the said defendant in payment for foodstuffs delivered to and
received by them. The said checks were dishonored by the drawee bank.
The lower court rendered a decision based on the compromise agreement by the
parities. The agreement reduced the claim to P110,000 and bound the
defendants to initially pay P55,000 of the debt before December 24, 1978. The
defendants agreed to pay the balance “individually and jointly” within a period of
six months or before June 30, 1980.
So filed a Motion for Execution on the ground that the defendants failed to make
the initial payment of P55,000 as provided in the abovementioned decision.
Ronquillo opposed the motion for execution alleging that his inability to make the
payment was due to So’s own act of making himself inaccessible.
Ronquillo tendered the amount of P13,750 as his share of the P55,000 initial
payment. Another defendant, Pilar Tan (“Tan”) offered to pay the same amount.
Because So refused to accept their payments, demanding the full initial payment.
Ronquillo and Tan deposited the amount with the court. The court ordered the
issuance of a writ of execution for the balance of the initial amount payable to the
two other defendants.
So sought the reconsideration of the Order and prayed for the execution of the
decision in its entirety against all defendants, jointly and severally. So opposed
the motion arguing that the lower court held that the liability of the 4 defendants
was not expressly declared to be solidary, consequently each defendant is
obliged to pay only his own pro-rata or 1/4 of the amount due and payable.
A writ of execution was issued by the court for the payment of P82,500 [P55,000
(balance from the whole debt) + 27500 (unpaid shares of initial payment from two
other defendants or P13,750 + P13750)] against the properties of the defendants
including Ronquillo, “singly or jointly liable.” The sheriff issued a notice for the
sale of certain furniture and appliances found in Ronquillo’s residence to satisfy
the sum of P82,500.
Issue: W/N the liability of the 4 defendants including Ronquillo solidary.
Held: Yes.
The pertinent provisions are Art. 1207 1 and Art. 1208.2 By the terms of the
compromise agreement and the decision based upon it, the defendants obligated
themselves to pay their obligation “individually and jointly.”
An agreement to be “individually liable” undoubtedly creates a several obligation.
A several obligation is one by which one individual binds himself to perform the
whole obligation.
1
Art. 1207. The concurrence of two or more creditors or of two or more debtors in
one and the same obligation does not imply that each one of the former has a
right to demand, or that each one of the latter is bound to render, entire
compliance with the prestation. There is a solidary liability only when the
obligation expressly so states, or when the law or the nature of the obligation
requires solidarity.
2
Art. 1208. If from the law, or the nature or the wording of the obligations to
which the preceding article refers the contrary does not appear, the credit or debt
shall be presumed to be divided into as many shares as there are creditors or
debtors, the credits or debts being considered distinct from one another, subject
to the Rules of Court governing the multiplicity of suits. (1138a)
Reynante v. CA respondents to register said accretion for more than 50 years subjected said
accretion to acquisition through prescription by third persons.

More than 50 years ago, petitioner Jose Reynante was taken as tenant of the
late Don Cosme Carlos over a fishpond. During his tenancy, Jose Reynante Reynante has a better right to the accretions.
constructed a nipa hut where his family resided and took care of nipa palms
which he planted on lots 1 and 2.

Petitioner harvested and sold the nipa palms without interference and
prohibition from anybody. However, after the death of Don Cosme Carlos,
petitioner was made to surrender the fishpond and all his rights therein by
virtue of the “Sinumpaang Salaysay ng Pagsasauli ng Karapatan” with a
P200k consideration by the heirs of Don Cosme.

The respondents, heirs of Don Cosme, leased the fishpond to Carlos dela
Cruz while petitioner continued to live in the nipa hut he constructed on lots 1
and 2 and took care of the nipa palms he planted thereto.

Formal demand to vacate was made but petitioner refused or failed to

vacate. Thus, a complaint for forcible entry was instituted by the private
respondents.

ISSUE:

Who has prior physical possession of the property?

WON accretion benefits the owners.

RULLING:

Petitioner proved prior possession for more than 50 years. What was
surrendered was the fishpond and his rights thereon not the “sasahan” where
he built his hut.

It was found out that Lots 1 & 2 were created by alluvial formation and
properties of the respondents by accretion. However, failure of the
Vda. De Nazareno vs. Court of Appeals, Salasalan, Rabaya, Labis “To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion
which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.”
GR No. 98045

June 26, 1996

But the Court provides the following requisites of accretion (Rules of
Alluvion):
FACTS:

Antonio Nazareno is an owner of a titled property situated beside an 1. That the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible;
accretion area along the banks of Cagayan River. Jose Salasalan & Leo
Rabaya leased parcels of land from Nazareno. When Salsalan & Rabaya 2. That it be the result of the action of the waters of the river (or sea);
stopped paying rentals, Nazareno filed an ejectment suit. The Municipal Trial and
Court ruled in favor of Nazareno; the RTC affirmed the decision. Thus,
Nazareno filed an application with the Bureau of Lands to perfect his title 3. That the land where the accretion takes place is adjacent to the
over the accretion area being claimed by him. banks of rivers (or sea coast).

ISSUE:

Whether or not the subject land is a public land? In Republic v. CA, “the requirement that the deposit should be due to the
effect of the current of the river is indispensable”. In Hilario v. City of Manila,
ARGUMENTS: “the word “current” indicates the participation of the body of water in the ebb
and flow of waters due to high and low tide”.
VDA. DE NAZARENO SALASALAN AND RABAYA
Here, the subject land was the direct result of the dumping of sawdust by the
 The subject land is a private land being an accretion to Antonio Sun Valley Lumber Co. consequent to its sawmill operations.
Nazareno’s titled property.

 Art. 457 of the Civil Code which provides that “To the owners of
lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually
receive from the effects of the current of the waters”.

 The accumulation was gradual and imperceptible, resulting from the

action of the waters or current of the Balacanas Creek and Cagayan River.
 They contend the public character of the subject land.

 Mere application of the Miscellaneous Sales Patent by Nazareno is

an admission that the land being applied is a public land.

RULING:

The Court ruled that the subject land is part of the public domain since the
accretion was man-made or artificial. Under Article 457 of the Civil Code:

Rachel Celestial, petitioner v. Jesse Cachopero, respondent
Carpio Morales, J October 15, 2003 G.R. No. 142595
Doctrine
Art. 461, NCC. River beds which are abandoned through the natural change
in the course of the waters ipso facto belong to the owners whose lands are
occupied by the new course in proportion to the area lost. However, the
owners of the lands adjoining the old bed shall have the right to acquire the
same by paying the value thereof, which value shall not exceed the value of
the area occupied by the new bed.
Article 461 provides for compensation for the loss of the land occupied by the
new bed since it is believed more equitable to compensate the actual losers
than to add land to those who have lost nothing. Thus, the abandoned river
bed is given to the owner of the land onto which the river changed its course
instead of the riparian owner.
Art. 461 and Art. 370 of the Spanish Civil Code are applicable only when the
river beds are abandoned through the natural change in the course of the
waters. The rules on alluvion do not apply to man-made or artificial
accretions nor to accretions to lands that adjoin canals or esteros or artificial
drainage systems.
Summary
Petitioner and her brother were in a dispute over a parcel of land which was
formerly a part of Salunayan Creek, but has dried up because of the
construction by the National Irrigation Administration. Cachopero earlier filed
a Miscellaneous Sales Application over the property with the Bureau of
Lands, saying that he had been occupying the land and that he already
introduced improvements therein. Opposing his application, Celestial claimed
that she has preferential right over the land, basing it on her right of
accession (citing Article 370 of the Spanish Civil Code and Art. 461 of the
NCC), her long-term adverse possession, and her being the adjacent and
riparian (situated on a bank of river) owner. On the issue of whether she
owns the property, the Court said that it is of public dominion and is outside
the commerce of men, therefore it is not susceptible to private appropriation
and acquisitive prescription. She also could not invoke either of the Civil
Code provisions because these are applicable only when the river beds are
abandoned through the natural change in the course of the waters. There
wasn’t even a change in the course involved for the river just dried up.
Facts - Cachopero filed a Miscellaneous Sales Application (MSA)
with the Bureau of Lands covering a 415 square meter parcel of land located
at Barrio 8, Midsayap, Cotabato and formerly part of the Salunayan Creek in
Katingawan, Midsayap. He alleged that he had been occupying the land
since
- 1968 whereon he built a residential house and introduced other
improvements.
- Celestial filed a protest against the MSA, saying that she has
preferential right over the land subject thereof since it is adjacent to, and is
the only outlet from, her residential house.
- After an ocular inspection by the Bureau of Lands, it was found out
that the land was formerly part of the Salunayan Creek, but has dried up
because of the NIA’s construction of an irrigation canal. Cachopero’s
application and her protest were denied because the local department of
public works and highways and the municipal government may need the land
in the future. However, Cachopero was allowed to stay on the land until such
a time that the government needs the land for road-expansion.
- Celestial filed an action for ejectment against her brother, but they
later reached a compromise.
- Cachopero filed a second MSA with the regional Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) covering the same property,
but this time he had the certification from the mayor and indorsement from
the district engineer that the land is no longer needed by the government and
that it is suitable for residential purposes.
- However, his application was dismissed and though the regional
director agrees that it’s residential land, he ordered for the sale of the land at
a public auction because of the conflicting interests of the parties.
- Cachopero tried to seek relief from the lower court, but it was denied.
However, the Court of Appeals granted his petition for certiorari and ordered
the DENR to process his MSA.
Ratio/Issues 1. Whether or not the DENR Regional Executive Director
and OIC Regional Director acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction for ordering the public auction of the property
(YES)
a) The said officials issued the order pursuant to Commonwealth Act No.
141, the Public Land Act, which provides the procedure for the disposition of
lands of the public domain which are open to disposition or concession and
intended to be used for residential purpose.
b) However, with the enactment of RA no. 730, an exception was created for
the law authorizes the disposition of lands of the public domain by private
sale, instead of bidding, provided that: (1) the applicant has in his favor the
conditions specified therein and (2) the area applied for is not more than
1,000 square meters .
c) There was a positive duty on the part of the DENR Director to process
respondent’s MSA, and to ascertain, particularly in light of petitioner’s
protest, whether respondent was qualified to purchase the subject land at a
private sale pursuant to R.A. 730. He cannot rely on equity as his basis for
ordering the public auction.
b) ACCESSION: Celestial cannot rely on Article 370 of the Spanish Civil
Code and Art. 461 of the NCC. She claimed that at the time she bought it
from Basadre, the said portion already dried up so that almost one-half of a
house was already built, but she failed to allege when it really happened
which would determine the applicable provision in her case. This would be
helpful in determining the applicable law.
- Court explained that the rule in Art. 370 (‘The beds of rivers which remain
abandoned because the course of water has naturally changed belong to the
owners of the riparian lands throughout their respective lands.) has been
abandoned with the adoption of Art. 461. (See doctrine.) It
- Had the disputed portion of the Salunayan Creek dried up after the present
Civil Code took effect, the subject land would clearly not belong to petitioner
or her predecessor-in-interest for the provision contemplates an abandoned
river bed due to natural change in the course of waters, but in her case, the
subject land became dry as a result of the construction of an irrigation canal.
- Both provisions pertain to situations where there has been a change in the
course of a river, not where the river simply dries up. In the instant Petition, it
is not even alleged that the Salunayan Creek changed its course.
Held Petition denied

2. Whether or not petitioner has a claim of ownership over the land, based on Prepared by: Eunice V. Guadalope
her alleged long-time adverse possession and her right of accession (NO)

a) ADVERSE POSSESSION: A creek, like the Salunayan Creek, is a recess

or arm extending from a river and participating in the ebb and flow of the sea.
As such, under Articles 420(1) 44 and 502(1) 45 of the Civil Code, the
Salunayan Creek, including its natural bed, is property of the public domain
which is not susceptible to private appropriation and acquisitive prescription.
Absent any declaration by the government, that a portion of the creek has
dried-up does not, by itself, alter its inalienable character.

- Despite the fact that the municipal government later certified that said land
was alienable and disposable, the Court cited a case wherein it said, “The
adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of title or confirmation
of an imperfect title refers only to alienable or disposable portions of the
public domain.”
DIONISIA P. BAGAIPO vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and claim ownership over the old abandoned riverbed because the same is
LEONOR LOZANO inexistent.

G.R. No. 116290. December 8, 2000

FACTS

Petitioner Dionisia P. Bagaipo is the registered owner of Lot No. 415, a

146,900 square meter agricultural land situated in Ma-a, Davao City while
Respondent Leonor Lozano is the owner of a registered parcel of land
located across and opposite the southeast portion of petitioner’s lot facing
the Davao River.

On May 26, 1989, Bagaipo filed a complaint for Recovery of Possession with
Mandatory Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Damages against Lozano for:

(1) the surrender of possession by Lozano of a certain portion of land

measuring 29,162 square meters which is supposedly included in the area
belonging to Bagaipo under TCT No. T-15757; and

(2) the recovery of a land area measuring 37,901 square meters which
Bagaipo allegedly lost when the Davao River traversed her property.

Bagaipo contended that as a result of a change in course of the said river,

her property became divided into three lots, namely: Lots 415-A, the area
presently occupied by Bagaipo, 415-B, which cut across Bagaipo’s land was
taken up by the new course of the Davao River and 415-C, the land presently
located across the river and parallel to Bagaipo’s property.

The trial court concluded that the applicable law is Article 457 of the New
Civil Code and not Art. 461and dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court, hence the present
case.

ISSUE

Whether the land is owned by Bagaipo due to the changing of the river’s
course or by Lozano by the principle of accretion.

HELD

The trial court and the appellate court both found that the decrease in land
area was brought about by erosion and not a change in the river’s course.
The decrease in petitioner’s land area and the corresponding expansion of
respondent’s property were the combined effect of erosion and accretion
respectively. Art. 461 of the Civil Code is inapplicable. Petitioner cannot