Republic of the Philippines cent of the gross returns or earnings from the operation of his taxi cab.
Plaintiffs
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-6339             April 20, 1954
MANUEL LARA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,  being engaged in the taxi or transportation business which is a public utility, came
vs.
PETRONILO DEL ROSARIO, JR., defendant-appellee.
Manansala and Manansala for appellants.
Ramon L. Resurreccion for appellee.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
In 1950 defendant Petronilo del Rosario, Jr., owner of twenty-five taxi cabs or cars,
operated a taxi business under the name of "Waval Taxi." He employed among
others three mechanics and 49 chauffeurs or drivers, the latter having worked for
periods ranging from 2 to 37 months. On September 4, 1950, without giving said
mechanics and chauffeurs 30 days advance notice, Del Rosario sold his 25 units or
cabs to La Mallorca, a transportation company, as a result of which, according to the
mechanics and chauffeurs above-mentioned they lost their jobs because the La
Mallorca failed to continue them in their employment. They brought this action
against Del Rosario to recover compensation for overtime work rendered beyond
eight hours and on Sundays and legal holidays, and one month salary (mesada)
provided for in article 302 of the Code of Commerce because the failure of their
former employer to give them one month notice. Subsequently, the three mechanics
unconditionally withdrew their claims. So only the 49 drivers remained as plaintiffs.
The defendant filed a motion for dismissal of the complaint on the ground that it
stated no cause of action and the trial court for the time being denied the motion
saying that it will be considered when the case was heard on the merits. After trial
the complaint was dismissed. Plaintiffs appealed from the order of dismissal to the
Court of Appeals which Tribunal after finding only questions of law are involved,
certified the case to us.
The parties are agreed that the plaintiffs as chauffeurs received no fixed
compensation based on the hours or the period of time that they worked. Rather,
they were paid on the commission basis, that is to say, each driver received 20 per
claim that as a rule, each drive operated a taxi 12 hours a day with gross earnings
ranging from P20 to P25, receiving therefrom the corresponding 20 per cent share
ranging from P4 to P5, and that in some cases, especially during Saturdays,
Sundays, and holidays when a driver worked 24 hours a day he grossed from P40 to
P50, thereby receiving a share of from P8 to P10 for the period of twenty-four hours.
The reason given by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is that the defendant
under the exception provided by the Eight-Hour Labor Law (Commonwealth Act No.
444); and because plaintiffs did not work on a salary basis, that is to say, they had no
fixed or regular salary or remuneration other than the 20 per cent of their gross
earnings "their situation was therefore practically similar to piece workers and hence,
outside the ambit of article 302 of the Code of Commerce."
For purposes of reference we are reproducing the pertinent provisions of the Eight-
Hour Labor Law, namely, sections 1 to 4.
SECTION 1. The legal working day for any person employed by another shall
not be more than eight hours daily. When the work is not continuous, the time
during which the laborer is not working and can leave his working place and
can rest completely shall not be counted.
SEC. 2. This Act shall apply to all persons employed in any industry or
occupation, whether public or private, with the exception of farm laborers,
laborers who prefer to be paid on piece work basis, domestic servants and
persons in the personal service of another and members of the family of the
employer working for him.
SEC. 3. Work may be performed beyond eight hours a day in case of actual
or impending emergencies, caused by serious accidents, fire flood, typhoon,
earthquakes, epidemic, or other disaster or calamity in order to prevent loss
of life and property or imminent danger to public safety; or in case of urgent
work to be performed on the machines, equipment, or installations in order to
avoid a serious loss which the employer would otherwise suffer, or some
other just cause of a similar nature; but in all cases the laborers and the
employees shall be entitled to receive compensation for the overtime work
performed at the same rate as their regular wages or salary, plus at least
twenty-five per centum additional.
 In case of national emergency the Government is empowered to establish
rules and regulations for the operation of the plants and factories and to
determine the wages to be paid the laborers.
SEC. 4. No person, firm, or corporation, business establishment or place or
center of work shall compel an employee or laborer to work during Sundays
and legal holidays, unless he is paid an additional sum of at least twenty-five
per centum of his regular remuneration: Provided however, That this
prohibition shall not apply to public utilities performing some public service
such as supplying gas, electricity, power, water, or providing means of
transportation or communication.
Under section 4, as a public utility, the defendant could have his chauffeurs work on
Sundays and legal holidays without paying them an additional sum of at least 25 per
cent of their regular remuneration: but that with reference only to work performed on
Sundays and holidays. If the work done on such days exceeds 8 hours a day, then
the Eight-Hour Labor Law would operate, provided of course that plaintiffs came
under section 2 of the said law. So that the question to be decided here is whether or
not plaintiffs are entitled to extra compensation for work performed in excess of 8
hours a day, Sundays and holidays included.
It will be noticed that the last part of section 3 of Commonwealth Act 444 provides for
extra compensation for over-time work "at the same rate as their regular wages or
salary, plus at least twenty-five per centum additional'" and that section 2 of the
same act excludes application thereof laborers who preferred to be on piece work
basis. This connotes that a laborer or employee with no fixed salary, wages or
remuneration but receiving as compensation from his employer uncertain and
variable amount depending upon the work done or the result of said work (piece
work) irrespective of the amount of time employed, is not covered by the Eight-Hour
Labor Law and is not entitled to extra compensation should he work in excess of 8
hours a day. And this seems to be the condition of employment of the plaintiffs. A
driver in the taxi business of the defendant, like the plaintiffs, in one day could
operate his taxi cab eight hours, or less than eight hours or in excess of 8 hours, or
even 24 hours on Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays, with no limit or restriction other
than his desire, inclination and state of health and physical endurance. He could
drive continuously or intermittently, systematically or haphazardly, fast or slow, etc.
depending upon his exclusive wish or inclination. One day when he feels strong,
active and enthusiastic he works long, continuously, with diligence and industry and
makes considerable gross returns and receives as much as his 20 per cent
commission. Another day when he feels despondent, run down, weak or lazy and
wants to rest between trips and works for less number of hours, his gross returns are
less and so is his commission. In other words, his compensation for the day depends
upon the result of his work, which in turn depends on the amount of industry,
intelligence and experience applied to it, rather than the period of time employed. In
short, he has no fixed salary or wages. In this we agree with the learned trial court
presided by Judge Felicisimo Ocampo which makes the following findings and
observations of this point.
. . . As already stated, their earnings were in the form of commission based
on the gross receipts of the day. Their participation in most cases depended
upon their own industry. So much so that the more hours they stayed on the
road, the greater the gross returns and the higher their commissions. They
have no fixed hours of labor. They can retire at pleasure, they not being paid
a fixed salary on the hourly, daily, weekly or monthly basis.
It results that the working hours of the plaintiffs as taxi drivers were entirely
characterized by its irregularity, as distinguished from the specific regular
remuneration predicated on specific and regular hours of work of factories
and commercial employees.
In the case of the plaintiffs, it is the result of their labor, not the labor itself,
which determines their commissions. They worked under no compulsion of
turning a fixed income for each given day. . . ..
In an opinion dated June 1, 1939 (Opinion No. 115) modified by Opinion No. 22,
series 1940, dated June 11, 1940, the Secretary of Justice held that chauffeurs of
the Manila Yellow Taxicab Co. who "observed in a loose way certain working hours
daily," and "the time they report for work as well as the time they leave work was left
to their discretion.," receiving no fixed salary but only 20 per cent of their gross
earnings, may be considered as piece workers and therefore not covered by the
provisions of the Eight-Hour Labor Law.
The Wage Administration Service of the Department of Labor in its Interpretative
Bulletin No. 2 dated May 28, 1953, under "Overtime Compensation," in section 3
thereof entitled Coverage, says:
The provisions of this bulletin on overtime compensation shall apply to all
persons employed in any industry or occupation, whether public or private,
with the exception of farm laborers, non-agricultural laborers or employees
who are paid on piece work, contract, pakiao, task or commission
 basis, domestic servants and persons in the personal service of another and
members of the family of the employer working for him.

From all this, to us it is clear that the claim of the plaintiffs-appellants for overtime
compensation under the Eight-Hour Labor Law has no valid support.

As to the month pay (mesada) under article 302 of the Code of Commerce, article
2270 of the new Civil Code (Republic Act 386) appears to have repealed said Article
302 when it repealed the provisions of the Code of Commerce governing Agency.
This repeal took place on August 30, 1950, when the new Civil Code went into effect,
that is, one year after its publication in the Official Gazette. The alleged termination
of services of the plaintiffs by the defendant took place according to the complaint on
September 4, 1950, that is to say, after the repeal of Article 302 which they invoke.
Moreover, said Article 302 of the Code of Commerce, assuming that it were still in
force speaks of "salary corresponding to said month." commonly known as
"mesada." If the plaintiffs herein had no fixed salary either by the day, week or
month, then computation of the month's salary payable would be impossible. Article
302 refers to employees receiving a fixed salary. Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino in his book
entitled "Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Commercial Laws of the
Philippines," Vol. 1, 4th edition, p. 160, says that article 302 is not applicable to
employees without fixed salary. We quote —

Employees not entitled to indemnity. — This article refers only to those who
are engaged under salary basis, and not to those who only receive
compensation equivalent to whatever service they may render. (1
Malagarriga 314, citing decision of Argentina Court of Appeals on
Commercial Matters.)

In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs
against appellants.

Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, and
Diokno, JJ., concur.
Paras, C.J., concurs in the result.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
EN BANC
G.R. No. 178902               April 21, 2010
MANUEL O. FUENTES and LETICIA L. FUENTES, Petitioners,  Tarciano met the other conditions, Atty. Plagata notarized Rosario’s affidavit in
vs.
CONRADO G. ROCA, ANNABELLE R. JOSON, ROSE MARIE R. CRISTOBAL
and PILAR MALCAMPO,Respondents.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case is about a husband’s sale of conjugal real property, employing a
challenged affidavit of consent from an estranged wife. The buyers claim valid
consent, loss of right to declare nullity of sale, and prescription.
The Facts and the Case
Sabina Tarroza owned a titled 358-square meter lot in Canelar, Zamboanga City. On
October 11, 1982 she sold it to her son, Tarciano T. Roca (Tarciano) under a deed of
absolute sale.1 But Tarciano did not for the meantime have the registered title
transferred to his name.
Six years later in 1988, Tarciano offered to sell the lot to petitioners Manuel and
Leticia Fuentes (the Fuentes spouses). They arranged to meet at the office of Atty.
Romulo D. Plagata whom they asked to prepare the documents of sale. They later
signed an agreement to sell that Atty. Plagata prepared2 dated April 29, 1988, which
agreement expressly stated that it was to take effect in six months.
The agreement required the Fuentes spouses to pay Tarciano a down payment of
₱60,000.00 for the transfer of the lot’s title to him. And, within six months, Tarciano
was to clear the lot of structures and occupants and secure the consent of his
estranged wife, Rosario Gabriel Roca (Rosario), to the sale. Upon Tarciano’s
compliance with these conditions, the Fuentes spouses were to take possession of
the lot and pay him an additional ₱140,000.00 or ₱160,000.00, depending on
whether or not he succeeded in demolishing the house standing on it. If Tarciano
was unable to comply with these conditions, the Fuentes spouses would become
owners of the lot without any further formality and payment.
The parties left their signed agreement with Atty. Plagata who then worked on the
other requirements of the sale. According to the lawyer, he went to see Rosario in
one of his trips to Manila and had her sign an affidavit of consent.3 As soon as
Zamboanga City. On January 11, 1989 Tarciano executed a deed of absolute
sale4 in favor of the Fuentes spouses. They then paid him the additional ₱140,000.00
mentioned in their agreement. A new title was issued in the name of the
spouses5 who immediately constructed a building on the lot. On January 28, 1990
Tarciano passed away, followed by his wife Rosario who died nine months
afterwards.
Eight years later in 1997, the children of Tarciano and Rosario, namely, respondents
Conrado G. Roca, Annabelle R. Joson, and Rose Marie R. Cristobal, together with
Tarciano’s sister, Pilar R. Malcampo, represented by her son, John Paul M. Trinidad
(collectively, the Rocas), filed an action for annulment of sale and reconveyance of
the land against the Fuentes spouses before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Zamboanga City in Civil Case 4707. The Rocas claimed that the sale to the spouses
was void since Tarciano’s wife, Rosario, did not give her consent to it. Her signature
on the affidavit of consent had been forged. They thus prayed that the property be
reconveyed to them upon reimbursement of the price that the Fuentes spouses paid
Tarciano.6
The spouses denied the Rocas’ allegations. They presented Atty. Plagata who
testified that he personally saw Rosario sign the affidavit at her residence in Paco,
Manila, on September 15, 1988. He admitted, however, that he notarized the
document in Zamboanga City four months later on January 11, 1989.7 All the same,
the Fuentes spouses pointed out that the claim of forgery was personal to Rosario
and she alone could invoke it. Besides, the four-year prescriptive period for nullifying
the sale on ground of fraud had already lapsed.
Both the Rocas and the Fuentes spouses presented handwriting experts at the trial.
Comparing Rosario’s standard signature on the affidavit with those on various
documents she signed, the Rocas’ expert testified that the signatures were not
written by the same person. Making the same comparison, the spouses’ expert
concluded that they were.8
On February 1, 2005 the RTC rendered judgment, dismissing the case. It ruled that damages in favor of the Rocas and deleted the award of attorney’s fees to the
the action had already prescribed since the ground cited by the Rocas for annulling Fuentes spouses.13
the sale, forgery or fraud, already prescribed under Article 1391 of the Civil Code
four years after its discovery. In this case, the Rocas may be deemed to have notice Unsatisfied with the CA decision, the Fuentes spouses came to this court by petition
of the fraud from the date the deed of sale was registered with the Registry of Deeds for review.14
and the new title was issued. Here, the Rocas filed their action in 1997, almost nine
years after the title was issued to the Fuentes spouses on January 18, 1989.9 The Issues Presented

Moreover, the Rocas failed to present clear and convincing evidence of the fraud.
Mere variance in the signatures of Rosario was not conclusive proof of forgery.10 The
RTC ruled that, although the Rocas presented a handwriting expert, the trial court
could not be bound by his opinion since the opposing expert witness contradicted the
same. Atty. Plagata’s testimony remained technically unrebutted.11
The case presents the following issues:
1. Whether or not Rosario’s signature on the document of consent to her
husband Tarciano’s sale of their conjugal land to the Fuentes spouses was
forged;

Finally, the RTC noted that Atty. Plagata’s defective notarization of the affidavit of 2. Whether or not the Rocas’ action for the declaration of nullity of that sale to
consent did not invalidate the sale. The law does not require spousal consent to be the spouses already prescribed; and
on the deed of sale to be valid. Neither does the irregularity vitiate Rosario’s consent.
She personally signed the affidavit in the presence of Atty. Plagata.12 3. Whether or not only Rosario, the wife whose consent was not had, could
bring the action to annul that sale.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the RTC decision. The CA found
sufficient evidence of forgery and did not give credence to Atty. Plagata’s testimony The Court’s Rulings
that he saw Rosario sign the document in Quezon City. Its jurat said differently. Also,
upon comparing the questioned signature with the specimen signatures, the CA
First. The key issue in this case is whether or not Rosario’s signature on the
noted significant variance between them. That Tarciano and Rosario had been living
document of consent had been forged. For, if the signature were genuine, the fact
separately for 30 years since 1958 also reinforced the conclusion that her signature
that she gave her consent to her husband’s sale of the conjugal land would render
had been forged.
the other issues merely academic.
Since Tarciano and Rosario were married in 1950, the CA concluded that their
The CA found that Rosario’s signature had been forged. The CA observed a marked
property relations were governed by the Civil Code under which an action for
difference between her signature on the affidavit of consent15 and her specimen
annulment of sale on the ground of lack of spousal consent may be brought by the
signatures.16 The CA gave no weight to Atty. Plagata’s testimony that he saw
wife during the marriage within 10 years from the transaction. Consequently, the
Rosario sign the document in Manila on September 15, 1988 since this clashed with
action that the Rocas, her heirs, brought in 1997 fell within 10 years of the January
his declaration in the jurat that Rosario signed the affidavit in Zamboanga City on
11, 1989 sale.
January 11, 1989.
Considering, however, that the sale between the Fuentes spouses and Tarciano was
The Court agrees with the CA’s observation that Rosario’s signature strokes on the
merely voidable, the CA held that its annulment entitled the spouses to
affidavit appears heavy, deliberate, and forced. Her specimen signatures, on the
reimbursement of what they paid him plus legal interest computed from the filing of
other hand, are consistently of a lighter stroke and more fluid. The way the letters "R"
the complaint until actual payment. Since the Fuentes spouses were also builders in
and "s" were written is also remarkably different. The variance is obvious even to the
good faith, they were entitled under Article 448 of the Civil Code to payment of the
untrained eye.
value of the improvements they introduced on the lot. The CA did not award
Significantly, Rosario’s specimen signatures were made at about the time that she
signed the supposed affidavit of consent. They were, therefore, reliable standards for
comparison. The Fuentes spouses presented no evidence that Rosario suffered from
any illness or disease that accounted for the variance in her signature when she
signed the affidavit of consent. Notably, Rosario had been living separately from
Tarciano for 30 years since 1958. And she resided so far away in Manila. It would
have been quite tempting for Tarciano to just forge her signature and avoid the risk
that she would not give her consent to the sale or demand a stiff price for it.
What is more, Atty. Plagata admittedly falsified the jurat of the affidavit of consent.
That jurat declared that Rosario swore to the document and signed it in Zamboanga
City on January 11, 1989 when, as Atty. Plagata testified, she supposedly signed it
about four months earlier at her residence in Paco, Manila on September 15, 1988.
While a defective notarization will merely strip the document of its public character
and reduce it to a private instrument, that falsified jurat, taken together with the
marks of forgery in the signature, dooms such document as proof of Rosario’s
consent to the sale of the land. That the Fuentes spouses honestly relied on the
notarized affidavit as proof of Rosario’s consent does not matter. The sale is still void
without an authentic consent.
Second. Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, the law that applies to this
case is the Family Code, not the Civil Code. Although Tarciano and Rosario got
married in 1950, Tarciano sold the conjugal property to the Fuentes spouses on
January 11, 1989, a few months after the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988.
When Tarciano married Rosario, the Civil Code put in place the system of conjugal
partnership of gains on their property relations. While its Article 165 made Tarciano
the sole administrator of the conjugal partnership, Article 16617 prohibited him from
selling commonly owned real property without his wife’s consent. Still, if he sold the
same without his wife’s consent, the sale is not void but merely voidable. Article 173
gave Rosario the right to have the sale annulled during the marriage within ten years
from the date of the sale. Failing in that, she or her heirs may demand, after
dissolution of the marriage, only the value of the property that Tarciano fraudulently
sold. Thus:
Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage, and within ten years from the
transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of the
husband entered into without her consent, when such consent is required, or any act
or contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or impair her interest in the
conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her
heirs, after the dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of property
fraudulently alienated by the husband.
But, as already stated, the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. Its Chapter 4
on Conjugal Partnership of Gains expressly superseded Title VI, Book I of the Civil
Code on Property Relations Between Husband and Wife.18Further, the Family Code
provisions were also made to apply to already existing conjugal partnerships without
prejudice to vested rights.19 Thus:
Art. 105. x x x The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal
partnerships of gains already established between spouses before the effectivity of
this Code, without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the
Civil Code or other laws, as provided in Article 256. (n)
Consequently, when Tarciano sold the conjugal lot to the Fuentes spouses on
January 11, 1989, the law that governed the disposal of that lot was already the
Family Code.
In contrast to Article 173 of the Civil Code, Article 124 of the Family Code does not
provide a period within which the wife who gave no consent may assail her
husband’s sale of the real property. It simply provides that without the other spouse’s
written consent or a court order allowing the sale, the same would be void. Article
124 thus provides:
Art. 124. x x x In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to
participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may
assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of
disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written
consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the
disposition or encumbrance shall be void. x x x
Under the provisions of the Civil Code governing contracts, a void or inexistent
contract has no force and effect from the very beginning. And this rule applies to
contracts that are declared void by positive provision of law,20 as in the case of a sale
of conjugal property without the other spouse’s written consent. A void contract is
equivalent to nothing and is absolutely wanting in civil effects. It cannot be validated
either by ratification or prescription.21
But, although a void contract has no legal effects even if no action is taken to set it
aside, when any of its terms have been performed, an action to declare its
inexistence is necessary to allow restitution of what has been given under it.22 This
action, according to Article 1410 of the Civil Code does not prescribe. Thus:
Art. 1410. The action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract
does not prescribe.
Here, the Rocas filed an action against the Fuentes spouses in 1997 for annulment
of sale and reconveyance of the real property that Tarciano sold without their
mother’s (his wife’s) written consent. The passage of time did not erode the right to
bring such an action.
Besides, even assuming that it is the Civil Code that applies to the transaction as the
CA held, Article 173 provides that the wife may bring an action for annulment of sale
on the ground of lack of spousal consent during the marriage within 10 years from
the transaction. Consequently, the action that the Rocas, her heirs, brought in 1997
fell within 10 years of the January 11, 1989 sale. It did not yet prescribe.
The Fuentes spouses of course argue that the RTC nullified the sale to them based
on fraud and that, therefore, the applicable prescriptive period should be that which
applies to fraudulent transactions, namely, four years from its discovery. Since notice
of the sale may be deemed given to the Rocas when it was registered with the
Registry of Deeds in 1989, their right of action already prescribed in 1993.
But, if there had been a victim of fraud in this case, it would be the Fuentes spouses
in that they appeared to have agreed to buy the property upon an honest belief that
Rosario’s written consent to the sale was genuine. They had four years then from the
time they learned that her signature had been forged within which to file an action to
annul the sale and get back their money plus damages. They never exercised the
right.
If, on the other hand, Rosario had agreed to sign the document of consent upon a
false representation that the property would go to their children, not to strangers, and
it turned out that this was not the case, then she would have four years from the time
she discovered the fraud within which to file an action to declare the sale void. But
that is not the case here. Rosario was not a victim of fraud or misrepresentation. Her
consent was simply not obtained at all. She lost nothing since the sale without her
written consent was void. Ultimately, the Rocas ground for annulment is not forgery
but the lack of written consent of their mother to the sale. The forgery is merely
evidence of lack of consent.
Third. The Fuentes spouses point out that it was to Rosario, whose consent was not
obtained, that the law gave the right to bring an action to declare void her husband’s
sale of conjugal land. But here, Rosario died in 1990, the year after the sale. Does
this mean that the right to have the sale declared void is forever lost?
The answer is no. As stated above, that sale was void from the beginning.
Consequently, the land remained the property of Tarciano and Rosario despite that
sale. When the two died, they passed on the ownership of the property to their heirs,
namely, the Rocas.23 As lawful owners, the Rocas had the right, under Article 429 of
the Civil Code, to exclude any person from its enjoyment and disposal.1avvphi1
In fairness to the Fuentes spouses, however, they should be entitled, among other
things, to recover from Tarciano’s heirs, the Rocas, the ₱200,000.00 that they paid
him, with legal interest until fully paid, chargeable against his estate.
Further, the Fuentes spouses appear to have acted in good faith in entering the land
and building improvements on it. Atty. Plagata, whom the parties mutually entrusted
with closing and documenting the transaction, represented that he got Rosario’s
signature on the affidavit of consent. The Fuentes spouses had no reason to believe
that the lawyer had violated his commission and his oath. They had no way of
knowing that Rosario did not come to Zamboanga to give her consent. There is no
evidence that they had a premonition that the requirement of consent presented
some difficulty. Indeed, they willingly made a 30 percent down payment on the
selling price months earlier on the assurance that it was forthcoming.
Further, the notarized document appears to have comforted the Fuentes spouses
that everything was already in order when Tarciano executed a deed of absolute sale
in their favor on January 11, 1989. In fact, they paid the balance due him. And,
acting on the documents submitted to it, the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga City
issued a new title in the names of the Fuentes spouses. It was only after all these
had passed that the spouses entered the property and built on it. He is deemed a
possessor in good faith, said Article 526 of the Civil Code, who is not aware that
there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.
As possessor in good faith, the Fuentes spouses were under no obligation to pay for
their stay on the property prior to its legal interruption by a final judgment against
them.24 What is more, they are entitled under Article 448 to indemnity for the
improvements they introduced into the property with a right of retention until the
reimbursement is made. Thus:
Art. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in spouses entitled to the right of retention of the land until the indemnity is
good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or made; and
planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to
oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who 5. The RTC of Zamboanga City from which this case originated is DIRECTED
sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the to receive evidence and determine the amount of indemnity to which
land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, petitioner spouses Manuel and Leticia Fuentes are entitled.
he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate
the building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of SO ORDERED.
the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof. (361a)
ROBERTO A. ABAD
The Rocas shall of course have the option, pursuant to Article 546 of the Civil Associate Justice
Code,25 of indemnifying the Fuentes spouses for the costs of the improvements or
paying the increase in value which the property may have acquired by reason of WE CONCUR:
such improvements.
REYNATO S. PUNO
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS WITH MODIFICATION Chief Justice
the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV 00531 dated February 27, 2007
as follows:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO RENATO C. CORONA
1. The deed of sale dated January 11, 1989 that Tarciano T. Roca executed Associate Justice Associate Justice
in favor of Manuel O. Fuentes, married to Leticia L. Fuentes, as well as the
Transfer Certificate of Title T-90,981 that the Register of Deeds of (On Leave)
Zamboanga City issued in the names of the latter spouses pursuant to that CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
deed of sale are DECLARED void; Associate Justice
Associate Justice

2. The Register of Deeds of Zamboanga City is DIRECTED to reinstate ANTONIO EDUARDO B. TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
Transfer Certificate of Title 3533 in the name of Tarciano T. Roca, married to NACHURA CASTRO
Rosario Gabriel; Associate Justice Associate Justice

3. Respondents Gonzalo G. Roca, Annabelle R. Joson, Rose Marie R. ARTURO D. BRION DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Cristobal, and Pilar Malcampo are ORDERED to pay petitioner spouses Associate Justice Associate Justice
Manuel and Leticia Fuentes the ₱200,000.00 that the latter paid Tarciano T.
Roca, with legal interest from January 11, 1989 until fully paid, chargeable
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
against his estate;
Associate Justice Associate Justice
4. Respondents Gonzalo G. Roca, Annabelle R. Joson, Rose Marie R.
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Cristobal, and Pilar Malcampo are further ORDERED, at their option, to
Associate Justice Associate Justice
indemnify petitioner spouses Manuel and Leticia Fuentes with their expenses
for introducing useful improvements on the subject land or pay the increase in
value which it may have acquired by reason of those improvements, with the
 13
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA  Id. at 45-50.
Associate Justice
14
 A Division of the Court already denied the petition for having been filed late and on
CERTIFICATION other technical grounds. (Rollo, pp. 7 and 110-111). But it was reinstated on second
motion for reconsideration and referred to the En Banc on a consulta. (Rollo, pp. 199-
200).
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case 15
 Records, p. 10.
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
16
 Exhibits E to E-21 consisting of personal letters and legal documents signed by
REYNATO S. PUNO Rosario relative to a special proceedings case tried by another court.
Chief Justice
17
 Art. 166. Unless the wife has been declared a non compos mentis or a spendthrift,
or is under civil interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium, the husband cannot
alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wife’s
consent. If she refuses unreasonably to give her consent, the court may compel her
Footnotes to grant the same.

18
1
 Records, p. 8.  Family Code of the Philippines, Art. 254.

19
2
 Id. at 149.  Id., Art. 105; see also Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank v. Miguela C. Dailo,
G.R. No. 153802, March 11, 2005, 453 SCRA 283, 290.
3
 Id. at 10. 20
 Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 1409.
4
 Id. at 9. 21
 Id., Vol. IV (1990-1991 Edition) Arturo M. Tolentino, pp. 629 & 631.
5
 Id. at 171. 22
 Id. at 632.
6
 Id. at 1-5. 23
 Id., Art. 979. "Legitimate children and their descendants succeed the parents and
7
other ascendants, without distinction as to sex or age, and even if they should come
 TSN, April 12, 2000, pp. 16-18. from different marriages. x x x
8
 Rollo, p. 42. 24
 Id., Art. 544.
9
 Id. at 72. 25
 Art. 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; but only the
possessor in good faith may retain the thing until he has been reimbursed therefor.
10
 Id. at 73. Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good faith with the same
right of retention, the person who has defeated him in the possession having the
11
 Id. at 92. option of refunding the amount of the expenses or of paying the increase in value
which the thing may have acquired by reason thereof. (453a)
12
 Id. at 95-96.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 179579               February 1, 2012
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS and the DISTRICT COLLECTOR OF THE PORT
OF SUBIC, Petitioners, 
vs.
HYPERMIX FEEDS CORPORATION, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45,1 assailing the Decision2 and the
Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA), which nullified the Customs Memorandum
Order (CMO) No. 27-20034 on the tariff classification of wheat issued by petitioner
Commissioner of Customs.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On 7 November 2003, petitioner Commissioner of Customs issued CMO 27-2003.
Under the Memorandum, for tariff purposes, wheat was classified according to the
following: (1) importer or consignee; (2) country of origin; and (3) port of
discharge.5 The regulation provided an exclusive list of corporations, ports of
discharge, commodity descriptions and countries of origin. Depending on these
factors, wheat would be classified either as food grade or feed grade. The
corresponding tariff for food grade wheat was 3%, for feed grade, 7%.
CMO 27-2003 further provided for the proper procedure for protest or Valuation and
Classification Review Committee (VCRC) cases. Under this procedure, the release
of the articles that were the subject of protest required the importer to post a cash
bond to cover the tariff differential.6
A month after the issuance of CMO 27-2003, on 19 December 2003, respondent
filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief7 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las
Piñas City. It anticipated the implementation of the regulation on its imported and
perishable Chinese milling wheat in transit from China.8 Respondent contended that
CMO 27-2003 was issued without following the mandate of the Revised
Administrative Code on public participation, prior notice, and publication or
registration with the University of the Philippines Law Center.
Respondent also alleged that the regulation summarily adjudged it to be a feed
grade supplier without the benefit of prior assessment and examination; thus, despite
having imported food grade wheat, it would be subjected to the 7% tariff upon the
arrival of the shipment, forcing them to pay 133% more than was proper.
Furthermore, respondent claimed that the equal protection clause of the Constitution
was violated when the regulation treated non-flour millers differently from flour millers
for no reason at all.
Lastly, respondent asserted that the retroactive application of the regulation was
confiscatory in nature.
On 19 January 2004, the RTC issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)
effective for twenty (20) days from notice.9
Petitioners thereafter filed a Motion to Dismiss.10 They alleged that: (1) the RTC did
not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, because respondent was
asking for a judicial determination of the classification of wheat; (2) an action for
declaratory relief was improper; (3) CMO 27-2003 was an internal administrative rule
and not legislative in nature; and (4) the claims of respondent were speculative and
premature, because the Bureau of Customs (BOC) had yet to examine respondent’s
products. They likewise opposed the application for a writ of preliminary injunction on
the ground that they had not inflicted any injury through the issuance of the
regulation; and that the action would be contrary to the rule that administrative
issuances are assumed valid until declared otherwise.
On 28 February 2005, the parties agreed that the matters raised in the application for
preliminary injunction and the Motion to Dismiss would just be resolved together in
the main case. Thus, on 10 March 2005, the RTC rendered its Decision11 without
having to resolve the application for preliminary injunction and the Motion to Dismiss.
The trial court ruled in favor of respondent, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is GRANTED and the subject
Customs Memorandum Order 27-2003 is declared INVALID and OF NO FORCE
AND EFFECT. Respondents Commissioner of Customs, the District Collector of
Subic or anyone acting in their behalf are to immediately cease and desist from
enforcing the said Customs Memorandum Order 27-2003.
SO ORDERED.12
The RTC held that it had jurisdiction over the subject matter, given that the issue
raised by respondent concerned the quasi-legislative powers of petitioners. It
likewise stated that a petition for declaratory relief was the proper remedy, and that
respondent was the proper party to file it. The court considered that respondent was
a regular importer, and that the latter would be subjected to the application of the
regulation in future transactions.
With regard to the validity of the regulation, the trial court found that petitioners had
not followed the basic requirements of hearing and publication in the issuance of
CMO 27-2003. It likewise held that petitioners had "substituted the quasi-judicial
determination of the commodity by a quasi-legislative predetermination."13 The lower
court pointed out that a classification based on importers and ports of discharge were
violative of the due process rights of respondent.
Dissatisfied with the Decision of the lower court, petitioners appealed to the CA,
raising the same allegations in defense of CMO 27-2003.14 The appellate court,
however, dismissed the appeal. It held that, since the regulation affected substantial
rights of petitioners and other importers, petitioners should have observed the
requirements of notice, hearing and publication.
Hence, this Petition.
Petitioners raise the following issues for the consideration of this Court:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE
WHICH IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE LAW AND PREVAILING
JURISPRUDENCE.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THAT
THE TRIAL COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE.
The Petition has no merit.
We shall first discuss the propriety of an action for declaratory relief.
Rule 63, Section 1 provides:
Who may file petition. – Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other
written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or
regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation may, before breach or
violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine
any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or
duties, thereunder.
The requirements of an action for declaratory relief are as follows: (1) there must be
a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose
interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal
interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue involved must be ripe for judicial
determination.15 We find that the Petition filed by respondent before the lower court
meets these requirements.
First, the subject of the controversy is the constitutionality of CMO 27-2003 issued by
petitioner Commissioner of Customs. In Smart Communications v. NTC,16 we held:
The determination of whether a specific rule or set of rules issued by an
administrative agency contravenes the law or the constitution is within the jurisdiction
of the regular courts. Indeed, the Constitution vests the power of judicial review or
the power to declare a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential
decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation in the courts, including the
regional trial courts. This is within the scope of judicial power, which includes the
authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of the acts of
the political departments. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis supplied)
Meanwhile, in Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders, Inc. v. Department of
Finance Secretary,17 we said:
xxx [A] legislative rule is in the nature of subordinate legislation, designed to
implement a primary legislation by providing the details thereof. xxx
In addition such rule must be published. On the other hand, interpretative rules are
designed to provide guidelines to the law which the administrative agency is in
charge of enforcing.
Accordingly, in considering a legislative rule a court is free to make three
inquiries: (i) whether the rule is within the delegated authority of the administrative
agency; (ii) whether it is reasonable; and (iii) whether it was issued pursuant to
proper procedure. But the court is not free to substitute its judgment as to the
desirability or wisdom of the rule for the legislative body, by its delegation of
administrative judgment, has committed those questions to administrative judgments
and not to judicial judgments. In the case of an interpretative rule, the inquiry is not
into the validity but into the correctness or propriety of the rule. As a matter of power
a court, when confronted with an interpretative rule, is free to (i) give the force of law
to the rule; (ii) go to the opposite extreme and substitute its judgment; or (iii) give
some intermediate degree of authoritative weight to the interpretative rule.
(Emphasis supplied)
Second, the controversy is between two parties that have adverse interests.
Petitioners are summarily imposing a tariff rate that respondent is refusing to pay.
Third, it is clear that respondent has a legal and substantive interest in the
implementation of CMO 27-2003. Respondent has adequately shown that, as a
regular importer of wheat, on 14 August 2003, it has actually made shipments of
wheat from China to Subic. The shipment was set to arrive in December 2003. Upon
its arrival, it would be subjected to the conditions of CMO 27-2003. The regulation
calls for the imposition of different tariff rates, depending on the factors enumerated
therein. Thus, respondent alleged that it would be made to pay the 7% tariff applied
to feed grade wheat, instead of the 3% tariff on food grade wheat. In addition,
respondent would have to go through the procedure under CMO 27-2003, which
would undoubtedly toll its time and resources. The lower court correctly pointed out
as follows:
xxx As noted above, the fact that petitioner is precisely into the business of importing
wheat, each and every importation will be subjected to constant disputes which will
result into (sic) delays in the delivery, setting aside of funds as cash bond required in
the CMO as well as the resulting expenses thereof. It is easy to see that business
uncertainty will be a constant occurrence for petitioner. That the sums involved are
not minimal is shown by the discussions during the hearings conducted as well as in
the pleadings filed. It may be that the petitioner can later on get a refund but such
has been foreclosed because the Collector of Customs and the Commissioner of
Customs are bound by their own CMO. Petitioner cannot get its refund with the said
agency. We believe and so find that Petitioner has presented such a stake in the
outcome of this controversy as to vest it with standing to file this petition.18 (Emphasis
supplied)
Finally, the issue raised by respondent is ripe for judicial determination, because
litigation is inevitable19 for the simple and uncontroverted reason that respondent is
not included in the enumeration of flour millers classified as food grade wheat
importers. Thus, as the trial court stated, it would have to file a protest case each
time it imports food grade wheat and be subjected to the 7% tariff.
It is therefore clear that a petition for declaratory relief is the right remedy given the
circumstances of the case.
Considering that the questioned regulation would affect the substantive rights of
respondent as explained above, it therefore follows that petitioners should have
applied the pertinent provisions of Book VII, Chapter 2 of the Revised Administrative
Code, to wit:
Section 3. Filing. – (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines
Law Center three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the
date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3) months from that
date shall not thereafter be the bases of any sanction against any party of persons.
x x x           x x x          x x x
Section 9. Public Participation. - (1) If not otherwise required by law, an agency shall,
as far as practicable, publish or circulate notices of proposed rules and afford
interested parties the opportunity to submit their views prior to the adoption of any
rule.
(2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid unless the
proposed rates shall have been published in a newspaper of general
circulation at least two (2) weeks before the first hearing thereon.
(3) In case of opposition, the rules on contested cases shall be observed.
When an administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature, its applicability needs
nothing further than its bare issuance, for it gives no real consequence more than
what the law itself has already prescribed. When, on the other hand, the
administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for the means that can facilitate or
render least cumbersome the implementation of the law but substantially increases
the burden of those governed, it behooves the agency to accord at least to those
directly affected a chance to be heard, and thereafter to be duly informed, before that
new issuance is given the force and effect of law.20
Likewise, in Tañada v. Tuvera,21 we held:
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate
notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens.
Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of
the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish
or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice
whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the
publication of laws taken so vital significance that at this time when the people have
bestowed upon the President a power heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature.
While the people are kept abreast by the mass media of the debates and
deliberations in the Batasan Pambansa – and for the diligent ones, ready access to
the legislative records – no such publicity accompanies the law-making process of
the President. Thus, without publication, the people have no means of knowing what
presidential decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of
informing themselves of the specific contents and texts of such decrees. (Emphasis
supplied)
Because petitioners failed to follow the requirements enumerated by the Revised
Administrative Code, the assailed regulation must be struck down.
Going now to the content of CMO 27-3003, we likewise hold that it is unconstitutional
for being violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
The equal protection clause means that no person or class of persons shall be
deprived of the same protection of laws enjoyed by other persons or other classes in
the same place in like circumstances. Thus, the guarantee of the equal protection of
laws is not violated if there is a reasonable classification. For a classification to be
reasonable, it must be shown that (1) it rests on substantial distinctions; (2) it is
germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it is not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) it applies equally to all members of the same class.22
Unfortunately, CMO 27-2003 does not meet these requirements. We do not see how
the quality of wheat is affected by who imports it, where it is discharged, or which
country it came from.
Thus, on the one hand, even if other millers excluded from CMO 27-2003 have
imported food grade wheat, the product would still be declared as feed grade wheat,
a classification subjecting them to 7% tariff. On the other hand, even if the importers
listed under CMO 27-2003 have imported feed grade wheat, they would only be
made to pay 3% tariff, thus depriving the state of the taxes due. The regulation,
therefore, does not become disadvantageous to respondent only, but even to the
state.
It is also not clear how the regulation intends to "monitor more closely wheat
importations and thus prevent their misclassification." A careful study of CMO 27-
2003 shows that it not only fails to achieve this end, but results in the opposite. The
application of the regulation forecloses the possibility that other corporations that are
excluded from the list import food grade wheat; at the same time, it creates an
assumption that those who meet the criteria do not import feed grade wheat. In the
first case, importers are unnecessarily burdened to prove the classification of their
wheat imports; while in the second, the state carries that burden.
Petitioner Commissioner of Customs also went beyond his powers when the
regulation limited the customs officer’s duties mandated by Section 1403 of the Tariff
and Customs Law, as amended. The law provides:
Section 1403. – Duties of Customs Officer Tasked to Examine, Classify, and
Appraise Imported Articles. – The customs officer tasked to examine, classify, and
appraise imported articles shall determine whether the packages designated for
examination and their contents are in accordance with the declaration in the entry,
invoice and other pertinent documents and shall make return in such a manner as to
indicate whether the articles have been truly and correctly declared in the entry as
regard their quantity, measurement, weight, and tariff classification and not imported
contrary to law. He shall submit samples to the laboratory for analysis when feasible
to do so and when such analysis is necessary for the proper classification, appraisal,
and/or admission into the Philippines of imported articles.
Likewise, the customs officer shall determine the unit of quantity in which they are
usually bought and sold, and appraise the imported articles in accordance with
Section 201 of this Code.
Failure on the part of the customs officer to comply with his duties shall subject him Associate Justice Associate Justice
to the penalties prescribed under Section 3604 of this Code.1âwphi1
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
The provision mandates that the customs officer must first assess and determine the Associate Justice
classification of the imported article before tariff may be imposed. Unfortunately,
CMO 23-2007 has already classified the article even before the customs officer had ATTESTATION
the chance to examine it. In effect, petitioner Commissioner of Customs diminished
the powers granted by the Tariff and Customs Code with regard to wheat importation I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation
when it no longer required the customs officer’s prior examination and assessment of before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
the proper classification of the wheat.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
It is well-settled that rules and regulations, which are the product of a delegated Associate Justice
power to create new and additional legal provisions that have the effect of law, Chairperson, Second Division
should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the
administrative agency. It is required that the regulation be germane to the objects
CERTIFICATION
and purposes of the law; and that it be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with,
the standards prescribed by law.23
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
In summary, petitioners violated respondent’s right to due process in the issuance of consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
CMO 27-2003 when they failed to observe the requirements under the Revised
Division.
Administrative Code. Petitioners likewise violated respondent’s right to equal
protection of laws when they provided for an unreasonable classification in the
RENATO C. CORONA
application of the regulation. Finally, petitioner Commissioner of Customs went
Chief Justice
beyond his powers of delegated authority when the regulation limited the powers of
the customs officer to examine and assess imported articles.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED. Footnotes
1 
Rollo, pp. 124-142.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Associate Justice 2 
Id. at 33-46.

WE CONCUR: 3 
Id. at 47.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO 4 
Records, pp. 16-18.
Associate Justice
Chairperson 5 
SUBJECT: Tariff Classification of Wheat

ARTURO D. BRION JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ In order to monitor more closely wheat importations and thus prevent their
misclassification, the following are hereby prescribed:
 1. For tariff purposes, wheat shall be classified as follows: including, but not limited to, proofs of sale or consumption of said wheat importation,
certificate of quality issued by manufacturing country and contract of sale.
1.1 Under HS 1001.9090 (Food Grade) when all the following elements are present:
3.4 Any VCRC decision adverse to the government shall be subject to automatic
1.1.1 the importer/consignee of the imported wheat is a flour miller as per attached list review by the Commissioner of Customs.
(Annex ‘A’), which shall form as integral part of this Order
7 
Rollo¸ pp. 158-168.
1.1.2 the wheat importation consists of any of those listed in Annex ‘A’ according to
8 
the country of origin indicated therein Records, p. 12.

9 
1.1.3 the wheat importation is entered/unloaded in the Port of Discharge indicated Rollo, pp. 58-59.
opposite the name of the flour miller, as per Annex ‘A’
10 
Id. at 60-78.
1.2 Under HS 1001.9010 (Feed Grade)
11 
Id. at 108-114; penned by Judge Romeo C. De Leon.
1.2.1 When any or all of the elements prescribed under 1.1 above is not present.
12 
Id. at 114.
1.2.2 All other wheat importations by non-flour millers, i.e., importers/consignees NOT
listed in Annex ‘A’ 13 
Id. at 112.
6 
SUBJECT: Tariff Classification of Wheat 14 
Id. at 117-122.

x x x           x x x          x x x 15 
Tolentino v. Board of Accountancy, 90 Phil. 83 (1951).

2. Any issue arising from this Order shall be resolved in an appropriate protest or 16 
456 Phil. 145 (2003).
VCRC case.
17 
G.R. No. 108524, 10 November 1994, 238 SCRA 63, 69-70.
3. In case of a VCRC case, the following applies:
18 
Rollo, p. 112.
3.1 The shipment may qualify for Tentative Release upon payment of the taxes and
duties as per declaration and the posting of cash bond to cover the tariff differential. 19 
Office of the Ombudsman v. Ibay, 416 Phil. 659 (2001).
3.2 The Tentative Release granted by the VCRC shall, prior to the release of the 20 
shipment from Customs custody, be subject to representative. For this purpose, the CIR v. Michel J. Lhuiller Pawnshop Inc., 453 Phil. 1043 (2003).
District/Port Collector concerned shall forward to the Office of the Commissioner the
Tentative Release papers, together with all pertinent shipping and supporting 21 
220 Phil. 422 (1985).
documents, including, but not limited to, contract of sale, phytosanitary certificate and
certificate of quality. 22 
Philippine Rural Electric Cooperatives Association, Inc. v. DILG, 451 Phil. 683 (2003).

In the case of Outports, the required documents shall be faxed to the Office of the 23 
Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De los Angeles v. Home Development Mutual
Commissioner of Customs to any of these numbers: 527-1953/527-4573. Fund, 389 Phil. 296 (2000).

3.3 In resolving the classification issue, the VCRC shall consider the
import/consignee, type/source of wheat and port of discharge of the wheat
importation, as indicated in Annex ‘A’, and require the proofs/evidences (sic),
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 187378               September 30, 2013
RAMONITO O. ACAAC, PETALFOUNDATION, INC., APOLINARIO M. ELORDE,
HECTOR ACAAC, and ROMEO BULAWIN, Petitioners,  organization inside the sanctuaries;11 and (b) the construction of any structures,
vs.
MELQUIADES D. AZCUNA, JR., in his capacity as Mayor, and MARIETES B.
BONALOS, in her capacity as Municipal Engineer and Building Official-
Designate, both of Lopez Jaena Municipality, Misamis Occidental,Respondents.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated September
30, 2008 and Resolution3 dated March 9, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CV No. 00284-MIN which reversed and set aside the Decision4 dated
November 26, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court of Oroquieta City, Branch 2 (RTC) in
Civil Case No. 4684 for injunction.
The Facts
Petitioner People’s Eco-Tourism and Livelihood Foundation, Inc.(PETAL) is a non-
governmental organization, founded by petitioner Ramonito O. Acaac, which is
engaged in the protection and conservation of ecology, tourism, and livelihood
projects within Misamis Occidental.5 In line with its objectives, PETAL built some
cottages made of indigenous materials on Capayas Island (a 1,605 square meter
islet) in 1995 as well as a seminar cottage in 20016which it rented out to the public
and became the source of livelihood of its beneficiaries,7 among whom are
petitioners Hector Acaac and Romeo Bulawin.
On April 11 and May 20, 2002, however, respondents Mayor Melquiades D. Azcuna,
Jr. (Azcuna) and Building Official Marietes B. Bonalos issued separate Notices of
Illegal Construction against PETAL for its failure to apply for a building permit prior to
the construction of its buildings in violation of Presidential Decree No.
1096,8 otherwise known as the "National Building Code of the Philippines," ordering it
to stop all illegal building activities on Capayas Island. When PETAL failed to comply
with the requirements for the issuance of a building permit, a Third and Final Notice
of Illegal Construction was issued by respondents against it on July 8, 2002,9 but still
the same remained unheeded.
It was also on July 8, 2002 that the Sangguniang Bayan of Lopez Jaena (SB)
adopted Municipal Ordinance No. 02, Series of 200210 (subject ordinance) which
prohibited, among others: (a) the entry of any entity, association, corporation or
permanent or temporary, on the premises, except if authorized by the local
government.12 On July 12, 2002, Azcuna approved the subject ordinance; hence, the
same was submitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Misamis Occidental (SP),
which in turn, conducted a joint hearing on the matter. Thereafter, notices were
posted at the designated areas, including Capayas Island, declaring the premises as
government property and prohibiting ingress and egress thereto.13
On August 23, 2002, a Notice of Voluntary Demolition was served upon PETAL
directing it to remove the structures it built on Capayas Island. Among the reasons
cited was its violation of the subject ordinance. A similar notice was also served
against individual petitioners on October 25, 2002.
On October 29, 2002, petitioners filed an action praying for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order, injunction and damages15 against respondents before
the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 4684, alleging that they have prior vested rights
to occupy and utilize Capayas Island. PETAL claimed that its predecessors-in-
interest have been in possession thereof since 1961, with whom it entered into a
Memorandum of Agreement for the operation of the said island as a camping,
tourism, and recreational resort; thus, the issuance of the subject ordinance was
prejudicial to their interest as they were deprived of their livelihood. Moreover,
PETAL assailed the validity of the subject ordinance on the following grounds: (a) it
was adopted without public consultation; (b) it was not published in a newspaper of
general circulation in the province as required by Republic Act No.7160,16 otherwise
known as "The Local Government Code of 1991" (LGC);and (c) it was not approved
by the SP. Therefore, its implementation should be enjoined.17
In their Answer,18 respondents averred that petitioners have no cause of action
against them since they are not the lawful owners or lessees of Capayas Island,
which was classified as timberland and property belonging to the public domain.
Further, they maintained that they have complied with all the publication and hearing
requirements for the passage of the subject ordinance, which was deemed approved
by operation of law for failure of the SP to take any positive action thereon as
provided under the LGC. As such, it is valid and enforceable.
The RTC Ruling
19
On November 26, 2004, the RTC rendered a Decision  declaring the subject
ordinance as invalid/void based on the following grounds: (a) PETAL’s protest has
not been resolved and that the subject ordinance was not duly approved by the SP;
(b) the said ordinance was not published in a newspaper of general circulation nor
was it posted in public places; (c) Capayas Island is classified as timberland, hence,
not suited to be a bird or fish sanctuary; and (d) the authority and control over
timberlands belong to the national government, through the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).20 Based on the foregoing, respondents
were ordered, among others, to desist from closing Capayas Island to the
public.21 However, the petitioners were ordered to remove the structures they built
thereon without valid building permits22 since they were found to have no title over
the disputed property.23
Aggrieved, respondents appealed the foregoing pronouncement before the CA,
docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 00284-MIN.
The Proceedings Before the CA
On September 30, 2008, the CA rendered a Decision24 granting respondents’ appeal.
Contrary to the RTC’s ruling, it held that the subject ordinance was deemed
approved upon failure of the SP to declare the same invalid within30 days after its
submission in accordance with Section 56 of the LGC.25 It also gave credence to
Azcuna’s testimony that the subject ordinance was posted and published in
conspicuous places in their municipality, and in the bulletin board.26 Moreover, public
consultations were conducted with various groups before the subject ordinance was
passed.27 The CA further ruled that the Municipality of Lopez Jaena was vested with
sufficient power and authority to pass and adopt the subject ordinance under Section
447 in relation to Section 16 of the LGC.28 Therefore, it is not only the DENR that
could create and administer sanctuaries.29 Having enacted the subject ordinance
within its powers as a municipality and in accordance with the procedure prescribed
by law, the CA pronounced that the subject ordinance is valid.30
On the other hand, the CA upheld the RTC’s finding that petitioner shave no
proprietary rights over the Capayas Island, thereby rendering their action for
injunction improper.31
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration32 therefrom was denied by the CA in a
Resolution33 dated March 9, 2009. Hence, the instant petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not the subject ordinance is valid and
enforceable against petitioners.34
The Court’s Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
Section 56 of the LGC provides:
SEC. 56. Review of Component City and Municipal Ordinances or Resolutions by the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan. – (a) Within three (3) days after approval, the secretary
to the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan shall forward to the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan for review, copies of approved ordinances and the
resolutions approving the local development plans and public investment programs
formulated by the local development councils.
(b) Within thirty (30) days after receipt of copies of such ordinances and
resolutions, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan shall examine the documents or
transmit them to the provincial attorney, or if there be none, to the provincial
prosecutor for prompt examination. The provincial attorney or provincial
prosecutor shall, within a period of ten (10) days from receipt of the
documents, inform the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in writing his comments or
recommendations, which may be considered by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan in making its decision.
(c) If the Sangguniang Panlalawigan finds that such an ordinance or
resolution is beyond the power conferred upon the Sangguniang Panlungsod
or Sangguniang Bayan concerned, it shall declare such ordinance or
resolution invalid in whole or in part. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan shall
enter its action in the minutes and shall advise the corresponding city or
municipal authorities of the action it has taken.
 (d) If no action has been taken by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan within thirty
(30) days after submission of such an ordinance or resolution, the same shall
be presumed consistent with law and therefore valid.
In this case, petitioners maintain that the subject ordinance cannot be deemed
approved through the mere passage of time considering that the same is still
pending with the Committee on Fisheries and Aquatic Resources of the SP.35 It,
however, bears to note that more than 30 days have already elapsed from the time
the said ordinance was submitted to the latter for review by the SB;36 hence, it should
be deemed approved and valid pursuant to Section 56 (d) above. As properly
observed by the CA:
Par. (d) should be read in conjunction with par. (c), in order to arrive at the meaning
of the disputed word, "action." It is clear, based on the foregoing provision, that the
action that must be entered in the minutes of the sangguniang panlalawigan is the
declaration of the sangguniang panlalawigan that the ordinance is invalid in whole or
in part. x x x.
This construction would be more in consonance with the rule of statutory
construction that the parts of a statute must be read together in such a manner as to
give effect to all of them and that such parts shall not be construed as contradicting
each other. x x x laws are given a reasonable construction such that apparently
conflicting provisions are allowed to stand and given effect by reconciling them,
reference being had to the moving spirit behind the enactment of the statute.37
Neither can the Court give credence to petitioners’ contentions that the subject
ordinance was not published nor posted in accordance with the provisions of the
LGC.38 It is noteworthy that petitioners’ own evidence reveals that a public
hearing39 was conducted prior to the promulgation of the subject ordinance.
Moreover, other than their bare allegations, petitioners failed to present any evidence
to show that no publication or posting of the subject ordinance was made. In
contrast, Azcuna had testified that they have complied with the publication and
posting requirements.40 While it is true that he likewise failed to submit any other
evidence thereon, still, in accordance with the presumption of validity in favor of an
ordinance, its constitutionality or legality should be upheld in the absence of any
controverting evidence that the procedure prescribed by law was not observed in its
enactment. Likewise, petitioners had the burden of proving their own allegation,
which they, however, failed to do. In the similar case of Figuerres v. CA,41 citing
United States v. Cristobal,42 the Court upheld the presumptive validity of the
ordinance therein despite the lack of controverting evidence on the part of the local
government to show that public hearings were conducted in light of: (a) the
oppositor’s equal lack of controverting evidence to demonstrate the local
government’s non-compliance with the said public hearing; and (b) the fact that the
local government’s non-compliance was a negative allegation essential to the
oppositor’s cause of action:
However, it is noteworthy that apart from her bare assertions, petitioner Figuerres
has not presented any evidence to show that no public hearings were conducted
prior to the enactment of the ordinances in question. On the other hand, the
Municipality of Mandaluyong claims that public hearings were indeed conducted
before the subject ordinances were adopted, although it likewise failed to submit any
evidence to establish this allegation. However, in accordance with the presumption of
validity in favor of an ordinance, their constitutionality or legality should be upheld in
the absence of evidence showing that the procedure prescribed by law was not
observed in their enactment. In an analogous case, United States v. Cristobal, it was
alleged that the ordinance making it a crime for anyone to obstruct waterways had
not been submitted by the provincial board as required by §§2232-2233 of the
Administrative Code. In rejecting this contention, the Court held:
From the judgment of the Court of First Instance the defendant appealed to this court
upon the theory that the ordinance in question was adopted without authority on the
part of the municipality and was therefore unconstitutional. The appellant argues that
there was no proof adduced during the trial of the cause showing that said ordinance
had been approved by the provincial board. Considering the provisions of law that it
is the duty of the provincial board to approve or disapprove ordinances adopted by
the municipal councils of the different municipalities, we will assume, in the absence
of proof to the contrary, that the law has been complied with.
We have a right to assume that officials have done that which the law requires them
to do, in the absence of positive proof to the contrary.
Furthermore, the lack of a public hearing is a negative allegation essential to
petitioner's cause of action in the present case. Hence, as petitioner is the party
asserting it, she has the burden of proof. Since petitioner failed to rebut the
presumption of validity in favor of the subject ordinances and to discharge the burden
of proving that no public hearings were conducted prior to the enactment thereof, we
are constrained to uphold their constitutionality or legality.43 (Emphases supplied,
citation omitted)
All told, the Court finds no reversible error committed by the CA in upholding the
validity of the subject ordinance.
In any event, petitioners have not shown any valid title44 to the property in dispute to Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
be entitled to its possession. Besides, the RTC’s order directing the removal of the Chairperson's Attestation,
structures built by petitioners on Capayas Island without building permits was not
appealed. As such, the same should now be deemed as final and conclusive upon I certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in
them. consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's
Division.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated September 30, 2008 and
Resolution dated March 9, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 00284- MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
MIN are hereby AFFIRMED. Chief Justice

SO ORDERED.

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice Footnotes

WE CONCUR: 1
 Rollo, pp. 9-22.

2
ANTONIO T. CARPIO  Id. at 31-46. Penned by Associate Justice Ruben C. Ayson, with Associate Justices Rodrigo
Associate Justice F. Lim, Jr. and Michael P. Elbinias, concurring.
Chairperson 3
 Id. at 25-29.

ARTURO D. BRION MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO 4

 Id. at 55-71. Penned by Judge Bernadette S. Paredes-Encinareal.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
5
 Id. at 32.
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice 6
 Id. at 11.

7
ATTESTATION  Id. at 32-33.

8
I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in  "ADOPTING A NATIONAL BUILDING CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES (NBCP) THEREBY
REVISING REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED SIXTY-FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-ONE (R.A. NO.
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's 6541)."
Division.
9
 Rollo , p. 34.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice 10
 Records, pp. 28-29. Entitled "AN ORDINANCE ESTABLISHING CAPAYAS ISLAND AND
Chairperson, Second Division ITS SURROUNDINGS, MANSABAY BAJO AND SIBULA AS BIRDS, FISH AND SHELLS
SANCTUARY LOCATED WITHIN THE MUNICIPAL WATERS OF LOPEZ JAENA WITH A
TOTAL AREA OF SIXTY THREE POINT ONE HUNDRED NINETY SEVEN (63.197)
CERTIFICATION HECTARES, THREE (3) HECTARES AND THREE (3) HECTARES RESPECTIVELY."

11
 Rollo, pp. 33-34.
12 34
 Records, p. 28. See subject ordinance.  Id. at 13.

13 35
 Rollo, pp. 34-35.  See id. at 14-15.

14 36
 Id. at 35.  Id. at 14.

15 37
 Id. at 36.  Id. at 38-39.

16 38
 "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991."  SEC. 511. Posting and Publication of Ordinances with Penal Sanctions. – (a) ordinances
with penal sanctions shall be posted at prominent places in the provincial capitol, city,
17
 Records, p. 5. municipal or Barangay hall, as the case may be, for a minimum period of three (3) consecutive
weeks. Such ordinances shall also be published in a newspaper of general circulation, where
18
available, within the territorial jurisdiction of the local government unit concerned, except in the
 Id. at 76-81. case of Barangay ordinances. Unless otherwise provided therein, said ordinances shall take
effect on the day following its publication, or at the end of the period of posting, whichever
19
 Rollo , pp. 55-71. occurs later.

20
 Id. at 67-68. xxxx

39
21
 Id. at 71.  Records, p. 60. A "dialogue-consultation" was conducted by the SB on June 13, 2002.

40
22
 Id.  Rollo, pp. 40-41.

41
23
 Id. at 70.  364 Phil. 683(1999).

42
24
 Id. at 31-46.  34 Phil. 825 (1916).

43
25
 Id. at 39-40.  Figuerres v. CA, supra note 41, at 692-693.

44
26
 Id. at 40-41.  Rollo, p. 70.

27
 Id. at 43.

28
 Id. at 42.

29
 Id. at 43.

30
 Id. at 42-43.

31
 Id. at 45.

32
 Id. at 47-53.

33
 Id. at 25-29.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 170338             December 23, 2008
VIRGILIO O. GARCILLANO, petitioner,  recordings were to become the subject of heated legislative hearings conducted
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC
INFORMATION, PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY, NATIONAL DEFENSE AND
SECURITY, INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY, and
SUFFRAGE AND ELECTORAL REFORMS, respondents.
x----------------------x
G.R. No. 179275             December 23, 2008
SANTIAGO JAVIER RANADA and OSWALDO D. AGCAOILI, petitioners, 
vs.
THE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY
THE SENATE PRESIDENT THE HONORABLE MANUEL VILLAR, respondents.
x----------------------x
MAJ. LINDSAY REX SAGGE, petitioner-in-intervention
x----------------------x
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., BENIGNO NOYNOY C. AQUINO, RODOLFO G.
BIAZON, PANFILO M. LACSON, LOREN B. LEGARDA, M.A. JAMBY A.S.
MADRIGAL, and ANTONIO F. TRILLANES, respondents-intervenors
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
More than three years ago, tapes ostensibly containing a wiretapped conversation
purportedly between the President of the Philippines and a high-ranking official of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) surfaced. They captured unprecedented
public attention and thrust the country into a controversy that placed the legitimacy of
the present administration on the line, and resulted in the near-collapse of the Arroyo
government. The tapes, notoriously referred to as the "Hello Garci" tapes, allegedly
contained the President’s instructions to COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano
to manipulate in her favor results of the 2004 presidential elections. These
separately by committees of both Houses of Congress.1
In the House of Representatives (House), on June 8, 2005, then Minority Floor
Leader Francis G. Escudero delivered a privilege speech, "Tale of Two Tapes," and
set in motion a congressional investigation jointly conducted by the Committees on
Public Information, Public Order and Safety, National Defense and Security,
Information and Communications Technology, and Suffrage and Electoral Reforms
(respondent House Committees). During the inquiry, several versions of the
wiretapped conversation emerged. But on July 5, 2005, National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) Director Reynaldo Wycoco, Atty. Alan Paguia and the lawyer of
former NBI Deputy Director Samuel Ong submitted to the respondent House
Committees seven alleged "original" tape recordings of the supposed three-hour
taped conversation. After prolonged and impassioned debate by the committee
members on the admissibility and authenticity of the recordings, the tapes were
eventually played in the chambers of the House.2
On August 3, 2005, the respondent House Committees decided to suspend the
hearings indefinitely. Nevertheless, they decided to prepare committee reports based
on the said recordings and the testimonies of the resource persons.3
Alarmed by these developments, petitioner Virgilio O. Garcillano (Garcillano) filed
with this Court a Petition for Prohibition and Injunction, with Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction4docketed as G.R. No.
170338. He prayed that the respondent House Committees be restrained from using
these tape recordings of the "illegally obtained" wiretapped conversations in their
committee reports and for any other purpose. He further implored that the said
recordings and any reference thereto be ordered stricken off the records of the
inquiry, and the respondent House Committees directed to desist from further using
the recordings in any of the House proceedings.5
Without reaching its denouement, the House discussion and debates on the "Garci
tapes" abruptly stopped.
After more than two years of quiescence, Senator Panfilo Lacson roused the
slumbering issue with a privilege speech, "The Lighthouse That Brought Darkness."
In his discourse, Senator Lacson promised to provide the public "the whole
unvarnished truth – the what’s, when’s, where’s, who’s and why’s" of the alleged
wiretap, and sought an inquiry into the perceived willingness of telecommunications
providers to participate in nefarious wiretapping activities.
On motion of Senator Francis Pangilinan, Senator Lacson’s speech was referred to
the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security, chaired by Senator
Rodolfo Biazon, who had previously filed two bills6 seeking to regulate the sale,
purchase and use of wiretapping equipment and to prohibit the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) from performing electoral duties.7
In the Senate’s plenary session the following day, a lengthy debate ensued when
Senator Richard Gordon aired his concern on the possible transgression of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 42008 if the body were to conduct a legislative inquiry on the matter.
On August 28, 2007, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago delivered a privilege
speech, articulating her considered view that the Constitution absolutely bans the
use, possession, replay or communication of the contents of the "Hello Garci" tapes.
However, she recommended a legislative investigation into the role of the
Intelligence Service of the AFP (ISAFP), the Philippine National Police or other
government entities in the alleged illegal wiretapping of public officials.9
On September 6, 2007, petitioners Santiago Ranada and Oswaldo Agcaoili, retired
justices of the Court of Appeals, filed before this Court a Petition for Prohibition with
Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction,10 docketed as G.R. No. 179275, seeking to bar the Senate from
conducting its scheduled legislative inquiry. They argued in the main that the
intended legislative inquiry violates R.A. No. 4200 and Section 3, Article III of the
Constitution.11
As the Court did not issue an injunctive writ, the Senate proceeded with its public
hearings on the "Hello Garci" tapes on September 7,12 1713 and October 1,14 2007.
Intervening as respondents,15 Senators Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., Benigno Noynoy C.
Aquino, Rodolfo G. Biazon, Panfilo M. Lacson, Loren B. Legarda, M.A. Jamby A.S.
Madrigal and Antonio F. Trillanes filed their Comment16 on the petition on September
25, 2007.
The Court subsequently heard the case on oral argument.17
On October 26, 2007, Maj. Lindsay Rex Sagge, a member of the ISAFP and one of
the resource persons summoned by the Senate to appear and testify at its hearings,
moved to intervene as petitioner in G.R. No. 179275.18
On November 20, 2007, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. Nos. 170338 and
179275.19
It may be noted that while both petitions involve the "Hello Garci" recordings, they
have different objectives–the first is poised at preventing the playing of the tapes in
the House and their subsequent inclusion in the committee reports, and the second
seeks to prohibit and stop the conduct of the Senate inquiry on the wiretapped
conversation.
The Court dismisses the first petition, G.R. No. 170338, and grants the second, G.R.
No. 179275.
-I-
Before delving into the merits of the case, the Court shall first resolve the issue on
the parties’ standing, argued at length in their pleadings.
In Tolentino v. COMELEC,20 we explained that "‘[l]egal standing’ or locus
standi refers to a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has
sustained or will sustain direct injury because of the challenged governmental act x x
x," thus,
generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when (1) he can show that he
has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the
allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to
the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a
favorable action.21
The gist of the question of standing is whether a party has "alleged such a personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends
for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."22
However, considering that locus standi is a mere procedural technicality, the Court,
in recent cases, has relaxed the stringent direct injury test. David v. Macapagal-
Arroyo23 articulates that a "liberal policy has been observed, allowing ordinary
citizens, members of Congress, and civic organizations to prosecute actions
involving the constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations and rulings."24 The fairly
recent Chavez v. Gonzales25 even permitted a non-member of the broadcast media,
who failed to allege a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy, to challenge
the acts of the Secretary of Justice and the National Telecommunications
Commission. The majority, in the said case, echoed the current policy that "this
Court has repeatedly and consistently refused to wield procedural barriers as
impediments to its addressing and resolving serious legal questions that greatly
impact on public interest, in keeping with the Court’s duty under the 1987
Constitution to determine whether or not other branches of government have kept
themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws, and that they have not
abused the discretion given to them."26
In G.R. No. 170338, petitioner Garcillano justifies his standing to initiate the petition
by alleging that he is the person alluded to in the "Hello Garci" tapes. Further, his
was publicly identified by the members of the respondent committees as one of the
voices in the recordings.27 Obviously, therefore, petitioner Garcillano stands to be
directly injured by the House committees’ actions and charges of electoral fraud. The
Court recognizes his standing to institute the petition for prohibition.
In G.R. No. 179275, petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili justify their standing by alleging
that they are concerned citizens, taxpayers, and members of the IBP. They are of the
firm conviction that any attempt to use the "Hello Garci" tapes will further divide the
country. They wish to see the legal and proper use of public funds that will
necessarily be defrayed in the ensuing public hearings. They are worried by the
continuous violation of the laws and individual rights, and the blatant attempt to
abuse constitutional processes through the conduct of legislative inquiries
purportedly in aid of legislation.28
Intervenor Sagge alleges violation of his right to due process considering that he is
summoned to attend the Senate hearings without being apprised not only of his
rights therein through the publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing
Inquiries in Aid of Legislation, but also of the intended legislation which underpins the
investigation. He further intervenes as a taxpayer bewailing the useless and wasteful
expenditure of public funds involved in the conduct of the questioned hearings.29
Given that petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili allege an interest in the execution of the
laws and that intervenor Sagge asserts his constitutional right to due process,30 they
satisfy the requisite personal stake in the outcome of the controversy by merely
being citizens of the Republic.
Following the Court’s ruling in Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives,31 we
find sufficient petitioners Ranada’s and Agcaoili’s and intervenor Sagge’s allegation
that the continuous conduct by the Senate of the questioned legislative inquiry will
necessarily involve the expenditure of public funds.32 It should be noted that
in Francisco, rights personal to then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. had been
injured by the alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives, yet the
Court granted standing to the petitioners therein for, as in this case, they invariably
invoked the vindication of their own rights–as taxpayers, members of Congress,
citizens, individually or in a class suit, and members of the bar and of the legal
profession–which were also supposedly violated by the therein assailed
unconstitutional acts.33
Likewise, a reading of the petition in G.R. No. 179275 shows that the petitioners and
intervenor Sagge advance constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this
Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. The issues are
of transcendental and paramount importance not only to the public but also to the
Bench and the Bar, and should be resolved for the guidance of all.34
Thus, in the exercise of its sound discretion and given the liberal attitude it has
shown in prior cases climaxing in the more recent case of Chavez, the Court
recognizes the legal standing of petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili and intervenor
Sagge.
- II -
The Court, however, dismisses G.R. No. 170338 for being moot and academic.
Repeatedly stressed in our prior decisions is the principle that the exercise by this
Court of judicial power is limited to the determination and resolution of actual cases
and controversies.35 By actual cases, we mean existing conflicts appropriate or ripe
for judicial determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, for otherwise the decision of
the Court will amount to an advisory opinion. The power of judicial inquiry does not
extend to hypothetical questions because any attempt at abstraction could only lead
to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to
actualities.36 Neither will the Court determine a moot question in a case in which no
practical relief can be granted. A case becomes moot when its purpose has become
stale.37 It is unnecessary to indulge in academic discussion of a case presenting a
moot question as a judgment thereon cannot have any practical legal effect or, in the
nature of things, cannot be enforced.38
In G.R. No. 170338, petitioner Garcillano implores from the Court, as
aforementioned, the issuance of an injunctive writ to prohibit the respondent House
Committees from playing the tape recordings and from including the same in their
committee report. He likewise prays that the said tapes be stricken off the records of
the House proceedings. But the Court notes that the recordings were already played
in the House and heard by its members.39 There is also the widely publicized fact
that the committee reports on the "Hello Garci" inquiry were completed and
submitted to the House in plenary by the respondent committees.40 Having been
overtaken by these events, the Garcillano petition has to be dismissed for being
moot and academic. After all, prohibition is a preventive remedy to restrain the doing
of an act about to be done, and not intended to provide a remedy for an act already
accomplished.41
- III -
As to the petition in G.R. No. 179275, the Court grants the same. The Senate cannot
be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry without
duly published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional
requirement.
Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that "[t]he Senate or
the House of Representatives, or any of its respective committees may conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure." The requisite of publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic
requirements of due process.42 Publication is indeed imperative, for it will be the
height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a
law or rule of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive
one.43What constitutes publication is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code, which
provides that "[l]aws shall take effect after 15 days following the completion of their
publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in
the Philippines."44
The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and even on oral
argument that the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of
Legislation had been published in newspapers of general circulation only in 1995 and
in 2006.45 With respect to the present Senate of the 14th Congress, however, of
which the term of half of its members commenced on June 30, 2007, no effort was
undertaken for the publication of these rules when they first opened their session.
Recently, the Court had occasion to rule on this very same question. In Neri v.
Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations,46 we said:
Fourth, we find merit in the argument of the OSG that respondent
Committees likewise violated Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution,
requiring that the inquiry be in accordance with the "duly published rules of
procedure." We quote the OSG’s explanation:
The phrase "duly published rules of procedure" requires the Senate of
every Congress to publish its rules of procedure governing inquiries in
aid of legislation because every Senate is distinct from the one before
it or after it. Since Senatorial elections are held every three (3) years
for one-half of the Senate’s membership, the composition of the
Senate also changes by the end of each term. Each Senate may thus
enact a different set of rules as it may deem fit. Not having
published its Rules of Procedure, the subject hearings in aid of
legislation conducted by the 14th Senate, are therefore,
procedurally infirm.
Justice Antonio T. Carpio, in his Dissenting and Concurring Opinion, reinforces this
ruling with the following rationalization:
The present Senate under the 1987 Constitution is no longer a continuing
legislative body. The present Senate has twenty-four members, twelve of
whom are elected every three years for a term of six years each. Thus, the
term of twelve Senators expires every three years, leaving less than a
majority of Senators to continue into the next Congress. The 1987
Constitution, like the 1935 Constitution, requires a majority of Senators to
"constitute a quorum to do business." Applying the same reasoning in Arnault
v. Nazareno, the Senate under the 1987 Constitution is not a continuing body
because less than majority of the Senators continue into the next Congress.
The consequence is that the Rules of Procedure must be republished by the
Senate after every expiry of the term of twelve Senators.47
The subject was explained with greater lucidity in our Resolution48 (On the Motion for
Reconsideration) in the same case, viz.:
On the nature of the Senate as a "continuing body," this Court sees fit to
issue a clarification. Certainly, there is no debate that the Senate as an
institution is "continuing," as it is not dissolved as an entity with each
national election or change in the composition of its members. However, in
the conduct of its day-to-day business the Senate of each Congress acts
separately and independently of the Senate of the Congress before it. The
Rules of the Senate itself confirms this when it states:
RULE XLIV
UNFINISHED BUSINESS
SEC. 123. Unfinished business at the end of the session shall be
taken up at the next session in the same status.
All pending matters and proceedings shall terminate upon the
expiration of one (1) Congress, but may be taken by the succeeding
Congress as if present for the first time.
Undeniably from the foregoing, all pending matters and proceedings, i.e.,
unpassed bills and even legislative investigations, of the Senate of a
particular Congress are considered terminated upon the expiration of that
Congress and it is merely optional on the Senate of the succeeding Congress
to take up such unfinished matters, not in the same status, but as if
presented for the first time. The logic and practicality of such a rule is
readily apparent considering that the Senate of the succeeding Congress
(which will typically have a different composition as that of the previous
Congress) should not be bound by the acts and deliberations of the Senate of
which they had no part. If the Senate is a continuing body even with respect
to the conduct of its business, then pending matters will not be deemed
terminated with the expiration of one Congress but will, as a matter of course,
continue into the next Congress with the same status.
This dichotomy of the continuity of the Senate as an institution and of the
opposite nature of the conduct of its business is reflected in its Rules. The
Rules of the Senate (i.e. the Senate’s main rules of procedure) states:
RULE LI
AMENDMENTS TO, OR REVISIONS OF, THE RULES
SEC. 136. At the start of each session in which the Senators elected
in the preceding elections shall begin their term of office, the
President may endorse the Rules to the appropriate committee for
amendment or revision.
The Rules may also be amended by means of a motion which should
be presented at least one day before its consideration, and the vote of
the majority of the Senators present in the session shall be required
for its approval.
RULE LII
DATE OF TAKING EFFECT
SEC. 137. These Rules shall take effect on the date of their adoption
and shall remain in force until they are amended or repealed.
Section 136 of the Senate Rules quoted above takes into account the new
composition of the Senate after an election and the possibility of the
amendment or revision of the Rules at the start of each session in which the
newly elected Senators shall begin their term.
However, it is evident that the Senate has determined that its main rules are
intended to be valid from the date of their adoption until they are amended or
repealed. Such language is conspicuously absent from the Rules.
The Rules simply state "(t)hese Rules shall take effect seven (7) days after
publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation." The latter does not
explicitly provide for the continued effectivity of such rules until they are
amended or repealed. In view of the difference in the language of the two
sets of Senate rules, it cannot be presumed that the Rules (on legislative
inquiries) would continue into the next Congress. The Senate of the next
Congress may easily adopt different rules for its legislative inquiries which
come within the rule on unfinished business.
The language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution requiring that the
inquiry be conducted in accordance with the duly published rules of
procedure is categorical. It is incumbent upon the Senate to publish the rules
for its legislative inquiries in each Congress or otherwise make the published
rules clearly state that the same shall be effective in subsequent Congresses
or until they are amended or repealed to sufficiently put public on notice.
If it was the intention of the Senate for its present rules on legislative inquiries
to be effective even in the next Congress, it could have easily adopted the
same language it had used in its main rules regarding effectivity.
Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated
publication by arguing that the rules have never been amended since 1995 and,
despite that, they are published in booklet form available to anyone for free, and
accessible to the public at the Senate’s internet web page.49
The Court does not agree. The absence of any amendment to the rules cannot justify
the Senate’s defiance of the clear and unambiguous language of Section 21, Article
VI of the Constitution. The organic law instructs, without more, that the Senate or its
committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation only in accordance with duly
published rules of procedure, and does not make any distinction whether or not
these rules have undergone amendments or revision. The constitutional mandate to
publish the said rules prevails over any custom, practice or tradition followed by the
Senate.
Justice Carpio’s response to the same argument raised by the respondents is
illuminating:
The publication of the Rules of Procedure in the website of the Senate, or in
pamphlet form available at the Senate, is not sufficient under the Tañada v.
Tuvera ruling which requires publication either in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation. The Rules of Procedure even provide that
the rules "shall take effect seven (7) days after publication in two (2)
newspapers of general circulation," precluding any other form of publication.
Publication in accordance with Tañada is mandatory to comply with the due
process requirement because the Rules of Procedure put a person’s liberty at
risk. A person who violates the Rules of Procedure could be arrested and
detained by the Senate.
Senate has to be deferred until it shall have caused the publication of the rules,
because it can do so only "in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure."
Very recently, the Senate caused the publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation in the October 31, 2008 issues of Manila
Bulletin and Malaya. While we take judicial notice of this fact, the recent publication
does not cure the infirmity of the inquiry sought to be prohibited by the instant
petitions. Insofar as the consolidated cases are concerned, the legislative
investigation subject thereof still could not be undertaken by the respondent Senate
Committees, because no published rules governed it, in clear contravention of the
Constitution.
With the foregoing disquisition, the Court finds it unnecessary to discuss the other
issues raised in the consolidated petitions.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 170338 is DISMISSED, and the petition in
G.R. No. 179275 is GRANTED. Let a writ of prohibition be issued enjoining the
Senate of the Republic of the Philippines and/or any of its committees from
conducting any inquiry in aid of legislation centered on the "Hello Garci" tapes.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice

The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792,50 otherwise WE CONCUR:
known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to support their claim of valid
publication through the internet is all the more incorrect. R.A. 8792 considers an
electronic data message or an electronic document as the functional equivalent of a REYNATO S. PUNO
written document only for evidentiary purposes.51 In other words, the law merely Chief Justice
recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their being the original) of electronic data
messages and/or electronic documents.52 It does not make the internet a medium for LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
publishing laws, rules and regulations. Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could not, in
Associate Justice Associate Justice
violation of the Constitution, use its unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry subject
of these consolidated cases. The conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation by the *RENATO C. CORONA CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
 6
 Rollo (G.R. No. 179275), pp. 215-220.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
7
 Id. at 169.
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice Associate Justice 8
 An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of the Privacy of
Communications and for Other Purposes.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice 9
 Rollo (G.R. No. 179275), pp. 169-170.

RUBEN T. REYES TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO 10

 Id. at 3-17.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
11
 Id. at 7-13.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice 12
 Id. at 24.

13
 Id. at 44.

14
CERTIFICATION  Memorandum of Respondents-Intervenors, p. 6.

15
 Rollo (G.R. No. 179275), pp. 68-70.
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was 16
 Id. at 71-90.
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
17
 Id. at 62. The Court identified the following issues for discussion in the October 2, 2007 Oral
REYNATO S. PUNO Argument:
Chief Justice
1. Whether the petitioners have locus standi to bring this suit.

2. Whether the Rules of Procedure of the Senate and the Senate Committees
governing the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation have been published, in
accordance with Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. Corollarily:
Footnotes
(a) Whether these Rules must be published by every Congress.
* On leave.
(b) What mode/s of publication will comply with the constitutional
1
 Rollo (G.R. No. 179275), p. 168. requirement.

2
 Rollo (G.R. No. 170338), pp. 7-9. 3. Whether the inquiry, which is centered on the so-called "Garci tapes," violates
Section 3, Article III of the Constitution and/or Republic Act No. 4200. (Id. at 66.)
3
 Id. at 9.
18
 Motion for Leave to Intervene and Petition-in-Intervention filed on October 26, 2007.
4
 Id. at 1-38.
19
 Resolution dated November 20, 2007.
5
 Id. at 36-38.
20 40
 465 Phil. 385, 402 (2004).  See news article "Separate findings, no closure" by Michael Lim Umbac published in The
Philippine Daily Inquirer on March 29, 2006; News item "5 House committees in ‘Garci’ probe
21
 Tolentino v. Commission on Elections, id. file report on Monday" published in The Manila Bulletin on March 25, 2006.

41
22
 Province of Batangas v. Romulo, G.R. No. 152774, May 27, 2004, 429 SCRA 736, 755.  Simon, Jr. v. Commission on Human Rights, G.R. No. 100150, January 5, 1994, 229 SCRA
117, 135-136; Agustin v. De la Fuente, 84 Phil. 515, 517 (1949).
23
 G.R. Nos. 171396, 171409, 171485, 171483, 171400, 171489 and 171424, May 3, 2006, 42
489 SCRA 160.  Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Philippines, A Commentary, 1996 ed., p. 679.

43
24
 David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, id. at 218.  Tañada v. Tuvera, 220 Phil. 422, 432-433 (1985).

44
25
 G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008, 545 SCRA 441.  As amended on June 18, 1987 by Executive Order No. 200 entitled "Providing for the
Publication of Laws Either in the Official Gazette or in a Newspaper of General Circulation in
26
the Philippines as a Requirement for their Effectivity".
 Id.
45
27
 Rollo (G.R. No. 179275), p. 179; Memorandum of Respondents-Intervenors, pp. 9-10.
 Reply in G.R. No. 170338, pp. 36-37.
46
28
 G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008, 549 SCRA 77, 135-136.
 Rollo (G.R. No. 179275), p. 4.
47
29
 Id. at 297-298.
 Petition-in-Intervention, p. 3.
48
30
 Dated September 4, 2008.
 David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, supra note 23, at 223.
49
31
 TSN, Oral Arguments, March 4, 2008, (G.R. No. 179275), pp. 413-414.
 460 Phil. 830 (2003).
50
32
 Entitled "An Act Providing for the Recognition and Use of Electronic Commercial and Non-
 Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives, id. at 897. Commercial Transactions and Documents, Penalties for Unlawful Use Thereof and For Other
Purposes," approved on June 14, 2000.
33
 Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives, supra note 31, at 895.
51
 MCC Industrial Sales Corporation v. Ssangyong Corporation, G.R. No. 170633, October 15,
34
 Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, Jr., G.R. No. 113375, May 5, 1994, 232 SCRA 110, 139. 2007, 536 SCRA 408. (Emphasis supplied.)

52
35
 Dumlao v. COMELEC, 184 Phil. 369, 377 (1980). This case explains the standards that have  Sections 6, 7 and 10 of R.A. No. 8792 read:
to be followed in the exercise of the power of judicial review, namely: (1) the existence of an
appropriate case; (2) an interest personal and substantial by the party raising the constitutional Sec. 6. Legal Recognition of Data Messages. - Information shall not be denied legal
question; (3) the plea that the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the effect, validity or enforceability solely on the grounds that it is in the data message
necessity that the constitutional question be passed upon in order to decide the case. purporting to give rise to such legal effect, or that it is merely referred to in that
electronic data message.
36
 La Bugal-B’laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, 465 Phil. 860, 889-890 (2004).
Sec. 7. Legal Recognition of Electronic Documents. – Electronic documents shall
37
 Rufino v. Endriga, G.R. Nos. 139554 and 139565, July 21, 2006, 496 SCRA 13, 46. have the legal effect, validity or enforceability as any other document or legal writing,
and –
38
 Lanuza, Jr. v. Yuchengco, G.R. No. 157033, March 28, 2005, 454 SCRA 130, 138.
(a) Where the law requires a document to be in writing, that requirement is met by an
39
 Rollo (G.R. No. 170338), p. 9. electronic document if the said electronic document maintains its integrity and
reliability, and can be authenticated so as to be usable for subsequent reference, in
that –
(i) The electronic document has remained complete and unaltered, apart
from the addition of any endorsement and any authorized change, or any
change which arises in the normal course of communication, storage and
display; and
(ii) The electronic document is reliable in the light of the purpose for which it
was generated and in the light of all the relevant circumstances.
(2) Paragraph (1) applies whether the requirement therein is in the form of an
obligation or whether the law simply provides consequences for the information not
being presented or retained in its original form.
(3) For the purposes of subparagraph (a) of paragraph (1):
(a) the criteria for assessing integrity shall be whether the information has
remained complete and unaltered, apart from the addition of any
endorsement and any change which arises in the normal course of
communication, storage and display; and

(b) Paragraph (a) applies whether the requirement therein is in the form of an (b) the standard of reliability required shall be assessed in the light of the
obligation or whether the law simply provides consequences for the document not purpose for which the information was generated and in the light of all
being presented or retained in its original form. relevant circumstances.

(c) Where the law requires that a document be presented or retained in its original
form, that requirement is met by an electronic document if –

(i) There exists a reliable assurance as to the integrity of the document from
the time when it was first generated in its final form; and

(ii) That document is capable of being displayed to the person to whom it is

to be presented: Provided, That no provision of this Act shall apply to vary
any and all requirements of existing laws on formalities required in the
execution of documents for their validity.

For evidentiary purposes, an electronic document shall be the functional equivalent of

a written document under existing laws.

This Act does not modify any statutory rule relating to the admissibility of electronic
data messages or electronic documents, except the rules relating to authentication
and best evidence.

Sec. 10. Original Documents. – (1) Where the law requires information to be
presented or retained in its original form, that requirement is met by an electronic data
message or electronic document if:

(a) The integrity of the information from the time when it was first generated
in its final form, as an electronic data message or electronic document is
shown by evidence aliunde or otherwise; and

(b) Where it is required that information be presented, that the information is

capable of being displayed to the person to whom it is to be presented.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-7083             May 19, 1955
JUAN EUGENIO and BASILIA EUGENIO, petitioners,  Under the existing classification, such contract would be "inexisting" and "the action
vs.
SILVINA PERDIDO, ROSITA, JOSE, ROMUALDO, FELIX, ALEJANDRINO,
FRANCISCA, ASUNCION, FLORENCIA and AMADO, all surnamed
Salang, respondents.
Guillermo E. Boñgolan for petitioners.
Padilla, Carlos, and Fernando for respondents.
BENGZON, J.:
Review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals, wherein the relevant facts
may be stated as follows:
1. On November 1, 1927 Homestead Patent No. 10847 was issued in the name of
Teodoro Eugenio; 2. On March 12, 1932 Teodoro Eugenio in the presence of his son
Juan, and daughter Basilia, (plaintiffs in the case) sold the homestead and delivered
possession thereof, for the sum of P1,300.00 to the defendant Silvina Perdido and
her husband Clemente Sadang, whose heirs are joined as defendants and
respondents; 3. On May 4, 1949 this action was filed to recover the land, upon the
theory that the contract was mere mortgage of the homestead, which plaintiff
inherited from their father; and that they had attempted unsuccessfully to repay the
debt; 4. The court of first instance held the contract to be a contract of sale, which
was void, because executed within five years from the issuance of the homestead
patent; therefore it ordered to return of the property upon repayment of P1,300.00
with interest; 5. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the award holding that
plaintiffs had no personality to attack the validity of the sale, and that all they had
was the right to repurchase which they failed to exercise within five years from March
12, 1932.
Denial of plaintiffs' motion to reconsider, led to the presentation of this petition for
review, which is based upon two legal propositions, to wit: (1) The action to annul the
sale in 1932 had not prescribed; (2) the right to repurchase within the five-year
period has not lapsed, inasmuch as the sale was never registered.
There is no question that the sale in March 1932 having been made within five years
from "the date of issuance of the patent" was "unlawful and null void from its
execution", by express provision of sections 116 and 122 of Act No. 2874. (Now
Com. Act No. 141).
or defense for declaration" of such inexistence" does not prescribe". (Art. 1410 New
Civil Code). While it is true that this is a new provision of the New Civil Code, it is
nevertheless a principle recognized since Tipton vs. Velasco 6 Phil. 67 that "mere
lapse of time cannot give efficacy to contracts that are null and void"1
The imprescriptibility of plaintiff's action to recover is further strengthened by Sec. 46
of the Land Registration Act (Act 496) providing that "no title to registered land in
derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or
adverse possession".
In this connection it should be explained that the patent issued to the homesteader
Teodoro Eugenio was recorded in the registry of deeds of Nueva Viscaya, and that
Original Certificate of Title No. 62 dated December 5, 1927 Exhibit X was issued in
his name. Such being the case his homestead was considered "registered within the
meaning of the Land Registration Act No. 496"2, and enjoys the same privileges as
Torrens titles issued under said legislations.3
The imprescriptibility of such title has recently been recognized in Acierto vs. de los
Santos, L-5828, Sept. 1954.
We are aware, of course, that title by adverse possession (acquisitive prescription) is
distinct from the statute of limitations (extinctive prescription)4 and the operations and
effects of such distinction has been explored during the discussions of this petitions
for review.
But we have finally agreed that as to lands registered under the Torrens system, ten
years' adverse possession may not be permitted to defeat the owners' right to
possession — which is the necessary incident ownership. Otherwise loss of the land
by prescription would be indirectly approved, in violation of Sec. 46 of the Land
Registration Act. This statute, being a later enactment, may be said to have partially
amended the Statute of Limitation established in Act No. 190 in so far as registered
lands are concerned.
Nevertheless petitioners' case may not so easily prevail on the foregoing
considerations, for respondents have vigorously pressed several points needing
particular attention.
Admitting arguendo, they say, that the Deeds of Sale violated the Homestead Law,
nevertheless, the petitioners have no personality to prosecute the instant suit,
since it is the Government that is the real party in interest, and the object of its suit
would be reversion of the property to the state. They cite section 124 of Public Land
Law (2874) providing that sale "shall be unlawful and null and void from its
execution; and shall produce the effect of annulling and cancelling the grant, title,
patent etc. . . . and cause the reversion of the property" to the State. The answer to
this is that the reversion is not automatic, (Villacorta vs. Ulanday, 73 Phil. 655) and
so long as the Government has not chosen to act, the rights of the homesteader
stand and must be recognized in the courts of law.5
Respondents also content that, having executed the deed of the sale, petitioners are
estopped from denying defendants' ownership and possession, or that, at least,
being in pari delicto they should not be allowed to recover.
As to the first point, it is enough to remember that no estoppel can be predicted on
an illegal act. (19 Am. Jur. p. 804). The principle of estoppel as contented by
respondents would mean something like this: petitioners having represented and led
the respondents to believe, that the sale was valid, they may not thereafter allege it
is invalid. Yet the respondents are conclusively presumed to know the law, and
should not be allowed to plead estoppel which is founded in ignorance..
"It is generally considered that as between the parties to a contract, validity cannot
be given to it by estoppel if it is prohibited by law or is against the public policy". (19
Am. Jur. p. 802, citing many cases.)
As to the rule of in pari delicto, homesteaders or their heirs have heretofore been
allowed to maintain actions similar to this.6
In a recent decision annulling a homestead sale, this Court thru Mr. Justice Alex.
Reyes said:
Appellants, however, contend that the voiding provision of the Act may not be
invoked in favor of plaintiffs as their predecessor in interest was in pari
delicto, and that, since the same provision says the illegal sale shall have the
effect of annulling the grant and cause of reversion of the property and its
improvements to the State, plaintiffs may no longer claim the homestead.
Similar contentions were made in the case of Catalina de los Santos vs.
Roman Catholic Church of Midsayap et al., G.R. No. L-6088, decided
February 25, 1954, but they were there overruled, this Court holding that
the pari delicto doctrine may not be invoked in a case of this kind since it
would run counter to an avowed fundamental policy of the State, that the
forfeiture of the homestead is a matter between the State and the grantee of
his heirs, and that until the State has taken steps to annul the grant and
asserts title to the homestead the purchaser is, as against the vendor or his
heirs, "no more entitled to keep the land than any intruder." (Acierto vs. De
los Santos 95 Phil., 887).
Lastly respondents say, "Granting, without conceding, that petitioners' predecessor-
in-interest, Teodoro Eugenio, could not have conveyed his homestead title on March
12, 1932, yet his subsequent acquisition of a complete homestead title sufficient for
conveyancing under the Homestead Law on November 1, 1932 validated whatever
defect the title of Clemente Sadang might have had."
A similar consideration was rejected in Sabas vs. Garma 66 Phil. 471, probably for
the reason that a non-existent contract could not be ratified.
Wherefore, in view of the foregoing consideration, the decision under review should
be, and is hereby reversed. Plaintiffs are permitted to recover the homestead upon
payment of P1,300.00 to defendants. Costs shall be paid by the latter. So ordered.
Pablo, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion and Reyes,
J.B.L., JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1
 See Sabbas vs.  Garma, 66 Phil., 471.
2
 Manolo vs.  Lukban and Liwanag, 48 Phil., 973.
3
 El Hogar Filipino vs.  Olviga, 60 Phil., 17.
4
 Corporacion de P. Agustinos  vs. Crisostomo, 32 Phil., 427.
5
 De los Santos vs.  Roman Catholic Church, 94 Phil., 405.
6
 Labrador and Canonizado vs.  De los Santos, 66 Phil., 579; Kasilag vs.  Rodriguez, 69 Phil.,
217; Oliverosvs. Porciungcula, 69 Phil., 305; De los Santos vs.  Roman Catholic Church, 94
Phil., 405.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 47491. May 4, 1989.]
GALICANO GOLLOY, Petitioner, v. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE
VALDEZ, JR., CONSOLACION VALDEZ, LOURDES VALDEZ, SOLEDAD
VALDEZ and BENNY MADRIAGA, Respondents.
Crispulo B. Ducusin for Petitioner.
Celso M. Alviar for Private Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. LAND REGISTRATION; OVERLAPPING OF BOUNDARIES; POSSESSOR OF
LAND DISTURBED HELD RIGHTFUL OWNER. — Private respondents and their
predecessor or predecessors never possessed, much less, claimed the overlapped
portions. Petitioner has been always in possession of the same in the concept of an
owner, and his possession was disturbed only in February, 1966, when the private
respondents caused to be placed two (2) monuments inside his land. It will be
recalled that, as per report of Surveyor Jovino B. Dauz (Record on Appeal, pp. 21-
28), private respondents’ land (TCT 8565 is Lot No. 1, 11-8218) was surveyed on
March 11, 1913 and originally titled and registered on March 1, 1918 in the name of
Dominga Balanga. On the other hard, petitioner’s land (TCT No. 45764) is Lot-A of
Subdivision plan, Psd-14013, a portion of land described in OCT No. 126) was
surveyed on March 18, 1918 and subsequently titled and registered in the name of
Agustin Galloy. The said lands, having been surveyed and thereafter registered, it
follows that monuments were placed therein to indicate their respective boundaries.
It is hardly persuasive that private respondents’ predecessor, Dominga Balanga,
believing that she has a rightful claim to the overlapped portions, did not make any
move to question the placement of the monuments. She could have easily objected
to the placement and pointed out that the placement of the monuments excluded the
overlapped portions from her property. However, no such objection was made.
These facts could only be construed to mean that private respondents’ predecessor,
Dominga Balanga, never believed that she has a right and legal claim to the
overlapped portion. 
2. ID.; ID.; LONG INACTION AND DELAY IN ASSERTING RIGHT TO DISPUTED
LAND; DEFENSE OF LACHES AVAILABLE. — Considering that petitioner and his
predecessor or predecessors have been in continuous possession in the concept of
an owner, for almost fifty (50) years (from August 15, 1919, when the property was
registered, up to February, 1966, when the private respondents caused the
placement of two (2) monuments inside his land), the latter if they have any right at
all to the overlapped portion, are guilty of laches. Although the defense of
prescription is unavailing to the petitioners because, admittedly, the title to Lot No.
5517 is still registered in the name of respondent, still the petitioners have acquired
title to it by virtue of the equitable principle of laches due to respondent’s failure to
assert her claims and ownership for thirty two (32) years.
DECISION
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the September 29, 1977 Decision ** of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. L-43359R, entitled Galicano Golloy v. Jose J.
Valdez Jr., et. al., affirming the judgment of the then Court of First Instance of Tarlac;
and the November 29, 1977 Resolution of the same court denying the motion for
reconsideration.
Herein petitioner, for more than twenty (20) years, has been the registered owner
and in possession of a 41,545-square meter parcel of land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 45764. The Southwest portion of this land is bounded by
herein private respondents’ land which is covered by Certificate of Title No. 8565.
Sometime in February, 1966, private respondents subdivided their land among
themselves. In the course of the subdivision, private respondents caused to be
placed two (2) monuments inside the Southwest portion of petitioner’s land. Hence,
petitioner filed with the then Court of First Instance of Tarlac, presided over by Judge
Arturo B. Santos, an action to quiet title. The same was docketed therein as Civil
Case No. 4312.
Private respondents, in their filed motion to dismiss with counterclaim, alleged that
they never encroached upon the landholding of petitioner and nothing has been
placed on his land which would create any cloud thereon; and that the truth of the
matter was that they merely subdivided their own land according to their title and
therefore there was nothing for petitioner to quiet or remove cloud on his title.
In the pre-trial of December 12, 1967, the parties agreed that inasmuch as the only
issue in dispute referred ultimately to the question of the boundaries of their
respective lots, the same might be resolved by appointing a public surveyor of the
Bureau of Lands to relocate the disputed area with the end in view of determining the
true and correct boundaries of their parcels.
The trial court, in line with the above-said agreement, in an Order dated December
13, 1968, ordered the Director of Lands to appoint an impartial public land surveyor
to conduct the relocation survey on the disputed area.chanrobles.com : virtual law
library
On May 20, 1968, Jovino B. Dauz, Surveyor of the Bureau of Lands, Dagupan City,
submitted his Report (Record on Appeal, pp. 21-28, Rollo, p. 34), which states in
substance, that petitioner’s land is Lot A of the Subdivision plan, Psd-1413, being a
portion of the land described in Original Certificate of Title No. 126 in the name of
Agustin Golloy (No. 11, Record on Appeal, p. 23); that the land titled under OCT No.
126 was surveyed on March 18, 1918 and subsequently titled and registered on
August 15, 1919 (No. 12, Ibid); that on the other hand, private respondents’ land is
Lot No. 1, 11-8218 in the name of Domingo Balanga, surveyed on March 11, 1913
and originally titled and registered on March 1, 1918 (No. 15, Ibid.); that there are
overlappings on the boundaries of the two (2) lands (Nos. 226, 27, 28 and 29, Ibid.);
and that the overlappings are due to the defect in the survey on petitioner’s land
since it did not duly conform with the previously approved survey of Lot 1, 11-3218
under OCT 8565 (No. 25, Ibid). He ended his report by submitting that private
respondents’ land, TCT No. 8565, prevails over petitioner’s land, TCT No. 45764,
since the former was surveyed and titled ahead.
On July 8, 1968, petitioner filed a Memorandum (Record on Appeal, pp. 28-35).
On October 21, 1968, the trial court ruled in favor of private respondents. The
decretal portion of the decision, reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, conformably to the agreement of the parties during the pre-trial on
December 12, 1967, this Court renders judgment in accordance with the aforesaid
surveyor’s Report and Relocation Plan; and the plaintiff and the defendants are
accordingly directed to abide by and respect the boundaries indicated on the
relocation plan of Surveyor Dauz which he found to be the true and correct
boundaries of the properties covered by TCT Nos. 8567 and 45764 of the land
records of Tarlac.
"For lack of proof, the claim for damages by plaintiff and the defendants are both
denied.
"No pronouncement on costs.
"SO ORDERED." (Rollo, p. 14)
Petitioner, after his motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court, appealed
the said decision, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, in a Decision
promulgated on September 29, 1977 (Rollo, pp. 22-29). A motion for reconsideration
was filed, but the same was denied in a Resolution promulgated on November 29,
1977 (Ibid., pp. 30-32). Hence, the instant petition.
The Second Division of this Court, in a Resolution dated January 4, 1978, resolved
to require the respondents to comment (Ibid., p. 36); which comment was filed on
February 14, 1978 (Ibid., pp. 41-42). Petitioners filed a reply thereto on March 27,
1978 (Ibid., p. 47) in compliance with the resolution of February 14, 1978 (Ibid., p.
44).chanrobles law library : red
In a Resolution dated April 5, 1978 the Court gave due course to the petition (Ibid., p.
52). Petitioner filed his Brief on January 10, 1981 (Ibid., p. 60). Private respondents
having failed to file their brief within the required period, the case was considered
submitted for decision without private respondents’ brief in the resolution of February
8, 1981 (Ibid., p. 66).
The sole issue in this case is — who between the two title holders is entitled to the
land in dispute?
The instant petition is impressed with merit.
It must be stated that private respondents and their predecessor or predecessors
never possessed, much less, claimed the overlapped portions. Petitioner has been
always in possession of the same in the concept of an owner, and his possession
was disturbed only in February, 1966, when the private respondents caused to be
placed two (2) monuments inside his land. It will be recalled that, as per report of
Surveyor Jovino B. Dauz (Record on Appeal, pp. 21-28), private respondents’ land
(TCT 8565 is Lot No. 1, 11-8218) was surveyed on March 11, 1913 and originally
titled and registered on March 1, 1918 in the name of Dominga Balanga. On the
other hard, petitioner’s land (TCT No. 45764) is Lot-A of Subdivision plan, Psd-
14013, a portion of land described in OCT No. 126) was surveyed on March 18,
1918 and subsequently titled and registered in the name of Agustin Galloy. The said
lands, having been surveyed and thereafter registered, it follows that monuments
were placed therein to indicate their respective boundaries. It is hardly persuasive
that private respondents’ predecessor, Dominga Balanga, believing that she has a
rightful claim to the overlapped portions, did not make any move to question the
placement of the monuments. She could have easily objected to the placement and
pointed out that the placement of the monuments excluded the overlapped portions
from her property. However, no such objection was made. These facts could only be
construed to mean that private respondents’ predecessor, Dominga Balanga, never
believed that she has a right and legal claim to the overlapped portion. There
appears to be no evidence to support claims of repeated demands against petitioner
to refrain from cultivating the contested portion, much less an action filed in court to
enforce such demands.
Besides, considering that petitioner and his predecessor or predecessors have been
in continuous possession in the concept of an owner, for almost fifty (50) years (from
August 15, 1919, when the property was registered, up to February, 1966, when the
private respondents caused the placement of two (2) monuments inside his land),
the latter if they have any right at all to the overlapped portion, are guilty of
laches.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
In the case of Caragay-Layno v. Court of Appeals (133 SCRA 718, 723-724 [1984],
this Court stated —
"Of significance is the fact, as disclosed by the evidence, that for twenty (20) years
from the date of registration of title in 1947 up to 1967 when this suit for recovery of
possession was instituted, neither the deceased DE VERA up to the time of his
death in 1951, nor his successors-in-interest, had taken steps to possess or lay
adverse claim to the disputed portion. They may, therefore be said to be guilty of
laches as would effectively derail their cause of action. Administrator ESTRADA took
interest in recovering the said portion only when he noticed the discrepancy in areas
in the Inventory of Property and in the title."cralaw virtua1aw library
"The foregoing conclusion does not necessarily wreak havoc on the indefeasibility of
a Torrens title. For, mere possession of certificate of title under the Torrens System
is not conclusive as to the holder’s true ownership of all the property described
therein for he does not by virtue of said certificate alone become the owner of the
land illegally included."
In a more recent case, the case of Lola v. Court of Appeals (145 SCRA 439, 449
[1986]), this Court ruled:
"We also agree with the petitioners that laches effectively bars the respondent from
recovering the lot in dispute.
"Although the defense of prescription is unavailing to the petitioners because,
admittedly, the title to Lot No. 5517 is still registered in the name of respondent, still
the petitioners have acquired title to it by virtue of the equitable principle of laches
due to respondent’s failure to assert her claims and ownership for thirty two (32)
years.
"There are precedents for this ruling. In the following cases, we upheld the equitable
defense of laches and ruled that the long inaction and delay of the title holder in
asserting his right over the disputed lot bars him from recovering the same."cralaw
virtua1aw library
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the Court of Appeals under review is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one rendered ordering, private respondents
to cause the segregation of the disputed portion presently occupied by the petitioner
Galicano Golloy and reconvey the same to the latter and after the segregation to
order the Register of Deeds of Tarlac to issue a new certificate of title covering said
portion in favor of the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Melencio-Herrera, J., No part. Concurred in the Court of Appeals’ Decision under
review.
Endnotes:
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. L-55960 November 24, 1988
YAO KEE, SZE SOOK WAH, SZE LAI CHO, and SY CHUN YEN, petitioners,  65-68;] and,
vs.
AIDA SY-GONZALES, MANUEL SY, TERESITA SY-BERNABE, RODOLFO SY,
and HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Montesa, Albon, & Associates for petitioners.
De Lapa, Salonga, Fulgencio & De Lunas for respondents.
CORTES, J.:
Sy Kiat, a Chinese national. died on January 17, 1977 in Caloocan City where he
was then residing, leaving behind real and personal properties here in the Philippines
worth P300,000.00 more or less.
Thereafter, Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy filed
a petition for the grant of letters of administration docketed as Special Proceedings
Case No. C-699 of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal Branch XXXIII, Caloocan
City. In said petition they alleged among others that (a) they are the children of the
deceased with Asuncion Gillego; (b) to their knowledge Sy Mat died intestate; (c)
they do not recognize Sy Kiat's marriage to Yao Kee nor the filiation of her children
to him; and, (d) they nominate Aida Sy-Gonzales for appointment as administratrix of
the intestate estate of the deceased [Record on Appeal, pp. 4-9; Rollo, p. 107.]
The petition was opposed by Yao Kee, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sy Yun
Chen who alleged that: (a) Yao Kee is the lawful wife of Sy Kiat whom he married on
January 19, 1931 in China; (b) the other oppositors are the legitimate children of the
deceased with Yao Kee; and, (c) Sze Sook Wah is the eldest among them and is
competent, willing and desirous to become the administratrix of the estate of Sy Kiat
[Record on Appeal, pp. 12-13; Rollo, p. 107.] After hearing, the probate court, finding
among others that:
(1) Sy Kiat was legally married to Yao Kee [CFI decision, pp. 12-27;
Rollo, pp. 49-64;]
(2) Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sze Chun Yen are the legitimate
children of Yao Kee with Sy Mat [CFI decision, pp. 28-31; Rollo. pp.
(3) Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo
Sy are the acknowledged illegitimate offsprings of Sy Kiat with
Asuncion Gillego [CFI decision, pp. 27-28; Rollo, pp. 64- 65.]
held if favor of the oppositors (petitioners herein) and appointed Sze Sook Wah as
the administratrix of the intestate estate of the deceased [CFI decision, pp. 68-69;
Rollo, pp. 105-106.]
On appeal the Court of Appeals rendered a decision modifying that of the probate
court, the dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the lower Court is
hereby MODIFIED and SET ASIDE and a new judgment rendered as
follows:
(1) Declaring petitioners Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-
Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy acknowledged natural children of the
deceased Sy Kiat with Asuncion Gillego, an unmarried woman with
whom he lived as husband and wife without benefit of marriage for
many years:
(2) Declaring oppositors Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Chu and Sze Chun
Yen, the acknowledged natural children of the deceased Sy Kiat with
his Chinese wife Yao Kee, also known as Yui Yip, since the legality of
the alleged marriage of Sy Mat to Yao Kee in China had not been
proven to be valid to the laws of the Chinese People's Republic of
China (sic);
(3) Declaring the deed of sale executed by Sy Kiat on December 7,
1976 in favor of Tomas Sy (Exhibit "G-1", English translation of Exhibit
 "G") of the Avenue Tractor and Diesel Parts Supply to be valid and
accordingly, said property should be excluded from the estate of the
deceased Sy Kiat; and
(4) Affirming the appointment by the lower court of Sze Sook Wah as
judicial administratrix of the estate of the deceased. [CA decision, pp.
11-12; Rollo, pp. 36- 37.]
From said decision both parties moved for partial reconsideration, which was
however denied by respondent court. They thus interposed their respective appeals
to this Court.
Private respondents filed a petition with this Court docketed as G.R. No. 56045
entitled "Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy v.
Court of Appeals, Yao Kee, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sy Chun Yen"
questioning paragraphs (3) and (4) of the dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals'
decision. The Supreme Court however resolved to deny the petition and the motion
for reconsideration. Thus on March 8, 1982 entry of judgment was made in G.R. No.
56045. **
The instant petition, on the other hand, questions paragraphs (1) and (2) of the
dispositive portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals. This petition was initially
denied by the Supreme Court on June 22, 1981. Upon motion of the petitioners the
Court in a resolution dated September 16, 1981 reconsidered the denial and decided
to give due course to this petition. Herein petitioners assign the following as errors:
I. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
DECLARING THE MARRIAGE OF SY KIAT TO YAO YEE AS NOT
HAVE (sic) BEEN PROVEN VALID IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAWS
OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
II. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
DECLARING AIDA SY-GONZALES, MANUEL SY, TERESITA SY-
BERNABE AND RODOLFO SY AS NATURAL CHILDREN OF SY
KIAT WITH ASUNCION GILLEGO. [Petition, p. 2; Rollo, p. 6.]
I. Petitioners argue that the marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee in accordance with
Chinese law and custom was conclusively proven. To buttress this argument they
rely on the following testimonial and documentary evidence.
First, the testimony of Yao Kee summarized by the trial court as follows:
Yao Kee testified that she was married to Sy Kiat on January 19, 1931
in Fookien, China; that she does not have a marriage certificate
because the practice during that time was for elders to agree upon the
betrothal of their children, and in her case, her elder brother was the
one who contracted or entered into [an] agreement with the parents of
her husband; that the agreement was that she and Sy Mat would be
married, the wedding date was set, and invitations were sent out; that
the said agreement was complied with; that she has five children with
Sy Kiat, but two of them died; that those who are alive are Sze Sook
Wah, Sze Lai Cho, and Sze Chun Yen, the eldest being Sze Sook
Wah who is already 38 years old; that Sze Sook Wah was born on
November 7, 1939; that she and her husband, Sy Mat, have been
living in FooKien, China before he went to the Philippines on several
occasions; that the practice during the time of her marriage was a
written document [is exchanged] just between the parents of the bride
and the parents of the groom, or any elder for that matter; that in
China, the custom is that there is a go- between, a sort of marriage
broker who is known to both parties who would talk to the parents of
the bride-to-be; that if the parents of the bride-to-be agree to have the
groom-to-be their son in-law, then they agree on a date as an
engagement day; that on engagement day, the parents of the groom
would bring some pieces of jewelry to the parents of the bride-to-be,
and then one month after that, a date would be set for the wedding,
which in her case, the wedding date to Sy Kiat was set on January 19,
1931; that during the wedding the bridegroom brings with him a couch
(sic) where the bride would ride and on that same day, the parents of
the bride would give the dowry for her daughter and then the
document would be signed by the parties but there is no solemnizing
officer as is known in the Philippines; that during the wedding day, the
document is signed only by the parents of the bridegroom as well as
by the parents of the bride; that the parties themselves do not sign the
document; that the bride would then be placed in a carriage where
she would be brought to the town of the bridegroom and before
departure the bride would be covered with a sort of a veil; that upon
reaching the town of the bridegroom, the bridegroom takes away the
veil; that during her wedding to Sy Kiat (according to said Chinese
custom), there were many persons present; that after Sy Kiat opened
the door of the carriage, two old ladies helped her go down the
carriage and brought her inside the house of Sy Mat; that during her
 wedding, Sy Chick, the eldest brother of Sy Kiat, signed the document
with her mother; that as to the whereabouts of that document, she and
Sy Mat were married for 46 years already and the document was left
in China and she doubt if that document can still be found now; that it
was left in the possession of Sy Kiat's family; that right now, she does
not know the whereabouts of that document because of the lapse of
many years and because they left it in a certain place and it was
already eaten by the termites; that after her wedding with Sy Kiat,
they lived immediately together as husband and wife, and from then
on, they lived together; that Sy Kiat went to the Philippines sometime
in March or April in the same year they were married; that she went to
the Philippines in 1970, and then came back to China; that again she
went back to the Philippines and lived with Sy Mat as husband and
wife; that she begot her children with Sy Kiat during the several trips
by Sy Kiat made back to China. [CFI decision, pp. 13-15; Rollo, pp.
50-52.]
Second, the testimony of Gan Ching, a younger brother of Yao Kee who stated that
he was among the many people who attended the wedding of his sister with Sy Kiat
and that no marriage certificate is issued by the Chinese government, a document
signed by the parents or elders of the parties being sufficient [CFI decision, pp. 15-
16; Rollo, pp.  that:
52-53.]
Third, the statements made by Asuncion Gillego when she testified before the trial
court to the effect that (a) Sy Mat was married to Yao Kee according to Chinese
custom; and, (b) Sy Kiat's admission to her that he has a Chinese wife whom he
married according to Chinese custom [CFI decision, p. 17; Rollo, p. 54.]
Fourth, Sy Kiat's Master Card of Registered Alien issued in Caloocan City on
October 3, 1972 where the following entries are found: "Marital status—Married"; "If
married give name of spouses—Yao Kee"; "Address-China; "Date of marriage—
1931"; and "Place of marriage—China" [Exhibit "SS-1".]
Fifth, Sy Kiat's Alien Certificate of Registration issued in Manila on January 12, 1968
where the following entries are likewise found: "Civil status—Married"; and, 'If
married, state name and address of spouse—Yao Kee Chingkang, China" [Exhibit
"4".]
And lastly, the certification issued in Manila on October 28, 1977 by the Embassy of
the People's Republic of China to the effect that "according to the information
available at the Embassy Mr. Sy Kiat a Chinese national and Mrs. Yao Kee alias Yui
Yip also Chinese were married on January 19, 1931 in Fukien, the People's Republic
of China" [Exhibit "5".]
These evidence may very well prove the fact of marriage between Yao Kee and Sy
Kiat. However, the same do not suffice to establish the validity of said marriage in
accordance with Chinese law or custom.
Custom is defined as "a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly
observed (practiced) as a social rule, legally binding and obligatory" [In the Matter of
the Petition for Authority to Continue Use of the Firm Name "Ozaeta, Romulo, de
Leon, Mabanta and Reyes", July 30, 1979, SCRA 3, 12 citing JBL Reyes & RC
Puno, Outline of Phil. Civil Law, Fourth Ed., Vol. 1, p. 7.] The law requires that "a
custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence" [Article 12, Civil
Code.] On this score the Court had occasion to state that "a local custom as a
source of right can not be considered by a court of justice unless such custom is
properly established by competent evidence like any other fact" [Patriarca v. Orate, 7
Phil. 390, 395 (1907).] The same evidence, if not one of a higher degree, should be
required of a foreign custom.
The law on foreign marriages is provided by Article 71 of the Civil Code which states
Art. 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance
with the laws in force in the country where they were performed and
valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except
bigamous, Polygamous, or incestuous marriages, as determined by
Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied.) ***
Construing this provision of law the Court has held that to establish a valid foreign
marriage two things must be proven, namely: (1) the existence of the foreign law as
a question of fact; and (2) the alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence
[Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43, 49 (1922).]
In proving a foreign law the procedure is provided in the Rules of Court. With respect
to an unwritten foreign law, Rule 130 section 45 states that:
SEC. 45. Unwritten law.—The oral testimony of witnesses, skilled
therein, is admissible as evidence of the unwritten law of a foreign
country, as are also printed and published books of reports of
 decisions of the courts of the foreign country, if proved to be
commonly admitted in such courts.
Proof of a written foreign law, on the other hand, is provided for under Rule 132
section 25, thus:
SEC. 25. Proof of public or official record.—An official record or an
entry therein, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by
an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer
having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a
certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the
record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a
secretary of embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul,
or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the
Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept
and authenticated by the seal of his office.
The Court has interpreted section 25 to include competent evidence like the
testimony of a witness to prove the existence of a written foreign law [Collector of
Internal Revenue v. Fisher 110 Phil. 686, 700-701 (1961) citing Willamette Iron and
Steel Works v. Muzzal, 61 Phil. 471 (1935).]
In the case at bar petitioners did not present any competent evidence relative to the
law and custom of China on marriage. The testimonies of Yao and Gan Ching cannot
be considered as proof of China's law or custom on marriage not only because they
are
self-serving evidence, but more importantly, there is no showing that they are
competent to testify on the subject matter. For failure to prove the foreign law or
custom, and consequently, the validity of the marriage in accordance with said law or
custom, the marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat cannot be recognized in this
jurisdiction.
Petitioners contend that contrary to the Court of Appeals' ruling they are not duty
bound to prove the Chinese law on marriage as judicial notice thereof had been
taken by this Court in the case of Sy Joc Lieng v. Sy Quia [16 Phil. 137 (1910).]
This contention is erroneous. Well-established in this jurisdiction is the principle that
Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. They must be alleged
and proved as any other fact [Yam Ka Lim v. Collector of Customs, 30 Phil. 46, 48
(1915); Fluemer v. Hix, 54 Phil. 610 (1930).]
Moreover a reading of said case would show that the party alleging the foreign
marriage presented a witness, one Li Ung Bieng, to prove that matrimonial letters
mutually exchanged by the contracting parties constitute the essential requisite for a
marriage to be considered duly solemnized in China. Based on his testimony, which
as found by the Court is uniformly corroborated by authors on the subject of Chinese
marriage, what was left to be decided was the issue of whether or not the fact of
marriage in accordance with Chinese law was duly proven [Sy Joc Lieng v. Sy
Quia, supra., at p. 160.]
Further, even assuming for the sake of argument that the Court has indeed taken
judicial notice of the law of China on marriage in the aforecited case, petitioners
however have not shown any proof that the Chinese law or custom obtaining at the
time the Sy Joc Lieng marriage was celebrated in 1847 was still the law when the
alleged marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee took place in 1931 or eighty-four (84) years
later.
Petitioners moreover cite the case of U.S. v. Memoracion [34 Phil. 633 (1916)] as
being applicable to the instant case. They aver that the judicial pronouncement in the
Memoracion case, that the testimony of one of the contracting parties is competent
evidence to show the fact of marriage, holds true in this case.
The Memoracion case however is not applicable to the case at bar as said case did
not concern a foreign marriage and the issue posed was whether or not the oral
testimony of a spouse is competent evidence to prove the fact of marriage in a
complaint for adultery.
Accordingly, in the absence of proof of the Chinese law on marriage, it should be
presumed that it is the same as ours *** [Wong Woo Yiu v. Vivo, G.R. No. L-21076,
March 31, 1965, 13 SCRA 552, 555.] Since Yao Kee admitted in her testimony that
there was no solemnizing officer as is known here in the Philippines [See Article 56,
Civil Code] when her alleged marriage to Sy Mat was celebrated [CFI decision, p. 14;
Rollo, p. 51], it therefore follows that her marriage to Sy Kiat, even if true, cannot be
recognized in this jurisdiction [Wong Woo Yiu v. Vivo, supra., pp. 555-556.]
II. The second issue raised by petitioners concerns the status of private respondents.
Respondent court found the following evidence of petitioners' filiation:
 (1) Sy Kiat's Master Card of Registered Alien where the following are
entered: "Children if any: give number of children—Four"; and, "Name
—All living in China" [Exhibit "SS-1";]
(2) the testimony of their mother Yao Kee who stated that she had five
children with Sy Kiat, only three of whom are alive namely, Sze Sook
Wah, Sze Lai Chu and Sze Chin Yan [TSN, December 12, 1977, pp.
9-11;] and,
(3) an affidavit executed on March 22,1961 by Sy Kiat for presentation
to the Local Civil Registrar of Manila to support Sze Sook Wah's
application for a marriage license, wherein Sy Kiat expressly stated
that she is his daughter [Exhibit "3".]
Likewise on the record is the testimony of Asuncion Gillego that Sy Kiat told her he
has three daughters with his Chinese wife, two of whom—Sook Wah and Sze Kai
Cho—she knows, and one adopted son [TSN, December 6,1977, pp. 87-88.]
However, as petitioners failed to establish the marriage of Yao Kee with Sy Mat
according to the laws of China, they cannot be accorded the status of legitimate
children but only that of acknowledged natural children. Petitioners are natural
children, it appearing that at the time of their conception Yao Kee and Sy Kiat were
not disqualified by any impediment to marry one another [See Art. 269, Civil Code.]
And they are acknowledged children of the deceased because of Sy Kiat's
recognition of Sze Sook Wah [Exhibit "3"] and its extension to Sze Lai Cho and Sy
Chun Yen who are her sisters of the full blood [See Art. 271, Civil Code.]
Private respondents on the other hand are also the deceased's acknowledged
natural children with Asuncion Gillego, a Filipina with whom he lived for twenty-five
(25) years without the benefit of marriage. They have in their favor their father's
acknowledgment, evidenced by a compromise agreement entered into by and
between their parents and approved by the Court of First Instance on February 12,
1974 wherein Sy Kiat not only acknowleged them as his children by Asuncion Gillego
but likewise made provisions for their support and future inheritance, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
2. The parties also acknowledge that they are common-law husband
and wife and that out of such relationship, which they have likewise
decided to definitely and finally terminate effective immediately, they
begot five children, namely: Aida Sy, born on May 30, 1950; Manuel
Sy, born on July 1, 1953; Teresita Sy, born on January 28, 1955;
Ricardo Sy now deceased, born on December 14, 1956; and Rodolfo
Sy, born on May 7, 1958.
3. With respect to the AVENUE TRACTOR AND DIESEL PARTS
SUPPLY ... , the parties mutually agree and covenant that—
(a) The stocks and merchandize and the furniture and
equipments ..., shall be divided into two equal shares
between, and distributed to, Sy Kiat who shall own
one-half of the total and the other half to Asuncion
Gillego who shall transfer the same to their children,
namely, Aida Sy, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy, and Rodolfo
Sy.
(b) the business name and premises ... shall be
retained by Sy Kiat. However, it shall be his obligation
to give to the aforenamed children an amount of One
Thousand Pesos ( Pl,000.00 ) monthly out of the rental
of the two doors of the same building now occupied by
Everett Construction.
xxx xxx xxx
(5) With respect to the acquisition, during the existence of the 
common-law husband-and-wife relationship between the parties, of
the real estates and properties registered and/or appearing in the
name of Asuncion Gillego ... , the parties mutually agree and
covenant that the said real estates and properties shall be transferred
in equal shares to their children, namely, Aida Sy, Manuel Sy,
Teresita Sy, and Rodolfo Sy, but to be administered by Asuncion
Gillego during her lifetime ... [Exhibit "D".] (Emphasis supplied.)
xxx xxx xxx
This compromise agreement constitutes a statement before a court of record by
which a child may be voluntarily acknowledged [See Art. 278, Civil Code.]
Petitioners further argue that the questions on the validity of Sy Mat's marriage to
Yao Kee and the paternity and filiation of the parties should have been ventilated in
the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court.
Specifically, petitioners rely on the following provision of Republic Act No. 5502,
entitled "An Act Revising Rep. Act No. 3278, otherwise known as the Charter of the
City of Caloocan', with regard to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court:
SEC. 91-A. Creation and Jurisdiction of the Court.—
xxx xxx xxx
The provisions of the Judiciary Act to the contrary notwithstanding, the
court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the
following cases:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Cases involving custody, guardianship, adoption, revocation of
adoption, paternity and acknowledgment;
(3) Annulment of marriages, relief from marital obligations, legal
separation of spouses, and actions for support;
(4) Proceedings brought under the provisions of title six and title
seven, chapters one to three of the civil code;
xxx xxx xxx
and the ruling in the case of Bartolome v. Bartolome [G.R. No. L-23661, 21 SCRA
1324] reiterated in Divinagracia v. Rovira [G.R. No. L-42615, 72 SCRA 307.]
With the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts were
abolished. Their functions and jurisdiction are now vested with the Regional Trial
Courts [See Section 19 (7), B.P. Blg. 129 and Divinagracia v. Belosillo, G.R. No. L-
47407, August 12, 1986, 143 SCRA 356, 360] hence it is no longer necessary to
pass upon the issue of jurisdiction raised by petitioners.
Moreover, even without the exactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 we find in Rep.
Act No. 5502 sec. 91-A last paragraph that:
xxx xxx xxx
If any question involving any of the above matters should arise as an
incident in any case pending in the ordinary court, said incident shall
be determined in the main case.
xxx xxx xxx
As held in the case of Divinagracia v. Rovira [G.R. No. L42615. August 10, 1976, 72
SCRA 307]:
xxx xxx xxx
It is true that under the aforequoted section 1 of Republic Act No.
4834 **** a case involving paternity and acknowledgment may be
ventilated as an incident in the intestate or testate proceeding (See
Baluyot vs. Ines Luciano, L-42215, July 13, 1976). But that legal
provision presupposes that such an administration proceeding is
pending or existing and has not been terminated. [at pp. 313-314.]
(Emphasis supplied.)
xxx xxx xxx
The reason for ths rule is not only "to obviate the rendition of conflicting rulings on
the same issue by the Court of First Instance and the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court" [Vda. de Baluyut v. Luciano, G.R. No. L-42215, July 13, 1976, 72
SCRA 52, 63] but more importantly to prevent multiplicity of suits. Accordingly, this
Court finds no reversible error committed by respondent court.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.
Footnotes

* The petition for review in G.R. No. 56045 was denied for lack of
merit on March 9, 1981, Counsel for the petitioners then filed a Motion
for Consolidation and for Extension of Time to File Motion for
Reconsideration which was granted on July 8, 1981. On February 17,
1982, however, petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the
resolution of March 9, 1981 was denied.

** Other than the exceptions contained in this article, this provision of

law is derived from Section 19, Act No. 3613 and Section IV, General
Order No. 68.

*** The presumption that, in the absence of proof, the foreign law is
the same as the law of the forum, is known as processual
presumption which has been applied by this Court in the cases of Lim
v. The Insular Collector of Customs, 36 Phil, 472 (1917); International
Harvester Co. in Russia v. Hamburg-American Line, 42 Phil. 845
(1918); Miciano v. Brimo, 60 Phil, 867 (1924); and Rayray v. Chae
Kyung Lee, G.R. No. L-18176, October 26, 1966,18 SCRA 450.

**** Rep. Act 4834 created the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court
of Iloilo. Section 1 of said Act is the exact copy of section 19-A of Rep.
Act 5502.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 95122-23             May 31, 1991
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS (COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND
DEPORTATION), BOARD OF SPECIAL INQUIRY, COMMISSIONER ANDREA D.
DOMINGO, ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER JORGE V. SARMIENTO, ACTING
ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER REGINO R. SANTIAGO, MEMBERS OF THE
BOARD OF SPECIAL INQUIRY, ESTANISLAO CANTA, LEO MAGAHOM and
BENJAMIN KALAW, petitioners,  continuing with any of the proceedings which would lead to the deportation of
vs.
HON. JOSELITO DELA ROSA, Presiding Judge, RTC Manila, Branch 29,
WILLIAM T. GATCHALIAN,respondents.
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS (COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND
DEPORTATION), BOARD OF SPECIAL INQUIRY, COMMISSIONER ANDREA D.
DOMINGO, ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER JORGE V. SARMIENTO, ACTING
ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER REGINO R. SANTIAGO, MEMBERS OF THE
BOARD OF SPECIAL INQUIRY, ESTANISLAO CANTA, LEO MAGAHOM and
BENJAMIN KALAW, petitioners,  declared a Filipino citizen, or in the alternative, to remand the case to the trial court
vs.
HON. TERESITA DIZON CAPULONG, Presiding Judge, RTC Branch 172,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, DEE HUA T. GATCHALIAN, SHERWING T.
GATCHALIAN, KENNETH T. GATCHALIAN, REXLON T. GATCHALIAN, and
WESLIE T. GATCHALIAN, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 95612-13             May 31, 1991
WILLIAM T. GATCHALIAN, petitioner, 
vs.
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS (COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND
DEPORTATION), et al., respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioners.
edesma, Saludo & Associates for respondent William Gatchalian.
Cervo and Tanay Law Office for respondent T.D. Capulong, D.H.T. Gatchalian, et al.
BIDIN, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by the Solicitor General seeking 1)
to set aside the Resolution/Temporary Restraining Order dated September 7, 1990,
issued by respondent Judge de la Rosa in Civil Case No. 90-54214 which denied
petitioners' motion to dismiss and restrained petitioners from commencing or
respondent William Gatchalian, docketed as D.C. No. 90-523, as well as the Order of
respondent Judge Capulong dated September 6, 1990 in Civil Case No. 3431-V-90
which likewise enjoined petitioners from proceeding with the deportation charges
against respondent Gatchalian, and 2) to prohibit respondent judges from further
acting in the aforesaid civil cases.
On October 23, 1990, respondent Gatchalian filed his Comment with Counter-
Petition, docketed as G.R. Nos. 96512-13, alleging lack of jurisdiction on the part of
respondent Board of Commissioners, et al., over his person with prayer that he be
for further proceedings.
On December 13, 1990, petitioners filed their comment to respondent Gatchalian's
counter-petition. The Court considers the comment filed by respondent Gatchalian as
answer to the petition and petitioners' comment as answer to the counter-petition
and gives due course to the petitions.
There is no dispute as to the following facts:
On July 12, 1960, Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian, was
recognized by the Bureau of Immigration as a native born Filipino citizen following
the citizenship of his natural mother, Marciana Gatchalian (Annex "1", counter-
petition). Before the Citizenship Evaluation Board, Santiago Gatchalian testified that
he has five (5) children with his wife Chu Gim Tee, namely: Jose Gatchalian, Gloria
Gatchalian, Francisco Gatchalian, Elena Gatchalian and Benjamin Gatchalian
(Annex "2", counter-petition).
On June 27, 1961, William Gatchalian, then a twelve-year old minor, arrived in
Manila from Hongkong together with Gloria, Francisco, and Johnson, all surnamed
Gatchalian. They had with them Certificates of Registration and Identity issued by
the Philippine Consulate in Hongkong based on a cablegram bearing the signature of
the then Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Felixberto Serrano, and sought admission as
Filipino citizens. Gloria and Francisco are the daughter and son, respectively, of
Santiago Gatchalian; while William and Johnson are the sons of Francisco.
After investigation, the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 rendered a decision dated July
6, 1961, admitting William Gatchalian and his companions as Filipino citizens (Annex
"C", petition). As a consequence thereof, William Gatchalian was issued
Identification Certificate No. 16135 by the immigration authorities on August 16, 1961
(Annex "D", petition).
On January 24, 1962, the then Secretary of Justice issued Memorandum No. 9
setting aside all decisions purporting to have been rendered by the Board of
Commissioners on appeal or on review motu proprio of decisions of the Board of
Special Inquiry. The same memorandum directed the Board of Commissioners to
review all cases where entry was allowed on the ground that the entrant was a
Philippine citizen. Among those cases was that of William and others.
On July 6, 1962, the new Board of Commissioners, after a review motu proprio of the
proceedings had in the Board of Special Inquiry, reversed the decision of the latter
and ordered the exclusion of, among others, respondent Gatchalian (Annex "E",
petition). A warrant of exclusion also dated July 6, 1962 was issued alleging that "the
decision of the Board of Commissioners dated July 6, 1962 . . . has now become
final and executory (Annex "F", petition).
The actual date of rendition of said decision by the Board of Commissioners
(whether on July 6, 1962 or July 20, 1962) became the subject of controversy in the
1967 case of Arocha vs. Vivo (21 SCRA 532) wherein this Court sustained the
validity of the decision of the new Board of Commissioners having been promulgated
on July 6, 1962, or within the reglementary period for review.
Sometime in 1973, respondent Gatchalian, as well as the others covered by the July
6, 1962 warrant of exclusion, filed a motion for re-hearing with the Board of Special
Inquiry where the deportion case against them was assigned.
On March 14, 1973, the Board of Special Inquiry recommended to the then Acting
Commissioner Victor Nituda the reversal of the July 6, 1962 decision of the then
Board of Commissioners and the recall of the warrants of arrest issued therein
(Annex "5", counter-petition).
On March 15, 1973, Acting Commissioner Nituda issued an order reaffirming the July
6, 1961 decision of the Board of Special Inquiry thereby admitting respondent
Gatchalian as a Filipino citizen and recalled the warrant of arrest issued against him
(Annex "6", counter-petition).
On June 7, 1990, the acting director of the National Bureau of Investigation wrote the
Secretary of Justice recommending that respondent Gatchalian along with the other
applicants covered by the warrant of exclusion dated July 6, 1962 be charged with
violation of Sec. 37 (a), pars. 1 and 2, in relation to Secs. 45 (c), and (d) and (e) of
Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, also known as the Immigration Act of
1940 (Annex "G", petition).
On August 1, 1990, the Secretary of Justice indorsed the recommendation of the NBI
to the Commissioner of Immigration for investigation and immediate action (Annex
"20", counter-petition).
On August 15, 1990, petitioner Commissioner Domingo of the Commission of
Immigration and Deportation * issued a mission order commanding the arrest of
respondent William Gatchalian (Annex "18", counter-petition). The latter appeared
before Commissioner Domingo on August 20, 1990 and was released on the same
day upon posting P200,000.00 cash bond.
On August 29, 1990, William Gatchalian filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with injunction before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. 29, presided by
respondent Judge dela Rosa, docketed as Civil Case No. 90-54214.
On September 4, 1990, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 90-54214
alleging that respondent judge has no jurisdiction over the Board of Commissioners
and/or the Board of Special Inquiry. Nonetheless, respondent judge dela Rosa
issued the assailed order dated September 7, 1990, denying the motion to dismiss.
Meanwhile, on September 6, 1990, respondent Gatchalian's wife and minor children
filed before the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Br. 172, presided
by respondent judge Capulong Civil Case No. 3431-V-90 for injunction with writ of
preliminary injunction. The complaint alleged, among others, that petitioners acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction in the institution of deportation proceedings
against William. On the same day, respondent Capulong issued the questioned
temporary restraining order restraining petitioners from continuing with the
deportation proceedings against William Gatchalian.
The petition is anchored on the following propositions: 1) respondent judges have no
jurisdiction over petitioners (Board of Commissioners, et al.,) and the subject matter
of the case, appellate jurisdiction being vested by BP 129 with the Court of Appeals;
2) assuming respondent judges have jurisdiction, they acted with grave abuse of
discretion in preempting petitioners in the exercise of the authority and jurisdiction to
hear and determine the deportation case against respondent Gatchalian, and in the
process determine also his citizenship; 3) respondent judge dela Rosa gravely
abused his discretion in ruling that the issues raised in the deportation proceedings
are beyond the competence and jurisdiction of petitioners, thereby disregarding the
cases of Arocha vs. Vivo and Vivo vs. Arca (supra), which put finality to the July 6,
1962 decision of the Board of Commissioners that respondent Gatchalian is a
Chinese citizen; and 4) respondent judge Capulong should have dismissed Civil
Case No. 3431-V-90 for forum-shopping.
In his counter-petition, William Gatchalian alleges among others that: 1) assuming
that the evidence on record is not sufficient to declare him a Filipino citizen,
petitioners have no jurisdiction to proceed with the deportation case until the courts
shall have finally resolved the question of his citizenship; 2) petitioners can no longer
judiciously and fairly resolve the question of respondent's citizenship in the
deportation case because of their bias, pre-judgment and prejudice against him; and
3) the ground for which he is sought to be deported has already prescribed.
For purposes of uniformity, the parties herein will be referred to in the order the
petitions were filed.
Petitioners argue that under Sec. 9 (3) of BP 129, it is the Court of Appeals which
has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments or orders of quasi-judicial
agencies, boards or commissions, such as the Board of Commissioners and the
Board of Special Inquiry.
Respondent, on the other hand, contends that petitioners are not quasi-judicial
agencies and are not in equal rank with Regional Trial Courts.
Under Sec. 21 (1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the Regional Trial Courts have
concurrent jurisdiction with this Court and the Court of Appeals to issue "writs
of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpusand injunction
which may be enforced in any part of their respective regions, . . ." Thus, the RTCs
are vested with the power to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.
It is true that under Sec. 9 (3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the Court of Appeals is
vested with —
(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions,
resolutions, order, or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial
agencies, instrumentalities, board or commission, except those falling within
the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the
Constitution, the provisions of this Act, and of sub-paragraph (1) of the third
paragraph of and sub-paragraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of
the Judiciary Act of 1948.
It does not provide, however, that said exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals extends to all quasi-judicial agencies. The quasi-judicial bodies whose
decisions are exclusively appealable to the Court of Appeals are those which under
the law, Republic Act No. 5434, or their enabling acts, are specifically appealable to
the Court of Appeals (Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force vs. Court of
Appeals, 171 SCRA 348 [1989]; Lupangco vs. Court of Appeals, 160 SCRA 848
[1988]). Thus, under Republic Act No. 5434, it is specifically provided that the
decisions of the Land Registration Commission (LRC), the Social Security
Commission (SSC), Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), the Patent Office and the
Agricultural Invention Board are appealable to the Court of Appeals.
In the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force (supra), this Court clarified the
matter when We ruled:
Under our Resolution dated January 11, 1983:
. . . The appeals to the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of
Appeals) from quasi-judicial bodies shall continue to be governed by
the provisions of Republic Act No. 5434 insofar as the same is not
inconsistent with the provisions of B.P. Blg. 129.
The pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 5434 are as follows:
 Sec. 1. Appeals from specified agencies.— Any provision of existing
law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, parties
aggrieved by a final ruling, award, order, or decision, or judgment of
the Court of Agrarian Relations; the Secretary of Labor under Section
7 of Republic Act Numbered Six hundred and two, also known as the
"Minimum Wage Law"; the Department of Labor under Section 23 of
Republic Act Numbered Eight hundred seventy-five, also known as
the "Industrial Peace Act"; the Land Registration Commission; the
Social Security Commission; the Civil Aeronautics Board; the Patent
Office and the Agricultural Inventions Board, may appeal therefrom to
the Court of Appeals, within the period and in the manner herein
provided, whether the appeal involves questions of fact, mixed
questions of fact and law, or questions of law, or all three kinds of
questions. From final judgments or decisions of the Court of Appeals,
the aggrieved party may appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court as
provided under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Because of subsequent amendments, including the abolition of various
special courts, jurisdiction over quasi-judicial bodies has to be, consequently,
determined by the corresponding amendatory statutes. Under the Labor
Code, decisions and awards of the National Labor Relations Commission are
final and executory, but, nevertheless, reviewable by this Court through a
petition for certiorari and not by way of appeal.
Under the Property Registration Decree, decision of the Commission of Land
Registration, en consulta, are appealable to the Court of Appeals.
The decisions of the Securities and Exchange Commission are likewise
appealable to the Appellate Court, and so are decisions of the Social Security
Commission.
As a rule, where legislation provides for an appeal from decisions of certain
administrative bodies to the Court of Appeals, it means that such bodies are
co-equal with the Regional Trial Courts, in terms of rank and stature, and
logically, beyond the control of the latter. (Emphasis supplied)
There are quasi-judicial agencies, as the National Labor Relations Commissions,
whose decisions are directly appealable to this Court. It is only when a specific law,
as Republic Act No. 5434, provides appeal from certain bodies or commissions to
the Court of Appeals as the Land Registration Commission (LRC), Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) and others, that the said commissions or boards may
be considered co-equal with the RTCs in terms of rank, stature and are logically
beyond the control of the latter.
However, the Bureau of Immigration (or CID) is not among those quasi-judicial
agencies specified by law whose decisions, orders, and resolutions are directly
appealable to the Court of Appeals. In fact, its decisions are subject to judicial review
in accordance with Sec. 25, Chapter 4, Book VII of the 1987 Administrative Code,
which provides as follows:
Sec. 25. Judicial Review.—(1) Agency decisions shall be subject to judicial
review in accordance with this chapter and applicable laws.
x x x           x x x          x x x
(6) The review proceeding shall be filed in the court specified in the statute or,
in the absence thereof, in any court of competent jurisdiction in accordance
with the provisions on venue of the Rules of Court.
Said provision of the Administrative Code, which is subsequent to B.P. Blg. 129 and
which thus modifies the latter, provides that the decision of an agency like the
Bureau of Immigration should be subject to review by the court specified by the
statute or in the absence thereof, it is subject to review by any court of competent
jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions on venue of the Rules of Court.
B.P. Blg. 129 did not intend to raise all quasi-judicial bodies to the same level or rank
of the RTC except those specifically provided for under the law as aforestated. As
the Bureau of Immigration is not of equal rank as the RTC, its decisions may be
appealable to, and may be reviewed through a special civil action for certiorari by,
the RTC (Sec. 21, (1) BP 129).
True, it is beyond cavil that the Bureau of Immigration has the exclusive authority
and jurisdiction to try and hear cases against an alleged alien, and in the process,
determine also their citizenship (Lao Gi vs. Court of Appeals, 180 SCRA 756 [1989]).
And a mere claim of citizenship cannot operate to divest the Board of
Commissioners of its jurisdiction in deportation proceedings (Miranda vs. Deportation
Board, 94 Phil. 531 [1954]).
However, the rule enunciated in the above-cases admits of an exception, at least
insofar as deportation proceedings are concerned. Thus, what if the claim to
citizenship of the alleged deportee is satisfactory? Should the deportation
proceedings be allowed to continue or should the question of citizenship be
ventilated in a judicial proceeding? In Chua Hiong vs. Deportation Board (96 Phil.
665 [1955]), this Court answered the question in the affirmative, and We quote:
When the evidence submitted by a respondent is conclusive of his
citizenship, the right to immediate review should also be recognized and the
courts should promptly enjoin the deportation proceedings. A citizen is
entitled to live in peace, without molestation from any official or authority, and
if he is disturbed by a deportation proceeding, he has the unquestionable
right to resort to the courts for his protection, either by a writ of habeas
corpus or of prohibition, on the legal ground that the Board lacks
jurisdiction. If he is a citizen and evidence thereof is satisfactory, there is no
sense nor justice in allowing the deportation proceedings to continue,
granting him the remedy only after the Board has finished its investigation of
his undesirability.
. . . And if the right (to peace) is precious and valuable at all, it must also be
protected on time, to prevent undue harassment at the hands of ill-meaning
or misinformed administrative officials. Of what use is this much boasted right
to peace and liberty if it can be availed of only after the Deportation Board
has unjustly trampled upon it, besmirching the citizen's name before the bar
of public opinion? (Emphasis supplied)
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction of petitioners Board of Commissioners over
deportation proceedings is, therefore, not without exception (Calacday vs. Vivo, 33
SCRA 413 [1970]; Vivo vs. Montesa, 24 SCRA 155 [1967]). Judicial intervention,
however, should be granted only in cases where the "claim of citizenship is so
substantial that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the claim is correct. In
other words, the remedy should be allowed only on sound discretion of a competent
court in a proper proceeding (Chua Hiong vs. Deportation Board, supra; Co. vs.
Deportation Board, 78 SCRA 107 [1977]). It appearing from the records that
respondent's claim of citizenship is substantial, as We shall show later, judicial
intervention should be allowed.
In the case at bar, the competent court which could properly take cognizance of the
proceedings instituted by respondent Gatchalian would nonetheless be the Regional
Trial Court and not the Court of Appeals in view of Sec. 21 (1), BP 129, which
confers upon the former jurisdiction over actions for prohibition concurrently with the
Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court and in line with the pronouncements of this
Court in Chua Hiong and Co cases.
Ordinarily, the case would then be remanded to the Regional Trial Court. But not in
the case at bar.1âwphi1 Considering the voluminous pleadings submitted by the
parties and the evidence presented, We deem it proper to decide the controversy
right at this instance. And this course of action is not without precedent for "it is a
cherished rule of procedure for this Court to always strive to settle the entire
controversy in a single proceeding leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of
future litigation. No useful purpose will be served if this case is remanded to the trial
court only to have its decision raised again to the Court of Appeals and from there to
this Court" (Marquez vs. Marquez, 73 Phil. 74; Keramic Industries, Inc. vs. Guerrero,
61 SCRA 265 [1974]) Alger Electric, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (135 SCRA 37
[1985]), citing Gayos vs. Gayos (67 SCRA 146 [1975]).
In Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (157 SCRA 357 [1988]), We
also stated:
Remand of the case to the lower court for further reception of evidence is not
necessary where the court is in a position to resolve the dispute based on the
records before it. On many occasions, the Court, in the public interest and the
expeditious administration of justice, has resolved actions on the merits
instead of remanding them to the trial court for further proceedings, such as
where the ends of justice would not be subserved by the remand of the case
or when public interest demands an early disposition of the case or where the
trial court had already received all the evidence of the parties (Quisumbing
vs. CA, 112 SCRA 703; Francisco, et al., vs. The City of Davao, et al., supra;
Republic vs. Security Credit & Acceptance Corp., et al., 19 SCRA 58; Samal
vs. CA, supra; Republic vs. Central Surety & Insurance Co., 25 SCRA 641).
Likewise in Tejones vs. Gironella (159 SCRA 100 [1988]), We said:
Sound practice seeks to accommodate the theory which avoids waste of
time, effort and expense, both to the parties and the government, not to
speak of delay in the disposal of the case (cf. Fernandez vs. Garcia, 92 Phil.
592, 297). A marked characterstic of our judicial set-up is that where the
dictates of justice so demand . . . the Supreme Court should act, and act with
finality (Li Siu Liat vs. Republic, 21 SCRA 1039, 1046, citingSamal vs. CA, 99
Phil. 230 and US vs. Gimenez, 34 Phil. 74.) (Beautifont, Inc. vs. Court of
appeals, et al., Jan. 29, 1988; See also Labo vs. Commission on Elections,
176 SCRA 1 [1989]).
Respondent Gatchalian has adduced evidence not only before the Regional Trial
Court but also before Us in the form of public documents attached to his pleadings.
On the other hand, Special Prosecutor Renato Mabolo in his Manifestation (dated
September 6, 1990; Rollo, p. 298, counter-petition) before the Bureau of Immigration
already stated that there is no longer a need to adduce evidence in support of the
deportation charges against respondent. In addition, petitioners invoke that this
Court's decision in Arocha vs. Vivo and Vivo vs. Arca (supra), has already settled
respondent's alienage. Hence, the need for a judicial determination of respondent's
citizenship specially so where the latter is not seeking admission, but is already in
the Philippines (for the past thirty [30] years) and is being expelled (Chua Hiong vs.
Deportation Board, supra).
According to petitioners, respondent's alienage has been conclusively settled by this
Court in the Arocha and Vivocases, We disagree. It must be noted that in said cases,
the sole issue resolved therein was the actual date of rendition of the July 6, 1962
decision of the then board of Commissioners, i.e., whether the decision was
rendered on July 6, 1962 or on July 20, 1962 it appearing that the figure (date) "20"
was erased and over it was superimposed the figure "6" thereby making the decision
fall within the one-year reglementary period from July 6, 1961 within which the
decision may be reviewed. This Court did not squarely pass upon any question of
citizenship, much less that of respondent's who was not a party in the aforesaid
cases. The said cases originated from a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed on
July 21, 1965 by Macario Arocha in behalf of Pedro Gatchalian. Well settled is the
rule that a person not party to a case cannot be bound by a decision rendered
therein.
Neither can it be argued that the Board of Commissioners' decision (dated July 6,
1962) finding respondent's claim to Philippine citizenship not satisfactorily proved,
constitute res judicata. For one thing, said decision did not make any categorical
statement that respondent Gatchalian is a Chinese. Secondly, the doctrine of res
judicata does not apply to questions of citizenship (Labo vs. Commission on
Elections (supra); citing Soria vs. Commissioner of Immigration, 37 SCRA 213; Lee
vs. Commissioner of Immigration, 42 SCRA 561 [1971]; Sia Reyes vs. Deportation
Board, 122 SCRA 478 [1983]).
In Moy Ya Lim vs. Commissioner of Immigration (41 SCRA 292 [1971]) and in Lee
vs. Commissioner of Immigration (supra), this Court declared that:
(e)verytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a
judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or
administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not
considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and
again as the occasion may demand.
An exception to the above rule was laid by this Court in Burca vs. Republic (51
SCRA 248 [1973]), viz:
We declare it to be a sound rule that where the citizenship of a party in a
case is definitely resolved by a court or by an administrative agency, as a
material issue in the controversy, after a full-blown hearing with the active
participation of the Solicitor General or his authorized representative, and this
finding or the citizenship of the party is affirmed by this Court, the decision on
the matter shall constitute conclusive proof of such party's citizenship in any
other case or proceeding. But it is made clear that in no instance will a
decision on the question of citizenship in such cases be considered
conclusive or binding in any other case or proceeding, unless obtained in
accordance with the procedure herein stated.
Thus, in order that the doctrine of res judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship,
the following must be present: 1) a person's citizenship must be raised as a material
issue in a controversy where said person is a party; 2) the Solicitor General or his
authorized representative took active part in the resolution thereof, and 3) the finding
or citizenship is affirmed by this Court.
Gauged by the foregoing, We find the pre-conditions set forth in Burca inexistent in
the Arocha and Vivo cases relied upon by petitioners. Indeed, respondent William
Gatchalian was not even a party in said cases.
Coming now to the contention of petitioners that the arrest of respondent follows as a
matter of consequence based on the warrant of exclusion issued on July 6, 1962,
coupled with the Arocha and Vivo cases (Rollo, pp. 33), the Court finds the same
devoid of merit.
Sec. 37 (a) of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, otherwise known as the
Immigration Act of 1940, reads:
Sec. 37. (a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the
Commissioner of Immigration or of any other officer designated by him for the
purpose and deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner of
Immigration after a determination by the Board of Commissioner of the
existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien.
(Emphasis supplied)
From a perusal of the above provision, it is clear that in matters of implementing the
Immigration Act insofar as deportation of aliens are concerned, the Commissioner of
Immigration may issue warrants of arrest only after a determination by the Board of
Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the
alien. In other words, a warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration,
to be valid, must be for the sole purpose of executing a final order of deportation. A
warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration for purposes of
investigation only, as in the case at bar, is null and void for being unconstitutional
(Ang Ngo Chiong vs. Galang, 67 SCRA 338 [1975] citing Po Siok Pin vs. Vivo, 62
SCRA 363 [1975]; Vivo vs. Montesa, 24 SCRA 155; Morano vs. Vivo, 20 SCRA 562;
Qua Chee Gan vs. Deportation Board, 9 SCRA 27 [1963]; Ng Hua To vs. Galang, 10
SCRA 411; see also Santos vs. Commissioner of Immigration, 74 SCRA 96 [1976]).
As We held in Qua Chee Gan vs. Deportation Board (supra), "(t)he constitution does
not distinguish warrants between a criminal case and administrative proceedings.
And if one suspected of having committed a crime is entitled to a determination of
the probable cause against him, by a judge, why should one suspected of a violation
of an administrative nature deserve less guarantee?" It is not indispensable that the
alleged alien be arrested for purposes of investigation. If the purpose of the issuance
of the warrant of arrest is to determine the existence of probable cause, surely, it
cannot pass the test of constitutionality for only judges can issue the same (Sec. 2,
Art. III, Constitution).
A reading of the mission order/warrant of arrest (dated August 15, 1990; Rollo, p.
183, counter-petition) issued by the Commissioner of Immigration, clearly indicates
that the same was issued only for purposes of investigation of the suspects, William
Gatchalian included. Paragraphs 1 and 3 of the mission order directs the Intelligence
Agents/Officers to:
x x x           x x x          x x x
1. Make a warrantless arrest under the Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule
113, Sec. 5, for violation of the Immigration Act, Sec. 37, para. a; Secs. 45
and 46 Administrative Code;
x x x           x x x          x x x
3. Deliver the suspect to the Intelligence Division and immediately conduct
custodial interrogation, after warning the suspect that he has a right to remain
silent and a right to counsel; . . .
Hence, petitioners' argument that the arrest of respondent was based, ostensibly, on
the July 6, 1962 warrant of exclusion has obviously no leg to stand on. The mission
order/warrant of arrest made no mention that the same was issued pursuant to a
final order of deportation or warrant of exclusion.
But there is one more thing that militates against petitioners' cause. As records
indicate, which petitioners conveniently omitted to state either in their petition or
comment to the counter-petition of respondent, respondent Gatchalian, along with
others previously covered by the 1962 warrant of exclusion, filed a motion for re-
hearing before the Board of Special Inquiry (BSI) sometime in 1973.
On March 14, 1973, the Board of Special Inquiry, after giving due course to the
motion for re-hearing, submitted a memorandum to the then Acting Commissioner
Victor Nituda (Annex "5", counter-petition) recommending 1 the reconsideration of
the July 6, 1962 decision of the then Board of Commissioners which reversed the
July 6, 1961 decision of the then Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 and 2 the lifting of
the warrants of arrest issued against applicants. The memorandum inferred that the
"very basis of the Board of Commissioners in reversing the decision of the Board of
Special Inquiry was due to a forged cablegram by the then Secretary of Foreign
Affairs, . . ., which was dispatched to the Philippine Consulate in Hong Kong
authorizing the registration of applicants as P.I. citizens." The Board of Special
Inquiry concluded that "(i)f at all, the cablegram only led to the issuance of their
Certificate(s) of Identity which took the place of a passport for their authorized travel
to the Philippines. It being so, even if the applicants could have entered illegally, the
mere fact that they are citizens of the Philippines entitles them to remain in the
country."
On March 15, 1973, then Acting Commissioner Nituda issued an Order (Annex "6",
counter-petition) which affirmed the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 decision dated
July 6, 1961 admitting respondent Gatchalian and others as Filipino citizens; recalled
the July 6, 1962 warrant of arrest and revalidated their Identification Certificates.
The above order admitting respondent as a Filipino citizen is the last official act of
the government on the basis of which respondent William Gatchalian continually
exercised the rights of a Filipino citizen to the present. Consequently, the
presumption of citizenship lies in favor of respondent William Gatchalian.
There should be no question that Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William
Gatchalian, is a Filipino citizen. As a matter of fact, in the very order of the BOC of
July 6, 1962, which reversed the July 6, 1961 BSI order, it is an accepted fact that
Santiago Gatchalian is a Filipino. The opening paragraph of said order states:
 The claim to Filipino citizenship of abovenamed applicants is based on the
citizenship of one Santiago Gatchalian whose Philippine citizenship was
recognized by the Bureau of Immigration in an Order dated July 12, 1960.
(Annex "37", Comment with Counter-Petition).
Nonetheless, in said order it was found that the applicants therein have not
satisfactorily proven that they are the children and/or grandchildren of Santiago
Gatchalian. The status of Santiago Gatchalian as a Filipino was reiterated
in Arocha and Arca (supra) where advertence is made to the "applicants being the
descendants of one Santiago Gatchalian, a Filipino." (at p. 539).
In the sworn statement of Santiago Gatchalian before the Philippine Consul in
Hongkong in 1961 (Annex "1" to the Comment of petitioners to Counter-Petition), he
reiterated his status as a Philippine citizen being the illegitimate child of Pablo
Pacheco and Marciana Gatchalian, the latter being a Filipino; that he was born in
Manila on July 25, 1905; and that he was issued Philippine Passport No. 28160 (PA-
No. A91196) on November 18, 1960 by the Department of Foreign Affairs in Manila.
In his affidavit of January 23, 1961 (Annex "5", counter-petition), Santiago reiterated
his claim of Philippine citizenship as a consequence of his petition for cancellation of
his alien registry which was granted on February 18, 1960 in C.E.B. No. 3660-L; and
that on July 20, 1960, he was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration as a Filipino
and was issued Certificate No. 1-2123.
The dissenting opinions of my esteemed brethrens, Messrs. Justices F.P. Feliciano
and H.G. Davide, Jr., proposing to re-open the question of citizenship of Santiago
Gatchalian at this stage of the case, where it is not even put in issue, is quite much
to late. As stated above, the records of the Bureau of Immigration show that as of
July 20, 1960, Santiago Gatchalian had been declared to be a Filipino citizen. It is a
final decision that forecloses a re-opening of the same 30 years later. Petitioners do
not even question Santiago Gatchalian's Philippine citizenship. It is the citizenship of
respondent William Gatchalian that is in issue and addressed for determination of the
Court in this case.
Furthermore, petitioners' position is not enhanced by the fact that respondent's arrest
came twenty-eight (28) years after the alleged cause of deportation arose. Section
37 (b) of the Immigration Act states that deportation "shall not be effected . . . unless
the arrest in the deportation proceedings is made within five (5) years after the cause
of deportation arises." In Lam Shee vs. Bengzon (93 Phil. 1065 [1953]), We laid
down the consequences of such inaction, thus:
There is however an important circumstance which places this case beyond
the reach of the resultant consequence of the fraudulent act committed by
the mother of the minor when she admitted that she gained entrance into the
Philippines by making use of the name of a Chinese resident merchant other
than that of her lawful husband, and that is, that the mother can no longer be
the subject of deportation proceedings for the simple reason that more than 5
years had elapsed from the date of her admission. Note that the above
irregularity was divulged by the mother herself, who in a gesture of sincerity,
made an spontaneous admission before the immigration officials in the
investigation conducted in connection with the landing of the minor on
September 24, 1947, and not through any effort on the part of the immigration
authorities. And considering this frank admission, plus the fact that the
mother was found to be married to another Chinese resident merchant, now
deceased, who owned a restaurant in the Philippines valued at P15,000 and
which gives a net profit of P500 a month, the immigration officials then must
have considered the irregularity not serious enough when, inspire of that
finding, they decided to land said minor "as a properly documented
preference quota immigrant" (Exhibit D). We cannot therefore but wonder
why two years later the immigration officials would reverse their attitude and
would take steps to institute deportation proceedings against the minor.
Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, we believe that much as the
attitude of the mother would be condemned for having made use of an
improper means to gain entrance into the Philippines and acquire permanent
residence there, it is now too late, not to say unchristian, to deport the minor
after having allowed the mother to remain even illegally to the extent of
validating her residence by inaction, thus allowing the period of prescription
to set in and to elapse in her favor. To permit his deportation at this late hour
would be to condemn him to live separately from his mother through no fault
of his thereby leaving him to a life of insecurity resulting from lack of support
and protection of his family. This inaction or oversight on the part of
immigration officials has created an anomalous situation which, for reasons of
equity, should be resolved in favor of the minor herein involved. (Emphasis
supplied)
In the case at bar, petitioners' alleged cause of action and deportation against herein
respondent arose in 1962. However, the warrant of arrest of respondent was issued
by Commissioner Domingo only on August 15, 1990 — 28 long years after. It is clear
that petitioners' cause of action has already prescribed and by their inaction could
not now be validly enforced by petitioners against respondent William Gatchalian.
Furthermore, the warrant of exclusion dated July 6, 1962 was already recalled and
the Identification certificate of respondent, among others, was revalidated on March
15, 1973 by the then Acting Commissioner Nituda.
It is also proposed in the dissenting opinions of Messrs. Justices Feliciano and
Davide, Jr., that the BOC decision dated July 6, 1962 and the warrant of exclusion
which was found to be valid in Arocha should be applicable to respondent William
Gatchalian even if the latter was not a party to said case. They also opined that
under Sec. 37 (b) of the Immigration Act, the five (5) years limitation is applicable
only where the deportation is sought to be effected under clauses of Sec. 37 (b)
other than clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 and that no period of limitation is applicable in
deportations under clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12.
The Court disagrees. Under Sec. 39 of the Immigration Act, it is reiterated that such
deportation proceedings should be instituted within five (5) years. Section 45 of the
same Act provides penal sanctions for violations of the offenses therein enumerated
with a fine of "not more than P1,000.00 and imprisonment for not more than two (2)
years and deportation if he is an alien." Thus:
Penal Provisions
Sec. 45. Any individual who—
(a) When applying for an immigration document personates another
individual, or falsely appears in the name of deceased individual, or evades
the immigration laws by appearing under an assumed name; fictitious name;
or
(b) Issues or otherwise disposes of an immigration document, to any person
not authorized by law to receive such document; or
(c) Obtains, accepts or uses any immigration document, knowing it to be
false; or
(d) Being an alien, enters the Philippines without inspection and admission by
the immigration officials, or obtains entry into the Philippines by wilful, false,
or misleading representation or wilful concealment of a material fact; or
(e) Being an alien shall for any fraudulent purpose represent himself to be a
Philippine citizen in order to evade any requirement of the immigration laws;
or
(f) In any immigration matter shall knowingly make under oath any false
statement or representations; or
(g) Being an alien, shall depart from the Philippines without first securing an
immigration clearance certificates required by section twenty-two of this Act;
or
(h) Attempts or conspires with another to commit any of the foregoing acts,
shall be guilty of an offense, and upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not
more than one thousand pesos, and imprisoned for not more than two years,
and deported if he is an alien. (Emphasis supplied)
Such offenses punishable by correctional penalty prescribe in 10 years (Art. 90,
Revised Penal Code); correctional penalties also prescribe in 10 years (Art. 92,
Revised Penal Code).
It must be noted, however, that under Sec. 1, Act No. 3326 [1926], as amended,
(Prescription for Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances)
"violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts,
prescribe in accordance with the following rules: . . .c) after eight years for those
punished by imprisonment for two years or more, but less than six years; . . ."
Consequently, no prosecution and consequent deportation for violation of the
offenses enumerated in the Immigration Act can be initiated beyond the eight-year
prescriptive period, the Immigration Act being a special legislation.
The Court, therefore, holds that the period of effecting deportation of an alien after
entry or a warrant of exclusion based on a final order of the BSI or BOC are not
imprescriptible. The law itself provides for a period of prescription. Prescription of the
crime is forfeiture or loss of the rights of the State to prosecute the offender after the
lapse of a certain time, while prescription of the penalty is the loss or forfeiture by the
government of the right to execute the final sentence after the lapse of a certain time
(Padilla, Criminal Law, Vol. 1, 1974, at p. 855).
"Although a deportation proceeding does not partake of the nature of a criminal
action, however, considering that it is a harsh and extraordinary administrative
proceeding affecting the freedom and liberty of a person, the constitutional right of
such person to due process should not be denied. Thus, the provisions of the Rules
of Court of the Philippines particularly on criminal procedure are applicable to
deportation proceedings." (Lao Gi vs. Court of Appeals, supra). Under Sec. 6, Rule
39 of the Rules of Court, a final judgment may not be executed after the lapse of five
(5) years from the date of its entry or from the date it becomes final and executory.
Thereafter, it may be enforced only by a separate action subject to the statute of
limitations. Under Art. 1144 (3) of the Civil Code, an action based on judgment must
be brought within 10 years from the time the right of action accrues.
In relation to Sec. 37 (b) of the Immigration Act, the rule, therefore, is:
1. Deportation or exclusion proceedings should be initiated within five (5) years after
the cause of deportation or exclusion arises when effected under any other clauses
other than clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 and of paragraph (a) of Sec. 37 of the
Immigration Act; and
2. When deportation or exclusion is effected under clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 of
paragraph (a) of Sec. 37, the prescriptive period of the deportation or exclusion
proceedings is eight (8) years.
In the case at bar, it took petitioners 28 years since the BOC decision was rendered
on July 6, 1962 before they commenced deportation or exclusion proceedings
against respondent William Gatchalian in 1990. Undoubtedly, petitioners' cause of
action has already prescribed. Neither may an action to revive and/or enforce the
decision dated July 6, 1962 be instituted after ten (10) years (Art. 1144 [3], Civil
Code).
Since his admission as a Filipino citizen in 1961, respondent William Gatchalian has
continuously resided in the Philippines. He married Ting Dee Hua on July 1, 1973
(Annex "8", counter-petition) with whom he has four (4) minor children. The marriage
contract shows that said respondent is a Filipino (Annex "8"). He holds passports
and earlier passports as a Filipino (Annexes "9", "10" & "11", counter-petition). He is
a registered voter of Valenzuela, Metro Manila where he has long resided and
exercised his right of suffrage (Annex 12, counter-petition). He engaged in business
in the Philippines since 1973 and is the director/officer of the International Polymer
Corp. and Ropeman International Corp. as a Filipino (Annexes, "13" & "14", counter-
petition). He is a taxpayer. Respondent claims that the companies he runs and in
which he has a controlling investment provides livelihood to 4,000 employees and
approximately 25,000 dependents. He continuously enjoyed the status of Filipino
citizenship and discharged his responsibility as such until petitioners initiated the
deportation proceedings against him.
"The power to deport an alien is an act of the State. It is an act by or under the
authority of the sovereign power. It is a police measure against undesirable aliens
whose presence in the country is found to be injurious to the public good and
domestic tranquility of the people" (Lao Gi vs. Court of Appeals, supra). How could
one who has helped the economy of the country by providing employment to some
4,000 people be considered undesirable and be summarily deported when the
government, in its concerted drive to attract foreign investors, grants Special
Resident Visa to any alien who invest at least US$50,000.00 in the country? Even
assuming arguendo that respondent is an alien, his deportation under the
circumstances is unjust and unfair, if not downright illegal. The action taken by
petitioners in the case at bar is diametrically opposed to settled government policy.
Petitioners, on the other hand, claim that respondent is an alien. In support of their
position, petitioners point out that Santiago Gatchalian's marriage with Chu Gim Tee
in China as well as the marriage of Francisco (father of William) Gatchalian to Ong
Chiu Kiok, likewise in China, were not supported by any evidence other than their
own self-serving testimony nor was there any showing what the laws of China were.
It is the postulate advanced by petitioners that for the said marriages to be valid in
this country, it should have been shown that they were valid by the laws of China
wherein the same were contracted. There being none, petitioners conclude that the
aforesaid marriages cannot be considered valid. Hence, Santiago's children,
including Francisco, followed the citizenship of their mother, having been born
outside of a valid marriage. Similarly, the validity of the Francisco's marriage not
having been demonstrated, William and Johnson followed the citizenship of their
mother, a Chinese national.
After a careful consideration of petitioner's argument, We find that it cannot be
sustained.
In Miciano vs. Brimo (50 Phil. 867 [1924]; Lim and Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 36
Phil. 472; Yam Ka Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 30 Phil. 46 [1915]), this Court held
that in the absence of evidence to the contrary, foreign laws on a particular subject
are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines. In the case at bar, there
being no proof of Chinese law relating to marriage, there arises the presumption that
it is the same as that of Philippine law.
The lack of proof of Chinese law on the matter cannot be blamed on Santiago
Gatchalian much more on respondent William Gatchalian who was then a twelve-
year old minor. The fact is, as records indicate, Santiago was not pressed by the
Citizenship Investigation Board to prove the laws of China relating to marriage,
having been content with the testimony of Santiago that the Marriage Certificate was
lost or destroyed during the Japanese occupation of China. Neither was Francisco
Gatchalian's testimony subjected to the same scrutiny by the Board of Special
Inquiry. Nevertheless, the testimonies of Santiago Gatchalian and Francisco
Gatchalian before the Philippine consular and immigration authorities regarding their
marriages, birth and relationship to each other are not self-serving but are admissible
in evidence as statements or declarations regarding family reputation or tradition in
matters of pedigree (Sec. 34, Rule 130). Furtheremore, this salutary rule of evidence
finds support in substantive law. Thus, Art. 267 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 267. In the absence of a record of birth, authentic document, final
judgment or possession of status, legitimate filiation may be proved by any
other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. (See also Art.
172 of the Family Code)
Consequently, the testimonies/affidavits of Santiago Gatchalian and Francisco
Gatchalian aforementioned are not self-serving but are competent proof of filiation
(Art. 172 [2], Family Code).
Philippine law, following the lex loci celebrationis, adheres to the rule that a marriage
formally valid where celebrated is valid everywhere. Referring to marriages
contracted abroad, Art. 71 of the Civil Code (now Art. 26 of the Family Code)
provides that "(a)ll marriages performed outside of the Philippines in accordance with
the laws in force in the country where they were performed, and valid there as such,
shall also be valid in this country . . ." And any doubt as to the validity of the
matrimonial unity and the extent as to how far the validity of such marriage may be
extended to the consequences of the coverture is answered by Art. 220 of the Civil
Code in this manner: "In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the
family. Thus, every intendment of law or facts leans toward the validity of marriage,
the indissolubility of the marriage bonds, the legitimacy of children, the community of
property during marriage, the authority of parents over their children, and the validity
of defense for any member of the family in case of unlawful aggression." (Emphasis
supplied). Bearing in mind the "processual presumption" enunciated in Miciano and
other cases, he who asserts that the marriage is not valid under our law bears the
burden of proof to present the foreign law.
Having declared the assailed marriages as valid, respondent William Gatchalian
follows the citizenship of his father Francisco, a Filipino, as a legitimate child of the
latter. Francisco, in turn is likewise a Filipino being the legitimate child of Santiago
Gatchalian who (the latter) is admittedly a Filipino citizen whose Philippine
citizenship was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration in an order dated July 12,
1960.
Finally, respondent William Gatchalian belongs to the class of Filipino citizens
contemplated under Sec. 1, Article IV of the Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of
this Constitution. . . .
This forecloses any further question about the Philippine citizenship of respondent
William Gatchalian.
The Court is not unaware of Woong Woo Yiu vs. Vivo (13 SCRA 552 [1965]) relied
upon by petitioners. The ruling arrived thereat, however, cannot apply in the case at
bar for the simple reason that the parties therein testified to have been married in
China by a village leader, which undoubtedly is not among those authorized to
solemnize marriage as provided in Art. 56 of the Civil Code (now Art. 7, Family
Code).
Premises considered, the Court deems it unnecessary to resolve the other issues
raised by the parties.
WHEREFORE, G.R. Nos. 95122-23 is DISMISSED for lack of merit; G.R. Nos.
95612-13 is hereby GRANTED and respondent William Gatchalian is declared a
Filipino citizen. Petitioners are hereby permanently enjoined from continuing with the
deportation proceedings docketed as DC No. 90-523 for lack of jurisdiction over
respondent Gatchalian, he being a Filipino citizen; Civil Cases No. 90-54214 and
3431-V-90 pending before respondent judges are likewise DISMISSED. Without
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Gancayco, Sarmiento, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Fernan, C.J., and Narvasa, J., concur in the result.
 Separate Opinions
DAVIDE, JR., J., concurring-dissenting:
I can easily agree with the summary of antecedent facts in the ponencia of Mr.
Justice Bidin and the reiteration therein of the established doctrine that the Bureau of
Immigration has the exclusive authority and jurisdiction to try and hear cases against
alleged aliens, and in the process, determine also their citizenship, and that "a mere
claim of citizenship cannot operate to divest the Board of Commissioners of its
jurisdiction in deportation proceedings." I also agree with the conclusion that the
petitioners in G.R. No. 95122-23, the Board of Commissioners and Board of Special
Inquiry, hereinafter referred to as the Boards, are quasi-judicial bodies.
However, I cannot go along with the view that the case of William Gatchalian should
be treated as an exception to that doctrine and, above all, to the law which vests
upon the Court of Appeals exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the Boards. Neither
can I have solidarity with his opinion that this Court should, in this instance, rule on
the citizenship of Mr. Gatchalian instead of remanding the case to the Regional Trial
Court. To grant him these benefits would do violence to the law, liberally stretch the
limits of the exceptions or misapply the exceptionary rule, and to unduly pollute the
settled doctrine. No fact or circumstance exists to justify the application of the
exceptions for the benefit of Mr. Gatchalian. On the contrary, substantial facts exist
to render immutable the unqualified application of the law and the doctrine.
To my mind, the questioned acts of the Boards were done absolutely within their
quasi-judicial functions. Therefore, the rule laid down in Filipinas Engineering and
Machine Shop vs. Ferrer (135 SCRA 25) and Lupangco vs. Court of Appeals (160
SCRA 848) does not apply.
Consequently, pursuant to paragraph 3 of Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
and Our resolutions of 15 September 1987 and 2 April 1990 in G.R. No. 79635
(Commissioner of Customs vs. Court of Tax Appeals, et al.) and G.R. No. 80320
(Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Court of Tax Appeals, et al.), respectively,
and Our decisions of 16 March 1989, 22 December 1989, and 6 June 1990 in G.R.
No. 83578 (Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force vs. Court of Appeals, et al.),
171 SCRA 348, G.R. No. 86625 (Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of
Tax Appeals, et al.), 180 SCRA 609, 617, and in G.R. No. L-48113 (Yang vs. Court
of Appeals, et al.), respectively, the Gatchalians should have invoked the exclusive
appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals for appropriate redress instead of filing
petitions for certiorari and prohibition with injunction before the Regional Trial Court
of Manila (Civil Case No. 90-54214) and before the Regional Trial Court of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila (Civil Case No. 3431-V-90). The trial courts should have
dismissed the cases. In issuing the questioned orders, respondents Judge Dela
Rosa and Judge Capulong clearly acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion.
As to why William Gatchalian filed his petition before the former court and his wife
and minor children filed a separate complaint before the latter has not been
explained. It is to be noted that he is a registered voter of Valenzuela, Metro Manila
where he has long resided and exercised his right of suffrage (Annex 12, Counter-
Petition). Therefore, he should have filed his petition with the Regional Trial Court of
Valenzuela. His wife and minor children are not parties to the case before the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation. Their causes of action are based
mainly on their claim that the acts of the Boards against William tend to deprive
plaintiff mother consortium and connubium and the plaintiffs minors protection and
support. At once, the viability of their causes of action is doubtful; however, if indeed
they have valid causes of action, they could have been joined as co-plaintiffs in the
case filed by William. It appears then that their filing of a separate complaint before
another court was part of a strategy to frustrate the proceedings before the Boards.
As correctly maintained by the petitioning Boards, we have here a clear case of
forum-shopping, especially considering the fact that on September 4, 1990, or two
days before the filing of the case before the Valenzuela court the government filed a
motion to dismiss the case before the Manila court. Forum-shopping has long been
condemned and proscribed. In People vs. Court of Appeals, et al. (101 SCRA 450,
463), promulgated on 28 November 1980, this Court held that a party "should not be
allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in two different forums." In the Resolution
of 31 July 1986 in E. Razon Inc., et al. vs. Philippine Port Authority, et al., G.R. No.
75197, this Court held:
The acts of petitioners constitute a clear case of forum-shopping, an act of
malpractice that is proscribed and condemned as trifling with the courts and
abusing their processes. It is improper conduct that tends to degrade the
administration of justice. (See also Buan vs. Lopez, Jr., 145 SCRA 34; Palm
Avenue Realty Development Corp. vs. PCGG, 153 SCRA 591; Minister of
Natural Resources, et al. vs. Heirs of Orval Hughes, et al., 155 SCRA 566;
Limpin vs. IAC, 161 SCRA 98; Collado vs. Hernando, 161 SCRA 639;
Villanueva, et al. vs. Adre, et al., 172 SCRA 877; Danville Maritime, Inc. vs.
COA, 175 SCRA 717; Crisostomo vs. SEC, 179 SCRA 154; Adlawan vs.
Tomol, 179 SCRA 42; and Alonto vs. Memoracion, 185 SCRA 73).
William Gatchalian did not stop in his forum-shopping in the regional trial courts.
Under the guise of a counter-petition, he is now before this Court in an active
offensive role. This is a very clever, albeit subtle, ploy to bang directly to this Court
the issue of his deportation and to divest the Boards of their original jurisdiction
thereon. He could have done this at the first instance; he did not. He and his wife and
minor children deliberately chose, instead, to separately go to the wrong court,
evidently to delay the proceedings before the Boards, which they accomplished
when the two judges separately issued orders restraining said Boards from
commencing or continuing with any of the proceedings which would lead to the
deportation of William Gatchalian (Civil Case No. 90-54214) and from proceeding
with the deportation charges against William Gatchalian (Civil Case No. 3431-V-90).
Chua Hiong vs. Deportation Board (96 Phil. 665) cited in the ponencia as another
authority which allows William Gatchalian to enjoy the protective mantle of the
exceptionary rule affecting the exclusive power of the Commission on Immigration
and Deportation to try and hear cases against aliens and in the process also
determine their citizenship is either not applicable or is mis-applied. This case laid
down the principle that "when the evidence submitted by a respondent is conclusive
of his citizenship, the right to immediate review should also be recognized and the
courts should promptly enjoin the deportation proceedings. . . . If he is a citizen and
evidence thereof is satisfactory, there is no sense nor justice in allowing the
deportation proceedings to continue, granting him the remedy only after the Board
has finished its investigation of his undesirability. . . ." (emphasis supplied). The
word courts should not now be interpreted to mean or to include the regional trial
courts because, as stated above, said courts do not have any appellate jurisdiction
over the Commission on Immigration and Deportation, the Board of Commissioners
and the Board of Special Inquiry. This case was decided in 1955 yet, or twenty-six
years before the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
The condition sine qua non then to an authorized judicial intervention is that the
evidence submitted by a respondent is conclusive of his citizenship, or as stated
in Co vs. Deportation Board, (78 SCRA 104, 107), the claim of citizenship is so
substantial that there are no reasonable grounds for the belief that the claim is
correct.
The facts before this Court do not constitute, or even show, a conclusive or
substantial evidence that William Gatchalian is a Filipino citizen. On the contrary,
very serious doubts surround such a claim from the beginning. His initial entry into
the Philippines was made possible through a Certificate of Identity (as Filipino) which
was issued on the basis of a forged cablegram by the then Secretary of Foreign
Affairs. Then on 6 July 1962 the then new Board of Commissioners promulgated a
written decision in I.C. Cases Nos. 61-2108-C to 61-2116-C inclusive (Application for
admission as Philippine citizens of Jose, Elena, Benjamin, Juan, Pedro, Gloria,
Francisco, William and Johnson, all surnamed Gatchalian) reversing the decision of
the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 of 6 July 1961 and ordering the exclusion of
William Gatchalian and the others as aliens not properly documented. Accordingly, a
warrant of exclusion, also dated 6 July 1962, was issued by the Commissioners
commanding the deportation officer to exclude William Gatchalian, and others, and
to cause their removal from the country on the first available transportation in
accordance with law to the port of the country of which they were nationals. The
pertinent portion of the Decision reads as follows:
The claim to Philippine citizenship of above-named applicants is based on the
citizenship of one Santiago Gatchalian whose Philippine citizenship was
recognized by the Bureau of Immigration in an Order, dated July 12, 1960. It
is alleged that applicants JOSE GATCHALIAN, FRANCISCO GATCHALIAN,
ELENA GATCHALIAN and BENJAMIN GATCHALIAN are the legitimate
children of Santiago Gatchalian with one Chiu Gim Tee. Except for the self-
serving testimonies of Santiago Gatchalian and his alleged children, there
has not been submitted any evidence of Santiago Gatchalian's marriage to
Chiu Gim Tee and the birth of the alleged children of the couple. The
personal records of Santiago Gatchalian on file with this office do not reflect
the names of applicants as his children, and while two names listed in his
Form 1 (ACR application), Jose and Elena, bear the same name as two of
herein applicants, the difference in the ages of said applicants, casts serious
doubt on their identity. Apropos, the applicants JOSE GATCHALIAN,
GLORIA GATCHALIAN, FRANCISCO GATCHALIAN, ELENA GATCHALIAN
and BENJAMIN GATCHALIAN, not having satisfactorily proved as the
children of Santiago Gatchalian, determination of the citizenship of the other
applicants, JUAN GATCHALIAN, PEDRO GATCHALIAN and JOHNSON
GATCHALIAN, whose right to Filipino citizenship are merely drawn from their
fathers, Jose Gatchalian and Francisco Gatchalian, is unnecessary.
(Decision, Annex "E" of Petition).
Looking back to the case of Santiago, William's alleged grandfather, I cannot find
sufficient credible evidence to support his claim of Filipino citizenship. For a long time
before 20 July 1960 he considered himself a Chinese citizen. The "conclusion" of the
Bureau of Immigration that Santiago is a Filipino citizen is based on totally
questionable and insufficient evidence which cannot inspire belief. The Order itself,
signed by Associate Commissioner Felix Talabis, supports this conclusion. It reads in
full as follows:
This is a petition for the cancellation of an alien registry of SANTIAGO
GATCHALIAN, registered as Chinese and holder of ACR No. A-219003
issued at Manila on 13 February 1951 and ICR No. 7501 dated 3 May 1946.
He is alleged to be the son of Filipino parents who were not lawfully married.
It is alleged that the petitioner was born in Binondo, Manila, on 25 July 1905,
to Pablo Pacheco and Marciana Gatchalian. It is noted that in his application
for alien registration filed with this Office on 13 January 1951, Santiago
Gatchalian stated that his deceased parents were Pablo Pacheco and
Marciana. He was identified by his only brother, Joaquin Pacheco, who
insisted that he and petitioner are illegitimate. It is true that, on record, there
is a certificate signed on 26 October 1902 by Maxima Gatchalian, their
maternal grandmother, giving consent to the marriage of Marciana Gatchalian
to Pablo Pacheco (Exh. B), but Joaquin said that his parents did not actually
get married. In proof of this, the baptismal record of the petitioner expressly
states that Santiago Gatchalian was born on 25 July 1905 and baptized on 6
October 1905, being the son of Marciana Gatchalian, "filipina", and an
unknown father (verbatim copy dated 22 June 1907, Parish Priest of Binondo,
Manila).
The petitioner, apparently not completely certain about his civil status, has
been interchangeably using his paternal and maternal surnames. In school
he was known as Santiago Pacheco (Class card for 1920-21, Meisic, Manila;
Certificates of completion of third and fourth grades, Meisic Primary School);
but in his residence certificate dated 17 September 1937, and in Tax
Clearance Certificate issued on 2 October 1937, he is referred to as Santiago
Gatchalian; and in a communication dated 6 June 1941, he was addressed to
as Santiago Pacheco by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes office.
Considering, however, the positive assertion by his elder brother who is
better informed about their origin, the incontestable entry in his baptismal
record that he is illegitimate and the entry in the marriage contract of his elder
brother wherein the father's name is omitted and the mother, Marciana
Gatchalian, is described as Filipina (marriage contract dated 29 November
1936) there is sufficient evidence to establish that Santiago Gatchalian is
really Filipino at birth, being the legitimate child of a Filipino woman.
WHEREFORE, the herein petition to cancel his alien registration is granted,
petitioner shall henceforth be shown in the records of this office as a citizen of
the Philippines and the issuance to him of the appropriate Identification
certificate showing his correct status is hereby authorized. (Order of 12 July
1960, Annex "1" of Comment with Counter-Petition).
As to his alleged marriage to Chu Gim Tee, and their five children, we only have his
self-selling oral testimony, thus:
Q What is the name of your wife?
A Her name is Chu Gim Tee.
Q Is she still alive?
A No, she died in 1951, in Amoy.
Q Do you have children with her, if so, mention their names, ages and sexes?
A Yes. I have five children, all of them alive and they are as follows:
Jose Gatchalian, born on Jan. 2, 1927 in Amoy; Gloria Gatchalian, born
February 20, 1929 in Amoy; Francisco Gatchalian, born on March 3, 1931 in
Amoy; Elena Gatchalian, born on April 4, 1933 in Amoy; Benjamin
Gatchalian, born on 31 March 1942 in Amoy.
Q Where are they living now?
A All of them are now living in Macao, with my sister-in-law by the name of
Chu Lam Tee. (p. 4, Transcript of the proceedings before the Citizen
Evaluation Board on 12 February 1960, Annex "2" of Comment with Counter-
Petition).
If indeed Santiago's parents, Pablo Pacheco and Marciana Gatchalian, were
married, what was his reason for insisting, through his brother Joaquin, that he, is an
illegitimate son? The only possible reason is that Pablo Pacheco is a Chinese
citizen, in which case Santiago would follow the citizenship of Marciana, a "filipina."
But to give full faith and credit to the oral insistence of illegitimacy is to do violence to
the presumptions of validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds and
the legitimacy of children. (Art. 220, Civil Code). These are among the presumptions
which the ponencia precisely applied when it rejected the petitioners' claim that
Santiago failed to establish his claimed marriage to Chu Gim Tee and Francisco's
(father of William) claimed marriage to Ong Chiu Kiok, both of which were allegedly
celebrated abroad. I cannot find any valid justification why these presumptions
should be liberally applied in favor of claimed marriages allegedly celebrated abroad
but denied to purported marriages celebrated in the Philippines.
Interestingly, Santiago used the surname Pacheco during such proceedings and
when he testified, he gave his name as Santiago Gatchalian Pacheco. This is an
incontrovertible proof that he recognized the legitimate union of his father and
mother.
On 18 February 1960, Santiago was recalled to be confronted re his claim as to the
number of his children; he testified thus:
Q In your testimony on February 12, this year, you named as your children
the following: Jose, Gloria, Francisco, Elena and Benjamin, all born in Amoy,
arranged according to the order of their ages. However, in your Form 1 when
you secured your ACR in 1951, you mentioned only Jose Gatchalian and
Elena Gatchalian. Why, what is the reason why in this form that you filled up
in 1951, you mentioned only Jose and Elena?
A That form I am not the one who filled it because that is not my handwriting.
It is the handwriting of my broker or the clerk of my broker. However, when
they prepared that I mentioned my children named Jose, Gloria, Francisco,
Elena in a piece of paper which I gave to him, except Benjamin.
Q Why did you not mention Benjamin in the list?
A Because he was not yet baptized then. (Transcript, p. 7, Annex "2" of
Comment with Counter-Petition).
The explanation is very flimsy and does not deserve the respect of a passing glance.
There is no showing that Gatchalian took any immediate definite positive step
against the 6 July 1962 decision and the warrant of exclusion.
It was only sometime in 1973, or eleven years after, that he and others covered by
the warrant of expulsion filed a motion for re-hearing with the Board of Special
Inquiry. There has been no explanation for the unreasonable delay in the filing of the
motion. It may be surmised that it was due to his minority, considering that he was
allegedly only twelve years old when he arrived in Manila from Hongkong on 27 June
1961. But, such minority was no obstacle to the filing of any remedial action for and
in his behalf.
The action taken by and the recommendation of the Board of Special Inquiry of 14
March 1973 to the then Acting Commissioner Victor Nituda for the reversal of the
July 6, 1962 decision of the Board of Commissioners were not only highly
anomalous, irregular and improper, it was done without any semblance of authority.
The Board of Special Inquiry did not have the power to review, modify or reverse a
Decision of the Board of Commissioners rendered about eleven years earlier. Then
Acting Commissioner Victor Nituda, acting alone, did not likewise have the power or
authority to approve the recommendation of said Board, to revive and/or reaffirm the
July 6, 1961 decision of the Board of Special Inquiry, to reverse, and nullify, the
Decision of 6 July 1962 of the Board of Commissioners, and to order the admission
of William Gatchalian as a Filipino citizen. Pursuant to Sec. 26 (b) of C.A. No. 613,
as amended (The Philippine Immigration Act of 1940), only the Board of
Commissioners can act on the recommendation, if at all it was legally and validly
done. The Board of Commissioners is composed of the Commissioner of
Immigration and the two Deputy Commissioners. In the absence of any member of
the Board, the Department Head shall designate an officer or employee in the
Bureau of Immigration to serve as member thereof. In any case coming before it, the
decision of any two members shall prevail. (Sec. 8, C.A. No. 613 as amended). The
Department Head referred to is the Secretary of Justice since the Commission is, for
administrative purposes, under the supervision and control of the Department of
Justice.
The decision then of Acting Commissioner Nituda was void and invalid ab initio. In
view thereof, the rationalization in the ponencia that the issue could be re-opened
since the decision of the Board of Commissioners of 6 July 1962 did not
constitute res judicata is irrelevant. But even if it is to be conceded that the 6 July
1962 decision did not constitute res judicata, I find it both strange and illogical to give
full faith and credit to the unilateral action of Mr. Nituda and to use it to bar the
Boards from exercising its power and jurisdiction over William Gatchalian.
Assuming that indeed William is the grandson of Santiago, I find it rather strange why
Santiago did not mention him in his testimony before the Citizenship Evaluation
Board. At that time William was already eleven years old. It is logical to presume that
the proceeding initiated by Santiago was principally for the benefit of his alleged
children and grandchildren. It was, as subsequent events proved, intended to
prepare the legal basis for their entry into the country as Filipino citizens. Thus,
eleven months after he obtained a favorable decision from the Board, and on two
successive dates, his alleged children and grandchildren entered the country. On 25
June 1961 his alleged children Jose, Elena, Benjamin, and his alleged grandchildren
Pedro and Juan arrived from Hongkong. On 27 June 1961, his alleged daughter
Gloria and son Francisco with his alleged children William and Johnson also arrived
from Hongkong. (pp. 4-5, Petition).
That he has continuously resided in the Philippines since 1961; he is married to Ting
Dee Hua on July 1, 1973, and his marriage contract shows that he is a Filipino
citizen; he holds passports and earlier passports as a Filipino; he is a registered
voter of Valenzuela, Metro Manila where he has long resided and exercised his right
of suffrage; he is engaged in business in the Philippines since 1973, and is a
director/officer of the International Polymer Corp. and Ropeman International Corp.
as a Filipino, and that the companies he runs and in which he has a controlling
investment provided a livelihood to 4,000 employees and approximately 25,000
dependents; he is a taxpayer; and he has continuously enjoyed the status of Filipino
citizenship, discharged his responsibility as such until petitioning Boards initiated the
deportation proceedings against him, are not of any help to William Gatchalian. For,
they neither confer nor strengthen his claim of Filipino citizenship since they are all
rooted on the illegal and void decision of then Acting Commissioner Victor Nituda of
15 March 1973. A decision which is void and invalid ab initio cannot be a source of
valid acts. Neither can such substantive infirmity be cured by salutary acts that tend
to confirm the status conferred by the void decision.
In the light of the foregoing, it follows that the warrant of exclusion issued against
William Gatchalian pursuant to and by virtue of the 6 July 1962 Decision of the Board
of Commissioners subsists and remains valid and enforceable.
I disagree with the view advanced in the ponencia that the State can no longer
enforce the warrant of exclusion because it is already barred by prescription
considering that Section 37 (b) of the Immigration Act states that deportation "shall
not be effected . . . unless the arrest in the deportation proceedings is made within
five (5) years after the cause of deportation arises."
Said paragraph (b) of Section 37 reads in full as follows:
(b) Deportation may be effected under clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 paragraph
(a) of this section at any time after entry, but shall not be effected under any
other clause unless the arrest in the deportation proceedings is made within
five years after the cause of deportation arises. Deportation under clauses 3
and 4 shall not be effected if the court or judge thereof, when sentencing the
alien, shall recommend to the Commissioner of Immigration that the alien be
not deported. (As amended by Sec. 13, R.A. No. 503). (Emphasis supplied).
Note that the five-year period applies only to clauses other than 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 of
paragraph (a) of the Section. In respect to clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12, the limitation
does not apply. These clauses read as follows:
(2) Any alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date of this Act,
who was not lawfully admissible at the time of entry;
x x x           x x x          x x x
(7) Any alien who remains in the Philippines in violation of any limitation or
condition under which he was admitted as a non- immigrant;
(8) Any alien who believes in, advises, advocates or teaches the overthrow
by force and violence of the Government of the Philippines, or of constituted
law and authority, or who disbelieves in or is opposed to organized
government, or who advises, advocates, or teaches the assault or
assassination of public officials because of their office, or who advises,
advocates, or teaches the unlawful destruction of property, or who is a
member of or affiliated with any organization entertaining, advocating or
teaching such doctrines, or who in any manner whatsoever lends assistance,
financial or otherwise, to the dissemination of such doctrines;
x x x           x x x          x x x
(11) Any alien who engages in profiteering, hoarding, or black-marketing,
independent of any criminal action which may be brought against him;
(12) Any alien who is convicted of any offense penalized under
Commonwealth Act Numbered Four Hundred and Seventy-Three, otherwise
known as the Revised Naturalization Laws of the Philippines, or any law
relating to acquisition of Philippine citizenship;
x x x           x x x          x x x
Mr. Gatchalian is covered by clause (2); besides, the warrant for his exclusion was
issued within a period of five years following his entry.
Lam Shee vs. Bengzon (93 Phil. 1065) is not applicable to Mr. Gatchalian. In issue in
that case was the deportation of a minor whose mother fraudulently entered the
Philippines by using the name of a resident Chinese merchant who is not her lawful
husband but against whom no deportation proceedings was initiated within five years
following her entry. Said mother did in fact acquire permanent residence status.
Furthermore, the minor's mother never claimed to be a Filipino citizen.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, I vote to GRANT the petition in G.R. Nos.
95122-23, SET ASIDE the questioned orders of respondents Judge Joselito Dela
Rosa and Judge Teresita Dizon Capulong as having been issued beyond their
jurisdiction, ORDER the DISMISSAL of Civil Case Nos. 90-54214 of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila and 3431-V-90 of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila and to DISMISS for lack of merit the COUNTER-PETITION.
FELICIANO, J., dissenting:
I regret I am unable to join the opinion written by my distinguished brother in the
Court, Mr. Justice A.A. Bidin, and I, therefore, undertake to submit this separate
opinion.
For convenience, the following is a precis of the matters discussed in detail below.
1. I agree that the Warrant of Arrest dated 14 August 1990 is defective in its
language. The surrounding facts, however, make quite clear that an amended
warrant of arrest or mission order, or a new one correctly worded, may be issued by
Immigration Commissioner Domingo for the purpose of carrying out an existing and
valid Warrant of Exclusion covering respondent William Gatchalian and his co-
applicants for admission.
2. The 6 July 1962 Decision of the Board of Commissioners ("BOC") and Warrant of
Exclusion remain valid and effective and enforceable against respondent William
Gatchalian, and his co-applicants for that matter. That Decision reversed a 6 July
1961 decision of the Board of Special Inquiry ("BSI") and held that respondent
William Gatchalian and his co-applicants failed to subtantiate and prove their claim to
Philippine citizenship in 1961. Respondent William Gatchalian does not claim
Philippine citizenship by any mode of entitlement subsequent to his application for
entry as a citizen of the Philippines in 1961, i.e., by any act or circumstance
subsequent to his birth and supposed filiation as a legitimate son of Francisco
Gatchalian, also a supposed citizen of the Philippines.
3. In its Decision in Arocha vs. Vivo,1 the Supreme Court upheld the validity and legal
effect of the 6 July 1962 Decision of the BOC and the Warrant of Exclusion not only
against Pedro Gatchalian, the particular Gatchalian who was taken into custody by
immigration authorities in 1965, but also against Pedro's co-applicants, which include
respondent William Gatchalian. The validity of the claim to Philippine citizenship by
Pedro Gatchalian, as a supposed descendant of Santiago Gatchalian, allegedly a
natural born citizen of the Philippines, was directly placed in issue in the 1961-1962
proceedings before the BSI and the BOC, and by the Solicitor General and Pedro
Gatchalian in Arocha vs. Vivo (supra). In upholding the validity and legal effect of the
6 July 1962 BOC Decision that the Gatchalian applicants had not substantiated their
claim to Philippine citizenship, this Court in effect ruled that the Gatchalian
applicants were not Philippine citizens, whatever their true nationality might be.
4. Should this Court now determine to examine once more the claim to Philippine
citizenship of respondent William Gatchalian, a detailed examination of the facts,
including the supposed status of Santiago Gatchalian as a natural born Philippine
citizenship, shows that those claims to Philippine citizenship were indeed not proven
by respondent William Gatchalian and his co-applicants. Since respondent William
Gatchalian does not claim to have been naturalized as a Philippine citizen after
rendition of the 6 July 1962 BOC Decision, he must accordingly be held to be not a
Philippine citizen.
5. Should the legal results thus reached seem harsh to some, I respectfully submit
that the remedy lies not with this Court which is charged with the application of the
law as it is in fact written, but with the political branches of the Government. It is
those departments of Government which must consider the desirability and wisdom
of enacting legislation providing for the legalization of the entry and stay of aliens
who may be in the same situation as respondent William Gatchalian and his co-
applicants.
I
1. Petitioner argues that respondent William Gatchalian's arrest follows as a matter
of "consequence" of the Warrant of Exclusion issued by the BOC on 6 July 1962.
This is opposed by respondent Gatchalian upon the ground that the Mission Order or
Warrant of Arrest does not mention that it is issued pursuant to a final order of
deportation or Warrant of Exclusion.
The Mission Order or Warrant of Arrest dated 14 August 1990 issued by petitioner
Commissioner Domingo, CID, reads in part as follows:
Intelligence Officers/Agents: All Teams
Team No.
 Subject: William, Juan, Francisco, Jose, Benjamin, Jonathan, Pedro, Gloria,
Elena, all surnamed Gatchalian
Address: Bgy. Canumay, Valenzuela, M.M.
x x x           x x x          x x x
1. Make a warrantless arrest under the Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule
113, Section 5, for violation of the Immigration Act, Section 37, para. a; Secs.
45 and 46 Administrative Code;
2. Make a warrantless search as an incident to a lawful arrest under Rule
125, Section 12.
3. Deliver the suspect to the Intelligence Division and immediately conduct
custodial interrogation, after warning the suspect that he has a right to remain
silent and a right to counsel;
4. Prepare and file an affidavit of arrest with the Special Prosecutor's Office
and, in case of a search, prepare and file an inventory of the properties
seized, verified under oath following Office Memorandum Order No. 45
x x x           x x x          x x x
The above Mission Order merely referred to Section 37 (a) of the Immigration Act, as
amended, and to Sections 45 and 46 of the Administrative Code (should be
Immigration Law), and that its wording suggests that the arrest is sought to be
carried out for the purpose of carrying out a preliminary investigation or custodial
interrogation rather than for the purpose of enforcing a final order of deportation or
warrant of exclusion. More specifically, the Mission Order failed to mention the 6 July
1962 BOC Decision and Warrant of Exclusion. At the same time, there is no
gainsaying the fact that the 6 July 1962 BOC Decision and Warrant of Exclusion do
exist and became final and, as discussed in detail below, remain valid and effective.
It should be noted also that by 6 September 1990, Special Prosecutor Mabolo had
filed a Manifestation or Motion before the Bureau of Immigration explicitly referring to
the Warrant of Exclusion issued against respondent William Gatchalian and his
original co-applicants for admission in 1961, which had been passed upon in Arocha
vs. Vivo(supra), and argued that there was, therefore, no longer any need to adduce
evidence in support of the charges against respondent William Gatchalian.
Thus it appears to me that the Warrant of Arrest or Mission Order dated 15 August
1990, ineptly worded as it is, may be amended so as to refer explicitly to the
mentioned Warrant of Exclusion, or a new warrant of arrest or mission order issued
similarly explicitly referring to the Warrant of Exclusion.
2. It is indispensably necessary to refer to the Warrant of Exclusion of 6 July 1962
which read as follows:
WHEREAS, upon review, motu proprio of the proceedings had on the
application for admission as Philippine citizens of JOSE GATCHALIAN,
ELENA GATCHALIAN, BENJAMIN GATCHALIAN, JUAN GATCHALIAN,
PEDRO GATCHALIAN, GLORIA GATCHALIAN, FRANCISCO
GATCHALIAN, WILLIAM GATCHALIAN, and JOHNSON GATCHALIAN, the
Board of Commissioners found them not entitled to admission as Filipinos in
a Decision, dated July 6, 1962, and ordered their exclusion as persons not
properly documented;
AND WHEREAS, the Decision of the Board of Commissioners, dated 6 July
1962, ordering the exclusion of above-named applicants, has now
become final and executory.
NOW THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in the undersigned by
law, you are hereby ordered to exclude the aforenamed individuals and
cause their removal from this country to the port where they came or to the
port of the country of which they are nationals, on the first available
transportation, in accordance with law. (Emphasis supplied)
It should be noted that respondent William Gatchalian was a party to the 1961-1962
proceedings before the Bureau of Immigration which proceedings culminated in the 6
July 1962 Decision of the BOC and the aforequoted Warrant of Exclusion.
It is, however, insisted by respondent William Gatchalian that the Warrant of
Exclusion may no longer be executed or implemented as against him in view of the
passage of approximately twenty-eight (28) years since the issuance of such
Warrant. Respondent Gatchalian here relies upon Section 37 (b) of the Immigration
Act which states that:
Sec. 37 (b). Deportation may be effected under clauses 2, 3, 7, 8, 11 and 12
of the Par. (a) of this Section at any time after entry, but shall not be effected
under any other clauses unless the arrest in the deportation proceedings is
 made within five (5) years after the cause for deportation arises . . .
(Emphasis supplied)
Examination of the above quoted Section 37 (b) shows that the five (5) year-
limitation is applicable only where deportation is sought to be effected under clauses
of Section 37 (a) other than clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12; that where deportation or
exclusion is sought to be effected under clauses 2, 7, 8 11 and 12 of Section 37
(a), no period of limitation is applicable; and that, to the contrary, deportation or
exclusion may be effected "at any time after entry."
Examination of contemporaneous facts shows that the Government has sought to
effect the exclusion and deportation of respondent William Gatchalian upon the
ground that he had entered the country as a citizen of the Philippines when he was
not lawfully admissible as such at the time of entry under Section 37 (a) (2), since the
BOC had held him and the other Gatchalians there involved as not properly
documented for admission, under Section 29 (a) (17) of the Immigration Act, as
amended. On 7 July 1990, the Acting Director of the National Bureau of Investigation
("NBI") initiated the proceedings immediately before us by writing to the Secretary of
Justice recommending that respondent William Gatchalian, and his co-applicants
covered by the Warrant of Exclusion dated 6 July 1962, be charged with: "Violation
of Section 37 (a), paragraphs 1 and 2, in relation to Section 45 (c), (d) and (e) of
Commonwealth Act 613 as amended, also known as the Immigration Act of 1940."
The Secretary of Justice endorsed this recommendation to Immigration
Commissioner Domingo for investigation and immediate action. On 20 August 1990,
Special Prosecutor Mabolo filed a charge sheet against respondent William
Gatchalian which specified the following charges:
The respondent is an alien national who unlawfully gained entry into the
Philippines without valid travel document in violation of the Immigration
Act; Sec. 37 par. a, sub pars. (1) and (2);
That respondent being an alien misrepresented himself as Philippine Citizen
by false statements and fraudulent documents in violation of the Immigration
Act, Sec. 45, par. (c), (d) and (e).
That respondent being an alien national is an undocumented person
classified as excludable under the Immigration Act, Sec. 29 (a) sub par. (17).
x x x           x x x          x x x
(Emphasis supplied)
Section 37 (a) (1) and (2), of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, provides as
follows:
Sec. 37 (a). The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the
Commissioner of Immigration or of any other officer designated by him for the
purpose and deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration
after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the
ground for deportation as charged against the alien.
(1) Any alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date of this act by
means of false and misleading statements or without inspection and
admission by the Immigration authorities at a designated port of entry or at
any place other than at a designated port of entry; (As amended by Republic
Act No. 503).
(2) An alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date of this act, who
was not lawfully admissible at the time of entry.
x x x           x x x          x x x
(Emphasis supplied)
Section 37 (a) (2), quoted above, relates back to Section 29 (a) of the Immigration
Act, as amended, which lists the classes of alien excluded from entry in the
Philippines, as follows:
Sec. 29. (a). The following classes of aliens shall be excluded from entry into
the Philippines;
x x x           x x x          x x x
(17) Persons not properly documented for admission as may be required
under the provisions of this act. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, in the instant case, the net result is that no time limitation is applicable in
respect of the carrying out of the Warrant of Exclusion issued in 1962.
A little reflection suffices to show why this must be so. What was involved in 1961
when the supposed children and grandchildren of Santiago Gatchalian first
descended upon the Philippines, was the right of a person claiming to be a Philippine
citizen to enter for the first time and reside in the Philippines. On the part of the
Government, what was at stake was the right to exclude from the country persons
who had claimed the right to enter the country as Philippine citizens but who had
failed to substantiate such claimed status. Aliens seeking entry into the Philippines
do not acquire the right to be admitted into the country by the simple passage of
time. Exclusion of persons found not to be entitled to admission as Philippine
citizens, must be distinguished from the deportation of aliens, who, after having been
initially lawfully admitted into the Philippines, committed acts which rendered them
liable to deportation.
Normally, aliens excluded are immediately sent back to their country of origin.2 This
is so in cases where the alien has not yet gained a foothold into the country and is
still seeking physical admittance. However, when the alien had already physically
gained entry but such entry is later found unlawful or devoid of legal basis, the alien
can be excluded any time after it is found that he was not lawfully admissible at the
time of his entry. Technically, the alien in this case is being excluded; however, the
rules on deportation can be made to apply to him in view of the fact that the cause
for his exclusion is discovered only after he had gained physical entry.
It is worth noting at this point that in Arocha vs. Vivo (supra), this Court upheld the 6
July 1962 Order of the BOC and the application of the Warrant of Exclusion, in
respect of Pedro Gatchalian, even though more than five (5) years had elapsed by
the time the Court's Decision was promulgated on 26 October 1967.
Though respondent William Gatchalian is physically inside the country, it is the
government's basic position that he was never lawfully admitted into the country,
having failed to prove his claim of Philippine citizenship, and hence the Warrant of
Exclusion of 6 July 1962, or a new Warrant of Exclusion for that matter, may be
executed "at any time" under Section 37 (b). It is the correctness of that basic
position which must be ascertained and in that ascertainment, the mere passage of
time is quite peripheral in relevance considering the express language of Section 37
(b).
My distinguished brother, Bidin, J., finally invokes Act No. 3326, and on the basis of
Section 1 thereof, would hold that where the arrest for purpose of deportation is
made more than five (5) years after the cause for deportation arose, the prescriptive
period of eight (8) years should be applied. Act No. 3326 which took effect on 4
December 1926, establishes prescriptive periods in respect of criminal prosecutions
for violations penalized not by the Revised Penal Code but rather by special
acts which do not otherwise establish a period of prescription. In other words, Act
No. 3326 establishes a statute of limitations for the institution of criminal
proceedings. It is, however, quite settled that deportation proceedings cannot be
assimilated to criminal prosecutions for violation either of the Revised Penal Code or
of special statutes.3 Moreover, Act No. 3326 purports to be applicable only where the
special act itself has not established an applicable statute of limitations for criminal
proceedings. It cannot, however, be said that Article 37 (b) of the Immigration Act
(quoted earlier) has not established an applicable statute of limitations. For,
precisely, Section 37 (b) of the Immigration Act states that deportation may be
effected under certain clauses of Section 37 (a) "at any time after entry." One of
those instances is, precisely, deportation upon the ground specified in Clause (2) of
37 (a) which relates to "any alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date
of this act, who was not lawfully admissible at the time of entry." Thus, the
Immigration Act, far from failing to specify a prescriptive period for deportation under
Section 37 (a) (2), expressly authorizes deportation under such ground "at any time
after entry." It is, thus, very difficult to see how Act No. 3326 could apply at all to the
instant case.
Finally, we must recall once more that what is actually involved in the case at bar
is exclusion, not deportation.
3. It is urged by the government that Arocha vs. Vivo (supra) has already resolved
the claim to Philippine citizenship of respondent William Gatchalian adversely to him
and that such ruling constitutes res judicata. Upon the other hand, respondent
William Gatchalian vehemently argues that neither the 6 July 1962 BOC's Decision
nor Arochadefinitely settled the question of his citizenship.
My respectful submission is that respondent William Gatchalian's argument
constitutes a highly selective reading of both the BOC Decision and the Decision
in Arocha Written by J.B.L. Reyes, J. for a unanimous court. The 6 July 1962
Decision of the BOC, in its dispositive portion, reads as follows:
 IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, this Board finds and
hereby holds that the applicants[Jose Gatchalian, Elena Gatchalian,
Benjamin Gatchalian, Juan Gatchalian, Pedro Gatchalian, Gloria Gatchalian,
Francisco Gatchalian, William Gatchalian and Johnson Gatchalian]
herein have not satisfactorily proved their claim to Philippine citizenship and
therefore the Decision of the Board of Special Inquiry, dated July 6, 1961
admitting them as Filipinos is hereby reversed, and said applicants should
be, as they are hereby ordered excluded as persons not properly
documented.
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied)
Since respondent William Gatchalian and his co-applicants in 1961 claimed the right
to enter the country as Philippine citizens, determination of their right to enter the
Philippines thus indispensably involved the resolution of their claim to Philippine
citizenship. In other words, the determination of that citizenship in the instant case
was not a mere incident of the case; it was rather the central and indeed the only
issue that had to be resolved by the BOC. Review of the 1961 proceedings before
the BSI shows that the sole issue before it was the supposed Philippine citizenship of
the applicants. Thus, the very same issue of claimed Philippine citizenship was
resolved by the BOC when it reversed the 6 July 1961 decision of the BSI. This case
may be distinguished from other types of cases, e.g., applications for public utility
franchises, petitions for change of name, applications for registration as voter, filing
of certificates of candidacy for an elective position, etc., where the central issue is
not citizenship although resolution of that issue requires a determination of the
citizenship of the applicant, candidate or petitioner.
The ruling of the BOC that respondent William Gatchalian and his co-applicants for
admission as Philippine citizens had not satisfactorily proved their claim to Philippine
citizenship, can only be reasonably read as a holding that respondent William
Gatchalian and his co-applicants were not Philippine citizens, whatever their true
nationality or nationalities might be. Thus, it appears to be merely semantic play to
argue, as respondent William Gatchalian argues, that the 1962 BOC Decision did not
categorically hold him to be an "alien" and that the BOC had merely held him and his
co-applicants as "not properly documented." The phrase "not properly documented"
was strictly and technically correct. For William Gatchalian and his co-applicants had
presented themselves as Philippine citizens and as such entitled to admission into
the country. Since the BOC rejected their claims to Philippine citizenship, William
Gatchalian and his co-applicants were non-Filipinos "not properly documented for
admission" under Section 29 (a) (17), Immigration Act as amended.
4. In Arocha vs. Vivo (supra), the Supreme Court had before it the following items:
1. The 6 July 1961 Decision of the BSI which allowed the entry of respondent
Gatchalian and his co-applicants as citizens of the Philippines;
2. A split BOC Decision approving the 6 July 1961 BSI decision, which had
been "noted" by two (2) Commissioners but rejected by Commissioner
Galang on 14 and 26 July 1961 and 21 August 1961, respectively;
3. The 6 July 1962 Decision of the BOC in which the BOC had
reviewed motu proprio the Gatchalian proceedings before the BSI and
reversed the BSI decision of 6 July 1961;
4. The Warrant of Exclusion dated 6 July 1962 issued pursuant to the 6 July
1962 Decision of the BOC; and
5. A decision of the Manila Court of First Instance dated 31 July 1965,
rendered in a habeas corpusproceeding brought to effect the release of
Pedro Gatchalian who had been taken into custody by immigration officials
pursuant to the 6 July 1962 Warrant of Exclusion.
The Court of First Instance ("CFI") decision ordered Pedro Gatchalian's release upon
the ground that the 6 July 1962 BOC Decision had been issued beyond the one (1)
year period for review of the BSI decision of 6 July 1961. The CFI decision was
reversed and nullified by the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court held that the BOC Decision of 6 July 1962 had not been
antedated and that it was valid and effective to reverse and nullify the BSI order
granting admission to the Gatchalians as citizens of the Philippines.
The Court also held that the split BOC decision of July-August 1961 did not operate
to confirm and render final the BSI decision of 6 July 1961, the split decision being
null and void because it had not been rendered by the BOC as a body.
The Court further rejected Pedro Gatchalian's argument that he was not bound by
the 6 July 1962 BOC Decision:
It is argued for the appellee that the minutes in Exh. 5-A refer only to the
cases of Gloria, Francisco and Benjamin Gatchalian. But the designation of
the case is "Gloria Gatchalian, et al." No reason is shown why the case of
 these three should be considered and voted upon separately, considering
that the claims to citizenship and entry of all were based on the same
circumstances, applicants being the descendants of one Santiago
Gatchalian, a Filipino and that all their applications for entry were in fact
jointly resolved by the Board of Inquiry in one single decision (Annex 1,
petition, G.R. No. L-24844).4
I respectfully submit that the above-quoted ruling in Arocha disposes of the
contention here being made by respondent William Gatchalian that he is not bound
by the Decision in Arocha vs. Vivo, Arocha held that the 1962 BOC Decision was
valid and effective and William was certainly one of the applicants for admission in
the proceedings which began in 1961 before the BSI.
Respondent William Gatchalian contends that the Court in Arocha did not find him
nor any of his co-applicants to be aliens and that all the Court did was to hold that
the 6 July 1962 Board of Commissioners decision had not been antedated. This
contention cannot be taken seriously. As has already been pointed out several times,
the 1962 Board of Commissioners decision held that William Gatchalian and his
eight (8) other co-applicants for admission had not proved their claim to Philippine
citizenship; not being Filipinos, they must have been aliens, to be excluded as
persons not properly documented. Moreover, a review of the Rollo in Arocha vs.
Vivo shows that the parties there had expressly raised the issue of the citizenship of
Pedro Gatchalian in their pleadings. The Solicitor General, in his fifth assignment of
error, argued that the Court of First Instance had erred in declaring Pedro Gatchalian
a Filipino, and simultaneously urged that the 6 July 1962 decision of the Board of
Commissioners was quite correct. Pedro Gatchalian, upon the other hand,
contended that precisely because he was a Filipino, the Bureau of Immigration had
no jurisdiction to exclude him.5
The Court also said in Arocha:
Finally, it is well to note that appellee did not traverse the allegation of
appellant Commissioners in their return to the writ of Habeas Corpus that
appellee Pedro Gatchalian gained entry on the strength of a forged
cablegram, purportedly signed by the former Secretary of Foreign Affairs
Felixberto Serrano, and apparently authorizing appellee's documentation as a
Filipino (par. 3[a] of Return, C.F.I. Rec., pp. 15-16). Such failure to deny
imports admission of its truth by the appellee, establishes that his entry was
irregular. Neither has he appealed the decision of the Commissioners of
Immigration to the Department Head.6
Since the physical entry of Pedro Gatchalian was effected simultaneously with that of
Francisco and William Gatchalian, on exactly the same basis and on the strength of
the same forged cablegram allegedly from then Secretary of Foreign Affairs
Felixberto Serrano, it must follow that the entry of Francisco and William Gatchalian
was similarly irregular. The applications for admission of the nine (9) Gatchalians
were all jointly resolved by the BSI on 6 July 1961 on the identical basis that they
were all descendants of Santiago Gatchalian, a supposed natural born Philippine
citizen.
5. The purported reversal of the 1962 BOC Decision by Commissioner Nituda in
1973, cannot be given any effect. A close examination of the same reveals that such
purported reversal was highly irregular.
Respondent William Gatchalian alleges that Mr. Nituda, being in 1973 Acting
Commissioner of Immigration, had the authority to reverse the BOC Decision of 6
July 1962, since he (Nituda) had immediate control, direction and supervision of all
officers, clerks and employees of the Bureau of Immigration. Control means,
respondent Gatchalian continues, the power to alter or modify or nullify or set aside
what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.7
Respondent Gatchalian's view is obviously flawed. The Commissioner's power of
control over the officers and employees of the Bureau of Immigration cannot be
compared to the power of control and supervision vested by the Constitution in the
President of the Philippines (which was what Ham was all about), for the
Commissioner's general power of control cannot be said to include the power to
review and set aside the prior final decision reached by the BOC. The Commissioner
of Immigration, acting alone, cannot be regarded as an authority higher than the
BOC itself (constituted by the Commissioner and the two [2] Associate
Commissioners), in respect of matters vested by the governing statute in such Board
itself. One of these matters is precisely the hearing and deciding of appeals from
decisions of the BSI, and the motu proprio review of the entire proceedings of a case
within one (1) year from the promulgation of a decision by the BSI.8
Respondent Gatchalian points to Section 29 (b) of the Immigration Act as amended,
as empowering Nituda to reverse the 1962 BOC Decision. Section 29 (b) reads as
follows:
Section 29. . . .
 x x x           x x x          x x x
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of this section, the Commissioner of
Immigration, in his discretion, may permit to enter (sic) any alien properly
documented, who is subject to exclusion under this section, but who is —
(1) an alien lawfully resident in the Philippines who is returning from a
temporary visit abroad;
(2) an alien applying for temporary admission.
It is difficult to understand respondent's argument. For one thing, Section 29
(b) relates to an "alien properly documented" while respondent Gatchalian
precisely claims to be a citizen of the Philippines rather than a resident alien
returning from a temporary visit abroad or an alien applying for temporary
admission.
It should be recalled that Nituda's 1973 Decision approved a ruling rendered
by a Board of Special Inquiry in 1973 that respondent Gatchalian was
properly documented, a ruling which was precipitated by a "Petition for
Rehearing" filed by respondent Gatchalian and his co-applicants in 8 March
1972 before the BSI. There are a number of obvious defects in the action of
the BSI. Firstly, the motion for rehearing was filed way out of time.Rule 3, B
22 of the Immigration Rules and Regulations of 1 January 1941 provides as
follows:
At any time before the alien is deported, but not later than seven days
from the date he receives notice of the decision on appeal of the
Board of Commissioners, the applicant or his attorney or counsel may
file a petition for rehearing only on the ground of newly discovered
evidence. Such petition shall be in writing and shall set forth the
nature of the evidence discovered and the reason or reasons why it
was not produced before. . . . (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent Gatchalian's and his co-applicants' motion for rehearing was
filed, not seven (7) days but rather ten (10) years after notice of the 1962
BOC Decision had been received by them. Secondly, Rule 3, B 25 of the
Immigration Rules and Regulations prescribed that any motion for rehearing
shall be filed only with the Board of Commissioners; the Gatchalians' motion
for rehearing was filed with the BSI which then purported to reopen the case
"without first securing the consent in writing of the Commissioner of
Immigration" as required by Rule 2, D 20.
Furthermore, the purported reversal of the 1962 BOC Decision was made not
by the duly constituted BOC in 1973, but only by its Chairman, then Acting
Commissioner Nituda. Mr. Nituda's action flew in the face of Rule 3, B 22 of
the Immigration Rules and Regulation, which mandates that the decision of
any two (2) members of the BOC shall prevail. It thus appears that Mr. Nituda
purported to act as if he were the entire BOC. Indeed, even the BOC itself in
1973 could not have lawfully reversed a final decision rendered by the BOC
ten (10) years ago.9
We must, finally, not lose sight of the ruling in Arocha vs. Vivo (supra) where the
Supreme Court expressly outlined the procedure to be followed by the BOC in
resolving cases before them. This court was very explicit in holding that individual
actions of members of the BOC are legally ineffective:
. . . [T]he former Immigration Commissioners appeared to have acted
individually in this particular instance and not as a Board. It is shown by the
different dates affixed to their signatures that they did not actually meet to
discuss and vote on the case. This was officially made to record by the
Secretary of Justice in his Memorandum Order No. 9, on January 24, 1962,
wherein he stated.
that for the past several years, the Board of Commissioners of
Immigration has not met collectively to discuss and deliberate in the
cases coming before it. [Citation omitted]
Individual action by members of a board plainly renders nugatory the purpose
of its constitution as a Board. The Legislature organized the Board of
Commissioners precisely in order that they should deliberate collectively and
in order that their views and Ideas should be exchanged and examined
before reaching a conclusion (See Ryan vs. Humphrise, LRA 1915F
1047). This process is of the essence of a board's action, save where
otherwise provided by law, and the salutary effects of the rule would be lost
were the members to act individually, without benefit of discussion.
 The powers and duties of boards and commissions may not be
exercised by the individual members separately. Their acts are official
only when done by the members convened in sessions, upon a
concurrence of at least a majority and with at least a quorum present.
[Citation omitted]
Where the action needed is not of the individuals composing a board
but of the official body, the members must be together and act in their
official capacity, and the action should appear on the records of the
board. [Citation omitted]
Where a duty is entrusted to a board, composed of different
individuals, that board can act officially only as such, in convened
sessions, with the members, or a quorum thereof, present. [Citation
omitted]10 (Emphasis supplied)
The act of Mr. Nituda of reversing the 1962 Decision of the BOC could not
hence be considered as the act of the BOC itself.
The pretended act of reversal 0of Mr. Nituda must, therefore, be stricken
down and disregarded for having been made in excess of his lawful authority.
The 1973 order of Nituda was ineffective to vest any right upon respondent
Gatchalian who, it is worth nothing, did not pretend to submit any newly
discovered evidence to support their claim to Philippine citizenship already
rejected by the 1962 BOC. In essence, Mr. Nituda purported not merely to set
aside the 1962 BOC Decision but also the 1967 Decision of this Court
in Arocha vs. Vivo.
II
I turn to an examination of the underlying facts which make up the basis of
the claim of William Gatchalian to Philippine citizenship. The most striking
feature of this claim to Philippine citizenship is that it rests upon a fragile web
constructed out of self-serving oral testimony, a total lack of official
documentation whether Philippine or foreign, of negative facts and of
invocation of presumptions without proof of essential factual premises. Put in
summary terms, the claim of William Gatchalian to Philippine citizenship rests
upon three (3) premises, to wit:
a. that Santiago Gatchalian was a Philippine citizen;
b. the supposed filiation of Francisco Gatchalian as a legitimate son of
Santiago Gatchalian, which leads to the intermediate conclusion that
Francisco was a Philippine citizen; and
c. the supposed filiation of William Gatchalian as a legitimate son of
Francisco Gatchalian leading to the final conclusion that William
Gatchalian is a Philippine citizen.
I respectfully submit that a careful examination of the facts made of record
will show that the correctness and factual nature of each of these layered
premises are open to very serious doubt, doubts which can only lead to the
same conclusion which the BOC reached on 6 July 1962 when it reversed the
BSI, that is, that there was failure to prove the Philippine citizenship of
William Gatchalian and of his eight (8) alleged uncles, aunts and brother in
1961 when they first arrived in the Philippines.
1. The supposed Philippine citizenship of Santiago Gatchalian must be
considered first. Santiago was allegedly born in Binondo, Manila, on 25 July
1905 to Pablo Pacheco and Marciana Gatchalian. The records do not
disclose anything about Pablo Pacheco but everyone, including William
Gatchalian, assumes that Pablo Pacheco was a Chinese subject and never
became a citizen of the Philippine Islands. The basic claim of Santiago was
that his mother Marciana Gatchalian was a Philippine citizen and that
Marciana was not lawfully married to Pablo Pacheco and that consequently,
he (Santiago) was an illegitimate son of Marciana Gatchalian.
The first point that should be made in respect of Santiago's claim was that he
had always regarded himself as a Chinese citizen until around 1958 or 1960,
that is, when he reached the age of 53 or 55 years. Santiago, by his own
testimony, lived the bulk of his adult life in China where he went in 1924 at
age 19 and where he stayed for about 13 years returning to the Philippines
for the first time in 1937. He returned in the same year to China, stayed there
for another nine (9) years, and then came back to the Philippines again in
1946. He once more left the Philippines for China on 14 April 1947 and
returned on 14 June 1947. Upon his second return to the Philippines in 1946,
he documented himself as a Chinese national: he was holder of ICR No.
7501 dated 3 May 1946. He continued to be documented as such, the record
showing that he was also holder of an ACR No. A-219003 dated 13 January
1951. Santiago, again by his own statement, married in China a Chinese
woman. This Chinese wife, however, Santiago never brought or attempted to
bring to the Philippines and she allegedly died in China in 1951, or four (4)
years after Santiago had permanently returned to the Philippines.
In 1958, when he was 53 years of age, Santiago obtained a residence
certificate where for the first time he described himself as a Filipino. It was
also only in 1960, that is, when Santiago was 55 years of age, that he filed a
petition for cancellation of his ACR obviously upon the theory that he had
always been a Philippine citizen. It was at the hearing of his petition for
cancellation of his ACR that Santiago made his oral statements concerning
the supposed circumstances of his birth, parentage and marriage. Santiago's
petition to cancel his ACR was apparently made in preparation for efforts to
bring in, the succeeding year, a whole group of persons as his supposed
descendants.
The second point that needs to be made in respect of Santiago's claim of
citizenship resting on his supposed status as an illegitimate son of a Filipina
woman, is that no birth certificate bearing the name of Santiago Gatchalian
was ever presented.
Instead, a baptismal certificate bearing the name Santiago Gatchalian was
presented showing the name of Marciana Gatchalian, Filipina, as mother,
with the name of the father unknown. There was also presented a marriage
certificate dated 1936 of Joaquin Pacheco, alleged brother of Santiago
Gatchalian, also showing Marciana Gatchalian as mother with the name of
the father similarly left blank. These two (2) pieces of paper, together with
Santiago's own statements to the Citizenship Evaluation Board as well as the
statements of Joaquin Pacheco to the same Board, constituted the sum total
of the evidence supporting Santiago's claim to Philippine citizenship and on
the basis of which an Order dated 12 July 1960, signed by Felix S. Talabis,
Associate Commissioner, granted the petition to cancel Santiago's alien
registry.
In so issuing his Order granting cancellation of Santiago's ACR,
Commissioner Talabis disregarded Santiago's failure to present a birth
certificate, in obvious violation of rules of the Bureau of Immigration which
expressly require the submission of a birth certificate, or a certified true copy
thereof, in proceedings brought for cancellation of an ACR upon the ground
that the petitioner is an illegitimate son of a Filipina mother.11 It is well-settled
that a baptismal certificate is proof only of the administration of baptism to the
person named therein, and that such certificate is not proof of anything else
and certainly not proof of parentage nor of the status of legitimacy or
illegitimacy.12
That Order also casually disregarded a number of other things, one of which
was a document dated 1902 signed by Maxima Gatchalian, the mother of
Marciana Gatchalian, stating that Maxima —
. . . residing in the City of Manila, mother of Marciana Gatchalian,
unmarried, of 18 years of age, her father being dead, do hereby
freely consent to her marriage with Pablo C. Pacheco, of Manila, and
that I know of no legal impediment to such marriage. (Emphasis
supplied)
Such parental consent indicated that a marriage ceremony would have taken
place shortly thereafter as a matter of course; otherwise, the consent would
have been totally pointless. Even more importantly, Commissioner Talabis'
Order disregarded the testimony of Santiago Gatchalian himself in the same
cancellation proceedings that he (Santiago) believed that his parents had
been married by the Justice of the Peace of Pasig, Rizal.13 In his Order,
Commissioner Talabis referred to the fact that Santiago Gatchalian had been
"interchangeably using his parental and maternal surnames. In school, he
was known as Santiago Pacheco (Class Card for 1920-1921, Meisic Manila;
Certificates of Completion of Third and Fourth Grades, Meisic Primary
School). But in his Special Cedula Certificate No. 676812 dated 17
September 1937, and in tax clearance certificate issued on 2 October 1937,
he is referred to as Santiago Gatchalian; and in a Communication dated 6
June 1941, he was addressed to as Santiago Pacheco by the Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Office." At the very least, such use of both paternal and
maternal surnames indicated that Santiago was uncertain as to his supposed
illegitimacy. In our case law, moreover, the use of a paternal surname may be
regarded as an indication of possession of the status of a legitimate or
acknowledged natural child.14
Perhaps the most important aspect of Commissioner Talabis Order granting
cancellation of Santiago's ACR, is that such Order failed to give any weight to
the presumption in law in favor of marriage, a presumption significantly
reinforced by the parental consent given by Maxima Gatchalian to the
marriage of her daughter Marciana Gatchalian to one Pablo C. Pacheco. A
related presumption is that in favor of the legitimacy of offspring born of a
man and woman comporting themselves as husband and wife.15 I respectfully
submit that these presumptions cannot be successfully overthrown by the
simple self-serving testimony of Santiago and of his alleged brother Joaquin
Pacheco and by the two (2) pieces of paper (the baptismal certificate of
Santiago and the marriage certificate of Joaquin Pacheco). It seems relevant
to point out that Joaquin Pacheco, too, was unable to present any birth
certificate to prove his supposed common parentage with Santiago
Gatchalian; Joaquin was allegedly born in 1902, the same year that Maxima
Gatchalian gave her consent to the marriage of Marciana Gatchalian and
Pablo C. Pacheco.
The third point that needs to be underscored is that Santiago Gatchalian did
nothing to try to bring into the Philippines his supposed sons and daughters
and grandchildren since 1947, when he returned permanently to the
Philippines, and until 1960. The story given by the nine (9) supposed
descendants of Santiago when they first arrived in the Philippines was that
they had left the People's Republic of China and had gone to Macao in
1952 and there they stayed until they moved to Hongkong in 1958. It should
also be noted that the youngest supposed child of Santiago, Benjamin
Gatchalian, was said to have been born in China in 1942 and was
consequently only five (5) years old when Santiago returned permanently to
the Philippines in 1947. In other words, Santiago Gatchalian behaved as if
the nine (9) supposed descendants did not exist until 1960 when
Commissioner Talabis' Order cancelling Santiago's ACR was issued.
It may also be noted that Santiago's 1951 ACR application mentioned only
two (2) children of Santiago: Jose and Elena. In 1961, however, Santiago
stated before the immigration investigator that he had a total of five (5)
children: Jose, Elena, Francisco, Gloria and Benjamin. Santiago's
explanation strongly echoes a common lawyer's excuse for failure to
seasonably file some pleading, and, it is respectfully submitted, is equally
contrived and unpersuasive; that he had his clerk fill up the ACR; that he
gave his clerk four (4) names (not five [5]); that the clerk had simply failed to
fill up the ACR correctly. In its 6 July 1962 Decision, the BOC noted that
"while the two (2) names listed in [Santiago's] [ACR application] Jose and
Elena, bear the same names as two of the [9] applicants, the difference in the
ages of said persons compared to the said applicants, casts serious doubts
on their Identity."16
It is suggested in the majority opinion that the question of citizenship of
Santiago Gatchalian is a closed matter which cannot be reviewed by this
Court; that per the records of the Bureau of Immigration, as of 20 July 1960,
Santiago Gatchalian had been declared to be a Filipino citizen and that this
forecloses re-opening of that question thirty (30) years later. I must, with
respect, disagree with this suggestion. The administrative determination by
the Bureau of Immigration as of 20 July 1960 certainly does not
constitute res adjudicatathat forecloses this Court from examining the
supposed Philippine citizenship of Santiago Gatchalian upon which private
respondent William Gatchalian seeks to rely. The Court cannot avoid
examining the Philippine nationality claimed by Santiago Gatchalian or, more
accurately, claimed on his behalf by William Gatchalian, considering that one
of the central issues here is the tanability or untenability of the claim of
William Gatchalian to Philippine citizenship and hence to entry or admission
to the Philippines as such citizen.
2. The second of the three (3) premises noted in the beginning of this section
is: that Francisco Gatchalian was the legitimate son of Santiago Gatchalian
and therefore followed the supposed Philippine citizenship of Santiago. This
premise has in fact two (2) parts: (a) the physical filiation of Francisco
Gatchalian as the son of Santiago Gatchalian; and (b) that Santiago
Gatchalian was lawfully married to the Chinese mother of Francisco
Gatchalian. This premise is remarkable for the total absence of documentary
support for either of its two (2) parts. Francisco was born in Amoy, China in
1931, according to Santiago. The sum total of the evidence on this premise
consists of Francisco Gatchalian's own statement and that of Santiago. No
birth certificate or certified true copy thereof, or comparable documentation
under Chinese law, was submitted by either Santiago or by Francisco. No
secondary evidence of any kind was submitted. No testimony of a
disinterested person was offered.
Santiago Gatchalian claimed to have been married in China in 1926 to a
Chinese woman, Chua Gim Tee, out of which marriage Francisco was
allegedly born. No documentary proof of such marriage in China, whether
primary or secondary, was ever submitted. Neither was there ever presented
any proof of the contents of the Chinese law on marriage in 1926 and of
compliance with its requirements.
It is firmly settled in our jurisdiction that he who asserts and relies upon the
existence of a valid foreign marriage must prove not only the foreign law on
marriage and the fact of compliance with the requisites of such law, but also
the fact of the marriage itself. In Yao Kee vs. Sy-Gonzales,17 the issue before
the Court was whether the marriage of petitioner Yao Kee to the deceased Sy
Kiat in accordance with Chinese law and custom had been adequately
proven. In rendering a negative answer, this Court, speaking through
Cortes, J., said:
These evidence may very well prove the fact of marriage between
Yao Kee and Sy Kiat. However, the same do not suffice to
establish the validity of said marriage in accordance with Chinese law
and custom.
Custom is defined as "a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts,
uniformly observed (practiced) as a social rule, legally binding and
obligatory." The law requires that "a custom must be proved as a fact,
according to the rules of evidence" [Article 12, Civil Code]. On this
score the Court had occasion to state that "a local custom as a source
of right can not be considered by a court of justice unless such
custom is properly established by competent evidence like any other
fact" [Patriarca vs. Orato, 7 Phil. 390, 395 (1907)]. The same
evidence, if not one of a higher degree, should be required of a
foreign custom.
The law on foreign marriages is provided by Article 71 of the Civil
Code which states that:
Art. 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
were performed, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in
this country, except bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous
marriages, as determined by Philippine law.
Construing this provision of law the Court has held that to establish a
valid foreign marriage two things must be proven, namely: (1) the
existence of the foreign law as a question of fact; and (2) the alleged
foreign marriage by convincing evidence [Adong vs. Cheong Seng
Gee, 43 Phil. 43, 49 (1922).18(Emphasis supplied)
In the instant case, there was absolutely no proof other than Santiago's bare
assertion that a marriage ceremony between Santiago and Chua Gim Tee had taken
place in China in accordance with Chinese law. The contents of the relevant Chinese
law on marriage at the time of the supposed marriage, was similarly not shown.
Should it be assumed simply that the requirements of the 1926 Chinese law on
marriage are identical with the requirements of the Philippine law on marriage, it
must be pointed out that neither Santiago nor Francisco Gatchalian submitted proof
that any of the requirements of a valid marriage under Philippine law had been
complied with.
I respectfully urge, therefore, that the reliance in the majority opinion upon our
conflicts rule on marriage embodied in Article 71 of the Civil Code (now Article 26 of
the Family Code; then Section 19 of Act No. 3630) is unwarranted. The rule that a
foreign marriage valid in accordance with the law of the place where it was
performed shall be valid also in the Philippines, cannot begin to operate until after
the marriage performed abroad and its compliane with the requirements for validity
under the marriage law of the place where performed, are first shown as factual
matters. There is, in other words, no factual basis for a presumption that a lawful
marriage under Chinese law had taken place in 1926 in China between Santiago
Gatchalian and Chua Gim Tee.
It must follow also that Francisco Gatchalian cannot simply rely upon a presumption
of legitimacy of offspring of a valid marriage.1âwphi1 As far as the record here is
concerned, there could well have been no marriage at all in China between Santiago
Gatchalian and Chua Gim Tee (just as Santiago had insisted that his father and
mother had never married each other) and that consequently Francisco Gatchalian
could just as well have followed the nationality of his admittedly Chinese mother.
3. The last premise noted earlier is the supposed filiation of William Gatchalian as a
legitimate son of Francisco which resulted in William's following the supposed
Philippine citizenship of Francisco Gatchalian. William was, according to Santiago
Gatchalian, born in Amoy, China in 1949. Here again, just in the case of Francisco
Gatchalian, there is a complete absence of contemporaneous documentary evidence
of the supposed filiation of William Gatchalian as a legitimate son of Francisco
Gatchalian.19 The only support ever presented for such alleged filiation consisted of
the oral statements of Santiago Gatchalian, Francisco Gatchalian and William Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Padilla, Regalado, JJ., concur
Gatchalian. It is difficult to resist the impression that there took place here a
pyramiding of oral statements, each resting upon another oral statement and all
going back to the supposed bastardy of Santiago, a status suddenly discovered or
asserted by Santiago in his 55th year in life. No birth certificate, or comparable
documentation under Chinese law, exhibiting the name of William Gatchalian was Footnotes
submitted.
* Renamed Bureau of Immigration as per Executive Order No. 292.
Francisco Gatchalian stated that he had married a Chinese woman, Ong Siu Kiok, in
Amoy in 1947 according to Chinese custom. Once again, we must note that there FELICIANO, J.: dissenting:
was no proof submitted that a marriage ceremony satisfying the requirements of
"Chinese custom" had ever taken place in China between Francisco and Ong Siu 1
 21 SCRA 532 (1967); 128 Phil. 566 (1967).
Kiok; neither was there any proof that a marriage "according to Chinese custom" was
valid and lawful under Chinese law in 1947 and of factual compliance with the 2
requirements of the law and custom in China concerning marriage.20 Ong Siu Kiok  Section 36, Commonwealth Act No. 613 as amended, or Immigration Law.
was alleged to have died in Macau and never came to the Philippines. It must then 3
follow, once again, that no presumption of a lawful marriage between Francisco  Tiu Chun Hai and Go Tam vs. Commission of Immigration and the Director
Gatchalian and his alleged Chinese wife can be invoked by William Gatchalian. It of National Bureau of Investigation, 104 Phil. 949 (1958); La Tang Bun vs.
follows still further that William Gatchalian cannot invoke any presumption of Fabre, 81 Phil. 683 (1948).
legitimacy in his own favor. As in the case of his putative father Francisco, William
4
could as well have followed the nationality of his concededly Chinese mother.  21 SCRA at 539.

5
One final note: it might be thought that the result I have reached is unduly harsh  Rollo of G.R. No. 24844, p. 32 (Brief for the Respondents-Appellants, p.
considering the prolonged physical stay of William Gatchalian in the country. But this 28); Rollo of G.R. No. 24844, p. 41 (Brief for the Petitioner-Appellee, p. 8).
Court must apply the law as it is in fact written. I respectfully submit that the
6
appropriate recourse of respondent William Gatchalian, should he feel that he has  21 SCRA at 541.
some humanitarian claim to a right to stay in the Philippines, is to the political
departments of Government. Those departments of Government may then consider 7
 Citing Ham vs. Bachrach, 109 Phil. 949 (1968).
the wisdom and desirability, in the light of the interests of the country, of legislation
permitting the legalization of the entry and stay in the Philippines of respondent 8
 Section 27 (d), Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended.
William Gatchalian and those similarly situated. Unless and until such legislation is
enacted, this Court really has no choice save to apply and enforce our immigration 9
 See Commissioner of Immigration vs. Hon. Fernandez, et al., 120 Phil. 178
law and regulations and our law on citizenship. (1964).

Accordingly, I vote to GRANT the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition in G.R. Nos. 10

 21 SCRA at 540.
95122-23, and to SET ASIDE the Resolution/Temporary Restraining Order dated 7
September 1990 issued by respondent Judge Dela Rosa in Civil Case No. 90-5214, 11
 Memorandum Circular, Department of Justice, dated 28 August 1958;
as well as the Order of respondent Judge Capulong dated 6 September 1990 in Civil Administrative Memorandum, Bureau of Immigration, dated 17 March 1952,
Case No. 3431-V-90; and to RE-AFFIRM that respondent William Gatchalian is not a cited in E.F. Hernandez and O.A. Domingo, Philippine Immigration Law and
Philippine citizen. Procedure, (1970 ed.,) p. 437.
12
 See, e.g., People vs. Villeza, 127 SCRA 349 (1984); Macadangdang vs.
Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 73 (1980); Fortus vs. Novero, 23 SCRA 1331
(1968); Cid vs. Burnaman, 24 SCRA 434 (1968); Vidaurraza vs. Court of
Appeals, 91 Phil. 492 (1952); and Capistrano vs. Gabino, 8 Phil. 135 (1907).
A It may be also that he is ashamed to make it be known that he is a
legitimate child that is why he said our parents are married." (Annex
"B-9" of private respondent Gatchalian's "Comment with Counter-
Petition" in G.R. Nos. 95612-13)

13 14
 The transcript of the investigation conducted on 12 February 1960 in CEB  E.g., In Re Mallare, 59 SCRA 45 (1974); and Adriano vs. De Jesus, 23 Phil.
No. 3860-R, In Re Petition to Cancel Alien Registry, Santiago Gatchalian, 350 (1912).
petitioner, Annex "2" of private respondent Gatchalian's "Comment with
Counter-Petition" in G.R. Nos. 95612-13 states: 15
 See, in this connection, Rule 131, Section 5 (cc) and (dd) of the Rules of
Court.
"[Immigration Investigator]
16
 Annex "37" of Comment with Counter-Petition, G.R. Nos. 95612-13.
Q It says here, "this is to certify that I, the undersigned, residing in the
City of Manila, mother of Marciana Gatchalian, unmarried, of 18 years 17
 167 SCRA 736 (1988).
of age, her father being dead, do hereby freely consent to her
marriage with Pablo C. Pacheco, of Manila, and that I know of no 18
 167 SCRA at 743-744.
legal impediment to such marriage." Was your father, Pablo C.
Pacheco, and mother, Marciana Gatchalian, ultimately or eventually 19
 William Gatchalian presented his own marriage contract executed in 1973,
married because of this consent of your grandmother? which showed as his parents Francisco Gatchalian and Ong Siu Kiok. This, of
course, has no probative value for present purposes.
[Santiago Gatchalian]
20
 Yao Kee vs. Sy-Gonzales, supra.
A Yes, I was informed by my brother Joaquin Pacheco that our
parents were married by the justice of the peace of Pasig, Rizal."
(Emphasis supplied)

In his subsequent testimony in the same proceedings, Joaquin

Pacheco, and a singularly accommodating immigration investigator
who posed obviously leading questions, sought to soften the impact of
Santiago's admission that his parents were married:

"[Immigration Investigator]

Q Or is it because [Santiago] was ashamed to admit that he was a

legitimate child and that is the reason why he said your parents were
married?

[Joaquin Gatchalian]

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 114776           February 2, 2000
MENANDRO B. LAUREANO, petitioner, 
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND SINGAPORE AIRLINES LIMITED, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to
reverse the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated October 29, 1993, in C.A. G.R.
No. CV 34476, as well as its Resolution dated February 28, 1994, which denied the
motion for reconsideration.
The facts of the case as summarized by the respondent appellate court are as
follows:
Sometime in 1978, plaintiff [Menandro B. Laureano, herein petitioner], then
Director of Flight Operations and Chief Pilot of Air Manila, applied for
employment with defendant company [herein private respondent] through its
Area Manager in Manila.
On September 30, 1978, after the usual personal interview, defendant wrote
to plaintiff, offering a contract of employment as an expatriate B-707 captain
for an original period of two (2) years commencing on January 21, 1978.
Plaintiff accepted the offer and commenced working on January 20, 1979.
After passing the six-month probation period, plaintiffs appointment was
confirmed effective July 21, 1979. (Annex "B", p. 30, Rollo).
On July 21, 1979, defendant offered plaintiff an extension of his two-year
contract to five (5) years effective January 21, 1979 to January 20, 1984
subject to the terms and conditions set forth in the contract of employment,
which the latter accepted (Annex "C" p. 31, Rec.).
During his service as B-707 captain, plaintiff on August 24, 1980, while in
command of a flight, committed a noise violation offense at the Zurich Airport,
for which plaintiff apologized.(Exh. "3", p. 307, Rec.).
Sometime in 1980, plaintiff featured in a tail scraping incident wherein the tail
of the aircraft scraped or touched the runway during landing. He was
suspended for a few days until he was investigated by board headed by Capt.
Choy. He was reprimanded.
On September 25, 1981, plaintiff was invited to take a course of A-300
conversion training at Aeroformacion, Toulouse, France at dependant's
expense. Having successfully completed and passed the training course,
plaintiff was cleared on April 7, 1981, for solo duty as captain of the Airbus A-
300 and subsequently appointed as captain of the A-300 fleet commanding
an Airbus A-300 in flights over Southeast Asia. (Annexes "D", "E" and "F", pp.
34-38, Rec.).
Sometime in 1982, defendant, hit by a recession, initiated cost-cutting
measures. Seventeen (17) expatriate captains in the Airbus fleet were found
in excess of the defendant's requirement (t.s.n., July 6, 1988. p. 11).
Consequently, defendant informed its expatriate pilots including plaintiff of the
situation and advised them to take advance leaves. (Exh. "15", p. 466, Rec.)
Realizing that the recession would not be for a short time, defendant decided
to terminate its excess personnel (t.s.n., July 6, 1988, p. 17). It did not,
however, immediately terminate it's A-300 pilots. It reviewed their
qualifications for possible promotion to the B-747 fleet. Among the 17 excess
Airbus pilots reviewed, twelve were found qualified. Unfortunately, plaintiff
was not one of the twelve.
On October 5, 1982, defendant informed plaintiff of his termination effective
November 1, 1982 and that he will be paid three (3) months salary in lieu of
three months notice (Annex "I", pp. 41-42, Rec.). Because he could not
uproot his family on such short notice, plaintiff requested a three-month
notice to afford him time to exhaust all possible avenues for reconsideration
and retention. Defendant gave only two (2) months notice and one (1) month
salary. (t.s.n., Nov. 12, 1987. p. 25).
Aggrieved, plaintiff on June 29, 1983, instituted a case for illegal dismissal
before the Labor Arbiter. Defendant moved to dismiss on jurisdiction grounds.
Before said motion was resolved, the complaint was withdrawn. Thereafter,
plaintiff filed the instant case for damages due to illegal termination of
contract of services before the court a quo (Complaint, pp. 1-10, Rec.).
Again, defendant on February 11, 1987 filed a motion to dismiss
alleging inter alia: (1) that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the case, and (2) that Philippine courts have no jurisdiction over the instant
case. Defendant contends that the complaint is for illegal dismissal together
with a money claim arising out of and in the course of plaintiffs employment
"thus it is the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC who have the jurisdiction pursuant
to Article 217 of the Labor Code" and that, since plaintiff was employed in
Singapore, all other aspects of his employment contract and/or documents
executed in Singapore. Thus, defendant postulates that Singapore laws
should apply and courts thereat shall have jurisdiction. (pp. 50-69, Rec.).
In traversing defendant's arguments, plaintiff claimed that: (1) where the
items demanded in a complaint are the natural consequences flowing from a
breach of an obligation and not labor benefits, the case is intrinsically a civil
dispute; (2) the case involves a question that is beyond the field of
specialization of labor arbiters; and (3) if the complaint is grounded not on the
employee's dismissal per se but on the manner of said dismissal and the
consequence thereof, the case falls under the jurisdiction of the civil courts.
(pp. 70-73, Rec.)
On March 23, 1987, the court a quo denied defendant's motion to dismiss
(pp. 82-84, Ibid). The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. (p.
95 ibid.)
On September 16, 1987, defendant filed its answer reiterating the grounds
relied upon in its motion to dismiss and further arguing that plaintiff is barred
by laches, waiver, and estoppel from instituting the complaint and that he has
no cause of action . (pp. 102-115)1
On April 10, 1991, the trial court handed down its decision in favor of plaintiff. The
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff Menandro
Laureano and against defendant Singapore Airlines Limited, ordering
defendant to pay plaintiff the amounts of —
SIN$396,104.00, or its equivalent in Philippine currency at the current rate of
exchange at the time of payment, as and for unearned compensation with
legal interest from the filing of the complaint until fully paid;
SIN$154,742.00, or its equivalent in Philippine currency at the current rate of
exchange at the time of payment; and the further amounts of P67,500.00 as
consequential damages with legal interest from the filing of the complaint until
fully paid;
P1,000,000.00 as and for moral damages; P1,000,000.00 as and for
exemplary damages; and P100,000.00 as and for attorney's fees.
Costs against defendant.
SO ORDERED.2
Singapore Airlines timely appealed before the respondent court and raised the
issues of jurisdiction, validity of termination, estoppel, and damages.
On October 29, 1993, the appellate court set aside the decision of the trial court,
thus,
. . . In the instant case, the action for damages due to illegal termination was
filed by plaintiff-appellee only on January 8, 1987 or more than four (4) years
after the effectivity date of his dismissal on November 1, 1982. Clearly,
plaintiff-appellee's action has already prescribed.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The complaint is hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED.3
Petitioner's and Singapore Airlines' respective motions for reconsideration were
denied.
Now, before the Court, petitioner poses the following queries:
1. IS THE PRESENT ACTION ONE BASED ON CONTRACT WHICH PRESCRIBES
IN TEN YEARS UNDER ARTICLE 1144 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE OR ONE FOR
DAMAGES ARISING FROM AN INJURY TO THE RIGHTS OF THE PLAINTIFF
WHICH PRESCRIBES IN FOUR YEARS UNDER ARTICLE 1146 OF THE NEW
CIVIL CODE?
2. CAN AN EMPLOYEE WITH A FIXED PERIOD OF EMPLOYMENT BE
RETRENCHED BY HIS EMPLOYER?
3. CAN THERE BE VALID RETRENCHMENT IF AN EMPLOYER MERELY FAILS
TO REALIZE THE EXPECTED PROFITS EVEN IF IT WERE NOT, IN FACT,
INCURRING LOSSES?
At the outset, we find it necessary to state our concurrence on the assumption of
jurisdiction by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9. The trial court rightly
ruled on the application of Philippine law, thus:
Neither can the Court determine whether the termination of the plaintiff is
legal under the Singapore Laws because of the defendant's failure to show
which specific laws of Singapore Laws apply to this case. As substantially
discussed in the preceding paragraphs, the Philippine Courts do not take
judicial notice of the laws of Singapore. The defendant that claims the
applicability of the Singapore Laws to this case has the burden of proof. The
defendant has failed to do so. Therefore, the Philippine law should be
applied.4
Respondent Court of Appeals acquired jurisdiction when defendant filed its appeal
before said court.5 On this matter, respondent court was correct when it barred
defendant-appellant below from raising further the issue of jurisdiction.6
Petitioner now raises the issue of whether his action is one based on Article 1144 or
on Article 1146 of the Civil Code. According to him, his termination of employment
effective November 1, 1982, was based on an employment contract which is under
Article 1144, so his action should prescribe in 10 years as provided for in said article.
Thus he claims the ruling of the appellate court based on Article 1146 where
prescription is only four (4) years, is an error. The appellate court concluded that the
action for illegal dismissal originally filed before the Labor Arbiter on June 29, 1983,
but which was withdrawn, then filed again in 1987 before the Regional Trial Court,
had already prescribed.
In our view, neither Article 11447 nor Article 11468 of the Civil Code is here pertinent.
What is applicable is Article 291 of the Labor Code, viz:
Art. 291. Money claims. — All money claims arising from employee-employer
relations accruing during the effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three
(3) years from the time the cause of action accrued; otherwise they shall be
forever barred.
xxx     xxx     xxx
What rules on prescription should apply in cases like this one has long been decided
by this Court. In illegal dismissal, it is settled, that the ten-year prescriptive period
fixed in Article 1144 of the Civil Code may not be invoked by petitioners, for the Civil
Code is a law of general application, while the prescriptive period fixed in Article 292
of the Labor Code [now Article 291] is a SPECIAL LAW applicable to claims arising
from employee-employer relations.9
More recently in De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals,10 where the money claim was
based on a written contract, the Collective Bargaining Agreement, the Court held:
. . . The language of Art. 291 of the Labor Code does not limit its application
only to "money claims specifically recoverable under said Code" but covers
all money claims arising from an employee-employer relations" (Citing
Cadalin v. POEA Administrator, 238 SCRA 721, 764 [1994]; and Uy v.
National Labor Relations Commission, 261 SCRA 505, 515 [1996]). . . .
It should be noted further that Article 291 of the Labor Code is a special law
applicable to money claims arising from employer-employee relations; thus, it
necessarily prevails over Article 1144 of the Civil Code, a general law. Basic
is the rule in statutory construction that "where two statutes are of equal
theoretical application to a particular case, the one designed therefore should
prevail." (Citing Leveriza v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 157 SCRA 282,
294.) Generalia specialibus non derogant.11
In the light of Article 291, aforecited, we agree with the appellate court's conclusion
that petitioner's action for damages due to illegal termination filed again on January
8, 1987 or more than four (4) years after the effective date of his dismissal on
November 1, 1982 has already prescribed.
In the instant case, the action for damages due to illegal termination was filed
by plaintiff-appelle only on January 8, 1987 or more than four (4) years after
the effectivity date of his dismissal on November 1, 1982. Clearly, plaintiff-
appellee's action has already prescribed.
We base our conclusion not on Article 1144 of the Civil Code but on which sets the
prescription period at three (3) years and which governs under this jurisdiction.
Petitioner claims that the running of the prescriptive period was tolled when he filed
his complaint for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter of the National Labor
Relations Commission. However, this claim deserves scant consideration; it has no
legal leg to stand on. In Olympia International, Inc., vs., Court of Appeals, we held
that "although the commencement of a civil action stops the running of the statute of
prescription or limitations, its dismissal or voluntary abandonment by the plaintiff
leaves in exactly the same position as though no action had been commenced at
all."12
Now, as to whether petitioner's separation from the company due to retrenchment
was valid, the appellate court found that the employment contract of petitioner
allowed for pre-termination of employment. We agree with the Court of Appeals
when it said,
It is a settled rule that contracts have the force of law between the parties.
From the moment the same is perfected, the parties are bound not only to the
fulfillment of what has been expressly stipulated but also to all consequences
which, according to their nature, may be in keeping with good faith, usage
and law. Thus, when plaintiff-appellee accepted the offer of employment, he
was bound by the terms and conditions set forth in the contract, among
others, the right of mutual termination by giving three months written notice or
by payment of three months salary. Such provision is clear and readily
understandable, hence, there is no room for interpretation.
xxx     xxx     xxx
Further, plaintiff-appellee's contention that he is not bound by the provisions
of the Agreement, as he is not a signatory thereto, deserves no merit. It must
be noted that when plaintiff-appellee's employment was confirmed, he
applied for membership with the Singapore Airlines Limited (Pilots)
Association, the signatory to the aforementioned Agreement. As such,
plaintiff-appellee is estopped from questioning the legality of the said
agreement or any proviso contained therein.13
Moreover, the records of the present case clearly show that respondent court's
decision is amply supported by evidence and it did not err in its findings, including
the reason for the retrenchment:
When defendant-appellant was faced with the world-wide recession of the
airline industry resulting in a slow down in the company's growth particularly
in the regional operation (Asian Area) where the Airbus 300 operates. It had
no choice but to adopt cost cutting measures, such as cutting down services,
number of frequencies of flights, and reduction of the number of flying points
for the A-300 fleet (t.s.n., July 6, 1988, pp. 17-18). As a result, defendant-
appellant had to lay off A-300 pilots, including plaintiff-appellee, which it found
to be in excess of what is reasonably needed.14
All these considered, we find sufficient factual and legal basis to conclude that
petitioner's termination from employment was for an authorized cause, for which he
was given ample notice and opportunity to be heard, by respondent company. No
error nor grave abuse of discretion, therefore, could be attributed to respondent
appellate court.1âwphi1.nêt
ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The decision of the Court of
Appeals in C.A. CV No. 34476 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1
 Rollo, pp. 30-32.
2
 Id. at 65.

3
 Id. at 40.

4
 Id. at 54.

5
 Id. at 32.

6
 Id. at 33.

7
 Art. 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the
time the right of action accrues:

(1) Upon a written contract;

xxx     xxx     xxx

8
 Art. 1146. The following actions must be instituted within four years:

(1) Upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff;

xxx     xxx     xxx

9
 Manuel L. Quezon University Association v. Manuel L. Quezon Educational
Institution Inc., 172 SCRA 597, 604 (1989), citing De Joya v. Lantin, 19
SCRA 893 (1967); Lagman v. City of Manila, 17 SCRA 579 (1966); Pepsi-
Cola Bottling Company of the Philippines v. Guanzon, 172 SCRA 571, 575
(1967); Barcenas v. NLRC, 187 SCRA 498, 503 (1990); Central Negros
Electric Cooperative Inc., v. NLRC, 236 SCRA 108, 114 (1994).

10
 297 SCRA 743 (1998).

11
 Id. at 750-751 (1998).

12
 180 SCRA 353, 363 (1989).

13
 Rollo, pp. 35-36.

14
 Id. at 37.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 157547               February 23, 2011
HEIRS OF EDUARDO SIMON, Petitioners,  xxx
vs.
ELVIN* CHAN AND THE COURT OF APPEALS, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
There is no independent civil action to recover the civil liability arising from the
issuance of an unfunded check prohibited and punished under Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 (BP 22).
Antecedents
On July 11, 1997, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila filed in the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Manila (MeTC) an information charging the late Eduardo Simon
(Simon) with a violation of BP 22, docketed as Criminal Case No. 275381 entitled
People v. Eduardo Simon. The accusatory portion reads:
That sometime in December 1996 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and
issue to Elvin Chan to apply on account or for value Landbank Check No. 0007280
dated December 26, 1996 payable to cash in the amount of ₱336,000.00 said
accused well knowing that at the time of issue she/he/they did not have sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank for payment of such check in full upon its
presentment, which check when presented for payment within ninety (90) days from
the date thereof was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for Account
Closed and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, said accused failed to pay
said Elvin Chan the amount of the check or to make arrangement for full payment of
the same within five (5) banking days after receiving said notice.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 1
More than three years later, or on August 3, 2000, respondent Elvin Chan
commenced in the MeTC in Pasay City a civil action for the collection of the principal
amount of ₱336,000.00, coupled with an application for a writ of preliminary
attachment (docketed as Civil Case No. 915-00).2 He alleged in his complaint the
following:
2. Sometime in December 1996 defendant employing fraud, deceit, and
misrepresentation encashed a check dated December 26, 1996 in the
amount of ₱336,000.00 to the plaintiff assuring the latter that the check is
duly funded and that he had an existing account with the Land Bank of the
Philippines, xerox copy of the said check is hereto attached as Annex "A";
3. However, when said check was presented for payment the same was
dishonored on the ground that the account of the defendant with the Land
Bank of the Philippines has been closed contrary to his representation that he
has an existing account with the said bank and that the said check was duly
funded and will be honored when presented for payment;
4. Demands had been made to the defendant for him to make good the
payment of the value of the check, xerox copy of the letter of demand is
hereto attached as Annex "B", but despite such demand defendant refused
and continues to refuse to comply with plaintiff’s valid demand;
5. Due to the unlawful failure of the defendant to comply with the plaintiff’s
valid demands, plaintiff has been compelled to retain the services of counsel
for which he agreed to pay as reasonable attorney’s fees the amount of
₱50,000.00 plus additional amount of ₱2,000.00 per appearance.
ALLEGATION IN SUPPORT OF PRAYER
FOR PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT
6. The defendant as previously alleged has been guilty of fraud in contracting
the obligation upon which this action is brought and that there is no sufficient
security for the claims sought in this action which fraud consist in the
misrepresentation by the defendant that he has an existing account and
 sufficient funds to cover the check when in fact his account was already
closed at the time he issued a check;
7. That the plaintiff has a sufficient cause of action and this action is one
which falls under Section 1, sub-paragraph (d), Rule 57 of the Revised Rules
of Court of the Philippines and the amount due the plaintiff is as much as the
sum for which the plaintiff seeks the writ of preliminary attachment;
8. That the plaintiff is willing and able to post a bond conditioned upon the
payment of damages should it be finally found out that the plaintiff is not
entitled to the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment.3
On August 9, 2000, the MeTC in Pasay City issued a writ of preliminary attachment,
which was implemented on August 17, 2000 through the sheriff attaching a Nissan
vehicle of Simon.4
On August 17, 2000, Simon filed an urgent motion to dismiss with application to
charge plaintiff’s attachment bond for damages,5 pertinently averring:
xxx
On the ground of litis pendentia, that is, as a consequence of the pendency of
another action between the instant parties for the same cause before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch X (10) entitled "People of the Philippines
vs. Eduardo Simon", docketed thereat as Criminal Case No. 275381-CR, the instant
action is dismissable under Section 1, (e), Rule 16, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
xxx
xxx
While the instant case is civil in nature and character as contradistinguished from the
said Criminal Case No. 915-00 in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch X
(10), the basis of the instant civil action is the herein plaintiff’s criminal complaint
against defendant arising from a charge of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 as a
consequence of the alleged dishonor in plaintiff’s hands upon presentment for
payment with drawee bank a Land Bank Check No. 0007280 dated December 26,
1996 in the amount of ₱336,000- drawn allegedly issued to plaintiff by defendant
who is the accused in said case, a photocopy of the Criminal information filed by the
Assistant City Prosecutor of Manila on June 11, 1997 hereto attached and made
integral part hereof as Annex "1".
It is our understanding of the law and the rules, that, "when a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged
is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party expressly
waives the civil action or reserves his right to institute it separately xxx.
On August 29, 2000, Chan opposed Simon’s urgent motion to dismiss with
application to charge plaintiff’s attachment bond for damages, stating:
1. The sole ground upon which defendant seeks to dismiss plaintiff’s
complaint is the alleged pendency of another action between the same
parties for the same cause, contending among others that the pendency of
Criminal Case No. 275381-CR entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Eduardo
Simon" renders this case dismissable;
2. The defendant further contends that under Section 1, Rule 111 of the
Revised Rules of Court, the filing of the criminal action, the civil action for
recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted
with the criminal action which the plaintiff does not contest; however, it is the
submission of the plaintiff that an implied reservation of the right to file a civil
action has already been made, first, by the fact that the information for
violation of B.P. 22 in Criminal Case No. 2753841 does not at all make any
allegation of damages suffered by the plaintiff nor is there any claim for
recovery of damages; on top of this the plaintiff as private complainant in the
criminal case, during the presentation of the prosecution evidence was not
represented at all by a private prosecutor such that no evidence has been
adduced by the prosecution on the criminal case to prove damages; all of
these we respectfully submit demonstrate an effective implied reservation of
the right of the plaintiff to file a separate civil action for damages;
3. The defendant relies on Section 3 sub-paragraph (a) Rule 111 of the
Revised Rules of Court which mandates that after a criminal action has been
commenced the civil action cannot be instituted until final judgment has been
rendered in the criminal action; however, the defendant overlooks and
conveniently failed to consider that under Section 2, Rule 111 which provides
as follows:
In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct
from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party during the
pendency of criminal case provided the right is reserved as required in the
 preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the
criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
In as much as the case is one that falls under Art. 33 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines as it is based on fraud, this action therefore may be prosecuted
independently of the criminal action;
4. In fact we would even venture to state that even without any reservation at
all of the right to file a separate civil action still the plaintiff is authorized to file
this instant case because the plaintiff seeks to enforce an obligation which
the defendant owes to the plaintiff by virtue of the negotiable instruments law.
The plaintiff in this case sued the defendant to enforce his liability as drawer
in favor of the plaintiff as payee of the check. Assuming the allegation of the
defendant of the alleged circumstances relative to the issuance of the check,
still when he delivered the check payable to bearer to that certain Pedro
Domingo, as it was payable to cash, the same may be negotiated by delivery
by who ever was the bearer of the check and such negotiation was valid and
effective against the drawer;
5. Indeed, assuming as true the allegations of the defendant regarding the
circumstances relative to the issuance of the check it would be entirely
impossible for the plaintiff to have been aware that such check was intended
only for a definite person and was not negotiable considering that the said
check was payable to bearer and was not even crossed;
6. We contend that what cannot be prosecuted separate and apart from the
criminal case without a reservation is a civil action arising from the criminal
offense charged. However, in this instant case since the liability of the
defendant are imposed and the rights of the plaintiff are created by the
negotiable instruments law, even without any reservation at all this instant
action may still be prosecuted;
7. Having this shown, the merits of plaintiff’s complaint the application for
damages against the bond is totally without any legal support and perforce
should be dismissed outright.6
On October 23, 2000, the MeTC in Pasay City granted Simon’s urgent motion to
dismiss with application to charge plaintiff’s attachment bond for
damages,7 dismissing the complaint of Chan because:
xxx
After study of the arguments of the parties, the court resolves to GRANT the Motion
to Dismiss and the application to charge plaintiff’s bond for damages.
For "litis pendentia" to be a ground for the dismissal of an action, the following
requisites must concur: (a) identity of parties or at least such as to represent the
same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the
relief being founded on the same acts; and (c) the identity in the two (2) cases should
be such that the judgment, which may be rendered in one would, regardless of which
party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other. xxx
A close perusal of the herein complaint denominated as "Sum of Money" and the
criminal case for violation of BP Blg. 22 would readily show that the parties are not
only identical but also the cause of action being asserted, which is the recovery of
the value of Landbank Check No. 0007280 in the amount of ₱336,000.00. In both
civil and criminal cases, the rights asserted and relief prayed for, the reliefs being
founded on the same facts, are identical.
Plaintiff’s claim that there is an effective implied waiver of his right to pursue this civil
case owing to the fact that there was no allegation of damages in BP Blg. 22 case
and that there was no private prosecutor during the presentation of prosecution
evidence is unmeritorious. It is basic that when a complaint or criminal Information is
filed, even without any allegation of damages and the intention to prove and claim
them, the offended party has the right to prove and claim for them, unless a waiver or
reservation is made or unless in the meantime, the offended party has instituted a
separate civil action. xxx The over-all import of the said provision conveys that the
waiver which includes indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages
arising under Articles 32, 33, and 34 of the Civil Code must be both clear and
express. And this must be logically so as the primordial objective of the Rule is to
prevent the offended party from recovering damages twice for the same act or
omission of the accused.
Indeed, the evidence discloses that the plaintiff did not waive or made a reservation
as to his right to pursue the civil branch of the criminal case for violation of BP Blg.
22 against the defendant herein. To the considered view of this court, the filing of the
instant complaint for sum of money is indeed legally barred. The right to institute a
separate civil action shall be made before the prosecution starts to present its
evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable
opportunity to make such reservation. xxx
Even assuming the correctness of the plaintiff’s submission that the herein case for
sum of money is one based on fraud and hence falling under Article 33 of the Civil
Code, still prior reservation is required by the Rules, to wit:
"In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action, may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of criminal
case provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil
action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only
a preponderance of evidence."
xxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court resolves to:
1. Dismiss the instant complaint on the ground of "litis pendentia";
2. Dissolve/Lift the Writ of Attachment issued by this court on August 14,
2000;
3. Charge the plaintiff’s bond the amount of ₱336,000.00 in favor of the
defendant for the damages sustained by the latter by virtue of the
implementation of the writ of attachment;
4. Direct the Branch Sheriff of this Court to RESTORE with utmost dispatch to
the defendant’s physical possession the vehicle seized from him on August
16, 2000; and
5. Direct the plaintiff to pay the defendant the sum of ₱5,000.00 by way of
attorney’s fees.
SO ORDERED.
Chan’s motion for reconsideration was denied on December 20, 2000,8 viz:
Considering that the plaintiff’s arguments appear to be a mere repetition of his
previous submissions, and which submissions this court have already passed upon;
and taking into account the inapplicability of the ratio decidendi in the Tactaquin vs.
Palileo case which the plaintiff cited as clearly in that case, the plaintiff therein
expressly made a reservation to file a separate civil action, the Motion for
Reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
On July 31, 2001, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Pasay City upheld the dismissal
of Chan’s complaint, disposing:9
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed decision, the same is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
On September 26, 2001, Chan appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) by petition for
review,10 challenging the propriety of the dismissal of his complaint on the ground of
litis pendentia.
In his comment, 11 Simon countered that Chan was guilty of bad faith and malice in
prosecuting his alleged civil claim twice in a manner that caused him (Simon) utter
embarrassment and emotional sufferings; and that the dismissal of the civil case
because of the valid ground of litis pendentia based on Section 1 (e), Rule 16 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure was warranted.
On June 25, 2002, the CA promulgated its assailed decision,12 overturning the RTC,
viz:
xxx
As a general rule, an offense causes two (2) classes of injuries. The first is the social
injury produced by the criminal act which is sought to be repaired through the
imposition of the corresponding penalty, and the second is the personal injury
caused to the victim of the crime which injury is sought to be compensated through
indemnity which is also civil in nature. Thus, "every person criminally liable for a
felony is also civilly liable."
The offended party may prove the civil liability of an accused arising from the
commission of the offense in the criminal case since the civil action is either deemed
instituted with the criminal action or is separately instituted.
Rule 111, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which became
effective on December 1, 2000, provides that:
(a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability
arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action
unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it
separately or institute the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Rule 111, Section 2 further states:
After the criminal action has been commenced, the separate civil action arising
therefrom cannot be instituted until final judgment has been entered in the criminal
action.
However, with respect to civil actions for recovery of civil liability under Articles 32,
33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code arising from the same act or omission, the rule has
been changed.
In DMPI Employees Credit Association vs. Velez, the Supreme Court pronounced
that only the civil liability arising from the offense charged is deemed instituted with
the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right
to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Speaking through Justice Pardo, the Supreme Court held:
"There is no more need for a reservation of the right to file the independent civil
action under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The
reservation and waiver referred to refers only to the civil action for the recovery of the
civil liability arising from the offense charged. This does not include recovery of civil
liability under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising
from the same act or omission which may be prosecuted separately without a
reservation".
Rule 111, Section 3 reads:
Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed independently. In the cases provided in
Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent
civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of
the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case,
however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or
omission charged in the criminal action.
The changes in the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure pertaining to independent
civil actions which became effective on December 1, 2000 are applicable to this
case.
Procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage. There are no vested rights in the rules of
procedure. xxx
Thus, Civil Case No. CV-94-124, an independent civil action for damages on account
of the fraud committed against respondent Villegas under Article 33 of the Civil
Code, may proceed independently even if there was no reservation as to its filing."
It must be pointed that the abovecited case is similar with the instant suit. The
complaint was also brought on allegation of fraud under Article 33 of the Civil Code
and committed by the respondent in the issuance of the check which later bounced.
It was filed before the trial court, despite the pendency of the criminal case for
violation of BP 22 against the respondent. While it may be true that the changes in
the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure pertaining to independent civil action
became effective on December 1, 2000, the same may be given retroactive
application and may be made to apply to the case at bench, since procedural rules
may be given retroactive application. There are no vested rights in the rules of
procedure.
In view of the ruling on the first assigned error, it is therefore an error to adjudge
damages in favor of the petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated July 13, 2001
rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 108 affirming the
dismissal of the complaint filed by petitioner is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The case is hereby REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
On March 14, 2003, the CA denied Simon’s motion for reconsideration.13
Hence, this appeal, in which the petitioners submit that the CA erroneously premised
its decision on the assessment that the civil case was an independent civil action
under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code; that the CA’s reliance on the
ruling in DMPI Employees Credit Cooperative Inc. v. Velez14 stretched the meaning
and intent of the ruling, and was contrary to Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 111 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure; that this case was a simple collection suit for a sum of
money, precluding the application of Section 3 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure.15
In his comment,16 Chan counters that the petition for review should be denied
because the petitioners used the wrong mode of appeal; that his cause of action,
being based on fraud, was an independent civil action; and that the appearance of a
private prosecutor in the criminal case did not preclude the filing of his separate civil
action.
Issue
The lone issue is whether or not Chan’s civil action to recover the amount of the
unfunded check (Civil Case No. 915-00) was an independent civil action.
Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
A xxx
Applicable Law and Jurisprudence on the
Propriety of filing a separate civil action based on BP 22
The Supreme Court has settled the issue of whether or not a violation of BP 22 can
give rise to civil liability in Banal v. Judge Tadeo, Jr.,17 holding:
xxx
Article 20 of the New Civil Code provides:
Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another,
shall indemnify the latter for the same.
Regardless, therefore, of whether or not a special law so provides, indemnification of
the offended party may be had on account of the damage, loss or injury directly
suffered as a consequence of the wrongful act of another. The indemnity which a
person is sentenced to pay forms an integral part of the penalty imposed by law for
the commission of a crime (Quemel v. Court of Appeals, 22 SCRA 44, citing Bagtas
v. Director of Prisons, 84 Phil 692). Every crime gives rise to a penal or criminal
action for the punishment of the guilty party, and also to civil action for the restitution
of the thing, repair of the damage, and indemnification for the losses (United States
v. Bernardo, 19 Phil 265).
xxx
Civil liability to the offended party cannot thus be denied. The payee of the check is
entitled to receive the payment of money for which the worthless check was issued.
Having been caused the damage, she is entitled to recompense.
Surely, it could not have been the intendment of the framers of Batas Pambansa Blg.
22 to leave the offended private party defrauded and empty-handed by excluding the
civil liability of the offender, giving her only the remedy, which in many cases results
in a Pyrrhic victory, of having to file a separate civil suit. To do so may leave the
offended party unable to recover even the face value of the check due her, thereby
unjustly enriching the errant drawer at the expense of the payee. The protection
which the law seeks to provide would, therefore, be brought to naught.
However, there is no independent civil action to recover the value of a bouncing
check issued in contravention of BP 22. This is clear from Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court, effective December 1, 2000, which relevantly provides:
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. - (a) When a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense
charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party
waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil
action prior to the criminal action.
The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made
before the prosecution starts presenting its evidence and under circumstances
affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.
When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of
moral, nominal, temperate, or exemplary damages without specifying the amount
thereof in the complaint or information, the filing fees therefor shall constitute a first
lien on the judgment awarding such damages.
Where the amount of damages, other than actual, is specified in the complaint or
information, the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon
the filing thereof in court.
Except as otherwise provided in these Rules, no filing fees shall be required for
actual damages.
No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in
the criminal case, but any cause of action which could have been the subject thereof
may be litigated in a separate civil action. (1a)
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to
include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action
separately shall be allowed.18
Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall
pay in full the filing fees based on the amount of the check involved, which shall be
considered as the actual damages claimed. Where the complaint or information also
seeks to recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the
offended party shall pay the filing fees based on the amounts alleged therein. If the
amounts are not so alleged but any of these damages are subsequently awarded by
the court, the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall constitute a first lien on
the judgment.
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet
commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the
court trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall
proceed in accordance with section 2 of the Rule governing consolidation of the civil
and criminal actions.
Section 3. When civil action may proceed independently. – In the cases provided in
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil
action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the
criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case,
however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or
omission charged in the criminal action.
The aforequoted provisions of the Rules of Court, even if not yet in effect when Chan
commenced Civil Case No. 915-00 on August 3, 2000, are nonetheless applicable. It
is axiomatic that the retroactive application of procedural laws does not violate any
right of a person who may feel adversely affected, nor is it constitutionally
objectionable. The reason is simply that, as a general rule, no vested right may
attach to, or arise from, procedural laws.19 Any new rules may validly be made to
apply to cases pending at the time of their promulgation, considering that no party to
an action has a vested right in the rules of procedure,20 except that in criminal cases,
the changes do not retroactively apply if they permit or require a lesser quantum of
evidence to convict than what is required at the time of the commission of the
offenses, because such retroactivity would be unconstitutional for being ex post
factounder the Constitution.21
Moreover, the application of the rule would not be precluded by the violation of any
assumed vested right, because the new rule was adopted from Supreme Court
Circular 57-97 that took effect on November 1, 1997.
Supreme Court Circular 57-97 states:
Any provision of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the following
rules and guidelines shall henceforth be observed in the filing and prosecution of all
criminal cases under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 which penalizes the making or
drawing and issuance of a check without funds or credit:
1. The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be
deemed to necessarily include the corresponding civil action, and no
reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed or
recognized.22
2. Upon the filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended
party shall pay in full the filing fees based upon the amount of the check
involved which shall be considered as the actual damages claimed, in
accordance with the schedule of fees in Section 7 (a) and Section 8 (a), Rule
141 of the Rules of Court as last amended by Administrative Circular No. 11-
94 effective August 1, 1994. Where the offended party further seeks to
enforce against the accused civil liability by way of liquidated, moral, nominal,
temperate or exemplary damages, he shall pay the corresponding filing fees
therefor based on the amounts thereof as alleged either in the complaint or
information. If not so alleged but any of these damages are subsequently
awarded by the court, the amount of such fees shall constitute a first lien on
the judgment.
 3. Where the civil action has heretofore been filed separately and trial thereof
has not yet commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal action upon
application with the court trying the latter case. If the application is granted,
the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with the pertinent
procedure outlined in Section 2 (a) of Rule 111 governing the proceedings in
the actions as thus consolidated.
4. This Circular shall be published in two (2) newspapers of general
circulation and shall take effect on November 1, 1997.
The reasons for issuing Circular 57-97 were amply explained in Hyatt Industrial
Manufacturing Corporation v. Asia Dynamic Electrix Corporation,23 thus:
xxx
We agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that upon filing of the criminal cases
for violation of B.P. 22, the civil action for the recovery of the amount of the checks
was also impliedly instituted under Section 1(b) of Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on
Criminal Procedure. Under the present revised Rules, the criminal action for violation
of B.P. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. The reservation
to file a separate civil action is no longer needed. The Rules provide:
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. —
(a) x x x
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be
deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such
civil action separately shall be allowed.
Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall
pay in full the filing fees based on the amount of the check involved, which shall be
considered as the actual damages claimed. Where the complaint or information also
seeks to recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the
offended party shall pay additional filing fees based on the amounts alleged therein.
If the amounts are not so alleged but any of these damages are subsequently
awarded by the court, the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall constitute a
first lien on the judgment.
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet
commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the
court trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall
proceed in accordance with section 2 of this Rule governing consolidation of the civil
and criminal actions.1avvphi1
The foregoing rule was adopted from Circular No. 57-97 of this Court. It specifically
states that the criminal action for violation of B.P. 22 shall be deemed to include the
corresponding civil action. It also requires the complainant to pay in full the filing fees
based on the amount of the check involved. Generally, no filing fees are required for
criminal cases, but because of the inclusion of the civil action in complaints for
violation of B.P. 22, the Rules require the payment of docket fees upon the filing of
the complaint. This rule was enacted to help declog court dockets which are filled
with B.P. 22 cases as creditors actually use the courts as collectors. Because
ordinarily no filing fee is charged in criminal cases for actual damages, the payee
uses the intimidating effect of a criminal charge to collect his credit gratis and
sometimes, upon being paid, the trial court is not even informed thereof. The
inclusion of the civil action in the criminal case is expected to significantly lower the
number of cases filed before the courts for collection based on dishonored checks. It
is also expected to expedite the disposition of these cases. Instead of instituting two
separate cases, one for criminal and another for civil, only a single suit shall be filed
and tried. It should be stressed that the policy laid down by the Rules is to
discourage the separate filing of the civil action. The Rules even prohibit the
reservation of a separate civil action, which means that one can no longer file a
separate civil case after the criminal complaint is filed in court. The only instance
when separate proceedings are allowed is when the civil action is filed ahead of the
criminal case. Even then, the Rules encourage the consolidation of the civil and
criminal cases. We have previously observed that a separate civil action for the
purpose of recovering the amount of the dishonored checks would only prove to be
costly, burdensome and time-consuming for both parties and would further delay the
final disposition of the case. This multiplicity of suits must be avoided. Where
petitioners’ rights may be fully adjudicated in the proceedings before the trial court,
resort to a separate action to recover civil liability is clearly unwarranted. In view of
this special rule governing actions for violation of B.P. 22, Article 31 of the Civil Code
cited by the trial court will not apply to the case at bar.24
The CA’s reliance on DMPI Employees Credit Association v. Velez25 to give due
course to the civil action of Chan independently and separately of Criminal Case No.
275381 was unwarranted. DMPI Employees, which involved a prosecution for estafa,
is not on all fours with this case, which is a prosecution for a violation of BP 22.
Although the Court has ruled that the issuance of a bouncing check may result in two
separate and distinct crimes of estafa and violation of BP 22,26 the procedures for the
recovery of the civil liabilities arising from these two distinct crimes are different and
non-interchangeable. In prosecutions of estafa, the offended party may opt to
reserve his right to file a separate civil action, or may institute an independent action
based on fraud pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code,27 as DMPI Employees has
allowed. In prosecutions of violations of BP 22, however, the Court has adopted a
policy to prohibit the reservation or institution of a separate civil action to claim the
civil liability arising from the issuance of the bouncing check upon the reasons
delineated in Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing Corporation, supra.
To repeat, Chan’s separate civil action to recover the amount of the check involved
in the prosecution for the violation of BP 22 could not be independently maintained
under both Supreme Court Circular 57-97 and the aforequoted provisions of Rule
111 of the Rules of Court, notwithstanding the allegations of fraud and deceit.
B
Aptness of the dismissal of the civil action
on the ground of litis pendentia
indicating that the rights asserted and the reliefs prayed for, as well as the facts upon
which the reliefs sought were founded, were identical in all respects. And, thirdly, any
judgment rendered in one case would necessarily bar the other by res judicata;
otherwise, Chan would be recovering twice upon the same claim.
It is clear, therefore, that the MeTC in Pasay City properly dismissed Civil Case No.
915-00 on the ground of litis pendentia through its decision dated October 23, 2000;
and that the RTC in Pasay City did not err in affirming the MeTC.
Wherefore, we grant the petition for review on certiorari, and, accordingly, we
reverse and set aside the decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals on June 25,
2002. We reinstate the decision rendered on October 23, 2000 by the Metropolitan
Trial Court, Branch 45, in Pasay City.
Costs of suit to be paid by the respondent.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

Did the pendency of the civil action in the MeTC in Manila (as the civil aspect in WE CONCUR:
Criminal Case No. 275381) bar the filing of Civil Case No. 915-00 in the MeTC in
Pasay City on the ground of litis pendentia? ARTURO D. BRION**
Associate Justice
For litis pendentia to be successfully invoked as a bar to an action, the concurrence Acting Chairperson
of the following requisites is necessary, namely: (a) there must be identity of parties
or at least such as represent the same interest in both actions; (b) there must be ROBERTO A. ABAD*** MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the Associate Justice Associate Justice
same facts; and, (c) the identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment
that may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful, amount
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
to res judicata in respect of the other. Absent the first two requisites, the possibility of Associate Justice
the existence of the third becomes nil.28
ATTESTATION
A perusal of Civil Case No. 01-0033 and Criminal Case No. 275381 ineluctably
shows that all the elements of litis pendentia are attendant. First of all, the parties in
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
the civil action involved in Criminal Case No. 275381 and in Civil Case No. 915-00,
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
that is, Chan and Simon, are the same. Secondly, the information in Criminal Case
No. 275381 and the complaint in Civil Case No. 915-00 both alleged that Simon had
issued Landbank Check No. 0007280 worth ₱336,000.00 payable to "cash," thereby
 10
ARTURO D. BRION  Id., pp. 80-88.
Associate Justice
11
Acting Chairperson  Id., pp. 89-97.

12
 Id., pp. 23-27; penned by Associate Justice Perlita J. Tria Tirona (retired), and concurred in
CERTIFICATION by Associate Justice Rodrigo V. Cosico (retired) and Associate Justice Mario L. Guariña.

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division 13
 Id., pp. 29-30.
Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the 14
 G.R. No. 129282, November 29, 2001, 371 SCRA 72.
opinion of the Court’s Division.
15
 See note 19, p.16.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice 16
 Rollo, pp. 105-109.

17
 G.R. No. L-78911, December 11, 1987, 156 SCRA 325.
Footnotes 18
 Bold emphasis supplied.
* Misspelled as Elven in the caption of the petition and in the rollo. 19
 Cheng v.Sy, G.R. No. 174238, July 7, 2009, 592 SCRA 155, 164-165.
** Acting Chairperson in lieu of Justice Conchita Carpio Morales who is on leave per Special 20
Order No. 925 dated January 24, 2011.  Aldeguer v. Hoskyn, 2 Phil. 502; Ayala de Roxas v. Case, 8 Phil. 197.

21
*** Additional member per Special Order No. 926 dated January 24, 2011.  Sec. 22, Art. III, 1987 Constitution; Cooley’s Principle of Constitutional Law, p. 313.

22
1
 Rollo, p. 31.  Bold emphasis supplied.

23
2
 Id., pp. 35-37.  G.R. No. 163597, July 29, 2005, 465 SCRA 454, 459-461.

24
3
 Id., pp. 35-36.  Bold emphasis supplied.

25
4
 Id., p. 24.  Supra, note 14.

26
5
 Id., pp. 38-46.  E.g., Rodriguez v. Ponferrada, G.R. Nos.155531-34, July 29, 2005, 465 SCRA 338, 343.

27
6
 Id., pp. 47-49.  Article 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil action for damages,
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party.
7
Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only
 Id., pp. 50-54. a preponderance of evidence.
8
 Id., p. 56. 28
 Taningco v. Taningco, G.R. No. 153481, August 10, 2007, 529 SCRA 735.
9
 Id., pp. 76-79.