LLAMANZARES V. J. Perez As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens.

ens.—As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. While the 1935
COMELEC Constitution’s enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language which would definitely exclude foundlings either. Because of silence
and ambiguity in the enumeration with respect to foundlings, there is a need to examine the intent of the framers. In Nitafan v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 152 SCRA 284 (1987), this Court held that: The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional
construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in constitutional
construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It
may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers.

Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings are Filipinos.—Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that
foundlings are Filipinos. These laws do not provide that adoption confers citizenship upon the adoptee. Rather, the adoptee must be a Filipino in the first
place to be adopted. The most basic of such laws is Article 15 of the Civil Code which provides that “[l]aws relating to family rights, duties, status,
conditions, legal capacity of persons are binding on citizens of the Philippines even though living abroad.” Adoption deals with status, and a Philippine
adoption court will have jurisdiction only if the adoptee is a Filipino.

Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law.—Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law. Under the 1987 Constitution, an
international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either by transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an
international law be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. On the other hand, generally accepted
principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from
treaty obligations. Generally accepted principles of international law include international custom as evidence of a general practice accepted as law, and
general principles of law recognized by civilized nations. International customary rules are accepted as binding as a result from the combination of two
elements: the established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part of States; and a psychological element known as the opinion juris sive
necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of
a rule of law requiring it. “General principles of law recognized by civilized nations” are principles “established by a process of reasoning” or judicial logic,
based on principles which are “basic to legal systems generally,” such as “general principles of equity, i.e., the general principles of fairness and justice,”
and the “general principle against discrimination” which is embodied in the “Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention Against
Discrimination in Education, the Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation.” These are the same core
principles which underlie the Philippine Constitution itself, as embodied in the due process and equal protection clauses of the Bill of Rights.

The common thread of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) and
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) is to obligate the Philippines to grant nationality from birth and ensure that no child is
stateless.—The common thread of the UDHR, UNCRC and ICCPR is to obligate the Philippines to grant nationality from birth and ensure that no child is
stateless. This grant of nationality must be at the time of birth, and it cannot be accomplished by the application of our present naturalization laws,
Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended, and R.A. No. 9139, both of which require the applicant to be at least eighteen (18) years old. The principles
found in two conventions, while yet unratified by the Philippines, are generally accepted principles of international law. The first is Article 14 of the 1930
Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws under which a foundling is presumed to have the “nationality of the
country of birth,” to wit: Article 14 A child whose parents are both unknown shall have the nationality of the country of birth. If the child’s parentage is
established, its nationality shall be determined by the rules applicable in cases where the parentage is known. A foundling is, until the contrary is proved,
1
 presumed to have been born on the territory of the State in which it was found. (Underlining supplied) The second is the principle that a foundling is
presumed born of citizens of the country where he is found, contained in Article 2 of the 1961 United Nations Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness: Article 2 A foundling found in the territory of a Contracting State shall, in the absence of proof to the contrary, be considered to have been
born within the territory of parents possessing the nationality of that State.

It is a generally accepted principle of international law to presume foundlings as having been born of nationals of the country in which the foundling is
found.

Passports; It has been pointed that the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) issues passports to foundlings. Passports are by law, issued only to citizens.
This shows that even the executive department, acting through the DFA, considers foundlings as Philippine citizens.

IN RE: J. Fernando Equal protection guarantee.—To impose an additional burden for the first time to warrant the denaturalization of a citizen whose naturalization was
APPLICATION obtained after the most exacting scrutiny not only by the lower courts but by this Tribunal, and especially so after a long lapse of time, would be clearly to
FOR subject him to a risk that certainly the Constitution, with its pledge of equal protection, cannot countenance.
PHILIPPINE
CITIZENSHIP Decision of court on matter of citizenship should be given preclusive effect; Reasons.—Recognizing the basic premise, that there must be an end to
OF CHAN litigations, some authorities recognize that administrative rulings or decisions should have res judicata or preclusive effect. x x x The same observation
TECK LAO. holds true with respect to a decision of a court on the matter of citizenship as a material matter in issue in the case before it which is affirmed by this
CHAN TECK Court. For the “effective operation of courts in the social and economic scheme requires that their decision have the respect of and be observed by the
LAO vs. parties, the general public and the courts themselves. According insufficient weight to prior decisions encourages disrespect and disregard of courts and
REPUBLIC their decisions and invites litigation.
REPUBLIC vs. J. Sereno As the agency tasked to “provide immigration and naturalization regulatory services” and “implement the laws governing citizenship and the admission
HARP and stay of aliens,” the DOJ has the power to authorize the recognition of citizens of the Philippines. Any individual born of a Filipino parent is a citizen of
the Philippines and is entitled to be recognized as such. Recognition is accorded by the BI and the DOJ to qualified individuals, provided the proper
procedure is complied with and the necessary documents are submitted. In this case, respondent was accorded recognition as a citizen on 24 February
2000. On 24 October 2000, he was issued Identification Certificate No. 018488, which confirmed his status and affirmed his entitlement to all the rights
and privileges of citizenship.

Deportation; In Board of Commissioners v. Dela Rosa, 197 SCRA 853 (1991), the Supreme Court (SC) reiterated the doctrine that citizens may resort to
courts for protection if their right to live in peace, without molestation from any official or authority, is disturbed in a deportation proceeding.—It is
settled that summary deportation proceedings cannot be instituted by the BI against citizens of the Philippines.
TECSON vs. J. Puno, Vitug
COMELEC

2
LAMBINO v. J. Carpio The essence of amendments “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition” is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the
COMELEC people. This means two essential elements must be present. First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative
can sign on their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition. These essential elements are present only if
the full text of the proposed amendments is first shown to the people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an
amendment is “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition” only if the people sign on a petition that contains the full text of the
proposed amendments. The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the face of the petition, or attached to it. If so attached, the
petition must state the fact of such attachment. This is an assurance that every one of the several millions of signatories to the petition had seen the full
text of the proposed amendments before signing. Otherwise, it is physically impossible, given the time constraint, to prove that every one of the millions
of signatories had seen the full text of the proposed amendments before signing.

An initiative that gathers signatures from the people without first showing to the people the full text of the proposed amendments is most likely a
deception, and can operate as a gigantic fraud on the people
SANIDAD v. J. Martin The October 16 referendum-plebiscite is a resounding call to the people to exercise their sovereign power as constitutional legislator. The proposed
COMELEC amendments, as earlier discussed, proceed not from the thinking of a single man. Rather, they are the collated thoughts of the sovereign will reduced only
into enabling forms by the authority who can presently exercise the powers of government. In equal vein, the submission of those proposed amendments
and the question of martial law in a referendum-plebiscite expresses but the option of the people themselves implemented only by the authority of the
President. Indeed, it may well be said that the amending process is a sovereign act, although the authority to initiate the same and the procedure to be
followed reside somehow in a particular body.

“Plebiscite” and “Referendum” distinguished.—A “referendum” is merely consultative in character. It is simply a means of assessing public reaction to the
given issues submitted to the people for their consideration, the calling of which is derived from or within the totality of the executive power of the
President. It is participated on by all citizens from the age of 15, regardless of whether or not they are illiterates, feeble-minded, or ex-convicts. A
“plebiscite,” on the other hand, involves the constituent act of those “citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are eighteen years
of age or over, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months
preceding the election.” Literacy, property, or any other substantive requirement is not imposed.It is generally associated with the amending process of
the Constitution, more particularly, the ratification aspect.
SANTIAGO v. J. Davide The system of initiative on the Constitution under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution is not self-executory.—The conclusion then is inevitable
COMELEC that, indeed, the system of initiative on the Constitution under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution is not self-executory. Has Congress “provided”

3
 1997 for the implementation of the exercise of this right? Those who answer the question in the affirmative, like the private respondents and intervenor
Senator Roco, point to us R.A. No. 6735. There is, of course, no other better way for Congress to implement the exercise of the right than through the
passage of a statute or legislative act.

R.A. No. 6735; Statutory Construction; Under Section 2 of R.A. No. 6735, the people are not accorded the power to “directly propose, enact, approve or
reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution” through the system of initiative—they can only do so with respect to “laws, ordinances, or resolutions.”—
Contrary to the assertion of public respondent COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act does not suggest an initiative on amendments to the Constitution. The said
section reads: SECTION 2. Statement and Policy.—The power of the people under a system of initiative and referendum to directly propose, enact,
approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative body upon compliance with the
requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed. (Italics supplied) The inclusion of the word “Constitution” therein was a delayed
afterthought. That word is neither germane nor relevant to said section, which exclusively relates to initiative and referendum on national laws and local
laws, ordinances, and resolutions. That section is silent as to amendments on the Constitution. As pointed out earlier, initiative on the Constitution is
confined only to proposals to AMEND. The people are not accorded the power to “directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the
Constitution” through the system of initiative. They can only do so with respect to “laws, ordinances, or resolutions.”
OPLE v. TORRES J. PUNO National ID System requires a law not a mere administrative order.
1998 Prescinding from these precepts, we hold that A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate to be covered by an administrative order. x x x An
administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific aspects in the administrative operation of government. It must be in
harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy.
ANG NARS Joint Resolution No. 4, being a mere resolution, cannot amend or repeal a prior law such as RA 9173 or the Philippine Nursing
PARTYLIST v. Act. The same applies to EO 811 which is also not a law, but an executive directive.
EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY

2019
GALICTO vs. J. Brion Since the issuance of an Executive Order (EO) is not judicial, quasi-judicial or a mandatory act, a petition for certiorari and prohibition is an incorrect
AQUINO remedy; instead a petition for declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), is the proper recourse.

2012 There is no vested right in salary increase.

LEAGUE OF J. Carpio The enactment of the Cityhood Laws is an exercise by Congress of its legislative power. Legislative power is the authority, under the Constitution, to make
CITIES vs. laws, and to alter and repeal them. The Constitution, as the expression of the will of the people in their original, sovereign, and unlimited capacity, has
COMELEC vested this power in the Congress of the Philippines. The grant of legislative power to Congress is broad, general, and comprehensive. The legislative body
possesses plenary powers for all purposes of civil government. Any power, deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by
2008 Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it elsewhere. In fine, except as limited by the Constitution, either expressly or impliedly, legislative power
embraces all subjects, and extends to matters of general concern or common interest.

Without doubt, the LGC is a creation of Congress through its law-making powers. Congress has the power to alter or modify it as it did when it enacted
R.A. No. 9009. Such power of amendment of laws was again exercised when Congress enacted the Cityhood Laws. When Congress enacted the LGC in

4
 1991, it provided for quantifiable indicators of economic viability for the creation of local government units—income, population, and land area. Congress
deemed it fit to modify the income requirement with respect to the conversion of municipalities into component cities when it enacted R.A. No. 9009,
imposing an amount of P100 million, computed only from locally-generated sources. However, Congress deemed it wiser to exempt respondent
municipalities from such a belatedly imposed modified income requirement in order to uphold its higher calling of putting flesh and blood to the very
intent and thrust of the LGC, which is countryside development and autonomy, especially accounting for these municipalities as engines for economic
growth in their respective provinces. Undeniably, R.A. No. 9009 amended the LGC. But it is also true that, in effect, the Cityhood Laws amended R.A. No.
9009 through the exemption clauses found therein. Since the Cityhood Laws explicitly exempted the concerned municipalities from the amendatory R.A.
No. 9009, such Cityhood Laws are, therefore, also amendments to the LGC itself. For this reason, we reverse the November 18, 2008 Decision and the
August 24, 2010 Resolution on their strained and stringent view that the Cityhood Laws, particularly their exemption clauses, are not found in the LGC.

Only congress can amend a law.

SILVERIO vs. J. Corona The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification; A change of name is a privilege, not a right.
REPUBLIC
Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He intended to make his first name compatible with the sex he
2007 thought he transformed himself into through surgery. However, a change of name does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil status. RA 9048 does not
sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s first name for his declared
purpose may only create grave complications in the civil registry and the public interest. Before a person can legally change his given name, he must
present proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change. In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his
true and official name. In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name.

petition in the trial court in so far as it prays for change of first name is not within that court’s primary jurisdiction as the petition should be filed with the
local civil registrar concerned, namely, where the birth certificate is kept.

No law allows the change of entry in the birth certificate as to sex on the ground of sex reassignment; Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry
involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error—it is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court.
NOGRALES vs. J. Carandang Comelec resolution: Implement the lae 6 months after the conduct of May 2019 elections.
COMELEC
if We were to follow COMELEC's interpretation, an incongruity would result as the winning candidate in COMELEC's special elections would serve a
2019 term less than that provided for in Section 7, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

TOLEDO vs. J. Purisima In upholding the validity of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 27, this Court declared that the limitation provided by the said Circular on permissible
COMELEC extensions of service after reaching the compulsory retirement age of sixty-five has a reasonable relationship with or is germane to the purpose of civil
service laws on retirement. And as reiterated in the said case, the policy considerations behind the limitation on the maximum extension of service
1999 allowable for compulsory retirees, as summarized in the dissenting opinion of Justice Griño-Aquino in the case of Cena, were as follows: “x x x extending
the service of compulsory retirees longer than one (1) year would: (1) Give a premium to late-comers in the government service and in effect discriminate
against those who enter the service at a younger age (2) Delay the promotion of the latter and of next-in-rank employees; and (3) Prejudice the chances
for employment of qualified young civil service applicants who have already passed the various governmental examinations but must wait for jobs to be
5
 vacated by ‘extendees’ who have long passed the mandatory retirement age but are enjoying extension of their government service to complete 15 years
so they may qualify for old age pension.” Thus, the one-year limitation on the extension of service of a government employee who has reached the
compulsory retirement age of sixty-five imposed under Memorandum Circular No. 27 was held valid and reasonable.
ONG vs. ALEGRE J. Garcia For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to apply, two conditions or requisites must concur, to wit: (1) that the official concerned has
been elected for three (3) consecutive terms in the same local government post, and (2) that he has fully served three (3) consecutive terms.
2006
There can be no dispute about petitioner Francis Ong having been duly elected mayor of that municipality in the May 1995 and again in the May 2001
elections and serving the July 1, 1995-June 30, 1998 and the July 1, 2001-June 30, 2004 terms in full. The herein controversy revolves around the 1998-
2001 mayoral term, albeit there can also be no quibbling that Francis ran for mayor of the same municipality in the May 1998 elections and actually served
the 1998-2001 mayoral term by virtue of a proclamation initially declaring him mayor-elect of the municipality of San Vicente. The question that begs to
be addressed, therefore, is whether or not Francis’s assumption of office as Mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte from July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001,
may be considered as one full term service in the context of the consecutive three-term limit rule. We hold that such assumption of office constitutes, for
Francis, “service for the full term,” and should be counted as a full term served incontemplation of the three-term limit prescribed by the constitutional
and statutory provisions, barring local elective officials from being elected and serving for more than three consecutive term for the same position.

Petitioner Francis’ contention that he was only a presumptive winner in the 1998 mayoralty derby as his proclamation was under protest did not make him
less than a duly elected mayor.—It is true that the RTC-Daet, Camarines Norte ruled in Election Protest Case No. 6850, that it was Francis’ opponent
(Alegre) who “won” in the 1998 mayoralty race and, therefore, was the legally elected mayor of San Vicente. However, that disposition, it must be
stressed, was without practical and legal use and value, having been promulgated after the term of the contested office has expired. Petitioner Francis’
contention that he was only a presumptive winner in the 1998 mayoralty derby as his proclamation was under protest did not make him less than a duly
elected mayor. His proclamation by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of San Vicente as the duly elected mayor in the 1998 mayoralty election coupled by
his assumption of office and his continuous exercise of the functions thereof from start to finish of the term, should legally be taken as service for a full
term in contemplation of the three-term rule.
LATASA vs. J. Azcuna It cannot be denied that the Court has previously held in Mamba-Perez v. COMELEC that after an elective official has been proclaimed as winner of the
COMELEC elections, the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to pass upon his qualifications. An opposing party’s remedies after proclamation would be to file a petition for
quo warranto within ten days after the proclamation. On the other hand, certain peculiarities in the present case reveal the fact that its very heart is
2003 something which this Court considers of paramount interest. This Court notes from the very beginning that petitioner himself was already entertaining
some doubt as to whether or not he is indeed eligible to run for city mayor in the May 14, 2001 elections.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The spirit embodied in a Constitutional provision must not be attenuated by a rigid application of procedural rules.—Time and
again, this Court has held that rules of procedure are only tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, such that when rigid application of the
rules tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, this Court is empowered to suspend their operation. We will not hesitate to set aside
technicalities in favor of what is fair and just. The spirit embodied in a Constitutional provision must not be attenuated by a rigid application of procedural
rules.

An examination of the historical background of Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution on term limits reveals that the members of the Constitutional
Commission were as much concerned with preserving the freedom of choice of the people as they were with preventing the monopolization of political
power.—As a rule, in a representative democracy, the people should be allowed freely to choose those who will govern them. Article X, Section 8 of the
Constitution is an exception to this rule, in that it limits the range of choice of the people. Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except
6
 such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. An examination of the historical background of the subject
Constitutional provision reveals that the members of the Constitutional Commission were as much concerned with preserving the freedom of choice of
the people as they were with preventing the monopolization of political power. In fact, they rejected a proposal set forth by Commissioner Edmundo
Garcia that after serving three consecutive terms or nine years, there should be no further reelection for local and legislative officials. The members,
instead, adopted the alternative proposal of Commissioner Christian Monsod that such officials be simply barred from running for the same position in the
succeeding election following the expiration of the third consecutive term

An elective local official, therefore, is not barred from running again in for same local government post, unless two conditions concur: 1.) that the official
concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms to the same local government post, and 2.) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
MARCOS vs. J. Kapunan For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar criteria of political laws. As these concepts have evolved in our
COMELEC election law, what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election purposes is used synonymously with domicile Romualdez-

1995 It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied
the constitution’s residency qualification requirement. The said statement becomes material only when there is or appears to be a deliberate attempt to
mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It would be plainly ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately and
knowingly make a statement in a certificate of candidacy which would lead to his or her disqualification.
ONGSIAKO REYES J. Perez It may need pointing out that there is no conflict between the COMELEC and the HRET insofar as the petitioner’s being a Representative of Marinduque is
vs. COMELEC concerned. The COMELEC covers the matter of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy, and its due course or its cancellation, which are the pivotal conclusions
that determines who can be legally proclaimed. The matter can go to the Supreme Court but not as a continuation of the proceedings in the COMELEC,
2013 which has in fact ended, but on an original action before the Court grounded on more than mere error of judgment but on error of jurisdiction for grave
abuse of discretion. At and after the COMELEC En Banc decision, there is no longer any certificate cancellation matter than can go to the HRET.

House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET); The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) jurisdiction over the qualification of the
Member of the House of Representatives is original and exclusive, and as such, proceeds de novo unhampered by the proceedings in the COMELEC which,
as just stated has been terminated. The HRET proceedings is a regular, not summary, proceeding.―The HRET’s constitutional authority opens, over the
qualification of its MEMBER, who becomes so only upon a duly and legally based proclamation, the first and unavoidable step towards such membership.
The HRET jurisdiction over the qualification of the Member of the House of Representatives is original and exclusive, and as such, proceeds de novo
unhampered by the proceedings in the COMELEC which, as just stated has been terminated. The HRET proceedings is a regular, not summary, proceeding.
It will determine who should be the Member of the House. It must be made clear though, at the risk of repetitiveness, that no hiatus occurs in the
representation of Marinduque in the House because there is such a representative who shall sit as the HRET proceedings are had till termination. Such
representative is the duly proclaimed winner resulting from the terminated case of cancellation of certificate of candidacy of petitioner. The petitioner is
not, cannot, be that representative. And this, all in all, is the crux of the dispute between the parties: who shall sit in the House in representation of
Marinduque, while there is yet no HRET decision on the qualifications of the Member.
ATONG PALAUM J. Carpio What the framers intended, and what they expressly wrote in Section 5(1), could not be any clearer: the party-list system is composed of three different
vs. COMELEC groups, and the sectoral parties belong to only one of the three groups. The text of Section 5(1) leaves no room for any doubt that national and regional
parties are separate from sectoral parties. Thus, the party-list system is composed of three different groups: (1) national parties or organizations; (2)

7
 2013 regional parties or organizations; and (3) sectoral parties or organizations. National and regional parties or organizations are different from sectoral
parties or organizations. National and regional parties or organizations need not be organized along sectoral lines and need not represent any particular
sector.

“Political Party” and “Sectoral Party,” Distinguished.—Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7941 defines a “party” as “either a political party or a sectoral party or a
coalition of parties.” Clearly, a political party is different from a sectoral party. Section 3(c) of R.A. No. 7941 further provides that a “political party refers to
an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government.” On the other hand,
Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that a “sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section
5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector.” R.A. No. 7941 provides different definitions for a political
and a sectoral party. Obviously, they are separate and distinct from each other.

R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or organizations to represent the “marginalized and underrepresented” sectors. To require all
national and regional parties under the party-list system to represent the “marginalized and underrepresented” is to deprive and exclude, by judicial fiat,
ideology-based and cause-oriented parties from the party-list system. How will these ideology-based and cause-oriented parties, who cannot win in
legislative district elections, participate in the electoral process if they are excluded from the party-list system? To exclude them from the party-list system
is to prevent them from joining the parliamentary struggle, leaving as their only option the armed struggle. To exclude them from the party-list system is,
apart from being obviously senseless, patently contrary to the clear intent and express wording of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941. Under the
party-list system, an ideology-based or cause-oriented political party is clearly different from a sectoral party. A political party need not be organized as a
sectoral party and need not represent any particular sector. There is no requirement in R.A. No. 7941 that a national or regional political party must
represent a “marginalized and underrepresented” sector. It is sufficient that the political party consists of citizens who advocate the same ideology or
platform, or the same governance principles and policies, regardless of their economic status as citizens.
ANG LADLAD vs. J. Del Castillo It was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the
COMELEC exclusion of Ang Ladlad.—Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that “[n]o law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is “government neutrality in religious matters.” Clearly,
2010 “governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.” We thus find that it was grave violation of the non-
establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad.

Moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the party-list system.—
We hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the party-
list system. The denial of Ang Ladlad’s registration on purely moral grounds amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals,
rather than a tool to further any substantial public interest. Respondent’s blanket justifications give rise to the inevitable conclusion that the COMELEC
targets homosexuals themselves as a class, not because of any particular morally reprehensible act. It is this selective targeting that implicates our equal
protection clause.

From the standpoint of the political process, the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender have the same interest in participating in the party-list system on
the same basis as other political parties similarly situated. State intrusion in this case is equally burdensome. Hence, laws of general application should
apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-represented
sectors.
8
BAGABUYO vs. J. Brion Municipal Corporations; Congressional Districts; Definition of Legislative Apportionment and Reapportionment.—Legislative apportionment is defined by
COMELEC Black’s Law Dictionary as the determination of the number of representatives which a State, county or other subdivision may send to a legislative body. It
is the allocation of seats in a legislative body in proportion to the population; the drawing of voting district lines so as to equalize population and voting
2008 power among the districts. Reapportionment, on the other hand, is the realignment or change in legislative districts brought about by changes in
population and mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality of representation.

The Constitution and the Local Government Code expressly require a plebiscite to carry out any creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of
boundary of a local government unit; No plebiscite requirement exists under the apportionment or reapportionment provision.—A pronounced distinction
between Article VI, Section 5 and, Article X, Section 10 is on the requirement of a plebiscite. The Constitution and the Local Government Code expressly
require a plebiscite to carry out any creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundary of a local government unit. In contrast, no plebiscite
requirement exists under the apportionment or reapportionment provision. In Tobias v. Abalos, 239 SCRA 106 (1994), a case that arose from the division
of the congressional district formerly covering San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate districts, we confirmed this distinction and the fact that no
plebiscite is needed in a legislative reapportionment. The plebiscite issue came up because one was ordered and held for Mandaluyong in the course of its
conversion into a highly urbanized city, while none was held for San Juan. In explaining why this happened, the Court ruled that no plebiscite was
necessary for San Juan because the objective of the plebiscite was the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city as required by Article X,
Section 10 the Local Government Code; the creation of a new legislative district only followed as a consequence. In other words, the apportionment alone
and by itself did not call for a plebiscite, so that none was needed for San Juan where only a reapportionment took place.
UMALIS vs. J. Velasco The power to create, divide, merge, abolish or substantially alter boundaries of provinces, cities, municipalities or barangays, which is pertinent in the case
COMELEC at bar, is essentially legislative in nature. The framers of the Constitution have, however, allowed for the delegation of such power in Sec. 10, Art. X of the
Constitution as long as (1) the criteria prescribed in the LGC is met and (2) the creation, division, merger, abolition or the substantial alteration of the
2014 boundaries is subject to the approval by a majority vote in a plebiscite.

It shall be the duty of the President to declare a city as highly urbanized within thirty (30) days after it shall have met the minimum requirements
prescribed in the immediately preceding Section, upon proper application therefor and ratification in a plebiscite by the qualified voters therein. In this
case, the provision merely authorized the President to make a determination on whether or not the requirements under Sec. 452 of the LGC are complied
with. The provision makes it ministerial for the President, upon proper application, to declare a component city as highly urbanized once the minimum
requirements, which are based on certifiable and measurable indices under Sec. 452, are satisfied. The mandatory language “shall” used in the provision
leaves the President with no room for discretion.

The Supreme Court rules that conversion to a Highly Urbanized City (HUC) is substantial alternation of boundaries governed by Sec. 10, Art. X of the
Constitution and resultantly, said provision applies, governs and prevails over Sec. 453 of the Local Government Code (LGC).—Verily, the upward
conversion of a component city, in this case Cabanatuan City, into an HUC will come at a steep price. It can be gleaned from the above-cited rule that the
province will inevitably suffer a corresponding decrease in territory brought about by Cabanatuan City’s gain of independence. With the city’s newfound
autonomy, it will be free from the oversight powers of the province, which, in effect, reduces the territorial jurisdiction of the latter. What once formed
part of Nueva Ecija will no longer be subject to supervision by the province. In more concrete terms, Nueva Ecija stands to lose 282.75 sq. km. of its
territorial jurisdiction with Cabanatuan City’s severance from its mother province. This is equivalent to carving out almost 5% of Nueva Ecija’s 5,751.3 sq.
km. area. This sufficiently satisfies the requirement that the alteration be “substantial.” Needless to stress, the alteration of boundaries would necessarily
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 follow Cabanatuan City’s conversion in the same way that creations, divisions, mergers, and abolitions generally cannot take place without entailing the
alteration. The enumerated acts, after all, are not mutually exclusive, and more often than not, a combination of these acts attends the reconfiguration of
LGUs. In light of the foregoing disquisitions, the Court rules that conversion to an HUC is substantial alternation of boundaries governed by Sec. 10, Art. X
and resultantly, said provision applies, governs and prevails over Sec. 453 of the LGC.

The issue on who will vote in a plebiscite involving a conversion into an HUC is a novel issue, and this is the first time that the Court is asked to resolve the
question. As such, the past plebiscites in the aforementioned cities have no materiality or relevance to the instant petition. Suffice it to say that conversion
of said cities prior to this judicial declaration will not be affected or prejudiced in any manner following the operative fact doctrine—that “the actual
existence of a statute prior to such a determination is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot always be erased by a new judicial
declaration.”

In identifying the LGU or LGUs that should be allowed to take part in the plebiscite, what should primarily be determined is whether or not the unit or
units that desire to participate will be “directly affected” by the change. To interpret the phrase, Tan v. COMELEC, 142 SCRA 727 (1986) and Padilla v.
COMELEC, 214 SCRA 735 (1992) are worth revisiting. We have ruled in Tan, involving the division of Negros Occidental for the creation of the new province
of Negros del Norte, that the LGUs whose boundaries are to be altered and whose economy would be affected are entitled to participate in the plebiscite.
ALDABA vs. J. Carpio A city whose population has increased to 250,000 is entitled to have a legislative district only in the “immediately following election” after the attainment
COMELEC of the 250,000 population.—The Certification of Regional Director Miranda, which is based on demographic projections, is without legal effect because
Regional Director Miranda has no basis and no authority to issue the Certification. The Certification is also void on its face because based on its own
2010 growth rate assumption, the population of Malolos will be less than 250,000 in the year 2010. In addition, intercensal demographic projections cannot be
made for the entire year. In any event, a city whose population has increased to 250,000 is entitled to have a legislative district only in the “immediately
following election” after the attainment of the 250,000 population.

National Statistics Coordination Board (NSCB); Certifications on demographic projection can be issued only if such projections are declared official by the
National Statistics Coordination Board (NSCB).—First, certifications on demographic projections can be issued only if such projections are declared official
by the National Statistics Coordination Board (NSCB). Second, certifications based on demographic projections can be issued only by the NSO
Administrator or his designated certifying officer. Third, intercensal population projections must be as of the middle of every year.

Any population projection forming the basis for the creation of a legislative district must be based on an official and credible source. That is why the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG) cited Executive Order No. 135 (The Guidelines on the Issuance of Certification of Population Sizes), otherwise the population
projection would be unreliable or speculative.—Executive Order No. 135 cannot simply be brushed aside. The OSG, representing respondent Commission
on Elections, invoked Executive Order No. 135 in its Comment, thus: Here, based on the NSO projection, “the population of the Municipality of Malolos
will be 254,030 by the year 2010 using the population growth rate of 3.78 between 1995-2000.” This projection issued by the authority of the NSO
Administrator is recognized under Executive Order No. 135 (The Guidelines on the Issuance of Certification of Population Sizes), which states: x x x (d)
Certification of population size based on projections may specify the range within which the true count is deemed likely to fall. The range will correspond
to the official low and high population projections. x x x (f) Certifications of population size based on published census results shall be issued by the
Provincial Census Officers or by the Regional Census Officers. Certifications based on projections or estimates, however, will be issued by the NSO
Administrator or his designated certifying officer.” (Emphasis supplied) Any population projection forming the basis for the creation of a legislative district
must be based on an official and credible source. That is why the OSG cited Executive Order No. 135, otherwise the population projection would be
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 unreliable or speculative.
A city must first attain the 250,000 population, and thereafter, in the immediately following election, such city shall have a district representative.—A city
that has attained a population of 250,000 is entitled to a legislative district only in the “immediately following election.” In short, a city must first attain the
250,000 population, and thereafter, in the immediately following election, such city shall have a district representative. There is no showing in the present
case that the City of Malolos has attained or will attain a population of 250,000, whether actual or projected, before the 10 May 2010 elections.
TAN vs. COMELEC J. Alampay A plebiscite for creating a new province should include the participation of the residents of the mother province for the plebiscite to conform to the
constitutional requirements.—We find no way to reconcile the holding of a plebiscite that should conform to said constitutional requirement but
1986 eliminates the participation of either of these two component political units. No amount of rhetorical flourishes can justify exclusion of the parent
province in the plebiscite because of an alleged intent on the part of the authors and implementors of the challenged statute to carry out what is claimed
to be a mandate to guarantee and promote autonomy of local government units. The alleged good intentions cannot prevail and overrule the cardinal
precept that what our Constitution categorically directs to be done or imposes as a requirement must first be observed, respected and complied with. No
one should be allowed to pay homage to a supposed fundamental policy intended to guarantee and promote autonomy of local government units but at
the same time transgress, ignore and disregard what the Constitution commands in Article XI Section 3 thereof. Respondents would be no different from
one who hurries to pray at the temple but then spits at the idol therein.

When the law says the “plebiscite shall be conducted in the areas affected” this means that residents of the political entity who stand to be economically
dislocated by the separation of a portion thereof have the right to participate in said plebiscite.—It is a well accepted rule that “in ascertaining the
meaning of a particular provision that may give rise to doubts, the intent of the framers and of the people, may be gleaned from the provisions in pari
materia.” Parliamentary Bill No. 3644 which proposed the creation of the new province of Negros del Norte recites in Sec. 4 thereof that “the plebiscite
shall be conducted in the areas affected within a period of one hundred and twenty days from the approval of this Act.” As this draft legislation speaks of
“areas,” what was contemplated evidently are plurality of areas to participate in the plebiscite. Logically, those to be included in such plebiscite would be
the people living in the area of the proposed new province and those living in the parent province. This assumption will be consistent with the
requirements set forth in the Constitution.

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