NISCE, ALYSSA ANGELA, R.

[12081000] G05 Bigamous and Polygamous Marriages

SANTIAGO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

July 15, 2015 G.R. No. 200233 SERENO, CJ.

DOCTRINE

- Knowledge of the second wife of the fact of spouse’s existing prior marriage constitutes an indispensable cooperation in
the commission of bigamy, which makes her responsible as an accomplice.

FACTS

- Four months after the solemnization of their marriage on July 29, 1997, petitioner Leonila G. Santiago, and Nicanor F.
Santos face an Information on Bigamy.

- Before the RTC and CA, petitioner claimed that she cannot be co-accused since she had no prior knowledge of Santos’
previous marriage. She also argued that their marriage was void due to lack of a marriage license.

- The first wife, Estela Galang, testified that she met the petitioner as early as March and April 1997 and introduced herself
as the legal wife of Santos.

- Petitioner denied the allegation and averred that she only met Galang in August and September 1997 after she had already
married Santos.

ISSUES

Whether or not for there to be a conviction of bigamy, a valid second marriage must be proven by the prosecution beyond
reasonable doubt.

RULING

- Given her knowledge of the first marriage and her clear intent to deceive the court, she was validly charged as an
accomplice for the crime of bigamy.

- The Court acknowledged the testimony of the first wife and stated that it was absurd for a learned person like the petitioner
to not know of Santos’ civil status. In the crime of bigamy, if the second spouse had knowledge of the previous undissolved
marriage of the accused, she is included in the information as a co-accused.

- The Court also acknowledged that petitioner and Santos had only known each other for less than four years therefore no
marriage license shall be necessary to deem their marriage valid. Under Article 34 of the Family Code, “no license
shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least
five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other.”

- Under Article 35(4), “those bigamous or polygamous marriages not failing under Article 41 shall be void ab initio.”
However, petitioner cannot claim her marriage to be void ab initio.

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- This is because petitioner married Santos while knowing full well that they had not yet complied with the five-year
cohabitation requirement under Article 34. The two of them lied before a solemnizing officer and misrepresented that they
had actually cohabited for at least five years before they married each other. Subsequently, they were issued a Certificate
of Marriage by the solemnizing officer and no marriage license was necessary. Thus, their marriage was considered
valid.

- In view of Santiago’s consent and agreement to marry Santos who is already bound in lawful wedlock, she is guilty
as an accomplice in the crime of bigamy and sentenced to prision correctional under Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code.

- In the case at bar, it was the petitioner’s illegal acts of feigning marriage that led to her conviction. The Court deals strictly
with acts that make a mockery of the sanctity of marriage.

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 NISCE, ALYSSA ANGELA, R. [12081000] G05 Bigamous and Polygamous Marriages

CASTILLO v. CASTILLO

April 18, 2016 G.R. No. 189607 SERENO, CJ.

DOCTRINE

- The absence of a judicial declaration that the first marriage was void ab initio is immaterial for marriages that were
celebrated before the effectivity of the Family Code.

FACTS

- On 25 May 1972, respondent Lea De Leon Castillo (Lea) married Benjamin Bautista (Bautista).

- On 6 January 1979, Lea married herein petitioner Renato Castillo (Renato).

- Renato filed before the RTC a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, praying that his marriage to Lea be declared
void due to her subsisting marriage to Bautista.

- Lea opposed, contending that her marriage to Bautista was null and void as they had not secured a marriage license and
that neither of them was a member of the denomination to which the solemnizing officer belonged.

- Lea also filed an action to declare her first marriage to Bautista void.

- The RTC declared the marriage of Lea and Bautista void and issued a certificate of finality saying that the decision had
been final and executory.

- Renato countered that although Lea belatedly managed to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity, she still could not deny
that at the time she entered into marriage with him, her previous marriage was valid and subsisting.

ISSUES

Whether or not the second marriage is valid.

RULING

- A judicial decree is not necessary since the validity of a marriage and all its incidents must be determined in accordance
with the law in effect at the time of its celebration. In this case, the law in force at the time Lea contracted both marriages,
1972 and 1979, was the Civil Code.

Under the Civil Code, no judicial decree to establish the invalidity is necessary in a void marriage; while in a voidable
marriage, there must be a judicial decree. The Civil Code contains no express provision on the necessity of a judicial
declaration of nullity of a void marriage.

- The statute in force then which was NCC Art. 80(4) stated that “bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under
article 83, number 2 are void from the beginning.” This is comparable to the current applicable law, Art. 35(4) of the

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Family Code which states that, “those bigamous or polygamous marriages not failing under Article 41 are void ab
initio.”

- The Court thus concludes that the subsequent marriage of Lea to Renato is valid in view of the invalidity of her first
marriage to Bautista because of the absence of a marriage license. That there was no judicial declaration that the first
marriage was void ab initio before the second marriage was contracted is immaterial as this is not a requirement under the
Civil Code.

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 NISCE, ALYSSA ANGELA, R. [12081000] G05 Subsequent Marriage, Upon Reappearance of Absent
Spouse

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HON. ESTRADA

March 18, 2015 G.R. No. 214792

DOCTRINE

- A spouse’s absence for more than 30 years is more than enough to declare him presumptively dead for all legal intents
and purposes.

FACTS

- On October 14, 2008, Teresita J. Olemberio filed a Petition for Declaration of Absence and Presumption of Death of her
husband Diego before the RTC of Malaybalay. Teresita alleged that she married Diego in 1973 in Bukidnon.

- Sometime in December 1976, Diego left their residence and never returned. He failed to communicate with her for the
past 32 years and never made contact with any of their relatives.

- She alleged that she exerted all efforts to reach Diego but failed. She filed the petition to declare her husband presumptively
dead so that she could contract another marriage without any impediment.

- RTC granted her petition however, the Office of the Solicitor General contested the grant alleging the insufficiency of
efforts done on Teresita’s part in locating Diego’s whereabouts.

ISSUES

- Whether or not the petitioner can freely contract another marriage without any impediment on the ground of the
husband’s presumption of death

RULING

- Yes, the petitioner can freely contract a marriage without legal impediments. Diego’s absence for more than 30 years is
more than enough to declare him presumptively dead for all legal intents and purposes.

- Under Art. 41 of the Family Code, A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage shall
be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four
consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead.”

- It can be gleaned from the totality of evidence that Diego had already died due to the prevalence of the New People’s
Army in Malaybalay. Under Article 391 of the Civil Code, a person in the armed forces who has taken part in war,
and has been missing for four years shall be presumed dead for all purposes.

- As cited by the CA, “It had been 32 years since the date of Diego Olemberio’s disappearance when Teresita seasonably
filed her petition with the RTC. The fact that Diego Olemberio would be 75 years old by now as reason enough to support
the presumption that he could be dead.”
- Also stated in Article 41, “the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.”

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- The acts of the petitioner going to SSS to inquire on Diego’s remittances and of going to the house of the parents of Diego
to inquire as to his whereabouts, constitute diligent efforts sufficient to support her belief that Diego is dead.