EN BANC

July 12, 2016

A.C. No. 11316

PATRICK A. CARONAN, Complainant
vs.
RICHARD A. CARONAN a.k.a. "ATTY. PATRICK A. CARONAN," Respondent

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

For the Court's resolution is the Complaint-Affidavit  filed by complainant Patrick A. Caronan (complainant),
1

before the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), against
respondent "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan," whose real name is allegedly Richard A. Caronan (respondent), for
purportedly assuming complainant's identity and falsely representing that the former has the required
educational qualifications to take the Bar Examinations and be admitted to the practice of law.

The Facts

Complainant and respondent are siblings born to Porferio  R. Caronan, Jr. and Norma A. Caronan. Respondent
2

is the older of the two, having been born on February 7, 1975, while complainant was born on August 5,
1976.  Both of them completed their secondary education at the Makati High School where complainant
3

graduated in 1993  and respondent in 1991.  Upon his graduation, complainant enrolled at the University of
4 5

Makati where he obtained a degree in Business Administration in 1997.  He started working thereafter as a
6

Sales Associate for Philippine Seven Corporation (PSC), the operator of 7-11 Convenience Stores.  In 2001, he
7

married Myrna G. Tagpis with whom he has two (2) daughters.  Through the years, complainant rose from the
8

ranks until, in 2009, he was promoted as a Store Manager of the 7-11 Store in Muntinlupa. 9

Meanwhile, upon graduating from high school, respondent enrolled at the Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng
Maynila (PLM), where he stayed for one (1) year before transferring to the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) in
1992.  In 1993, he was discharged from the PMA and focused on helping their father in the family's car rental
10

business. In 1997, he moved to Nueva Vizcaya with his wife, Rosana, and their three (3) children.  Since then,
11

respondent never went back to school to earn a college degree. 12

In 1999, during a visit to his family in Metro Manila, respondent told complainant that the former had enrolled in a
law school in Nueva Vizcaya. 13

Subsequently, in 2004, their mother informed complainant that respondent passed the Bar Examinations and
that he used complainant's name and college records from the University of Makati to enroll at St. Mary's
University's College of Law in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya and take the Bar Examinations.  Complainant
14

brushed these aside as he did not anticipate any adverse consequences to him. 15

In 2006, complainant was able to confirm respondent's use of his name and identity when he saw the name
"Patrick A. Caronan" on the Certificate of Admission to the Bar displayed at the latter's office in Taguig
City.  Nevertheless, complainant did not confront respondent about it since he was pre-occupied with his job and
16

had a family to support.17

Sometime in May 2009, however, after his promotion as Store Manager, complainant was ordered to report to
the head office of PSC in Mandaluyong City where, upon arrival, he was informed that the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) was requesting his presence at its office in Taft Avenue, Manila, in relation to an investigation
involving respondent who, at that point, was using the name "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan."  Accordingly, on May 18,
18

2009, complainant appeared before the Anti-Fraud and Computer Crimes Division of the NBI where he was
interviewed and asked to identify documents including: (1) his and respondent's high school records; (2) his
transcript of records from the University of Makati; (3) Land Transportation Office's records showing his and
respondent's driver's licenses; (4) records from St. Mary's University showing that complainant's transcript of
records from the University of Makati and his Birth Certificate were submitted to St. Mary's University's College
of Law; and (5) Alumni Book of St. Mary's University showing respondent's photograph under the name "Patrick
A. Caronan."  Complainant later learned that the reason why he was invited by the NBI was because of
19

respondent's involvement in a case for qualified theft and estafa filed by Mr. Joseph G. Agtarap (Agtarap), who
was one of the principal sponsors at respondent's wedding. 20

Realizing that respondent had been using his name to perpetrate crimes and commit unlawful activities,
complainant took it upon himself to inform other people that he is the real "Patrick A. Caronan" and that
respondent's real name is Richard A. Caronan.  However, problems relating to respondent's use of the name
21

"Atty. Patrick A. Caronan" continued to hound him. In July 2013, PSC received a letter from Quasha Ancheta
Peña & Nolasco Law Offices requesting that they be furnished with complainant's contact details or, in the
alternative, schedule a meeting with him to discuss certain matters concerning respondent.  On the other hand, 22

a fellow church-member had also told him that respondent who, using the name "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan,"
almost victimized his (church-member's) relatives.  Complainant also received a phone call from a certain Mrs.
23

Loyda L. Reyes (Reyes), who narrated how respondent tricked her into believing that he was authorized to sell a
parcel of land in Taguig City when in fact, he was not.  Further, he learned that respondent was arrested for
24

gun-running activities, illegal possession of explosives, and violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 22. 25

Due to the controversies involving respondent's use of the name "Patrick A. Caronan," complainant developed a
fear for his own safety and security.  He also became the subject of conversations among his colleagues, which
26

eventually forced him to resign from his job at PSC.  Hence, complainant filed the present Complaint-Affidavit to
27

stop respondent's alleged use of the former's name and identity, and illegal practice of law. 28

In his Answer,  respondent denied all the allegations against him and invoked res judicata as a defense. He
29

maintained that his identity can no longer be raised as an issue as it had already been resolved in CBD Case
No. 09-2362 where the IBP Board of Governors dismissed  the administrative case  filed by Agtarap against
30 31

him, and which case had already been declared closed and terminated by this Court in A.C. No.
10074.  Moreover, according to him, complainant is being used by Reyes and her spouse, Brigadier General
32

Joselito M. Reyes, to humiliate, disgrace, malign, discredit, and harass him because he filed several
administrative and criminal complaints against them before the Ombudsman. 33

On March 9, 2015, the IBP-CBD conducted the scheduled mandatory conference where both parties failed to
appear.  Instead, respondent moved to reset the same on April 20, 2015.  On such date, however, both paiiies
34 35

again failed to appear, thereby prompting the IBP-CBD to issue an Order  directing them to file their respective
36

position papers. However, neither of the parties submitted any. 37

The IBP's Report and Recommendation

On June 15, 2015, IBP Investigating Commissioner Jose Villanueva Cabrera (Investigating Commissioner)
issued his Report and Recommendation,  finding respondent guilty of illegally and falsely assuming
38

complainant's name, identity, and academic records.  He observed that respondent failed to controvert all the
39

allegations against him and did not present any proof to prove his identity.  On the other hand, complainant
40

presented clear and overwhelming evidence that he is the real "Patrick A. Caronan." 41

Further, he noted that respondent admitted that he and complainant are siblings when he disclosed upon his
arrest on August 31, 2012 that: (a) his parents are Porferio Ramos Caronan and Norma Atillo; and (b) he is
married to Rosana Halili-Caronan.  However, based on the Marriage Certificate issued by the National Statistics
42

Office (NSO), "Patrick A. Caronan" is married to a certain "Myrna G. Tagpis," not to Rosana Halili-Caronan. 43

The Investigating Commissioner also drew attention to the fact that the photograph taken of respondent when he
was arrested as "Richard A. Caronan" on August 16, 2012 shows the same person as the one in the photograph
in the IBP records of "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan."  These, according to the Investigating Commissioner, show that
44

respondent indeed assumed complainant's identity to study law and take the Bar Examinations.  Since 45

respondent falsely assumed the name, identity, and academic records of complainant and the real "Patrick A.
Caronan" neither obtained the bachelor of laws degree nor took the Bar Exams, the Investigating Commissioner
recommended that the name "Patrick A. Caronan" with Roll of Attorneys No. 49069 be dropped and stricken off
the Roll of Attorneys.  He also recommended that respondent and the name "Richard A. Caronan" be barred
46

from being admitted as a member of the Bar; and finally, for making a mockery of the judicial institution, the IBP
was directed to institute appropriate actions against respondent. 47

On June 30, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XXI-2015-607,  adopting the Investigating
48

Commissioner's recommendation.

The Issues Before the Court

The issues in this case are whether or not the IBP erred in ordering that: (a) the name "Patrick A. Caronan" be
stricken off the Roll of Attorneys; and (b) the name "Richard A. Caronan" be barred from being admitted to the
Bar.

The Court's Ruling

After a thorough evaluation of the records, the Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the findings and
recommendations of the IBP.

As correctly observed by the IBP, complainant has established by clear and overwhelming evidence that he is
the real "Patrick A. Caronan" and that respondent, whose real name is Richard A. Caronan, merely assumed the
latter's name, identity, and academic records to enroll at the St. Mary's University's College of Law, obtain a law
degree, and take the Bar Examinations.

As pointed out by the IBP, respondent admitted that he and complainant are siblings when he disclosed upon his
arrest on August 31, 2012 that his parents are Porferio Ramos Caronan and Norma Atillo.  Respondent himself
49

also stated that he is married to Rosana Halili-Caronan.  This diverges from the official NSO records showing
50

that "Patrick A. Caronan" is married to Myrna G. Tagpis, not to Rosana Halili-Caronan.  Moreover, the
51

photograph taken of respondent when he was arrested as "Richard A. Caronan" on August 16, 2012 shows the
same person as the one in the photograph in the IBP records of "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan."  Meanwhile, 52

complainant submitted numerous documents showing that he is the real "Patrick A. Caronan," among which
are: (a) his transcript of records from the University of Makati bearing his photograph;  (b) a copy of his high
53

school yearbook with his photograph and the name "Patrick A. Caronan" under it;  and (c) NBI clearances
54

obtained in 2010 and 2013. 55

To the Court's mind, the foregoing indubitably confirm that respondent falsely used complainant's name, identity,
and school records to gain admission to the Bar. Since complainant - the real "Patrick A. Caronan" - never took
the Bar Examinations, the IBP correctly recommended that the name "Patrick A. Caronan" be stricken off the
Roll of Attorneys.

The IBP was also correct in ordering that respondent, whose real name is "Richard A. Caronan," be barred from
admission to the Bar. Under Section 6, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, no applicant for admission to the Bar
Examination shall be admitted unless he had pursued and satisfactorily completed a pre-law course, VIZ.:

Section 6. Pre-Law. - No applicant for admission to the bar examination shall be admitted unless he presents a
certificate that he has satisfied the Secretary of Education that, before he began the study of law, he had
pursued and satisfactorily completed in an authorized and recognized university or college, requiring for
admission thereto the completion of a four-year high school course, the course of study prescribed therein
for a bachelor's degree in arts or sciences with any of the following subject as major or field of concentration:
political science, logic, english, spanish, history, and economics. (Emphases supplied)

In the case at hand, respondent never completed his college degree. While he enrolled at the PLM in 1991, he
left a year later and entered the PMA where he was discharged in 1993 without graduating.  Clearly, respondent
56

has not completed the requisite pre-law degree.

The Court does not discount the possibility that respondent may later on complete his college education and
earn a law degree under his real name.  However, his false assumption of his brother's name, identity, and
1âwphi1

educational records renders him unfit for admission to the Bar. The practice of law, after all, is not a natural,
absolute or constitutional right to be granted to everyone who demands it.  Rather, it is a privilege limited to
57

citizens of good moral character.  In In the Matter of the Disqualification of Bar Examinee Haron S. Meling in
58

the 2002 Bar Examinations and for Disciplinary Action as Member of the Philippine Shari 'a Bar, Atty. Froilan R.
Melendrez, the Court explained the essence of good moral character:
59
Good moral character is what a person really is, as distinguished from good reputation or from the opinion
generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where he is known. Moral
character is not a subjective term but one which corresponds to objective reality. The standard of personal and
professional integrity is not satisfied by such conduct as it merely enables a person to escape the penalty of
criminal law. Good moral character includes at least common honesty.  (Emphasis supplied)
60

Here, respondent exhibited his dishonesty and utter lack of moral fitness to be a member of the Bar when he
assumed the name, identity, and school records of his own brother and dragged the latter into controversies
which eventually caused him to fear for his safety and to resign from PSC where he had been working for years.
Good moral character is essential in those who would be lawyers.  This is imperative in the nature of the office
61

of a lawyer, the trust relation which exists between him and his client, as well as between him and the court. 62

Finally, respondent made a mockery of the legal profession by pretending to have the necessary qualifications to
be a lawyer. He also tarnished the image of lawyers with his alleged unscrupulous activities, which resulted in
the filing of several criminal cases against him. Certainly, respondent and his acts do not have a place in the
legal profession where one of the primary duties of its members is to uphold its integrity and dignity.
63

WHEREFORE, respondent Richard A. Caronan a.k.a. "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan" (respondent) is

found GUILTY of falsely assuming the name, identity, and academic records of complainant Patrick A. Caronan
(complainant) to obtain a law degree and take the Bar Examinations. Accordingly, without prejudice to the filing
of appropriate civil and/or criminal cases, the Court hereby resolves that:

(1) the name "Patrick A. Caronan" with Roll of Attorneys No. 49069 is ordered DROPPED and STRICKEN
OFF the Roll of Attorneys;

(2) respondent is PROHIBITED from engaging in the practice of law or making any representations as a lawyer;

(3) respondent is BARRED from being admitted as a member of the Philippine Bar in the future;

(4) the Identification Cards issued by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to respondent under the name "Atty.
Patrick A. Caronan" and the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Certificates issued in such name
are CANCELLED and/or REVOKED; and

(5) the Office of the Court Administrator is ordered to CIRCULATE notices and POST in the bulletin boards of all
courts of the country a photograph of respondent with his real name, " Richard A. Caronan," with a warning that
he is not a member of the Philippine Bar and a statement of his false assumption of the name and identity of
"Patrick A. Caronan."

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
and the Office of the Court Administrator.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978

In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILION (IBP Administrative
Case No. MDD-1)

RESOLUTION

CASTRO, C.J.:

The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines.

On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governors unanimously
adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues
Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent
from its Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues" to the IBP since the latter's
constitution notwithstanding due notice.

On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said resolution to the
Court for consideration and approval, pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the By-Laws of the IBP,
which reads:

.... Should the delinquency further continue until the following June 29, the Board shall promptly
inquire into the cause or causes of the continued delinquency and take whatever action it shall
deem appropriate, including a recommendation to the Supreme Court for the removal of the
delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys. Notice of the action taken shall be sent by
registered mail to the member and to the Secretary of the Chapter concerned.

On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to comment on the resolution and letter adverted to
above; he submitted his comment on February 23, 1976, reiterating his refusal to pay the membership fees due
from him.

On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP Board of Governors to reply to Edillon's
comment: on March 24, 1976, they submitted a joint reply.

Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the hearing, the parties were required to submit
memoranda in amplification of their oral arguments. The matter was thenceforth submitted for resolution.

At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the respondent's pleadings would show that the propriety and
necessity of the integration of the Bar of the Philippines are in essence conceded. The respondent, however,
objects to particular features of Rule of Court 139-A (hereinafter referred to as the Court Rule)   — in accordance
1

with which the Bar of the Philippines was integrated — and to the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of
the IBP By-Laws (hereinabove cited).

The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the Supreme Court the removal of a delinquent
member's name from the Roll of Attorneys is found in par. 2 Section 24, Article Ill of the IBP By-Laws (supra),
whereas the authority of the Court to issue the order applied for is found in Section 10 of the Court Rule, which
reads:

SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule,
default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in
the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of
the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.
The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership in the IBP is stated in these words of the Court Rule:

SECTION 1. Organization. — There is hereby organized an official national body to be known as

the 'Integrated Bar of the Philippines,' composed of all persons whose names now appear or may
hereafter be included in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.

The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in the following words of the Court Rule:

SEC. 9. Membership dues. Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as
the Board of Governors shall determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. ...

The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional
rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good
standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this
compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being
deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent
concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and
effect.

The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys,
contending that the said matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but is rather of an
"administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body."

The case at bar is not the first one that has reached the Court relating to constitutional issues that inevitably and
inextricably come up to the surface whenever attempts are made to regulate the practice of law, define the
conditions of such practice, or revoke the license granted for the exercise of the legal profession.

The matters here complained of are the very same issues raised in a previous case before the Court, entitled
"Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matter of the Petition for the Integration of the Bar of the Philippines,
Roman Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners." The Court exhaustively considered all these matters in that case in its
Resolution ordaining the integration of the Bar of the Philippines, promulgated on January 9, 1973. The Court
there made the unanimous pronouncement that it was

... fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments adduced in
Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of factual data contained in the
exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar
is 'perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable'. ...

Be that as it may, we now restate briefly the posture of the Court.

An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar
associations organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the
Bar is essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his share in
carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or
under the direction of the State, an integrated Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are required to
be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the
requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and
adherence to a code of professional ethics or professional responsibility breach of which constitutes sufficient
reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or
disbarment of the offending member.  2

The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated by overriding considerations of public interest and
public welfare to such an extent as more than constitutionally and legally justifies the restrictions that integration
imposes upon the personal interests and personal convenience of individual lawyers.  3

Apropos to the above, it must be stressed that all legislation directing the integration of the Bar have been
uniformly and universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police power over an important profession. The
practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with public interest because a
lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and
to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State — the administration of justice —
as an officer of the court.   The practice of law being clothed with public interest, the holder of this privilege must
4
submit to a degree of control for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has created. As the U. S.
Supreme Court through Mr. Justice Roberts explained, the expression "affected with a public interest" is the
equivalent of "subject to the exercise of the police power" (Nebbia vs. New York, 291 U.S. 502).

When, therefore, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6397   authorizing the Supreme Court to "adopt rules of
5

court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit," it did so in the
exercise of the paramount police power of the State. The Act's avowal is to "raise the standards of the legal
profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more
effectively." Hence, the Congress in enacting such Act, the Court in ordaining the integration of the Bar through
its Resolution promulgated on January 9, 1973, and the President of the Philippines in decreeing the constitution
of the IBP into a body corporate through Presidential Decree No. 181 dated May 4, 1973, were prompted by
fundamental considerations of public welfare and motivated by a desire to meet the demands of pressing public
necessity.

The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with and regulate personal liberty, property and
occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to secure the general
prosperity and welfare of the State (U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil 218), for, as the Latin maxim goes, "Salus
populi est supreme lex." The public welfare is the supreme law. To this fundamental principle of government the
rights of individuals are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be
made to prevail over authority because then society win fall into anarchy (Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726). It
is an undoubted power of the State to restrain some individuals from all freedom, and all individuals from some
freedom.

But the most compelling argument sustaining the constitutionality and validity of Bar integration in the Philippines
is the explicit unequivocal grant of precise power to the Supreme Court by Section 5 (5) of Article X of the 1973
Constitution of the Philippines, which reads:

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxx xxx xxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and pro. procedure in all courts, and the
admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar ...,

and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397, which reads:

SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may adopt rules
of Court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit in
order to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and
enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively.

Quite apart from the above, let it be stated that even without the enabling Act (Republic Act No. 6397), and
looking solely to the language of the provision of the Constitution granting the Supreme Court the power "to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of
law," it at once becomes indubitable that this constitutional declaration vests the Supreme Court with plenary
power in all cases regarding the admission to and supervision of the practice of law.

Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his practice of law and his exercise of the
said profession, which affect the society at large, were (and are) subject to the power of the body politic to
require him to conform to such regulations as might be established by the proper authorities for the common
good, even to the extent of interfering with some of his liberties. If he did not wish to submit himself to such
reasonable interference and regulation, he should not have clothed the public with an interest in his concerns.

On this score alone, the case for the respondent must already fall.

The issues being of constitutional dimension, however, we now concisely deal with them seriatim.

1. The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court is without power to compel him to become a
member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the Court Rule is unconstitutional for it
impinges on his constitutional right of freedom to associate (and not to associate). Our answer is: To compel a
lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate.  6
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. He became a
member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations.   All that integration actually does is to provide an
7

official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is
a ready a member.  8

Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the
meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only
compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the
State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of
improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program —
the lawyers.9

Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar,
such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State.  10

2. The second issue posed by the respondent is that the provision of the Court Rule requiring payment of a
membership fee is void. We see nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional
power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the
Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) — which power the respondent acknowledges —
from requiring members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the
expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed
as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration.  11

3. The respondent further argues that the enforcement of the penalty provisions would amount to a deprivation
of property without due process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights. Whether the practice of
law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the holder of a license to practice a profession,
we do not here pause to consider at length, as it clear that under the police power of the State, and under the
necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondent's right to practise law before
the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose
the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may
be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary.  12

But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege,   and as such
13

must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer's public
responsibilities.

4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike the name of a lawyer from
its Roll of Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that the matters of admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and supervision have been and are indisputably recognized as
inherent judicial functions and responsibilities, and the authorities holding such are legion. 
14

In In Re Sparks (267 Ky. 93, 101 S.W. (2d) 194), in which the report of the Board of Bar Commissioners in a
disbarment proceeding was confirmed and disbarment ordered, the court, sustaining the Bar Integration Act of
Kentucky, said: "The power to regulate the conduct and qualifications of its officers does not depend upon
constitutional or statutory grounds. It is a power which is inherent in this court as a court — appropriate, indeed
necessary, to the proper administration of justice ... the argument that this is an arbitrary power which the court
is arrogating to itself or accepting from the legislative likewise misconceives the nature of the duty. It has
limitations no less real because they are inherent. It is an unpleasant task to sit in judgment upon a brother
member of the Bar, particularly where, as here, the facts are disputed. It is a grave responsibility, to be assumed
only with a determination to uphold the Ideals and traditions of an honorable profession and to protect the public
from overreaching and fraud. The very burden of the duty is itself a guaranty that the power will not be misused
or prostituted. ..."

The Court's jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1973 Constitution when it explicitly granted to the Court the
power to "Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice ... and the admission to the practice of law and the
integration of the Bar ... (Article X, Sec. 5(5) the power to pass upon the fitness of the respondent to remain a
member of the legal profession is indeed undoubtedly vested in the Court.

We thus reach the conclusion that the provisions of Rule of Court 139-A and of the By-Laws of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines complained of are neither unconstitutional nor illegal.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous sense of the Court that the respondent Marcial A.
Edillon should be as he is hereby disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys
of the Court.

Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Muñoz Palma, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Santos, Fernandez
and Guerrero, JJ., concur.

 
 RULE 138

Attorneys and Admission to Bar

Section 1. Who may practice law. — Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member of the bar, or hereafter
admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this rule, and who is in good and regular standing, is
entitled to practice law.

Section 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. — Every applicant for admission as a
member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral
character, and resident of the Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of
good moral character, and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending
in any court in the Philippines.

Section 3. Requirements for lawyers who are citizens of the United States of America. — Citizens of the United
States of America who, before July 4, 1946, were duly licensed members of the Philippine Bar, in active practice
in the courts of the Philippines and in good and regular standing as such may, upon satisfactory proof of those
facts before the Supreme Court, be allowed to continue such practice after taking the following oath of office:

I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., having been permitted to continue in the practice of law in the

Philippines, do solemnly swear that I recognize the supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines;
I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted
authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or
willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will
delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of may
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well as to the courts as to my clients; and I impose
upon myself this voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me
God.

Section 4. Requirements for applicants from other jurisdictions. — Applicants for admission who, being Filipino
citizens, are enrolled attorneys in good standing in the Supreme Court of the United States or in any circuit court
of appeals or district court therein, or in the highest court of any State or Territory of the United States, and who
can show by satisfactory certificates that they have practiced at least five years in any of said courts, that such
practice began before July 4, 1946, and that they have never been suspended or disbarred, may, in the
discretion of the Court, be admitted without examination.

Section 5. Additional requirements for other applicants. — All applicants for admission other than those referred
to in the two preceding section shall, before being admitted to the examination, satisfactorily show that they have
regularly studied law for four years, and successfully completed all prescribed courses, in a law school or
university, officially approved and recognized by the Secretary of Education. The affidavit of the candidate,
accompanied by a certificate from the university or school of law, shall be filed as evidence of such facts, and
further evidence may be required by the court.

No applicant shall be admitted to the bar examinations unless he has satisfactorily completed the following
courses in a law school or university duly recognized by the government: civil law, commercial law, remedial law,
criminal law, public and private international law, political law, labor and social legislation, medical jurisprudence,
taxation and legal ethics.

Section 6. Pre-Law. — No applicant for admission to the bar examination shall be admitted unless he presents
a certificate that he has satisfied the Secretary of Education that, before he began the study of law, he had
pursued and satisfactorily completed in an authorized and recognized university or college, requiring for
admission thereto the completion of a four-year high school course, the course of study prescribed therein for a
bachelor's degree in arts or sciences with any of the following subjects as major or field of concentration: political
science, logic, english, spanish, history and economics.

Section 7. Time for filing proof of qualifications. — All applicants for admission shall file with the clerk of the
Supreme Court the evidence required by section 2 of this rule at least fifteen (15) days before the beginning of
the examination. If not embraced within section 3 and 4 of this rule they shall also file within the same period the
affidavit and certificate required by section 5, and if embraced within sections 3 and 4 they shall exhibit a license
evidencing the fact of their admission to practice, satisfactory evidence that the same has not been revoked, and
certificates as to their professional standing. Applicants shall also file at the same time their own affidavits as to
their age, residence, and citizenship.

Section 8. Notice of Applications. — Notice of applications for admission shall be published by the clerk of the
Supreme Court in newspapers published in Pilipino, English and Spanish, for at least ten (10) days before the
beginning of the examination.

Section 9. Examination; subjects. — Applicants, not otherwise provided for in sections 3 and 4 of this rule, shall
be subjected to examinations in the following subjects: Civil Law; Labor and Social Legislation; Mercantile Law;
Criminal Law; Political Law (Constitutional Law, Public Corporations, and Public Officers); International Law
(Private and Public); Taxation; Remedial Law (Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, and Evidence); Legal Ethics
and Practical Exercises (in Pleadings and Conveyancing).

Section 10. Bar examination, by questions and answers, and in writing. — Persons taking the examination shall
not bring papers, books or notes into the examination rooms. The questions shall be the same for all examinees
and a copy thereof, in English or Spanish, shall be given to each examinee. Examinees shall answer the
questions personally without help from anyone.

Upon verified application made by an examinee stating that his penmanship is so poor that it will be difficult to
read his answers without much loss of time., the Supreme Court may allow such examinee to use a typewriter in
answering the questions. Only noiseless typewriters shall be allowed to be used.

The committee of bar examiner shall take such precautions as are necessary to prevent the substitution of
papers or commission of other frauds. Examinees shall not place their names on the examination papers. No
oral examination shall be given.

Section 11. Annual examination. — Examinations for admission to the bar of the Philippines shall take place
annually in the City of Manila. They shall be held in four days to be disignated by the chairman of the committee
on bar examiners. The subjects shall be distributed as follows: First day: Political and International Law
(morning) and Labor and Social Legislation (afternoon); Second day: Civil Law (morning) and Taxation
(afternoon); Third day: Mercantile Law (morning) and Criminal Law (afternoon); Fourth day: Remedial Law
(morning) and legal Ethics and Practical Exercises (afternoon).

Section 12. Committee of examiners. — Examinations shall be conducted by a committee of bar examiners to

be appointed by the Supreme Court. This committee shall be composed of a Justice of the Supreme Court, who
shall act as chairman, and who shall be designated by the court to serve for one year, and eight members of the
bar of the Philippines, who shall hold office for a period of one year. The names of the members of this
committee shall be published in each volume of the official reports.

Section 13. Disciplinary measures. — No candidate shall endeavor to influence any member of the committee,
and during examination the candidates shall not communicate with each other nor shall they give or receive any
assistance. The candidate who violates this provisions, or any other provision of this rule, shall be barred from
the examination, and the same to count as a failure against him, and further disciplinary action, including
permanent disqualification, may be taken in the discretion of the court.

Section 14. Passing average. — In order that a candidate may be deemed to have passed his examinations
successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 75 per cent in all subjects, without falling below 50 per
cent in any subjects. In determining the average, the subjects in the examination shall be given the following
relative weights: Civil Law, 15 per cent; Labor and Social Legislation, 10 per cent; Mercantile Law, 15 per cent;
Criminal Law; 10 per cent: Political and International Law, 15 per cent; Taxation, 10 per cent; Remedial Law, 20
per cent; Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises, 5 per cent.

Section 15. Report of the committee; filing of examination papers. — Not later than February 15th after the
examination, or as soon thereafter as may be practicable, the committee shall file its report on the result of such
examination. The examination papers and notes of the committee shall be filed with the clerk and may there be
examined by the parties in interest, after the court has approved the report.

Section 16. Failing candidates to take review course. — Candidates who have failed the bar examinations for
three times shall be disqualified from taking another examination unless they show the satisfaction of the court
that they have enrolled in and passed regular fourth year review classes as well as attended a pre-bar review
course in a recognized law school.

The professors of the individual review subjects attended by the candidates under this rule shall certify under
oath that the candidates have regularly attended classes and passed the subjects under the same conditions as
ordinary students and the ratings obtained by them in the particular subject.

Section 17. Admission and oath of successful applicants. — An applicant who has passed the required
examination, or has been otherwise found to be entitled to admission to the bar, shall take and subscribe before
the Supreme Court the corresponding oath of office.

Section 18. Certificate. — The supreme Court shall thereupon admit the applicant as a member of the bar for all
the courts of the Philippines, and shall direct an order to be entered to that effect upon its records, and that a
certificate of such record be given to him by the clerk of court, which certificate shall be his authority to practice.

Section 19. Attorney's roll. — The clerk of the Supreme Court shall kept a roll of all attorneys admitted to
practice, which roll shall be signed by the person admitted when he receives his certificate.

Section 20. Duties of attorneys. — It is the duty of an attorney:

(a) To maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to support the Constitution and obey the
laws of the Philippines.

(b) To observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers;

(c) To counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as appear to him to be just, and such
defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable under the law.

(d) To employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him, such means only as are
consistent with truth and honor, and never seek to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice
or false statement of fact or law;

(e) To maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets of his
client, and to accept no compensation in connection with his client's business except from him or with his
knowledge and approval;

(f) To abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation
of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged;

(g) Not to encourage either the commencement or the continuance of an action or proceeding, or delay
any man's cause, from any corrupt motive or interest;

(h) Never to reject, for any consideration personal to himself, the cause of the defenseless or oppressed;

(i) In the defense of a person accused of crime, by all fair and honorable means, regardless of his
personal opinion as to the guilt of the accused, to present every defense that the law permits, to the end
that no person may be deprived of life or liberty, but by due process of law.

Section 21. Authority of attorney to appear. — an attorney is presumed to be properly authorized to represent

any cause in which he appears, and no written power of attorney is required to authorize him to appear in court
for his client, but the presiding judge may, on motion of either party and on reasonable grounds therefor being
shown, require any attorney who assumes the right to appear in a case to produce or prove the authority under
which he appears, and to disclose, whenever pertinent to any issue, the name of the person who employed him,
and may thereupon make such order as justice requires. An attorneys wilfully appear in court for a person
without being employed, unless by leave of the court, may be punished for contempt as an officer of the court
who has misbehaved in his official transactions.

Section 22. Attorney who appears in lower court presumed to represent client on appeal. — An attorney who
appears de parte in a case before a lower court shall be presumed to continue representing his client on appeal,
unless he files a formal petition withdrawing his appearance in the appellate court.
Section 23. Authority of attorneys to bind clients. — Attorneys have authority to bind their clients in any case by
any agreement in relation thereto made in writing, and in taking appeals, and in all matters of ordinary judicial
procedure. But they cannot, without special authority, compromise their client's litigation, or receive anything in
discharge of a client's claim but the full amount in cash.

Section 24. Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees. — An attorney shall be entitled to have and
recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services, with a view to the importance
of the subject matter of the controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the professional standing of the
attorney. No court shall be bound by the opinion of attorneys as expert witnesses as to the proper
compensation, but may disregard such testimony and base its conclusion on its own professional knowledge. A
written contract for services shall control the amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court to be
unconscionable or unreasonable.

Section 25. Unlawful retention of client's funds; contempt. — When an attorney unjustly retains in his hands
money of his client after it has been demanded, he may be punished for contempt as an officer of the Court who
has misbehaved in his official transactions; but proceedings under this section shall not be a bar to a criminal
prosecution.

Section 26. Change of attorneys. — An attorney may retire at any time from any action or special proceeding,
by the written consent of his client filed in court. He may also retire at any time from an action or special
proceeding, without the consent of his client, should the court, on notice to the client and attorney, and on
hearing, determine that he ought to be allowed to retire. In case of substitution, the name of the attorney newly
employed shall be entered on the docket of the court in place of the former one, and written notice of the change
shall be given to the advance party.

A client may at any time dismiss his attorney or substitute another in his place, but if the contract between client
and attorney has been reduced to writing and the dismissal of the attorney was without justifiable cause, he shall
be entitled to recover from the client the full compensation stipulated in the contract. However, the attorney may,
in the discretion of the court, intervene in the case to protect his rights. For the payment of his compensation the
attorney shall have a lien upon all judgments for the payment of money, and executions issued in pursuance of
such judgment, rendered in the case wherein his services had been retained by the client.

Section 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. — A member of the bar may
be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other
gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or
for a wilfull disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willful appearing as an
attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

Section 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance. — The Court of
Appeals or a Court of First Instance may suspend an attorney from practice for any of the causes named in the
last preceding section, and after such suspension such attorney shall not practice his profession until further
action of the Supreme Court in the premises.

Section 29. Upon suspension by the Court of Appeals or Court of First Instance, further proceedings in
Supreme Court. — Upon such suspension, the Court of Appeals or the Court of First Instance shall forthwith
transmit to the Supreme Court a certified copy of the order of suspension and a full statement of the facts upon
which the same was based. Upon the receipt of such certified copy and statement, the Supreme Court shall
make a full investigation of the facts involved and make such order revoking or extending the suspension, or
removing the attorney from his office as such, as the facts warrant.

Section 30. Attorney to be heard before removal or suspension. — No attorney shall be removed or suspended
from the practice of his profession, until he has had full opportunity upon reasonable notice to answer the
charges against him, to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to be heard by himself or counsel. But if upon
reasonable notice he fails to appear and answer the accusation, the court may proceed to determine the
matter ex parte.

Section 31. Attorneys for destitute litigants. — A court may assign an attorney to render professional aid free of
charge to any party in a case, if upon investigation it appears that the party is destitute and unable to employ an
attorney, and that the services of counsel are necessary to secure the ends of justice and to protect the rights of
the party. It shall be the duty of the attorney so assigned to render the required service, unless he is excused
therefrom by the court for sufficient cause shown.

Section 32. Compensation for attorneys de oficio. — Subject to availability of funds as may be provided by the
law the court may, in its discretion, order an attorney employed as counsel de oficio to be compensates in such
sum as the court may fix in accordance with section 24 of this rule. Whenever such compensation is allowed, it
shall be not less than thirty pesos (P30) in any case, nor more than the following amounts: (1) Fifty pesos (P50)
in light felonies; (2) One hundred pesos (P100) in less grave felonies; (3) Two hundred pesos (P200) in grave
felonies other than capital offenses; (4) Five Hundred pesos (P500) in capital offenses.

Section 33. Standing in court of person authorized to appear for Government. — Any official or other person
appointed or designated in accordance with law to appear for the Government of the Philippines shall have all
the rights of a duly authorized member of the bar to appear in any case in which said government has an interest
direct or indirect.

Section 34. By whom litigation conducted. — In the court of a justice of the peace a party may conduct his
litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for the purpose, or with the aid an
attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his
appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.

Section 35. Certain attorneys not to practice. — No judge or other official or employee of the superior courts or
of the Office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as a member of the bar or give professional
advice to clients.

Section 36. Amicus Curiae. — Experienced and impartial attorneys may be invited by the Court to appear
as amici curiae to help in the disposition of issues submitted to it.

Section 37. Attorneys' liens. — An attorney shall have a lien upon the funds, documents and papers of his client
which have lawfully come into his possession and may retain the same until his lawful fees and disbursements
have been paid, and may apply such funds to the satisfaction thereof. He shall also have a lien to the same
extent upon all judgments for the payment of money, and executions issued in pursuance of such judgments,
which he has secured in a litigation of his client, from and after the time when he shall have the caused a
statement of his claim of such lien to be entered upon the records of the court rendering such judgment, or
issuing such execution, and shall have the caused written notice thereof to be delivered to his client and to the
adverse paty; and he shall have the same right and power over such judgments and executions as his client
would have to enforce his lien and secure the payment of his just fees and disbursements.
 RULE 139-B

Disbarment and Discipline of Attorneys

Section 1. How Instituted. — Proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or discipline of attorneys may be
taken by the Supreme Court motu propio, or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the verified
complaint of any person. The complaint shall state clearly and concisely the facts complained of and shall be
supported by affidavits of persons having personal knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or by such
documents as may substantiate said facts.

The IBP Board of Governors may, motu propio or upon referral by the Supreme Court or by a Chapter Board of
Officers, or at the instance of any person, initiate and prosecute proper charges against erring attorneys
including those in the government service.

Six (6) copies of the verified complaint shall be filed with the Secretary of the IBP or the Secretary of any of its
chapter who shall forthwith transmit the same to the IBP Board of Governors for assignment to an investigator.

A. PROCEEDINGS IN THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES

Section 2. National Grievance Investigators. — The Board of Governors shall appoint from among IBP
members an Investigator or, when special circumstances so warrant, a panel of three (3) investigators to
investigate the complaint. All Investigators shall take an oath of office in the form prescribed by the Board of
Governors. A copy of the Investigator's appointment and oath shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court.

An Investigator may be disqualified by reason of relationship within the fourth degree of consanguinity of affinity
to any of the parties of their counsel, pecuniary interest, personal bias, or his having acted as counsel to his
acting as such Investigator. Where the Investigator does not disqualify himself, a party may appeal to the IBP
Board of Governors, which by majority vote of the members present, there being a quorum, may order his
disqualification.

Any Investigator may also be removed for cause, after due hearing, by the vote of at least six (6) members of the
IBP Board of Governors. The decision of the Board of Governors in all cases of disqualification or removal shall
be final.

Section 3. Duties of the National Grievance Investigator. — The National Grievance Investigators shall
investigate all complaints against members of the Integrated Bar referred to them by the IBP Board of
Governors.

Section 4. Chapter assistance to complainant. — The proper IBP Chapter may assist the complainant(s) in the
preparation and filing of his complaint(s).

Section 5. Service or dismissal. — If the complaint appears to be meritorious, the Investigator shall direct that a
copy thereof be served upon the respondent, requiring him to answer the same within fifteen (15) days from the
date of service. If the complaint does not merit action, or if the answer shows to the satisfaction of the
Investigator that the complaint is not meritorious, the same may be dismissed by the Board of Governors upon
his recommendation. A copy of the resolution of dismissal shall be furnished the complainant and the Supreme
Court which may review the case motu propio or upon timely appeal of the complainant filed within 15 days from
notice of the dismissal of the complainant.

No investigation shall be interrupted or terminated by reason of the desistance, settlement, compromise,

restitution, withdrawal of the charges, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same, unless the Supreme
Court motu propio or upon recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors, determines that there is no
compelling reason to continue with the disbarment or suspension proceedings against the respondent.
(Amendment pursuant to Supreme Court Resolution dated May 27, 1993 re Bar Matter 356).

Section 6. Verification and service of answer. — The answer shall be verified. The original and five (5) legible
copies of the answer shall be filed with the Investigator, with proof of service of a copy thereof on the
complainant or his counsel.
Section 7. Administrative counsel. — The IBP Board of Governors shall appoint a suitable member of the
Integrated Bar as counsel to assist the complainant of the respondent during the investigation in case of need for
such assistance.

Section 8. Investigation. — Upon joinder of issues or upon failure of the respondent to answer, the Investigator
shall, with deliberate speed, proceed with the investigation of the case. He shall have the power to issue
subpoenas and administer oaths. The respondent shall be given full opportunity to defend himself, to present
witnesses on his behalf, and be heard by himself and counsel. However, if upon reasonable notice, the
respondent fails to appear, the investigation shall proceed ex parte.

The Investigator shall terminate the investigation within three (3) months from the date of its commencement,
unless extended for good cause by the Board of Governors upon prior application.

Willful failure or refusal to obey a subpoena or any other lawful order issued by the Investigator shall be dealt
with as for indirect contempt of court. The corresponding charge shall be filed by the Investigator before the IBP
Board of Governors which shall require the alleged contemnor to show cause within ten (10) days from notice.
The IBP Board of Governors may thereafter conduct hearings, if necessary, in accordance with the procedure
set forth in this Rule for hearings before the Investigator. Such hearing shall as far as practicable be terminated
within fifteen (15) days from its commencement. Thereafter, the IBP Board of Governors shall within a like period
of fifteen (15) days issue a resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations, which shall forthwith be
transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action and if warranted, the imposition of penalty.

Section 9. Depositions. — Depositions may be taken in accordance with the Rules of Court with leave of the
investigator(s).

Within the Philippines, depositions may be taken before any member of the Board of Governors, the President of
any Chapter, or any officer authorized by law to administer oaths.

Depositions may be taken outside the Philippines before diplomatic or consular representative of the Philippine
Government or before any person agreed upon by the parties or designated by the Board of Governors.

Any suitable member of the Integrated Bar in the place where a deposition shall be taken may be designated by
the Investigator to assist the complainant or the respondent in taking a deposition.

Section 10. Report of Investigator. — Not later than thirty (30) days from the termination of the investigation, the
Investigator shall submit a report containing his findings of fact and recommendations to the IBP Board of
Governors, together with the stenographic notes and the transcript thereof, and all the evidence presented
during the investigation. The submission of the report need not await the transcription of the stenographic notes,
it being sufficient that the report reproduce substantially from the Investigator's personal notes any relevant and
pertinent testimonies.

Section 11. Defects. — No defect in a complaint, notice, answer, or in the proceeding or the Investigator's
Report shall be considered as substantial unless the Board of Governors, upon considering the whole record,
finds that such defect has resulted or may result in a miscarriage of justice, in which event the Board shall take
such remedial action as the circumstances may warrant, including invalidation of the entire proceedings.

Section 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors.

a) Every case heard by an investigator shall be reviewed by the IBP Board of Governors upon the record
and evidence transmitted to it by the Investigator with his report. The decision of the Board upon such
review shall be in writing and shall clearly and distinctly state the facts and the reasons on which it is
based. It shall be promulgated within a period not exceeding thirty (30) days from the next meeting of the
Board following the submittal of the Investigator's Report.

b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines that the respondent should
be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a resolution setting forth its findings
and recommendations which, together with the whole record of the case, shall forthwith be transmitted to
the Supreme Court for final action.

c) If the respondent is exonerated by the Board or the disciplinary sanction imposed by it is less than
suspension or disbarment (such as admonition, reprimand, or fine) it shall issue a decision exonerating
 respondent or imposing such sanction. The case shall be deemed terminated unless upon petition of the
complainant or other interested party filed with the Supreme Court within fifteen (15) days from notice of
the Board's resolution, the Supreme Court orders otherwise.

d) Notice of the resolution or decision of the Board shall be given to all parties through their counsel. A
copy of the same shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court.

B. PROCEEDINGS IN THE SUPREME COURT

Section 13. Supreme Court Investigation. — In proceedings initiated motu propio by the Supreme Court or in
other proceedings when the interest of justice so requires, the Supreme Court may refer the case for
investigation to the Solicitor-General or to any officer of the Supreme Court or judge of a lower court, in which
case the investigation shall proceed in the same manner provided in sections 6 to 11 hereof, save that the
review of the report of investigation shall be conducted directly by the Supreme Court.

Section 14. Report of the Solicitor General of other Court-designated Investigator. — Based upon the evidence
adduced at the investigation, the Solicitor General or other Investigator designated by the Supreme Court shall
submit to the Supreme Court a report containing his findings of fact and recommendations for the final action of
the Supreme Court.

C. COMMON PROVISIONS

Section 15. Suspension of attorney by Supreme Court. — After receipt of respondent's answer or lapse of the
period therefor, the Supreme Court, motu propio, or at the instance of the IBP Board of Governors upon the
recommendation of the Investigator, may suspend an attorney from the practice of his profession for any of the
causes specified in Rule 138, Section 27, during the pendency of the investigation until such suspension is lifted
by the Supreme Court.

Section 16. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court. 1 — The Court of Appeals
or Regional Trial Court may suspend an attorney from practice for any of the causes named in Rule 138, Section
27 2, until further action of the Supreme Court in the case.

Section 17. Upon suspension by Court of Appeals or Regional Trial Court, further proceedings in Supreme
Court. — Upon such suspension, the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court shall forthwith transmit to the
Supreme Court a certified copy of the order of suspension and a full statement of the facts upon which the same
was based. Upon receipt of such certified copy and statement, the Supreme Court shall make a full investigation
of the case and may revoke, shorten or extend the suspension, or disbar the attorney as the facts may warrant.

Section 18. Confidentiality. — Proceedings against attorneys shall be private and confidential. However, the
final order of the Supreme Court shall be published like its decisions in other cases.

Section 19. Expenses. — All reasonable and necessary expenses incurred in relation to disciplinary and
disbarment proceedings are lawfull charges for which the parties may be taxed as costs.

Section 20. Effectivity and Transitory Provision. — This Rule shall take effect June 1, 1988 and shall supersede
the present Rule 139 entitled "DISBARMENT OR SUSPENSION OF ATTORNEYS". All cases pending
investigation by the Office of the Solicitor General shall be transferred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Board of Governors for investigation and disposition as provided in this Rule except those cases where the
investigation has been substantially completed.

Footnotes

1 This section and the following Section 17 sepersede Section 9 of Rule 139.

2 The text of Rule 138, Section 27 reads: "SEC. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by the Supreme
Court on what grounds. — A member of the bar may be removed or suspended form his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney
for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
 RULE 139

Disbarment or Suspension of Attorneys

Section 1. Motion or complaint. — Proceedings for the removal or suspension of attorneys may be taken by the
Supreme Court on its own motion or upon the complaint under oath of another in writing. The complaint shall set
out distinctly, clearly, and concisely the facts complained of, supported by affidavits, if any, of persons having
personal knowledge of the facts therein alleged and shall be accompanied with copies of such documents as
may substantiate said facts.

Section 2. Service or dismissal. — If the complaint appears to merit action, a copy thereof shall be served upon
the respondent, requiring him to answer the same within ten (10) days from the date of service. If the complaint
does not merit action, or if the answer shows to the satisfaction of the Supreme Court that the complaint is not
meritorious, the same shall be dismissed.

Section 3. Investigation by Solicitor General. — Upon the issues raised by the complaint and answer, or upon
failure of the respondent to answer, the case shall be referred to the Solicitor General for investigation to
determine if there is sufficient ground to proceed with the prosecution of the respondent. In the investigation
conducted by the Solicitor General, the respondent shall be given full opportunity to defend himself, to produce
witnesses in his own behalf, and to be heard by himself and counsel. However, if upon reasonable notice, the
respondent fails to appear, the investigation shall proceed ex parte.

Section 4. Report of the Solicitor General. — Based upon the evidence adduced at the hearing, if the Solicitor
General finds no sufficient ground to proceed against the respondent, he shall submit a report to the Supreme
Court containing his findings of fact and conclusion, whereupon the respondent shall be exonerated unless the
court orders differently.

Section 5. Complaint of the Solicitor General. Answer of respondent. — If the Solicitor General finds sufficient
ground to proceed against the respondent, he shall file the corresponding complaint, accompanied with all the
evidence introduced in his investigation, with the Supreme Court, and the respondent shall be served by the
clerk of the Supreme Court with a copy of the complaint with direction to answer the same within fifteen (15)
days.

Section 6. Evidence produced before Solicitor General available. — The evidence produced before the Solicitor
General in his investigation may be considered by the Supreme Court in the final decision of the case, if the
respondent had an opportunity to object and cross-examine. If in the respondent's answer no statement is made
as to any intention of introducing additional evidence, the case shall be set down for hearing, upon the filing of
such answer or upon the expiration of the time to file the same.

Section 7. Commissioner to investigate and recommend. Rules of evidence. — Upon receipt of the respondent's
answer, wherein a statement is made as to his desire to introduce additional evidence, the case shall be referred
to a commissioner who, in the discretion of the court, may be the clerk of the Supreme Court, a judge of first
instance, or an attorney-at-law for investigation, report, and recommendation. The Solicitor General or his
representative shall appear before the commissioner to conduct the prosecution. The respondent shall be given
full opportunity to defend himself, to produce additional evidence in his own behalf, and to be heard by himself
and counsel. However, if upon reasonable notice the respondent fails to appear, the investigation shall proceed
ex parte. The rules of evidence shall be applicable to proceedings of this nature.

Section 8. Report of commissioner and hearing. — Upon receipt of the report of the commissioner, copies of
which shall be furnished the Solicitor General and the respondent, the case shall be set down for hearing before
the court, following which the case shall be considered submitted to the court for its final determination.

Section 9. Procedure in Court of Appeals or Courts of First Instance. — As far as may be applicable, the
procedure above outlined shall likewise govern the filing and investigation of complaints against attorneys in the
Court of Appeals or in Courts of First Instance. In case of suspension of the respondent, the judge of the court of
first instance or Justice of the Court of Appeals shall forthwith transmit to the Supreme Court a certified copy of
the order of suspension and a full statement of the facts upon which same is based.

Section 10. Confidential. — Proceedings against attorneys shall be private and confidential, except that the final
order of the court shall be made public as in other cases coming before the court.
 RULE 139-A

Integrated Bar of the Philippines

Section 1. Organization. — There is hereby organized an official national body to be known as the "Integrated
Bar of the Philippines," composed of all persons whose names now appear or may hereafter be included in the
Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.

Section 2. Purposes. — The fundamental purposes of the Integrated Bar shall be to elevate the standards of the
legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility
more effectively.

Section 3. Regions. — The Philippines is hereby divided into nine Regions of the Integrated Bar, to wit:

(a) Northern Luzon, consisting of the provinces of Abra, Batanes, Benguet, Cagayan, Ifugao, Ilocos
Norte, Ilocos Sur, Isabela, Kalinga-Apayao, La Union, Mountain Province, Nueva Vizcaya, and Quirino.

(b) Central Luzon, consisting of the provinces of Bataan, Bulacan, Nueva Ecija, Pampanga, Pangasinan,
Tarlac, and Zambales;

(c) Greater Manila, consisting of the City of Manila and Quezon City;

(d) Southern Luzon, consisting of the provinces of Batangas, Cavite, Laguna, Marinduque, Occidental
Mindoro, Oriental Mindoro, Quezon, and Rizal;

(e) Bicolandia, consisting of the provinces of Albay, Camarines Norte, Camarines Sur, Catanduanes,
Masbate, and Sorsogon;

(f) Eastern Visayas, consisting of the provinces of Bohol, Cebu, Eastern Samar, Leyte, Northern Samar,
Samar, and Southern Leyte;

(g) Western Visayas, consisting of the provinces of Aklan, Antique, Capiz, Iloilo, Negros Occidental,
Negros Oriental, Palawan, Romblon, and Siquijor.

(h) Eastern Mindanao, consisting of the provinces of Agusan del Norte, Agusan Del Sur, Bukidnon,
Camiguin, Davao del Norte, Davao del Sur, Davao Oriental, Misamis Oriental, Surigao del Norte, and
Surigao del Sur; and

(i) Western Mindanao, consisting of the cities of Basilan and Zamboanga, and the provinces of Cotabato,
Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Misamis Occidental, South Cotabato, Sulu, Zamboanga del Norte, and
Zamboanga del Sur.

In the event of the creation of any new province, the Board of Governors shall, with the approval of the Supreme
Court, determine the Region to which the said province shall belong.

Section 4. Chapters. — A Chapter of the Integrated Bar shall be organized in every province. Except as
hereinbelow provided, every city shall be considered part of the province within which it is geographically
situated.

A separate Chapter shall be organized in each of the following political subdivisions or areas;

(a) The sub-province of Aurora;

(b) Each congressional district of the City of Manila;

(c) Quezon City;

(d) Caloocan City, Malabon and Navotas;

(e) Pasay City, Makati, Mandaluyong and San Juan del Monte;
 (f) Cebu City; and

(g) Zamboanga City and Basilan City.

Unless he otherwise registers his preference for a particular Chapter, a lawyer shall be considered a member of
the Chapter of the province, city, political subdivision or area where his office, or, in the absence thereof, his
residence is located. In no case shall any lawyer be a member of more than one Chapter.

Each Chapter shall have its own local government as provided for by uniform rules to be prescribed by the
Board of Governors and approved by the Supreme Court, the provisions of Section 19 of this Rule
notwithstanding.

Chapters belonging to the same Region may hold regional conventions on matters and problems of common
concern.

Section 5. House of Delegates. — The Integrated Bar shall have a House of Delegates of not more than one
hundred twenty members who shall be apportioned among all the Chapters as nearly as may be according to
the number of their respective members, but each Chapter shall have at least one Delegate. On or before
December 31, 1974, and every four years thereafter, the Board of Governors shall make an apportionment of
Delegates.

The term of the office of Delegate shall begin on the date of the opening of the annual convention of the House
and shall end on the day immediately preceding the date of the opening of the next succeeding annual
convention. No person may be a Delegate for more than two terms.

The House shall hold an annual convention at the call of the Board of Governors at any time during the month of
April of each year for the election of Governor, the reading and discussion of reports including the annual report
of the Board of Governors, the transaction of such other business as may be referred to it by the Board, and the
consideration of such additional matters as may be requested in writing by at least twenty Delegates. Special
conventions of the House may be called by the Board of Governors to consider only such matters as the Board
shall indicate. A majority of the Delegates who have registered for a convention, whether annual or special, shall
constitute a quorum to do business.

Section 6. Board of Governors. — The Integrated Bar shall be governed by a Board of Governors. Nine
Governors shall be elected by the House of Delegates from the nine Regions on the representation basis of one
Governor from each Region. Each Governor shall be chosen from a list of nominees submitted by the Delegates
from the Region, provided that not more than one nominee shall come from any Chapter. The President and the
Executive Vice President, if chosen by the Governors from outside of themselves as provided in Section 7 of this
Rule, shall ipso facto become members of the Board.

The members of the Board shall hold office for a term of one year from the date of their election and until their
successors shall have been duly elected and qualified. No person may be a Governor for more than two terms.

The Board shall meet regularly once every three months, on such date and such time and place as it shall
designate. A majority of all the members of the Board shall constitute a quorum to do business. Special
meetings may be called by the President or by five members of the Board.

Subject to the approval of the Supreme Court, the Board shall adopt By-Laws and promulgate Canons of
Professional Responsibility for all members of the Integrated Bar. The By-Laws and the Canons may be
amended by the Supreme Court motu propio or upon the recommendation of the Board of Governors.

The Board shall prescribe such other rules and regulations as may be necessary and proper to carry out the
purposes of the Integrated Bar as well as the provisions of this Rule.

Section 7. Officers. — The Integrated Bar shall have a President and an Executive Vice President who shall be
chosen by the Governors immediately after the latter's election, either from among themselves or from other
members of the Integrated Bar, by the vote of at least five Governors. Each of the regional members of the
Board shall be ex officio Vice President for the Region which he represents.

The President and the Executive Vice President shall hold office for a term of one year from the date of their
election and until their successors shall have duly qualified. The Executive Vice President shall automatically
become the President for the next succeeding full term. The Presidency shall rotate from year to year among all
the nine Regions in such order or rotation as the Board of Governors shall prescribe. No person shall be
President or Executive Vice President of the Integrated Bar for more than one term.

The Integrated Bar shall have a Secretary, a Treasurer, and such other officers and employees as may be
required by the Board of Governors, to be appointed by the President with the consent of the Board, and to hold
office at the pleasure of the Board or for such terms as it may fix. Said officers and employees need not be
members of the Integrated Bar.

Section 8. Vacancies. — In the event the President is absent or unable to act, his duties shall be performed by
the Executive Vice President; and in the event of the death, resignation, or removal of the President, the
Executive Vice President shall serve as Acting President during the remainder of the term of the office thus
vacated. In the event of the death, resignation, removal, or disability of both the President and the Executive
Vice President, the Board of Governors shall elect an Acting President to hold office until the next succeeding
election or during the period of disability.

The filling of vacancies in the House of Delegates, Board of Governors, and all other positions of Officers of the
Integrated Bar shall be as provided in the By-Laws. Whenever the term of an office or position is for a fixed
period, the person chosen to fill a vacancy therein shall serve only for the unexpired term.

Section 9. Membership dues. — Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as the Board
of Governors shall determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. A fixed sum equivalent to ten percent
(10%) of the collection from each Chapter shall be set aside as a Welfare Fund for disabled members of the
Chapter and the compulsory heirs of deceased members thereof.

Section 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the
payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and
default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member
from the Roll of Attorneys.

Section 11. Voluntary termination of membership; re-instatement. — A member may terminate his membership
by filing a written notice to that effect with the Secretary of the Integrated Bar, who shall immediately bring the
matter to the attention of the Supreme Court. Forthwith he shall cease to be a member and his name shall be
stricken by the Court from the Roll of Attorneys. Reinstatement may be made by the Court in accordance with
rules and regulations prescribed by the Board of Governors and approved by the Court.

Section 12. Grievance procedures. — The Board of Governors shall provide in the By-Laws for grievance
procedures for the enforcement and maintenance of discipline among all the members of the Integrated Bar, but
no action involving the suspension or disbarment of a member or the removal of his name from the Roll of
Attorneys shall be effective without the final approval of the Supreme Court.

Section 13. Non-political Bar. — The Integrated Bar shall be strictly non-political, and every activity tending to
impair this basic feature is strictly prohibited and shall be penalized accordingly. No lawyer holding an elective,
judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the Government or any political subdivision or instrumentality
thereof shall be eligible for election of appointment to any position in the Integrated Bar or any Chapter thereof
shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his position as of the moment he files his certificate of candidacy for
any elective public office or accepts appointment to any judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the
Government or any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof.

Section 14. Positions honorary. — Except as may be specifically authorized or allowed by the Supreme Court,
no Delegate or Governor and no national or local Officer or committee member shall receive any compensation,
allowance or emolument from the funds of the Integrated Bar for any service rendered therein or be entitled to
reimbursement for any expense incurred in the discharge of his functions.

Section 15. Fiscal matters. — The Board of Governors shall administer the funds of the Integrated Bar and shall
have the power to make appropriations and disbursements therefrom. It shall cause proper Books of Accounts to
be kept and Financial Statements to be rendered and shall see to it that the proper audit is made of all accounts
of the Integrated Bar and all the Chapters thereof.

Section 16. Journal. — The Board of Governors shall cause to be published a quarterly Journal of the
Integrated Bar, free copies of which shall be distributed to every member of the Integrated Bar.
Section 17. Voluntary Bar associations. — All voluntary Bar associations now existing or which may hereafter
be formed may co-exist with the Integrated Bar but shall not operate at cross-purposes therewith.

Section 18. Amendments. — This Rule may be amended by the Supreme Court motu propio or upon the
recommendation of the Board of Governors or any Chapter of the Integrated Bar.

Section 19. Organizational period. — The Commission on Bar Integration shall organize the local Chapters and
toward this end shall secure the assistance of the Department of Justice and of all Judges throughout the
Philippines. All Chapter organizational meetings shall be held on Saturday, February 17, 1973. In every case,
the Commission shall cause proper notice of the date, time and place of the meeting called to organize a
Chapter shall constitute a quorum for the purpose, including the election of a President, a Vice President, a
Secretary, a Treasurer, and five Directors.

The Commission shall initially fix the number of Delegates and apportion the same among all the Chapters as
nearly as may be in proportion to the number of their respective members, but each Chapter shall have at least
one Delegate. The President of each Chapter shall concurrently be its Delegate to the House of Delegates. The
Vice President shall be his alternate, except where the Chapter is entitled to have more than one Delegate, in
which case the Vice President shall also be a Delegate.

The Board of Directors of the Chapter shall in proper cases elect additional as well as alternate Delegates.

The House of Delegates shall convene in the City of Manila on Saturday, March 17, 1973 for the Purpose of
electing a Board of Governors. The Governors shall immediately assume office and forthwith meet to elect the
Officers of the Integrated Bar. The Officers so chosen shall immediately assume their respective positions.

Section 20. Effectivity. — This Rule shall take effect on January 16, 1973.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 2869            March 25, 1907

MATEO CARIÑO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, respondent-appellee.

Coudert Brothers for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta for appellee.

ARELLANO, C.J.:

Mateo Cariño, the appellant herein, on the 23d of February, 1904, filed his petition in the Court of Land
Registration praying that there be granted to him title to a parcel of land consisting of 40 hectares, 1 are, and 13
centares, and situated in the town of Baguio, Province of Benguet, together with a house erected thereon and
constructed of wood and roofed with rimo, and bounded as follows: On the north, in lines running 1,048 metes
and 20 decimeters with the lands of Sepa Cariño, H. Phelps Whitmarsh, and Calsi; on the east, in lines running
991 meters and 50 decimeters with the land of Kuidno, Esteban Gonzales, and of the Civil Government; on the
south, in lines of 115 meters and 60 decimeters, with the lands of Talaca; and on the west, in lines running 982
meters and 20 decimeters, with the lands of Sisco Cariño and Mayengmeng.

By order of the court the hearing of this petition, No. 561, and that of Antonio Rebollo and Vicente Valpiedad
filed under No. 834, were heard together for the reason that the latter petition claimed a small portion of land
included in the parcel set out in the former petition.

The Insular Government opposed the granting of these petitions, alleging that the whole parcel of land is public
property of the Government and that the same was never acquired in any manner or through any title
of egresion from the State.

After trial, and the hearing of documentary and oral proof, the court of Land Registration rendered its judgment in
these terms:

Therefore the court finds that Cariño and his predecessors have not possessed exclusively and
adversely any part of the said property prior to the date on which Cariño constructed the house now
there — that is to say, for the years 1897 and 1898, and Cariño held possession for some years
afterwards of but a part of the property to which he claims title. Both petitions are dismissed and the
property in question is adjudged to be public land. (Bill of exceptions, p. 15.)

The conclusions arrived at the set forth in definite terms in the decision of the court below are the following:

From the testimony given by Cariño as well as from that of several of the witnesses for the Government
it is deduced, that in or about the year 1884 Cariño erected and utilized as a domicile a house on the
property situated to the north of that property now in question, property which, according to the plan
attached to expediente No. 561, appears to be property belonging to Donaldson Sim; that during the
year 1893 Cariño sold said house to one Cristobal Ramos, who in turn sold the same to Donaldson Sim,
moving to and living on the adjoining property, which appears on the plan aforesaid to be the property of
H. Phelps Whitmarsh, a place where the father and the grandfather of his wife, that is to say, Ortega and
Minse, had lived . . ..

In or about the years 1898 Cariño abandoned the property of Whitmarsh and located on the property
described in the plan attached to expediente No. 561, having constructed a house thereon in which he
now lives, and which house is situated in the center of the property, as is indicated on the plan; and
since which time he has undoubtedly occupied some portion of the property now claimed by him. (Bill of
exceptions, pp. 11 and 12.)
1. Therefore it is evident that this court can not decree the registration of all of the superficial extension of the
land described in the petition and as appears on the plan filed herein, such extension containing 40 hectares, 1
are, and 13 centares, inasmuch as the documentary evidence accompanying the petition is conclusive proof
against the petitioners; this documentary proof consists of a possessory information under date of March 7,
1901, and registered on the 11th day of the same month and year; and, according to such possessory
information, the land therein described contains an extension of only 28 hectares limited by "the country road to
the barrio of Pias," a road appearing on the plan now presented and cutting the land, as might be said, in half, or
running through its center from north to south, a considerable extension of land remaining on the other side of
the said road, the west side, and which could not have been included in the possessory information mentioned.

2. As has been shown during the trial of this case, this land, of which mention is made in said possessory
information, and upon which is situated the house now actually occupied by the petitioner, all of which is set forth
as argument as to the possession in the judgment, is "used for pasture and sowing," and belongs to the class
called public lands.

3. Under the express provisions of law, a parcel of land, being of common origin, presumptively belonged to the
State during its sovereignty, and, in order to perfect the legitimate acquisition of such land by private persons, it
was necessary that the possession of the same pass from the State. And there is no evidence or proof of title
of egresion of this land from the domain of the Spanish Government, nor is there any possessory information
equivalent to title by composicion or under agreement. 4, The possessory information filed herein is not the title
to property authorized in substitution for that of adjustment by the royal decree of February 13, 1894, this being
the last law or legal disposition of the former sovereignty applicable to the present subject-matter of common
lands: First, for the reason that the land referred to herein is not covered nor does it come within any one of the
three conditions required by article 19 of the said royal decree, to wit, that the land has been in an uninterrupted
state of cultivation during a period of six years last past; or that the same has been possessed without
interruption during a period of twelve years and has been in a state of cultivation up to the date of the information
and during the three years immediately preceding such information; or that such land had been possessed
openly without interruption during a period of thirty or more years, notwithstanding the land had not been
cultivated; nor is it necessary to refer to the testimony given by the two witnesses to the possessory information
for the following reason: Second, because the possessory information authorized by said royal decree or last
legal disposition of the Spanish Government, as title or for the purpose of acquiring actual proprietary right,
equivalent to that of adjustment with the Spanish Government and required and necessary at all times until the
publication of said royal decree was limited in time to one year, in accordance with article 21, which is as follows:
" A period of one year, not to be extended, is allowed to verify the possessory informations which are referred to
in articles 19 and 20. After the expiration of this period of the right of the cultivators and persons in possession to
obtain gratuitous title thereto lapses and the land together with full possession reverts to the state, or, as the
case may be, to the community, and the said possessors and cultivators or their assigns would simply have
rights under universal or general title of average in the event that the land is sold within a period of five years
immediately following the cancellation. The possessors not included under this chapter can only acquire by time
the ownership and title to unappropriated or royal lands in accordance with common law."

5. In accordance with the preceding provisions, the right that remained to Cariño, if it be certain that he was the
true possessor of the land in question, was the right of average in case the Government or State could have sold
the same within the period of five years immediately following for example, if the denouncement of purchase had
been carried out by Felipe Zafra or any other person, as appears from the record of the trial of the case. Aside
from this right, in such event, his possession as attested in the possessory information herein could not, in
accordance with common law, go to show any right of ownership until after the expiration of twenty years from
the expiration of twenty years from the verification and registry of the same in conformity with the provisions of
article 393 of the Mortgage Law and other conditions prescribe by this law.

6. The right of possession in accordance with common law — that is to say, civil law — remains at all times
subordinate to the Spanish administrative law, inasmuch as it could only be of force when pertaining to
royal transferable or alienable lands, which condition and the determination thereof is reversed to the
government, which classified and designated the royal alienable lands for the purpose of distinguishing them
from those lands strictly public, and from forestry lands which could at no time pass to private ownership nor be
acquired through time even after the said royal decree of February 13, 1894.

7. The advent of the new sovereignty necessarily brought a new method of dealing with lands and particularly as
to the classification and manner of transfer and acquisition of royal or common lands then appropriated, which
were thenceforth merely called public lands, the alienation of which was reserved to the Government, in
accordance with section 12 and 13 of the act of Congress of July 1, 1902,1 and in conformity with other laws
enacted under this act of Congress by the Philippine Commission prescribing rules for the execution thereof, one
of which is Act No. 648,2 herein mentioned by the petitioner, in connection with Act No. 627,3 which appears to
be the law upon which the petition herein is founded.

8. Section 6 of Act No. 627 admits prescription, in accordance with the provisions contained in Act No. 190, as a
basis for obtaining the right of ownership. "The petitioners claims title under the period of prescription of ten
years established by that act, as well as by reason of his occupancy and use thereof from time immemorial."
(Allegation 1.) But said act admits such prescription for the purpose of obtaining title and ownership to lands "not
exceeding more that sixteen hectares in extent." (Sec. 6 of said act.) The land claimed by Cariño is 40 hectares
in extent, if we take into consideration his petition, or an extension of 28 hectares, according to the possessory
information, the only thing that can be considered. Therefore, it follows that the judgment denying the petition
herein and now appealed from was strictly in accordance with the law invoked herein.

9. And of the 28 hectares of land as set out in the possessory information, one part of same, according to the
testimony of Cariño, belongs to Vicente Valpiedad, the extent of which is not determined. From all of which it
follows that the precise extent has not been determined in the trial of this case on which judgment might be
based in the event that the judgment and title be declared in favor of the petitioner, Mateo Cariño. And we
should not lose sight of the fact that, considering the intention of Congress in granting ownership and title to 16
hectares, that Mateo Cariño and his children have already exceeded such amount in various acquirements of
lands, all of which is shown in different cases decided by the said Court of Land Registration, donations or gifts
of land that could only have been made efficacious as to the conveyance thereof with the assistance of these
new laws.

By reason of the findings set forth it is clearly seen that the court below did not err:

1. In finding that Mateo Cariño and those from whom he claims his right had not possessed and claimed
as owners the lands in question since time immemorial;

2. In finding that the land in question did not belong to the petitioner, but that, on the contrary, it was the
property of the Government. (Allegation 21.)

Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed with the costs of this instance against the appellant. After the
expiration of twenty days from the notification of this decision let judgment be entered in accordance herewith,
and ten days thereafter let the case be remanded to the court from whence it came for proper action. So
ordered.
 SECOND DIVISION

April 3, 2019

G.R. No. 240596

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner

vs.
NOVO TANES y BELMONTE, Respondent

DECISION

CAGUIOA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari  (Petition) under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
1

Decision  dated February 21, 2018 and Resolution  dated July 11, 2018 of the Court of Appeals, Cagayan de
2 3

Oro City (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 08305-MIN, which upheld the Orders  dated March 31, 2017 and June 27,
4

2017 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, General Santos City (RTC) in Crim. Case No. 22306. The RTC
granted the application for bail of respondent Novo Tanes y Belmonte (Tanes), who was charged with violation
of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 9165 otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002.

The Facts

On April 6, 2011, an Information  was filed against Tanes for violating Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165, the
5

accusatory portion of which reads:

That on or about December 14, 2010, at about 8:20 P.M. in DARBCI Subdivision, National Highway, General
Santos City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, without
authority of law, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell for Five Hundred Pesos (Php500.00)
to poseur buyer, one sachet containing 0.0296 grams (sic) of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous
drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 6

Tanes pleaded not guilty to the charge. On April 10, 2015, he filed a Petition for Bail.  The RTC conducted
7

hearings on October 7, 2015, November 4, 2015, and February 3, 2017 for the bail application. 8

Ruling of the RTC

On March 31, 2017, the RTC issued an Order  granting Tanes' application for bail, the fallo of which reads:
9

WHEREFORE, after a careful evaluation of the records, this Court finds justifiable grounds to grant bail to the
accused.

Accused is allowed to post bail bond for his temporary liberty in the fixed amount of TWO HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (P200,000.00).

Set the continuation of trial x x x.

SO ORDERED. 10
The RTC found that the evidence of Tanes' guilt was not strong because there was doubt as to whether the
chain of custody in the buy-bust operation was preserved, explaining as follows:

The [c]ourt noted that in the affidavits of [the] prosecution's witnesses[,] there was allegedly a previous buying
transaction of shabu with the accused prior to the buy-bust operation subject of this case. Thus, the PDEA
agents had enough time to contact the media or DOJ representatives, or any elected public official to
witness the buy-bust operation being conducted following the report on the illegal trading in drugs by
the accused, but they fail[ed] to do so. Instead, they were just merely called to sign the inventory
sheet.  (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
11

The RTC ruled that the failure of the prosecution to show that the three witnesses (i.e., media representative,
DOJ representative, elected official) were also present in the actual buy-bust operation and not only during the
inventory negated the requirement of strong evidence of the accused's guilt to justify a denial of bail. Moreover,
the RTC ruled that the defense correctly cited the case of People v. Jehar Reyes  (Jehar Reyes) in support of its
12

argument.

The People (herein petitioner) filed a motion for reconsideration (MR), which was denied in an Order  dated
13

June 27, 2017.

Aggrieved, petitioner went to the CA via petition for certiorari. It alleged that the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting bail to Tanes because: (1) it did not state a
summary of the prosecution's evidence in its Order, therefore, petitioner was not accorded due process; and (2)
it required the presence of the three witnesses during the conduct of the buy-bust operation and during the
actual seizure of the drug, thereby extending the requirement laid down in R.A. 9165. 14

Ruling of the CA

In its assailed Decision  dated February 21, 2018, the CA dismissed the petition. According to the CA, petitioner
15

failed to show that the RTC's exercise of discretion in granting the application for bail was unsound and
unguided by jurisprudence.  It found that the RTC's Order was based on jurisprudence, specifically on the rule
16

on chain of custody and the Jehar Reyes case, which held that the three witnesses must be present during the
buy-bust operation and the confiscation of the dangerous drugs from the accused. 17

Moreover, the CA also made its own appreciation of the evidence presented and found that "[t]he evidence
presented by the prosecution in establishing that [Tanes'] guilt was strong was tarnished by a seemingly broken
chain in the custody."  Specifically, the CA made the following findings:
18

Here, the poseur buyer testified that the representative from the media and the elected official who signed the
Inventory Sheet were absent during the actual buy bust operation. The said officials appear to have gone to
the crime scene only to sign the Inventory Sheet and leave after signing the same. The absence of a
representative from the DoJ also appears to be inadequately explained as the police officers could have
contacted another representative from the DoJ when the other DoJ representative was unavailable.

It also appears that no photograph was presented showing the inventory of the seized shabu in the
presence of [Tanes], the representative of the media, and the elective public official. There were only
pictures captioned "Media representative signed/witness (sic) the inventory" and "Brgy Kagawad signed/witness
(sic) the inventory" but the person who took the pictures was not presented during the bail hearing to explain the
photographs. Moreover, the testimony of the buy bust team leader regarding whether there was a
photograph showing the inventory of the seized sachets appears to be unclear.  (Emphasis and 19

underscoring supplied)

Further, the CA ruled that petitioner was not denied due process. The records showed that three hearings were
conducted by the trial court for the bail application. During these hearings, petitioner was duly represented by its
prosecutors. Moreover, the CA stated that petitioner failed to identify which piece/s of evidence that the
prosecution presented before the bail hearings was/were excluded by the RTC in weighing whether the evidence
against Tanes' guilt was strong. 20

Furthermore, the CA also disagreed with petitioner's assertion that the RTC Order did not contain a summary of
the prosecution's evidence. 21

Petitioner's MR was denied by the CA in a Resolution  dated July 11, 2018; hence, this Petition.
22
Petition before the Court

In its Rule 45 Petition, petitioner argues that the CA erred in not finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the trial court when the latter granted the petition for bail based solely on Jehar Reyes. In particular, petitioner
claims that R.A. 9165 only requires the presence of the three witnesses during the conduct of the inventory, and
not during the actual buy-bust operation. Also, petitioner avers that the CA erred in affirming the trial court's
ruling despite the latter's failure to appreciate the evidence of the prosecution.

Issue

Whether the CA erred in affirming the Order of the RTC which granted Tanes' application for bail.

The Court's Ruling

The Petition is totally without merit.

The right to bail

The right to bail is recognized in the Bill of Rights, as stated in Section 13, Article III of the Constitution:

SEC. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of
guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may
be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.

In this regard, Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

SEC. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable. - No
person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall
be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.

Thus, before conviction, bail is a matter of right when the offense charged is punishable by any penalty lower
than reclusion perpetua. Bail becomes a matter of discretion if the offense charged is punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment that is, bail will be denied if the evidence of guilt is strong. 23

Procedure when bail is discretionary

In this case, Tanes was charged with violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165 which carries the penalty of
life imprisonment. Hence, Tanes' bail becomes a matter of judicial discretion if the evidence of his guilt is not
strong.

To determine whether evidence of guilt of the accused is strong, the conduct of bail hearings is required where
the prosecution has the burden of proof, subject to the right of the defense to cross-examine witnesses and
introduce evidence in rebuttal. The court is to conduct only a summary hearing, consistent with the purpose of
merely determining the weight of evidence for purposes of bail. 24

The court's grant or denial of the bail application must contain a summary of the prosecution's evidence. On this
basis, the judge formulates his or her own conclusion on whether such evidence is strong enough to indicate the
guilt of the accused.25

Petitioner was not deprived of

procedural due process

Applying the abovementioned standards to the present case, the Court finds that, contrary to petitioner's
assertions, the trial court did observe the rules to be followed in granting or denying the bail application. Records
show that the RTC conducted hearings for the application of bail on October 7, 2015, November 4, 2015, and
February 3, 2017. In all these hearings, petitioner was duly represented by its prosecutors. 26
Petitioner insists that the trial court miserably failed to state a summary or a reasonable recital of the evidence
for the prosecution.  As a result, petitioner avers that it was denied its right to due process.  The Court
27 28

disagrees.

In this regard, the Court finds it necessary to quote the relevant portions of the assailed RTC Order, to wit:

Hearing on the petition ensued. The prosecution presented four witnesses to prove that the guilt of the
accused is strong, to wit:

1. PSI Lily Grace M. Tadeo, the forensic chemist, who identified her findings as contained in the Chemistry
Reports Nos. D-332-2010 and D-333-2010 and the drug items;

2. PDEA Agent IO1 Mark Louis R. Degayo, team leader and photographer;

3. PDEA Agent IO1 Vincent Quelinderino, arresting officer; and

4. PDEA Agent IO1 Rodrick I. Gualisa, poseur-buyer.

They identified accused as the person who sold the drug item during the buy bust operation in the amount of
P500.00. The inventory of evidence/property and chain of custody were also identified.

Upon judicious and meticulous perusal of the evidence presented, the [c]ourt is of the view that the evidence of
guilt of the accused is not strong.

The [c]ourt note[s] that in the affidavits of prosecution's witnesses[,] there was allegedly a previous buying
transaction of shabu with the accused prior to the buy-bust operation subject of this case. Thus, the PDEA
agents had enough time to contact the media or DOJ representatives, or any elected public official to witness the
buy-bust operation being conducted following the report on the illegal trading in drugs by the accused, but they
fail[ed] to do so. Instead, they were just merely called to sign the inventory sheet.

xxxx

With the evidence presented for the consideration of the Court, the prosecution failed to substantiate its
allegation to prove that the guilt of the accused is strong. Clearly, therefore, the prosecution evidence as
such does not meet the required standard of "strong evidence" to justify the denial of the accused's right to
bail.  (Emphasis supplied)
29

Petitioner assails the RTC Order because it did not contain (1) a recital of the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses regarding the conduct of an actual buy-bust operation against Tanes;  or (2) a summary of the
30

testimonies of the prosecution witnesses establishing the links in the chain of custody of the confiscated
drug.  However, a perusal of the RTC Order shows that it complied with the jurisprudential standards on
31

providing a summary of the prosecution's evidence.

In Revilla, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan (First Division),  the Court discussed the meaning of "a summary of the
32

evidence for the prosecution" as follows:

x x x The summary of the evidence shows that the evidence presented during the prior hearing is formally
recognized as having been presented and most importantly, considered. The summary of the evidence is
the basis for the judge's exercising his judicial discretion. Only after weighing the pieces of evidence as
contained in the summary will the judge formulate his own conclusion as to whether the evidence of guilt against
the accused is strong based on his discretion. Thus, judicial discretion is not unbridled but must be supported by
a finding of the facts relied upon to form an opinion on the issue before the court. x x x  (Emphasis and
33

underscoring supplied)

Moreover, in People v. Cabral,  which petitioner cites as basis, the Court ruled that the summary "should
34

necessarily be a complete compilation or restatement of all the pieces of evidence presented during the hearing
proper. x x x An incomplete enumeration or selective inclusion of pieces of evidence for the prosecution in the
order cannot be considered a summary, for a summary is necessarily a reasonable recital of any evidence
presented by the prosecution." 35
Thus, what jurisprudence requires is a reasonable recital of every piece of evidence of the prosecution - which
was done in this case. Contrary to petitioner assertions, the testimonies per se of the witnesses need not be
reproduced in the Order, as long as the same is recognized and considered by the trial court in its exercise of
judicial discretion over the bail application.

Clearly, the trial court followed the proper procedure in granting Tanes' bail application. Having settled that
petitioner was not deprived of its right to procedural due process, the Court shall now deal with the propriety of
granting the bail application.

Non-compliance with the rules on

chain of custody of illegal drugs
negates a strong evidence of Tanes'
guilt

The main thrust of the RTC's Order granting bail is that based on the evidence presented during the bail
hearings, the prosecution failed to prove that the chain of custody over the seized drug had been preserved;
hence, the evidence of Tanes' guilt was not strong. The Court wholeheartedly agrees.

To recall, Tanes was charged with the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs under Section 5, Article II of R.A.
9165. The elements for conviction under said provision are: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object
and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.  The burden is on the
36

State to prove not only these elements but also the corpus delicti or the body of the crime.

In drug cases, the dangerous drug itself is the very corpus delicti of the violation of the law.  Consequently,
37

compliance with the rule on chain of custody over the seized illegal drugs is crucial in any prosecution that
follows a buy-bust operation. The rule is imperative, as it is essential that the prohibited drug recovered from the
suspect is the very same substance offered in court as exhibit; and that the identity of said drug is established
with the same unwavering exactitude as that requisite to make a finding of guilt. 38

In this regard, Section 21,  Article II of R.A. 9165 lays down the following procedure to be followed in order to
39

maintain the integrity of the confiscated drugs used as evidence: (1) the seized items must be inventoried and
photographed immediately after seizure or confiscation; (2) the physical inventory and photographing must be
done in the presence of (a) the accused or his/her representative or counsel, (b) an elected public official, (c) a
representative from the media, and (d) a representative from the DOJ, all of whom shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.

The phrase "immediately after seizure and confiscation" means that the physical inventory and photographing of
the drugs were intended by the law to be made immediately after, or at the place of apprehension. It is only
when the same is not practicable that the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. 9165 allow the
inventory and photographing to be done as soon as the buy-bust team reaches the nearest police station or the
nearest office of the apprehending officer/team.  In this connection, this also means that the three required
40

witnesses should already be physically present at the time of the conduct of the physical inventory of the seized
items which, as mentioned, must be immediately done at the place of seizure and confiscation - a requirement
that can easily be complied with by the buy-bust team considering that the buy-bust operation is, by its nature, a
planned activity.

In the present case, it appears that the buy-bust team committed several procedural lapses concerning the chain
of custody of the seized drug. In particular, the RTC and the CA found that: (1) there was no representative from
the DOJ present during the buy-bust operation and the inventory; (2) the two other witnesses (i.e., the media
representative and the elected public official) were not present during the apprehension and seizure of the illegal
drug but were merely called to sign the inventory sheet; and (3) no photograph was presented showing the
inventory of the seized shabu in the presence of Tanes and the witnesses. These lapses in the chain of custody
created doubt as to the identity and integrity of the seized drug. Consequently, the evidence as to Tanes' guilt
cannot be characterized as strong.

No error in RTC's reliance on the case

of Jehar Reyes

Petitioner avers that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in granting the bail application based solely on
the Jehar Reyes case. It maintains that R.A. 9165 only requires the presence of the three witnesses during the
conduct of the inventory, and not during the actual buy-bust operation.
The argument is without merit.

For reference, the relevant portion of Jehar Reyes is quoted below:

Thirdly, another substantial gap in the chain of custody concerned the absence of any representative of
the media or of the Department of Justice (DOJ), and of the elected public official during the buy-bust
operation and at the time of the confiscation of the dangerous drugs from the accused in the area of
operation. The Prosecution did not attempt to explain why such presence of the media or DOJ representatives,
and of the elected public official had not been procured despite the buy-bust operation being mounted in the
afternoon of November 27, 2002 following two weeks of surveillance to confirm the veracity of the report on the
illegal trading in drugs by the accused. The objective of requiring their presence during the buy-bust
operation and at the time of the recovery or confiscation of the dangerous drugs from the accused in the
area of operation was to ensure against planting of evidence and frame up. It was clear that ignoring such
objective was not an option for the buy-bust team if its members genuinely desired to protect the integrity of their
operation. Their omission attached suspicion to the incrimination of the accused. The trial and appellate courts
should not have tolerated the buy-bust team's lack of prudence in not complying with the procedures outlined in
Section 21(1), supra, in light of the sufficient time for them to comply.  (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
41

The RTC cannot thus be faulted for relying on the clear and unequivocal ruling made in Jehar Reyes because
unless overturned, the same remains good case law. To the contrary, Jehar Reyes has even been cited by the
Court in at least six cases  subsequent to it, one of which is People v. Sagana,  wherein the Court made similar
42 43

findings regarding the three witness rule. Citing Jehar Reyes, the Court therein held:

Similarly, none of the required third-party representatives was present during the seizure and inventory of the
dangerous articles.  Their presence in buy-bust operations and seizure of illicit articles in the place of
1âшphi1

operation would supposedly guarantee "against planting of evidence and frame-up." In other words, they
are "necessary to insulate the apprehension and incrimination proceedings from any taint of illegitimacy or
irregularity."

x x x In this case, the records were bereft of any explanation why the third-party representatives were
present only during the belated photographing of the confiscated articles. Hence, the very purpose of their
mandated presence is defeated.  (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
44

It bears stressing that the pronouncement in Jehar Reyes as regards the presence of the three witnesses in the
buy-bust operation has also been ruled upon by the Court in other cases. In the recent case of People v.
Supat,  the Court made the following pronouncements:
45

Section 21(1) of RA 9165 plainly requires the apprehending team to conduct a physical inventory of the seized
items and the photographing of the same immediately after seizure and confiscation. Further, the inventory
must be done in the presence of the accused, his counsel, or representative, a representative of the DOJ,
the media, and an elected public official, who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be
given a copy thereof.

The phrase "immediately after seizure and confiscation" means that the physical inventory and photographing of
the drugs were intended by the law to be made immediately after, or at the place of apprehension. And only if
this is not practicable that the IRR allows the inventory and photographing at the nearest police station or the
nearest office of the apprehending officer/team. This also means that the three required witnesses should
already be physically present at the time of apprehension - a requirement that can easily be complied
with by the buy-bust team considering that the buy-bust operation is, by its nature, a planned activity. In
other words, the buy-bust team has enough time and opportunity to bring with them said witnesses.

Moreover, while the IRR allows alternative places for the conduct of the inventory and photographing of the
seized drugs, the requirement of having the three required witnesses to be physically present at the time
or near the place of apprehension is not dispensed with. The reason is simple: it is at the time of arrest -
or at the time of the drugs "seizure and confiscation" - that the presence of the three witnesses is most
needed, as it is their presence at the time of seizure and confiscation that would insulate against the
police practice of planting evidence.  (Additional emphasis and underscoring supplied)
46

Also, the Court made similar pronouncements in People v. Tomawis,  to wit:
47
The presence of the three witnesses must be secured not only during the inventory but more
importantly at the time of the warrantless arrest. It is at this point in which the presence of the three
witnesses is most needed, as it is their presence at the time of seizure and confiscation that would belie any
doubt as to the source, identity, and integrity of the seized drug. If the buy-bust operation is legitimately
conducted, the presence of the insulating witnesses would also controvert the usual defense of frame-up as the
witnesses would be able to testify that the buy-bust operation and inventory of the seized drugs were done in
their presence in accordance with Section 21 of RA 9165.

The practice of police operatives of not bringing to the intended place of arrest the three witnesses, when they
could easily do so and "calling them in" to the place of inventory to witness the inventory and
photographing of the drugs only after the buy-bust operation has already been finished - does not
achieve the purpose of the law in having these witnesses prevent or insulate against the planting of
drugs.

To restate, the presence of the three witnesses at the time of seizure and confiscation of the drugs must
be secured and complied with at the time of the warrantless arrest; such that they are required to be at or
near the intended place of the arrest so that they can be ready to witness the inventory and
photographing of the seized and confiscated drugs "immediately after seizure and confiscation." 48

(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In this case, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses showed noncompliance with the three-witness
rule: first, only two witnesses were present; and second, the two witnesses were merely "'called in" to witness
the inventory of the seized drug. Additionally, no photograph was presented showing the inventory of the
seized shabu in the presence of Tanes and the witnesses. Hence, the RTC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion when it granted the petition for bail on the ground that the evidence of Tanes' guilt was not strong due
to doubts as regards the preservation of the chain of custody. Such ruling by the RTC has unquestionable
jurisprudential basis. Consequently, the CA was correct in upholding the RTC.

A final note

There being non-compliance with the rule on chain of custody of the drug seized during the buy-bust operation,
the evidence of guilt for the crime of illegal sale of drugs against Tanes is deemed not strong. Accordingly, he is
entitled to bail.

The present ruling, however, should not prejudge the RTC's ruling on the merits of the case. Indeed, there are
instances when the Court had ruled that failure to strictly comply with the procedure in Section 21, Article II of
R.A. 9165 does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items void. In such cases, the
prosecution must still satisfactorily prove that: (a) there is justifiable ground for non-compliance; and (b) the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved.  The prosecution must be able to
49

adequately explain the reasons behind the procedural lapses. 50

The Court emphasizes that no part of this Decision should prejudice the submission of additional evidence for
the prosecution to prove Tanes' guilt in the main case. After all, a grant of bail does not prevent the RTC, as the
trier of facts, from making a final assessment of the evidence after full trial on the merits.
51

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
BAR MATTER No. 914 October 1, 1999

RE: APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE PHILIPPINE BAR,

vs.

VICENTE D. CHING, applicant.

RESOLUTION

KAPUNAN, J.:

Can a legitimate child born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother and an alien father validly elect
Philippine citizenship fourteen (14) years after he has reached the age of majority? This is the question sought to
be resolved in the present case involving the application for admission to the Philippine Bar of Vicente D. Ching.

The facts of this case are as follows:

Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of the spouses Tat Ching, a Chinese citizen, and Prescila A. Dulay, a
Filipino, was born in Francia West, Tubao, La Union on 11 April 1964. Since his birth, Ching has resided in the
Philippines.

On 17 July 1998, Ching, after having completed a Bachelor of Laws course at the St. Louis University in Baguio
City, filed an application to take the 1998 Bar Examinations. In a Resolution of this Court, dated 1 September
1998, he was allowed to take the Bar Examinations, subject to the condition that he must submit to the Court
proof of his Philippine citizenship.

In compliance with the above resolution, Ching submitted on 18 November 1998, the following documents:

1. Certification, dated 9 June 1986, issued by the Board of Accountancy of the Professional
Regulations Commission showing that Ching is a certified public accountant;

2. Voter Certification, dated 14 June 1997, issued by Elizabeth B. Cerezo, Election Officer of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in Tubao La Union showing that Ching is a registered
voter of the said place; and

3. Certification, dated 12 October 1998, also issued by Elizabeth B. Cerezo, showing that Ching
was elected as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tubao, La Union during the 12 May
1992 synchronized elections.

On 5 April 1999, the results of the 1998 Bar Examinations were released and Ching was one of the successful
Bar examinees. The oath-taking of the successful Bar examinees was scheduled on 5 May 1999. However,
because of the questionable status of Ching's citizenship, he was not allowed to take his oath. Pursuant to the
resolution of this Court, dated 20 April 1999, he was required to submit further proof of his citizenship. In the
same resolution, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) was required to file a comment on Ching's petition for
admission to the bar and on the documents evidencing his Philippine citizenship.

The OSG filed its comment on 8 July 1999, stating that Ching, being the "legitimate child of a Chinese father and
a Filipino mother born under the 1935 Constitution was a Chinese citizen and continued to be so, unless upon
reaching the age of majority he elected Philippine citizenship" 1 in strict compliance with the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 625 entitled "An Act Providing for the Manner in which the Option to Elect Philippine
Citizenship shall be Declared by a Person Whose Mother is a Filipino Citizen." The OSG adds that "(w)hat he
acquired at best was only an inchoate Philippine citizenship which he could perfect by election upon reaching
the age of majority." 2 In this regard, the OSG clarifies that "two (2) conditions must concur in order that the
election of Philippine citizenship may be effective, namely: (a) the mother of the person making the election must
be a citizen of the Philippines; and (b) said election must be made upon reaching the age of majority." 3 The
OSG then explains the meaning of the phrase "upon reaching the age of majority:"

The clause "upon reaching the age of majority" has been construed to mean a reasonable time
after reaching the age of majority which had been interpreted by the Secretary of Justice to be
three (3) years (VELAYO, supra at p. 51 citing Op., Sec. of Justice No. 70, s. 1940, Feb. 27,
1940). Said period may be extended under certain circumstances, as when a (sic) person
concerned has always considered himself a Filipino (ibid., citing Op. Nos. 355 and 422, s. 1955;
3, 12, 46, 86 and 97, s. 1953). But in Cuenco, it was held that an election done after over seven
(7) years was not made within a reasonable time.

In conclusion, the OSG points out that Ching has not formally elected Philippine citizenship and, if ever he does,
it would already be beyond the "reasonable time" allowed by present jurisprudence. However, due to the
peculiar circumstances surrounding Ching's case, the OSG recommends the relaxation of the standing rule on
the construction of the phrase "reasonable period" and the allowance of Ching to elect Philippine citizenship in
accordance with C.A. No. 625 prior to taking his oath as a member of the Philippine Bar.

On 27 July 1999, Ching filed a Manifestation, attaching therewith his Affidavit of Election of Philippine Citizenship
and his Oath of Allegiance, both dated 15 July 1999. In his Manifestation, Ching states:

1. I have always considered myself as a Filipino;

2. I was registered as a Filipino and consistently declared myself as one in my school records
and other official documents;

3. I am practicing a profession (Certified Public Accountant) reserved for Filipino citizens;

4. I participated in electoral process[es] since the time I was eligible to vote;

5. I had served the people of Tubao, La Union as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan from
1992 to 1995;

6. I elected Philippine citizenship on July 15, 1999 in accordance with Commonwealth Act No.
625;

7. My election was expressed in a statement signed and sworn to by me before a notary public;

8. I accompanied my election of Philippine citizenship with the oath of allegiance to the

Constitution and the Government of the Philippines;

9. I filed my election of Philippine citizenship and my oath of allegiance to (sic) the Civil Registrar
of Tubao La Union, and

10. I paid the amount of TEN PESOS (Ps. 10.00) as filing fees.

Since Ching has already elected Philippine citizenship on 15 July 1999, the question raised is whether he has
elected Philippine citizenship within a "reasonable time." In the affirmative, whether his citizenship by election
retroacted to the time he took the bar examination.

When Ching was born in 1964, the governing charter was the 1935 Constitution. Under Article IV, Section 1(3) of
the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed
the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine
citizenship. 4 This right to elect Philippine citizenship was recognized in the 1973 Constitution when it provided
that "(t)hose who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred
and thirty-five" are citizens of the Philippines. 5 Likewise, this recognition by the 1973 Constitution was carried
over to the 1987 Constitution which states that "(t)hose born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who
elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority" are Philippine citizens. 6 It should be noted,
however, that the 1973 and 1987 Constitutional provisions on the election of Philippine citizenship should not be
understood as having a curative effect on any irregularity in the acquisition of citizenship for those covered by
the 1935 Constitution. 7 If the citizenship of a person was subject to challenge under the old charter, it remains
subject to challenge under the new charter even if the judicial challenge had not been commenced before the
effectivity of the new Constitution. 8

C.A. No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to Section 1(3), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, prescribes the
procedure that should be followed in order to make a valid election of Philippine citizenship. Under Section 1
thereof, legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect Philippine citizenship by expressing such intention
"in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any officer authorized to administer
oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement
with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines."

However, the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not prescribe a time period within which the election of
Philippine citizenship should be made. The 1935 Charter only provides that the election should be made "upon
reaching the age of majority." The age of majority then commenced upon reaching twenty-one (21) years. 9 In
the opinions of the Secretary of Justice on cases involving the validity of election of Philippine citizenship, this
dilemma was resolved by basing the time period on the decisions of this Court prior to the effectivity of the 1935
Constitution. In these decisions, the proper period for electing Philippine citizenship was, in turn, based on the
pronouncements of the Department of State of the United States Government to the effect that the election
should be made within a "reasonable time" after attaining the age of majority. 10 The phrase "reasonable time"
has been interpreted to mean that the election should be made within three (3) years from reaching the age of
majority. 11 However, we held in Cuenco vs. Secretary of Justice, 12 that the three (3) year period is not an
inflexible rule. We said:

It is true that this clause has been construed to mean a reasonable period after reaching the age
of majority, and that the Secretary of Justice has ruled that three (3) years is the reasonable time
to elect Philippine citizenship under the constitutional provision adverted to above, which period
may be extended under certain circumstances, as when the person concerned has always
considered himself a Filipino. 13

However, we cautioned in Cuenco that the extension of the option to elect Philippine citizenship is not indefinite:

Regardless of the foregoing, petitioner was born on February 16, 1923. He became of age on
February 16, 1944. His election of citizenship was made on May 15, 1951, when he was over
twenty-eight (28) years of age, or over seven (7) years after he had reached the age of majority.
It is clear that said election has not been made "upon reaching the age of majority." 14

In the present case, Ching, having been born on 11 April 1964, was already thirty-five (35) years old when he
complied with the requirements of C.A. No. 625 on 15 June 1999, or over fourteen (14) years after he had
reached the age of majority. Based on the interpretation of the phrase "upon reaching the age of majority,"
Ching's election was clearly beyond, by any reasonable yardstick, the allowable period within which to exercise
the privilege. It should be stated, in this connection, that the special circumstances invoked by Ching, i.e., his
continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines and his being a certified public accountant, a registered
voter and a former elected public official, cannot vest in him Philippine citizenship as the law specifically lays
down the requirements for acquisition of Philippine citizenship by election.

Definitely, the so-called special circumstances cannot constitute what Ching erroneously labels as informal
election of citizenship. Ching cannot find a refuge in the case of In re: Florencio Mallare, 15 the pertinent portion
of which reads:

And even assuming arguendo that Ana Mallare were (sic) legally married to an alien, Esteban's
exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age, constitutes a positive act of election of
Philippine citizenship. It has been established that Esteban Mallare was a registered voter as of
April 14, 1928, and that as early as 1925 (when he was about 22 years old), Esteban was
already participating in the elections and campaigning for certain candidate[s]. These acts are
sufficient to show his preference for Philippine citizenship. 16

Ching's reliance on Mallare is misplaced. The facts and circumstances obtaining therein are very different from
those in the present case, thus, negating its applicability. First, Esteban Mallare was born before the effectivity of
the 1935 Constitution and the enactment of C.A. No. 625. Hence, the requirements and procedures prescribed
under the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 for electing Philippine citizenship would not be applicable to him.
Second, the ruling in Mallare was an obiter since, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, it was not necessary for
Esteban Mallare to elect Philippine citizenship because he was already a Filipino, he being a natural child of a
Filipino mother. In this regard, the Court stated:
 Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a Filipina, is therefore himself a Filipino, and no
other act would be necessary to confer on him all the rights and privileges attached to Philippine
citizenship (U.S. vs. Ong Tianse, 29 Phil. 332; Santos Co vs. Government of the Philippine
Islands, 42 Phil. 543, Serra vs. Republic, L-4223, May 12, 1952, Sy Quimsuan vs. Republic, L-
4693, Feb. 16, 1953; Pitallano vs. Republic, L-5111, June 28, 1954). Neither could any act be
taken on the erroneous belief that he is a non-filipino divest him of the citizenship privileges to
which he is rightfully entitled. 17

The ruling in Mallare was reiterated and further elaborated in Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of
Representatives, 18 where we held:

We have jurisprudence that defines "election" as both a formal and an informal process.

In the case of In re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]), the Court held that the exercise of
the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election
of Philippine citizenship. In the exact pronouncement of the Court, we held:

Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age constitutes a

positive act of Philippine citizenship. (p. 52: emphasis supplied)

The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his life here in
the Philippines.

For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who cannot be excepted to have elected
Philippine citizenship as they were already citizens, we apply the In Re Mallare rule.

xxx xxx xxx

The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirement for those who still have to
elect citizenship. For those already Filipinos when the time to elect came up, there are acts of
deliberate choice which cannot be less binding. Entering a profession open only to Filipinos,
serving in public office where citizenship is a qualification, voting during election time, running for
public office, and other categorical acts of similar nature are themselves formal manifestations for
these persons.

An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the person electing is an alien. Or his
status is doubtful because he is a national of two countries. There is no doubt in this case about
Mr. Ong's being a Filipino when he turned twenty-one (21).

We repeat that any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of the private respondent would
not only have been superfluous but it would also have resulted in an absurdity. How can a
Filipino citizen elect Philippine citizenship? 19

The Court, like the OSG, is sympathetic with the plight of Ching. However, even if we consider the special
circumstances in the life of Ching like his having lived in the Philippines all his life and his consistent belief that
he is a Filipino, controlling statutes and jurisprudence constrain us to disagree with the recommendation of the
OSG. Consequently, we hold that Ching failed to validly elect Philippine citizenship. The span of fourteen (14)
years that lapsed from the time he reached the age of majority until he finally expressed his intention to elect
Philippine citizenship is clearly way beyond the contemplation of the requirement of electing "upon reaching the
age of majority." Moreover, Ching has offered no reason why he delayed his election of Philippine citizenship.
The prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking process. All
that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the
same with the nearest civil registry. Ching's unreasonable and unexplained delay in making his election cannot
be simply glossed over.

Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be claimed when needed and suppressed
when convenient. 20 One who is privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has only an inchoate right to such
citizenship. As such, he should avail of the right with fervor, enthusiasm and promptitude. Sadly, in this case,
Ching slept on his opportunity to elect Philippine citizenship and, as a result. this golden privilege slipped away
from his grasp.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court Resolves to DENY Vicente D. Ching's application for admission to
the Philippine Bar.

A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460             March 31, 2006

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Petitioner,

vs.
JUDGE FLORENTINO V. FLORO, JR., Respondent.

x--------------x

A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC             March 31, 2006

Re: RESOLUTION DATED 11 MAY 1999 OF JUDGE FLORENTINO V. FLORO, JR.

x--------------x

A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988             March 31, 2006

(Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 99-812-RTJ)

LUZ ARRIEGO, Petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE FLORENTINO V. FLORO, JR., Respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

"Equity does not demand that its suitors shall have led blameless lives." Justice Brandeis, Loughran v.
Loughran 1

THE CASES

The First Case: A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460 (Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr.)

It was in 1995 that Atty. Florentino V. Floro, Jr. first applied for judgeship. A pre-requisite psychological
evaluation on him then by the Supreme Court Clinic Services (SC Clinic) revealed "(e)vidence of ego
disintegration" and "developing psychotic process." Judge Floro later voluntarily withdrew his application. In June
1998, when he applied anew, the required psychological evaluation exposed problems with self-esteem, mood
swings, confusion, social/interpersonal deficits, paranoid ideations, suspiciousness, and perceptual distortions.
Both 1995 and 1998 reports concluded that Atty. Floro was unfit to be a judge.

Because of his impressive academic background, however, the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) allowed Atty.
Floro to seek a second opinion from private practitioners. The second opinion appeared favorable thus paving
the way to Atty. Floro’s appointment as Regional Trial Court (RTC) Judge of Branch 73, Malabon City, on 4
November 1998.

Upon Judge Floro’s personal request, an audit on his sala was conducted by the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) from 2 to 3 March 1999.2

After conducting the audit, the audit team, led by Atty. Mary Jane Dacarra-Buenaventura, reported its findings to
erstwhile Court Administrator, Alfredo L. Benipayo, who submitted his own report/memorandum 3 to then Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. dated 13 July 1999 recommending, among other things, that his report be
considered as an administrative complaint against Judge Floro and that Judge Floro be subjected to an
appropriate psychological or mental examination. Court Administrator Benipayo recommended as well that
Judge Floro be placed under preventive suspension for the duration of the investigation against him.

In a Resolution4 dated 20 July 1999, the Court en banc adopted the recommendations of the OCA, docketing the
complaint as A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460, in view of the commission of the following acts or omissions as reported by
the audit team:
 (a) The act of circulating calling cards containing self-laudatory statements regarding qualifications and
for announcing in open court during court session his qualification in violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.02,
Canons of Judicial Conduct;

(b) For allowing the use of his chambers as sleeping quarters;

(c) For rendering resolutions without written orders in violation of Rule 36, Section 1, 1997 Rules of
Procedures;

(d) For his alleged partiality in criminal cases where he declares that he is pro-accused which is contrary
to Canon 2, Rule 2.01, Canons of Judicial Conduct;

(e) For appearing and signing pleadings in Civil Case No. 46-M-98 pending before Regional Trial Court,
Branch 83, Malolos, Bulacan in violation of Canon 5, Rule 5.07, Canons of Judicial Conduct which
prohibits a judge from engaging in the private practice of law;

(f) For appearing in personal cases without prior authority from the Supreme Court and without filing the
corresponding applications for leaves of absence on the scheduled dates of hearing;

(g) For proceeding with the hearing on the Motion for Release on Recognizance filed by the accused
without the presence of the trial prosecutor and propounding questions in the form of examination of the
custodian of the accused;

(h) For using/taking advantage of his moral ascendancy to settle and eventually dismiss Criminal Case
No. 20385-MN (for frustrated homicide) in the guise of settling the civil aspect of the case, by persuading
the private complainant and the accused to sign the settlement even without the presence of the trial
prosecutor;

(i) For motu proprio and over the strong objection of the trial prosecutor, ordering the mental and
physical examination of the accused based on the ground that the accused is "mahina ang pick-up";

(j) For issuing an Order on 8 March 1999 which varies from that which he issued in open court in
Criminal Case No. 20385-MN, for frustrated homicide;

(k) For violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 Code of Judicial Conduct when he openly criticized the Rules of
Court and the Philippine justice system;

(l) For the use of highly improper and intemperate language during court proceedings;

(m) For violation of Circular No. 135 dated 1 July 1987.

Per the same resolution of the Court, the matter was referred to Retired Court of Appeals Justice Pedro Ramirez
(consultant, OCA) for investigation, report and recommendation within 60 days from receipt. Judge Floro was
directed to comment within ten days from receipt of the resolution and to subject himself to an appropriate
psychological or mental examination to be conducted "by the proper office of the Supreme Court or any duly
authorized medical and/or mental institution." In the same breath, the Court resolved to place Judge Floro under
preventive suspension "for the duration of the investigation of the administrative charges against him." He was
barely eight months into his position.

On 20 August 1999, Judge Floro submitted a Verified Comment where he set forth both affirmative and negative
defenses6 while he filed his "Answer/Compliance" on 26 August 1999.

On 3 March 2000, Judge Floro moved for the provisional/final dismissal of his case for failure to
prosecute.7 However, on 21 March 2000, he presented himself as his first witness in the hearing conducted by
Justice Ramirez.8 Subsequently, on 7 July 2000, Judge Floro filed a "Petition for Inhibition/Disqualification"
against Justice Ramirez as investigator9 which was denied by Justice Ramirez in an Order dated 11 July
2000. 10 Judge Floro’s motion for reconsideration 11 suffered the same fate. 12 On 27 July 2000, Judge Floro
submitted the question of Justice Ramirez’s inhibition/disqualification to this Court. 13 On 8 August 2000, the
Court ruled against the inhibition of Justice Ramirez. 13
On 11 September 2000, the OCA, after having been ordered by the Court to comment on Judge Floro’s motion
to dismiss, 15 recommended that the same should be denied.

Judge Floro presented his last witness on 6 March 2001. 16 The day after, Justice Ramirez came out with a
"Partial Report" recommending the dismissal of Judge Floro from office "by reason of insanity which renders him
incapable and unfit to perform the duties and functions of Judge of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital
Judicial Region, Malabon, Metro Manila, Branch 73." 17

In the meantime, throughout the investigation of the 13 charges against him and even after Justice Ramirez
came out with his report and recommendation on 7 March 2001, Judge Floro had been indiscriminately filing
cases against those he perceived to have connived to boot him out of office.

A list of the cases Judge Floro filed in the wake of his 20 July 1999 preventive suspension follows:

1. OCA IPI No. 00-07-OCA – against Atty. Mary Jane Dacarra-Buenaventura, Team Leader, Judicial
Audit Team, Office of the Court Administrator 18

2. OCA IPI No. 00-933-RTJ – against Judge Benjamin Aquino, Jr., Regional Trial Court, Branch 72,
Malabon City 19

3. AC No. 5286 – against Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo and Judge Benjamin Aquino, Jr.20

4. AC No. CBD-00-740 – against Thelma C. Bahia, Court Management Office, Atty. Mary Jane Dacarra-
Buenaventura, Atty. II, Court Management Office, both of the Office of the Court Administrator and Atty.
Esmeralda G. Dizon, Branch Clerk of Court, Branch 73, Malabon21

5. AC No. 6282 (CPL No. C-02-0278) – against former Court Administrator Justice Alfredo L. Benipayo
and (Ret.) Justice Pedro A. Ramirez, Consultant, Office of the Court Administrator22

6. A.M. No. 03-8-03-0 – against (Ret.) Justice Pedro A. Ramirez23

7. A.C. No. 6050 – against (Ret.) Justice Pedro A. Ramirez24

On 1 February 2006, Judge Floro moved that the cases he filed, now totaling seven, be dismissed.25 On 14
February 2006, the Court granted the motion to dismiss.26

The Second Case: A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988(Luz Arriego v. Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr.)

This charge is likewise the subject matter of charge "h" in A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460: "(f)or using/taking advantage
of his moral ascendancy to settle and eventually dismiss Criminal Case No. 20385-MN (for frustrated homicide)
in the guise of settling the civil aspect of the case, by persuading the private complainant and the accused to
sign the settlement even without the presence of the trial prosecutor." The complainant Luz Arriego is the mother
of the private complainant in Criminal Case No. 20385-MN.

On 28 June 2001, Arriego testified, while court stenographer Jocelyn Japitenga testified on 16 July 2001. On 31
July 2001, Arriego filed her Formal Offer of Evidence which was opposed by Judge Floro on 21 August 2001. On
5 September 2001, Judge Floro testified on his behalf while Atty. Galang testified against him on 4 October
2001. On 16 October 2001, Judge Floro filed a Memorandum in this case.27

The Third Case: A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC (Re: Resolution Dated 11 May 1999 of Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr.)

As can be gathered from the title, this case concerns a resolution issued by Judge Floro on 11 May 1999 in
Special Proceeding Case No. 315-MN "In Re: Petition To Be Admitted A Citizen Of The Philippines, Mary Ng
Nei, Petitioner." The resolution disposed of the motions for voluntary inhibition of Judge Floro and the
reconsideration of the order denying the petition for naturalization filed by petitioner in that case, Mary Ng Nei.

This resolution found its way to the OCA through a letter written by Atty. David S. Narvasa, the petitioner’s
counsel.28 The OCA, through Court Administrator Benipayo, made the following evaluation:
 In the subject resolution, Judge Floro, Jr. denied the motion for inhibition and declared it as null and void.
However, he ordered the raffling of the case anew (not re-raffle due to inhibition) so that the petitioner,
Mary Ng Nei, will have a chance to have the case be assigned to other judges through an impartial raffle.

When Judge Floro, Jr. denied the motion for inhibition, he should have continued hearing and taking
cognizance of the case. It is improper for him to order the raffle of the case "anew" as this violates
Administrative Circular No. 1 (Implementation of Sec. 12, Art. XVIII of the 1987 Constitution) dated
January 28, 1988 which provides to wit:

"8. Raffle of Cases:

xxxx

8.3 Special raffles should not be permitted except on verified application of the interested party who
seeks issuance of a provisional remedy and only upon a finding by the Executive Judge that unless the
special raffle is conducted, irreparable damage shall be suffered by the applicant. The special raffle shall
be conducted by at least two judges in a multiple-sala station.

x x x x"

Based on the foregoing, a judge may not motu proprio order the special raffle of a case since such is only
allowed upon a verified application of the interested party seeking a provisional remedy and only upon the
Executive Judge’s finding that if a special raffle is not conducted, the applicant will suffer irreparable damage.
Therefore, Judge Floro, Jr.’s order is contrary to the above-mentioned Administrative Circular.

Moreover, it is highly inappropriate for Judge Floro, Jr. to even mention in his resolution that Justice Regino C.
Hermosisima, Jr. is his benefactor in his nomination for judgeship. It is not unusual to hear a judge who speaks
highly of a "padrino" (who helped him get his position). Such remark even if made as an expression of deep
gratitude makes the judge guilty of creating a dubious impression about his integrity and independence. Such
flaunting and expression of feelings must be suppressed by the judges concerned. A judge shall not allow family,
social, or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment (Canon 2, Rule 2.03, Code of Judicial
Conduct).

The merits of the denial of the motion for inhibition and the ruling on the motion for reconsideration are judicial
matters which this Office has no authority to review. The remedy is judicial, not administrative.29

The OCA thus recommended that Judge Floro comment on (a) his act of ordering the raffle of the case in
violation of Administrative Circular No. 1; and (b) his remark on page 5 of the subject resolution that "Justice
Hermosisima, Jr. x x x helped undersigned so much, in the JBC, regarding his nomination x x x."

In a Resolution dated 17 August 1999, the Court en banc adopted the recommendations of the OCA.30 Judge
Floro, through his counsel, filed his Comment on 22 October 199931 which was noted by this Court on 7
December 1999. On 11 January 2000, Judge Floro filed a Formal Offer of Evidence which this Court, in a
resolution dated 25 January 2000, referred to Justice Ramirez for inclusion in his report and recommendation.

For the record, the OCA is yet to come up with its report and recommendation in this case as well as in the
second case (i.e., A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988). Thus, in a resolution dated 14 February 2006, the Court directed
Judge Floro as well as the other parties in these two cases to inform the Court whether or not they are willing to
submit A.M. RTJ-06-1988 and A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC for decision on the basis of the pleadings filed and the
evidence so far submitted by them or to have the decision in A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460 decided ahead of the two.
On 20 February 2006, the OCA, thru Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., manifested its willingness to
submit A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC for resolution based on the pleadings and the evidence submitted therein.
Complainant Luz Arriego in A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988 likewise informed this Court, in a Letter dated 28 February
2006, her willingness to submit her case for decision based on the pleadings already submitted and on the
evidence previously offered and marked. On the other hand, on 3 March 2006, Judge Floro manifested his
preference to have A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460 decided ahead of A.M. RTJ-06-1988 and A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC.

In the interest of orderly administration of justice, considering that these are consolidated cases, we resolve to
render as well a consolidated decision.
But first, the ground rules: Much has been said across all fronts regarding Judge Floro’s alleged mental illness
and its effects on his duties as Judge of a Regional Trial Court. For our part, figuring out whether Judge Floro is
indeed psychologically impaired and/or disabled as concluded by the investigator appointed by this Court is
frankly beyond our sphere of competence, involving as it does a purely medical issue; hence, we will have to
depend on the findings of the mental health professionals who interviewed/analyzed Judge Floro. Our job is
simply to wade through the evidence, filter out the irrelevant and the irreverent in order to determine once and
for all if Judge Floro is indeed guilty of the charges against him. If the evidence makes out a case against Judge
Floro, the next issue is to determine the appropriate penalty to be imposed.

Finally, we will have to determine whether Judge Floro acted with an evil mind or because of a psychological or
mental incapacity. Upon the resolution of this question hinges the applicability of equity.

As an aside, it bears pointing out that some of the charges ("c" and "g", "h" and "j", "e" and "f") will be jointly
discussed as they had likewise been jointly discussed by the OCA. These charges involve common facts and to
treat them separately will be superfluous.

DISCUSSION

As alleged and as proven, the 13 specified charges do not warrant the supreme penalty of dismissal against
Judge Floro

(a) Re: Charge of circulating calling cards containing self-laudatory statements regarding qualifications AND for
announcing in open court during court session his qualifications in violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.02, Canons of
Judicial Conduct

As narrated by the audit team, Judge Floro was circulating calling cards bearing his name as the Presiding
Judge of RTC, Branch 73, Malabon City, and indicating therein that he is a "bar exams topnotcher (87.55%)"
and with "full second honors" from the Ateneo de Manila University, A.B. and LL.B.32 The audit team likewise
reported that: "(b)efore the start of court session, Judge Floro is introduced as a private law practitioner, a
graduate of Ateneo de Manila University with second honors, and a bar topnotcher during the 1983 Bar
Examinations with an average score of 87.55%. Afterwards, a reading of the Holy Bible, particularly the Book of
Revelation according to Saint John, was made. The people in the courtroom were given the opportunity to ask
Judge Floro questions on the matter read. No questions were asked; hence the session commenced."33

Judge Floro argues that, per commentary of Justice Ruperto G. Martin, 34 "the use of professional cards
containing the name of the lawyer, his title, his office and residence is not improper" and that the word "title"
should be broad enough to include a Judge’s legal standing in the bar, his honors duly earned or even his Law
School. Moreover, other lawyers do include in their calling cards their former/present titles/positions like
President of the Jaycees, Rotary Club, etc., so where then does one draw the line? Finally, Judge Floro argues
that his cards were not being circulated but were given merely as tokens to close friends or by reciprocity to
other callers considering that common sense dictates that he is not allowed by law to seek other professional
employment.

As to the charge that he had been announcing in open court his qualifications, Judge Floro counters that it was
his branch clerk of court, Atty. Esmeralda Galang-Dizon, who suggested that during his initial court session, she
would briefly announce his appointment with an introduction of his school, honors, bar rating and law practice.
Naively, Judge Floro agreed as the introduction was done only during the first week of his assumption into office.

Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct says in no uncertain terms that "a judge should not seek
publicity for personal vainglory." A parallel proscription, this time for lawyers in general, is found in Rule 3.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility: "a lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent,
misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal
services." This means that lawyers and judges alike, being limited by the exacting standards of their profession,
cannot debase the same by acting as if ordinary merchants hawking their wares. As succinctly put by a leading
authority in legal and judicial ethics, "(i)f lawyers are prohibited from x x x using or permitting the use of any
undignified or self-laudatory statement regarding their qualifications or legal services (Rule 3.01, Code of
Professional Responsibility), with more reasons should judges be prohibited from seeking publicity for vanity or
self-glorification. Judges are not actors or actresses or politicians, who thrive by publicity." 35

The question, therefore, is: By including self-laudatory details in his professional card, did Judge Floro violate
Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct?
In Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc., 36 we explained that the use of an ordinary and simple professional card by lawyers
is permitted and that the card "may contain only a statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is
connected with, address, telephone number and special branch of law practiced." In herein case, Judge Floro’s
calling cards cannot be considered as simple and ordinary. By including therein the honors he received from his
law school with a claim of being a bar topnotcher, Judge Floro breached the norms of simplicity and modesty
required of judges.

Judge Floro insists, however, that he never circulated his cards as these were just given by him as tokens and/or
only to a few who requested the same. 37 The investigation by Justice Ramirez into the matter reveals otherwise.
An eye-witness from the OCA categorically stated that Judge Floro circulated these cards. 38 Worse, Judge
Floro’s very own witness, a researcher from an adjoining branch, testified that Judge Floro gave her one of these
cards. 39

As this charge involves a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, it should be measured against Rule 140 of
the Rules of Court as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC being more favorable to respondent Judge Floro. Rule
140, before its amendment, automatically classified violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct as serious
charges. As amended, a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct may amount to gross misconduct, which is a
serious charge, or it may amount to simple misconduct, which is a less serious charge or it may simply be a
case of vulgar and/or unbecoming conduct which is a light charge.

"Misconduct" is defined as wrong or improper conduct while "gross" connotes something "out of all measure;
beyond allowance; not to be excused; flagrant; shameful." 40 For serious misconduct to exist, the judicial act
complained of should be corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the law or a persistent disregard of well-
known legal rules. 41

With the foregoing as yardstick, we find the act of Judge Floro in circulating calling cards containing self-
laudatory statements constitutive of simple misconduct in violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct as it appears that Judge Floro was not motivated by any corrupt motive but, from what we can see from
the evidence, a persistent and unquenchable thirst for recognition. Concededly, the need for recognition is an all
too human flaw and judges do not cease to be human upon donning the judicial robe. Considering, however, the
proscription against judges seeking publicity for personal vainglory, they are held to a higher standard as they
must act within the confines of the code they swore to observe.

As to the charge that Judge Floro, through his branch clerk of court, had been announcing in open court his
qualifications, we find that this is likewise violative of Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct as it
smacks of unnecessary publicity. Judges should not use the courtroom as platform for announcing their
qualifications especially to an audience of lawyers and litigants who very well might interpret such publicity as a
sign of insecurity. Verily, the public looks upon judges as the bastion of justice – confident, competent and true.
And to discover that this is not so, as the judge appears so unsure of his capabilities that he has to court the
litigants and their lawyers’ approval, definitely erodes public confidence in the judiciary.

As it is not disputed, however, that these announcements went on for only a week, Judge Floro is guilty of
simple misconduct only.

(b)Re: Charge of allowing the use of his chambers as sleeping quarters

The audit team observed that "inside Judge Floro’s chamber[s], there is a folding bed with cushion located at the
right corner of the room. A man, who was later identified as Judge Floro’s driver, was sleeping. However, upon
seeing the audit team, the driver immediately went out of the room." 42

Judge Floro contends that this charge is without legal or factual basis. The man the audit team saw "sleeping"
on his folding bed, J. Torralba, was Judge Floro’s aide or "alalay" whom he allows to rest from time to time (in
between periods and especially during court sessions) for humanitarian reasons. J. Torralba was not sleeping
during that time that the audit team was in Branch 73 as he immediately left when he saw the members thereof.

This charge must fail as there is nothing inherently improper or deplorable in Judge Floro having allowed another
person to use his folding bed for short periods of time during office hours and while there is no one else in the
room. The situation would have been different if there had been any allegation of misuse or abuse of
government funds and/or facilities such as in the case of Presado v. Genova 43 wherein Judge Genova was
found guilty of serious misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service when he and his
family used his chambers as residential quarters, with the provincial government paying for the electrical bills.
Be that as it may, it does not augur well for a new judge to allow such familiarity from his aide as this becomes
fodder for gossip as what had apparently happened in this case. Judge Floro should have been aware of and
attuned to the sensibilities of his staff who were understandably uncomfortable with the uncommon arrangement
of a judge allowing his aide easy access to his folding bed.

(c) Re: Charge of rendering resolutions without written orders in violation of Rule 36, Section 1, 1997 Rules of
Procedure

(g) Re: Charge of proceeding with the hearing on the Motion for Release on Recognizance filed by the accused
without the presence of the trial prosecutor and propounding questions in the form of examination of the
custodian of the accused

The memorandum report reads:

c. It was reported by the staff of Branch 73 that regardless of the absence of the trial prosecutor, Judge Floro, Jr.
still proceeded with the hearing of the following matters:

(c-1) "Motion for Release on Recognizance" filed by the accused, in Criminal Cases Nos. 20384, 20371, 20246
and 20442 entitled "People vs. Luisito Beltran", "People vs. Emma Alvarez, et al.", "People vs. Rowena Camino",
and "People vs. John Richie Villaluz", respectively. In the hearing of these motions, Judge Floro, Jr. propounded
questions (in a form of direct examination) to the custodian of the accused without the accused being sworn by
the administering officer. (Note: initially, Judge Floro, Jr. ordered the Branch Clerk of Court Dizon to place the
accused under oath prior to the start of his questions. However, COC Dizon refused). The hearing on the
aforesaid motions is an offshoot of a previous hearing wherein the accused had pleaded guilty to a lesser
offense. After the reading of the sentence, Judge Floro, Jr. would automatically inform the accused that they are
qualified to apply for probation. In fact, Judge Floro, Jr. would even instruct his staff to draft the application in
behalf of the accused so that a motion for release on recognizance will immediately be heard and be
consequently granted. As appearing in the minutes of the hearing (attached herewith as Annexes "3" to "6"), the
custodians of the accused are either a barangay kagawad, barangay tanod or a member of the lupong
tagapamayapa. Likewise, no written order granting the motion for release on recognizance is being issued by
Judge Floro, Jr. since according to him neither rules nor circular mandates the issuance of a written order.
Instead, after granting the motion, Judge Floro, Jr. just requires the parties to sign the minutes of the session.
Photocopies of the minutes dated March 4, 1999 in Criminal Cases Nos. 20384-MN; 20373-MN; and 20371-MN
are hereto attached as Annexes "3" to "5".

On March 11, 1999, in Criminal Cases Nos. 20426-MN and 20442-MN, Judge Floro, Jr. granted a similar motion
without issuing a written order. Copies of the minutes are hereto attached as annexes "6" to "7." 44

In his Verified Comment, Judge Floro argues that he never violated any rule of procedure with respect to the
cases mentioned by the Audit Team, asserting that –

Contrary to the stance of the TEAM, Sec. 1 of Rule 36, Rules of Court refers only to final and not interlocutory
orders. Only final orders and judgments are promulgated, rendered and entered.

xxxx

Applying the foregoing well-settled doctrines of law to the case at bar, herein respondent faithfully complied with
the requirements of Sec. 7 of P.D. 968 as amended, regarding the applications for release on recognizance,
thus:

a. The application for release on recognizance, although captioned as MOTION FOR RELEASE ON
RECOGNIZANCE, is primarily governed by Sec. 7 of P.D. 968, a Special Law on Probation.

b. Any Application for Release on Recognizance, is given due course/taken cognizance of by

respondent, if on its face, the same bears the rubber stamp mark/receipt by the Office of the City/Public
Prosecutor.

c. The consistent practice both in RTC, METRO MANILA (all courts), especially in RTC, MALABON, and
in Malolos, Bulacan (where respondent practiced from 1985-1998 – almost 14 years), [and especially the
practice of former Judge A. V. Cabigao, Br. 73, RTC, Malabon, Metro Manila], is to interview the
custodian, in the chambers, regarding his being a responsible member of the community where the
 accused reside/resides; the questions propounded are in the form of direct and even cross examination
questions.

d. The accused is not required to be placed on the witness stand, since there is no such requirement. All
that is required, is to inform the accused regarding some matters of probation (optional) such as whether
he was sentenced previously by a Court, whether or not he has had previous cases, etc.

e. Even if RTC Judges in Malabon do not conduct Court hearings on application for release on
recognizance, respondent, for caution in most of the applications, included the interview/hearing on the
applications for release on recognizance, during criminal trial dates, where a fiscal/trial prosecutor is
available; at other times, the hearing is held in the chambers.45

The explanation given by Judge Floro betrays his liability for ignorance of the rules on probation under
Presidential Decree No. 968 (Probation Law), as amended. Contrary to his remonstrations, the release of an
accused on recognizance entails more than a cursory interview of the custodian and the applicant. Under the
Probation Law,46 and as we explained in Poso v. Judge Mijares,47 it is incumbent upon the Judge hearing the
application to ascertain first that the applicant is not a "disqualified offender" as "(p)utting the discharge of the
accused on hold would have allowed [the judge] more time to pass upon the request for provisional liberty."

Moreover, from Judge Floro’s explanations, it would seem that he completely did away with the requirement for
an investigation report by the probation officer. Under the Probation Law, the accused’s temporary liberty is
warranted only during the period for awaiting the submission of the investigation report on the application for
probation and the resolution thereon.48 As we explained in Poso v. Judge Mijares49 :

It must be stressed that the statutory sequence of actions, i.e., order to conduct case study prior to action on
application for release on recognizance, was prescribed precisely to underscore the interim character of the
provisional liberty envisioned under the Probation Law. Stated differently, the temporary liberty of an applicant
for probation is effective no longer than the period for awaiting the submission of the investigation report and the
resolution of the petition, which the law mandates as no more than sixty (60) days to finish the case study and
report and a maximum of fifteen (15) days from receipt of the report for the trial judge to resolve the application
for probation. By allowing the temporary liberty of the accused even before the order to submit the case study
and report, respondent Judge unceremoniously extended the pro tem discharge of the accused to the detriment
of the prosecution and the private complainants. (Emphasis supplied)

As to the argument of Judge Floro that his Orders for the release of an accused on recognizance need not be in
writing as these are duly reflected in the transcript of stenographic notes, we refer to Echaus v. Court of
Appeals 50 wherein we held that "no judgment, or order whether final or interlocutory, has juridical existence until
and unless it is set down in writing, signed and promulgated, i.e., delivered by the Judge to the Clerk of Court for
filing, release to the parties and implementation." Obviously, then, Judge Floro was remiss in his duties as judge
when he did not reduce into writing his orders for the release on recognizance of the accused in Criminal Cases
No. 20384, 20371, 202426 and 20442 entitled, "People v. Luisito Beltran," "People v. Emma Alvarez, et al.,"
"People v. Rowena Camino," and "People v. John Richie Villaluz." 51 From his explanation that such written
orders are not necessary, we can surmise that Judge Floro’s failure was not due to inadvertence or negligence
on his part but to ignorance of a procedural rule.

In fine, we perceive three fundamental errors in Judge Floro’s handling of probation cases. First, he ordered the
release on recognizance of the accused without the presence of the prosecutor thus depriving the latter of any
opportunity to oppose said release. Second, Judge Floro ordered the release without first requiring the probation
officer to render a case study and investigation report on the accused. Finally, the order granting the release of
the accused on recognizance was not reduced into writing.

It would seem from the foregoing that the release of the accused on recognizance, as well as his eventual
probation, was already a done deal even before the hearing on his application as Judge Floro took up the
cudgels for the accused by instructing his staff to draft the application for probation. This, Judge Floro did not
deny. Thus, we agree in the observation of the audit team that Judge Floro, as a matter of policy, had been
approving applications for release on recognizance hastily and without observing the requirements of the law for
said purpose. Verily, we having nothing against courts leaning backward in favor of the accused; in fact, this is a
salutary endeavor, but only when the situation so warrants. In herein case, however, we cannot countenance
what Judge Floro did as "the unsolicited fervor to release the accused significantly deprived the prosecution and
the private complainants of their right to due process." 52
Judge Floro’s insistence that orders made in open court need not be reduced in writing constitutes gross
ignorance of the law. Likewise, his failure to follow the basic rules on probation, constitutes gross ignorance of
the law. 53

Verily, one of the fundamental obligations of a judge is to understand the law fully and uphold it
conscientiously. 54 When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to know and simply apply it for
anything less is constitutive of gross ignorance of the law. 55 True, not every judicial error bespeaks ignorance of
the law and that, if committed in good faith, does not warrant administrative sanctions. 56 To hold otherwise
"would be nothing short of harassing judges to take the fantastic and impossible oath of rendering infallible
judgments." 57 This rule, however, admits of an exception as "good faith in situations of fallible discretion inheres
only within the parameters of tolerable judgment and does not apply where the issues are so simple and the
applicable legal principle evident and as to be beyond permissible margins of error." 58 Thus, even if a judge
acted in good faith but his ignorance is so gross, he should be held administratively liable. 59

(d) RE: Charge of partiality in criminal cases where he declared that he is pro-accused which is contrary to
Canon 2, Rule 2.01, Canons of Judicial Conduct

The audit team reported that Judge Floro relayed to the members thereof that in criminal cases, he is always
"pro-accused" particularly concerning detention prisoners and bonded accused who have to continually pay for
the premiums on their bonds during the pendency of their cases.

Judge Floro denies the foregoing charge. He claims that what he did impart upon Atty. Buenaventura was the
need for the OCA to remedy his predicament of having 40 detention prisoners and other bonded accused whose
cases could not be tried due to the lack of a permanent prosecutor assigned to his sala. He narrated as well to
Atty. Buenaventura the sufferings of detention prisoners languishing in the Malabon/Navotas jail whose cases
had not been tried during the vacancy of his sala from February 1997 to 5 November 1998. At any rate, Judge
Floro submits that there is no single evidence or proof submitted by any litigant or private complainant that he
sided with the accused.

Atty. Dizon, Judge Floro’s Clerk of Court, on the other hand, categorically stated under oath that Judge Floro,
during a staff meeting, admitted to her and the staff of Branch 73 and in the presence of his Public Attorney’s
Office (PAO) lawyer that he is pro-accused for the reason that he commiserated with them especially those
under detention as he, himself, had been accused by his brother and sister-in-law of so many unfounded
offenses. 60

Between the two versions, the testimony of Atty. Dizon is more credible especially since it is corroborated by
independent evidence, 61 e.g., Judge Floro’s unwarranted eagerness in approving application for release on
recognizance as previously discussed.

Canon 2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states: "A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary." This means that a judge whose duty is to apply the
law and dispense justice "should not only be impartial, independent and honest but should be believed and
perceived to be impartial, independent and honest" as well. 62 Like Caesar’s wife, a judge must not only be pure
but above suspicion. 63 Judge Floro, by broadcasting to his staff and the PAO lawyer that he is pro-accused,
opened himself up to suspicion regarding his impartiality. Prudence and judicial restraint dictate that a judge
should reserve personal views and predilections to himself so as not to stir up suspicions of bias and unfairness.
Irresponsible speech or improper conduct of a judge erodes public confidence in the judiciary. 64 "His language,
both written and spoken, must be guarded and measured, lest the best of intentions be misconstrued." 65

On a more fundamental level, what is required of judges is objectivity if an independent judiciary is to be

realized. And by professing his bias for the accused, Judge Floro is guilty of unbecoming conduct as his capacity
for objectivity is put in serious doubt, necessarily eroding the public’s trust in his ability to render justice. As we
held in Castillo v. Juan 66 :

In every litigation, x x x, the manner and attitude of a trial judge are crucial to everyone concerned, the offended
party, no less than the accused. It is not for him to indulge or even to give the appearance of catering to the at-
times human failing of yielding to first impressions. He is to refrain from reaching hasty conclusions or prejudging
matters. It would be deplorable if he lays himself open to the suspicion of reacting to feelings rather than to facts,
of being imprisoned in the net of his own sympathies and predilections. It must be obvious to the parties as well
as the public that he follows the traditional mode of adjudication requiring that he hear both sides with patience
and understanding to keep the risk of reaching an unjust decision at a minimum. It is not necessary that he
should possess marked proficiency in law, but it is essential that he is to hold the balance true. What is equally
important is that he should avoid any conduct that casts doubt on his impartiality. What has been said is not
merely a matter of judicial ethics. It is impressed with constitutional significance.

(h) Re: Charge of using/taking advantage of his moral ascendancy to settle and eventually dismiss Criminal
Case No. 20385-MN (for frustrated homicide) in the guise of settling the civil aspect of the case, by persuading
the private complainant and the accused to sign the settlement even without the presence of the trial prosecutor.

(j) Re: Charge of issuing an Order on 8 March 1999 which varies from that which he issued in open court in
Criminal Case No. 20385-MN, for frustrated homicide.

The memorandum report states:

During the arraignment and pre-trial of Criminal Case No. 20385-MN entitled: "People vs. Nenita Salvador",
Judge Floro, Jr., in the absence of the public prosecutor and considering that the private complainant was not
being represented by a private prosecutor, used his moral ascendancy and influence to convince the private
complainant to settle and eventually cause the dismissal of the case in the guise of settling its civil aspect by
making the private complainants and the accused sign the settlement. (Copy of the signed stenographic notes is
hereto attached as Annex "8").

xxxx

In an Order dated March 8, 1999 in Criminal Case No. 20385-MN, for frustrated homicide, Judge Floro, Jr. put
on record the "manifestations" of the private complainant and the accused relative to their willingness to settle
the civil aspect of the case. In the same order, Judge Floro, Jr. reserved his ruling on the said settlement until
after the public prosecutor has given his comment. However, per report of the court employees in Branch 73, the
aforesaid order was actually a revised one or a deviation from the original order given in open court. Actually, the
said criminal case was already settled even without the presence of the public prosecutor. The settlement was in
the nature of absolving not only the civil liability of the accused but the criminal liability as well. It was further
reported that the private complainants signed the compromise agreement due to the insistence or persuasion of
Judge Floro, Jr. The audit team was furnished a copy of the stenographic notes (unsigned draft order) and the
revised order (signed). Copies of the stenographic notes and the revised order are hereto attached as Annexes
"8", "13", and "14". (Note: the stenographic notes were signed by the parties to the case).

In the meantime, the mother of the private complainant in Criminal Case No. 20385-MN, Luz Arriego, filed an
administrative case against Judge Floro docketed as A.M. OCA-I.P.I. No. 99-812-RTJ. In her Affidavit
Complaint 67 dated 9 August 1999, she alleged that on 8 March 1999, Judge Floro forced them to settle her
daughter’s case against the accused therein despite the absence of the trial prosecutor. When the parties could
not agree on the amount to be paid by the accused for the medical expenses incurred by complaining witness,
they requested respondent that they be given time to study the matter and consult a lawyer to which Judge Floro
replied that the case be settled immediately, uttering, "ngayon na! ngayon na!" Moreover, Judge Floro allegedly
made them believe that the counter-charges filed by the accused against the complaining witness would likewise
be dismissed, so they agreed to settle the case. However, the written Order issued by respondent Judge did not
reflect the agreement entered into by the parties in open court.

Judge Floro takes exception to the foregoing OCA report and the complaint filed by Mrs. Arriego, maintaining
that the hearing on said case was not only in accordance with the Rules of Court but was also beneficial to the
litigants concerned as they openly manifested their willingness to patch up their differences in the spirit of
reconciliation. Then, considering that the parties suggested that they would file the necessary pleadings in due
course, Judge Floro waited for such pleadings before the TSN-dictated Order could be reduced to writing.
Meanwhile, in the course of a conversation between Judge Floro and Court Administrator Benipayo, the latter
opined that under Section 27 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, an offer of compromise in criminal cases is
tantamount to an admission of guilt except in some cases. With this in mind, the 8 March 1999 Order of the
hearing on even date was superseded by the revised written Order likewise dated 8 March 1999.

Judge Floro asserts that contrary to Atty. Buenaventura’s stance that he has no power to revise an Order, courts
have plenary power to recall and amend or revise any orally dictated order in substance and in form even motu
proprio.

The rule on the matter finds expression in Echaus v. Court of Appeals 68 wherein we declared:
x x x [N]o judgment, or order whether final or interlocutory, has juridical existence until and unless it is set down
in writing, signed and promulgated, i.e., delivered by the Judge to the Clerk of Court for filing, release to the
parties and implementation, and that indeed, even after promulgation, it does not bind the parties until and
unless notice thereof is duly served on them by any of the modes prescribed by law. This is so even if the order
or judgment has in fact been orally pronounced in the presence of the parties, or a draft thereof drawn up and
signed and/or copy thereof somehow read or acquired by any party. In truth, even after promulgation (i.e., filing
with the clerk of court), and even after service on the parties of notice of an order or judgment, the Court
rendering it indisputably has plenary power to recall and amend or revise it in substance or form on motion of
any party or even motu proprio, provided that in the case of a final order or judgment, the same has not attained
finality. (Emphasis supplied)

In herein case, what was involved was an interlocutory order made in open court – ostensibly a judicial approval
of a compromise agreement – which was amended or revised by removing the stamp of judicial approval, the
written order merely stating that Judge Floro was reserving its ruling regarding the manifestations of the parties
to enter into a compromise agreement after the public prosecutor shall have submitted its comments thereto. 69

Considering then that it was well within the discretion of Judge Floro to revise his oral order per the Echaus
ruling and factoring in his explanation for resorting to such an amendment, we find no basis for the charge of
dishonesty (under paragraph "j" of the complaint).

Anent the charge that Judge Floro used his moral ascendancy to settle and eventually dismiss Criminal Case
No. 20385-MN (for frustrated homicide) in the guise of settling the civil aspect of the case, by persuading the
private complainant and the accused to sign the settlement even without the presence of the trial prosecutor, the
same must likewise fail for lack of basis. The controversial settlement never came to pass. It was not judicially
approved as reflected in the revised Order of 8 March 1999, thus, Mrs. Arriego actually had no cause for
complaint. She cannot, on one hand, complain that the written order did not reflect the agreement reached
during the hearing and, on the other hand, claim that this agreement was reached under duress at the instance
of Judge Floro.

(i) For motu proprio and over the strong objection of the trial prosecutor, ordering the mental and physical
examination of the accused based on the ground that the accused is "mahina ang pick-up"

The audit team reported that in an Order dated 8 February 1999 in Criminal Case No. 20347-MN, Judge Floro
"motu proprio ordered the physical and mental examination of the accused by any physician, over the strong
objection of the trial prosecutor, on the ground that the accused is "mahina ang pick-up." 70

In refutation, Judge Floro argues --

In the case at bar, respondent/Court carefully observed the demeanor of the accused NESTOR ESCARLAN and
noted the manifestations of his counsel de oficio, Atty. E. Gallevo, PAO lawyer, and the comment/objections of
the trial prosecutor, Prosecutor J. Diaz, thus:

a. Atty. Gallevo manifested to the Court that the accused opted to enter a plea of not guilty;

b. But upon query of the Court, the accused approached the bench and he appeared trembling and
stammering;

c. Atty. Gallevo, upon questions by respondent, readily admitted that accused is "nauutal", has difficulty
of reasoning, of speaking, and very nervous;

d. Atty. Gallevo also manifested that the accused often changed his mind regarding the plea, from not
guilty to guilty and to not guilty, and so forth;

e. Considering the grave situation, Atty. Gallevo, upon citation by the Court/respondent of the pertinent
provisions of the Rules, namely Rule 28 (Mental Examination of Persons), Sec. 12 of Rule 116, and Sec.
5(g) of Rule 135, Rules of Court (plenary powers to issue orders to conform to justice), manifested orally
that the accused is "mahina ang pick-up";

f. Hence, respondent exercised his sound discretion in issuing the ORDER OF MENTAL
EXAMINATION.
The MENTAL examination ORDER finds legal support, since it is well-settled that "the court may order a
physical or MENTAL examination of a party where his physical or mental condition is material to the issues
involved." (27 C.J.S. p. 119, cf. MARTIN, p. 107, id.). 71

PAO lawyer Erwin Joy B. Gallevo took the witness stand for Judge Floro. He testified that he moved for the
suspension of the arraignment of the accused Nestor Escarlan Escancilla in order to assess his mental fitness
for trial. 72 As reflected in the Order for suspension, however, and as admitted by Judge Floro himself in his
Comment, Atty. Gallevo merely manifested that accused is "mahina ang pick-up."

Be that as it may, we cannot fault Judge Floro for suspending the arraignment motu proprio and "over the strong
objection of the trial prosecutor." It must be remembered that the scheduled arraignment took place in February
1999 when the applicable rule was still Section 12(a) of Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure,
which reads:

SEC. 12. Suspension of arraignment. – The arraignment shall be suspended, if at the time thereof:

(a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which effectively renders him unable
to fully understand the charge against him and to plead intelligently thereto. In such case, the court shall order
his mental examination and, if necessary, his confinement for such purpose.

The above-cited rule does not require that the suspension be made pursuant to a motion filed by the accused
unlike Section 11(a), Rule 116 of the present 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure which decrees that the
suspension be made "upon motion by the proper party." 73 Thus, it was well within the discretion of Judge Floro
to order the suspension of the arraignment motu proprio based on his own assessment of the situation. In fact,
jurisprudence imposes upon the Judge the duty to suspend the proceedings if it is found that the accused, even
with the aid of counsel, cannot make a proper defense. 74 As we underscored in People v. Alcalde 75 :

Settled is the rule that when a judge is informed or discovers that an accused is apparently in a present condition
of insanity or imbecility, it is within his discretion to investigate the matter. If it be found that by reason of such
affliction the accused could not, with the aid of counsel, make a proper defense, it is the duty of the court to
suspend the proceedings and commit the accused to a proper place of detention until his faculties are
recovered. x x x.

xxxx

The constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him under the Bill of
Rights carries with it the correlative obligation to effectively convey to the accused the information to enable him
to effectively prepare for his defense. At the bottom is the issue of fair trial. While not every aberration of the
mind or exhibition of mental deficiency on the part of the accused is sufficient to justify suspension of the
proceedings, the trial court must be fully satisfied that the accused would have a fair trial with the assistance the
law secures or gives. x x x.

Whether or not Judge Floro was indeed correct in his assessment of the accused’s mental fitness for trial is
already beside the point. If ever he erred, he erred in the side of caution which, under the circumstances of the
case, is not an actionable wrong.

(e)Re: Charge of appearing and signing pleadings in Civil Case No. 46-M-98 pending before Regional Trial
Court, Branch 83, Malolos, Bulacan in violation of Canon 5, Rule 5.07, Code of Judicial Conduct which prohibits
a judge from engaging in the private practice of law

(f)Re: Charge of appearing in personal cases without prior authority from the Supreme Court and without filing
the corresponding applications for leaves of absence on the scheduled dates of hearing

In support of the above charges, the memorandum report states:

i.Judge Floro, Jr. informed the audit team that he has personal cases pending before the lower courts in
Bulacan. He admitted that Atty. Bordador, the counsel of record in some of these cases, is just signing the
pleadings for him while he (Judge Floro, Jr.) acts as collaborating counsel. When attending the hearing of the
cases, Judge Floro, Jr. admitted that he does not file an application for leave of absence.
Based on the reports gathered by the audit team, Judge Floro, Jr. has a pending civil case in the Regional Trial
Court of Malolos, Bulacan and a criminal case in Municipal Trial Court, Meycauayan, Bulacan. It is reported that
in these cases, he is appearing and filing pleadings in his capacity as party and counsel for himself and even
indicating in the pleadings that he is the Presiding Judge of Branch 73, RTC, Malabon.

Upon verification by the audit team, it was found out that Judge Floro, Jr. indeed has a pending case before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 83, Malolos, Bulacan docketed as Civil Case No. 46-M-98, entitled: "In Re: In the
Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Robert V. Floro, Atty. Florentino V. Floro, Jr., Petitioner - versus –
Jesie V. Floro and Benjamin V. Floro". In this case Judge Floro, Jr. filed an "Ex-Parte Motion for Issuance of
Entry of Judgment with Manifestation and/or Judicial Admission" wherein he signed as the petitioner and at the
same time indicated that he is the presiding judge of RTC, Branch 73, Malabon, Metro Manila. Court
stenographer Marissa Garcia, RTC, Branch 83, Malolos, Bulacan confirmed this information. Judge Floro, Jr.
even attached a copy of his oath taking and his picture together with President Joseph Estrada to the aforesaid
pleading. Photocopy of the said Motion is hereto attached as Annex "9".

Judge Floro, Jr. has a pending request with the Court Management Office, Office of the Court Administrator, to
appear as counsel or collaborating counsel in several civil cases (except the above-mentioned case) pending
before lower courts. 76

Well ensconced is the rule that judges are prohibited from engaging in the private practice of law. Section 35,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court unequivocally states that: "No judge or other official or employee of the superior
courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as member of the bar or give
professional advice to client." Canon 5, Rule 5.07 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, on the other hand, provides
that: "A judge shall not engage in the private practice of law."

Judge Floro vehemently denies the foregoing charge claiming that he hired lawyers to attend to his personal
cases. 77

A scrutiny of the voluminous records in this case does not reveal any concrete proof of Judge Floro having
appeared as counsel in his personal cases after he had already been appointed Judge except that he prepared
a pleading ("Ex Parte Motion For Issuance of Entry of Judgment With Manifestation and/or Judicial Admission")
jointly with his counsel of record in connection with a habeas corpus case he filed against his brothers for the
custody of their "mild, mentally-retarded" brother. He explained, however, that he prepared the said pleading in
the heat of anger as he could not accept the judgment of dismissal in that case.78 He likewise explained that the
pleading was signed by him alone due to inadvertence and that he had rectified the same by filing an Amended
Manifestation with Affidavit of Merit. 79 Finally, during the hearing of this case, Judge Floro argued that he filed
the subject pleading as petitioner and not as counsel. 80

The proscription against the private practice of law by judges is based on sound public policy, thus:

[T]he rights, duties, privileges and functions of the office of an attorney-at-law are inherently incompatible with
the high official functions, duties, powers, discretion and privileges of a judge. It also aims to ensure that judges
give their full time and attention to their judicial duties, prevent them from extending special favors to their own
private interests and assure the public of their impartiality in the performance of their functions. These objectives
are dictated by a sense of moral decency and desire to promote the public interest. 81

Based on the above rationale, it becomes quite evident that what is envisioned by "private practice" is more than
an isolated court appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same
nature habitually or customarily holding one’s self to the public as a lawyer. 82 In herein case, save for the
"Motion for Entry of Judgment," it does not appear from the records that Judge Floro filed other pleadings or
appeared in any other court proceedings in connection with his personal cases. It is safe to conclude, therefore,
that Judge Floro’s act of filing the motion for entry of judgment is but an isolated case and does not in any wise
constitute private practice of law. Moreover, we cannot ignore the fact that Judge Floro is obviously not
lawyering for any person in this case as he himself is the petitioner.

Be that as it may, though Judge Floro might not be guilty of unauthorized practice of law as defined, he is guilty
of unbecoming conduct for signing a pleading wherein he indicated that he is the presiding judge of RTC, Branch
73, Malabon City and for appending to the pleading a copy of his oath with a picture of his oath-taking. The only
logical explanation we can reach for such acts is that Judge Floro was obviously trying to influence or put
pressure on a fellow judge by emphasizing that he himself is a judge and is thus in the right. 83 Verily, Canon 2,
Rule 2.04 of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a "judge shall refrain from influencing in any manner
the outcome of litigation or dispute pending before another court or administrative agency." By doing what he
did, Judge Floro, to say the least, put a fellow judge in a very awkward position.

As to charge (f), the OCA has failed to substantiate its claim that Judge Floro has been attending the hearing of
his personal cases without filing for leave of absence. As Judge Floro vehemently protests the charge as untrue,
it was incumbent upon the OCA to prove its case. Time and again we have held that although administrative
proceedings are not strictly bound by formal rules on evidence, the liberality of procedure in administrative
actions is still subject to limitations imposed by the fundamental requirement of due process. 84

(k) Re: Charge of openly criticizing the Rules of Court and the Philippine justice system

(l) Re: Charge of use of highly improper and intemperate language during court proceedings

The memorandum report reads:

In the course of the judicial audit, the audit team was able to observe the way Judge Floro, Jr. conducts court
proceedings. With the assistance of the court staff, the team was able to obtain a tape-recorded proceeding
conducted by Judge Floro, Jr. Attached is the transcript of the proceedings (Annex "15"). The tape record of the
court proceedings is also submitted along with this report as Exhibit "A".

xxxx

The case for hearing that day was Civil Case No. 1256 MM. A certain Atty. Abelarde was appearing for the
plaintiff while Atty. Emmanuel Basa was appearing for the defendant. During the hearing, it seems that the
counsels for both parties were guiding Judge Floro, Jr. on how to proceed with the trial.

There was one instance when Judge Floro, Jr. criticized the Rules of Court, to wit:

"Judge Floro, Jr.: Kasi nga ang may plano nito ay ang Rules of Court, hindi nila maayos ang Rules of Court
natin, hindi realistic kinopya lang sa law of California on Civil Procedure; pagdating dito eh … dahil sa kanila
maraming nagkakaproblema, masyadong maraming … eh ako wala akong pinagkopyahan yan … but ginawa ko
lang yon … Sabi ko si Judge nagko-complain kasi, sabi ko nga pagka ang lawyer hindi alam yan talo na sa akin
… except … na hindi papayag … kasi marami diyang …"

In another proceeding conducted on a different day, Judge Floro, Jr., instead of holding trial, discussed, in open
court, the case involving his brother. He even condemned the Philippine justice system and manifested his
disgust on the unfairness of the system. Thus, he said:

"Sabi ko paano ko matatagpuan ang katarungan dito sa korteng eto bulok ang hustisya. Ang kapatid ko
napakayaman, ako walang pera."

He continued:

"Yung kapatid ko. Hindi ko makuha kundi makita ko lang. Bawal kasi; yung kapatid ko retarded, bawal. In
memory of my brother, Robert Floro. So, ngayon nag-file ako. Sabi ni Judge Agloro senermonan pa ako, ganun
… ganun … Sabi ko paano ko makikita ang katarungan. Tapos ngayon ang nangyari di Judge na ako, hindi ko
pa nakita ang kapatid ko. Di ngayon, ang ginawa ko na-dismiss na yung case, hindi ko inano kasi wala akong
nakikitang katarungan dahil ang kapatid ko ay napakaraming pera. Alam ko naman kung ang isang court eh
parehas o may kiling eh. Yung abogado niya malakas na malakas doon. Sana hindi naka-record eto (laughs)
baka ako ma-contempt dito." 85

Judge Floro denies the foregoing accusations, emphatically arguing that these are all hearsay fabrications
supplied by his Clerk of Court, Atty. Dizon, and by disgruntled RTC personnel due to ill or ulterior motives (i.e., to
allegedly cover-up their consistent tardiness, habitual absenteeism and gross neglect of duties which were all
unearthed by Judge Floro).

As to the tape recording of an alleged court hearing wherein he criticized the Philippine judicial system, Judge
Floro contends that this recording was done clandestinely by his staff in violation of the Anti-Wire Tapping Law
(Republic Act No. 4200) and, to suit their plans, they twisted the facts by cutting portions thereof. They also
made it appear that the conversation took place in a court proceeding when, in fact, this was inside his
chambers.
During the investigation, it was established that the two tapes in question were submitted to the OCA sans the
"yellow notes" and the official transcribed copy thereof. 86 This means that the transcribed copy that was
submitted by the audit team as Annex "15" is but an unofficial copy and does not, by itself, prove that what was
being recorded was a court proceeding. This being the case, the two tapes, without concrete proof that they
were taken officially during a court proceeding, cannot be used against Judge Floro as the unauthorized
recording of a private conversation is inadmissible under Rep. Act No. 4200. 87

Without the tape and transcribed copies of the contents thereof, we are thus left with only Judge Floro’s word
against that of Atty. Dizon, his Clerk of Court who testified under oath as to Judge Floro’s alleged propensity to
criticize the judiciary and to use intemperate language. Resolving these particular charges would therefore
depend upon which party is more credible.

Atty. Dizon stated on the witness stand that:

Q: Is Judge Floro guilty of Violation of Canon 1 Rule 1.01 Code of Judicial Conduct when he openly criticized the
Rules of Court and the Philippine Justice System?

A: Yes. Judge Floro has mentioned to each and everyone of us in branch 73 the alleged "kabulukan ng
hustisya". Time and again he said the Rules of Court is of no use. He said that since theory and the practice of
law are very different, the Rules of Court does not always apply to different cases. Not only the justice system
did he criticize but likewise Judges and Justices. He told us . . . and I quote "D’yan sa Malolos sangkatutak ang
corrupt na Judges . . . Sa Court of Appeals P25,000.00 ang pinakamababang lagayan diyan."

To our mind, how can a Judge like him openly criticize the very institution he is now serving? Where is his
respect to the court, to the bar and to the bench? How can he uphold courts as temples of justice if he himself
did not believe in the justice system?

xxxx

Q What can you say about charge letter "L" which reads for the use of highly improper and intemperate
language during court proceedings?

A Judge Floro, if in the presence of all his staff, during the presence of me, the Court Interpreter, the Legal
Researcher, maybe a Clerk, he always discuss matters regarding practitioners in our court. There is one time
one Atty. Feliciano a lady lawyer, he said, "Luka-luka, talaga yang babaing yan" and then he would call even not
during court session, but during office hours our Court Interpreter "malandi, luka-luka, may fruit of the sun". So, it
did not surprise us one time when during a pre-trial conference in a Civil Case, for Civil Case No. 25-86-MN
"Lopez v. Reyes and Mercado", he uttered offensive language against his fellow judge. Take the transcription of
this court proceeding is already adapted by the Court Administrator. It was the content of the tape he sent the
Court Administrator. Actually, for consultation and advise after hearing what Judge Floro discussed in open
Court, before all of us, the court staff present in the hearing and before the lawyer and the defendants in the
case, we were in quandary whether or not to attach in the record the stenographic notes or even the actual
transcription of the proceedings because it contained offensive languages against the justice system, against a
certain judge, against a certain Clerk of Court named Jude Assanda, against people he is disgusted with. In fact,
instead of discussing the merit of the case or the possibility of the amicable settlement between the parties, he
integrated this kind of discussion. So, as a Clerk of Court, I may not use my discretion whether or not to advise
the stenographer to indeed present the same or attach the same in the record because it contained offensive
languages highly improper and intemperate languages like for example, "putang ina", words like "ako ang anghel
ng kamatayan, etcetera, etcetera". 88

The denials of Judge Floro are insufficient to discredit the straightforward and candid declarations of Atty. Dizon
especially in the light of confirming proofs from Judge Floro himself.

The Court finds the version of Atty. Dizon more credible because subject utterances are consistent with Judge
Floro’s claims of intellectual superiority for having graduated with several honors from the Ateneo School of Law
and having placed 13th in the bar examinations. Moreover, his utterances against the judicial system on account
of his perception of injustice in the disposition of his brother’s case are not far removed from his reactions to
what he perceived were injustices committed against him by the OCA and by the persons who were either in
charge of the cases against him or had some sort of participation therein. Consequently, although there is no
direct proof that Judge Floro said what he is claimed to have said, nonetheless, evidence that he sees himself as
intellectually superior as well as evidence of his habit of crying foul when things do not go his way, show that it is
more likely that he actually criticized the Rules of Court and the judicial system and is thus guilty of unbecoming
conduct. Verily, in administrative cases, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt is substantial
evidence or such relevant evidence as reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. 89 In
this case, there is ample and competent proof of violation on Judge Floro’s part.

(m) Re: Charge of violating Circular No. 13-87 dated 1 July 1987

The memorandum report stated that Judge Floro –

[D]eviat[ed] from the regular course of trial when he discusses matters involving his personal life and beliefs.
Canon 3, Rule 3.03 provides that "[a] judge shall maintain order and proper decorum in the court." A disorderly
judge generates disorderly work. An indecorous judge invites indecorous reactions. Hence, the need to maintain
order and proper decorum in court. When the judge respects himself, others will respect him too. When he is
orderly, others will follow suit. Proceedings in court must be conducted formally and solemnly. The atmosphere
must be characterized with honor and dignity befitting the seriousness and importance of a judicial trial called to
ascertain the truth. Anything which tends to detract from this atmosphere must be avoided. And the judge is
supposed to be in control and is therefore responsible for any detraction therefrom.

Circular No. 13 (Guidelines in the Administration of Justice) dated July 1, 1987 provides that trial of cases should
be conducted efficiently and expeditiously. Judges should plan the course and direction of trials so that waste of
time is avoided.

Moreover, a judge should avoid being queer in his behavior, appearance and movements. He must always keep
in mind that he is the visible representative of the law. Judge Floro, Jr.’s claims that he is endowed with psychic
powers, that he can inflict pain and sickness to people, that he is the angel of death and that he has unseen
"little friends" are manifestations of his psychological instability and therefore casts doubt on his capacity to carry
out the functions and responsibilities of a judge. Hence, it is best to subject Judge Floro, Jr. once again to
psychiatric or mental examination to ascertain his fitness to remain in the judiciary. 90

Circular No. 13-87, by itself, does not define nor punish an offense but, as its title would suggest, it merely sets
the guidelines in the administration of justice following the ratification of the 1987 Constitution.

The arguments forwarded by the OCA, however, best exemplify the fact that the 13 charges are inextricably
linked to the charge of mental/psychological illness which allegedly renders Judge Floro unfit to continue
discharging the functions of his office. This being the case, we will consider the allegation that Judge Floro
proclaims himself to be endowed with psychic powers, that he can inflict pain and sickness to people, that he is
the angel of death and that he has unseen "little friends" in determining the transcendental issue of his
mental/psychological fitness to remain in office.

But before we even go into that, we must determine the appropriate penalty to be imposed for the seven of the
13 charges discussed above. To recapitulate, we have found Judge Floro guilty, in one way or another, of seven
of the 13 charges against him. Thus:

1) Charge "a" - simple misconduct

2) Charges "c" and "g" – gross ignorance of the law

3) Charge "d" – unbecoming conduct

4) Charge "e" – unbecoming conduct

5) Charges "k" and "l" – unbecoming conduct

Gross ignorance of the law or procedure is a serious charge. Under Rule 140 as amended, a judge guilty of a
serious charge may be dismissed from the service, suspended from office without salary and other benefits for
more than three but not exceeding six months or fined in the amount of P 20,000.00 but not exceeding P
40,000.00 depending on the circumstances of the case. In herein case, considering that Judge Floro had barely
warmed his seat when he was slammed with these charges, his relative inexperience is to be taken in his favor.
And, considering further that there is no allegation or proof that he acted in bad faith or with corrupt motives, we
hold that a fine is the appropriate penalty. The fine is to be imposed in the maximum, i.e. P 40,000.00, as we will
treat the findings of simple misconduct and unbecoming conduct as aggravating circumstances. 91
Judge Floro must be relieved of his position as Judge of RTC Malabon Branch due to a medically disabling
condition of the mind that renders him unfit to discharge the functions of his office

As we have explained, the common thread which binds the 13 seemingly unrelated accusations in A.M. No.
RTJ-99-1460 is the charge of mental illness against Judge Floro embodied in the requirement for him to undergo
an appropriate mental or psychological examination and which necessitated his suspension pending
investigation. This charge of mental illness, if true, renders him unfit to perform the functions of his office
notwithstanding the fact that, in disposing of the 13 charges, there had been no finding of dismissal from the
service against Judge Floro.

The Supreme Court Clinic first had occasion to interview Judge Floro when the latter applied for judgeship
(which application he later voluntarily withdrew) way back in September 1995. The psychological report, as
prepared by Cecilia C. Villegas, M.D. (Director III, Chief SC Clinic Services) and Melinda C. Grio (Psychologist),
stated in part:

PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION:

There are evidences of developing psychotic process at present.

REMARKS:

Atty. Floro was observed to be restless and very anxious during the interview. He was argumentative and over
solicitous of questions asked, giving the impressions of marked suspiciousness. He centered on his academic
excellence, an Ateneo de Manila graduate of the College of Law, rated top 13th place in the bar examination. He
emphasized his obsessive and compulsive method of studying, at least 15 hours per day regardless of whether
it was school days or vacation time. Vying for honors all the time and graduated Law as second honor, he calls
this self-discipline and self-organization. He expressed dissatisfaction of his achievements, tend to be a
perfectionist and cannot accept failures. To emphasize his ultra bright mind and analytical system, he related
that, for the past 3 to 5 years, he has been experiencing "Psychic vision" every morning and that the biggest
secret of the universe are the "unseen things." He can predict future events because of "power in psychic
phenomenon" as when his bar results was to be released, he saw lights in the sky "no. 13-1," and he got the
13th place. He has been practicing "parapsychology" – seeing plenty of "dwendes" around him.

He can talk on and on of bizarre ideas, that tends (sic) to be irrelevant.

Intellectually, he has high assets, however, evidence of ego disintegration are prominent findings, both in the
interview (conscious) and psychological test results. (unconscious level). 92

Approximately three years later, in June 1998, Judge Floro again presented himself to the Supreme Court Clinic
when he applied anew for judgeship, this time of RTC Malabon. Psychologist Beatriz O. Cruz and Celeste P.
Vista, M.D. (Psychiatrist and Medical Officer IV) did the interview and evaluation. Dr. Vista observed:

Atty. Floro has an impressive academic achievements (sic), and he takes pride in this. During the interview, he
was quite reluctant to reveal information about his family background and would rather talk about his work and
academic achievements. However, he failed to integrate his knowledge into a cohesive unit which he can utilize
to cope with the various tasks that he undertakes. This renders him confused and ambivalent with a tendency to
vacillate with decision-making. He also has a low self-esteem and prone to mood swings with the slightest
provocation.

From the interview, there seems to have been no drastic change in his personality and level of functioning as a
lawyer in private practice. However, he showed a pervasive pattern of social and interpersonal deficits. He has
poor social skills and showed discomfort with close social contacts. Paranoid ideations, suspiciousness of
others’ motives as well as perceptual distortions were evident during the interview.

Atty. Floro’s current intelligence function is along the mild mental retardation (68) which is below the expected
cognitive efficiency of a judge. Despite his impressive academic background and achievements, he has lapses
in judgment and may have problems with decision-making. His character traits such as suspiciousness and
seclusiveness and preoccupation with paranormal and psychic phenomena though not detrimental to his role as
a lawyer, may cloud his judgment, and hamper his primary role as a judge in dispensing justice. Furthermore, he
is at present not intellectually and emotionally equipped to hurdle the responsibilities of a judge and he may
decompensate when exposed to anxiety-provoking and stress-laden situation. 93
It would seem that the JBC disregarded the above-quoted report as it allowed Judge Floro to seek a second
opinion from private practitioners. A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460, however, resurrected the issue of his mental and
psychological capacity to preside over a regional trial court. Thus, the Resolution of 20 July 1999 specifically
ordered Judge Floro to submit to "appropriate psychological or mental examination."

On 1 February 2000, per recommendation of Justice Ramirez, 94 the Court clarified that the "appropriate
psychological or mental examination" being adverted to in the Resolution of 20 July 1999 is to be conducted by
the SC Clinic. The Court thereby directed Judge Floro to "submit himself to the SC Clinic for psychological or
mental examination, within ten (10) days from notice." 95 Judge Floro sought reconsideration which was denied
by the Court on 22 February 2000. 96

The order to submit to the appropriate psychological examination by the SC Clinic was reiterated by the Court on
17 October 2000 with the admonition that Judge Floro’s failure to do so would result in appropriate disciplinary
sanctions. 97

On 24 October 2000, Judge Floro sought reconsideration of the 17 October 2000 Resolution with a conjunctive
special motion for him to undergo psychiatric examination by any duly authorized medical and/or mental
institution. 98 This was denied by the Court on 14 November 2000. 99

On 10 November 2000, Judge Floro moved, among other things, for the inhibition or disqualification of Supreme
Court Clinic doctors 100 and psychologist 101 with a manifestation that he filed cases against them for revocation of
licenses before the Professional Regulatory Commission (PRC), the Philippine Medical Association (PMA) and
the PAP 102 for alleged gross incompetence and dishonorable conduct under Sec. 24 of Rep. Act No. 2382/1959
Medical Act/Code of Medical Ethics. 103

On 16 November 2000, Justice Ramirez, with the approval of Court Administrator Benipayo, moved that Judge
Floro be sanctioned for obvious contempt in refusing to comply with the 1 February 2000 and 17 October 2000
resolutions. According to Justice Ramirez, Judge Floro’s filing of administrative cases with the PRC against Dr.
Mendoza, et al., is an indication of the latter’s intention to disregard and disobey the legal orders of the
Court. 104 The Court en banc agreed in the report of Justice Ramirez, thus Judge Floro was ordered to submit to
psychological and mental examination within 10 days from receipt, otherwise, he "shall be ordered arrested and
detained at the jail of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) x x x." 105

Judge Floro finally complied with the directive on 13 and 15 December 2000. 106 He likewise sought the services
of a private practitioner, Dr. Eduardo T. Maaba, who came out with his own evaluation of Judge Floro on 3
January 2001. 107

Thus, Judge Floro trooped to the Supreme Court Clinic for the third time in December 2000, this time in
connection with A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460. Francianina G. Sanchez, Clinical Psychologist and Chief Judicial Staff
Officer reported that "(o)ver all data strongly suggest a delusional disorder with movement in the paranoid
direction." Dr. Celeste Vista, for her part, stated that:

Based on the clinical data gathered, it appears that Judge Floro is basically a cautious, and suspicious individual
with a compulsion to analyze and observe motives in his milieu. Despite his status, cognitive assets and
impressive educational background, his current functioning is gauged along the LOW AVERAGE intelligence.

He can function and apply his skills in everyday and routine situations. However, his test protocol is
characterized by disabling indicators. There is impairment in reality testing which is an indicator of a psychotic
process. He is unable to make an objective assessment and judgment of his milieu. Hence, he is apt to
misconstrue signals from his environment resulting to perceptual distortions, disturbed associations, and lapses
in judgment. Such that, cultural beliefs in dwarfs, psychic and paranormal phenomena and divine gifts of healing
have become incorporated in a delusional (false and unshakable beliefs) system, that it has interfered and
tainted his occupational and social functioning. Hence, he is found to be unfit in performing his court duties as a
judge. 108

Pursuant to the aforecited December 2000 interview of Judge Floro, Supreme Court Senior Chief Staff Officer
Rosa J. Mendoza, M.D., reported to Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. in March 2001 that –

The findings of mental and psychological incapacity is thus substantially supported by evidence. Based on the
three[3] psychological tests and evaluation of the two[2] psychiatrists, the undersigned has no other recourse but
to recommend that Judge Florentino Floro be declared unfit to discharge his duties as a Judge, effective
immediately.

Not one to take this last recommendation sitting down, Judge Floro submitted earlier psychological evaluations
conducted by several mental health professionals which were all favorable to him. The first three evaluations
were in connection with his application as RTC Judge of Malabon City in 1998 brought about by him having
"failed" the examination given by the Supreme Court Clinic. The report dated 04 September 1998 by staff
psychologist, Rowena A. Reyes as noted by clinical Psychologist, Ma. Teresa Gustilo-Villasor of the
Metropolitan Psychological Corporation (MPC), states in part:

I. INTELLECTUAL/COGNITIVE CHARACTERISTICS

SUMMARY OF INTELLECTUAL/COGNITIVE CHARACTERISTICS

1. FFJ can draw from above average intellectual resources to cope with everyday demands. He
is able to handle both concrete and abstract requirements of tasks. Alert to details, he has a
logical approach in evaluating the relationship between things and ideas.

2. He thrives in predictable and structured situations, where he can consider solid facts to arrived
(sic)at concrete, tangible outcomes. Task-oriented, he can organize procedures and details so as
to get things done correctly and on schedule. He uses conventional standards to determine
personal progress. Set in his views, he may not readily accept others’ ideas and contributions
especially if these oppose his own.

3. A serious and thorough approach to his commitments is expected of FFJ. Generally, he

prefers to control his emotions and does not let this get in the way of his judgment and decisions.

II. EMOTIONAL/INTERPERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS

FFJ is motivated by the need to be recognized and respected for his undertakings. Achievement-
oriented, he sets high personal standards and tends to judge himself and others according to these
standards. When things do not develop along desired lines, he may become restless and impatient.
Nevertheless, he is careful of his social stature and can be expected to comply with conventional social
demands. 109

Testifying as one of Judge Floro’s witnesses, Rowena A. Reyes opined on cross-examination that
"psychologically speaking," Judge Floro was not fit to be a judge. Thus:

JUDGE AQUINO:

Q: Now, that we are telling you that Judge Floro based on his testimony here and on every available records of
the proceedings, has been claiming that he [is] possessed with Psychic Powers and he did not tell you that in the
interview. Would you consider his failure to tell you about his Psychic Powers to be a fatal [flaw]?

xxxx

A: Yes, Sir.

Q: Very grave one, because it will affect the psychological outlook of the patient?

A: Yes, Sir.

xxxx

Q: I tell you now, Judge Floro has been claiming in [these] proceedings and you were here when we were cross-
examining Mr. Licaoco and you heard that we mentioned in the course of our cross-examination. Would you
consider his failure to tell you about his power of by location to be a fatal [flaw] and your assessment of his
psychological outlook?

xxxx
A: Yes, Sir.

Q: Fatal [flaw]?

A: Yes, Sir.

Q: Did Judge Floro tell you also in the course of the interview that he is capable of being in a trance?

A: He did not.

Q: So, he did not tell you that while in a trance he could type letters?

A: He did not.

xxxx

Q: And reality oriented and a reality oriented person is one who will not be pronouncing or making
pronouncement concerning his psychic powers. Is this not correct?

xxxx

A: Yes sir.

Q: A reality oriented person is also one who will not claim that he is capable of having trances in the course of
his private activities and even in the course of the performance of his official duty as a Judge. Will you not agree
with that?

A: I agree with you, Sir.

Q: And if he will do so, he will not be actually a reality oriented person. Meaning tatagalugin ko na po nakukuha
naman "na ako ay psychic, na ako ay pwedeng ipower ng by location, na kaya kong mag trance. Gumawa pa ng
iba’t iba pang bagay at the same time." Yan ay hindi compatible sa pagiging reality oriented?

A: Yes, Sir.

Q: And a person who is not reality oriented is not fit to sit as a Judge.

xxxx

Q: I will add the phrase Psychologically speaking.

xxxx

A: Yes, Sir. 110

Another psychiatrist, Pacita Ramos-Salceda, M.D., Senior Consultant Psychiatrist of the Makati Medical Center,
stated in her report dated 3 September 1998 that at the time of the interview Judge Floro –

[W]as enthusiastic and confident. He is well informed about current issues, able to discuss a wide variety of
topics intelligently without hesitation. His thinking is lucid, rational, logical and reality based. He is well oriented,
intelligent, emotionally stable, with very good judgment. There is no previous history of any psychological
disturbances. 111

This was followed by the evaluation of Eduardo L. Jurilla, M.D., dated September 1998, who stated in his report
that –

Atty. Floro is an asthenic, medium height, fairly groomed, be-spectacled person with graying hair. When
interviewed he was somewhat anxious, elaborative and at times approximate in his answers. He was alert,
oriented, conscious, cooperative and articulate in Pilipino and English. He denied any perceptual disturbances.
Stream of thought was logical and goal-directed. There was pressure of speech with tendency to be
argumentative or defensive but there were no flight of ideas, thought blocking, looseness of associations or
neologisms. Delusions were not elicited. Affect was broad and appropriate but mood was anxious. There were
no abnormal involuntary movements or tics. Impulse control is good. Cognition is intact. Judgment, insight, and
other test for higher cortical functions did not reveal abnormal results.

Comments: The over-all results of this psychiatric evaluation of Atty. Florentino V. Floro, Jr. do not contradict his
nomination and appointment to the post he is seeking. 112

On the witness stand, however, and testifying as Judge Floro’s witness, Dr. Jurilla clarified that the interview had
its limitations 113 and he might have missed out certain information left out by his patient. 114 The following
exchange is thus instructive:

JUDGE AQUINO: x x x. Did Judge Floro tell you in the interview that he has little unseen, unheard friends known
as duwendes?

DR. JURILLA: He did not.

xxxx

Q: Did you interview Judge Floro or did he [volunteer] to you information about his claim to be the number five
psychic in the country?

xxxx

A: No, Your Honor.

Q: He did not tell you also that he is gifted also with this so called, psychic phenomena?

A: He did not.

xxxx

Q: He did not tell you also that in [traveling] from one place to another, at least four (4) kilometers apart, he used
to ride on a big white or whatever it is, horse?

A: Not during our interview.

xxxx

A: It is possible like any other psychiatrist or mental health doctor you might have missed some information or it
is possible that our clients or patients might not [have] told us everything.

Q: And if your clients or patients did not tell you things such as those that Judge Floro did not admittedly tell you
in the course of the interview, your opinion of the patient would be altered a little?

xxxx

A: The answer has something to do whether my evaluation may be altered. Yes, Your Honor in the absence of
any corroborative contradiction.

Q: More so, if the presence of confirming events that transpired after the interview, would that be correct?

A: The interview has its limitations.

Q: Let us say, what Judge Floro did [not] tell you during the interview are confirmed by events that transpired
after the interview, would you not say you have more reason to have your evaluation altered?

A: Yes.
Q: Especially so if you will now know that after that interview Judge Floro has been proclaiming himself as the
number five psychic in the country [where] no one has called him as a psychic at all?

xxxx

Q: Would it be really more altered?

A: I would say so.

xxxx

Q: Returning to the confirming proofs, meaning after the interview, which are confirmations of what Judge Floro
did not tell you during the interview, would your finding of [J]udge Floro be drastically altered if he will tell you
that he is capable or possessed of the power of bilocation?

xxxx

A: I would probably try to for a diagnosis.

Q: Which may make a drastic alteration of your evaluation of Judge Floro’s mental and psychological x x x?

A: My diagnosis I will be seeking for an abnormal condition.

Q: When you said abnormal something would have made you suspect that there was abnormality in the person
of Judge Floro?

A: Given the data.

Q: We will give you the data or additional information. Would you also have your evaluation favorable to Judge
Floro drastically altered if I tell you that based on record Judge Floro has claimed that while in a trance he is
capable of typing a letter?

xxxx

A: If there is data toward that effect prior to September 1998, probably drastically altered. 115

Lastly, Judge Floro presented the psychiatric evaluation of Eduardo T. Maaba, M.D., 116 dated 3 January 2001,
the relevant portions of which state:

Affect was adequate and no mood incongruity was observed. Content of thought did not reveal delusional
thought. He was proud of his achievements in line with his profession and expressed his frustration and
dissatisfaction with the way his colleagues are handling his pending administrative cases. He was observed to
be reality-oriented and was not suffering from hallucinations or abnormal perceptual distortions. Orientation, with
respect to time, place and person, was unimpaired. Judgment and decision-making capacity were adequately
functioning.

xxxx

An open-ended clinical interview was conducted at our clinic on December 26, 2000. He talked about his family
and academic achievements. He claimed to possess a divine gift for prophecy and a gift of healing. He also
talked about a "covenant" made during a dream between him and 3 dwarf friends named Luis, Armand and
Angel. He reported that the first part of his ministry is to cast illness and/or disease and the second part is to heal
and alleviate sufferings/pain from disease.

A series of psychological test was administered to Judge Floro on December 28, 2000. The battery of test
consisted of the following: (1) Otis-Lennon Mental Ability Test (2) SRA Language Test (3) Purdue Non-Language
Test (4) Sack’s Sentence Completion Test and (5) Draw A Person Test. Test results and evaluation showed an
individual with an Above Average Intelligence. Projective data, showed an obsessive-compulsive person who is
meticulous to details and strive for perfection in tasks assigned to him. He is reality-oriented and is deemed
capable of making day-to-day decisions in his personal as well as professional decisions. Confusion with regard
to sexual identification, was further observed.

Based on the clinical observation and the results of the psychological tests, respondent Judge Florentino V.
Floro, Jr., was found to be a highly intelligent person who is reality-oriented and is not suffering from any major
psychotic disorder. He is not deluded nor hallucinated and is capable of utilizing his superior intellect in making
sound decisions. His belief in supernatural abilities is culture-bound and needs further studies/work-ups.

On cross-examination by Judge Aquino, however, Dr. Maaba also stated that Judge Floro was unfit to be a
judge. 117 The relevant exchanges between Dr. Maaba and Judge Aquino are hereunder reproduced:

JUDGE AQUINO: And would you say that something is wrong with a judge who shall claim that he is possessed
with power of [bi-location]?

xxxx

DR. MAABA: A reality-oriented individual would not claim to be in two (2) places at one time.

Q: And that something must be wrong?

A: Yes.

Q: Okay. Would you say that something is wrong also with a judge claiming in the course of his testimony and in
this very case that while [he] was so testifying there is another spirit, another person, another character unseen
who is with him at the same time or in tagalog "sumapi sa kanya".

xxxx

A: The observation that Judge Floro had unseen companion "sumapi" to me is unbelievable.

Q: Unbelievable. And anyone claiming it might be suffering from some delusion?

xxxx

A: It could be and it could not be considered as perceptual distortion, your Honor.

Q: No, Delusion.

A: Delusions, no, but Hallucinations, maybe yes.

Q: Ah, Hallucination, and which maybe worse?

A: Both are on the same footing.

Q: Okay. Would you say that the person declaring in a proceeding as a witness about hallucinatory matters
would turn out to be fit to become a judge?

xxxx

A. If these delusions or hallucinations are part and parcel of a major psychiatric disorder like schizophrenia or an
organic mental disorder, this individual suffering from hallucinations or delusions is unfit to sit as a judge,
however, there is, this symptom might also exi[s]t in a non-psychotic illness and the hallucinations and delusions
could be transient and short in duration.

Q: But of doubtful capacity to sit as a judge?

A: Yes, doubtful capacity.

Q: Now, trance is something covered by the field of which you are practicing with psychiatry.
A: Yes.

Q: Would you consider a person claiming in the course of a judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative proceedings
particularly in the course of his testimony that while he was doing so, he was under trance normal.

xxxx

A: Let me explain the phenomenon of trance it is usually considered in the Philippines as part of a culture bound
syndrome and it could also be an indication … Basically the phenomenon of trance are often seen in cases of
organic mental disorder. It is also common in culture bound syndrome and the effect of person is usually loss of
concentration in a particular settings or situations so that a person or a judge hearing a case in court would [lose]
concentration and would not be able to follow up testimony of witnesses as well as arguments given by the
counsel for the defense and also for the prosecution, so I would say that there is this difficulty in manners of
attention span and concentration if that person sitting as a judge experience trance as in the case of Judge
Floro, this trance is manifested by flashing of lights and he might not be able to rationalize or to control
expressions or as well as physical when he is in a trance.

Q: Have you heard of a judge claiming that in the course of a proceeding, he was in a trance?

A: No, I have not encountered any.

Q: And if you hear one and will be shown records of one maybe such claim you will call that person not a normal
person.

A: Maybe weird.

Q: I will now show to you portions of the stenographic notes of the proceedings in these cases held on October
10, 2000, afternoon session, page 30 we start with the question of Atty. Dizon. "Atty. Dizon: Mr. witness, can you
tell us? Are you in trance at this very precise moment? JUDGE FLORO, JR.: "Nakalakip sila". I call it a trance,
but I distinguished not the trance that you see the – nag-sa-Sto., Nino, naninigas. That’s a trance that is created
by the so called… Because Fr. Jaime Bulatao, multi awarded Jesuit priest, considered that as mind projection.
He is correct in a sense that those nagta-trance na yan, naninigas, the mind projection or the hypnosis do come,
and there is a change in the psychological aspect of the person. But in my case I never was changed physically
or mentally. Only the lights and heat will penetrate that person. ATTY. DIZON: That will do. So at this very
moment, Mr. witness, "meron kayong kalakip ngayon?"" "Ngayong oras na ito?" JUDGE FLORO: Yes, they are
here. Atty. DIZON: Where are they? Judge Floro, Jr.: They cannot be seen but… ATTY. DIZON: No, can you
see them?" To point to us where are they in this room?", Now that you have read and seen this portion wherein
Judge Floro himself admitted that in the course of his testimony in these cases he was in a trance, would you
still consider him at least insofar as this claim of his to be a normal person?

A: No.

Q: No, okay, so he is not normal. Now, Judge Floro in these proceedings also and I will show to you the
transcript of stenographic notes later have claimed that he had, always had and still had a so–called counter
part, his other side, other self, what can you say to that claim, would that be the claim of a normal, mental sound
person?

A: No.

Q: And one who is not normal and mentally sound is of course not fit to sit as judge?

xxxx

A: Yes. 118

Based on the foregoing, the OCA, thru Justice Ramirez, reported that:

Upon the testimony of his own witnesses, Drs. Eduardo T. Maaba, Ma. Nieves Celeste and Eduardo L. Jurilla,
respondent Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. is unfit because of insanity to remain in office as Judge of the Regional
Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Malabon, Metro Manila, Branch 73.
It is weird for respondent Judge to state in one of his pleadings in this case that President Estrada would not
finish his term as President. It is unusual and queer of him to state in his calling card that he is a graduate of
Ateneo de Manila, second honors, bar topnotcher with a grade of 87.55% and include in his address the name
Colonel Reynaldo Cabauatan who was involved in a coup d’etat attempt. So is it strange of him to make use of
his alleged psychic powers in writing decisions in the cases assigned to his court. It is improper and grandiose of
him to express superiority over other judges in the course of hearings he is conducting and for him to say that he
is very successful over many other applicants for the position he has been appointed. It is abnormal for a Judge
to distribute self-serving propaganda. One who distributes such self-serving propaganda is odd, queer, amusing,
irresponsible and abnormal. A judge suffering from delusion or hallucination is unfit to be one. So is he who gets
into a trance while presiding at the hearing of a case in court. One need not be a doctor of medicine, a
psychiatrist and a psychologist to determine and conclude that a person in such circumstances is mentally unfit
or insane and should not be allowed to continue discharging the duties and functions of a judge. The life, liberty
and property of the litigants in the court presided by such judge are in his hands. Hence, it is imperative that he
is free from doubt as to his mental capacity and condition to continue discharging the functions of his office.

RECOMMENDATION

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that by reason of insanity which renders him incapable and unfit
to perform the duties and functions of Judge of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region,
Malabon, Metro Manila, Branch 73, respondent Florentino V. Floro, Jr. be REMOVED and DISMISSED from
such office. 119

We are in agreement with the OCA that Judge Floro cannot remain as RTC Judge because of the findings of
mental impairment that renders him unfit to perform the functions of his office. We hasten to add, however, that
neither the OCA nor this Court is qualified to conclude that Judge Floro is "insane" as, in fact, the psychologists
and psychiatrists on his case have never said so.

When Justice Ramirez recommended that Judge Floro be dismissed from the service due to "insanity," he was
apparently using the term in its loose sense. Insanity is a general layman’s term, a catch–all word referring to
various mental disorders. Psychosis is perhaps the appropriate medical term 120 as this is the one used by Drs.
Vista and Villegas of the Supreme Court Clinic. It is of note that the 1995, 1998 and 2000 psychological
evaluations all reported signs and symptoms of psychosis.

Courts exist to promote justice; thus aiding to secure the contentment and happiness of the people. 121 An
honorable, competent and independent judiciary exists to administer justice in order to promote the stability of
government, and the well-being of the people. 122 Carrying much of the weight in this daunting task of
administering justice are our front liners, the judges who preside over courts of law and in whose hands are
entrusted the destinies of individuals and institutions. As it has been said, courts will only succeed in their tasks if
the judges presiding over them are truly honorable men, competent and independent. 123

There is no indication that Judge Floro is anything but an honorable man. And, in fact, in our disposition of the
13 charges against him, we have not found him guilty of gross misconduct or acts or corruption. However, the
findings of psychosis by the mental health professionals assigned to his case indicate gross deficiency in
competence and independence.

Moreover, Judge Floro himself admitted that he believes in "psychic visions," of foreseeing the future because of
his power in "psychic phenomenon." He believes in "duwendes" and of a covenant with his "dwarf friends Luis,
Armand and Angel." He believes that he can write while on trance and that he had been seen by several people
to have been in two places at the same time. He has likened himself to the "angel of death" who can inflict pains
on people, especially upon those he perceived as corrupt officials of the RTCs of Malabon. He took to wearing
blue robes during court sessions, switching only to black on Fridays. His own witness testified that Judge Floro
explained that he wore black from head to foot on Fridays to recharge his psychic powers. Finally, Judge Floro
conducted healing sessions in his chambers during his break time. All these things validate the findings of the
Supreme Court Clinic about Judge Floro’s uncommon beliefs and that such beliefs have spilled over to action.

Lest we be misconstrued, we do not denigrate such belief system. However, such beliefs, especially since Judge
Floro acted on them, are so at odds with the critical and impartial thinking required of a judge under our judicial
system.

Psychic phenomena, even assuming such exist, have no place in a judiciary duty bound to apply only positive
law and, in its absence, equitable rules and principles in resolving controversies. Thus, Judge Floro’s reference
to psychic phenomena in the decision he rendered in the case of People v. Francisco, Jr. 124 sticks out like a sore
thumb. In said decision, Judge Floro discredited the testimony of the prosecution’s principal witness by
concluding that the testimony was a "fairytale" or a "fantastic story." 125 He then went to state that "psychic
phenomena" was destined to cooperate with the stenographer who transcribed the testimony of the witness. The
pertinent portion of Judge Floro’s decision is quoted hereunder:

3. The testimony of the prosecution’s PRINCIPAL witness (sole eyewitness of the incident) NORMANDY is
INCREDIBLE, is full of inconsistencies (major and not regarding minor points), ergo, the court concludes that
due to several indicia of fraud/perjury (flagrant/palpable deception of the Court), his testimony is not worthy of
belief, assuming ex-gratia argumenti, that the same may be admissible, and his Court narrative is hereby
declared a FAIRY TALE or a FANTASTIC STORY of a crime scene that is acceptable only for
SCREEN/cinematic viewing. The following details, are proof of the foregoing conclusion:

a.) NORMANDY swore that he, Ponciano Ineria and Raul Ineria were "sinalubong" by Lando/accused on
June 21, 1987 at 2:30 a.m. at alley Wesleyan/Tangos, Navotas, and that he saw the "nagpambuno"
between Raul and Ando, and that HE SAW P. INERIA dead, but HE WAS NO LONGER THERE, but he
still saw the "nagpambuno"; MORE IMPORTANTLY, he SWORE that HE NOTICED the ACCUSED P.
Francisco THE FOLLOWING DAY;

b.) The foregoing verily demonstrate his 11th HOUR CONCOCTION (Big Lie, having been asked to
submit false testimony); for how could have he witnessed the stabbing by accused when he NOTICED
him the following day? (TSN dated May 2, 1995, pp. 1-2); assuming arguendo that the TSN was
incorrect due to typographical error, or maybe the Court Stenographer III Eloisa B. Domingo might have
been SLEEPING during the testimony, so that the word DAY should have been corrected to another
word SUITABLE to Normandy’s FAIRY TALE, still, the Court had synthesized the entire NARRATIVE of
Normandy, but the Court found no reason that the seeming error ‘DAY’ should be corrected; the Court’s
sole/remaining conclusion is that EVEN the STENOGRAPHIC NOTES cooperated by PSYCHIC
PHENOMENA perhaps of FOR SURE, in having BEEN DESTINED to be FATEFULLY INSCRIBED
WITH THE WORDS FOLLOWING DAY (line 3, p. 3 TSN, id.) 126 (Emphasis supplied)

In State Prosecutors v. Muro 127 we held that –

What is required on the part of judges is objectivity. An independent judiciary does not mean that judges can
resolve specific disputes entirely as they please. There are both implicit and explicit limits on the way judges
perform their role. Implicit limits include accepted legal values and the explicit limits are substantive and
procedural rules of law. 128

The judge, even when he is free, is still not wholly free. He is not to innovate at pleasure. He is not a knight-
errant, roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or goodness. He is to draw his inspiration from
consecrated principles. He is not to yield to spasmodic sentiment, to vague and unregulated benevolence. He is
to exercise a discretion informed by tradition, methodized by analogy, disciplined by system, and subordinate to
the "primordial necessity of order in the social life." 129

Judge Floro does not meet such requirement of objectivity and his competence for judicial tasks leaves much to
be desired. As reported by the Supreme Court Clinic:

Despite his impressive academic background and achievements, he has lapses in judgment and may have
problems with decision-making. His character traits such as suspiciousness and seclusiveness and
preoccupation with paranormal and psychic phenomena though not detrimental to his role as a lawyer, may
cloud his judgment, and hamper his primary role as a judge in dispensing justice. x x x 130

Judge Floro’s belief system, as well as his actuations in the eight months that he served as RTC judge,
indubitably shows his inability to function with the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.

Verily, Judge Floro holds an exalted position in our system of government. Thus:

Long before a man dons the judicial robes, he has accepted and identified himself with large components of the
judge’s role. Especially if he has aspired to a judge’s status, he is likely to have conducted himself, more or less
unconsciously, in the fashion of one who is said to have "the judicial temperament." He is likely to have
displayed the kinds of behavior that the judge’s role demands. A large proportion of his experiences on the
bench develop and reinforce such conformity, moreover. The ritualistic elements of investiture and of court
procedure, the honorific forms of address, and even the imposing appearance of some court buildings serve to
emphasize the demands upon his behavior. Even the most unscrupulous former ambulance chaser who owes
his position to a thoroughly corrupt political organization must conform at least in part to the behaviors expected
of him as a judge. 131

The expectations concerning judicial behavior are more than those expected of other public officials. Judges are
seen as guardians of the law and they must thus identify themselves with the law to an even greater degree than
legislators or executives. 132

As it has been said, "[j]udges administer justice judicially, i.e., not according to some abstract ideas of right and
justice, but according to the rules laid down by society in its Code of Laws to which it gives its sanctions. The
function of the judge is primarily adjudication. This is not a mechanical craft but the exercise of a creative art,
whether we call it legislative or not, which requires great ability and objectivity." 133 We, thus, quote Justice
Frankfurter, in speaking of the functions of the Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States:

To practice the requisite detachment and to achieve sufficient objectivity no doubt demands of judges the habit
of self-discipline and self-criticism, incertitude that one’s own views are incontestable and alert tolerance toward
views not shared. But these are precisely the presuppositions of our judicial process. They are precisely the
qualities society has a right to expect from those entrusted with … judicial power.

xxxx

The judicial judgment … must move within the limits of accepted notions of justice and is not to be based upon
the idiosyncrasies of a merely personal judgment. 134

In fine, Judge Floro lacks the judicial temperament and the fundamental requirements of competence and
objectivity expected of all judges. He cannot thus be allowed to continue as judge for to do so might result in a
serious challenge to the existence of a critical and impartial judiciary.

Equitable considerations entitle Judge Floro backwages and other economic benefits for a period of three (3)
years.

In retrospect, we are forced to say that Judge Floro should not have joined the judiciary as RTC judge. However,
we have assiduously reviewed the history of this case and we cannot hold anyone legally responsible for such
major and unfortunate faux pas.

Judge Floro did not breach any rule of procedure relative to his application for judgeship. He went through the
entire gamut of tests and interviews and he was nominated by the JBC on the strength of his scholastic
achievements. As to having failed the psychological examinations given by the SC Clinic, it must be pointed out
that this was disregarded by the JBC upon Judge Floro’s submission of psychiatric evaluations conducted by
mental health professionals from the private sector and which were favorable to him. Nowhere is it alleged that
Judge Floro acted less than honorably in procuring these evaluations.

The JBC in 1999 had all the discretion to refer Judge Floro to a private clinic for a second opinion of his mental
and psychological fitness. In performing its functions, the JBC had been guided primarily by the Constitution
which prescribes that members of the Judiciary must be, in addition to other requirements, persons of proven
competence, integrity, probity and independence. 135 It was only on 18 October 2000 when it promulgated JBC-
009, the "Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council," that the JBC put down in writing guidelines or criteria it had
previously used in ascertaining "if one seeking such office meets the minimum constitutional qualifications and
possesses qualities of mind and heart expected of the Judiciary." 136 Rule 6 thereof states:

SECTION 1. Good health. – Good physical health and sound mental/psychological and emotional condition of
the applicant play a critical role in his capacity and capability to perform the delicate task of administering justice.
xxx

SEC. 2. Psychological/psychiatric tests. – The applicant shall submit to psychological/psychiatric tests to be

conducted by the Supreme Court Medical Clinic or by a psychologist and/or psychiatrist duly accredited by the
Council.

It would seem that as things stood then, the JBC could very well rely on the evaluation of a private psychologist
or psychiatrist not accredited by the JBC. Thus, the JBC cannot be faulted for accepting the psychological
evaluations of mental health professionals not affiliated with the Supreme Court Clinic.
It goes without saying that Judge Floro’s appointment as RTC judge is fait accompli. What awaits us now is the
seemingly overwhelming task of finding the PROPER, JUST AND EQUITABLE solution to Judge Floro’s almost
seven years of suspension in the light of the fact that the penalty imposed herein does not merit a suspension of
seven years.

Verily, the Supreme Court is vested with the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts. 137 The Constitution limits this power through the admonition that such rules "shall provide
a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the
same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights." 138

Rule 140 of the Rules of Court outlines the procedure to be followed in administrative cases against judges.
Glaringly, Rule 140 does not detail the steps to be taken in cases when the judge is preventively suspended
pending investigation. This is the state of things even after its amendment by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC which took
effect on 1 October 2001.

The Supreme Court’s power to suspend a judge, however, is inherent in its power of administrative supervision
over all courts and the personnel thereof. 139 This power -- consistent with the power to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts -- is hemmed in only by the Constitution which
prescribes that an adjective law cannot, among other things, diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.

The resolution of 20 July 1999 which put Judge Floro under preventive suspension resolved to:

(1) DIRECT Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. to answer the foregoing charges against him within ten (10) days from
notice; (2) REFER this case to Retired Justice Pedro Ramirez, Consultant, Office of the Court Administrator for
investigation, report and recommendation, within sixty (60) days from receipt of the records thereof; (3)
SUBJECT Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. for appropriate psychological or mental examination to be conducted by
the proper office of the Supreme Court or any duly authorized medical and/or mental institution.

Moreover, the Court RESOLVED to place Judge Florentino Floro, effective immediately under PREVENTIVE
SUSPENSION for the duration of the investigation of the administrative charges against him. 140

As can be gleaned from the above-quoted resolution, Judge Floro’s suspension, albeit indefinite, was for the
duration of the investigation of the 13 charges against him which the Court pegged at 60 days from the time of
receipt by the investigator of the records of the case. Rule 140, as amended, now states that "(t)he investigating
Justice or Judge shall terminate the investigation within ninety (90) days from the date of its commencement or
within such extension as the Supreme Court may grant" 141 and, "(w)ithin thirty (30) days from the termination of
the investigation, the investigating Justice or Judge shall submit to the Supreme Court a report containing
findings of fact and recommendation." 142

From the foregoing, the rule now is that a Judge can be preventively suspended not only for the entire period of
his investigation which would be 90 days (unless extended by the Supreme Court) but also for the 30 days that it
would take the investigating judge or justice to come up with his report. Moreover, the Court may preventively
suspend a judge until such time that a final decision is reached in the administrative case against him or
her. 143 This is because –

[U]nlike ordinary civil service officials and employees, judges who are charged with a serious offense warranting
preventive suspension are not automatically reinstated upon expiration of the ninety (90)-day period, as
mandated above. The Court may preventively suspend a judge until a final decision is reached in the
administrative case especially where there is a strong likelihood of his guilt or complicity in the offense charged.
Indeed, the measure is intended to shield the public from any further damage or wrongdoing that may be caused
by the continued assumption of office by the erring judge. It is also intended to protect the courts’ image as
temples of justice where litigants are heard, rights and conflicts settled and justice solemnly dispensed.

This is a necessary consequence that a judge must bear for the privilege of occupying an exalted position.
Among civil servants, a judge is indeed in a class all its own. After all, in the vast government bureaucracy,
judges are beacon lights looked upon as the embodiment of all what is right, just and proper, the ultimate
weapons against justice and oppression. 144

In the case of Judge Floro, he is under preventive suspension up to the present because of the serious charge
of mental unfitness aggravated by the fact that the actual investigation into his cases dragged on for a much
longer period than 90 days. And the reasons for the delay, for the most part, can be directly ascribed to Judge
Floro himself. From the records, it would seem that not only did Judge Floro move for several re-settings of the
hearings of his cases; he likewise dragged his feet with respect to the order to submit himself to the appropriate
psychological/mental examination. Worse, what started out as single case against him ballooned into 10 cases
which were consolidated into one due to common questions of fact and law. 145 All in all, Judge Floro filed seven
cases against those he perceived had connived to remove and/or suspend him from office, the last of which he
filed on 19 May 2003 against Justice Ramirez. 146

Be that as it may, EQUITY demands that we exercise utmost compassion in this case considering that the rules
on preventive suspension of judges, not having been expressly included in the Rules of Court, are amorphous at
best. We have ruled similarly in the case of Judge Philbert Iturralde, thus:

Be that as it may, we cannot in conscience hold that a judge who was placed under preventive suspension
pending investigation is not entitled to the payment of back salaries, allowances and other economic benefits for
the entire duration of the preventive suspension. The inequity of the doctrine as applied to judges is clearly
apparent, given the peculiar circumstance in which a judge finds himself preventively suspended by the Court
"until further orders".

In this case, Judge Iturralde was preventively suspended for 13½ months, during which period he was not paid
his salaries, allowances and other benefits. Except for a teaching job that the Court permitted him to undertake
pending resolution of the administrative case, Judge Iturralde had no other source of income. He thus incurred
several loans to provide for his family’s basic needs.

It would thus be unjust to deprive Judge Iturralde of his back salaries, allowances and other economic benefits
for the entire period that he was preventively suspended. As we have said in Gloria v. Court of Appeals,
preventive suspension pending investigation is not a penalty but only a measure intended to enable the
disciplining authority to conduct an unhampered formal investigation. We held that ninety (90) days is ample time
to conclude the investigation of an administrative case. Beyond ninety (90) days, the preventive suspension is
no longer justified. Hence, for purposes of determining the extent of back salaries, allowances and other benefits
that a judge may receive during the period of his preventive suspension, we hold that the ninety-day maximum
period set in Gloria v. Court of Appeals, should likewise be applied.

Concededly, there may be instances when an investigation would extend beyond ninety (90) days and such may
not be entirely unjustified. Nevertheless, we believe that in such a situation, it would be unfair to withhold his
salaries and other economic benefits for the entire duration of the preventive suspension, moreso if the delay in
the resolution of the case was not due to his fault. Upon being found innocent of the administrative charge, his
preventive suspension exceeding the ninety-day (90) period actually becomes without basis and would indeed
be nothing short of punitive. It must be emphasized that his subsequent acquittal completely removed the cause
for his preventive suspension in the first place. Necessarily, therefore, we must rectify its effects on just and
equitable grounds. 147

Taking off from the case of Judge Iturralde, we hold that Judge Floro is likewise entitled to the payment of back
salaries, allowances and other economic benefits being at the receiving end of a rule peculiar to judges who find
themselves preventively suspended by the Court "until further orders" or, as this case, "for the duration of the
investigation." Judge Iturralde’s suspension of 13 ½ months even pales in comparison to Judge Floro’s
suspension of 81 months, more or less. During this entire excruciating period of waiting, Judge Floro could not
practice his profession, thus putting him solely at the mercy of his brother’s largesse. And, though he was given
donations by those who came to him for healing, obviously, these could not compensate for his loss of income
as Judge.

Unlike the case of Judge Iturralde, however, wherein we held that the period of suspension exceeding 90 days
should be the basis for the payment of back salaries, we hold that, as a matter of equity, Judge Floro is entitled
to back salaries, allowances and other economic benefits for a period corresponding to three of his almost seven
years suspension. We cannot apply the ruling in Gloria that any suspension served beyond 90 days must be
compensated as we would be, in effect, rewarding Judge Floro’s propensity to delay the resolution of his case
through the indiscriminate filing of administrative cases against those he perceived connived to oust him out of
office. In Judge Iturralde’s case, the investigation was not delayed through any fault of his. More importantly,
Judge Iturralde was ultimately held innocent, thus, using by analogy Gloria v. Court of Appeals, his suspension
in excess of 90 days was already in the nature of a penalty which cannot be countenanced precisely because,
being innocent, he cannot be penalized. Judge Floro, on the other hand, and as already discussed, contributed
to the delay in the investigation of his cases. Moreover, unlike Judge Iturralde, Judge Floro has not been
adjudged innocent of all the 13 charges against him.
These facts, however, as we have already discussed, do not put Judge Floro beyond the reach of equity. To
paraphrase Justice Brandeis, equity does not demand that its suitors are free of blame. As we are wont to say:

Equity as the complement of legal jurisdiction seeks to reach and do complete justice where courts of law,
through the inflexibility of their rules and want of power to adapt their judgments to the special circumstances of
cases, are incompetent so to do. Equity regards the spirit of and not the letter, the intent and not the form, the
substance rather than the circumstance, as it is variously expressed by different courts. 148

In fine, notwithstanding the fact that Judge Floro is much to blame for the delay in the resolution of his case,
equitable considerations constrain us to award him back salaries, allowances and other economic benefits for a
period corresponding to three years. This is because Judge Floro’s separation from the service is not a penalty
as we ordinarily understand the word to mean. It is imposed instead upon Judge Floro out of necessity due to a
medically disabling condition of the mind which renders him unfit, at least at present, to continue discharging the
functions of his office.

The period of three years seems to us the most equitable under the circumstances. As discussed, if we were to
give him more than three years of back salaries, etc., then it would seem that we are rewarding him for his role
in delaying the resolution of these cases (as well as the seven cases he filed which were only dismissed on 14
February 2006 at his own bidding). On the other hand, if we were to peg the period at less than three years then
the same would only be a pittance compared to the seven years suspension he had to live through with
Damocles’ sword hanging over his head and with his hands bound as he could not practice his profession.

Judge Floro’s separation from the service moots the case against him docketed as A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC (Re:
Resolution Dated 11 May 1999 Of Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr.) A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988 (Luz Arriego v. Judge
Florentino V. Floro, Jr.), on the other hand, is dismissed for lack of merit.

A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC

It cannot be gainsaid that Judge Floro’s separation from the service renders moot the complaint in A.M. No. 99-
7-273-RTC. As it is, even the most favorable of resolutions in this case will not cause a ripple on the Court’s
decision to separate Judge Floro from the service. Thus, this charge is dismissed for being moot and academic.

A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988

Considering that this case is a replica of charge "h" in A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460 and considering that charge "h" is
without basis, this particular complaint filed by Luz Arriego must necessarily be dismissed for lack of merit.

Judge Floro’s separation from the service does not carry with it forfeiture of all or part of his accrued benefits nor
disqualification from appointment to any other public office including government-owned or controlled
corporations.

As Judge Floro’s separation from the service cannot be considered a penalty, such separation does not carry
with it the forfeiture of all or part of his accrued benefits nor disqualification from appointment to any other public
office including government-owned or controlled corporations.

In fact, the psychological and psychiatric reports, considered as the bedrock of the finding of mental impairment
against Judge Floro, cannot be used to disqualify him from re-entering government service for positions that do
not require him to dispense justice. The reports contain statements/findings in Judge Floro’s favor that the Court
cannot overlook in all fairness as they deserve equal consideration. They mention Judge Floro’s assets and
strengths and capacity for functionality, with minor modification of work environment. Thus:

a. High intellectual assets as a result of "self-discipline and self- organization." 149

b. "(I)mpressive academic achievements" with "no drastic change in his personality and level of
functioning as a lawyer in private practice." 150

c. "(C)haracter traits of suspiciousness, seclusiveness, pre-occupation with paranormal and psychic

phenomena … not detrimental to his role as a lawyer." 151

d. "Everyday situations can be comprehended and dealt with in moderate proficiency …. His concern for
the details that make up a total field represents his attempts at being systematic and cautious." 152
 e. "(E)quipped with analytical power." 153

Consequently, while Judge Floro may be dysfunctional as a judge because of the sensitive nature of said
position, he may still be successful in other areas of endeavor.

Putting all of the above in perspective, it could very well be that Judge Floro’s current administrative and medical
problems are not totally of his making. He was duly appointed to judgeship and his mental problems, for now,
appear to render him unfit with the delicate task of dispensing justice not because of any acts of corruption and
debasement on his part but clearly due to a medically disabling condition.

Finally, if Judge Floro’s mental impairment is secondary to genetics 154 and/or adverse environmental factors
(and, unfortunately, such essential information is not available), we cannot condemn people for their faulty genes
and/or adverse environment – factors they have no control over.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to:

1) FINE Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. in the total amount of FORTY THOUSAND (P40,000.00) PESOS
for seven of the 13 charges against him in A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460;

2) RELIEVE Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. of his functions as Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
73, Malabon City and consider him SEPARATED from the service due to a medically disabling condition
of the mind that renders him unfit to discharge the functions of his office, effective immediately;

3) As a matter of equity, AWARD Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. back salaries, allowances and other
economic benefits corresponding to three (3) years;

4) DISMISS the charge in A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988 (Luz Arriego v. Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr.) for LACK
OF MERIT; and

5) DISMISS the charge in A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC (Re: Resolution Dated 11 May 1999 Of Judge
Florentino V. Floro, Jr.) for MOOTNESS.

SO ORDERED.