Copyright @ IFAC Conflict Management and Resolution

in Regions of Long Confronted Nations (SWIIS 2000),

Ohrid, Republic of Macedonia, 2000

mE ETHICS OF MILITARY WORK:

A GUIDE FOR SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS

Marion A. Hersh

Centre ofSystems & Control and Department ofElectronics & Electrical Engineering,
University ofGlasgow, Glasgow G12 8LT, Scotland.
Tel: +441413304906. Fax: +441413306004. Email: m.hersh@elec.gla.ac.uk

Abstract: This paper discusses the ethical issues relating to scientists and engineers
and military work from both deontological and consequentialist perspectives. Therefore
the likely consequences of military work and their oppornmity costs with be
considered. As well as military funded work with direct military applications, the
issues of military funding for civilian work and civilian work with possible military
applications are also considered. Copyright 0 2000lFAC

Keywords: Ethics, military work, scientists, engineers, ethical principles

1. INTRODUCTION military funding for civilian work and military

Modem wars have tended to cause greater casualties
and a much higher proportion of civilian casualties
than previous ones, be spread over a wider area and
contribute to short and long term environmental
destruction. This is, at least in part due to
developments in military technology. However,
despite the devastating nature of existing military
technology, research and development work on new
weapons systems is still underway. In addition many
scientists and engineers work on the production and
maintenance of existing weapons systems.
In the past scientists and engineers have tended to
purely solve technical problems and not considered
the ethical and other implications of their work.
However this is changing and there is increasing
awareness of the importance of ethical issues
(Martin et al, 1996; Johnson, 1991). There are also
genuine differences of opinion on the ethics of
military work, as well as 'fuzzy' areas such as
applications of civilian work. The purpose of this
work is to raise awareness and discuss issues relating
to ethics and military work and suggest a framework
in which some of these issues can be considered,
rather than provide 'solutions'. The paper can be
divided into three main parts. In the first part,
consisting of section 2-3 the framework for
discussion is prepared and basic issues relating to
ethics and military work are examined. The main
issues relating to the ethics of military work for
scientists and engineers are presented in the second
part, consisting of sections 4-7. In the third part,
consisting of sections 8-10, the previous discussion
is summarised and some case studies and principles
for ethical decision making are presented.
2. ETHICS AND MILITARY WORK
The terms ethics and morals are frequently used
interchangeably, but it can be useful to distinguish

95
morality as concerned with right and wrong conduct
and motives and ethics as the philosophical study of
morality (Gluck, 1986). Despite this distinction, in
practice the term ethics is generally used to describe
right and wrong conduct and motives in a
professional context and will be used in this way
here. In some cases legal and ethical obligations can
come into conflict (park, 1995), for instance with
regards to the disclosure of information restricted by
considerations of national security.
There are a number of different ethical theories of
appropriate professional and personal conduct,
which can be divided into virtue ethics, utilarianism,
duty ethics and rights ethics (Babcock, 1991; Madu,
1996; Martin et ai, 1996, Hersh, 2000). A from a specifically Christian ethical context and
frequently used and simpler categorisation of ethics
is into consequentialist and deontological:
consequentialist approaches are concerned with
consequences and the balance between benefits and
harms, whereas deontological ones also consider tlle
intention and the innate virtue of a course of action.
Ethical principles can also be classified as
universalist or absolutist and situation based.
Absolutist approaches assume that a particular set of
ethical principles is always valid, regardless of the
surrounding circumstances, whereas situation based
ethics modify ethical principles or prioritise them
differently to take account of the particular situation.
Although in many ways more realistic, care has to be
taken to ensure that situation based ethics is not used
as an excuse to avoid hard ethical issues.
The term 'military work' rather than the more
frequently used term 'defence work' will be used here
to avoid any (unwarranted) assumptions about the
nature of the applications of this work. It can be
categorised both according to the type of work, such
as research and development, training, production
and maintenance, and the degree of military
involvement or application. Many military
establishments have research agreements with
universities and polytechnics, which cover a very
wide range of science and engineering areas (Evans
et al, 1991).
3. IS PREPARATION FOR WAR ETHICALLY
mSTIFIED?
Both deontological and consequential approaches to
the ethics of military work will be considered.
Since the logical application of military work is
preparation for offensive andlor defensive war,
consistency requires that scientists who engage
directly in military work should be prepared for their
work to be used directly or indirectly in war. It is
also important that ethical decision making is based
firmly in the present (post cold war) context. There
are a wide range of different viewpoints on the
96
ethics of military work, from the belief that military
work of any kind is totally unethical to the belief that
conducting scientific research for the military is a
civic duty (Kemp, 1994). The latter position is
related to just war theory, which has the basic
premises that waging war can be ethically justified if
a number of conditions are met of which the two
most important are (Norman, 1995) a just cause,
with national defence generally considered to be a
particularly just cause, and just conduct, which is
generally interpreted as meaning the avoidance of
killing and injuring civilians. Just war theory
(Miller, 1991; Norman, 1995), has been very
influential in Western Europe for several hundred
years and more recently in the US. However it arises
other ethical systems will probably lead to different
conclusions and insights.
3.1 The Needfor Defence?
As the term 'defence' implies, there is still a fairly
widely held view of military preparedness being
required for defence against outside aggression. It is
often assumed tllat national defence is necessary
without any awareness of the need to justify this or
to determine against which countries this defence
should be directed. A case in point is given by the
multi-billion pound UK trident nuclear submarines
stationed at Faslane in Scotland. They are presently
not aimed at a specific target country and the UK
government is being rather reticent about the nature
of the threat they are intended to counter. In
practice an increasing proportion of armed conflicts
are now within rather than between nations. For
instance, not one of the 30 major armed conflicts in
1992 was unambiguously of the country versus
country type and only four had some characteristics
of this type of conflict (Renner, 1993). More than 90
per cent of all casualties are now non-combatants
(Sivard, 1996). Governments and other elites
generally have much greater access to military
technology than opposition groups. Military work
by scientists and engineers generally tends to
increase this disparity of forces and military
technology and increase the ability of governments
to carry out internal repression.
Most countries witlI a well developed military
capacity engage in tlle arms trade and a sizeable
percentage of military production is exported. For
instance in the UK 24.3% of military production,
worth approximately 3.4 billion pounds, was
exported in 1993 (Hartley et ai, 1995). Controls
over recipient countries or likely uses, including in
internal repression, are generally limited. For
instance, in the UK the current controls on military
exports were introduced as a wartime emergency
measure in 1939 (CAAT, 2000). International
controls have focused on transparency rather than
restraint, but less than 90 (of 180) governments
provided data to the UN General Assembly annual
register of imports and exports of major combat
equipment in 1995. The decline in the arms trade,
particularly following the end of the cold war, has
made the anus market more commercial and led to
top of the range systems not previously for sale being
marketed. This has increased the lethality of arms
being exported and reduced scrutiny of arms
purchasers (Sivard, 1996). Trading in arms can lend
legitimacy and prestige (Williamson, 1990) to
governments which practice internal repression and
torture. For example over three quarters of US arms
sales to the developing world between 1990 and
1995 went to countries where citizens had no right
to choose their own governments (Sivard, 1996).
Changes in political alliances mean that armaments
have been used against the forces of the country that
sold them on a number of occasions. For instance
many of the 255 British servicemen who died in the
Falklands were killed by British weapons (Evans,
1991). Such changes of alliance can happen very
quickly, as in the case ofIraq in the Gulf War.
Therefore, rather than military preparedness being
required for defence, the threat of an external
'enemy' is often required to justify military spending,
which is desired for other reasons. This supposition
is given additional credence by US rejection of a
Russian offer (at a negotiating meeting in early
2000) for both countries to reduce their nuclear
warheads from the START 11 level of 3,000-3,5000
to 1,5000 and encouragement for Russia to maintain
its strategic nuclear forces on hair-trigger alert.
Although the US administration's rationale for a
limited national missile defence (NMD) system is
apparently based on the threat from so-called 'rogue
states' such as North Korea, (Schwartz, 2000), it
presumably requires Russia to maintain its nuclear
capacity as a (further) justification.
Therefore for many scientists and engineers the real
ethical question is not whether it is ethically justified
to do military work in support of the defence of their
countries, but whether it is ethically justified to
produce weapons which:
• Will be traded, including to countries with poor
human rights records and which may be used in
internal repression
• May be used in internal conflicts in their own
country
• Divert resources from civilian programmes.
3.2 The Achievement oJJust Aims?
Even if it is temporarily assumed that foreign and
domestic policy aims are just, there are still
97
questions about the practicality and ethics of trying
to achieve these just aims through preparation for
and engaging in war. By its very nature war
involves loss of life, injury, damage to and
destruction of the natural environment and damage
to property. Infrastructure damage can lead to
illness and loss of life after the conflict has ended.
Damage to the natural environment, if severe, can
have devastating consequences for human society
and other species in both the short and long term.
Most ethical systems have a ban on taking life,
which sometimes also includes animal life. This
may be absolute or limited by other ethical
principles, which allow the taking of life in certain
circumstances, such as self defence (Norman, 1995).
The people for whose benefit a particular military
action is carried out (whether or not they benefit
from it in reality) are generally different from those
who suffer as a result of it, though many conflicts
cause suffering to all sides. However principles of
fairness imply that one group of people should not be
exposed to the risks and another receive the benefits,
however significant these benefits may be (Rawls,
1971). This is particularly pertinent to military
research and even more so to the use of military
technology where beneficiaries and risk takers are
generally not the same and the nature of the
situation makes it difficult if not impossible to obtain
informed consent. However this ethical argument is
frequently sidestepped on the basis that the people
suffering are the 'enemy' and therefore do not have
to be taken into account.
In ethical terms the rights to life and bodily integrity
should be considered absolute and totally
independent of group membership or other factors,
including definition as 'enemy'. However most
ethical systems allow the use of force (and generally
any consequent injury or killing) in self defence, but
only against direct threats. The issue can be further
elaborated using the following ethical principles
1. The right to life and bodily integrity
2. The equal and inalienable value of all (human)
life, totally independent of any other factors
3. The right to take measures to preserve one's
own life or bodily integrity
4. Measures must be proportional to the
(perceived) threat and only directed against the
individuals who present a direct threat
The situation with regards to the use of force in
national self defence is more complicated. However
these four principles clearly exclude any form of
offensive war, regardless of the justice of the policy
aims which it is intended to achieve. They also
bring into question the ethics of defensive war,
without totally excluding it on ethical grounds.
They would also greatly change the conduct of even
defensive wars and directly exclude the use of many
if not most modem weapons teclmologies.
Another useful approach derives from consideration
of engineering as social experimentation (Martin et
al, 1996) to which analyses of ethical issues, for
instance in the field of medical experimentation, can
be applied (Johnson, 1991), in particular with
regards to free and informed consent (Kipnis, 1981).
The very nature of the situation in which military
technology is used prevents (informed) consent
being sought or obtained. However, it can probably
be assumed that career soldiers, and more
particularly officers, have given de facto consent to
offensive weapons being used against them, though
there are almost certainly limits on this consent.
This is almost certainly not the case for conscripts
and personnel doing military service or who joined
to obtain training or due to limited job availability,
without expecting to participate in armed conflict.
challenging increases the pressure and temptation to
accept military projects and/or funding. For instance
over half of US scientists and engineers had military
contracts and more than 65% of all US federal
research money went into military or related projects
in 1990 (Crowe, 1990). In most other countries
military research is not as dominant as in the US,
though the military still receives a significant
percentage of research funding in many countries.
For instance the member states of the European
Community invested about 11.6% of public research
and development expenditure on military research in
1990 (De Vestel, 1993). Table 1 below (OECD,
1998) shows that most countries (for which data is
given) invest considerably less on health and
environmental programmes than military research
and in many cases only a fraction of the amount.

The issue of the justice of the aims which Table I: Defence and Health and Environment R &
governments try to achieve by war remains to be D as Percentage of Total Government R&D
examined. The foreign policies of most
governments can be described as legitimate rather Military Environment
than just, since they generally involve advancing the 1992 1997 1992 1997
prestige and interests of the nation or more North 55.3 52.1 18.1 21.1
frequently its ruling class, rather than considering America
the interests and needs of humanity as a whole. The EU 20.1 15.9 6.4 6.3
following facts (Sivard, 1996) raise serious questions Nordic 12.5 10.4 2.3
as to the justice or ethics of the foreign and domestic countries
policies of most governments: US 58.6 55.0 9.9 11.0
• Half the world's governments spend more on UK 40.7 37.7 3.0 2.7
'defence' than the health service 27.7 9.7 11.0
France 35.7
• In the poorest countries, less than half the adult 10.0 9.6 5.9 4.8
Germanv
population is literate
Japan 5.9 5.8 7.2 6.3
• Life expectancy in the poorer countries is on
Total OEeD 36.4 31.7 8.0 8.3
average 14 years less than in the richer ones
Sweden 24.3 1.4
It has often been suggested that disarmament would
leave the world at the mercy of its worst enemies. Italy 7.1 7.2 6.7
However, although different countries do differ Spain 14.6 19.6 8.1 6.5
significantly in their respect for human rights and Canada 6.0 6.5 8.6 7.9
the ethics of their foreign policies, there are no Netherlands 3.7 3.1 3.8 3.5
shining saints or even governments which can safely Norway 5.6 5.5 2.6 3.6
be left in control of modem technological weapons,
particularly weapons of mass destruction. To take At the simplest level the very existence of modem
one example, the US is often held up in the Western military capacity is totally dependent on the
world and seems to consider itself a moral force participation of scientists and engineers in research
which is entitled to intervene in conflicts. However and development, training, production and the
the reality includes non-signature of the Ottawa maintenance of weapons systems for the military.
convention on landmines and the UN convention There have been more than 250 wars and 110
against the use of child soldiers, one in five children million war related deaths in the twentieth century
in poverty and ten million children without access to and six times as many deaths per war in the
health care (Sivard, 1996), the death penalty and the twentieth as in the nineteenth century (Sivard,
world's largest stock of nuclear weapons. 1996). The increase in death and destruction
associated with modem war are largely a
consequence of tlle development and wide
4. ENGINEERS, SCIENTISTS dissemination of advanced military technology.
AND MILITARY WORK Total withdrawal of engineers and scientists from
military work would not only prevent the
The availability of military funding as well as the development and production of new or replacement
fact that military projects are often technically weapons systems, including more advanced nuclear

98
weapons. It would also bring into question the safety
(to users) of existing systems and the ability to use
them (effectively).
Although anns races are often motivated and fuelled
by political factors, they are crucially dependent on
the involvement of scientists and engineers to
develop and construct both totally new types of
weapons systems and additional high performance
features for existing weapons systems. Building up
military capacity, particularly as part of an arms
race, can contribute to a psychological expectation
that this military capacity should be used and a
climate of acceptance of preparation for war rather
than peace. A particular example of this is given by
the period before the first world war in which an
anns race combined with the formation of opposing
military alliances was an important contributory
factor to the outbreak of war. This argument is in
direct contradiction to that of deterrence (Hassner,
1995; Miller, 1991), the effectiveness of which
seems to be called into question by the continuing
prevalence of war, as indicated by, for instance, the
26 major anned conflicts in 1995 or the more than a
million war-related deaths in 1994 (Sivard, 1996).
Engineers and scientists are responsible for the
developments in armaments technology (including
military aircraft) which have contributed to
spreading the effects of conflict more widely,
including by increasing the range of many weapons,
the speed at which military personnel can be moved
and the extent and severity of short and long term
environmental damage. This is true even for wars
within nations, due to technology both contributing
to spreading conflicts within the country and
increasing the speed of response from outside.
Military technology has made possible very rapid
intervention in conflicts, frequently by bombing,
including of civilians, who are now the main
casualties in war (Sivard, 1996). In the absence of
advanced military technology, this type of swift
response would not be possible and the enforced time
delay might lead to the investigation of non-military
options.
Despite suggestions that military research could be
used to reduce the destructiveness of war by, for
instance, developing highly accurate weapons
systems, there is little evidence of this. Instead
weapons systems have been designed with
increasing fire power and destructive capacity.
Despite considerable increases in accuracy, weapons
systems are being used to give blanket coverage of
an area and the ability to kill or injure a greater
number of people in a shorter period of time.
Modern weapons also allow killing and the causing
of injury and destruction at a distance, facilitating
abrogation of responsibility for this killing and
injury.
99
5. OPPORTUNITY COSTS
Military work has resource consumption and
therefore high opportunity costs, which also raise
ethical issues.
5. J The Economy and Employment
Many economies are very dependent on military
production and the arms trade. However studies
have shown that: economic growth falls with
increased military spending (Winn, 1984) and found
an inverse relationship between the share of gross
domestic product allocated to military research and
development and international competitiveness in
manufacturing (Kaldor et al, 1986). However
further work is required to determine whether this
relationship is causal. It is often assumed that
reductions in military spending lead to increases in
unemployment, but this is in fact not the case,
particularly if appropriate compensatory measures
are taken (Voss, 1992). Military technology is
expensive and therefore generally creat(.s fewer jobs
than other types of eX"penditure. Table 2 (Anderson,
1986; Schofield, 1986) below shows that the same
amount of investment in other sectors of the
economy will create significantly more jobs than
military expenditure and that investment in highly
sophisticated weapons systems creates even fewer
jobs than in simpler ones. AltllOugh these figures
are old, the relative costs have not changed
significantly. Therefore, military work by scientists
and engineers could be considered to have the
indirect effect of reducing the availability of
employment. In addition military research and
development and production divert expertise and
skilled technical workers from the civil sector, where
they are often in short supply, particularly in
'developing' countries (Gummett, 1986; Kaldor et al,
1986, Evans et aI, 1991).
Table 2: Job Creation in US and UK
Economic Sector or £ Cost per Job
Weapons System
Retail (UK) 28,000
Education (UK) 29,000
Hospitals (UK) 38,000
Newspapers (UK) 60,000
Clothes manufacture (UK) 64,000
Fabricated metals (UK) 112,000
Guided missiles & ordnance (UK) 129,000
Type 22 frigate (US) 86,000
Tornado MRCA (US) 309,000
Trident (US) 580,000
The argument of resource diversion by military
research is often countered by the purported great
benefits from 'spin-offs in other areas. However,
despite some well known examples, few civilian
products or technological spin-offs originate from
military technology (Kaldor, 1983). If the aim of
research is the development of new civilian products
or material, it would seem a better strategy to target
research funding and resources in the desired
application areas rather than assume that they will
haphazardly emerge from investment on totally
different projects (Rose, 1986). In addition, the high
consumption of resources by military research
diverts resources from direct application to civilian
projects and the development of improved
mechanisms for the development, utilisation and
dissemination of civilian research results.
5.2 Environment, Health and Non-Military Defence
Economic, social and increasingly environmental
problems, particularly in the 'developing countries',
are leading to an increase in tension and potential
for conflict. Control over and access to scarce
resources, such as coal, uranium and oil, is likely to
become an increasingly significant factor in future
international relations. For instance there are a
number of disagreements which could escalate into
real conflicts over the use of water resources. The
Gulf War has been called the 'first of the resource
wars' (Elworthy et al, 1990), but is only one of a
long series of resource wars. However, rather than
trying to reduce tension and conflict, the
industrialised countries which are the principle arms
dealers, have taken advantage of resource and other
conflicts to sell arms, frequently both inflaming the
conflict and creating a demand for more arms.
Many of the world's poorest countries spend from
Table 3: Opportunity Costs of Military Expenditure for Environmental Protection, Health and Education
Military Expenditure Cost
Three days of military spending $5 billion
European Fighter Aircraft $28 billion
2 months of Ethiopian military spending $30 billion
I plan for Ethiopia
Seawolf nuclear powered submarine $2.5 billion
Intercontinental stealth bomber $2.2 billion Family planning for one year to 120 million
Aegis guided missile destroyer $969 million An extra year of primary schooling for 11.4
Multiple launcher rocket loaded with ballistic $29 million
rockets
Tomahawk cruise missile for conventional or $5.8 million 1,200 wells with hand pumps for families
nuclear armed ship or submarine
Wide area smart mine $297,000
100
half to several times their aid budgets on
maintaining their military capacity. For instance in
1994 South Asia received on average six dollars per
capita in economic aid and spent ten dollars per
capita on the military and Africa (other than Egypt)
received on average 31 dollars per capita in
economic aid and spent 16 dollars per capita on the
military (Sivard, 1996). A significant proportion of
debt in the 'developing' countries is due to high
military spending, supported by indiscriminate
loans, during the cold war period (CAAT, 1999).
Although global military spending has been falling
in real terms for a number of years, it was still over
$700 billion in 1994.
This high military spending has costs for health,
education and the environment. Although the
world's health has improved and there is reduced
infant mortality and increased life expectancy, one
person in five still has insufficient food and dies
early due to the lack of food, clean water and basic
health care. Nearly 50,000 children and adults die
every day from infectious diseases which could be
prevented at low cost. In 1995 there were 20
countries whose food supply per capita was 10-30%
below basic nutritional requirements, 900 million
adults were illiterate, 130 million children did not
have access to primary schooling and another 100
million children a year did not complete basic
education (Sivard, 1996). Most of the 'Health for All
by the Year 2000' goals could have been achieved by
assigning a quarter of the military expenditures
saved by the end of the cold war to social programs
but this has not happened. The opportunity costs of
specific military expenditures are given in the
following table (Sivard, 1996; Saferworld, 1990):
Environmental, Health or Education Option
An action plan over five years to save the
world's tropical forests,
Reducing sulphur dioxide emissions in Europe
bv60%
The annual costs of the UN anti-desertification
Immunization program with added vaccines
and micronutrients for the world's children
women in the developing world
million girls in the least developed countries
A year's basic rural water and sanitation
services for 2 million people in developing
countries
without local water resources
3 million packets for oral rehydration therapy
for diarrheal illnesses
A focus on defence based on military capacity has
diverted resources from non-militlll)' approaches,
which include the following:
• Identifying and resolving environmental, social
and economic problems which can increase
tension and threaten world peace and security.
• Building trading, cultural and other links. This
has the dual effect of creating a vested interest
in maintaining peaceful relations to, for
instance, maintain trade, and reducing the
likelihood of conflicts due to cultural and other
misunderstandings or inaccurate information.
Non-military defence strategies avoid the very high
human, environmental and other costs of military
ones. Since they are based on resolving problems,
rather than trying to minimise damage, they are
likely to be more effective in the long as well as the
short term. Although it is unrealistic to expect an
immediate move from military to totally non-
military strategies, a phased shift of resources from
military to non-military defence is a possibility, with
increasing reliance on non-military defence if it
proves to be successful. As illustrated in table 3,
even a relatively small shift of expenditure from
weapons systems to resolving environmental
problems, and health care and education provision,
could have significant effects in reducing tension
and the likelihood of war. This is particularly
relevant to countries which have real 'enemies'. It
has often been said that nuclear weapons have kept
the peace for the last 55 years. If the estimated eight
trillion dollars spent on them and their infrastructure
since the second world war (Sivard 1996) had been
put into social, education and environmental
programmes, many of the over 160 wars and 30
million war-related deaths since 1945 might have
been avoided, as well as global prosperity increased
significantly.
6. PROFESSIONAL AND SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITIES
In the past there has been a tendency for scientists
and engineers to concentrate on the technical, rather
than the ethical aspects of their work. Engineers in
particular have generally carried out projects
determined by other people ratller than taking
personal and collective moral responsibility for the
consequences of their work. However there is
increasing recognition of the importance of ethical
factors in science and engineering. In particular
their skills, expertise and experience put engineers
and scientists in a good position to evaluate the
likely and possible consequences and ethics of their
work and, in many cases, they may be tlle only
people capable of doing this. However ethical issues
101
also concern members of the public and require
consultation with them. This will require scientists
and engineers to improve their communication
skills, to give greater importance to disseminating
scientific and technical information in an accessible
form, and to show greater responsiveness to public
concerns. Many countries lack an adequate science
and technology policy and strategy for its
implementation and, where such policies exist, they
rarely have an ethical dimension. Scientists and
engineers have particular skills and expertise which
allow them to make a unique contribution to this
debate.
A related issue is what responsibility scientists and
engineers have to provide services to society. It has
been suggested that all legitimate organisations
should be entitled to access to expert engineering
advice in the same way as all individuals (at least in
theory) are entitled to medical care and legal
representation (Florman, 1978). While an
interesting proposition, this ignores both practical
issues to do with the availability of funding and
ethical issues about the nature of the work for which
expertise is required. Arguments can be made for
state subsidies for the provision of this expertise and
for scientists and engineers to donate their expertise
to non-governmental organisations as part of their
commitment to society. However there are projects,
such as the development of more 'efficient' gas
chambers, participation in which would be unethical.
It has been suggested that ethical scientists and
engineers should undertake military work to ensure
that tllere are individuals with concerns about social
responsibility and ethics working in this area and
that it is not left to people without any conscience
(parnas, 1987). The problem with this suggestion
becomes much clearer when applied to the
construction of gas chanlbers. Building gas
chambers efficiently, without wasting public funds
and while strictly taking account of health and safety
legislation and restrictions on emissions, it not
sufficient to make this ethical. A related argUDlent
has been called the replaceability principle (Kemp,
1994) and seems to be based on the idea that it is
justifiable to do something if someone else would
have. This argUDlent has most frequently been
applied to justify arms sales, regardless of the nature
of the regimes to which they are sold, their human
rights records and the likelihood of these arms being
used in internal oppression. The fallacy of this
argument becomes clear on being applied to a
hypothetical defence for robbing a bank. The logical
extension of this argument would be that ethics are
totally irrelevant, since it is always possible to find at
someone who will carry out a given action (for
sufficient remuneration). In addition applying this
argument to reward as well as blame would give the
nonsensical conclusion that scientists and engineers
do not deserve to be paid for their work, as someone
else could have been found to do it (Lackey, 1994).
Another frequently met argument is that individuals
who make only a small contribution to a large
project only have a minimal responsibility for the
overall outcome. However anyone who makes a
contribution, however small, which is essential for
the success of the whole project should be considered
to bear moral responsibility for the whole outcome,
regardless of whether someone else could have
carried out this work (Lackey, 1994). This is also
the case in collaborative work, where overall success
is dependent on a number of people working
together.
Scientists and engineers, particularly those in senior
positions, have responsibilities by virtue of their
positions, including to set an example to colleagues
and show leadership on the ethical use of
technology. This could be considered to include the
responsibilities to refuse ethically questionable work,
to use their skills and expertise to carry out work of
benefit to society and to work to change institutional
cultures. Ethical behaviour by individuals could
have the further positive effect of contributing
towards moves to more ethically conscious
institutional cultures in which ethical issues are
taken seriously and ethical considerations are of
paramount importance in decision making. At the
minimum this would avoid individuals being put in
jeopardy for behaving ethically or having to make
insidious choices between ethical behaviour and
avoiding unpleasant consequences, such as job loss.
7. FUZZY AREAS
In addition to clearly military work there are a
number of 'fuzzy' areas, including
• Research projects with military funding, but no
apparent military applications.
• (Unforeseen) military applications of civilian
research and work with both civilian and
military applications.
• Military projects relating purely to damage
reduction.
7.1 Military Applications of Civilian Work
Many civilian research projects could be of great
interest to the military. This raises a number of
issues, including how best to maintain the division
between civilian and military work and how to avoid
unethical applications without general restrictions on
access to research results. Totally refraining from
research is probably the only way of avoiding any
102
possibility of military applications. However, this
would have serious consequences in withdrawing
expertise from society, and engineers and scientists
can be considered to have some responsibility to
make their skills available to society, in particular
when their training has been wholly or partly
publicly funded. On the other hand it should not be
assumed that it is always unethical to carry out work
with beneficial, but possibly also military,
applications. This depends on the likelihood and
probable significance of both the social,
environmental or other beneficial applications and
the military applications, as well as the intrinsic
scientific or technical value of the work and requires
consideration of both deontological and
consequentialist ethics. Examples of socially
beneficial research areas, which may have military
applications include 'artificial sight' and navigation
and orientation systems for blind people and
speech/text conversion systems for deaf people.
Thus there is a need for techniques for evaluating
the different factors and making ethical decisions.
Although it is likely that the risks and benefits will
be experienced by different groups of people, it is
still ethical to carry out a comparative evaluation, as
the risks are neither a direct consequence of nor a
prerequisite for the benefits. In addition they are
uncertain and generally due to additional work by
different individuals or organisations to those
carrying out the original work from which the
benefits derive. Evaluation techniques should also
give appropriate, but not excessive, weight to the
researcher's interest in the project and the likely
effect on career development. When potential
military applications become apparent during the
course of the project, tllere can be conflict between
responsibilities to sponsors and colleagues and
society as a whole in addition to other ethical issues.
In some, but not all cases resignation from the
project on grounds of conscience may be the
appropriate solution, though this could have (severe)
personal consequences. However, it could be used to
draw attention to the importance of ethical issues
and lead to debate amongst colleagues.
The doctrine of double effect (Norman, 1995) which
allows the performance of actions to achieve desired
consequences, despite the existence of foreseeable,
but unintended and undesirable consequences,
should not be used as a general get-out clause to
imply that scientists and engineers do not have any
responsibility for the applications of their work.
Instead it should be considered an important
component of their professional and ethical
responsibilities to determine and try to avoid
undesirable or unethical consequences. This
responsibility should include the investigation of
safeguards to ensure that, as far as possible, all
applications of tlleir work meet ethical criteria. One
possibility is a licensing process which is used purely
to screen out unethical applications and not for
revenue raising, since limiting access and gaining
profit from the products of publicly funded research
could be considered unethical. Since academics and
universities are generally not in a position to
challenge unlawful use of their work in the courts,
particularly against large and powerful organisations
such as 'defence' ministries, this would have to be
backed up by the establishment of national or
international university patenting authorities, with
the power to do this. Another possibility is
examining different ways, possibly using different
techniques, to achieve the same social or research
aims to try and reduce the likelihood of military
applications.
The development of improved protective clothing or
antidotes to biological and chemical weapons are
often seen as having only passively defensive
applications and therefore being ethically acceptable.
Although they can reduce injury and death from
chemical and biological weapons, the availability of
protective clothing and antidotes allows chemical
and biological weapons to be used offensively and
can have the effect of lowering resistance to the use
of these weapons. The real motivation for this
research is as likely to be increasing the feasibility (if
not actual preparation for) the use of chemical and
biological weapons, as protection against them. This
would then make this research legally as well as
ethically highly questionable, since the use of
biological and chemical weapons is banned in
international law (Sivard, 1996).
Advances in the detection of nuclear and chemical
weapons have both civilian and military
applications, with the civilian applications relating
to support for non-proliferation treaties and other
disarmament measures and the military applications
to gaining information about the nuclear and
chemical capabilities of potential 'enemies'. Since
monitoring of disarmament agreements is an
essential part of ensuring they are carried out,
research of this type is essentially in support of peace
and does not raise ethical questions. It should
therefore be considered civilian and funding for it
assigned to civilian rather than military
organisations. Analogous arguments hold for work
on safely decommissioning nuclear and other
weapons.
7.2 Military Funding
Work funded by the military can raise ethical
questions, even when the research itself is benign or
socially useful. Military funding generally leads to
restrictions on the right to publish or a requirement
to obtain permission from the military sponsor. For
103
instance all US Department of Defence contracts
include a pre-publication review or licence to censor
agreement (Kenney, 1987; Ehrlich, 1984). In the
UK the Ministry of Defence (MoD) even refuses to
divulge details of research contracts with
universities, including for non-classified work (Rose,
1991), though much of the information is available
in university annual reports (Evans et al, 1991).
This secrecy and the restrictions on publication can
impede the free exchange of information which is an
important component of research. In some cases it
could also lead to the suppression of certain results
or even whole areas of research or a small number of
researchers monopolising funding in particular areas
(Shrader-Frechette, 1994).
In some countries the military nurnstry receives
preferential treatment from governments in research
funding relative to civilian ministries. For instance
in the UK a joint research grant scheme with the
research councils was set up in 1985, with the MoD
and the relevant research council each to contribute
half of the funding (Evans et al, 1991). Since the
UK research councils are often unable to fund all the
projects which receive high assessments, this scheme
encourages researchers to accept military funding,
particularly since they have to opt out of it rather
than opt in. Joint schemes of this type also blur the
distinction between civilian and military research.
The social context of the research and the mission of
the agency supporting it generally have an effect on
its goals, making it desirable that civilian research is
carried out in civilian institutions and with civilian
funding and that there is a clear separation between
civilian and military work. This is likely to result in
a higher degree of public accountability and scrutiny,
whereas military funded research may be classified
(Lappe, 1990). In addition, since military
establishments are not charitable organisations, they
generally fund work because they expect it to have
military applications. For instance the MoD
considers that its work in universities and
polytechnics is 'a vital contribution' to its military
research programme (Evans et al, 1991). Military
funded work in universities and polytechnics is often
the first stage in a process of transforming an
innovative scientific idea into battlefield military
hardware. Military sponsors are likely to at least
closely scrutinise all research they fund for potential
military applications, thereby increasing the
likelihood of such applications. In some cases the
division of projects amongst different universities
can camouflage military end uses (Evans et al,
1991). Therefore the concept of civilian research
funded by the military may be misleading.
Military establishments have shown a great ability to
assimilate and redirect new forms of science and
technology into military applications. The military
may exert a pull towards the assimilation of science
and engineering by pressing for expansion of
research and development programmes in particular
areas and justifying this in terms of protecting
national security. If civilian support of research is
uncertain or inadequate and moral barriers to the
militarisation of research are weak, at least some
scientists and corporations will actively encourage
military establishments to support their work (Falk
et al, 1990). The militarisation of the biological
sciences is being opposed by social forces, due to
aversion, including by the military, to biological and
chemical weapons, societal support for the use of the
biological sciences to enhance life, international law
and political action. However, there is not the same
specific opposition in the case of physics and
engineering.
Some of the other problems with military funded
research are shared by industrially funded work and
result from the pressure to bring in external funding.
The control of a high percentage of research funding
by the military (and industry) may have already led
to a shift away from long term fundamental research
to short term applied work, resulting in a de facto
limitation of academic freedom. Individual
researchers or even whole research groups may have
been channelled into areas having commercial or
military potential and away from fundamental
research or areas of the greatest social or academic
merit (Stark, 1984). Acceptance of military funding
can contribute to increasing the acceptability or
respectability of military work and reduce the
pressure on government to provide civilian sources
of research funding. Ethical scientists and engineers
should also consider themselves responsible for
pressurising governments to redistribute research
funding from military to civilian organisations.
However, particularly when civilian research
funding is limited, the choice may be between
accepting military funding, with all its ethical
questions, or not carrying out the research at all.
Researchers considering accepting military funding
for apparently civilian work should consider both the
deontological ethics of military funding and the
consequentialist ethics of the likely benefits of the
research and the probability of it being exploited for
military applications.
8. Case Studies
In this section a number of case studies, which
illustrate some of the issues discussed in the text,
will be presented. The first case study is related to
the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI). In May 1985
David Parnas (1987) was asked to serve on a
$IOOO/day advisory panel of the SDI Organisation
('Star Wars' program) to make recommendations on
a research and development programme to solve
104
computational problems relating to space based
defence systems. Two months later he had resigned
from the panel and become an active opponent of
SDI. He is not opposed to all military work, but
considers the use of nuclear weapons as a deterrent
to be dangerous and immoral and was initially
enthusiastic about the possibility of SDI making such
weapons obsolete.
The SDI initiative aimed at developing a network of
satellites to detect and intercept intercontinental
ballistic missiles before they could do significant
damage. Parnas had initial doubts about whether
this goal was technically achievable and a possible
conflict of interest, since he had a project that could
benefit from SDI funding. However the panel
organiser assured him that this conflict of interest
was practically a qualification for panel membership
and that other members had similar conflicts of
interest. This fact in itself raises serious ethical
problems. While preparing position papers after the
initial meetings, Parnas came to the conclusion that
it was not possible to construct an effective shield
and that an untrustworthy shield would be more
likely to lead to an escalation of the arms race than
an abandonment of nuclear weapons. He found that
other scientists agreed with his technical
conclusions, but wanted the programme to continue,
as they considered the research funds would advance
the state of computer science. Parnas thought this
unlikely, but, more importantly, considered it
dishonest to take money for a project which he knew
to be technically impossible. He resigned and
submitted position papers to support his resignation,
considering it unprofessional to act otherwise.
The next case study concerns the use of toxins. A
young researcher who was an authority on the toxic
properties of a particular toxin called samitoxin
accepted a post-doctoral scholarship at Fort Detrick,
US in 1966 and subsequently isolated the red tide
toxin, which was allegedly used in CIA-mediated
assassination schemes. Fort Detrick was then a
major installation conducting both defensive and
offensive biological warfare research. The
researcher was aware of the extreme toxicity of the
chemical he was isolating and the nature of the
establishment he was working in. Therefore he
should have been aware that its staff would probably
try to use his toxin studies in warfare related
applications and he can be held morally responsible
for the consequences of his work. (Lappe, 1990)
The third case study relates to MoD funding for a
veterinary school project. In 1988 the MoD made a
grant of £145,000 to Bristol University veterinary
school. The original project, which had failed to
obtain funding from the appropriate research
councils was a study of the effects of four airborne
disease organisms on the health of fann animals in
closed environments. However acceptance of MoD
funding resulted in a change of aim to study the
single organism Klebsiella pneumoniae, which does
not endanger animals, but causes possibly fatal
pneumonia in humans.
Staff at the vet school were concerned that the
knowledge gained from the project could be used to
develop airborne pathogens for offensive military
purposes and that the project was against the spirit
of the 1972 Biological Weapons convention which
outlawed the development and production of
biological weapons. Fifty members of staff signed a
petition and letters were sent to the official journal of
the British Veterinary Association and the project
head, asking him reverse the decision to accept
military money. Attempts to resolve the dispute
failed. The Head of Department in overall charge of
the project admitted that 'Knowledge gained from
this work could be used to enhance the survival of an
airborne pathogen for offensive military purposes'.
In the end Sue Mayer, a lecture in the vet school
resigned. She was 'extremely upset that our
resources at the vet school were being diverted to
military ends and certainly that was not something
that I had ever thought I would do when I graduated
as a vet.' (Evans et al, 1991).
9. AN ETHICAL FRAMEWORK FOR DECISION
MAKING: A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS
Since the issues involved are complicated and
individuals also have different personal ethical
stances, it is not possible to make categorical
statements as to what is and is not ethical. Instead a
framework of principles to facilitate decision making
will be presented. The following list is not intended
to be exhaustive and has been deliberately kept
relatively short, while trying to cover the most
important issues. Ethical engineers and scientists
should pose themselves, colleagues, funding bodies,
project supervisors and other relevant parties a
number of questions to ensure that they:
• Understand and support the overall aim of the
work
• Are adequately informed about and have
seriously considered all likely direct and
indirect consequences of the project
• Understand their own motivation, including any
personal advantage from carrying out the work,
and their personal code of ethics
• Are aware of foreign and domestic policy
objectives and how the proposed project
contributes to these objectives
• Are aware of their own individual positions on
military preparations and the use of force, in
both an offensive and defensive context
105
• Have considered other ways of achieving the
same goals without military preparations
• Have considered the effects of both the specific
project and military research in general on the
conduct of war
• Have considered the likelihood of their research
results being applied to weapons development
or production and the significance of any likely
applications
• Know the mISSion of the organisation
sponsoring the research
• Have evaluated the likelihood of the work
achieving beneficial and non-military
publication or being freely published at all
• Have considered the broader context of the
work, including possible environmental impacts
and affects on minority groups.
10. CONCLUSIONS
Issues related to the ethics of military work have
been discussed using both deolontological and
consequentialist approaches. This has involved an
examination of some of the consequences of military
work and the refutation of a number of common
assumptions, including that armaments are primarily
required for defence. Instead they are more
frequently traded, used offensively, particularly in
civil wars and internal repression, or not used. In
addition to ethical issues relating to direct military
work, the ethics of 'fuzzy' areas, such as accepting
military funding for civilian work and civilian work
with military applications, have been considered.
Several case studies have been presented to illustrate
some of the arguments and points made. A
framework to inform ethical decision making has
been presented in the form of a number of issues to
be considered. Further work will investigate a
number of the issues raised here in more detail and
develop a systems approach to ethics. This systems
approach will then be applied to the investigation
and analysis of a number of recent conflicts.
Since the human dimension is very important in
ethics, two statements will be presented in overall
conclusion of the discussion. The first is from
Enrico Fermi and 1.1. Rabi and refers to nuclear
weapons (Rigden, 1987): 'It is clear that the use of
such a weapon cannot be justified on any ethical
ground which gives a human being a certain
individuality and dignity even if he happens to be a
resident of an enemy country ... Any postwar
situation resulting from such a weapon would leave
unresolveable enmities for generations. A desirable
peace cannot come from such an inhuman
application of force.'
The second is from David Parnas (1987): 'If each of
us lives as though what we do does matter, the world
will be a far better place than it now is. ... my
decision not to participate in SDI will not stop this
misguided program. However, if everyone who
knows that the program will not lead to a
trustworthy shield against nuclear weapons refuses
to participate, there will be no program. Every
individual's decision is important.'
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